The Scandies Rose, a crab vessel known
in the industry for its stability, was the type of fishing boat deckhands would
strive to work for. Known in local circles as "The Battleship" or "The Tank", this vessel, like
many other reputable workhorses in Alaskan crab fishing earned the nicknames through decades of
survival and success in brutal conditions. These conditions are unpredictable and can have deadly
consequences, even for the most seasoned mariners. Laid down by Bender Shipbuilding out of Mobile,
Alabama, launched in 1978 and originally named "Enterprise" the boat was built for one purpose;
pot fishing. Pot fishing vessels require expansive decks that will be loaded and offloaded
constantly stacked as high as the ship's bridge. Most importantly, their ability to remain stable
being crucial throughout these operations. Crab season frequently sees these boats
pushed hard through high seas, difficult navigation, freezing temperatures and an often
underestimated silent killer; the buildup of ice. The Enterprise would change hands in 1989
renamed to The Scandies Rose owned and operated by Scandies Rose Fishing Company LLC it
was essentially a one ship company, common in the world of crab fishing. At a length of 130 feet or
39.6 meters, The Scandies Rose would also feature a width or beam of 34.6 feet, a draft depth
of about 11.3 feet and a gross tonnage of 195. Powered by twin Detroit Diesel 12 cylinder
engines, total horsepower would be about 1,610 or 805 horsepower to each screw. This
setup providing enough maneuverability to navigate unforgiving Alaskan waters. With no
major incidents to speak of prior to December 2019 and only minor modifications during routine
repairs the Scandies Rose remained mostly as built throughout its life. The vessel had seen operation
in waters like the Puget Sound, Bering Sea, Gulf of Alaska and was the subject of episode 8
in season 16 on Deadliest Catch, airing June 2nd 2020. The Scandies Rose was Captained by 45-year
fishing veteran Gary Cobban Jr. Part owner of the boat, Cobban was a man known by his colleagues
as; a "Great Captain" that was, "Surprisingly Safety Conscious" and, "The Most Experienced
Fisherman They'd Ever Met." He saw frequent success in Alaskan waters. The ship and captain
well known to the industry and enthusiasts alike. In Spring of 2019, the vessel received a
thorough valuation by independent third party; Fisherman's Maritime Services Incorporated. The
Scandie's Rose, hauled out at Loveric Shipyard near Seattle for dry dock inspection, then floated
in fresh water nearby for service suitability. The vessel's owners considering the boat's sale,
needed to determine market value prior to moving forward. These inspection companies check vessels
like these professionally, from stem to stern, electronics to engines, toilets and plumbing
to decking. Every corner and weld inspected and conditions evaluated. The total market value,
determined after a three month long process, to be 3.5 million dollars; the value it should sell for.
But a replacement value of 15 million if lost. In fact, noted by the inspection company;
"The vessel is well constructed with very good scantlings and workmanship. The construction of
this vessel is extraordinary for a boat built by Bender Shipbuilding during the late 1970s.
The craftsmanship, materials and design are on par with the best of the
west coast built fishing boats." Starting Sunday December 29, in the Kodiak
port, preparations for what was to be a Cod and Opilio Crab fishing voyage began. On
board were captain Cobban and six crew members; one acting as engineer, another as deck
boss and the remaining four as deck hands. The crew's experience ranging from brand
new to 20 years in fishing and seafaring. The captain's son among them; David Leigh Cobban.
