FM 3-0 Operations, Professional Development Opportunity - 29 January 2019

I just got back from Florida Panama City yesterday regrettably my grandmother of 91 years old she passed and so we had a funeral on Saturday how many people lost their grandparents so you kind of know how I am right now basically emotionally spent having spent time with someone who raised me from a little pup and what's the old saying your parents are the ones who give you life but your grandparents are the ones who kind of tell you who you are and help you figure out who you are and for me it was one of those things where you know it's a gift you cannot buy you cannot return and you can't wrap unwrap it you know that gift to me was where she gave me a belief in God country and family but more importantly she gave me a belief in myself and so I as I gone through the army I would say it as many times that I've sat on a Ledge and saying am i capable of being able to go through flight school my Cape will get through your MBA what have you but as always at inspirations from your grandmother just say yep you can do this and I always joke about when I was in Airborne School and I never flown in my entire life never flown and so I jumped out five times and I'm like wow that's how fun to take off but it didn't know how to land so I go to flight school and how many aviators in the room okay whoo so you sit down at this desk and you you and your IP and your student and student pilot with you and the guy goes how many flight hours you have and these folks come in with private pilot license went to North Dakota State and all the Emory Riddle and all this stuff and I'm sitting listening to talk about all these things I never had no knowledge of and then the guy turns to me and goes how many flight hours you have I said well sir I I've I've flown five times but landed and he said this is gonna be a long year so on that note I'll keep my day job but look we have rich Crete with us this morning and over the past six months that I've been in in command of the organization and probably over the last two years plus the Army has been gone through a huge doctrinal change or shift towards where we are making some monumental changes to our doctrine clarissa stand up please so our lead doctrine writers Clarissa and you can have a seat but she has done a fabulous job of working with the folks at Cass comm and sustainment community what I will tell you is that army medicine you know has a lot of warfighting function to war fighting functions we belong to protection and sustainment so with that said we got to make sure that the army health system is integrated accordingly and it has been Colonel Creed general Lundy and general Townsend who has I think charted a path for the army that's gonna make us a more capable fighting force into the future our goal here at the health readiness center of excellence is to ensure that both sustainment and force protection has us integrated seamlessly in all phases of the operation and so what we're going to get it today we'll get a look through the tactical aspect of what it is but I will hold I'm gonna ask all of our colleagues from the seated who has played a role in the sustainment Quick Looks we've had several that the HR the finance and these logistics community have all come together and we kind of wore gained all aspects of the doctrinal changes again it's scenario 3 and so with that been in mind I would like to make sure that we have a dialogue I've heard Colonel Creed speak and he feeds off of interaction and so we really want to have that take place by way of credentials armored officer who's commanded at every level CGS C went to Sam's how many of Sam's grudges we have Clayton you want to raid his hand he's like so clay Sam's guy what does that mean these guys went to a year-long training after CGS see and I'm told as commonly referred to as the book of the week Club because essentially you got to read a book a week and write all these big studies about it but but they come out of that training though well-prepared to work on campaign campaign campaign plans for two three four star general officers so he did that at CFC we're talking about somebody who I think for the since 2016 has been working at up at Leavenworth he tells me it is 40 below with the windchill factor up at Fort Leavenworth so he's kind of pleased to be in San Antonio right now hey without further ado Creed make it happen [Applause] good morning thank you sir it's been a real honor to be down here to talk to you all again who was here in August when I came down and got to hear some of this before anybody okay so you guys have to keep me straight like general sergeant said I'm a recovering armored officer and I've been working fm3 oh pretty much since I got up there to a fortress Leavenworth and in late 16 so as such is one of the authors and one of the editors as we work our way through this I don't want to fight each slide to the nth degree what I'd like to do is set the conditions for for questions and a dialogue as we go through it because I have nothing to lose I will tell you exactly why something says what it says or the logic behind some of those those decisions so are with the idea that we're gonna be focused on large-scale ground combat operations as we walk our way through this I will throw out the first old-school term that all sustainers need to be familiar with which is hitting the LD on the move so the line of departure is you're generally where your start point is and your higher-level commander is going to say I need you to cross LD at this time so when we this this briefing this meeting was supposed to start at 9:30 general Sergeant started at 9:25 so that we could hit the LD on the move and we're across it at 9:30 and that's a cultural shift and very different then some of you may have been familiar with in the past you don't move to the LD at the time you cross the LD at the time so what are you saying is most of the light guys that we know they turn LD into an assembly area right armored guys we call it in as we're driving across it okay so we're going to talk about today I'm going to give you a quick little overview on doctrine on where we're at at the end now I will also talk on some of the big things that we're working on in the future one of which is FM for oh this general sergeant mentioned I'm gonna tell you why we're changing our doctrine and using three Oh is the vehicle to do that we'll hit some of the big ideas and zip through a couple of high points in the chapters first thing we're going to talk about who who's heard of the multi-domain operations future concept they have just about everybody because that's what senior leaders talk about to the great American public to the legislators the resourcing folks the MTO concept is a future concept okay if we have to fight tonight tomorrow or next week we're going to execute using our current doctrine not our future concept all right so while it's good to be informed about where the Army's going in the next five or ten years and some of those big decisions that our senior leaders are making in terms of resources it's more important to understand what your doctrine says right now about how you're going to have to operate and fight right now the multi-domain operations concept the last version was published on 1 December of 18 we have incorporated as much of the multi domain operations future concept in the current doctrine as we could and we're going to continue to do that it'll be an evolutionary process all right so what I've done here in this pitch is anything that's highlighted in blue is relevant to the future concept and you'll see how we've started to evolve towards that end do concept that we're going to be executing as an army no later than 2028 all right any questions on the concepts of doctrine relationship all right so our current doctrinal hierarchy we're moving towards this right now we used to have four levels it went from ATP to ADP to FM to ATP all right we're doing away with the ad RPS we're consolidating them and the ATP's together so around the army right now including in the sustainment warfighting function with ADP four of we are revising all of those and those that have a role to play in large-scale ground combat or gonna be linked directly to what's written in FM three oh all right so if you only read one broad operations publication then I would ask you to grind your way through FM trio in all your spare time particularly feel great officers in a book we will have all the ATP's revised and the cornerstone FM's like FM 4 Oh revised prior to AUSA so October of nineteen we will have those out and about and I'll talk to you later on about some of the other ones that are coming but what we've done is we've lowered the number of echelon is a doctrine that people have to worry about and we focused on what's important that's the bottom line takeaway probably spend more time on this slide than any other NEC GSC graduates in here heard general Lundy talk through this while you were in the schoolhouse in the last couple years all right so this is a multi-purpose slide and it does a lot of different things its primary purpose though was to address a difference in culture okay the operations whose characteristics are on the left hand side of the chart reflect the middle of the yellow part of the conflict continuum down to the green okay we call them small-scale of limited contingencies and those characteristics or the characteristics of operations that the Army's been conducting in Iraq Afghanistan Africa and around the world since 2001 2002 alright one third of our army at any given time across all three components he's focused on those types of operations and for the foreseeable future they're gonna continue to focus on those kinds of operations but the army chief of staff both general Odierno and general Mele directed that the Army is going to focus its readiness goals on large-scale ground combat which whose characteristics you see here on the right-hand side of the chart why is that as we were focused in Afghanistan and Iraq for a long time there were a lot of people above the army whose views were that we were kinda at the end of history after the end of the Cold War as the era of great power competition was behind us and we were very busy we were focused on current operations in Afghanistan in Iraq and we were doing our nation's business as we needed to so over time over about 15 years not counting the Cold War drawdown which has an influence as well the army was optimized for the center of the chart in the yellow across the dot mil PF across doctrine about how we did operations how we trained our leader development the material that we acquired our personnel and facilities all of those things were optimized for operations on the left-hand side of the chart all right we are moving the aim point in our army relatively rapidly over the last few years up into the middle of the red the focus on large-scale ground combat against pure threats who are a pure threats the pure threats are on the bottom of the chart and those little maps show the places in the world where you're most likely to be engaged in conflict with those pure adversaries so in competition their adversaries in conflict their enemies so we try to keep those words separate who's read the national defense strategy the excerpt right so we talks about this idea of great power competition that you're either competing or in conflict and we conduct a conflict you return to competition again right during competition you're either winning or losing you're never won or lost during conflict however you can very much lose quite a bit in a very short period of time so the readiness informed by risk is on conflict but we still have to be able to do the things in competition that we need to do to shape the operational environment and prevent conflict as well as prepare ourselves for large-scale ground combat because large-scale ground combat against any of those pure threats on the bottom will become as you our fights veno MRE there'll be no MRX we'll be executing operational plans moving to ports and airfields and moving overseas to a theater to fight as we are so there's some very real implications to that across the force in every war fighting function so just a couple of the differences between the two I highlighted domain superiority so the domains are air space cyberspace land and maritime so since the end of the Cold War we've not fought anybody who could contest us in the air at sea or really in space okay well they've increased their capabilities in space they don't contest us in space in other words our freedom of action in space is unimpeded if we fight one of those four opponents particularly in the regional context you see on the maps those adversaries who are now enemies can contest us in every domain and in competition they're going to contestants we're in space cyberspace and the information environment so we're in contact all the time we're always contested on the types of operations on the left we're always contested on land and the information environment we're Army we're used to fighting folks and we've been fighting folks but we've had a certain freedom of action we've had the initiative in all the fights that we've been in we pick and choose the campaign's that we conduct in the current operational environment these adversaries may decide to take action in their own national interest of what they think their national interests are that causes us to respond so we will not always have the initiative nor will we always enjoy the advantages that we've we've experienced over most of our careers when you can be contested in the air and at sea that has very real implications to the joint force and how much the joint force can do to enable operations on land so those implications for us are that we are going to have to solve a lot of our tactical problems with what we have with us okay I'm not going to depend upon the joint force