- [Petter] Have you ever played
the computer game Tetris? If you have, you will likely be familiar with the feeling of how fast
things start to go wrong just before game over and how little
it feels like you can do about it. Well, the pilots of this airplane
is experiencing that exact same feeling, but for them, the stakes
are much, much higher. Stay tuned. - [Radio Altimeter]
100, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10. - On the 22nd of January, 2002,
a Boeing 757 from Icelandair was cruising along at 37,000 feet
over the North Atlantic. This was the first leg
of a three-leg day for the crew, who was enjoying some slow time
before they needed to start preparing for their approach into Oslo Gardermoen. They had departed
their home base in Keflavik, Iceland at 07:35 in the morning and was now heading first
towards Oslo Gardermoen in Norway before they would continue
to Stockholm Arlanda in Sweden and then finally back home again
to Keflavik. The pre-flight planning
had been pretty straightforward. It was a standard January day
in Scandinavia with some light snow forecasted,
giving reasonable visibility and a cloud base around 500 feet. The temperature was hovering
around minus 4 degrees centigrade. The only issue the pilots had seen was a possibility
for some light freezing rain, which could potentially cause
some icing on the ground, but apart from that, the weather didn't look like
it would cause any major issues. The aircraft was in good shape,
except for a few inoperative systems that the engineering department
had deferred to be fixed at a later stage. Those include the right GPS,
the right ILS, and the center autopilot. But none of those systems were critical for the flights
that they were planning to do, so the captain
had accepted the aircraft. The two pilots in charge of this flight
were reasonably experienced. The captain was 43 years old
with a total flying experience of just over 8,000 hours,
and he had been working for Icelandair since 1975 when he started
as a baggage handler and then worked his way up
into the cockpit where he started
as a first officer in 1986. The first officer was 26 years old and he had started his career
in Icelandair as a flight dispatcher before he, a few years later,
also joined the pilot ranks. At the time of this flight,
he had been flying for three years and amassed almost
2,500 hours of total time. As they were cruising along,
they checked the progress page on the CDU and it indicated that
they might arrive early to Oslo due to some really strong tailwinds. Now we pilots are generally great fans
of tailwinds during the en route segment, but that feeling changes slightly
when we start descending since the tailwinds can cause
quite a bit of problems there as you will soon see. The captain was pilot flying and initially he was planning to fly a practice
Category II autoland approach into Runway 01 Right in Gardermoen. Now a Category II ILS approach
is a low visibility procedure that we normally use
only when it's very foggy and we therefore need
to descend to a lower minima in order to be able to see the runway. There are several
extra procedures required in order for such an approach to be flown. Among other things, the area around the runway
must be safeguarded. Extra separation is needed
between the aircraft. And the aircraft itself also needs to have
special equipment fitted and functioning. Because this procedure is quite special, we pilots also need to go through
special training for it and we're tested
on our abilities twice a year. On top of that, we also need to fly
at least one Category II or Category III approach for real during each six-month period
before our checks. So that was likely why the captain wanted to fly a practice approach
on this occasion. Now one peculiar thing
that wasn't mentioned in the final report but that I reacted to was the fact
that the aircraft was dispatched with the right ILS inoperative
as well as the center autopilot. Because normally, in order to be able
to fly these type of approaches, the autopilots needs to be connected
to separate sources of ILS signals and therefore, this aircraft
shouldn't be able to fly even a practice Category II approach. Now in the end, this detail
will not become that important, but either something is very different
in the 757 from the 737 or the captain
had completely missed this fact, which could point to some degraded
technical situational awareness. Anyway, around 200 nautical miles
away from Oslo, the first officer left the radio frequency
and started copying the weather information
from Gardermoen Airport. The Automatic
Terminal Information Service, ATIS, stated that
Runway 01 Right was in use with a wind of 010 degrees, 3 knots,
and a visibility of 3,000 meters in light freezing drizzle,
few clouds at 200 feet, scattered clouds at 300 feet,
and broken clouds at 500 feet. A temperature
of minus 4 degrees centigrade and an air pressure
of 985 hectopascal. But the ATIS also included information
about some temporary conditions, including a visibility
of only 1,000 meters in freezing drizzle and mist. Vertical visibility of only 400 feet and, crucially, a tailwind
of 20 knots reported down to 200 feet. The reason this is important
is because it shows both a potentially worsening
visibility situation and also, crucially, the combination of a very cold temperature
on the ground with freezing drizzle and the mention
of a strong tailwind on approach. This is indicative of a potentially
quite tricky atmospheric phenomenon known as a temperature inversion. So what's that, you're asking? Well, normally as we climb higher