They would use the next day and a half prepping the vessel for a planned departure of Monday the
30th. Their destination? Fishing grounds in the Bering Sea on the north side of the Aleutian
Islands, a roughly two to three day journey. The Cod and Opilio or "Snow Crab" season
set to open Wednesday January 1st and last roughly two to three weeks. This new year season
bringing numerous boats out to get their share. During the nearly two day prep, 195
crab pots were stacked and secured, groceries and potable water brought aboard,
fuel holds filled, bilge pumps checked, hatches tightened, bait stocks replenished and
the vessel prepped according to U.S. Coast Guard stability specifications. On Monday the 30th
the captain covered safety drills with the crew providing instructions on; donning survival suits,
fire suppression, life raft locations & operation, the location of the vessel's Emergency
Position Indicating Radio Beacon or "EPIRB" and how to perform MAYDAY calls
using comms equipment on the bridge. Crew members would describe Captain Cobban's
routine safety drills as, "very thorough." The crew also discussed weather forecasts along
their proposed route and utilized the "Windy" app to receive forecast info. The captain and
crew knowing the weather was quote; "...going to be bad." The forecast called for heavy gales
and warnings for heavy freezing spray. However, rough weather is generally the norm for these
mariners and these areas in the Gulf of Alaska are notorious for it. In fact, several other vessels
would leave out that same evening regardless. The Scandies Rose got underway
from the port at Kodiak by 8:35 pm Monday December 30th. The intended route would
see the vessel pass through Kupreanof Strait, then southwest toward the Shelikof Strait and
on through False Pass opening to Bechevin Bay and ultimately, the Bering Sea. On a steady
southwesterly course at a speed of 8-10 knots the captain would be at the helm in six hour
shifts. Each remaining crew member alternating in for one hour shifts, covering the opposite
six while the captain rests. Then the rotation would repeat. These vessels often maintain such
schedules to allow ample rest time but also because mariners aboard typically need to gain
crucial experience in all manner of seafaring. Each vessel may have their own variation
but in general deckhands are expected to, "wear many hats" as it were. Each crew member
also making the rounds at the end of each watch to ensure engines, auxiliary equipment and
other systems are in good working order. Ice accumulation (accretion) in these waters
is common, although difficult to fully predict, it was thought to be factored in when using
those predetermined stability calculations. When freezing spray from wind and waves begins
to accumulate, the gathering ice becomes heavy; changing the center of gravity, creating weight
imbalances, causing heavy lists, even capsizing and sinking vessels. Although commercial fishing
deaths in U.S. waters have been declining steadily over the past few decades, the dangers are ever
present. The FV Destination, a fishing boat similar to The Scandies Rose, capsized and sank
and lost all souls aboard in February of 2017. The vessel, found by investigators to have been
overcome by ice accumulation on its fishing pot stack, leading to a deadly unrecoverable list. In
icing conditions, the mesh of fishing pots acts as a sort of catch-net, increasing accumulation
drastically. After a long investigation though it was also found that the Destination had left port
overloaded, its stability compromised beforehand. "Stability" or to oversimplify; a vessel's
ability to remain upright and not roll over, plays a crucial role in the world of shipping and
understanding it is vital for any master and crew from the smallest row boat to the largest
container ships. The combination of ballast water, fuel and oil acting as ballast, securing cargo,
the overall load carried on decks before during and after, weight change, load shift, fishing,
stacking, unloading... All these factors must be accounted for in maintaining stability, especially
crucial if the vessel is meant to navigate rough waters. These fishing boats and their
crews make their living navigating rough waters. Captain Cobban took over the watch the next
morning, 8 am Tuesday December 31st. The weather living up to predictions. Deckhands reported a
couple waves over the bow throughout the night and freezing spray accumulating to about an
inch thick, on the starboard side of the pot stack. The crew noting that it was not enough
to require removal yet and many captains in the industry stating they don't attempt
ice removal until at least a few inches have gathered. That quote; "Anything less would
be too difficult and time consuming to remove." Ice removal also requires the vessel be idle and
somewhat sheltered like a cove or natural bay, ensuring spray is reduced in the meantime,
pointing into the wind and minimizing dangers to the crew as they negotiate icy exposed decking,
climbing over and maneuvering around pot stacks wielding heavy tools like sledge
hammers in efforts to break it off. Despite the poor conditions, the vessel maintained
an even keel. The winds at an approximate 30-50 knots with 20-30 foot seas. The Scandies Rose had
transited the Shelikof Strait, entering more open waters. At 11:18 am, the captain placed a call via
satellite phone to the fishing vessel "Amatuli". The Amatuli was en-route to Dutch Harbor. Several
hours prior it had made the same journey but chose to navigate around Kodiak island to the south due
to differences in tides. The Amatuli's captain, majority and managing owner of The Scandies Rose,
spoke with captain Cobban for about 12 minutes. The conversation however, was fairly unremarkable.