to solve every problem particularly early conflict so we started a position of disadvantage because we're our home team is here in CONUS for the most part and any of these fights or away fights so that automatically puts us at a position of disadvantage and it's a greater position of disadvantage when you're contested in every domain the tempo of the large-scale ground combat coupled with the fact that you're contested in all domains makes for a very different kind of fight all right it's a fight at scale and scope general Mundi likes to talk about a BCT has 108 squads times 27 BC T's and then you divide by 3 by the number of companies and divide by 4 again for the number of battalions you're talking about an enormous amount of forces engaged at any one time and when you're talking about these types of threats you're not talking about troops in contact I've got a patrol that's under fire here I got one airplane getting shot at over here we're talking about all this happening simultaneously at scale at every echelon all right so that forces you to think a little bit differently about the problems that you're going to face it requires a different culture in terms of training and readiness than the fights on the left hand side and for the medical community and something that we talked about at the tabletop exercises the general sergeant talked about this last bullet at the bottom battalions and brigades at risk so if Afghanistan and Iraq are really bad days the platoon is at risk of being overrun and I've got 15 or 20 casualties multiply that by a hundred and eight okay or more and one of these kinds of fights with the Chinese or Russians all right the British Army published a white paper and basically that the title of it was we could lose our army in an afternoon you know fight with the Russians because they can only put a couple brigades on the ground at the time all right so it's a very different implication across all the war fighting functions but particularly on the medical side any questions on this right in the last piece I'll talk about these these threat methods it's primarily focused on the Russians in Chinese but these methods or their operational approach the way they want to fight they use preclusion which is keeping us out who's sort of a2/ad anti-access zero denial that's what that is it's long range fires integrated air defense and integrated fires complexes we surface-to-surface missiles and long-range artillery that can shoot hundreds of kilometers in some cases thousands all right again real implications in terms of a my fob is not a safe space anymore when dealing with these kinds of folks isolation is exactly what it sounds like we have forces that are forward deployed if these folks decide to conduct an attack they're our forces that are forward are initially going to be isolated and they're going to want to keep them isolated systems warfare all that means is I've got sensors I've got shooters I've got a systems approach that I want to fight the Russians Chinese and North Koreans are essentially artillery armies that use maneuver forces to fix and they want to kill with long-range fires all right and they want to kill in big groups all right they want to annihilate they want to destroy they want to keep you away from them all right so that systems warfare approach has some real implications to the joint force and how it wants to fight information warfare I think we're all very familiar with that that's going on all the time all right we see it in the newspapers every day and it could have something to do with something domestic and it happens to things overseas with our allies and partners and then sanctuary I don't have sanctuary blue because it's not a MOLLE domain consideration for those of you that were in Afghanistan Iraq understand sanctuary quite early you know Iranian is on the other side of the border feeding stuff across insurgents coming across from Syria the Taliban in Pakistan that's all about sanctuary but with these great power pieces you think about a fight like what the Ukrainians had to deal with in 2014 the Russian integrated air defense systems and long-range shooters on side of the border which meant they were off-limits to the Ukrainians unless they wanted to fight a full-on war with Russia which they didn't want to do so that creates some dilemmas all right so we talked about for a long time counterinsurgency being the PhD level of war I'm not sure that that is so when you when you factor in all the characteristics on the right a large-scale ground combat is every bit as complicated and complex with the added dimensions of a much more lethal operational environment all right so these are the problems we were trying to solve I'll focus on the blue but we say you know the fact of the matter is when we were looking at the operational environment all the domains are likely to be contested so how do we want to fight when the joint force isn't going to solve all our problems for us the days where a medevac could fly to the point of injury or very close to the point of injury because you only had one or two units in contact are not the same kind of days you're gonna have in large-scale ground combat where you've got 27 BCTs and then 50 other types of brigades a raid over to us cores a Marine Expeditionary Force which is a core and then a multinational Corps and say a European scenario or a US Corps or two fighting under Eighth Army with three Rock field armies on the Korean Peninsula very different so we recognize that all battle is multi domain and it's going to continue to be joint and multinational across the range of military operations we also had to account for the fact that our armies not the same army that it was 20 years ago and that some of these threats have greater capabilities than we have in terms of range and lethality they also have the advantages of geography you know geography is still important a lot of these flights are gonna be close to them which means they have a lot of time to get ready so we needed to think about that the same pier threats can generate some very formal integrated air defense I mentioned the Ukraine earlier the Ukrainian Air Force did not fly for 18 months anywhere in the Ukraine except in the far western part of the country because the Russian air defense systems on the ground could put them all at risk okay our doctrine had to account for the threats in a multipolar world so we could not just dust off air land battle and say okay we're just going to pull out the PlayBook from the 80s and we'll be good to go the world is a very different place technology's different the threats are different and the geography we need to worry about is different we also had to account for the fact that there's a lot of bad stuff that goes on below the level of state-on-state conflict right in other words we couldn't walk away from the operational environment that a third of our army across all three components has to deal with every day we still have forces in Afghanistan Syria Iraq Africa we still have folks that have to conduct exercises in Europe and the Pacific we still got an issue in Korea well we have to be on our toes so we needed to think through how we didn't just focus on the line of departure to the limit of advance like we did in the old old doctrine in the cold war days we needed to account for the whole thing and see how they fit together and then we had to be a learning organization and we failed to consolidate gains effectively in Iraq and ultimately in Afghanistan as well so we need to think about that if we fight and we win our battles but we not we're not winning our wars then we have a problem and so we need you to think about that as well and give senior leaders some tools to work with we probably don't have a lot of military theory nerds or doctrine nerds in here I wasn't one I swear before I got to this job you see the quote on the bottle bottom from Clausewitz and you'll see a few of those this isn't explicitly Clausewitz Ian's approach the doctrine in other words we're always conducting operations to fulfill some political strategic purpose there's a linkage there we don't just do operations for operations sake we need to understand that and that informed a few of the other things that we came up with is we went full so if you're gonna have one slide to post in your cubicle and say okay I understand fm3 oh this would probably be it so you've got the logic chart on the left hand side of the of the slide we use logic charts and in selected parts of doctrine to show the logic the thinking the thought process that undergirds or frames the doctrine that we're talking about so here are we talking I know it's an eye chart but we talked about the challenges of an operational environment and then we talked about the army strategic roles and the army strategic roles or the shape the operational environment prevent conflict prevail and large-scale ground combat and consolidate gains those are the four army strategic roles and they're the army strategic roles because they're the army is the only member or service in the joint force that's capable of executing those roles they're not phases of an operation there are continuous responsibilities that the Army has to meet as part of the joint force you can see how they kind of line up with the joint phasing model and we're really thinking about whether we're gonna pull the joint phasing model out of here because what when they when people tend to see this and I haven't had a chance to talk to them yet they look at it and say oh so they're phases of an operation they're not phases of operation they happen simultaneously around the world all the time with the possible exception of large-scale ground combat you've got the definition of unified land operations which is the army operational concept and then you've got decisive action okay which is a center to the unified land operations concept it's executed using the mission command philosophy of command and control and it's executed by extra ones so those echelons are a field army or a theater army cores divisions and brigades and that's what this publication is focused on large unit tactics we call them extra wands but they're fighting as formations and that's really important from a warfighting function perspective they're not headquarters sitting on a on a static base their formations employing functional and multifunctional capabilities including medical capabilities at each different echelon and they to do that effectively you really need to be able to see yourself and we'll talk about that later we talked about the elements of combat power they haven't changed and we talk about all domains and you see land is in the middle of that not just because we're an army and we're focused on land but it's the land forces that integrate all those multi domain capabilities army division Corps and Army Headquarters are the only headquarters in the joint force that can see what's going on in every domain simultaneously the Air Force can't see what happens on land right neither can the Navy what army headquarters have the command and control systems to be able to see into all to the air maritime domains as well as space and cyberspace so the army integrates molle domain capabilities and will be central to the Joint Forces transition towards multi domain or all domain operations in the future then we talk about hey why we're doing all this stuff we're maneuvering to achieve and exploit positions of relative advantage all right so to do that you have to be able to see yourself first see the threat and then understand your operational environment you see on the right hand side we we organized ourselves according to the army strategic roles within the publication and I'll show you that we're focused on large-scale ground combat so there's three chapters focused on that which in a 380 page book doesn't seem like a whole lot well that's because a lot of things have to happen before large-scale ground combat in the performance of the other army strategic roles if we're going to be operating from a position of relative advantage during conflict we talked about all domains being multi domain and all domains are being contested which meant we had to adjust the operational framework and I'll show you a picture of that well the operational framework is much broader than it used to be in it you know actually in some circumstances encompass the entire globe and there's different considerations so in the past we always worried about time and space all right well we had to think about the cognitive and virtual considerations in the operation operational framework as well cognitive gets too friendly and enemy decision-making it gets to morale it gets to the politics of a particular fight it gets to legitimacy and those other abstract ideas the the virtual considerations are exactly what you would think they are they have they pertain to space and cyberspace the capabilities that are resonant there as well as the capabilities that are enabled by space and cyberspace so I was talking to the TCC class just before this and someone was making the point about much of the sustainment warfighting function is demand based right well how do we how do we capture those demands on our networks right that are enabled by space and cyberspace but if the threat can contest those domains and you automatically have a problem in terms of your situational awareness right so we have to be able to think through that and come up with how we're going to work around that issue so I mentioned the extended battlefield it includes the electromagnetic spectrum but it's also the information environment something happens in one part of the world you can see it on a video if not in minutes certainly within hours anywhere in the world right now so there's real implications to what we do with in terms of the information environment we are focused on peer threats right in the introduction we name names Russia China North Korea Iran