above the Earth's surface, the temperature will decrease with around 3 degrees centigrade
per 1,000 feet of altitude. This temperature drop then continues until we reach an area
in the atmosphere known as the tropopause, under which most of the weather
and clouds that we can see is located. The fact that the temperature decreases allows pockets of warmer air
to float upwards, and those bubbles will continue to rise until they reach a temperature
known as the dew point, where the water vapor
inside of that pocket will start to condense
into water droplets and form clouds. Those are the fluffy cumulus clouds that you often see
during the afternoons during the summer. Anyway, sometimes
very special atmospheric circumstances can cause this rule
of temperature reduction with altitude to locally reverse, meaning that the temperature,
instead of getting colder with altitude, starts getting warmer for a short while, and that's known
as a temperature inversion. This often happens during the presence
of strong high pressure. And I'm sure that you've all seen this
during the summer when the weather has been really good
for a few days that the visibility often starts to decrease
and it can become very hazy. That's because
the normal circulation of air, as I described earlier,
has been halted by the inversion, which has created a kind of lid under which all pollution
and moisture gets trapped. These inversions can also be caused
by very heavy, cold air flowing down into valleys
during the winter and creating these local lids,
and that's often recognized, among other things,
by the presence of freezing rain. The freezing rain is caused
by the precipitation above the inversion being normal rain, which then suddenly falls
into much colder air below it, where it becomes super cool,
but it doesn't have time to freeze into snow or hail
until it hits the surface. That's why freezing rain can create
so much problems with icing, but also, and crucially for this story, because this inversion
has created this lid, the winds above and below it
can be very different from each other. In this case, the wind above the inversion
was westerly and quite strong, but below it, it was northeasterly. So why would that be an issue then? Well, those of you who have been following
this channel for a while know that aircraft always try to take off
and land into the wind. That's because this will enable maximum speed of air
flowing over the wings with the lowest actual speed
over the ground. Basically, air speed for free. That will enable us
to take off using shorter distances. And it will also allow us to land
with a lower ground speed, enabling a shorter landing roll. But what happens if there's
a strong tailwind on the approach but still headwind on the ground? Well, we're shortly
about to find out after this. Don't you also find it tiring not to know
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trying to make a real difference. Now back to the story. When the first officer
came back on the radios after having copied the ATC, shared the weather information
with the captain. It was not great, but it was still within the Category 1
ILS requirements for the planned runway. And the detail about the reported tailwind was not really discussed
or seen as a threat at this point. Instead, the captain
handed over the controls and started setting up the flight deck
for the Category II practice approach that he was still planning to do. And he then proceeded
to brief the first officer on the arrival route and the approach. In the back of the cabin,
the 5 flight attendants were taking good care of the
75 passengers that they had on board. In total, there were only 82 people
on this first flight, which is quite a light load,
and that's something that will likely have an important impact
on what's about to come. Around 09:30 UTC,
the Oslo Air Traffic Controller gave them their first descend clearance
and then advised the pilots that they would be flying the SIG TWO
ECHO arrival route into Gardermoen. The aircraft started descending with around 117 nautical miles to go
according to the FMC. And that would be very close
to the ideal distance they needed in order to descend. A rule of thumb that we often use
to calculate how many miles we need to descend for an aircraft of this size
is that we need about three times the altitude in a thousand feet
in track miles, plus 1 nautical mile
for each 10 knots of airspeed that we need to lose above 200 knots. In this case, if the aircraft
was cruising at 37,000 feet, that would mean 37 times 3 which is 111. And then their indicated air speed
was likely around 260 knots, meaning another 6 miles
added on top of that, which is 117. The Aircraft Flight Management Computer will calculate the optimal
descent path for us, which we normally tend to use,
but its calculation assumes that we will be flying
the entire programmed arrival route. But quite often we get shortcuts,
making computer calculation less reliable. If that happens
and we haven't prepared for it, we can end up high on our profile. Something that we really want
to try to avoid. And therefore, we tend to always sit
and manually calculate how many track miles we need
in a straight line distance to the airport in order to see if we can actually accept
a shortcut that's given to us. On top of that,
there is also another thing that we need to keep in mind
when we are monitoring this. The calculation that I just showed you assumes that we're descending
in still air. If we're not, then we need to take
