(plane whooshing) - Two aircraft, two sets of crews and passengers who are all traveling
somewhere for a purpose. Maybe they have
plans to visit relatives or going on a work trip or maybe this is just
a regular day on the job. No matter what the circumstances are, these passengers and crew will all be soon forced
to share something truly terrible. Stay tuned. The 1st of February 1991 was a nice, crisp day in California, United States. The visibility was good with
only some few high clouds and the air traffic coming into Los Angeles International
Airport was flowing smoothly. As the afternoon went
on, the air traffic controllers in the tower went about their
duties like on any other day and nothing seemed out of the ordinary. Los Angeles Airport
or LAX, as I will refer to it here, was already, back then,
a sprawling huge airport with four active runways. Now, at LAX, the controllers
operated a bit differently than in other US airports, in that all of its runways
could be used simultaneously for both takeoff and landing whilst the other airports
normally assigned some runways for takeoff and others
exclusively for landings. The fact that LAX didn't do that
meant that the workload in the tower could
at times be quite high, but this afternoon
it was relatively calm with only a quite moderate flow. On that same day,
a Fairchild Metroliner from SkyWest Airlines was scheduled to operate several
short flights within California. Eventually, there was a crew change at Inyokern Airport where
the two new pilots took over the aircraft and then initially
flew it over to Los Angeles. They then continued operating
to Fresno and then back to Los Angeles again
where they, around 1730 local time, were finally getting ready
for a flight over to Palmdale. This Metroliner had seats
for up to 19 passengers and since it was operating under FAA Part 23 commuter regulations, it was allowed to operate
with only two pilots and no cabin crew,
so on this leg, over to Palmdale, there were 10 passengers
and two pilots on board and they were using
call sign SkyWest 5569. The Metroliner was
a great little aircraft, powered by two turboprop engines
on a low-mounted wing. And even though it had
a pretty tall landing gear, the whole aircraft
was still pretty low, especially compared to a Boeing 737. And that will become
important later on in this story. The other thing that
is worth mentioning here was its external lighting. It consisted of a standard green and red navigation light on each wing, together with white
flashing strobe lights on the wings and tail,
a white nav light, also on the tail and
a red anti-collision light mounted on the top of the tail fin. This anti-collision light
had a brightness of 100 candles or 1257 lumen which
was about four times weaker than the current standard
was back in 1991 but since this aircraft
had been certified back in the early 1970s,
it was still approved. Another peculiarity with this
anti-collision light was that it was partly
obscured by the rudder cap, meaning that it was hard to see at angles of around 5.4 degrees
above and behind it. Now on top of all of those
lights that I just mentioned, there were also
forward-facing landing lights, taxi lights as well as a couple of ice-detecting lights
that was illuminating the wings. All of this aircraft lighting, basically had two primary purposes. The first was just like
headlights on a car to illuminate where the aircraft was going when it was taxiing,
landing and taking off. And the other,
more important purpose, was to make sure that the aircraft was visible to other aircraft
as well as to air traffic control. But this was primarily something that was thought of as being important when the aircraft was airborne. On the ground, only certain
parts of this lighting like the taxi light, nav lights and anti-collision light
was normally used in order to not
blind other traffic around. Whilst the SkyWest pilots
were working on helping their passengers to board,
another aircraft, a Boeing 737-300 from US Air, was already airborne and inbound towards Los Angeles. It had started the day
in Syracuse and was heading to its final destination in San Francisco with intermediate stops in Washington DC, Columbus, Ohio and Los Angeles. There had been a scheduled crew change in Washington, where the
current pilots had taken over. And since the captain had
flown the first leg to Columbus, the first officer was now
pilot flying on flight 1493 and they had 83 passengers on board. The day had been running
really smoothly so far and the two pilots were in
a great mood as they continued their roughly four hours
and 40 minutes flight at a cruise altitude of 35,000 feet. The captain was 48 years old
and was very experienced, with a total time of 16,300 hours of which 4,300 had been
flown on the Boeing 737. He had upgraded to the
captain position about six years before this flight and was
very comfortable in his role. The first officer was 32 years old and had just over
4,300 hours of total time, 982 of which had been flown on the 737. He had previously been flying on Learjet before getting hired by US Air
just over two years prior. The pilots were joined
by four cabin crew members and one of them had,
during the boarding, stopped at the overwing exit and asked a passenger that
she saw was very, very young whether he would be able to fulfill the duties of an abled-bodied person in case of an evacuation. Now, an able-bodied person is someone who will be able to assist the cabin crew with things