The only reference to conditions being the Amatuli's captain stating they pulled into a
sheltered cove briefly as the weather was quote "foul". Captain Cobban remarking at the end of
their call only that it was quote, "very cold" his vessel was experiencing light
icing and the sea conditions were poor. Again, for fishing operations like these
though, just another day at the office. At about 2pm the captain ended his watch and The
Scandies Rose crew began their six hour rotation. The vessel's average speed had slowed a bit from
about 8 to 6.5 knots but was still maintaining a steady course to the southwest. Weather
conditions deteriorated throughout the afternoon. The vessel churning its way through high seas,
the spray increasing from both worsening weather and the bow crashing through wave after wave.
The spray freezing and ice accumulating further. By 7:15 pm a crew member woke the captain for
his evening watch. Once on the bridge the two discussed the deteriorating conditions.
The vessel had developed a two degree list to starboard due to ice buildup on the pot
stacks and superstructure. At this point though, two degrees was not exactly concerning. More
importantly, ice buildup was at roughly two inches and the vessel could correct this
by transferring fuel within tanks. The fuel already acts as ballast and shifting
it to maintain stability temporarily, while not ideal, is also somewhat commonplace, especially
under the circumstances. The boat's engineer already assuming it would be needed before the
captain even asked. By most industry standards, fellow captains and peers agreed they'd have
made the same decision to press on. At about 8pm captain Cobban called a friend in North
carolina to wish her a Happy New Year. She didn't hear anything alarming by the sound of
his voice and that he only casually mentioned the vessel was icing, had a slight list and they would
eventually need to; "tuck in some place safe." Shortly after, roughly eight
miles northeast of Sutwik Island, captain Cobban called the Amatuli once again. The
Amatuli was just about to enter Dutch Harbor now. The two men discussed the weather, Scandies
Rose condition and the captain of the Amatuli advising Cobban to quote, "be cautious."
The call not overtly concerning in nature. The wind howling at an approximate 60 to 70 knots
or more now, temperatures around 12 degrees and seas 30 feet or more. The Scandies Rose starboard
list had rapidly increased to about 20 degrees, enough to warrant the vessel make for the closest
shelter they could find. At around 8:40 p.m, five and a half miles due east of Sutwik
Island, captain Cobban called the fishing vessel Pacific Sounder. The Sounder was currently
in the Bering Sea preparing to fish for cod. Its captain, longtime friend of Cobban and fellow
fishermen, stated The Scandies Rose captain was concerned about a 20-degree list and that icing
was really bad but also that Cobban stated it was too rough to send the crew out and break ice. That
he was going to try and seek shelter southeast of sutwik island. However, the Sounders captain noted
the captain's tone wasn't that of any urgency, even following up with casual conversation about
the recent holidays and small talk about vessel ownership. At which point the Sounder's captain
needed to end the roughly 30 minute long chat, at 9:10 pm so he could tend to his own
vessel's generator in the engine room. 9:45 pm and the Automatic Identification Systems
or A.I.S., showed the Scandies Rose transponder two and a half miles south of Sutwik Island
turned about 50 degrees to starboard. The vessel, altering to a northwesterly course toward
the refuge of Sutwik's natural southern bays. The captain on the Pacific Sounder had completed
his task in the engine room at about the same time, 9:45pm when he decided to call captain
Cobban back. He grew instantly concerned when the veteran captain's normally stoic tone had
changed, telling him worriedly; "I don't know how this is going to go, the list has gotten a
lot worse." The connection was abruptly cut and the Sounder's captain attempted to call back 10
or more times but the system could not connect. On board The Scandies Rose, icing had become
so overwhelming on the starboard side, after what was thought to be sudden
bursts of even more violent gales, that the now rolling vessel, creaking
and groaning under the stress, jolted two crew members from their bunks
below decks; friends Dean and John. The Vanishing Angle of the fishing boat in its
current state, or the maximum degree of list after which a vessel becomes unstable and can no longer
right itself, was approximately 30 to 35 degrees, down considerably from about 40 to 45. When The
Scandies Rose was on its southwesterly course, those near hurricane force winds,
almost perpendicular to the vessel, were blasting it steadily on the starboard side.
