(♪♪) >> Bob: On this edition of "The Fifth Estate"... >> I have a warning for you tonight. >> Bob: It was General Motors' deadly secret. >> What happened to this GM car? Crappy little Cobalt. >> Bob: Now, a startling look inside the GM culture that put a price on their customers' lives. >> GM made a business decision not to fix the safety defects. >> Bob: The dead Canadian who might have been saved. >> He died for a 57-cent piece that should have been fixed over ten years ago. >> Bob: And the life or death question, what's Transport Canada doing to protect you? >> It's incumbent upon the manufacturer to let Transport Canada know about a defect in a timely fashion. >> That's right. >> Is almost a decade-and-a-half in timely fashion? >> Bob: I'm Bob McKeown. This is "The Fifth Estate." Ahead, the story of the switch from hell. (♪♪) >> Bob: You may not know his name yet but Dany Dubuc-Marquis of Quebec's eastern townships will be a pivotal figure in this story. At 23, he was all you'd want a young man to be. Good son. Great friend. The favourite camp counsellor. Passionate about everything he did. Studying to be a Special Ed. teacher, he and his college class were soon to depart for summer school in Belgium. But then in June 2013, on this highway near Granby, Quebec, Dany's Chevrolet Cobalt left the road and crashed. His father Normand got the phone call every parent dreads. (speaking in French) >> Bob: As you'll see, how and why Dany Dubuc-Marquis died should be a cautionary tale for Canadians. It raises questions about corporate greed but also about the safety of Canada's 23 million motor vehicles, and specifically how Transport Canada handled the recall of millions of General Motors cars and the fatal flaw that GM hid from Canadians and Americans for years. For General Motors, it all began to go wrong along a stretch of highway in Georgia on March the 10th, 2010. (♪♪) >> Bob: At the wheel of her Chevrolet Cobalt was Brooke Melton, a pediatric nurse outside Atlanta. It was her 29th birthday and she was driving down this two-lane highway to meet her boyfriend for dinner. When suddenly her car veered across the centre line and an SUV travelling in the opposite direction smashed into the Cobalt, demolishing it. (♪♪) >> Bob: Later that night, Brooke's mother and father, Beth and Ken, were contacted by the local hospital. >> And the surgeon got on the phone with me and told me how bad Brooke's accident was and that she would not be able to recover, she had a broken neck, and, um, there was nothing that she could do for her. >> Bob: The police said her death was a tragic accident caused by a driving error on wet pavement. But Brooke's dad just couldn't bring himself to accept the official story. >> Brooke was so conscientious in her driving. I know that's easy to say for a parent about their child, but she was. She was very conscientious. And very careful. That's why I knew it had to be something else. I knew it had to be a mechanical failure somewhere. >> Bob: The Meltons were also convinced that Exhibit "A" was the twisted hulk of Brooke's car. Her 2005 Chevy Cobalt, but they needed someone to unlock the mysteries it held, an automotive detective to discover what really killed their daughter. (♪♪) >> Bob: It would be a circuitous path that brought them to this unlikely place, the little town of Merigold, Mississippi, population 439. (♪♪) >> Bob: There's only one garage in Merigold, mechanic Charlie Miller started it 30 years ago. He's since earned a reputation as the go-to expert witness in hundreds of American automobile lawsuits. >> They wanted to know the truth, no matter what the truth was, they needed to know why their daughter died. >> Bob: And immediately, Charlie Miller knew something was very wrong when he downloaded the data from the Chevy Cobalt's computer. >> The engine went from around 2,000 rpm to 0 in one second. As a mechanic, you know that's impossible. >> Bob: What's more, Miller learned that Brooke Melton's ignition switch had somehow moved from "on" to the "accessory" position, apparently with disastrous consequences. >> And what that told me as a mechanic, that if this switch moved from "on" to "accessory," she had no anti-lock brakes, she had no electronic power steering, and she had no engine control at all. >> Bob: Miller also noticed how easily the Chevrolet Cobalt's key could be moved from the "on" position to "accessory" with just the slightest jostle, without even knowing it. >> It seemed too easy to me, it seemed very easy to move. I could tell the difference, it was very obvious. >> Bob: But was that a problem unique to Brooke Melton's car? To find out, Miller went to the local junkyard to get another used Cobalt ignition so he could compare the two. And? >> It was weak, as I would turn it, just like hers. It was very close to hers. It didn't have as much force as I