German Leadership WW2: Genius or Insanity? | Animated History

despite being jostled and bounced about by the primitive suspension of his tank the german radio operator remains calm as he listens to the chatter between his unit and the others currently sweeping through the small commune of aven the news is always the same the french are in full retreat and the 7th panzer division is advancing so fast that even high command cannot keep track of them but not everything is perfect at that moment neither man cares about the demands of some senior staff officer a hundred miles away from the front line their orders come from rommel and thanks to his leadership they have taken more ground in a day than the german empire could in three years as men back at headquarters continue yelling demands for information and reports across the airwaves the ghost division rumbles onwards to victory hi i'm griffin johnson the armchair historian in the decades since the second world war the rise and fall of nazi germany has been analyzed from countless angles but one question that's often overlooked is how big of a role german leadership played in the downfall were the men who commanded the armies of the third reich military geniuses brought down by impossible odds incompetent madmen driven by pure luck or somewhere in between in this video we'll try to answer that question by examining the military hierarchy of nazi germany and how their decisions led their country first to conquest then to ruin during the second world war burn out and poor nutrition was a major issue faced by german officers resulting in brilliant strategies like irwin rommel suffering serious bouts of illness and poor health while on campaign that's why the sponsor of today's video is gnome sign up today with noom by going to noom.com armchair historian and take advantage of a program that combines proven cognitive behavior therapy techniques and the power of modern technology nume asks just 10 minutes a day from its users and provides long-term results coaching you on how to change your behavior and improve your lifestyle as a busy person i appreciate that nume doesn't take the world from its users but instead develops a roadmap for their specific health needs and goals and proposes simple incremental changes that result in a lasting impact some members of our production team were enthusiastic to try new out and they especially liked the meal log and intuitive food classification system which simplifies how to think about caloric intake and what to eat and why as well as the lessons designed to highlight motivations behind some of the food choices we make and identify the root causes of issues like stress or anxiety and how to manage them get started on noom today by taking a simple 30 second quiz at noom.com armchair historian or download noom via the link in the description below [Music] since adolf hitler's initial rise to power in 1933 his sights were set on the complete consolidation and control of the german military which he finally achieved in 1938 two manufactured scandals collectively known as the blomberg fritch affair led to the removal of war minister verner von blamberg and commander-in-chief werner von fritsch from their posts this allowed for hitler to take over as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and restructure the ministry of war into the uber commando der vermasht or okw hitler appointed wilhelm keitel a man quickly won over to the fuhrer as chief of okw's general staff and made alfred yodel another loyalist head of the wfst or operation staff these men particularly kaidel functioned as little more than mouthpieces for adolf hitler a means to ensure his hold on the military was absolute beneath yodel and kaidal the okw was split into three main branches the okh army high command initially led by army commander-in-chief walter von brauj the okm commander of the navy led by naval commander-in-chief and grand admiral eric raider and the okl commander of the air force headed by its air force commander-in-chief hermann goering these branches all reported to the okw on operational matters but aside from semi-regular interventions by adolf hitler himself their leaders avoided joint consultation and operated more or less independently the structure of the military hierarchy became even more disjointed in 1940 with the introduction of the waffen-ss as an independent fourth branch of the armed services that answered only to hitler under die hard nazi heinrich himmler the ss operated with a separate budget administration training centers uniform and rank system assigned to support the vermost in the field ss units tended to operate without the approval or even knowledge of the okw disconnected though they were all branches of the german military under the nazis were united by one thing complete subservience to the will of adolf hitler while certainly not omnipotent in his dealings with the military it is impossible to deny the overbearing influence this one man had on the destiny of his self-proclaimed reich while not as incompetent as many have since depicted him hitler possessed a set of ideals that resulted in many of his decisions not being entirely guided by careful calculated assessments of the situation at hand rather he was driven by his beliefs namely that his so-called aryan race was superior to all others after their incredible victory in france this view spread throughout the high command confirming in the minds of hitler and his inner circle that they were unstoppable and that nazism was the key to achieving total victory this conviction was unshakable and behind every order hitler gave in his time as fearer lay a certainty that if his people simply held firm and followed his orders they could not possibly be defeated contrary to the post-war grumbling of many prominent generals germany's military elites were all more than happy to fall in line with the nazi regime even before later victories lent hitler's ideas a veneer of legitimacy many of these men shared the nazi's goals others were bought with lavish gifts of cash land and tax exemptions and others feared the anger of the people if they went against the leader who had secured their complete devotion in other words whether out of genuine devotion mutual benefit bribery or fear all but a handful of germany's military leaders were fully committed to the nazi vision of a thousand-year reich for all their later claims of discontent and unwilling cooperation with madman hitler many of his generals stuck by him all the way through the