there were a lot of people that thought we thought we're gonna get the vapors when we did that you know who they're calling people out and we said well we're gonna roll the dice and do it and we did it and nobody said a word because everybody knows that right we know who the bad guys are but those bad guys some of them have threats or have capabilities that represent threats that are more significant than our own capabilities across all the war fighting functions it may be because they have a better piece of kit in terms of integrated air defense the long range fires or it may just be because they enjoy that geographical proximity to the place where a fight has taken place or they have a cultural affinity with the people that are involved there so as such nowhere in our doctrine anymore are we talking about us being the greatest army in the history of the world all right we're taking a very cold logical approach to there are situations where we're going to be operating against people that have some significant advantages and then we talk about operations by echelon and it says brigades there at the at the end it doesn't say brigade combat teams when we talk in doctrine about brigade combat teams will say brigade combat teams when we talk about brigades in fm3 oh we're talking about all types of regains functional multifunctional including your type of brigades all right because for these extra wants the fight is formations they need to be able to employ those capabilities in a synchronized and integrated fashion in support of operations and that's very different than how we've had to do things in Iraq or Afghanistan and a fob centric world where everybody got their fair share and there was enough capability to ensure that we could keep a level of risk relatively low alright large-scale ground combat is not going to look like that because we're not going to have the opportunity to set those types of conditions most of the time any questions on this so this is from the bottom of the chart and it's just again hammers home how we think about relative advantage it's the old see yourself see the threat see the operational environment that has got to be the point of departure for all your plans operations and training there's abstract and then there's physical alright so physical and geographical combat power those are math problems but math matters math is important particularly in large-scale ground combat because you don't know what risks you're taking if you don't understand the math then undergirds what you're trying to do and we went through this general sergeant and a hundred of our closest friends from across the sustainment community just looking at all the different math problems that come out when you're talking about large-scale ground combat math problems we haven't had to worry about under pressure with making hard decisions in the recent past any questions on this so I think it's important and I like to hear from our CDA colleagues to talk about some of the the challenges and dilemmas that we're bringing to the forefront that our army has to wrestle with particularly with regards to sustainment and so when you talk about I'll just say transportation as an example I mean when you talk about the term endurance and you talked about this question of strategic positioning and you go back to the strategic roles of the Army in shape well from a math problem perspective you know you don't have enough medical capacity through the domains to already position into Germany just say or to Korea and so when we started talking about this relative position of advantages you go back to your point you got to then move those folks to a rail head to a port or what have you to get them into a particular theater so the question that that we're wrestling with particularly in the medical space is number one how do we allow the army those Burgh those BCTs to move in a relative freedom of maneuver to be able to fix an army in this position and how do we then do medical care that doesn't impede those operations and so I was just saying to our see there colleagues can you give us some some discussions that we've had with them and then one piece said I would tell you is it when you talk about the demand piece it goes back to our class 8 discussion that we've been having with our colleagues as well thanks sir okay everybody hear me hi I'm Colonel Bruce Sowinski the director of our seated here so one of the topics we had a pretty lengthy discussion on is and and Colonel Creed alluded to it earlier math the math of this is the amount of casualties we're going to have right so as a vignette when when there is modeling done about how a fight in Europe might go on a given day there may be a requirement to evacuate and regulate 750 bed patients out of the theater because we have as patients are going into our medical treatment facilities you know once they're stable we've got to get them out of there because there's more coming behind them when you look at the cash the estimates it's pretty daunting and just the tasks involved with having to medically evacuate and regulate 750 patients out of the theater you know it involves not only medical evacuation assets that we have in the theater ground and air but also we've got to work with the Air Force and probably other gym partners to get the task done something that general Sargent mentioned earlier medical resupply out there when you look at the amount of cash seized and you take a look at how much class 8 a and B blood products it's going to take to to treat those patients it's also staggering and how do we get all those medical supplies to where they need to get to the point of injury the different roles of care and so forth at a hospital now you're looking at two to four hundred casters before today or something like everybody hear me back there okay you've got to wrap your heads around that when we talk about general sergeant mentioned the strategic role shaded prevent large-scale ground combat consolidation the games each one of those has meaning it has meaning for the warfighter but that people for the warfighter has an eye test the specified tasks for each and every one of you in this group now I'm going to tell you you know we got our doctor folks you know scattered throughout but mostly in that deform over here I'm going to say something that may hit some y'all a little man we don't even know her own doctor and that's just not us folks you know this is David community's wrestling with this as well over the last twenty years we've been spoiled by a death adaptations to our doctor we've been spoiled very successfully of getting a patient from point of entry to row three in an hour and 11 that's great but the scope and scale that we're getting ready to face that may not be possible you know and are you mentally and physically ready to support that's that that kind of a plate and it comes down to is knowing our doctrine because guess what I'm a seventy hotel I'm proud of that NOC but everybody in here no matter what your AOC is you're a planet if you can't represent and speak our doctrine and we're losing you know so listen II work that's why Colonel from free to see her listen when he's putting out here but also on about I would ask you you know Lincoln I'm gonna let them with people coming over link in with our doctors notes find out what's out there I read a lot of stuff online and everything that our doctrines messed up okay well one you know what the doctrine is to define that it is messed up into when it pretty you can fighting for the field we want that you know so I again I just asked you know free stalking charge points gross Pinsky's points you know that scope of scale transcends each one of those strategic roles and has you know Creed large given the scope and scale implications specified apply for each every person what I was gonna add in is if you have a question or a comment and you're not able to project your voice like Colonel Vernon does there's microphones available to to Vernon's point you just want to put some context to what he's been describing one of the major challenges that that we've had to address as a medical community was this question of mission command okay this question of mission command who is the most appropriate headquarters to mission command the medical infrastructure on the battlefield okay that there's been discussions that a theater Sustainment Command should be that organization that that's what's generating the questions that the comments that he just made why is that being generated there are perceptions that medical folks while deployed doesn't understand all aspects of how they integrate and support a maneuver operation so don't think just because you medical that that we don't have a responsibility to understand and to be able to represent as he just discussed every quick look that we have we're trying to describe who will be the best head quote while we are functional as a relates to an organization while we have centralized command and control from the top-down that is still at risk what am I saying a theater Sustainment Command used to do what command and control all the es B's within the battlefield what that will centralize what does the army just did they said no we're going to put a sustainment brigade with a division so therefore now the division is in charge of that well what makes it what if we don't demonstrate the complexity and the interoperability that we have with blood we have with four surgical teams we have with combat stress control then the army could say well though let's just put a member gage assign it directly to a division and let an armored infantry officer development and do to your mission commander move it across the battlefield if we don't have the expertise to be able to describe why we shouldn't do that then secondly there is a discussion and I just want to make sure your buddy understands is at the national level with regards to the casualties that we're going to take it's pretty common knowledge to us with regards to the triage process you know urgent surgical delayed expected and all of that well in this battle we're talking about having mass Cal events simultaneously across a battlefield we're talking about not having enough quote Grey's registration and not enough morgue activity to be able to host those bodies so what are we talking about now mass graves we just talked about endurance go back to slide please so when you talk about this round you talk about this wheel domestic support well anybody has been deployed from a medevac perspective if you didn't get the patient to a hospital within an hour you had to write a letter back to the Secretary of Defense what I'm going to tell you there's be a lot of letter writing in this type of battlefield because we will not be getting people back in that particular time so a breaks BCTC commander is gonna have to make some choices about who's gonna get treated who's not gonna get treated so where is that gonna go to so now I'm fighting and I'm saying my colleague a medic have to make a decision about who's gonna get what particular treatment are you gonna expend all your all your medical products on somebody who you know is gonna be expecting so those are decisions that we're gonna have to make ads like to patients when I was deployed I had a veterinary tech and we had all the feral animals all across the battlespace and she had to go and make determination about euthanizing those animals she says sir I did not join the army to euthanize animals I came to save animals so now you as a medical petunia leader you've got to make your determination who's gonna get the what life you're gonna kind of gonna try to give some survivability to or not we think it's gonna do to us at that particular point so I'm just trying to put some context to the realities of what this how complex this battlefield is gonna be for us and why we need to make sure that we have the technical knowledge to be able to explain this in a tactical way to our our colleagues Thanks well you were talking I was thinking about Giovanni Ribisi in Saving Private Ryan right the best portrayal of a combat medic making hard decisions at the point of the spirit all right so this is how we've organized fm3 oh and I've got slides to talk to each of this and I will try to zip through them so we can have a conversation I'm not going to talk Appendix A in appendix B there's no slides for that but they're vastly really important the command and support relationships piece gets that what general sergeant was talking about right am i attached to my OPCON and my take on and my general support of my direct support there's certain assumptions you can make in limited contingencies because you have enough capability that are bad assumptions in a more mobile fight over distance where the ability to move capabilities left and right because of the real constraints of geography of time and space force you to make decisions early that you know they may be decisions that have to be reversed later but their decisions that take time to implement there's no instantaneous gratification when you have to make changes at scale and scope for the types and sizes of the forces engaged and then the risk considerations understanding now when we wrote this we were writing it two years ago we were trying to address some changes to the culture that they're required so when we talk about risk and we talk about risk continuously throughout fm3 oh we're talking about risk to the force we're talking about risk to the mission we're not talking about slips trips and falls and wearing your yo PT built on the fob or whether you're going to get in trouble because of a story in The New York Times online the next day all right those are not the kinds of things we're talking about so chapter 1 is an overview it's kind of a cultural scene setters some vignettes in there to talk about hey here's some historical examples of what large-scale ground combat by the United States Army looked