thought it should. >> Bob: So that means both of the old ignitions malfunctioned. But what would happen if he compared them to a brand-new Chevy Cobalt ignition? Miller got one from the local GM dealer. It had the same GM part number as the old ones so it should have performed exactly the same. But it didn't. >> And when I installed that new switch, the effort to turn this key went up dramatically. It would click in place, it was harder to move it out of position. (♪♪) >> Bob: The question was why? Enter Mark Hood, an engineer from Pensacola, Florida. Hood's specialty is failure analysis. Investigating events like bridge collapses and plane crashes. Now his assignment was to explain the mysterious loss of power in the Chevy Cobalt in which Brooke Melton died. >> This is an actual ignition switch assembly. >> Reporter: This is how a Cobalt ignition switch works. >> Clutch in. (engine starts) >> Bob: When you insert the key, it turns what's called the ignition column. At the far end is a part called the detent plunger which goes up and down like the top of a ballpoint pen. As it does, it rotates the cylinder that moves the ignition key from "on" to "accessory." If that tiny spring-loaded plunger, a 57-cent piece, that determines how easily the key will move. So what was going on inside the Cobalt's ignition switch, causing the older ignitions to let the key slip into the "accessory" position with such tragic consequences? Atlanta attorney Lance Cooper set out to piece together that puzzle for the Meltons. He says he'll never forget the phone call he got from engineer Mark Hood. >> He says, "Lance, you're not going to believe what I just found," and I said, "What?" And he said, "They changed the switch." I said, "What do you mean they changed the switch?" And he said, "They changed the newer switch to make it harder to turn the key from 'run' to 'accessory' or 'off'." >> Bob: Hood had made a crucial discovery. The plunger from Brooke Melton's ignition, the one that malfunctioned, was infinitesimally shorter than the new part that worked just fine. >> And on this card, I taped down a 2005 detent plunger and a new replacement detent plunger and you can see the difference in length between the two detent plungers. >> Bob: That difference is a mere 1.6 millimetres, just the thickness of a quarter, but it literally would be the difference between life and death for Brooke Melton. And even more disturbing, when hood discovered both ignition switches had the same part number, he knew General Motors had put the new improved part into its new models but left the old defective part in its older cars. However, GM never told its customers either about the change, or the danger. Attorney Lance Cooper. >> What's the plausible explanation, what's the benefit to the company of doing that? >> Well, the company doesn't want you to know that they've changed the switch because if you know they've changed the switch and the old switch harms or kills someone, they'll be held responsible for that. Not only responsible for the death but under U.S. law, liable for punitive damages to punish them for their bad conduct. <i> ♪ Can you imagine when this</i> <i> race is won ♪</i> >> Bob: When we come back, selling cars with dreams of graduation and the prom. And keeping secrets about the ignition switch from hell. >> We certainly did not approve the detent plunger design change. >> I asked him as many different ways as I could whether he knew of a change, whether GM knew of a change. He said I don't know, GM doesn't know. (♪♪) (♪♪) >> Bob: The aftermath of a crash is always horrifying. 29-year-old Brooke Melton of Georgia and 23-year-old Dany Dubuc-Marquis of Quebec died in their Chevy Cobalts but for GM, safety problems go back for half a century. >> First of the 1960 compact cars, the Chevrolet Corvair, was revealed today. >> Bob: As these Vintage commercials show, General Motors portrayed itself as an iconic company. It's automobiles symbols of a prosperous North American middle class. >> The Corvair will be in mass production within a few weeks, at a new ten acre additiion... >> Bob: Though GM long touted its commitment to safety, consumer advocate Ralph Nader exposed design defects in its first generation compact car, the Chevy Corvair, that Nader called unsafe at any speed, as he told the CBC. >> Well, then surely they did the right thing, they found out there was something wrong with the car and they fixed it. >> The question is why did it take them four years to find out, this is my point. Either it's sheer callousness or indifference or they don't bother to find out how their cars behave. >> Bob: Thanks to Ralph Nader's campaign, it wasn't long before the U.S. passed its first legislation to mandate standards of automotive safety and to compel car makers to disclose safety defects. >> We have this exposed bit of metal