The Mongol invasions of Japan are often reduced
to stories of great typhoons breaking the Mongol fleet, of honourable samurai searching for
duels or less honourable samurai sneaking around the island of Tsushima. But what tends
to receive less attention in portrayals are the preparations and strategy employed
by the Japanese government of the time, the Kamakura Bakufu. In this part of our series
on how to defend against the Mongols, we look at the top-level preparations of the shogunate
to prepare their islands and maximize their strengths against the navies of Khubilai Khan.
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description and pinned comment. Thank you! The Kamakura Bakufu had been preparing for a
Mongol attack for several years before the first invasion in 1274. Diplomatic contacts between the
Mongols and Japan had begun in 1266, and repeated envoys followed over the next few years. The rude,
silent treatment of Mongol envoys would have been an offensive maneuver regardless of the Mongols’
rather infamous opinion on the matter, and the potential consequence could not have been lost on
the part of the Japanese. Mongol emperor Khubilai Khan’s letters demanding Japanese cooperation
and submission became increasingly harsh, which, coupled with contacts with Southern China’s
Song Dynasty, meant the Japanese must have been quite aware of the risk they faced on such
a course of action. But being an island nation, Japan must have felt reasonably secure at first.
This began to change in 1268. That year, a new, more energetic and confrontational man became
the shikken, the de facto ruler of Japan and regent for the shogun, and in turn, regent for the
emperor. This was the 18-year-old Hojo Tokimune, the man who steered Japan through both Mongol
invasions. Never one to back down from a fight, Hojo Tokimune anticipated early on the
potential threat Japan faced, and, soon after his appointment, began to send additional
soldiers to patrol and prepare defences on Kyushu, one of Japan’s southern islands close to Korea.
Not only its proximity to Korea, but its wide, accessible and protected beaches and bays made
it an ideal landing site. The likeliest of these was Hakata Bay, the most direct harbour for ships
approaching from Korea. Thus the Kamakura Bakufu centered defence preparations here, with
scouts and patrols keeping watch over it and garrisons steadily being placed in proximity.
The Hojo clan was right to expect an invasion via Korea. In 1268, the same year of Hojo Tokimune’s
ascension, Khubilai Khan ordered the Koreans to begin the construction of a new fleet of
1,000 ships. Though the Southern Song Dynasty remained the primary target, the construction
of the fleet in such proximity to Japan could not be kept hidden. Indeed, when a large revolt
broke out in Korea the next year, which briefly deposed the Korean King Wonjong, some Koreans made
their way to Japan. They brought news with them of the revolt, and requested Japanese assistance
against the Mongols. None was forthcoming, and the Mongols crushed the revolt by 1271,
reinstalling Wonjong and strengthening their hold over the peninsula. A Mongol army was
now stationed in Korea to further secure it. But the words of the Koreans confirmed the
suspicions of Hojo Tokimune. They must have brought with them words of the fleet construction
and rumours of an attack on Japan. As Khubilai Khan’s envoys continued to come to Kamakura, there
could have been little doubt of the threat now on the horizon. Hojo Tokimune’s government had
to put Japan on a war footing. Yet the curious nature of Japan’s government at the time had to
be navigated. While Japan was nominally ruled by the Emperor, the Emperor was a powerless
figure, reduced to figurehead by the Shoguns of the Minamoto clan in the late twelfth century.
But at the very start of the thirteenth century, the death of the shogun left only young boys
as heirs, prompting the creation of a regent position, the shikken, from the Hojo clan, who
did not give this position up. Thus the de facto ruler of Japan in the 1200s was the regent of the
regent for the emperor. This caused some legal troubles for the Bakufu, that is the shogunate,
as it could only raise troops who were gokenin, landholders who were vassals of the shogun.
In the lead-up to the first Mongol invasion, Hojo Tokimune legally could not raise any
great army from across Japan. By sending troops from Kamakura, who he had direct access
to, Tokimune could only hope that other lords may follow his example, but he could not enforce it.