the headwind or tailwind into account in this calculation as well. If we have tailwind
like these pilots did, then we need to add
around 1 nautical mile for each 10 knots of tailwind. And that's something
that can be very easily forgotten. During the descent, the pilots did discuss
the unusually strong tailwind they had when they could clearly see it
on their navigation display. But it was never
really perceived as a real threat. As they were getting closer to Oslo, the air traffic controller advised them
that there had been a change of runway. Gardermoen was now using Runway 01 Left
instead of Runway 01 Right due to snow clearing
in progress on 01 Right. This new runway didn't have
Category II approach capability. So the captain now quickly handed over
the controls again to the first officer and started resetting up
for this new approach, which included changing
to Category I minimums, as well as doing a full new briefing. This direct routing
also meant a slight shortcut, meaning that they now had
less track miles. And they suddenly found themselves getting a bit high
on their descent profile. Minutes later,
the controller cleared Flight 315 to continue direct
towards a waypoint called SONER. And he also told them that
they could use free speed below flight level 100. Normally, we always have to reduce
the speed to below 250 knots below flight level 100
because of potential general aviation traffic and birds
and stuff below there. But within controlled airspace, the controller can temporarily
waive this rule. They typically do this,
either to speed the traffic flow up or to help pilots to lose some altitude
if they've ended up high, which was likely the case here. As the aircraft was clear
to descend lower, they were now directed
to fly direct towards a non-directional beacon called SOLBERG,
meaning yet again, a further shortcut. The captain had now realized
the problem as his aircraft continuously kept getting higher and higher
above the calculated descent profile. And he had started to use his speed brake
to try to increase the drag. He also eventually
reduced the speed a little bit. And although that would have
initially worked against him, since slowing down meant pitching up
and reducing the descent rate, this would eventually enable him to start
configuring the aircraft with flaps, which would further increase the drag and allow him
to descend faster per nautical mile. You see, what you're seeing here is what we refer to
as descent and energy management. And it's one of the most difficult parts of handling an airliner
under normal conditions. During line training,
it tends to be among the last things that are signed off before a student
is ready for their line check. And it takes years to properly master. In the end, though,
if tailwind and shortcuts makes following
the descent profile too hard, there is one sure remedy
that always works, and that's asking for more track miles. That can be done
in the form of a longer radar vector from the air traffic controller or by entering
a holding pattern for a short while. But in any case, more track miles
will always slow things down and give some breathing room
to the pilots. The problem though,
is that pilots are proud people and we often try to fix the issue rather than adding a couple of minutes
and extra fuel burn to the flight. It is really easy,
especially as pilot flying to become really goal-oriented
and like, I must get this aircraft down in such a way
that we miss the obvious solution, which is just to slow things down
and get some more time. This is where a strong
and assertive pilot monitoring can and must play a really important role. By not being in direct control
of the aircraft, the pilot monitoring generally
has a better overview. And in these kind of situations,
he or she must speak up and suggest the obvious solution
which is asking for more track miles. Unfortunately, in this case, the first officer seemed
to have not fully picked up on the deteriorating energy situation
and therefore, he remained passive. The normal procedures
were however followed and the cabin crew
secured the cabin for landing and notified the pilots
when they were ready. When the aircraft was about
10 nautical miles away from the runway, they were cleared to descend
to 3,000 feet, proceed direct on 8 miles final,
and after that, they were cleared to intercept
the ILS approach for Runway 01 Left. At this point, the aircraft had an indicated air speed
of about 220 knots. It was still above the profile
and with a tailwind of close to 45 knots, meaning that their ground speed
was much higher than normal, at close to 270 knots. Now a quite useful rule of thumb
for most Boeing aircraft is what we call the 10-mile 3-2-1 rule. It states that at 10 nautical miles, we should be about 3,000 feet, 200 knots
and with flaps 1 selected. In this case, the aircraft was both above this altitude
and with a higher speed. And on top of that, the tailwind
was making it almost impossible to get back down onto the profile. In pilot terms,
this is known as being hot and high. Even if they would have been able
to correct the profile, dealing with such
a strong tailwind on final would have been really challenging. First, the tailwind in practice means
that the aircraft will have to descend with a steeper than expected
relative angle because it's moving faster. But on top of that, this tailwind
would eventually disappear and below the inversion,
it would turn into a headwind. What that would mean,
since the aircraft gets its performance from the speed of the air
that's flowing past it, is that it would suddenly go