here instead of padding as exists on the other model. >> Bob: But the questions about safety problems at General Motors have resonated ever since. What did GM know, when, and what did GM do or not do about them? In the 1970s and '80s, GM's defective design of so-called side saddle gas tanks made its pickup trucks especially vulnerable to fire and collisions. >> The fuel expulses from the tank violently, gets ignited, there's an immediate Holocaust and the people in the pickup burn to death. >> Bob: GM motors stopped manufacturing the trucks but though hundreds of people died, the worst fire hazard in U.S. automotive history, GM somehow made a deal to avoid a recall, paying a $51 million settlement instead. The result is that GM vehicles with those explosive gas tanks remain on the road even today. (♪♪) ♪ Can you imagine when this race is won ♪ >> Bob: In recent years, General Motors has refocused on its compact car business. With inexpensive automobiles and ads aimed at young, often first-time drivers. ♪ Forever Young ♪ >> Introducing the Saturn Ion, specifically designed and engineered for whatever's next. >> Bob: After the Saturn Ion came the Chevrolet Cobalt marketed to the same youthful demographic. The two cars were different on the outside but much the same underneath. Including the ignition switch. >> Chevy Cobalt, an American revolution. >> Bob: And we now know that General Motors insiders soon seemed nervous about the Cobalt's ignition. In 2001, with the car still in development, the engineer in charge wrote an E-mail complaining the design of the ignition switch had failed miserably. When he ordered it to be manufactured anyway, he called it the switch from hell. That GM engineer's name was Ray deGiorgio. You'll be hearing about him again. So by 2001, General Motors knew the Chevy Cobalt ignition switch was a problem. In 2005 when the car went on sale, the New York Times reporter reviewing it told a strange story about the test Cobalt stalling after the ignition switch had mistakenly been bumped into the accessory position. Eventually the complaints and the crashes were more than GM could ignore but despite the law requiring car companies to publicly disclose safety defects, GM didn't. The company somehow rationalized that a loss of power, even at high speed, wasn't really a safety issue but more of a customer convenience issue. And there was no recall. Instead, what General Motors did was send this service bulletin to its dealers in Canada and the U.S. Telling them the Cobalt ignition could be rotated out of position in an especially heavy key ring, but no warning about the deadly possibilities if it was. And no indication that General Motors was about to secretly replace that tiny but defective ignition part, the detent plunger that was too short to keep the ignition key in place and could cause high-speed crashes. But still, with no disclosure of the defect and no recall. According to auto industry critic Clarence Ditlow, GM has long been keenly aware of the cost of recalling and repairing its vehicles. >> They certainly do a cost analysis. They've done cost benefit analysis of what it would cost to save a life. >> Bob: A case in point, the memo from a GM engineer in the '70s that was infamous for its callous calculation of the cost per car at which it no longer made financial sense for General Motors to try to save a life with a part change or recall. How much was too much? Incredibly, that prohibitive amount was just $2.40 per vehicle. So it's worth it to pay the damages of a lawsuit when somebody dies in a fire because of a faulty part? >> That's right. >> Rather than recall and repair the part in the first place. >> It's cheaper to pay the lawsuit than it is to put the safety into the vehicle. >> Shares of General Motors fell sharply today after the brokerage firm Goldman Sachs urged investors to sell the stock. >> Bob: And as the world economy began its downward spiral in 2007 and 8, financial considerations apparently were far more pressing than fixing those troublesome ignition switches. >> The idea of having to recall, you know, hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of cars to make their repair was going to cost the company money at a time when it didn't have money. >> Bob: Mary Ann Kellar is a long-time auto industry analyst who has written two books about General Motors and its culture. >> You don't speak up in meetings, you don't talk about the problem. If you do talk about the problem and become very aggressive about it, you're branded a disgruntled employee and your career ends. Simple. >> Guys, you are looking at GM's CEO Dan Ackerson, he has just driven the first Volt up on to the stage here. >> Bob: After all the attention to bankruptcy and bail-outs, GM was intent on shifting the spotlight, here announcing a new electric car. But it still couldn't