like and there's a lot of emphasis on casualties replacement ops and sustainment because those kinds of considerations are some of the defining characteristics of large-scale ground combat and we talked about the army strategic roles and what success looks like I've got a slide in there that talks about it but again we're in competition or we're in conflict so we had to talk about what success in competition looks like how do we get on the winning foot how are we up on the right level of balance across all three components in the force in terms of being prepared for large-scale ground combat and what do we do during competition to do that and then we for the first time emphasize the importance of consolidating games it's that follow-through an exploitation of your tactical operations to achieve what you're trying to achieve which requires fighting and on a whole bunch of other things we say the divisions of course the lowest echelon that typically orchestrate and synchronizes multi-domain capabilities that's because they don't exist at the lower echelons in many cases now well you don't have the authorities to use them but there's also the other issue and the other issue is because of their scarcity we generally tend to pull them up at higher levels and then tasks organize them out in terms of their application to a particular military problem and then I already talked about what we did the operational framework and we lay that out as well so here's the theory of victory right what does success look like during competition during operations the shape or operations to prevent alright those things are highlighted in blue because there's multi-domain considerations in that I said we're we're in a fight in cyberspace and the information environment all time we have people trying to make it more difficult for us to shape conditions for successful large-scale ground combat operations large-scale ground combat it's about converging capabilities in time and space all right what's available how do I use it to its best effect with the understanding that there isn't enough for everybody to go around we focus on dislocation and disintegration all right disintegration of that systems warfare approach dislocation to make sure if we can at all possible operate in such a way that makes the enemies courses of action irrelevant and then consolidating gains it's not about stability it's not about counterinsurgency it's about exploitation and pursuit it's about not giving the bad guys arrest enables its to protract a conflict by fighting us a different way if we consolidate gains the right way then we don't have an insurgency to counter so the operational framework most of you remember we were support close and deep area we added the consolidation area the joint security area and the strategic support area I'll talk about the errors in purple first Army units conduct tactical tasks or activities in those areas all right but they're controlled by a joint force commander so the strategic support area is Fort Sam Houston to theater all right it's the continental United States to a theater that's why it says inter theater all right so strategic lines of communication and we're in contact there you can see space cyberspace and information extend the breadth of that operational framework now remember this is a mental model all right in any particular operation where your unit is on the ground you're going to apply that mental model to your particular situation and the task that you're assigned the consolidation area is new the way to think about that is it's an area of operations assigned to a brigade combat team in a division or for a core at least initially that's where consolidation of gains begins the joint security area is a joint term so so let's make sure the the last time we had this the quick look there was some discussion on the consolidation area right and then the question is at what levels do you truly consolidate at and so there was some discussion about Kenna Brigade be some be doing some simultaneous consolidation type activities or does it have to be at the division or at a core and so as I was thinking through that piece the question is for us in the medical community you know as we were trying to figure out how to get specific capability back to a quote a cache or for a surgical team we too can be I think be doing some simultaneous consolidation or reintegration regeneration of medical capacity to continue to fight in the close and the in the in the close area if you will yes on that right so the consolidation area is a forcing function all right it's a forcing function for army senior leaders commanders when they're conducting their planning for an operation it forces you to account for the amount of forces you need to see an operation through to its political or strategic end state okay so if you think about 2004 or 2003 rather we achieved all our tactical goals in Iraq alright we overthrew the regime we defeated the Iraqi army well what what did we not do we didn't think through the consolidate gains piece we sent the army home we D bath defied the country which did what it removed all order and discipline from the entire society and set the conditions for an insurgency because we didn't bring enough combat power to the fight to occupy the whole country to secure to pursue to exploit all right so we gave the bad guys a rest when we talk in terms of the operational framework about consolidation area it's different than consolidate and reorganize on the objective which gets to some of the points that's a continuous process throughout a flight but it's also part of that fulfilling that higher strategic role of consolidating gains in that you can't wait till the fights over to maintain and sustain your combat power because that operation you're conducting now is going to be followed up by subsequent operations in the future so it is a continuous process and it's across warfighting function so depending on where you are where your unit may be within the operational framework in a particular geographical area you need to kind of be able to visualize and think through all right I've got these operations going on right now with this level of casualties now I know phase two of this operation whatever it is is going to involve further movement further maneuver further casualties down the road but at some point I'm getting to this place on the ground and we're going to transition so that hopefully we can we can conclude that operation successfully so that operational framework is not a static thing it's going to vary in time and space and and what you are thinking about in terms of physical temporal virtual and cognitive is going to vary in time and space as well and it will also vary based on where your unit is in the operational framework and what tasks you're being assigned or expected to perform you may not be assigned those tasks you have to anticipate them and of course with the mission command philosophy I think that's okay so I'll talk to you a security area too because so that's a joint term so the joint security area these places like Japan the southern part of the peninsula on Korea Turkey the German ports Kuwait all right those are the places within the theater that you're building and sustaining combat power that units are transiting through back and forth or personnel are transiting back and forth and I talked about what those threat capabilities were earlier those places I all names are pretty much sanctuary for us right now right there certainly sanctuary during competition there sanctuary when we were fighting in Iraq Afghanistan and Africa they're not sanctuary when you're fighting the Russians or the Chinese alright you're within range of those capabilities you're within range of some of those capabilities in CONUS okay the days where a you know we're gonna launch some cruise missile attacks it's some guy in a cave in Afghanistan we're not worried about them doing something back to us at in the Port of Houston okay if you watch cruise missiles or sink some ships and the Chinese or Russian Navy's the chances of their attack submarines launching tactical conventional munitions to attack a port in the United States it may not be a hundred percent but it's pretty high why wouldn't they all right it's a game on thing there's international ramifications for those types of operations when you're again talking about great powers so we need to think in those terms and remember that particularly in the information environment and cyberspace our command and control capabilities are entirely dependent upon the network right your ability deploy so the threats are going to seek to disrupt those kinds of things we have to anticipate that chapter two is big and gets back to some of the points general sergeants some others have made we've never put a chapter two like this in an operations manual before and we decided we had to from a cultural perspective because a bunch of maneuver guys out there the only thing that they could spell is BCT all right or they've been operating as parts of divisions and Brigade or divisions in cores that sit on fobs and the only way you could tell a brigade talk from a division talk from a core talk was the number of flat-screen TVs with UAV feeds in right and how long their meetings are and what the weekly battle rhythm was all right so what we needed to do in large-scale you know with a focus on large-scale ground combat is it described all of the capabilities that the army brings what are the roles and responsibilities of those functional and multifunctional brigades or separate battalions how do they fit in to those format and those extra wants to fly these formations and then what is training readiness look like across the war fighting functions as well because general Milley directed that we address that so we do at the end of the chapter which is why we've highlighted this piece about trainings the most important thing we do to prepare the reason it's highlighted in blue is is a moledo main consideration to that I said that our friendly forces are always in contact through either space-based ISR or cyberspace the threats can assess our training readiness every bit as accurately as we can all right that's a little bit different than that was in the Cold War we watch adversary CTC rotations live and in color and we pay attention to that at their training areas they do the same thing to us in ours all of our lessons learned repositories are on nipper all right they can assess how we're doing so it behooves us to be honest in our own self-assessment so - can you give me give us some appreciation for the field army yes sir so cuz I see us always talking about the theater army but but there's a field army echelon that comes into play in certain places as well right so in theaters that have we appear adversaries and we're talking into Paycom pertain to China and then you come pertaining to Russia the Army's moving towards establishing either a field army or field army like capability it's a gap that we're trying to address in terms of we need an extra on the command and control a multi-core fight we don't have that echelon except in Korea where there's 8th army and that 8th army is not organized to do that without significant augmentation ok so it's a gap that we've recognized in TRADOC and we're making a case to the army senior leadership in the joint leadership for the for structure to atleast put a field army in Europe because that's where the greatest risk of a multi-core flight is in Korea you already have 8th army that can help in that role with augmentation and that's you know that's baked into the planning over there but the other thing in Korea is you've got multiple Rock field armies already the US forces would operate as a part of so that's where we're going with that so I it stays theater army here while we mentioned field army in FM trio because we don't have that echelon established yet I'm not talking about that as a separate thing but that is something that the army is looking at and there are very real implications think of the field army as the tactical extra want for multiple cores while the theater army has that broad all-encompassing performing all four strategic roles is the army service component commander for the joint force commander at the combat combatant command or geographical combatant command level this task organization piece is big and it gets back to the command and support relationships because there isn't enough capability to go around for everybody to get their fair share commanders are going to wait the decisive operation or the main effort with a certain amount of capability in the context of whatever is going on and we need to be able to think in terms of this is going to be more dynamic I'm not gonna have a patch chart that's gonna tell me a year in advance who I'm gonna be working with all right it may be changing every week at the lower tax electrons it could change every day so that again is kind of a cultural thing that we need to be aware of so when we published this these are right out of FM 3 Oh from different places so you got a theater army Accord and the division there were people jumping out windows all over the army they're going oh my god what is this he said you saying this was a division looks like now no we're not there's no lines between any of these icons in there well we were reflecting was that for these extra wants to fight as a formation this is the example of the capabilities that they have to have so if you say that there's 17 army divisions and three cores and then you count up all the icons in here not just the BCTs but all the functional multifunctional brigades all of a sudden you realize there aren't enough of those for everybody to get one or two or however many it's shown up there on the chart and we said yes that's true and that's exactly the point that we're making that you're gonna have to make some tough decisions that you're going to have to have Oh