Although the winds were causing the accumulation of ice they were also aiding, deceptively,
in the vessel's ability to remain upright. By the time captain cobb had turned toward the
bays of Sutwik Island, the ice accumulation was enough that it reduced overall stability,
the severity of this though investigators thought to be obfuscated by those deceiving
winds acting as a sort of crutch all along, preventing the list from worsening further before
the turn. The turn towards Sutwik brought the prevailing winds and waves from the overloaded
starboard side, around partially to port. Now, with all forces pushing and acting towards
starboard the vessel was unfortunately doomed. When Dean and John had jumped
up from their bunks, rollover was only minutes away. Overhearing that brief
final conversation with the Pacific Sounder, one of the men rushing up to the bridge yelling to
the captain; "What is going on!?" Captain Cobban responding flustered; "I don't know, I don't know,
I think we're sinking!" The deckhand yelled down to his friend in the stateroom; "The boat is
sinking!" Everything started happening extremely fast, no alarms had been sounded and the captain
would place the mayday call soon after while crew members scrambled. The two deckhands quickly
located their immersion suits in the wheelhouse helping each other to get them on and the
rest of the crew joined shortly thereafter. All the while the vessel's angle reaching nearly
90 degrees, floors slowly becoming slick walls. Dean and John knew somewhat by instinct at this
point that they all needed to abandon ship, fast. Helping a couple others with their suits
was proving nearly impossible in the confusion and quickly worsening situation. They
described the scene as "pure chaos." Several of the men still inside screaming;
"We're gonna die, oh my god we're gonna die!" Hyperventilating in sheer panic. John and Dean
also quote; "freaking out" internally but trying to talk calmly to each other. Determined to
take those few potential steps towards survival with their suits on, John then Dean exited
via a port side door to get out on deck, the immersion suits big bulky gloves
making it difficult for articulation. The MAYDAY call by captain Cobban was
broadcast at approximately 9:55 pm, at some point amidst the chaos and panicked
screams surrounding him in the wheelhouse. As the rollover continued unabated, the remaining
four crew and captain were still inside the bridge not nearly as collected as the other two.
Dean and John repeatedly screaming at them; "Get Out, Get Out, Get The **** Out of There!
The Boat's Going Down!" The men scrambling around outside the bridge trying to find a line
or anything to throw down inside and help the others climb up and out of the wheelhouse. But
everything; lines, life rings, buoys, everything nearby outside was completely frozen, there
was so much ice. Nothing was easily accessible. At this point they both knew they were down
from minutes to just a few precious seconds. Captain Gary Cobban, older than the others and
not nearly as able-bodied lost his footing on the nearly 90-degree decking and the men could
only watch as he tumbled helplessly back across the bridge striking the opposite side of the
wheelhouse. The captain's son David unwilling to leave his side as his father screamed in pain.
They saw one other crew member, Brock Rainey had fully donned his survival suit but didn't
make it in time to join the others outside. The two friends now essentially standing on
the side of the wheelhouse, were determined to remain at least atop the vessel as it completely
capsized. The Scandies Rose laid further on its side, the lights went out and they clambered
to remain atop the hull as it rolled over. Now completely in darkness, ice everywhere,
slipping, stumbling but trying to stay together. They were immediately swept off the
flat side of the hull by a powerful wave... The conditions still deadly with waves
30 foot plus, wind gusts anywhere from 50 to 70 knots the two became separated. Thrown
around in their survival suits by the violent, frigid seas. Calling out each other's
names in the hopes they could reunite, their suits floating awkwardly as they'd been
unable to inflate the bladders around the neck. The suits float on their own without them
but John's head was being dunked repeatedly as his feet floated higher than his head
at an awkward angle in the high seas. Dean witnessed the Scandies Rose' final moments
as John struggled with his own survival suit. The Rose briefly stood vertical, bow protruding
from the waves then disappeared, straight down. About 20 minutes passed and Dean spotted what
looked like the beacon light from a life raft. Still calling out for John while