like opening emergency exits, potentially helping other passengers, in case it would
be needed in an emergency. And only people who are able to do so can be seated
next to emergency exits. In this case, the passenger responded that he was 17 years old and thought that he would be able to do it. Now when she heard this, the cabin crew agreed
but still decided to brief him and the other passengers about how to operate the emergency exit, something that wasn't
standard actually back then. Keep that in mind. Now most of you
are probably quite familiar with the Boeing 737 already. But for those of you who aren't, the 737-300 is a twin engine jet aircraft with a passenger capacity,
in the case of US Air, of 128. From a technical standpoint,
this was a very modern aircraft at the time and this particular
individual was six years old with largely original
interior panels and furnishings. There were no technical
defects recorded on it but one thing that's
worth pointing out here is that in 1985, new rules concerning the fire retardant properties of furnishings in aircraft
had been implemented. These new rules required
that the materials used in new aircraft had
to be very flame-retardant but this aircraft was manufactured just before these rules
came into place. Now it did have a partial
refurbishing in 1989 but most of the overhead bins
and the interior walls were still made
from the original materials. Another technical aspect of the 737 is where it's storing
its flight crew oxygen cylinder. In case of a rapid
depressurization at high altitude, the passengers will be fed oxygen from masks which drops
down from the overhead bins. I'm sure you've seen that. These masks are connected
to oxygen generators who, through the combination of chemicals, will produce oxygen
for around 13 minutes or so. This is generally well enough
to allow the pilots to perform an emergency
descent down to 10,000 feet where the air is then
fully breathable again. But the pilots does not get their oxygen from an oxygen generator. Instead their masks are
fed from an oxygen cylinder which is located under
the cockpit just forward of the front cargo hold. And this oxygen cylinder will
soon play an important part. Anyway, around time 17:40, the crew of US Air Flight 1493 received their first descent
clearance down towards LAX and the area controller told
them that they were cleared for the CIVET TWO
arrival and descent profile. The captain read this back
and the first officer initiated the descent whilst also verifying that this was the arrival route that they had already
briefed and prepared for. The sun had just set beneath
the ocean in the west and it must have been a beautiful sight as the pilots were now descending into the darkness below them. The aircraft was cleared
to descend in steps down towards Los Angeles
and they were also told that they could expect
Runway 24 Right or Left for landing but that they would be advised later on, which one of those runways
it would actually be. The pilots continued
following normal procedures, including advising the cabin crew when they were about
15 minutes away from the airport. And that prompted the cabin
crew to secure the cabin. Everything was working
just like clockwork. At time 17:57:28, the LAX
Terminal Radar Approach Controller, TRACON, instructed Flight 1493 to intercept the localizer
for Runway 24 Right and then continue their
descent down to 10,000 feet. About one and a half minutes later, the same controller
then also asked the pilots if they had the airport in sight. Both pilots started peering
out through the cockpit windows into the now dark evening
and could just about make out the lights of the airport in the distance as they were about
25 miles away at this point. The captain answered, "Affirm,"
which prompted the controller to then clear them for a
visual approach for Runway 24 Left and he also told them to descend to cross an RNAV point called DENAY at a minimum of 8,000 feet. When he heard this,
the first officer disconnected the autopilot and then
started visually transitioning over towards the centerline
for Runway 24 Left. The captain read back the clearance but since they had
been following the ILS localizer for Runway 24 Right up to this point, the first officer asked him to please confirm that
the clearance actually was for Runway 24 Left and not Right, which the captain then also did. The controller confirmed
that they had heard right the first time and
the weather was absolutely great, so I'm sure that the first officer was really enjoying
some hand-flying here. I often disconnect a bit
further out myself when the conditions are right to actually feel and
enjoy the aircraft a bit. It's part of what
makes this job so fun. Now the two runways ahead of them were at the same distance. So even though there was
no instrument landing system active for Runway 24 Left,
the first officer could still use the glide slope indicator for the other runway as
a way to help maneuver vertically. This had all of the hallmarks of a great approach but
what the pilots didn't know was that ahead of them, several now very
unfortunate circumstances were starting to align with each other and I'll tell you all
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Now back to the video. At the same time as the
USA Air Boeing 737 was lining up on a long final, Sky West Flight 5569
had received their departure clearance and started up their engines. As they started taxiing out towards their departure runway, 24 Left, the first officer completed