plans that are informed by the mobilization of capabilities across compos 2 & 3 the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve because a large number of those icons are almost entirely in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve all right so if you have plans that depend on them being there at 8 days into an operation that plan may not be a good plan right now so folks have gone back to take a look at that and think about those implications so chapter 3 is operations to shape so shape in the operational environment is the focus you can see security cooperation and so forth these are things that go on every day around the world right now all right if you're doing exercises in Europe you're doing exercise in the Pacific you're doing planning the US Army Europe or US Army Pacific or army south or army north you're thinking about those kinds of things that are improving the operational environment in the US strategic interest and we do those kinds of things all the time even catch a little old doctrine cell that we run here at Fort Leavenworth we send people out down to different continents around the world just to help them with doctrine so that some of our partners or would be partners don't decide to go towards an adversary for that kind of help all right that's just an example of what operation is to shape look like I hi boulders the blue pieces there because they are very operational they're not planning they're actually things that theater armies do we subordinate Ilan's all the time a lot of that is focused on sustainment I'll give you an example in 2014 in response to the Russian snap military exercises in their Western military district at the same time all the unpleasantness was going on in the Ukraine we decided we were going to make a demonstration we're gonna send the 2nd Cavalry Regiment up north up into Poland and the Baltic so they do about a 1200 kilometer road march and when they said go to go do that we realized hey we hadn't really shaped an operational environment real well you know we didn't know what the route classifications were we weren't real clear on the network we didn't know what the bridges and tunnels could bear we didn't even have some really good maps of some some of the areas that were asking people to go on and you said well you know why not well because we'd be focused on other things and the theater army didn't have the capability to do all of those kinds of things since that time they've become much more operationally focused the same thing is true in Korea and our other theater armies around the world you can't wait until there's a crisis to do that planning those running staff estimates they're critically important and then lastly that's setting the conditions for the future contingency operations the exercises the training of things that we do should be done not just to show the flag or for some sort of public affairs you know purpose but they should really be about setting the conditions for success in the future that's why we do questions on operations to shape this operations prevent are a little bit different there's a crisis action flavor to this an adversary has done something where we have indications and warnings that they're going to do something that requires the employment of army forces generally overseas to deter conflict alright so if you think about all the ballistic missile testing that the North Koreans were doing a couple of years back and that caused us to do what we sent theater high-altitude air defense to Japan and the Korean Peninsula out to some of the Pacific Islands the initial heel-to-toe rotations of B seat armor brigade combat teams to Europe were also categorized as operations to prevent because we could not tell if the Russians were doing an exercise or they were preparing to open a land bridge to Kaliningrad there was no way for us to tell we didn't have the IR s our capability so we moved Brigade Combat teams there on heel to toe rotations and so now those rotations are really about shaping the operational environment and maintaining that advantage that we have now to deter but initially there was a crisis action so operations prevent are narrower in scope and scale those you then spend a lot of time in Korea when you do the theater exercises and the political crisis worsens in this scenario we request or the Eighth Army USFK commander request flexible flexible deterrent options or flex flexible response options those options our army units and Air Force capabilities and naval capabilities as well but for our perspective that means we're moving army units into it all right so that's what operations to prevent look like and the theater army is the big enabler there this last bullet is pretty important you only deter if you're a credible coercive force you can't deter if you can't coerce alright if I can't force you to do something and you don't know or I don't know that you can force me to do something I'm not really gonna be too impressed by everything else that you're doing all right so it gets back to that training readiness piece that we talked about that the chief had us put in the chapter one chapter five is an overview of large-scale ground combat what the Army's role in that is for the joint force we provide the capability and capacity across all domains for the application of land power okay and I talked to you early on now Army Headquarters particularly division Corps and Army have the ability to see into all of those domains the Marines fight on land okay but they'll be the first ones to tell you large-scale ground combat is not their thing they participate in it they support it they're on our left and right well it's the Army's responsibility to do that and that's not just within the US joint force but it's with our allies as well and then at the bottom there it talks about the bulk of the chapter is focused on those tasks that apply to both offensive operations and defensive operations reconnaissance security aren't hugely important to you guys but there are some implications at the lower tactical Esha wants in terms of medevac and so forth those are not the types of operations that we've done in the recent past certainly not at scale and there's some real sustainment challenges to conducting reconnaissance and security operations because you're or when you're doing those you're kind of out on your own and you're not within that golden hour all right you've got some real challenges so we're talking about risk goes way up for those types of operations but your risk is even higher if you don't do them all right large-scale defensive operations we haven't talked defense at a large scale since the Cold War all right so defensive operations are not secure in the fob it's not protecting yourself as you're moving on combat logistics patrol from place to place it's about holding ground it's about defending at scale and scope against somebody who's got a position of relative advantage on you you're not defending if you're not already at a position of disadvantage and one of the things that we we've talked about is you know we rotate brigade combat teams and battalions forward in the theater we do it in Korea we do it in Europe what are those forces going to do if the Russians or the North Koreans attack they're gonna define they're gonna defend outnumber and they may be isolated for a period of time so we're emphasizing this you know when you're your outfit who's been tasked to go forward into one of those theaters you kind of have to think about the worst-case scenario nobody in task force Smith thought that they would be making a last stand outside of Suwon in 1950 when they were an occupation duty in Japan all right so it's not the end of history we have to be able to think about the worst case piece I won't bore you with all the different aspects of the defense but you got to understand what type of defense the commander's you're supporting or conducting because they have different characteristics all right a mobile offense is exactly that so you're talking about people moving around so a static approach to sustainment for them and you know it is not gonna be most effective and the retrograde I already talked about there's nothing more difficult than a retrograde in contact with an opponent all right because you're a retrograding because you're not winning all right so there's some very real implications and tough choices to be made there as well as some anticipation of what that looks like what it feels like we talk about the characteristics of the defense and the operations in depth that applies you know so there's an enemy focus to that but there's a friendly focus to it as well and so what is sustainment particularly medical look like in terms of depth and the defense with the understanding that the situation may be changed because you're changing because you're operating from a position of relative disadvantage and then we talk about security forces there so you think division cavalry Corps cavalry regiments none of which exist anymore so commanders will be task organizing those things to conduct those roles to prevent surprise to keep you from becoming decisive engaged with the enemy main body on his own terms so there's some real implications to that and since there was our task organized and they're not units that are typically organized that way what usually happens there in operation is when it's a pickup game of people being tasks organized as something that they may not be expert at there's a lot of fog and friction right there's quite a bit of buffoonery likely to have to happen so again it's about visualizing what your role is in anticipating what could go wrong what could go right and what needs to happen to support those types of fights they're very complicated okay so large-scale offensive operations this is really kind of the heart of the publication the offense is the decisive formal war we try to go on the offense as quickly as possible to achieve our goals all right it's about not just seizing and retaining the initiative what it's about exploiting and it's that exploitation piece that's the most dynamic and the biggest challenge for sustainment because you have to be able to think two or three steps ahead to be able to maintain that type of tempo you need to sustain that exploitation over distance otherwise you end up starting all over again with a new type of offensive operation sooner than you want it so we haven't changed the offensive tasks and we talked about the defeat mechanisms and it's something it serves as a feed mechanisms that you just want to understand what the commander's operational approaches the commander's trying to defeat the enemy one way specifically it has different implications than others but what we say in the doctrine is commander's generally want to employ all four defeat mechanisms as close to simultaneously as possible because then you create dilemmas for the enemy what that does they always create a much bigger burden on the sustainment community because you got lots of different kinds of things happening at the same time in a very geographically disparate area so this balancing high tempo and synchronization is part of that art of command and control okay we only have enough capability to maintain X amount of tempo during a particularly against the particular type of threat so how fast is fast enough right and it's gonna there's gonna be a lot of and there are right now even they're an MC TP warfighter exercises or CTC rotations a lot of tough conversations between sustainers and their commanders about hey boss I get what course of action that you want to conduct but this is what I can do to support it alright so again it gets back to this idea of difficult choices and where are you gonna accept risk all right the decisive operation has to be the decisive operation if it's going to be decisive than it has to be supported the right way the main effort much the same so if you you almost always have got to have a vote in terms of how sustainment capabilities are employed to meet the commander's intent and you start with the decisive operation or the main effort critically important so I talked about sustainment but you got all these other places where we have gaps in terms of fires in electronic warfare cyberspace operations chemical defense all right the commander's balancing not just sustainment but all these other considerations simultaneously and the ones that involve the most lethality in the shortest amount of time or generally where they're gonna be focused so sometimes you may have to fight to get their attention on something that's important and it may not be important right this very second but it's going to be important in 36 hours from now as we're crossing the river as an example this this piece bullet second from the bottom about remaining dispersed so I talked a little earlier about these artillery armies that are trying to kill you fix you and kill you with long-range fires all right they're using the integrated air defense to keep big blue the US Air Force or a rotary wing aviation back what that requires is for our cores divisions BCTs battalion task forces to try to avoid presenting themselves as lucrative targets which greatly increases the burdens of the sustainment community because you're spreading everybody out its if it's by definition very inefficient all right so how do you get the level of effective issue effectiveness effectiveness that you need to support that course of action because they have to remain this first or we you know our risk of significant casualties go way up all right so it becomes more of a challenge so it gets back to that tempo question if I got to be dispersed in my tempo is probably going to be what a little bit slower and sustainers are the ones that provide that hard-headed advice because it's that Math & Science thing there's certain things that you just can't cut your way through a tank only goes so far with no gas like this far right