swimming with everything he had, Dean headed toward the enclosed survival raft,
too tired to immediately climb in but relieved to be near it. He heard John call out in response
approaching the raft from the other side they both climbed in and took a moment to collect themselves
feeling disbelief they'd made it to this point. The life raft had done its job. This was an
eight person, pod style raft built to deploy and float to the surface automatically upon
being submerged. In addition to the external, automatic beacon already lit, it contained other
survival supplies inside. The men were aware of this and rummaged around for whatever they could
find, hoping to make their presence known through the dark, deadly weather and waves. The beacon
outside going dark after only 10 minutes or so. The suits that had saved their lives thus far
were also quite cumbersome, Dean struggling with the quote gumby gloves to open the small
packages and boxes in the survival kit. The immersion suits being all one piece meant
the gloves can't just be removed either. The suits were also allowing enough
water inside that the men could feel, it hampering their ability to stay warm and creating
extreme discomfort. The raft had steadily been taking on water as well, the seas splashing in
and all around and pieces of survival kit that were on the floor weren't floating. The water,
deep enough inside the raft now that the two had to submerge themselves to reach all the way down
and retrieve stuff, fearing the raft may capsize at any moment as well. It took about an hour but
they finally found what they were looking for; the flare gun kit. They immediately shot
all them off as the kit didn't have many. The lights had gone out on the raft already
and by their knowledge of these waters, if the Scandies Rose EPIRB had
triggered like it was supposed to, they felt rescue should have arrived toward
the end of the first hour. Their decision to fire off all flares was largely for this reason,
convinced rescuers should already be within sight. But the first hour became the second. The second
became the third. The cold was setting in. The men were soaking wet, frozen, feelings
of hope fading into confusion, despair... With repeated unsuccessful attempts to
contact the vessel after its MAYDAY, the Coast Guard sent out an urgent
broadcast on all relevant frequencies requesting vessels in the area keep
a lookout and report any sightings. When the Coast Guard contacted the fishing vessel
"Ruff & Ready" directly via satellite phone, the fishing boat was about 25 miles due west of
Scandies Rose' last known position, one of the closest in the vicinity. But they were unable to
assist due to their own struggle in the abysmal weather conditions. Other vessels potentially
within range of the captain's MAYDAY call didn't even receive it since their antennas had
iced up and were having troubles of their own. The Coast Guard's MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter
would get underway by roughly 11:30 pm from Air Station Kodiak but the Scandies Rose'
last known position was extremely remote. The weather wasn't going to let up along their
flight path either. Extra fuel had to be loaded and additional complexities in flight planning
were required. This flight was going to push the rescue helicopter and its crew to the
very edge of their range and capabilities. Coast Guard Cutter Mellon was diverted
from its patrol near Dutch Harbor as well, the Mellon's eta roughly 20 hours though.
A Coast Guard C-130 was also dispatched from Elmendorf Richardson in Anchorage to aid
in search and act as a communications platform. Earlier, once inside their raft, Dean and John
had spotted the Scandies Rose' second life raft but decided not to risk exiting theirs and just
watched it floating nearby for most of those grueling hours waiting for rescue. At roughly the
four hour mark the two men spotted what they first thought was the light from a ship's mast over near
the other life raft. They had no flares left but knew there was a functioning flashlight
they'd been saving for this very reason. They began signaling toward the light that
appeared to be investigating the other life raft, which turned out to be empty. The light suddenly
raised straight up quite a distance and the two deckhands knew instantly it was a Coast Guard
helicopter. At 2:08am Dean and John were pulled up one by one into the Jayhawk. The Coast Guard crew
even forced to de-ice to rescue swimmers goggles and dry suit throughout the process. They'd
pushed the helicopter so far it was dangerously low on fuel and had to cut auxiliary power to
conserve it, which meant no interior heating for the long ride back to Kodiak station...