war right up until the reich started to collapse around them [Music] [Music] the most defining features of nazi germany's military leadership stemmed for better and for worse from the fact that ultimate authority over all operations rested on a single man regardless of any strategic assessments logistical concerns or consensus among his advisors adolf hitler could make any decision he wanted about the course of the war and everyone else would simply have to obey at the best of times this meant that the labyrinthine military bureaucracy could be bypassed with the stroke of the fuhrer's pen sweeping changes in doctrine tactics and equipment could be implemented instantly letting the vermost adapt to new circumstances with breathtaking speed this stood in stark contrast to the allied forces who often had to put up with months of committee meetings field tests and observational trials before implementing even the smallest innovations on the other hand this system encouraged officers to bitterly compete with each other for power and prestige as whoever could catch hitler's ear at a crucial moment would usually receive preferential treatment this extreme inter-service rivalry inevitably resulted in germany's resources being squandered on feudal wonder weapon projects or simply hoarded by one branch of the military for the sake of denying them to the competition this is not to say that the high command made nothing but snap decisions based on personal intuition far from it hitler's vermosh inherited a tradition of military philosophy and command structures going back to the 19th century later refined through the interwar period through weimar reformists like hans von say one of these strategic traditions the most innovative and important was kriegspiela or wargames a series of planning exercises aimed at examining the strengths and weaknesses of every player active in the field of war alongside these laborious planning stages the decentralized nature of german tactical command worked most to their advantage during the early stages of the war thanks to the philosophy of offstrack tactic or mission type tactics this approach emphasized that it was the outcome of a mission that mattered most not the individual steps to accomplish it field commanders were given great autonomy to take objectives plan offensives and direct the flow of battle without needing to run every decision up the chain of command this mythology allowed axis field commanders the freedom to make snap decisions and react dynamically to the evolving situation while enemy officers were still waiting to be acknowledged by their seniors the invasion of france was perhaps the quintessential example of mission type tactics in action proceeding so quickly that the 7th panzer division was completely unreachable led by irwin rommel this armored division moved so swiftly and independently that neither their enemies nor their superiors could locate them earning the unit the nickname ghost division meanwhile the strategic picture was further muddled by the actions of the ss who were deployed to pursue their own objectives only sometimes in connection to the rest of the army but as high command struggled to keep up with the situation the men on the ground were busy taking the principles of auftrak tactique to heart led by veterans of the great war the vermont was able to engage in a series of stunning offensive maneuvers that caught their enemies completely off guard astonishingly field officers managed to organize a coherent strategy of rapid combined arms warfare more or less on the fly using military theories and concepts that had formally existed only as thought exercises or at best small-scale experiments during the invasions of poland and czechoslovakia such improvisation would have caused the immediate disintegration of any other army in europe but the highly disciplined and motivated german soldiers maintained implicit trust in their leaders even when supplies were running short and seemingly insurmountable odds lay before them unfortunately for germany the tactical genius displayed by officers in the field only really served to compensate for the deeply dysfunctional structure of the okw instead of learning from their successes and forging closer ties in the face of adversity senior officers became more and more obsessed with hoarding power and influence for themselves with hitler able to appoint and dismiss officers entirely at his own discretion job stability within the third reich was non-existent incentivizing bitter inter-service rivalries in essence the german system was best at producing lone wolf officers men who could confidently tackle any assignment but who refused to set aside their differences to take down larger prey in contrast to the chaos which would later come german strategists had ample time before the war to plan for their first invasions and this thoroughness swiftly dismembered the czechoslovakian and polish states in the latter campaign the strategy of spreading german forces across the polish borders to achieve a pincer maneuver proved extremely effective but it required taking extreme risks that conventional military wisdom would have deemed unacceptable general eric von manstein later wrote of the superior discipline and fighting spirit of the german soldiers but also acknowledged that much of the invasion's unexpected success came in part to the loser's own mistakes and above all as a result of the complete inaction of poland's western allies at the time of her defeat though the okw had hoped for a period of calm to analyze the reports of the polish campaign hitler's announcement of the imminent invasion of france threw everything into a frenzy during the months that followed okh officers went back and forth with hitler and among themselves to try and form a cohesive plan to invade france the strategy which emerged known as falgelb called for the main assault into northern belgium through the netherlands engaging anglo-french forces across a long front unbeknownst to the germans this attack was exactly what the allies were preparing for their defensive strategy at the time known as the dial plan was designed to push back a traditional invasion through northern belgium by erecting a strong defensive line from givet to antwerp along the mews and dial rivers keenly aware of fall gelb's weaknesses general heinz guderian and eric von manstein engaged in a bitter feud with its chief proponent the much more conservative and restrained garrett van roensten guderian later wrote the situation became