same thing with rotary wing and the rest and then this last piece down here at the bottom of the doctrine talks about the importance of getting into the close fight it's not because we have a cult in the maneuver world about being in the close fight it's because with our capability gaps that we have against the threats right now our biggest advantage is the close fight training organization the equipment we have in the BCTs will win a close fight if we can get into it it may be costly but it's much less costly we've been trying to trade long-range jabs with somebody that's you know a few inches taller and and throws punches a lot faster than you do all right the operations consolidate gains we kind of talked about that it's about defeating or destroying the enemy means to protract the resistance we do this right we employ both to the defeat and stability mechanisms we don't have an insurgency to counter so training considerations this is not all-encompassing but if you kind of think your way through this and we talked at PCC when I go to force comm units and talk about this at the divisions you know you'll get company commanders will say so what should I focus on if large-scale ground combat is you know our thing when we're deploying to Europe or we're going to Korea I said well I would take my medal my mission essential task list and then the collective tasks and individual tasks underneath that and make sure everybody in my organization can do that to a tee had trained in the dark in mop four and everybody laughs and they're like well we'll never get there well you're right you probably won't the only people that are that good or Delta Force but you got out you got a fight to get to the close as close to that as you can and those drills are look very different for whatever type of unit you're in and they encompass all domains you know one of the things that happens at ctc's all the time as all sudden you can't talk on the radio and people are like doing the first thing that they do and they're like playing with the radio and doing all this and it takes them a second to realize that their networks being jammed all right so that's a MOLLE domain issue so what's my drill for switching Nets you know how long do I wait before everybody switches to the alternate frequency same thing happens with our cyber base capabilities as well this one here is big and it's big for staff officers as well as commanders so commanders make decisions but when you're fighting in Afghanistan Iraq are generally and we have the initiative we generally wait till we have a pretty damn perfect picture before we make important decisions okay we don't have enough time to do that in large-scale ground combat so you have to figure out and it's an art that comes through repetition how much is enough information to make a decision what information do I need to have so that I'm telling my staff that I have these running staff estimates let's say hey you know g4 it's the same a brigade commander PSP commander do I have enough fuel to turn right instead of left go to this objective instead of that can I do it well they're out support it what's the enemy's situation there do I have enough ammunition what's my my slants in terms of combat power in each unit what's my medical capability to deal with something you know deal with a large number of casualties in this area reverse that area if something goes badly wrong so it gets back to the importance of drills at the bottom and the drills I think are the biggest takeaway thoughts on this how's it going everybody this is a Colonel Ryan tech Meyer from the sea did just think for a minute when we're talking about large-scale combat operations so when we were going through the TT X's and the sustainment Quick Looks in addition to what Colonel Vernon said previously in addition to what the CG said previously in Colonel Creed and Colonel Sowinski talking about scope and scale if you are a company medic to stay alive to keep that maneuver company moving to keep that movement over company dispersed you have to move correct if you're a company medic at a casualty collection point and you have patients and you can't evacuate them how do you move if you already battalion aid station and you're a PA you're a med platoon star in a field medic field medical assistant Med petunia and it's time to move and you have patients how do you move if you can't evac if you have what we're talking about when we looked at the division look up there previously that is spread across a hundred hundreds of kilometres you may have no ability and no ability to get a medevac aircraft in true okay we windows of opportunity correct what if your evac distance is ten hours to the next roll of care these are the these are the problem sets that we're discussing at these at these TTX is that these Quick Looks talking about and oh by the way let alone regulating 750 bed patients out of theater how do you get them from point of injury to roll one to roll two to roll three then we have to solve the problem about the fact that Transcom doesn't have enough list for that much cause you just put it in your mind that these are pretty much impossible situations that we're trying to figure out solutions for and a lot of risk so they really feel impossible if your cultural norm is ground in Afghanistan in Iraq so let me paint you a picture as a tank company team commander conducted an attack of the liver breach all right you're the first or second company through the breach so I'll paint you a picture we've got all this operation coming in so it's smoke you can't see hardly anything that's good because that means the bad guys can't see exactly where you are is either but they're shooting artillery and all around all right the engineers go in drop a Mick lick will hold through the wire in the mines and the tank company goes through Abrams and the lead aprons and Bradley's behind as soon as you pop out on the other side if you're lucky everybody spreads out all right people aren't doing a lot of talking on the radio others saying that I'm here and I'm there you get a vehicle get hits a mine because it didn't get cleared out of the breach all right the vehicles disabled you got casualties what's the battle drill then so the battle drill is the tank behind it if it can't move pushes it through from behind it Rams it through and drops it off to the other side and everybody's go-go-go nobody's getting out of a vehicle to treat casualties in that tank all right every vehicle that gets killed or damaged is left behind right where it's at because if you stop you got more of them there it's completely the opposite battle drill from what you do when you have casualties in Afghanistan or Iraq all right you're not even looking back all you're doing is trying to figure out how many people are still on the radio so who's policing them up you've got the first sergeant and the maintenance team chief first sergeant and I m113 now seem to be something else and a maintenance team chief and they're m88 that are coming up long behind so two tracks and you might have a third depending on whether you've got something else attached to you they're going from vehicle to vehicle doing a quick check probably it's not the doctor Utley correct term but they're doing a rapid triage themselves to figure out who gets loaded in the medic track who gets loaded in the m88 or one of the Humvees all right and we'll be better back later and then the guy the poor medic who might be an e4 he usually was in our companies he's the the track commander as soon as that track is full he turns around and goes back on his own to an a XP all right the XP will go to either another arm and ambulance or if you don't have enough armored ambulances it'll go to a wheeled ambulance and then take them to the battalion aid station nobody up front in fight in the contact is paying any attention to that it's the First Sergeant maintenance team chief and once it goes to the medic there the medic takes them back in the track all right the medic then comes back on his own gets on the radio where are you guys at it comes and catches back up and and and repeats as necessary as you're going along all right now hopefully you're not suffering a lot of Kenji's but you got to think about that every VC T's got 18 or 22 companies that are doing the same thing simultaneously in in some variation going on at the same time it's a very different type of environment a way of thinking the the very basic fundamental things of navigation you know the fact that you might have ephors come in on the track it's not an NCO oh my god right but most of us who are got gray hair grew up an army word that was not an unusual situation and people were chosen for those Duty position because they could do it and then you went to the field in your practice there and you can practice it without having to take tracks out of the motor pool you can practice it with rock drills walking around we used to do it with golf carts on the golf course you know I mean you can do those kinds of things you kind of have to think outside the box because no one's going to solve that problem for you your commanders are going to tell you hey this is what has to happen we've got in to the standards that we're trying to to get to and then you're gonna have to be innovative in ways to figure out how to make that happen now that's kind of a worst-case piece but that's not by any stretch of the imagination overly dramatic that was just the routine standard in armor times mech the ties and light battalions have their own variation but they do somewhat similar things so you have any thoughts any thoughts or questions ma'am yes sir you spoke on the the different strategic roles as far as the laid out in FM three oh and by Chapter each role but can you talk a little bit more about the continuous nature of some of those strategic roles and that you don't just set the theater and forget it it's a continuous thing yeah so sending the theater is never done much like getting to a tee in your medal is never done because the environments always changing the adversary is always doing something all right the resources that you are given and a particular own organization plus the organization's around you are highly variable you may be assigned someplace it's not a real high national priority at the time so that planning piece executing what you can do to improve your own position is continuous I talked about the strategic roles being continuous so if it was a large-scale ground combat to say in the Pacific US Army Pacific's got to worry about more than just what's say what's going on in the Korean Peninsula they got to worry about what the Russians are doing the Vladivostok they got to worry about what the Indians are doing in the Indian Ocean they got to worry about what Vietnam is doing what the Philippines are doing all of those things shaping that operational environment or preventing conflict or ongoing simultaneously so depending on what echelon you are the focus of your particular task is to support a higher purpose at the lower tax electrons in large-scale ground combat it's going to be prevailing in large-scale ground combat but when you're performing during competition exercises training events and so forth the purpose should be about improving the situation should large-scale ground combat be required at least in those theaters with fair adversaries you know I would say that the one thing that can't be overshadowed from a medical perspective is the joint piece I think our sustainment colleagues don't have a true appreciation for the integrated nature by which if the army folks are the ground joint ground come a commander to j-flex eat a plate we will to potentially be that particular force because all the service didn't have a commanding control element in there in their service and in the joint concept of health support I would say that we still haven't done a good job I'm looking at you too a good job of trying to make sure that that all aspects of that is considered in our particular doctrine as well and so I think cd8 folks are going to work with demin ra and other folks to kind of make sure that that joint concept of health support is considered throughout and this other concept of army support to other services from a standpoint of not only medical but also from the sustainment piece as well and so I think you know when you start talking about what's different between the previous you know coin environment versus the large-scale ground combat operation is going to be inherently that joint piece and I think that we can't overstate then and it's not that simple to be what execute yes sir it's about question you can't make assumptions about what another service is gonna do what another entity within the joint force headquarters is gonna do yeah that's all spot-on I will tell you we organized over time for efficiency sake so if there were capabilities that were in the army and they were in the Air Force and they were in the Marines over a course of time to save money we said well we'll depend on this service to do this primarily piece of it and this service to do that which is one of the reasons why we've got a real issue with our fires artillery right because we said our long-range artillery is gonna be 9 States Air Force and the United States Navy but if the Air Force the Navy can't get into a particular fight then all of a sudden you got a problem so you can't make assumptions about that and that's very probably even much more Gordon on the sustainment side somebody had a yes sir it's lit more sir major more from the seated just uh just just to touch on what the CG just mentioned a minute ago we have to know our sister services doctrine as well how we all fit together and not only that but just by a show of hands how many folks are even familiar with our sister services doctrine and their capabilities but also we have to look at our coalition partners capabilities as well as we move into you know that