from a tailwind which caused a high ground speed
into a sudden headwind. And during that change,
if the change comes suddenly, it would be indicated
as a sudden increase in airspeed, which would increase the lift
and could cause an overspeed of the flaps. Like I mentioned earlier,
this kind of conditions can be really tricky
and will require the pilots to be exceedingly careful
and prepared for it. When they were cleared for the approach, the captain,
who was still flying on autopilot, armed the autopilot approach mode. In this mode, the autopilot will feel when the localizer and glide slope beams,
transmitted from antennas on the ground, are close enough
and it will then lock onto those and start following them
down towards the runway. But because the aircraft was still flying
with a much higher ground speed than the autopilot had calculated with,
the aircraft just flew past the centerline when it captured the localizer and then proceeded out on the east side before turning back to the left
to try and align with the beam again. At this point, the glide slope beam
was so far below the aircraft that the autopilot was unable
to capture it and instead, continued to descend using
the previously selected descent mode. At time, 09:46,
the approach air traffic controller cleared the aircraft
to descend further down to 2,500 feet. The captain reached over
and set this new altitude on the Mode Control Panel, the MCP. And remember this altitude because it will become
very important very soon. After the new altitude had been set, he then called for the landing gear
to be selected down and the landing checklist to be started. He also asked for the flaps
to be extended to 20 degrees. The aircraft had now established itself
on the localizer, but was still more than one dot high
on the glide slope, which meant that the autopilot
still had not been able to capture it. The captain saw this
and from the position they were now in, he doubted that the autopilot
would be able to rectify the situation. So instead, he elected to disconnect both the autopilot and the autothrottle
to start pitching down manually. Now this can sometimes help
if a small correction is needed, but the overall energy situation
of the aircraft is rarely rectified by disconnecting the automatics
and instead, it often just increases
the workload on the crew, which negatively impacts
both communication and CRM. The first officer was,
up until this point, responding to commands from the captain
and executing what he was told to do. But he appeared to be mentally
falling behind the aircraft and did not try to prompt the captain about the increasingly
unstabilized approach. And as if this wasn't enough,
when the captain was now scanning his primary flight display,
his ILS pointers suddenly and without any failure flag,
just disappeared. This caused the captain
to decrease his descent rate slightly when he was trying to figure out
what was happening, making the aircraft go
even further above the glide slope. He called out the failure he was seeing
to check if the first officer was also experiencing the same, but everything seems
to be working on his side. This situation could really
only be solved in two ways. Either by immediately handing over
the controls to the first officer, who would then have to try
to manually deal with the high energy approach
without being prepared for it. Or the captain could initiate
a go-around, but none of these options
were used at this point. The captain's ILS instrument
kept appearing and disappearing as the aircraft
descended down the approach which further distracted him from continuing to configure the aircraft
and preparing it for landing. They passed the 1,000 feet landing gate
where they needed to be stabilized on the glide slope on speed
and with all checklists completed without the landing flaps selected
or the landing checklist complete. Also, they were still
well above the glide slope, meaning that the aircraft
was not stabilized. This is a mandatory go-around condition but the approach still continued
for another few seconds. Now remember how I said that the MCP altitude
had been selected to 2,500 feet? Well, in normal conditions,
the missed approach altitude, which is the altitude
that the aircraft should climb to in case of a go-around,
in this case 4,000 feet, should be set
when the glide slope is captured. But since the glide slope
was never captured, this altitude had also not been set, which would act as yet another brick
added to the Tetris game in this case. When the aircraft descended through
580 feet above ground, the captain finally decided
that he had had enough and correctly decided
to abandon the approach. He called out, "Go-around." And this is where
the incident really starts. When the go-around maneuver started,
the indicated airspeed was 182 knots. The aircraft was flown manually
and the flaps were set at 20 degrees. When the captain pushed
the TO/GA buttons, it activated the flight director's
go-around mode, which moved the command bars up to guide the pilots towards
an initial pitch of 15 degrees nose up. It also reactivated the autothrottle which started moving
the engine thrust levers forward towards maximum go-around EPR. Now since the engines on the 757
is mounted under the wings, a big thrust increase
will cause a pitch up momentum. And that, together with the fact
that the captain likely was starting to become overloaded might be an explanation
to what happened next. Because the pitch of the aircraft didn't stop at 15 degrees
as the flight directors commanded. Instead, it continued up to 20 degrees, which caused