the safety briefing with the passengers since there
was no cabin crew on board. The aircraft proceeded
from terminal six, via the North Route to Gate 32 and then towards the
holding point for Runway 24L. But because the Metroliner
was a relatively small aircraft, they wouldn't need to taxi
all the way down to the end of the runway for departure. Instead, they were planning
to use what's known as an intersection takeoff position, further up on the runway. We pilots often do
this to minimize taxi time and it's perfectly safe to do so as long as the performance has been calculated with that in mind. Now at this point, we also
have to start talking a bit about the air traffic controllers who were working this night and the way that they
were dealing with the traffic. LAX had, like I mentioned
before, four runways and they were divided into
two sets of parallel runway pairs. Runway 24 Right and Left made up the northern pair and Runway
25 Right and Left, the southern. In between the runway pairs, the main terminal
buildings were situated and just to the east of them,
the air traffic control tower. Inside the tower, there were six controllers working this afternoon: four fully-qualified controllers, one developmental controller, handling one of the ground frequencies and one area supervisor. Now when several air traffic
controllers work together, they have to do so using
some kind of organized system. And the way things were done back then and mostly even today, is by the use of something
known as flight progress strips. These strips are filled up with information about a particular flight
and is then passed from one controller to the next when they hand over
the aircraft between them. That way, the controller
in charge of the aircraft knows that he or she have
the responsibility for it, what clearance it has already received and, approximately, in what sequence that aircraft is in
relation to other traffic. Normally, those strips would then follow the same sequence
as the handovers do, so from the clearance delivery to ground and then
onto the tower controller who would be handling the takeoff. But at LAX, they had decided
to change this slightly so that the strips would go from the clearance delivery controller directly to the tower controller in order to reduce some workload
for the ground controllers. This meant that an aircraft
could, at any time during taxi, get directly into contact with the tower and request, for example,
an intersection takeoff. Now, this was very convenient for the crew of the aircraft,
but it put a lot more workload on the tower controllers who now had to, on top of separating landing
and departing traffic, also sometimes look up
and try to localize traffic on the airport in order
to answer their requests. The work of the controllers
were done mostly visually. But they were also supposed to have some electronic
aids at their disposal. One of those systems was called the Airport Surface
Detection System, or ASDE, and was essentially
a surface radar built to detect principal
features of the airport, including aircraft and vehicles and then present them on a
radar screen for the controller. But this was a very crude system
and prone to malfunctions, especially when used
for longer periods of time. And on this particular afternoon,
it was not working. Another more advanced
and reliable system had been requested to replace it, but for some reason,
its implementation kept getting delayed, and that meant that on this afternoon, there was no surface
radar system available to help the active controller. Another factor that will play
a role in this accident was the placement of the tower in relation to the northern runways. Since the tower
was situated quite close to the Runway 24 ends,
the controllers could see the beginning of the
aircraft take off rolls perfectly, but as the aircraft started
rolling further down the runway, four sets of ramp lights
had been built to light up the ramp next to Terminal 2. These lights were constructed
so high up and in such an angle that during the time of darkness, their glare would restrict
the controller's view of the Intersection 45
and 47 to Runway 24 Left. This had been brought to the attention of someone who,
according to verbal reports, had apparently changed
the angle of those lights, but even though this issue
had been reported as solved, the glare was still there
on the evening of February 1st. And then we get to the controller herself. The tower controller in
charge on this evening had only been working in her position as a full-performance level controller for about two and a half months. About one month
after her initial certification, she had undergone an assessment by her supervisor at the time, as she was working in the tower, and this assessment was made
in an effort to find weaknesses that could be used
for further training events under something known as
the Technical Appraisal Program or TAP, and it was therefore
not a pass or fail event. In the assessment, her supervisor identified a few key weaknesses in her performance, and those included a loss of awareness of aircraft separation,
the misidentification of an aircraft by the use of an incorrect call sign, the failure to complete
two required coordinations with other controllers, and a failure to issue a required
advisory to an aircraft. These deficiencies were then debriefed with the controller after the check, but no other remedial action