type of an environment because as we were mentioning you know Colonel Creed mentioned how far it is your taint go without fuel well does the coalition forces there have the refuel capability so you have to know that you have to know what everyone else is doing out there on the battlespace no wonder that but also your enemy's capabilities and understand those as well because who knows maybe they capability that you need is something that our forces can it can leverage and take advantage of but if you don't notice there you don't know what capabilities they have and how you all work in together then you're really setting yourself up for failure and you're setting the force up for failure so really doctrine why is it important not only our army doctrine but across the entire spectrum because that serves as a base to set that baseline so you have a basis to then work from the plan from as as Colonel Vernon was saying we're all planners in some faith in some shape or fashion but if we don't have a base to work from we're really really not gonna be that successful so that's a great point so major so let's talk to multinational piece a little bit I represent the US Army at the land operations working group for NATO and I in charge of the command control effort at AB cancer she's an Australian British Canadian in New Zealand right so Afghans five eyes all of those other armies that are us making assumptions that the United States Army's going to be providing capabilities to support them particularly in sustainment because they said well our countries are only going to fund our armed forces that are big enough to fit say in the British Army position they could fit their entire army and cowboy stadium and leave room for like thirty thousand Packers fans all right so you got to understand those assumptions going in because they're they're pretty significant they tend to provide combat power in terms of BCT like or battalion task force type capabilities and they don't bring a whole lot of anything else for the most part so that is a very real concern sort of major now I will tell you from the doctrinal standpoint we do a pretty good job NATO doctrine looks and smells a lot like u.s. doctrine anything with the five eyes the Koreans and the Japanese is the same way because they take our doctrine we stay tied in with them they stay tied in with us and they mimic us to the largest possible extent so that's kind of a good news story but the vanity story is we we see time and again showing up at multinational exercises and our allies have read our doctrine and then they get confused when we're not doing it because we're running off of SOPs or something and we didn't bother to share those ahead of time and it happens all the time it's funny but it's true and it is a cause for consternation if you assume that these are come as you are fights so it is good to know the doctrine as a baseline for a point of departure because the doctrine is not a recipe it's a list of ingredients so you need to know what ingredients are available to put those recipes together they're appropriate for a specific type of place type of operation okay so some doctrine priorities coming out over the next year that you may find interesting we're updating we've been updating the tactics pubs nothing radically different in there but if you're assigned in support of a unit that's executing the lower tactical level you may want to take a peek at those support and consolidation area operations ATP's coming out because there was a perception by about half the folks and the force it we wrote to broadly in three oh and they needed a little more directive TTP's in terms of what is it supporting consolidation area I mean the next one is kind of important the threat series so in the Cold War we had a three volume doctrinal publication on the Soviet Army it was called the Soviet Army and then there was one on tactics and one on operations we haven't had that now for for 25 26 years getting close to 30 we are bringing back a TPS addressed it at the four primary adversaries and to talk about how those armies are going to fight the one on the Russians and North Koreans will be published this year early next year will do one on the on the Chinese and Iranians why is that important well it's important because if you're part of a unit that's rotating forward into a theater or is obligated against an operations plan against one of those adversaries it would behoove you to understand how they tend to fight it gives you some cultural perspectives and so forth so we think those are going to be very useful moving down to sustainment the biggest change in sustainment is this focus on large-scale ground combat which we had walked away from and then as your CG talked about not only had we walked away from it from a warfighting functions perspective for a long time but we also went to a modular force and changed all our force structure on top of 25 years of cutting tooth to tail so now our tale is where our belly buttons are and you've got a lot of strategic level leaders who don't realize how much tail we've lost and so you got these assumptions on tops of assumptions and perspectives that are very skewed so our biggest emphasis from a doctrinal perspective for going on close to a year now has been getting our sustainment warfighting doctrine straight and FM 4o is going to be the capstone publication should come out I'm guessing this summer sir fingers crossed but there's been looked at by a ton of general officers on both the sustainment and the maneuver side and we're going to continue to iterate that till we get it about right and then that publication will be the sustainment community's version of FM 3 oh it will inform all the other doctrine to get it aligned and and properly focused where it needs to be the extra one roles and responsibilities from the maneuver guy standpoint that's hugely important for us because the current FM 394 that talks about operations by those big ash wands Army's cores and divisions is really good the way we have it except it's really good for Afghanistan and Iraq I mean it's very specifically says so right in front and it's for those command posts being designed to be static and so forth and we're redesigning the command post that those extra ones across the army right now so we're revising the doctrine to get it focused to account for the four strategic roles and the importance of those echelons fighting as formations which the current doctrine does not do they move into the mission command war fighting function start at the bottom up we've been at we've had multiple conversations since I got there and it kept coming back to the majors at CGS C and the fact that a lot of folks showed up they had no background in large-scale ground combat the programs of instruction in the schoolhouse were all focused on BCT level operations in Afghanistan or Iraq and they didn't change that course of instruction until last year and they really didn't get it refined until this year so we're kind of playing catch-up but one of the things that we notice is just like when we were lieutenants or captain's from young majors people all go to the bookstore and they buy these staff officer guides right it's got all the gouge you need to know to be a good planner at the battalion or Brigade level or even division level and we said why are people spending their own money on that why doesn't the United States Army publish something for their their people the British Army does the German army does so we took their stuff stole shamelessly from it bought a couple versions hopefully the last ones ever purchased by these companies that make these things all right we're going to put them all out of business so we we put together a draft we're beta testing it in CGS see right now at Sam's and then at M CTP we're gonna do that for the next three or four months we're gonna staff it worldwide across the army and then we're gonna publish something that can be issued hard copy at all the schools and trade off for people to use we think that's going to be a big deal and so we will we will expedite that as quickly as we can FM 6o is under revision that's basically the reference that most folks at battalion Brigade and division level team tend to look at as staff officers or break it into two and FM 500 + FM 601 that talks about roles and responsibilities or the other that focuses on processes all right ADP 500 the operations process not a radical change it's out for army wide staffing now it's still in force comm what we did was we took a lot of the bills and whistles that have been hung on the MDM P process army design and so forth during counterinsurgency focus and kind of stripped a lot of that away so that we have a bias towards rapid staff work rapid decision-making a rapid operations process that reflects what's required at scale and scope so we're pretty happy with that and then last but not least ATP 600 which is mission command this is going to be a pretty big deal when it gets gets published and general Townsend from TRADOC wants to be personally involved in the rollout on this and what we've done is we've clarified a lot of things that got muddied when we published the the current version in 2012 we were operating our constraints back then we thought it was the end of history lots of good intentions went awry and we and we did some crazy things like we said command and control isn't a thing anymore command and control is bad it's industrial age and so forth and we realized that command and control is fundamental to military operations all right without command and control you got nothing so we still had command control we just called it mission command but we also called the philosophy of mission command mission command and we call the system's mission command we call the war fighting function mission command then we had a mission command verb mission command is a noun and then with junior people who get very frustrated with their their bosses mission command as an expletive alright so we cleaned all this stuff up alright command and control as central to military operations that mission command philosophy is how you command appropriately in a particular situation sometimes you need more control sometimes you need less control sometimes you have subordinates that need a little bit more Direction sometimes you have subordinates that have a little less sometimes you have an operation that has to be synchronized and controlled like an air assault or a river crossing other times you have types of operations where you want command your subordinates to run while like a pursuit or an exploitation alright so we we cleaned up the logic lines on this and we simplified it a lot we made a logic chart tanker proof and it's it's I think you guys are gonna like it when you see it so we'll see how that is received by the force that's the logic chart for six oh so you see in the middle commander control is fundamental of all operations commands illegal thing all right only commanders command the command control is the review there's the purview of all leaders and staffs all right everybody's got a role in that noncommissioned officers have a role in that all right we didn't talk about that in our old doctrine very well we also made assumptions that everybody it was all you know I was coming in here unicorns and rainbows that we can just apply a mission command philosophy and let people cross the line of departure and self-actualize everything would be good all right no okay when you were to come in or looking down and you're conducting an operation the first thing you do is figure out what's the hardest thing I got to do and then you figure out who your best person is and they their formation is the one that you assign the hardest task right it's just human nature that's what we all do yeah we didn't even account for that dynamic and the doctrine so when we talk about the elements of the mission command philosophy which is about empowering subordinate decision-making and enabling decentralized execution appropriate to the situation you had that count for these elements right competence your confidence your subordinates your boss's confidence creates for a level of shared understanding right I got to understand I gotta understand myself the threat the operational environment how we do business doctrine right that creates trust once you have a certain level of trust commanders can write their intense a certain way they can write like pretty broad intents that creates a discipline we didn't put discipline in front of the word initiative because that was sending the wrong message right if we say initiative here we mean the good kind all right not putting discipline doesn't automatically mean that the opposite is OK all right so it's implicit that we want the right kind of thing so come errors intent can lead to mission orders I tell you what I need to get done I don't tell you how to do in excruciating detail except during those kinds of operations they have to be tightly synchronized alright and much of sustainment does have to be synchronized so there is gonna be by necessity a certain level of control up to a certain point or in sustainment it may be down to a certain point I can issue mission type orders alright and then I can I'll trust that my subordinates are going to execute the right level of initiative and I'm going to accept the risk up we accept the risk up we don't float risk down all right that requires an amount immense amount of effort when it comes to leader development it's much more difficult to employ a mission command philosophy effectively than it is to micromanage that the heck out of everything and I would challenge anybody if you want to see a really good primer on what mission command means is the Google general Perkins and mission command on YouTube and and and take a look at his little remarks at CGS see he explains it all very well and before he retired we said hey boss you're retired and nobody else