escape its past. April 2013, Detroit, Michigan, a meeting room at the Westin Hotel. Lawyer Lance Cooper representing Brooke Melton's family in their suit against General Motors started taking depositions. On the hot seat, the GM engineer who supervised development of the Cobalt ignition switch, Ray deGiorgio. Remember, he called it the switch from hell. >> Primarily, I was the project engineer for the ignition switch in that vehicle. >> Bob: You'll also recall Lance Cooper's team had discovered that GM secretly replaced the defective part called the detent plunger in newer models of the Cobalt. But asked whether he'd approved the change, engineer DeGiorgio denied any knowledge of it whatsoever. >> We certainly did not approve a detent plunger design change. >> I asked him as many different ways as I could whether he knew of a change, whether GM knew of a change. He said "I don't know, GM doesn't know." He said "I've spoken with the supplier, they don't know of any change, there was no change ever made." And then we presented him with a photograph showing the change and his position was "I don't know anything about this." >> Did you ever authorize -- >> Bob: Ray deGiorgio was then asked by the General Motors lawyer if he had approved that new ignition switch. Again, he denied it all. >> Absolutely not. >> So if any such change was made, it was made without your knowledge and authorization? >> That is correct. >> Bob: But after DeGiorgio made those claims he knew nothing, this document surfaced, a letter from GM to the supplier called Delphi that made the controversial ignition switches. It was dated 2006, but only came to light eight years later, after Ray DeGiorgio's testimony. It's a requisition from GM ordering the new changed ignition switches. It was approved and signed by none other than Ray deGiorgio. And a month-and-a-half after DeGiorgio testified, Lance Cooper deposed another key engineer for the Chevy Cobalt named Gary Altman. Listen as Altman is asked about the role of money in GM's refusal to disclose that ignition defect and order a recall. >> GM put its profits over the safety of Brooke Melton, didn't it? >> Object to form. >> It made a business decision not to fix this problem and five months later, sold her a vehicle with the problem, didn't it? >> Object to form. Argumentative. Lack of foundation. >> You can answer. >> That is what happened, yes. (♪♪) >> Bob: It was a truly stunning moment. For all of GM's corporate culture, the admission under oath that General Motors intentionally ignored a fatal safety defect for years simply because it would cost less. >> Then he was asked, therefore, GM made a business decision not to fix these safety defects, and he had to acknowledge yes. >> Safety defects which cost lives. >> Sure. That's the whole point, is once you know there's a safety defect -- this isn't a mirror that's, you know, rusting too early or something. This is an engine stalling problem and that's the whole point we were making to them was this is a safety defect and ultimately, he and the other engineers, when that question was put to them, they had to acknowledge, yes, it is a safety defect. (♪♪) >> Bob: After the break, when it comes to GM, have Canadian vehicle safety regulators been asleep at the switch? >> Did Transport Canada know that this was an issue before February the 10th, 2014? >> Please define "issue". (♪♪) >> Bob: Every year in Canada and the U.S., millions of vehicles are recalled for a variety of reasons. The public seldom knows about most of them. But what happened in February 2014 was different. Not only did General Motors announce that almost a million of its compact cars had a defective ignition switch, but that a growing number of its customers had lost their lives because of it. The media took notice. >> What happened to this GM car? 778,000 being recalled of these crappy little Cobalts. >> This is CNN breaking news. >> Bob: As the story unfolded, GM would exponentially increase the number of recalled vehicles. >> Word of a massive recall from General Motors, more than 1 million vehicles are affected and here's the issue, it's an ignition problem. >> Bob: And the death toll has kept mounting, too. Grieving families gathering outside the embattled company's headquarters in Detroit. General Motors now admits the ignition switch is related to at least 29 fatalities. In all, GM has received claims for over 150 deaths and more than 700 serious injuries. Figures that keep going up. In April 2014, Mary Barra, the new General Motors CEO, but long-time CEO employee, was summoned to Washington, to Capitol Hill to testify. Finally answering questions about the deadly ignition switches that could have been asked, indeed should have been asked, a decade before. >> Was there a culture in GM at that time that they would have put cost over safety? >> Again, we're