finally landing safely at approximately 3:40am. Dean and John were quickly brought aboard
a waiting ambulance and onto the hospital where they were treated for hypothermia,
both making a quick physical recovery. In an interview later the rescue flight commander
stating; "they were anticipating bad weather but what they got was a lot worse, it took both
pilots to keep the helicopter flying level," stating; "the 170 mile, two and a half hour
journey was the most challenging flight of his career." Dean and John would recount events
to interviewers in as much detail as possible, especially in hopes to aid in finding survivors. The ensuing search would cover a 1,400 square mile
area using all potential drift models based on The Scandies Rose final position, on the weather
patterns and the two survivors coordinates. The Coast Guard searching tirelessly throughout
New Year's day. Multiple MH-60 helicopters C-130s and then the Cutter Mellon arrived three
hours quicker than planned, at 4:15pm. Searching in these conditions though,
even puts rescue personnel at risk and the cutter had to stop for its own ice removal
efforts that afternoon. The primary goal of such a high risk search and rescue puts victim recovery
far behind the priority of locating survivors, the likelihood of which dwindling by the hour.
And by 6:08pm on January 1st, 20 hours after captain Cobban's mayday was received by the
U.S. Coast Guard, the search was called off... The investigation that followed, was difficult
to put it simply. The owners of The Scandies Rose contracted a firm specializing in underwater
survey and salvage. The MV Endurance, a vessel that acts as a platform for high-tech survey
equipment and remote operated vehicles or ROVs, would arrive at the last known coordinates
on the morning of Monday February 10th 2020. Greeted by a diesel fuel sheen on
the surface a quarter mile long, the Endurance would use sonar to locate the
wreck on the sea floor. The Scandies Rose lay 160 feet deep on its starboard, side bow
pointing east. The Endurance, battling rough weather and tidal conditions would conduct ROV
operations in the following two to three days, providing extensive, crucial footage for
investigators. The footage helped confirm, rule out or otherwise answer several factors in the
month-long investigation that followed. Factors we will touch on shortly. Before the Endurance
was forced to depart due to deteriorating weather, the ROV observed two survival suits inside the
bridge containing the remains of victims. No other victims or survival suits were found.
On May 11th 2020, the Coast Guard sent a letter of presumed death for the captain and
four crew members to the victims families... Now, it's important to note; via thorough
investigations, witness interviews, the policies and procedures Scandies Rose had
clearly followed throughout its history, the NTSB and Coast Guard ruled out the following: Fatigue.
The vessel maintained a sufficient rotation schedule to allow rest periods. Drug and Alcohol
Use. The Scandies Rose had a well-documented no drug and alcohol policy. Survivors Dean
and John also adamant in backing this up. Vessel Maintenance, Propulsion, Steering and Hull
Integrity. The Scandies Rose was well documented to have been maintained in good condition
up to and including the incident voyage. Unexpected Down Flooding. Or, waves pouring
water into openings that lead below decks. This also ruled out as a factor prior to or
causing initial severe listing conditions. Any down flooding that occurred was well after the
vessel had reached 20 to 30 plus degrees of list perhaps most crucially though, ruled out
was the crew's loading of fishing pots, vessel stability preparations,
and the captain's decision making. So, if these weren't to blame then what happened?
A situation like this is a prime example of the need for proper research, due diligence
and how crucial an agency like the NTSB is. While not perfect, that's part of what makes the
due diligence and transparency necessary, because people aren't perfect. No human or group of humans
is. There is no pure good or evil. No bright line for right or wrong. We're all caught in the
churn, trying to coexist somewhere in the middle. Details, causes, blame can so easily be attributed
incorrectly, especially in events that transpired far away from civilization, under the cover of
darkness, obscured by terrible weather conditions. In researching this incident, for example, and
a major part of why i'm on my soapbox right now, I saw commenters on videos and articles about
it accusing the captain and crew of being drunk, simply dismissing them for taking drugs or
throwing around other baseless accusations with zero attempt at research. Hell, I even
fully admit; none of these videos I make should be used as actual research. Proper research
and knowing where to look is crucial towards informed decision making. The NTSB and Coast Guard
getting to the bottom of The Scandies Rose tragedy was a prime example of finding what
really happened amid so many challenges. Then using those findings to possibly save
more lives in the future. As you'll see, the true culprit they found, while not nearly
as headline-worthy, is without question, deadly. These vessels and their crews don't typically
even flinch at the news of ice buildup. One of Cobban's fellow captains stating;
"...ice is just a constant presence in the Bering Sea in the winter time you're not
going to go many years without having to chop ice half a dozen times or more." They
just get to work removing it and keep going. However, what The Scandies Rose was subjected to,
prior to its turn north, was a phenomena referred to by the national oceanic and atmospheric
administration or NOAA as one or multiple "Williwaws". Dangerous winds that occur mainly
along the Aleutian chain and Gulf of Alaska shores and are influenced by local topography. They're
most frequent in winter and are usually the result of air damming up on the windward slopes of
mountains. This air spills over in strong gusts on the lee side that lasts only a matter of minutes.