was taken, like extra training, for example, partially
because the supervisor was unsure about how the TAP program was actually supposed to work. When SkyWest Flight 5569
had taxied about halfway towards their departure point, they were shifted over to
a new ground controller frequency. The first officer
advised this new controller that they were number two on taxiway tango behind
an Aeroméxico aircraft ahead. The new controller
acknowledged this and told them to hold position initially and then, whenever ready, turn right onto tango and then at 45,
transition to uniform and hold. 45 in this case was
an intersection with Runway 24 Left, and as it turns out, it would
suit Flight 5569 perfectly as a starting point for their takeoff. The first officer read
back the clearance and then the Metroliner
continued to taxi with the pilots inside completing their pre-flight takeoff procedures. Intersection 45 was situated
just beyond the touchdown markings for Runway 24 Left
and within the touchdown zone. It was also one of the intersections that were affected by those
glaring light poles, sticking up between the tower and the intersection. At time 18:03:38, the first officer in the Metroliner was
advised to contact the tower on frequency 133.9. He did so and when he called up, he advised the tower controller, "Skywest 569, at 45. Would like to go from here if we can." The tower controller
responded and told them to taxi up to and hold
short of Runway 24 Left, which the first officer acknowledged. And so far, nothing was
out of the ordinary here and everything was still under control. The SkyWest crew was getting ready for an intersection takeoff
like they almost always did at LAX and the controller was well
aware of where they were and in what sequence
they were in the traffic. As this was happening,
US Air Flight 1493 was still on final and talking to the approach controller, so they didn't
hear this initial conversation between the SkyWest
aircraft and the tower. Remember how I said
that air traffic controllers are using flight progress strips
to keep track of their traffic? Well, the tower controller did have a strip for SkyWest Flight 5569, but the strip for another
Metroliner, which was taxiing behind Flight 5569,
had not been given to her due to an error by the
clearance delivery controller. Remember that. Inside the cockpit of
US Air Flight 1493, the approach was going well and the two pilots were
in a really great mood. They were about seven nautical miles out and had just selected gear down since the controller had asked
them to expedite the descent down to 4,000 feet due
to crossing traffic above them. And the drag from the extended
gear would allow them to increase their descent rate
without increasing their speed, which is important
when you're on approach. Once they had passed 4,000 feet, the approach controller
thanked them for their help and then told them
to contact Los Angeles Tower on frequency 133.9, which
the captain also read back. After this, the first officer
started asking for flaps to be extended,
speed to be reduced and for the landing
checklist to be completed. Remember, he was still hand-flying here and the captain did all of
this before calling up the tower. This meant that the time
that they would have on the tower frequency
became a bit shorter, but it was still long enough since they hadn't reached
the mandatory reporting point yet. At time 18:04:33, US Air Flight 1493 finally called up the tower controller and advised her that they
were established on final, inside of ROMEN,
the outer marker position, about 5.3 nautical
miles away from the runway. This call was received by the controller, but she never answered to it and the reason for that was that she was now getting increasingly busy with a developing problem
further down the runway. You see, just before
Flight 1493 had called up, the tower controller had been dealing with an aircraft departing
from Runway 24 Right and just after that, she was
trying to reach another aircraft, which was due to cross Runway 24 Left further down on the runway. But the pilots in
that aircraft had managed to switch over to another frequency, which meant that the tower controller couldn't get a hold of them. As she was continuing to try
and reach this aircraft, she also made a
call to SkyWest Flight 5569 and she told them to taxi into position and hold Runway 24 Left,
traffic crossing downfield. The first officer of Flight 5569
read back that clearance, released the brakes
and then started lining up on the active runway. Another important detail here is that the standard operating procedures in SkyWest at the time,
instructed the pilots to only turn on their landing
and strobe lights once the takeoff
clearance had been received. This meant that as the Metroliner
was now lining up, the flashing strobe lights
on the wings and tail was not yet activated. As the SkyWest aircraft started moving, the tower controller continued to try and reach the other aircraft to get them to cross the runway before the traffic situation
made it impossible. At the same time, another aircraft, Southwest Airlines Flight 725,
which was a Boeing 737, came onto the frequency
and told the controller that they were ready in sequence, meaning that they could accept the takeoff clearance
whenever it was possible. The tower controller told
them to continue taxiing down towards the holding point
from Runway 24 Left and to hold position there
as they would get to follow the Metroliner in