even tenser when it became clear that not even colonel general von roonstedt had any clear idea about the potentialities of tanks and declared himself in favor of the more cautious solution now is the time when we needed a manstein what saved the germans was perhaps a stroke of luck on january 10 1940 a german aircraft carrying details of fall gelb crashed in belgium this crash later known as the mekolin incident gave the allies crucial intelligence about the german plans and consequently forced hitler and his generals to reconsider fall gelb at this crucial turning point general manstein convinced the fuhrer to adopt his plan for the invasion drive an armored spearhead through the ardennes forest in the south as the main assault while distracting the allies with a secondary attack in the north the manstein plan relying on more modern tactics than its predecessor was a shocking success leading to the capitulation of france in only six weeks the germans followed up their conquest of france with a series of quick decisive victories in the balkans rapidly toppling yugoslavia and greece from the outside the nazi war machine seemed like an unstoppable juggernaut executing its operations with perfect discipline and efficiency peeling back the curtain however reveals a more complicated state of affairs the balkans campaign was a success but these strategists in the general staff were flying by the seat of their pants through most of the operations and major strategic decisions continued to be made on the basis of whichever scheme hitler could be persuaded of at a given time this almost felt disaster in crete where the luftwaffe attempted a mass paratrooper landing that nearly cost them an entire airborne division this highlighted a critical weakness in the nazi organizational structure as they had no way of assessing the merits of new unorthodox tactics except by implementing them on the battlefield however it was on the eastern front that the disjointed and competitive nature of the german high command started to cost them dearly operation barbarossa was wildly successful at first but the lack of communication between the branches of the military caused immediate logistical problems not helped by hitler's constant micromanagement which had begun to alienate his commanders in the field then as soon as the mighty lightning assault faltered hitler began seeking out scapegoats laying the blame on the old guard officers who were not fully subservient to him and his ideology he fired browhich after the general's stress-induced heart attack replacing him as head of the okh then proceeded on a spree of forced retirements and dismissals by the beginning of 1942 over 30 generals core and division commanders and senior officers were removed from command the leaders who had won so many victories largely through their own skill and determination in the absence of communication from high command were gone those who remained became increasingly reluctant to bring bad news to the fuhrer or contradict him in any way instead the generals operating along the eastern front began increasingly over-promising on what their depleted units could still achieve still hoping to earn a greater portion of the army's rapidly dwindling resources this trend spelled disaster nowhere more so than at stalingrad logistical failures and a lack of coordination plagued the assaulting forces all while those at the top stubbornly insisted that total victory was just around the corner general hans yeshconnect one of the senior officers of the okl assured hitler that the luftwaffe could keep the troops trapped in stalingrad supplied despite their complete inability to do so general manstein also strongly urged the fuhrer not to order the encircled sixth army to break out insisting he could break through these soviet lines with his own men and relieve stalingrad however such a feat was wholly beyond his capabilities by that point and the forces in stalingrad were abandoned with their loss went any hope of victory on the eastern front by 1944 the writing was on the wall for nazi germany fooled by allied misdirection campaigns the german leaders failed to foresee or adequately defend against the normandy landings with a new western front opened and the eastern front close to collapsing there was not much anyone could have done to turn the tides meanwhile hitler continued to tighten his grip on the military even further after a failed assassination attempt on july 20th over 7 000 suspected collaborators were arrested and nearly 4 500 were executed there was almost nobody left at this point who could go against the increasingly erratic whims of adolf hitler he ordered scorched earth tactics to deny the allies the chance to resupply and launched a series of hopeless counter-attacks in a desperate effort to secure a separate peace with the western allies the endless string of failures and disappointments that followed were blamed on those senior officers who remained many of these men including field marshals gunther von kluge and erwin rummel chose to take their own lives rather than face disgrace and execution at their leader's hands by 1945 when the german military was disintegrating entirely most remaining officers began to abandon the sinking ship many moved to save their ill-gotten fortunes shifting the cash that had bought their loyalty for so long out of german banks and into hidden vaults the few shreds of okw that remained took it upon themselves to coordinate their troops retreat so that as few men as possible wound up in soviet hands hitler remained fanatical and defiant until the end but by this point there was no germany left to carry out his orders when hitler ended his own life on april 30th it fell to the former head of naval high command admiral carl donates to negotiate the unconditional surrender of germany this was a fitting end for a military leadership that was marred by infighting and miscommunication from start to finish with a man at the top who alternated between obsessively controlling all facets of the military and passively endorsing whichever of his bickering advisors caught his attention alongside a fragmented high command rarely capable of working together [Music] you

Channel: The Armchair Historian

Views: 1,114,114

Keywords: WW2, Adolf Hitler, Hitler's High Command, Was hitler crazy, was hitler on drugs?, the german leadership, germany in ww2, structure of the german command, german strategy in the second world war

Id: 1LcwLRqWw_I

Length: 21min 30sec (1290 seconds)

Published: Sat Feb 26 2022