Another issue plagued Kamakura’s troops. Many of the gokenin, reliant on their landholding
for income, had, in the decades since the establishment of the Bakufu, parcelled out their
lands in each generation. By the eve of the Mongol invasion, many of these lands had diminished so
much that for gokenin in Kyushu like Takezaki Suenaga, they were only able to raise 5 troops to
accompany them; average for the gokenin of Kyushu, but more than what the common gokenin
of Honshu, Japan’s largest island, could muster. Many of the gokenin struggled to
handle the costs of outfitting themselves and their mounts in the necessary arms and armour, let
alone their retainers and still yet cover the cost of travelling to Kyushu. To remedy this, in the
years leading up to the first Mongol invasion, the Kamakura Bakufu passed laws forbidding
the transfer or sale of gokenin lands to non-relatives; land already sold had to be
returned for the original price, and in 1271 this was changed so that these lands had to be returned
for free. By doing so, Hojo Tokimune hoped to improve the ability of the gokenin to meet the
costs of the upcoming confrontation. At the same time, he consolidated positions of power around
himself and his family, an effort to centralize command in the face of the many powerful lords
across Japan whose egos could impede his strategy. In late 1274, the fleet of Khubilai Khan’s
newly established Yuan Dynasty set out from Korea to Japan. The islands of Tsushima and
Iki were swiftly overrun within a few days. While the islanders put up a spirited defence,
they were simply too few to delay the advance. A few refugees from the islands brought word to
Honshu and the Bakufu. Hojo Tokimune was ready; upon learning of the Yuan’s approach, he
is recorded stating, “Finally! This is the most momentous event of my life!” When a
priest asked how he planned to respond, Tokimune shrieked, “Katsu!” - victory.
Tokimune’s preparations had been underway for years. Most of the defending troops along
Hakata Bay were local gokenin raised in Kyushu, but additional troops from Honshu were sent in the
final months before the attack. He had prepared well, and the Mongols landed precisely where he
had anticipated. When the boots of Yuan troops disembarked on the soft sands of Hakata Bay on
November 19th, 1274, the shogunate’s warriors were there to meet them. As the Yuan ships had neared
the bay, word was sent to rally the garrisons, and even as the first clashes began, more gokenin
and their retainers were rushing from across Kyushu to join them. The fighting that ensued was
fierce. The Yuan had brought the larger force, many of its men of greater experience than that
of the Japanese. Over the course of the day, the Yuan troops broke through several sections
of the Japanese line and burned down neighbouring towns. Still, the level of Japanese resistance
and preparedness was greater than the Yuan had anticipated. The archery of the samurai was
better than expected, as they picked off one of the top Yuan commanders and stole his horse.
The Yuan realized this expected “puny island” was putting up greater defence than they had
come prepared for, and that their overconfident force was not large enough to fight their way
through the defenders of Kyushu or possibly occupy all of Japan. A withdrawal was undertaken
in good order: eyewitness accounts like that of the gokenin Takezaki Suenaga indicate a carefully
managed withdrawal on the part of the Yuan forces, returning to their ships and sailing back
to Korea. While rough weather made the return journey more difficult, stories of great
typhoons sinking the first Yuan fleet are later exaggerations not present in contemporary sources.
For Hojo Tokimune, the divine support had not been in the form of waves but through ensuring of
the Japanese victory with their own means. But Hojo Tokimune was under no impression
that he had broken Mongol power in any way, and knew another attack was forthcoming. Khubilai
Khan would want revenge as certainly as the sun would rise again over Japan— especially
once the envoys Khubilai sent in 1275 were executed by the Japanese. Hojo Tokimune did
not sit on his laurels but immediately began to prepare for the next invasion. He had
seen what had worked well and importantly, he also understood where his preparations
had not been enough— and with the next assault likely to be much greater, he needed to
double his efforts if he wished to withstand it. To do this required more samurai to be in Kyushu,
and this required greater control over samurai regardless of whether they were gokenin or not. To
aid in this Tokimune replaced many of the shugo, military governors of Japan’s provinces, with
Hojo clan loyalists and family members to carry out his orders. In an expansion of his
powers, both gokenin and non-gokenin troops, troops not normally under his jurisdiction,
could now be levied for Japan’s defence. The power of the shugo was also increased locally
in order to facilitate this, for many of the warriors now being called up for duty may
have chafed at falling under Bakufu control. Traditionally, the Bakufu and Japanese governments
had rewarded samurai for their valour in combat against the enemy, with riches and lands taken
from defeated factions. In a war in Japan, there were many lands to redistribute; but no such
riches could be gained from a foreign foe who left little behind. Many of the gokenin had not only
put their livelihoods and lives at stake to travel across Japan to Kyushu; many would do so again
travelling to Kamakura city for their reward. The rambunctious Takezaki Suenaga, for instance,
sold his horse and saddle to pay for his journey to Kamakura from Kyushu. Though he succeeded in
getting rewarded, the Bakufu was reluctant to pay the expense for rewarding all these samurai,
did not wish them to leave their posts in Kyushu, and did not want them to beggar themselves, and
sell all their horses and equipment before the Mongols returned. The Bakufu thus forbade samurai
to leave Kyushu, citing military necessity. Of the estimated 6,000 Japanese who fought in the
first invasion, only 120 received rewards, mostly those of the higher class. While
useful at the moment, in decades to come, this had severe consequences for the Bakufu, as
many samurai found themselves impoverished by paying all of their own expenses for the campaign.