front of them after that. Now, what this exchange actually meant was that, at this point, the controller's situational
awareness was still intact. She knew that SkyWest Flight 5569 was on the runway
awaiting takeoff clearance here. But now, as you can see, things are starting
to become more complicated as she was still trying
to get into contact with the other aircraft
needing to cross the runway. At time 18:05:09, the missing aircraft finally came back
onto the frequency and apologized for
having messed up earlier. The tower controller told them that it was okay and then
she finally issued the clearance for them to cross the runway and to contact the ground controller when they were clear of the runway. The pilots read this
back and then apologized again, to which the controller just
repeated the same clearance, but with an incorrect
call sign this time, a call sign that she had
actually dealt with about five minutes earlier and this could possibly
have been an indication of her stress level starting to rise. Remember, she still had
one aircraft on the runway and another one on final, which was just getting
closer and closer. Now, since the captain of
Flight 1493 never got a response to his first call, he tried
again at 18:05:29. But also this time,
there was no response from the tower, who was now busy telling a departure aircraft
to change their frequency. And just around here somewhere, something must have started to happen to the tower controller. Somewhere, during the conversation with the crossing aircraft, the departing traffic and
the US air flight on final, she must have forgotten
about the SkyWest aircraft that was still waiting on the runway. She now asked the SouthWest 737 to confirm that they were
holding short of the runway and when they did so, she cleared US Air Flight
1493 to land on Runway 24L. Now you might ask, how could she forget
about an aircraft like this? Didn't she have a flight progress strip in front of her that
was supposed to remind her? Well, the answer to that is yes. But unfortunately, the
other Metroliner that I mentioned before with
call sign West Wing 5072 had now appeared on the frequency and they did not have a strip since the clearance
delivery controller had forgotten to transfer that strip to her. This fact just further
increased the workload as she now had to start looking for that strip in
the middle of everything else. And in that confusion,
and with the number of strips in front of her matching
with the only two aircraft that she could see, not
the three that she actually had, because remember that third aircraft on the runway might
still have been hidden behind those glaring lights, the error simply
slipped through the crack. And there was no one there to notice it and no warning
system available to notify her. Now, if air traffic control fails, the remaining safety barrier
then becomes the pilot. This means that the four
pilots involved in the situation, plus maybe others on the frequency, were now realistically the only ones that could stop this
impending disaster. The pilots inside the Metroliner on the runway should have heard the tower clear the
737 behind them to land. Believe me, when you're
standing on an active runway, you're really putting
all your attention on that frequency, just
awaiting your takeoff clearance. But there is, of course, a possibility that they were busy maybe completing the last part of their checklist
or discussing something else. We would have known this if we had the cockpit
voice recording from them, but, unfortunately,
this category of aircraft had not yet been mandated to carry a cockpit
voice recorder at that time. There was a rule being implemented in October that same year,
forcing the implementation of CVRs and in a
really cruel twist of fate, SkyWest had actually asked the FAA to allow them
to install voice recorders early. When they did so, they had also asked the FAA to get an exception
from the rule of being grounded if a CVR didn't work, up until the official
implementation date of course. But the FAA had just said no to that. If they installed
those devices early, they would also need to
work for the aircraft to be airworthy, and obviously the airline didn't want
to take that extra risk. This, in my view, is
red tape at its absolute worst. Anyway, that's why we won't know for sure why the pilots in
the Metroliner didn't speak up when they heard the landing clearance of the aircraft behind them, but what about the pilots
inside of the Boeing on final? Well, after they had
received their landing clearance, the captain switched on
their landing lights and made sure that the
landing checklist was complete. They were completely stabilized
as they passed 1,000 feet, and when they did
so, the captain only made some remarks about how it
was all looking real good. There were no discussions in the cockpit about any potential traffic conflicts. That could have been
because the Metroliner had only been cleared
to taxi into position and hold less than 10 seconds after the 737 had joined that same frequency, meaning that that call
or the significance of it might have been missed. There were also a lot of
other calls around that same time, and the phraseology,
"Taxi into position and hold," is somewhat ambiguous
and could potentially refer to several different things. So there is a possibility
that it didn't raise the type of awareness
that a clear line up and wait clearance
would have done. That's, by the way,
why we today are very careful with using the