a much higher than normal climb rate. The gear was selected up,
which led to less drag. And the speed
initially increased to 198 knots before the high pitch
caused it to start dropping again. The very high climb rate
that the aircraft was now flying meant that the altitude capture function
of the flight director almost immediately sensed
that the aircraft was getting closer to the 2,500 feet that was still set
on the MCP and therefore, it started moving the flight directors
to level off at that altitude. This also sent signals to the autothrottle
to start reducing thrust to maintain the speed selected
on the Mode Control Panel of 150 knots. But instead of following these commands,
the captain continued to pitch up and manually forced the thrust levers
to stay in go-around thrust. At this stage,
the captain's situation awareness was likely quite reduced because of the destabilized approach
behind him and the now rapidly changing go-around
that was unfolding around him. He probably knew
that the go-around altitude that he had briefed earlier
was supposed to be 4,000 feet, and could therefore not understand
why the aircraft suddenly wanted to start leveling off
way lower than that. The aircraft quickly climbed
past 2,500 feet, with the flight directors
now pointing down to indicate how to recapture that altitude. Meanwhile, the high pitch angle
had now also caused the speed to reduce back to 137 knots, which was close to the minimum speed
of 131 knots required for flaps 20, which they still had extended. Can you hear how the Tetris bricks
are starting to fall faster and faster? At time 09:49:34, the aircraft reached
its maximum multitude of 2,895 feet as the captain suddenly started applying
forward pressure on his yoke to pitch the aircraft down. It is unknown if he did this
to try to stop the rapid speed decrease or if he, in his now quite confused state,
just wanted to follow the flight directors who were directing him to pitch down. In any case, the pitch forward
he now introduced was far beyond what any normal maneuver
would require. This sudden pitch forward
created a negative G force of minus 0.6G, causing water to be pushed
out of the toilets like fountains, as well as throwing all loose items
inside the aircraft up into the ceiling. In the cabin, purses and mobile phones
were flying around so violently that some of the items
from the pockets of passenger seats in rows forward of the wings
were later found in the aft galley. Luckily, all crew and passengers
were seated down with their seatbelts fastened
when this happened, except for one passenger whose seatbelt
didn't lock for some reason, but he still managed
to remain in his seat. Now the aircraft
started descending rapidly. The first officer, who had been thoroughly
behind the aircraft up until this point and hadn't provided much help,
now called out, "Bug up!" Which is the call that we use
to move the speed bug up to the speed needed
for safe flap retraction. The captain, still flying manually,
now reached up and changed the selected speed
on the MCP from 150 to 210 knots. And he then selected level change
to try to get the flight directors to indicate something
that made sense to him. Since he was still flying manually
at this point, him changing the values on the MCP was strictly against
the standard operating procedures, as the pilot flying
should only focus on flying when the autopilot is disconnected. And to show you
why that is so important. As he was doing this, his forward pressure
on the control column increased and pushed the nose down into a terrifying dive
of 49 degrees nose down. And this was happening
at an altitude of only 2,500 feet or so. This dive obviously
led to a very rapid acceleration. And now the first officer
came back into the game and called out, "What are you doing?
Pull up, pull up!" At the same time, the autothrottle
was finally left alone to do its job, which meant that it started pulling
the thrust levels back to idle, which unfortunately, again,
due to the engines under-mounted positions now led to a further pitch down momentum. The Ground Proximity Warning System
had now joined the first officer and was calling out,
"Terrain," and "too low, terrain." But none of the pilots
registered those oral warnings. Again, showing that the hearing just doesn't seem to work well
under extreme stress. The speed had now accelerated
to 251 knots, which was way above
the maximum speed for flaps 20, and the ground was now approaching fast. Both pilots now realized
what was happening and started pulling on their controls
for dear life. We know that they both did this
because the flight data recorder registered different values
from the left and right elevator, showing that each pilot
was now controlling one elevator, just as it was designed to do,
but in case of a control blockage. This sudden pitch up caused
a crushing positive G load of 3.59Gs, around the same as you will experience
on some roller coasters, but well outside of the maximum
certified limits of a passenger aircraft, which is 2.5Gs, with a safety factor
of 1.5G on top of that. As this violent pull up was happening, people in the cabin
were screaming for their lives, as all of the items that had been
previously pinned up into the ceiling, including the toilet water,
now came raining back down. The lowest point that the aircraft reached was 321 feet above the north threshold
of Runway 01 Left. And the terrified passengers could,
at that point, see the ground below them. The pilots never saw the ground. This whole ordeal was done