Tokimune prepared in other ways; further divine help was sought, as shrines and temples across
the islands were ordered to pray for Japan’s victory. To better defend Hakata Bay and prevent
the breakouts of the first invasion, the order was given to expand the sea wall. It appears
a minimal set of fortifications had existed at certain points around Hakata Bay, remnants
from fears of Chinese invasions in centuries past. Now they would be expanded well beyond
any previous system. Built 50 metres inland, 20 kilometres east and west of Hakata Bay, an
approximately 3 metre high to 3.5 metre wide wall was quickly raised. It was a simple but effective
concept; a defensive structure for the Japanese to hide behind and fight from, which would obstruct
any movements of landing parties which may seek to flank the defenders of Hakata Bay. Landing
assaults by sea were hard in the best of times, and this would not be the best of times.
For the wall’s construction, whoever’s land had the wall pass through it, was responsible
for the cost and construction of that section. While it was another cost-saving measure for the
Bakufu, it angered many and hampered construction; it was supposed to be complete before the end of
1276, but construction continued through 1277. At the end of 1275, Hojo Tokimune and his advisers
even discussed taking the fight to the enemy and launching some sort of invasion of Korea. While
it never materialized, orders were made to prepare some ships and gokenin. Undertaking such a task,
though was eventually recognized to be beyond their abilities while at the same time planning
the defence of Kyushu; even though already the Bakufu was dealing with reports of conflict
between officials and gokenin with the increasing demands being levied on them, all the while
forbidding samurai to leave Kyushu. The ships and men raised for the scrapped invasion of Korea
were instead sent to defenders at Hakata Bay. When the larger Yuan fleets of the
second invasion set out in summer 1281, Hojo Tokimune’s preparations showed their
success. He benefited from struggles on the part of the Yuan, with one of their fleets delayed
in its launch. The sea-wall worked exceptionally: instead of landing and beginning their assault,
the Yuan fleet skirmished along the shore, trying to seek some unguarded section. With the
Yuan staying offshore, the Japanese took their own ships to bring the fight to them. In the night,
the samurai rowed up beside the Yuan warships, scaling them and battling on the decks. A
few islands off Kyushu’s coast were taken, but by the time a storm surge at the end of August
1281 scattered the Yuan ships, their will to fight had been sapped and had been unable to force
their landing. Thus, Tokimune’s ploy worked well. Even after this victory, Tokimune did not let
his guard down. A furious Khubilai continued to send envoys with demands for submission, and made
plans for a third invasion. Tokimune continued to maintain garrisons and patrols on Kyushu, with the
gokenin who lived there forbidden from leaving the island without permission of the Bakufu. Kyushu
island itself came under greater control of the Hojo clan, with more Hojo shugo appointed there to
keep a close eye on this strategically vital area. The sea wall continued to be maintained, stores
of weapons and other war materials were gathered, and any official or landowner who complained
was swiftly replaced by someone more pliable. Another plan for a Japanese invasion of Korea was
even discussed, though once more went nowhere as the threat of a third Yuan attack remained too
high. This third invasion never materialized, and Mongol interest in a third attack
quickly dissipated with the death of Khubilai Khan in 1294. But Hojo Tokimune
never knew that relief; he died in 1284, only 32 years old. He was succeeded by his
young son. With the boy too young to rule, power fell into the hands of another
regent. Thus from 1285 until 1293, Japan was ruled by the regent of the regent
acting for the shogun acting for the emperor, who was in turn sidelined in his own court
even more by his father, the previous emperor, who had retired yet still ran things there!
Without Tokimune’s presence, the careful system he had balanced began to fall apart, as rival
lords began conspiring against each other for power in the vacuum. Thousands of gokenin who had
impoverished themselves to fight for the Bakufu never received rewards, for even after the second
invasion, these had mostly been given to important Bakufu and Hojo clan supporters and allies.
In this way, the Bakufu inadvertently created a class of very dissatisfied and very well-armed
men. While the threat of a third potential Mongol invasion kept everyone playing nice for a
few years, by the 1330s, the once mighty Kamakura Bakufu had collapsed into civil war.
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