doing a complete investigation but I would say, in general, we've moved from a cost culture after the bankruptcy to a customer culture. >> Ms, Barra, GM knew about the defect in the ignition switches as far as 2001, 13 years before the recall, correct? "Yes" or "no" will work. >> The investigation will tell us that. >> Bob: There's no question that General Motors has taken its licks in the U.S. Its CEO has twice been summoned to testify on Capitol Hill. There are two on-going congressional investigations and another with the Department of Justice. And the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has fined GM the maximum allowed by law, $35 million for not publicly disclosing the defects in its ignition switches. But here in Canada, our safety regulators at Transport Canada have taken no official action against GM whatsoever. Though almost 400,000 Canadian cars are on that GM ignition switch recall list. And listen to federal Transport Minister Lisa Raitt in the House of Commons explaining exactly when her department first learned of the GM ignition switch problem. >> Transport Canada was not aware of an ignition switch issue prior to receiving its first notice from GM Canada in February. >> Bob: So Raitt told Parliament that Transport Canada didn't know about the ignition switch issue until the rest of us found out, when GM announced that massive recall. That was February 2014. The problem, as we're about to show you, is that that appears not to be true. Remember, it was June 2013 when 23-year-old college student Dany Dubuc-Marquis died in the crash of his Chevy Cobalt. That was eight months before GM announced its recall. Dany's dad Normand told Transport Canada his son had been drinking heavily with friends that fateful night. But when he saw the fatal wreck, he immediately noticed something else that troubled him. Within days, Quebec police contacted Transport Canada investigators at their lab at the Ecole Polytechnic in Montreal. They wanted to know, with such severe frontal damage, why didn't the airbags deploy? And Transport Canada learned something else. At some point after Dany's Cobalt left the road during what investigators call the collision event, the ignition somehow moved from "on" to "accessory." How did that happen? According to documents obtained by "The Fifth Estate," Transport Canada investigators would soon identify a possible link between those two suspicious events. Two weeks after Dany died, an internal E-mail to verify if the fact that the ignition switch was in the "accessory" position could have influenced anything with the non-deployment event. The next week, a phone call from Transport Canada to discuss the possible influence on the air bag system of the ignition switch in the "accessory" position and in October, a note about the sharing of complaints, presumably including the ignition switch issue with the vehicle manufacturer, in other words, General Motors. But again, listen to Lisa Raitt months later denying any knowledge of the defective switch or the role it played in Dany Dubuc-Marquis' death. >> There was no connection made to that previous accident that the honourable member referred to that happened unfortunately in June of last year. >> Bob: But Lisa Raitt's own departmental file showed Transport Canada had indeed investigated that connection. Lisa Raitt declined our request for an interview. However, Transport Canada did make available its director-general of motor vehicle safety, Kash Ram. Did Transport Canada know that this was an issue before February the 10th, 2014? >> Please define "issue." >> Bob: Well, you might ask Lisa Raitt that. Here's what she said in Parliament, "Transport Canada was not aware of an ignition switch issue prior to receiving its first notice from GM Canada in February 2014." So that's what the minister says, is she correct about that? >> Yes, in terms of a defect -- >> Bob: No idea it was an issue? >> No. >> Bob: But again, Transport Canada's own documents leave little doubt they knew the ignition switch of Dany Dubuc-Marquis' Chevy Cobalt might have played a role in his death. That would seem to show within a couple weeks of that crash, Transport Canada knew there could be a problem with that ignition switch. >> Now, what we determined in a number of collisions is that the switch had moved from "run" to "accessory." What we don't know in many cases today is what caused that switch to move. At the time, it was reasonable to believe that one contributor could have been a bumping of the switch. We have seen that before in a number of cases. There was no reason to rule out that the bumping of the switch could have caused it. >> Bob: Transport Canada was seemingly on the verge of figuring out the role of the ignition switch in Dany Dubuc-Marquis' death. They knew the ignition had mysteriously moved somehow to the "accessory" position but rather than take the next step and hone in on proving why it moved, Transport Canada apparently said, well, he might have bumped the switch, and that's where they left it, effectively shutting down their investigation. And Transport Canada sent Dany's Cobalt to a local junkyard where it would remain for months until after the GM recall in February. According to Clarence Ditlow of the U.S. Centre for Auto Safety, Transport Canada is not known as an especially proactive organization. >> We look at Transport Canada from time to time just in terms of are they doing the same recall in Canada, are they investigating in Canada the defects that are being investigated here and when it comes to recalls, it looks like Canada is a hand-me-down country. >> Bob: What do you mean by that? >> They get recalls handed down from the U.S. I mean, the best that Canada's going to get in terms of recalls is what the U.S. does and if the U.S. misses it, Canada is going to miss it. And then sometimes Canada doesn't even act. >> Bob: When we return, the life or death stakes of a recall that comes too late. >> He died for a 57-cent piece that should have been fixed over ten years ago. (♪♪) >> Bob: The city of Detroit, Michigan, look its best from high above after years of lay-offs, bankruptcies and recalls. But Detroit remains the capital of the American automobile industry which de facto makes it the capital of Canada's automobile industry. Even the minister in charge of Canadian auto safety acknowledges crucial decisions for Canada, like those concerning the ignition switch, are made in executive suites south of the border. >> Mr. Chair, the timing of when the parent company knew of this defect is actually under investigation by U.S. authorities. We know that GM Canada does not act independently of its parent company and decision making like this recalls is centralized as it is with other manufacturers. >> Bob: And not only do American car companies like GM call the shots for their Canadian subsidiaries, but the laws governing motor vehicle safety in Canada are far weaker than those in the U.S. American regulators can order the recall of cars with safety defects. In Canada, Transport Canada has no such power. The best it can do is to request a recall, which the manufacturer can refuse. The result could be years spent in court. And under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Transport Canada can only regulate GM Canada which almost everyone agrees mostly rubber stamps corporate decisions that are made in Detroit. We asked Kash Ram, Transport Canada's director-general of motor vehicle safety, what GM Canada told them about the switch from hell. Did GM Canada ever let you know that there was a problem with those ignition switches? >> GM Canada did not say that there were problems with the ignition switches, no, they did not. And GM Canada did not admit to a problem until such time that the recall was decided upon by the parent firm, GM U.S. >> Bob: But under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, GM Canada is obliged to disclose a safety defect in a timely fashion. "Timely" meaning what? >> Well, "timely" meaning upon becoming aware. Now, it will depend based on circumstances, in some cases it's days, typically it's days, upon determining, upon becoming aware that there is a safety-related defect. >> Bob: Is almost a decade-and-a-half in timely fashion? >> They have admitted fault, but we have to see -- we have -- it has to be evidence-based. >> Bob: Has General Motors Canada owned up to the fact that before that recall in February 2014, they knew about the ignition switch issue? >> At this point in time, we have no evidence to suggest that GM Canada did not comply with its obligations under the Canadian law but it's not closed yet. We continue to scrutinize their actions. >> Bob: But there is evidence that the GM Canada head office in Oshawa knew of the ignition switch problems long before February. GM Canada president Kevin Williams declined our interview request. But according to a written statement to us, GM Canada participated in company meetings in mid-December 2013 when the ignition switch issue was raised. So that was two months before the recall. But then there's this, from 2005, almost a decade earlier, the service bulletin sent by GM to its dealers in Canada and the U.S. Remember, that was when General Motors in the U.S. was about to secretly replace the defective part without letting its customers know. Among the cars with that ignition defect, the Chevy Cobalt, the Saturn Ion and another GM compact, the Pontiac Pursuit. Automotive watchdog Clarence Ditlow asks how could GM Canada not know about that? >> The Pontiac Pursuit is on that bulletin. That's sold only in Canada. You know, here's a bulletin that says the ignition goes to the "accessory" position and GM Canada doesn't know about it on a Canadian car sold in Canada? No, I don't believe that. (♪♪) >> Bob: So if GM Canada had done more to get those dangerous cars off the road when it first learned of the ignition switch problem, what difference might it have made? Well, consider a case we discovered that took place in Montreal in March, six weeks after the recall. 