exact phraseology intended for line up and take off clearances. But this still doesn't
explain why the 737 pilots didn't see the Metroliner
on the runway in front of them. The weather was fine
and the visibility was great, even though it was
completely dark at this point. But here, another sad
fact comes into play, one that I have already
mentioned earlier on. Remember how SkyWest
had, as a procedure, to not switch on those strobe lights until they had received
their take-off clearance? Well, what that meant was that
the most conspicuous part of their aircraft lighting
was now not activated. The aircraft would still
have been reasonably easy to see when it was taxiing onto
the runway and then lining up. But once it was standing
still on the centerline, its white position lights
would have blended in perfectly with the runway centerline lights. And on top of that,
remember what I told you about the red anti-collision
light on top of the tail? Yeah, that one would have been easy to see during normal circumstances, but it was unfortunately partly hidden by the rudder cap behind and above it, just where the approaching
737 was now closing in. And since the runway edge lights, centerline and approach lights
would have been much brighter than the non-illuminated
aircraft fuselage, it would also have
essentially been hidden, and all of these circumstances meant that the Metroliner
was now effectively invisible, as it was standing on the centerline bang in the middle
of the touchdown zone. If it would have just lined
up about three feet left or right of the centerline, it would
have likely been another story, as the lights would
have then been misaligned and much easier to see. Once the 737 passed 500 feet,
the captain called out, "You're coming out of 500 feet,
bug plus 12, sink is 700." The first officer checked to that and then he made sure
that the landing lights were on and then started mentally
preparing for the landing. He saw in the corner of his eye that another aircraft was taxiing towards them on taxiway uniform, but everything else
looked perfectly fine. Now, we pilots normally aim
for a point on the runway just before where we
intend to touch down. So in this case, since
it was dark outside, this would have likely been just in front of the main
touchdown zone lights. We tend to use the PAPI lights for initial vertical guidance,
but as we get lower, more and more of
our focus is instead directed towards that runway itself, making sure that the touchdown point is not moving up
or down in the windows. This means that anything beyond that, especially if it's not supposed
to be there and hard to see, would be very hard
to notice by the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring,
which was the captain in this case, might
have just been monitoring the instruments and therefore
not have seen it. The threshold was passed
at 50 feet with 130 knots and the flare was then
started at around 30 feet. The main landing gear touched
down at the 1,500-feet mark on the centerline
exactly where it should be and the first officer
then gently started derotating the nose to land the nose wheel, while simultaneously also
selecting reverse thrust. But as he was doing this, his eyes suddenly caught a
glimpse of a red light just in front of him
and almost immediately the whole Metroliner appeared in view with the glare of his landing lights
reflected in its propellers. The first officer immediately
applied max braking, but it was clearly too
late and there was no time to make any evasive maneuvering at all. The time has simply run out. (suspenseful music) At time 18:06:59,
US Air Flight 1493 collided with Sky West Flight 5569
just abeam Intersection 45 on Runway 24 Left. The collision happened
just as the nose gear of the 737 was touching down with the main brunt of the impact hitting the lower left side
of the Boeing's nose, causing a huge fireball. Since the Metroliner
was substantially smaller and lower than the 737,
it got completely crushed underneath the weight of the Boeing, which now started dragging the twisted wreckage along the runway. The nose gear of
the Boeing soon collapsed, meaning that all directional
control was instantly lost and the sparks from
the initial collision quickly ignited the fuel from the Metroliner, whose main body was
now completely mangled on the left side wing of the 737. It is likely that all occupants of the Metroliner perished
almost immediately from the initial collision, but inside of the Boeing,
people were still alive. They had just noticed a seemingly
normal landing followed by abrupt braking and then a strong jolt as the impact happened. This was then immediately
followed by severe vibrations, a strange clear orange glow
outside of the windows, as well as heat and smoke
that quickly started coming up from below the floor. When the cabin crew first saw this, the two that were seated
in the rear of the aircraft unbuckled their seatbelts to start getting ready
for what they assumed would be an immediate evacuation, and so did several passengers. But the problem here was that this accident was still not over. The two aircraft were still moving at a considerable speed and since
the pilots now had no way of controlling the trajectory,
the flaming wreckage soon left the runway and careened
over towards the left, where they crossed two taxiways before finally crashing into
an abandoned fire station. As that happened, the two aircraft obviously came to an immediate stop, meaning that all of