with no outside references for them. Like I mentioned earlier, it was lucky
that this aircraft was relatively light, as a slightly higher weight
would have likely meant that this recovery
would have been impossible. The aircraft now turned skywards again with an almost equally
extreme pitch up attitude of 40 degrees. The autothrottle activated again and increased the thrust
to 98% as the climb continued. After several more abrupt control inputs the aircraft finally regained
some kind of stabilized climb and leveled off momentarily at 3,000 feet until it finally continued climbing
to 4,000 feet. The pitch attitudes during the maneuver had moved between 49 degrees pitch down
to 40 degrees pitch up. And just to put that into context, an aircraft is deemed
to be in an unusual attitude if it pitches below 10 degrees nose down
or above 25 degrees nose up. Those attitudes require an immediate recovery procedure
to be performed, something that we train in the simulators
at regular intervals. So what happened next then? Well, the aircraft
had finally stabilized at 4,000 feet. The autopilot was engaged and the after takeoff checklist
was completed. The first officer then
contacted air traffic control and reported the missed approach,
but he didn't mention anything about the terrifying upset
that they'd just experienced. The captain made a short PA
to the passengers where he said that the previous approach
had not been successful, which must be
the understatement of the year. And he then told them
that they would be doing another approach and that they should be on the ground
within about 10 minutes. As he was making that PA, the status in the cabin
was absolute chaos, with items thrown around everywhere. And inside the cockpit,
it looked the same, with approach plates, manuals
and flight bags strewn all over. The second approach
was much more stabilized, but just like on the first one, the captain's ILS instruments
started misbehaving. But this time, he handed over the controls
to the first officer, who continued to a successful landing. During the taxi,
the pilots tried to summarize what had caused the upset
without coming to any real conclusions. When they parked at the gates,
they cleaned up the cockpit and then proceeded to brief
the shocked cabin crew about what had happened. Unfortunately, at that point,
the passengers had all disembarked, which meant that they never received
any briefing or explanation about what had happened, something that eventually led
to several of them contacting the aviation authorities
to file reports about the flight. Others likely suffered long-term
psychological trauma from the event. And this just goes to show how important
proper information and communication is, especially after
a traumatic event like this. The captain checked with the cabin crew
how they were feeling and if they felt fit
to continue flying the next two flights, which they all said that they did. After this, technicians were called to check on the status
of the captain's ILS system as well as the flaps that the first officer
was worried about overspeeding. But nothing was mentioned
about the possible overstress of the airframe itself
as a result of the maneuver. Instead, the aircraft
was eventually released to service and the crew continued to fly
over towards Stockholm. But the event must have been bothering
the captain because once on the ground in Arlanda,
he called up the chief pilot and asked him to meet up the aircraft
in Keflavik so that he could report the event
face to face. And it was after this debrief
later in the evening that the first formal report
about the aircraft upset was sent to the authorities,
which eventually led to this report. Obviously, the cockpit voice recorder
had been long overwritten by then, but the flight data recorder was removed
and preserved that same night. Once the full, terrifying story
was made clear to the investigators, the aircraft was grounded
and ordered by Boeing to go through
a full structural inspection. Incredibly, not even a wrinkle
on the skin was observed, which must stand as a testament
to the fantastic durability of the 757. Some engine support bolts were replaced
just to be on the safe side, but the aircraft
could then continue to operate without any further restrictions. The investigation
led to several recommendations regarding flight crew training
of go-around from unstabilized approaches
and general CRM principles, with special emphasis
on the role of the pilot monitoring. It also highlighted that Icelandair
was not continuously monitoring its fleet for exceedances
using operational flight data monitoring, even though the aircraft
were equipped to do so. If such a system would have been in place, it would have captured
the extreme G loading that the aircraft
had been subjected to much quicker than what happened in this case. Finally, some pointers were also sent
to the Norwegian Air Traffic Control regarding the effect shortcuts could have
on aircraft during the approach segment. But I want to take this opportunity to tell all of you
young, budding pilots out there to always speak up
if you start to feel uncomfortable. And also, just ask
for some more track miles when needed. It will only add a few minutes
to the flight time, but it will save you many gray hairs
throughout your career, I promise you. Now check out this video next
or binge on this playlist. You can support the channel
by buying some merch, send a super thanks, or join my awesome Patreon crew. All links are in the description below. Have an absolutely fantastic day
and I'll see you next time, bye-bye.