is giving this speech I need to take the elements of this speech and make our doctrine look like it was what the doctrine was supposed to say but didn't and I think we fixed that so opening up for discussion questions about anything that I can confidently answer any concerns sir the new futurist command that's being set up in Austin Texas how does that fit or do they have any role in what's being developed here right now yes understand me colonel working a cat but we pay attention to what's going on army futures command is about ensuring that we can monetize the army in a more efficient and timely manner than the existing systems that we had did so we started with the cross-functional teams that we were addressing initially eight then I think we're down to six big problem sets and we link them together so we weren't developing a combat vehicle that radios wouldn't fit on that couldn't be sustained and you know so they wanted to make sure everything kind of fit together futures command was the next logical step to that so they look deep into the future and they're looking for those disruptive technologies those kinds of things so that the army is postured to feel the right types of capabilities in the future right now they are informed by the current operational environment they were also informed by their best estimates of the future operational environment every once in a while there'll be technologies that are revolutionary you know will change everything but for the most part you're talking about evolutionary change that could greatly increase your capabilities but it's not radically different necessarily and how we think about fighting a war but there are going to be aspects of it that are they will be more in the experimental side and we do meet in the middle basically through the seeds in TRADOC and the TRADOC capability managers so so the just to expound on that deal you know Parkins how do we see ourselves regards to the integration of the filtered force in the conceptual force well see dudes have worked in both sides of fencing historically the fielded force we in conceptual the army saw a gap said let's get a futures command to kind of develop that piece but both general Murray who's commander of army futures command and general Townsend has said that hey our CID is are going to be that connective tissue because proponents will never give up the responsibility to develop and design those activities that needs to be formed across the battle space so RC did come March timeframe will become a part of the army futures command we have a medical section that's assigned to it already and that will be the link from the Army Medical Department to ensure that everything that is being developed conceptually can be brought into our system because the system that we currently have are not just going to go away so we're gonna have to transition those systems over time to be able to make sure we have a current fielded force but also the conceptual force as well one of the things that I wanted to harp on will go back to the previous slide when you showed the ATP's so here what I've seen in what the army from a medical departments perspective and the Surgeon General has talked about it she said hey look we are not army professionals we're not healthcare professionals in the army or army healthcare professionals and so this question is how proficient are we understanding the things that Conakry just talked about nobody challenges generally speaking our proficiency as being our basic tasks nurse physician the Foxtrot or hotel or XYZ but the question is do we have the capacity to be able to integrate ourselves into this particular tactical formation that's being discussed what I'm concerned about is and in in that some of our colleagues at the different school houses in an example our infantry colleague said he walked into a infantry OBC classroom and you had an instructor talking TTP's versus doctor I would argue we might be falling prey to that as well you know as a captain teaching here at Fort Sam Houston any loss the Advanced Course I was doing a lot of TTP's because I wasn't in the books understanding the doctrine aspect what I got going on so my question also is we sent out our draft manuals worldwide staffing of our army manuals Medical Department how many people you think give us any feedback somebody already knew the answer world wide staff and that's the term you used worldwide staffing we get about what five six people right back I mean I'm being generous right back to the schoolhouse and say no in six old when you talk about mission command well maybe you want to have this aspect of it because it has a different implication to the sustainment community talk about four oh well in the term in sustainment when it says that the execution of that particular comment of less medical what does it actually mean why am I saying that because those are the battles we are having to fight every time we go to the sustainment quick look what does integration mean what does consolidated gains means to us but my question is why can't we get people in our own community why can't we get it why can't we have a dialogue with each other about that how am I gonna say that we're not reading it it gets to your inbox you hit delete so I'm gonna implore everybody who's assigned to the schoolhouse they're standing on a platform can you help us can you help us please because these guys and see did and the Vernon's and the ik Myers and the Moors and it's offense keys zante these folks are in a knife fight every single day and now we've got a seat at the table generally speaking when I went to these sustainment quick looks there was only two people in the room Sowinski and myself this last time we went we got to general London and we said hey we need to have medical brigades we need to have MD SCS we need to have Combat Support Hospital guys in the room when we had about 40 45 people that came in and kind of support us I gotta tell you we can't just that the Army is changing at an exponential rate and we're acting as if everything is normal in our in our in our system it's not and so the other part is everybody brings the value with different experiences and so I don't want to be talking amongst ourselves and CD is all I'm saying I want to be having a down log and a communication with the entire army healthcare system because everybody's everybody asked me to have learned something different than other people when I was in Iraq guard against in here's how we did it well that's how you did it but it doesn't mean that's right it doesn't mean it's right so my question is help us challenge ourselves intellectually about what we actually doing I really want to make them to the fore because I'm having I'm having some significant anxiety as you can probably tell I don't know how that we can so this is what general Mundi will say to the majors at CGS see every year is that his expectation is while they're in the schoolhouse these things are only about a hundred pages one hundred fifteen hundred twenty pages each his expectation is that all army professionals at the field grade level have read through those things and I'll have to be experts Adam but they read through well because then you realize how you fit in whatever your branch or specialty is and he's talking about all boy fighting function in all majors Rome so the least known where to look if you've got more detailed questions because you are now assigned someplace where this particular publication is more important to you than another and that was always the intent behind the hierarchy was to give a general sense of professional information for people who were expected to serve on staffs or be in formations that operate at multiple exons particularly the bigger ones and I think they're doing an okay job with that but nobody sits around just reading doctrine and we all get that that's why he says in the schoolhouse is when you have the opportunity to do that and that's the opportunity to do a little reading sir hi I'm a larger love over at a seated usually one of the peons in a room but what I wanted to say is you know as you look at this complexity that's coming and all the decisions that commanders have to make you know one of the things that the army provides a commander is something known as the senior enlisted advisor and more than ever when you think of what a commander has to do and figure out he will need his NCOs to be educated knowledgeable and able to provide insightful advice so what does that mean it means NCOs we've got to get out there and while it's good to be great the training and physical fitness and all of this stuff we now have to learn all of these domains so that when he leans or she looks at you and says what do you think you can actually provide some insightful advice because one of the things we are experts at is the human domain it's the human domain and it's not that we're smarter than officers is that we recruited those soldiers officers and enlisted we train them in basic training when a soldier gets in trouble the first one you normally see is an NCO so we understand a human domain and this kind of battle and environment we're heading into we will need NCOs who are smart intelligent and ready to provide insightful advice and so that's my encouragement to NCOs this is not just for officers all of us need to learn this stuff because we're gonna win together that's the only way to do it the so that's a great point started the when we redid six oh one of the other gigantic holes in it that Turkey and I think it was a turkey was that it downplayed and almost didn't even mention the roles of NCOs in terms of what command and control how is that possible it's not how the army operates or how the army fights it also downgraded staffs by breaking things in the commander tasks and staff to know their army tasks not commander tasks or staff tasks they're not NCO or officer tasks they're they're everybody's tasks but there's each of the different positions plays a role in it so we emphasize that pretty strongly I saw our major processor from the mission command center had helped us out making sure we got that right so interested in any feedback on that what else we've got like one minute it gets to be the last 20 by General MacArthur one of the things is sitting here and kept staring at it wanted to keep take away from where there's two words too late all right don't let that become us too late we learn about our doctrine and we learn we educate ourselves too late right instead of being reactive let's be proactive and potentially going to our next conflict better prepared then trying to figure out everything while bad things are happening all around us thank you so carnal Creed and our neighbors at Fort Hood Texas and I used to see them walking around the neighborhood with this little kid and it was night and I'm seeing this guy with all of his career and I'm like who was that guy's must have his grandparent in in town visiting and the kid was like six years old at the time and I'm like no that's rich [Music] Irish blond as you can see he's truly a subject-matter expert at the at the design of doctrine and one thing I would tell you general Lundy and general Townsend guess what they do they read every word of all this doctrine you just talked about is that not true statement oh that's a true statement so what's our made you just discuss I think we have to do the same thing I recall when I went to the aviation officer vans course we had a doctrinal test on the first day and I'm just gonna be honest with you it humbled a lot of us captains who thought we were all that okay well we did the same thing here at Fort Sam Houston I would argue that it might have humbled some of our captain's here as well and they do the same thing at Fort Leavenworth so my goal is to create the same type of exam for every instructor who comes in this organization okay because everybody's walking around as if they are proficient and I will tell you that we're not I recall being an aviator when I was out there I'm a recovering area by the way right you sit on your latrine every time you go in alive latrine in the library getting your your would you emerge the procedures warning cautions and notes all your limitations associated with the aircraft to be able to be proficient well guess what there's a certain amount of proficiency that you got to know about what is it too tight the three types of advance what is it different types of offense because every one of them has wood what did you say earlier they have different implications of how you support it medically so I've been in t see you've been to JROTC and when a commanding coming around we carry conducted aerial defense or mobile defense I got to know how to support that but no we're gonna sit in the room and believe that okay no he's gonna tell my to do my job no and what did you say earlier hey sir if you do that here's gonna be implications medically that's what they're expecting us to do not that they go execute the operation and then you have all these caches and nobody there to support them that's our fault if we don't do that so I'm going to employ everybody in the room because we're taking time to do leader development sessions this is not a one shot one kill this is a continuous discussion and my belief would be is that I'm hopeful that in the hallways in the classrooms in the at the watercooler so I'm gonna says way sir I just read this part of FM 406 oh and I don't think we got this about right and guess what our doctrine or writers gonna do we're paying people to write back to the sustainment and says hey here's a consideration you haven't put in the manual everything that you see in these manuals have been written and thought of by someone and I hope that someone could be you to help us get this thing right all right have a great day whoo [Music] you

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Length: 126min 54sec (7614 seconds)

Published: Tue Feb 12 2019