However, such winds are violent often reaching hurricane force and their onset is sudden, often
interrupting periods of near-calm conditions. These forces especially intense near the Shelikof
Strait and along the Scandies Rose' path. During these conditions, entry well
into the bays is necessary for refuge. The vessel had actually accumulated 6 to 15
inches of ice in a very short period, this is a huge amount by anyone's standards. In addition,
the captain and crew had loaded 195 fishing pots. This amount, how the pot stack was loaded,
the method of securing it was all according to the Scandies Rose stability calculation
instructions, set forth by the U.S. Coast Guard. The crew followed these specifications
strictly as they had done for quite some time. These stability calculations were found to be
inaccurate, the primary culprit of this story. When the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Center or
MSC calculates each commercial vessel's stability characteristics, they determine how much a vessel
can carry, where and how to load it on deck, empty pots versus full, ballast tank capacities
and so on. In the case of the Scandies Rose, up to and including the year 2019, the following
determinations were made; calculating additional weight of only up to 1.3 inches of ice on
horizontal surfaces and 0.65 inches on vertical. A number of captains say they regularly exceed this
before they even consider stopping to chop ice. The stability assessment did not accurately model
the Scandies Rose' shelter and forecastle enclosed volumes, the current bulwarks heights and quote;
"significantly underpredicted the superstructure windage area" possibly even utilizing older
versions of the ship's bulwarks. For example, the NTSB also found the MSC had significant
differences of ballast tank volumes in their report versus the vessel's true capacities. This
was all in addition to other mathematical errors and omissions by the quote, "naval architect who
completed The Scandies Rose stability instructions who had been independently completing
vessel stability instructions for about 30 years." These instructions regularly
taken as the final word by mariners when prepping their vessel for upcoming voyages. Following these
conclusions the NTSB recommendations would be: To the Coast Guard and Their Marine Safety
Center. Evaluate further the effects of icing on crab pots and pot stacks especially when
accumulated asymmetrically the regulations at the time assumed even distribution only
and as stated, only up to about 1.3 inches. Apply these and other updated calculations to
regulations and oversight programs for fishing vessels. Going forward, require owners shipmasters
and chief engineers of commercial fishing vessels to complete training and demonstrate competency
in vessel stability and watertight integrity. Require that all personnel carry manually
activated personal locator beacons or PLBs. Ideally these would be worn at all times by each
person working on commercial vessels at sea, registered individually to each crew member.
The system would be more reliable than, for example, the EPIRB that failed
to trigger on the Scandies Rose. To the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Improve surface observation capabilities in lacking areas like Sutwik Island
and Chignik bay. To the National Weather Service. Bring your website for freezing spray predictions
online and promote its use in the industry. And it looks like they may have gotten a start
on this since. From the way it looks to me, if it weren't for the captain's MAYDAY call
just before the vessel capsized, survivors Dean and John and the fate of The Scandies Rose may
have all been lost to the sea without a trace. According to the NTSB, following the sinking of
The Scandies Rose a maritime vocational school in seattle partnered with one of the vessels owners
and developed an eight-hour long stability course tailored specifically to crab boats. As of March
2021 the class had been well attended so far. Two participating captains remarking
they would highly recommend the class one mentioning he believed the class should
be mandatory for all crab boat captains... Correction: David *Leigh* Cobban Hey everyone thanks so much for watching.
Making these larger project videos with so many animations and in-depth research, without
sponsors *occasionally*, is due in large part to so many great supporters and a special thanks
goes out to those top tier supporters; Alex W, Andrew M, Jenny E, Jeremy H, Kenneth P,
Lil Tony, Nathan F, Paul R and Zachary D. Don't forget; Your Safety is Crucial.