those people who had unbuckled their seatbelts now flew forward and into their seats,
aisles and bulkheads. This is the reason why you need
to keep your seatbelt fastened until we pilots turn off the seatbelt sign or the cabin crew tells you to. Fortunately, the two flight attendants that had unbuckled themselves
didn't hurt themselves badly and were able
to reasonably quickly come to their senses again. The impact with the
building had completely mangled the forward left part of the cockpit, likely
killing the captain immediately. And the fire that was now raging below the fuselage
soon got into contact with the crew oxygen cylinder
that I mentioned before. That cylinder had likely been
damaged in the initial impact and now started spewing pure oxygen into the fuel-fed fire
drastically increasing its intensity. Black smoke was now quickly filling up the cabin, making the evacuation both more urgent and harder to do. And the fire, which soon
also entered the cabin, could spread relatively easy in the older type overhead
bins and wall panels. The flight attendant in the
front managed to soon open the forward right door, but the main evacuation
route quickly became the overwing exit on the right
hand side away from the fire. The back left door
had been partially opened with the slide deployed
by the eager cabin crew while the aircraft
was still moving, meaning that it was now inoperative and the back-right door was being used, but that area soon
filled with dense black smoke. Now, remember that emergency briefing that the flight attendant had done with the 17-year-old boy,
sitting next to the overwing exit? Well, it now turns out
that this briefing likely saved several lives as the passengers clearly
remembered what they had to do and therefore,
quickly got that door open. Unfortunately though, one passenger who was sitting in that
emergency row froze from pure fear, impeding
the speed of the evacuation and on top of that,
two other passengers at some point started fighting in front of the exit,
slowing it down even further. This, together with
a slightly damaged seat in front of the exit meant
that some passengers and one cabin crew who was trying to help them sadly didn't have time to exit before they
were overcome by the smoke. Out of the 83 passengers
and six crew onboard the 737, 22 perished and 13
received serious injuries. On top of that, all 12 passengers and crew onboard the
Metroliner had also perished, meaning that the total death toll with this horrible
accident actually rose to 34 with one more added a few days later as a passenger died from his injuries. Now, in the tower,
the controllers had immediately hit the accident button as soon
as that first fireball was seen, but initially there
was quite some confusion about what
had actually caused it. The fire brigade quickly arrived to the scene and
did an absolutely outstanding job. They helped with the evacuation,
of course, and one of them actually climbed into
the right hand cockpit window and managed to pull
out the first officer and thereby saving his life. Another firefighter found
a propeller inside of the right-hand engine of the 737 and called this into the tower as they initially
hadn't been made aware that there were two
aircraft involved in this accident. This information then
finally made it clear to everyone what had happened and Sky West Flight
5569 was quickly identified as the aircraft that
had likely been hit. When the investigation started, it showed that the accident was caused by a failure of
air traffic control management at LAX to implement proper procedures to provide redundancy in case an individual
controller would make a mistake. Specifically, the local
decision to allow that flight progress strips to bypass the ground
controller was deemed as highly inappropriate. This together with some
other deficient procedures had then ultimately led
to the tower controller losing her situational awareness and issuing that fatal landing clearance which ultimately caused the crash. The recommendations that came out of this horrible accident focused on improving ATC procedures specifically around intersection takeoffs and reinforcing the need for clear and unambiguous
phraseology as well as for pilots to actively monitor the
ATC frequency for potential threats. This also clearly showed the need for the implementation
of crew resource management, CRM courses, which would
cover things like communication and threat awareness, both of
which were involved in this case. It was also later
found that the captain of the US Air aircraft had been using off-the-shelf
medication without clearing that with his AME and
even though that had no impact on this accident, it was recommended to further highlight
the potential dangers of doing this to the pilots out there. Now, one procedure
that also came directly from this accident, which
we all are using today, is to switch on the strobe lights
whenever we enter a runway, no matter if it's active or not, and to also consider lining up
slightly off the center line to make the aircraft more
visible for traffic around. Now, of course, there were
several other recommendations made in this final report
as well and all of them, you can read if you click on the link here below to my website,
mentourpilot.com. There you can also find aviation news and links to my sponsors. Check out these videos next and if you want to help me
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and I'll see you next time. Bye bye.