55-year-old Danylo Kulish was on the way to pick up his girlfriend at Trudeau Airport. He was driving his 2006 Saturn Ion when it happened. His younger brother Taras. >> And it was a clear day, there was no snowstorm. He was driving southbound on Highway 13. And lost control. He went straight into the cement pillar that divided the highway and the exit so the pillar that's right there, he went right in. Full frontal crash. >> Bob: Danylo Kulish was pronounced dead of massive internal injuries. The Kulish family says no one told them about the GM recall until after his death. >> My sister was watching TV, and she saw a report, a TV report, on this woman who was holding a picture of her daughter who she said died in a Saturn Ion the same type of situation. >> Bob: It soon became clear Danylo's crash looked very much like the others involving GM vehicles with defective ignition switches. >> Bob: No skidmarks? >> No skidmarks which implies he did not brake or could not brake because the three things that happen is you lose power steering, any kind of power steering, you lose your power brakes, and the airbags don't deploy upon impact. >> Bob: And the clinching detail, they say investigators told them the ignition was found in the "accessory" position. Kash Ram insists blame for the death of Danylo Kulish lies not with Transport Canada but how long it took GM to admit its mistakes. >> They say if Transport Canada had taken more of an interest in this, had taken the Dubuc-Marquis crash seriously or more seriously, he might be alive today. What would you say to them? >> I can't speak to the family. It's a tragic loss when anyone dies in one of these crashes. It's very unfortunate, I can't speak to GM's action in that regard. You'll have to ask GM why that was the case. >> It angers me because why should we be waiting for anything from the United States? I mean, Transport Canada should be its own independent organization and should be able to react accordingly to what is going on here and they're just -- they're nowhere to be seen or found. >> Bob: It's a sentiment shared by the family of Dany Dubuc-Marquis. They wonder about the premature end to Transport Canada's initial investigation of Dany's death. Whatever GM decides about any claims for compensation from the Dubuc family, for its part, Transport Canada insists it did a good job. >> GM can speak for themselves in terms of the evidence they have in hand. We speak based on the very close, very careful assessment we have done of these crashes. >> Bob: Though Dany's dad Normand is critical of Transport Canada, he maintains the real blame belongs to General Motors. And after all the promises about a new customer culture, the Kulish family got this letter addressed to Danylo and sent after the crash that killed him. In it, GM CEO Mary Barra apologized for what she called the inconvenience or frustration caused by how the ignition switch problems were handled. By then, Danylo Kulish had been dead for five months. >> He died for no reason. He died for a 57-cent piece that should have been fixed over ten years ago. And would have cost them hardly anything if they would have just done the right thing from day one. (♪♪) >> Bob: But the lesson of the General Motors ignition switch is that, inevitably, it will happen again. >> The problem is that in North America, you know, safety is not job number one for any of the car companies. And the regulatory agencies either here in the U.S. or Canada are not up to the job of policing the auto industry. >> Bob: So until safety does become job one for the automobile industry, with 23 million motor vehicles in Canada and without Canadian laws that can assure they're safe, the next switch from hell may already be somewhere out there on the road. (♪♪) >> Bob: A final note on our story. After General Motors admitted the pattern of incompetence and neglect which allowed that defective ignition switch to remain hidden for so long, it dismissed 15 of its employees, including the engineer responsible for the switch from hell, Ray DeGiorgio. But GM insists no one in a senior executive position had any knowledge of what was going on, which, given GM's corporate culture, some critics find hard to believe. ♪ ♪
Great Doc
Why should the key even turn to accessories while the car is running? If that’s going to stop your engine and lose braking/power steering. Can’t say I’ve ever drove a car in the uk that would allow this.
Slightly more resistance? Why not make it impossible