[MUSIC] Hi, I'm Jules Van Binsbergen, and a finance professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. >> And I'm Jonathan Berk, a finance professor at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. >> And this is the All Else Equal podcast. [MUSIC] Welcome back, everybody. Today is going to be our last episode before we go into our summer schedule. So we'll go not into a bi-weekly schedule, but rather a monthly schedule instead. And Jonathan, I think we've had a fantastic year. It's been such a good year in so many ways. Our listenership has grown so much, our subscribers have grown so much. And we've got two awards this year, the Signal Awards and the American Writing Awards. I really think that this year could not have gone better. >> I agree, Jules, I mean, in many way, I was very surprised. We have almost 300,000 listens and something like 15,000 subscribers. I'm very surprised. It's very enjoyable to go to conferences and have people tell you that they've been listening to the podcast and what they liked about the podcast. >> And so, fittingly, I think we're going to end on a high note for the season on a topic that I think our listeners will be very interested in, which is, two important questions. The first one, how do you become a CEO? So what are the characteristics of the people that become CEOs? What do their CVs look like, and what is the quickest way to become a CEO of a company? And then secondly, how are CEOs compensated, and is that fair? >> Yeah, and I think these are subjects that you and I have often been in discussions with a mutual friend of ours, Dirk Jenter, who's a professor of finance at the London School of Economics, and I would say a world expert on CEOs. And so the two of us thought, it would be great just to do a podcast where we have a conversation with Dirk, and just talk about many of the issues with CEO that he has found in his research. So with that in mind, Dirk, welcome to the show. >> Thank you very much for having me, it's a pleasure seeing both of you. >> It's really great to have you, Dirk. Thanks so much for taking the time to speak with us. >> So, Dirk, people have a fascination of CEOs because they're wealthy people, but here, our focus is different. Tell us, why do CEOs matter for the world and why should we be interested in CEOs? >> This is a really great question, I am completely with you. We're not interested in CEOs because they are rich or in the media or anything like that. As an academic, we're not groupies for rich people. In fact, in many ways, if we could run the world without them, we'd probably all be quite happy with that. But by now, there's really a lot of evidence that CEOs do matter. And it just starts with the very simple observations that when a CEO changes or when a company changes its CEO, the company tends to change a lot, both in terms of firm behavior and in terms of firm performance. Now, this is a little bit difficult to interpret, right, and we know that, because it might just be that the firm needs a change. The board desires the firm to change, and in that process also brings in a new CEO. And probably the firms that need to change the most going to bring in an outside CEO. And this is going to be really, really, really difficult to figure out whether the changes we see are actually due to the CEO or caused by the CEO, or just part of some sort of bigger change program going on. Now, having said all this, the sheer fact that board members, directors, experienced executives feel like they have to bring in a new CEO whenever a company really needs to change kind of tells you something. It would be really odd if this was all some kind of weird cargo cult, some kind of weird delusion that, we need to bring in somebody new to change the firm, right? These very experienced executives, these very experienced directors are convinced that CEOs are really, really important. Another piece of evidence here is that, really over the last 10, 15 years, a really wonderful literature has sprung up, that does surveys of companies, and really figures out what the management processes inside these companies are. So management processes are things like lean management and permanent or perpetual performance improvements, reporting requirements, documentation, on and on and on. And there is an incredibly strong correlation between having these structured management processes and company performance. So really suggesting that management is a thing, right, management matters. Management isn't just some people making stuff up. This is actually a process, this is a technology, and it really differs across companies. Now, some research we've done, which I think is really interesting, even being slightly distasteful, is looking at situations where CEOs die in office. Now, it's obviously a terrible situation, it's tragic. But from a research perspective, it's also really interesting, because now we have a CEO change, but it's one that's not desired by the board of directors. So it's not a situation where the board of directors says, the company needs to change, let's bring a new CEO. In fact, sort of the ideal experiment is one where the board wakes up in the morning and says, my God, we've just lost our CEO. This is horrible, this is terrible, now we need to find a new one. And even in these situations, we do find that companies change a lot. And interestingly, not in specific directions, they just change. Some change the leverage upward, some change it downwards. Some increase their sales growth, some lowers their sales growth, and on and on and on. So really just saying that CEOs matter, and different CEOs do things differently. Probably most interestingly, for about 20, 25% of companies, and to be clear, we are talking about large publicly traded companies here. For about 20, 25% of companies, the stock price reaction to a CEO death is positive, suggesting that shareholders are actually, to put it bluntly, kind of happy that the CEO died, or at least believe that the company is worth more after the CEO died. Hopefully, they're not happy about it, but certainly they do view the company as more valuable after the CEO has died. And we also then see that subsequent operating performance tends to improve. So this suggests that those companies did not have the right CEO before. So the CEO death, in some sense, gave them an opportunity to rematch, find another one, find a better replacement, and try again. Which for me as a governance person is a pretty strong indictment of the board of directors basically saying, you didn't do your job before, you had the wrong person in office. You needed a CEO death to finally do your job and go out and find a better CEO, something you should have just done by yourself. And so summarizing all of that, I think by now, there's just a lot of evidence that CEOs really, really do matter for what companies do and for how well they perform. >> Fantastic, thank you, Dirk. So a lot of our listeners are senior executives at firms. And so maybe use an expert on CEOs, if you had to give them any advice, what are the sorts of things that CEOs need to have as characteristics? How do you become a CEO at a company? Can you help them out with that? >> And that's another really fantastic question. So let me start by talking a little bit about a recent study we did, where we did the simplest thing possible. We just looked at all the new CEOs hired by S&P 500 companies in the last 30 years, and we just wanted to see the background of those CEOs. And probably the most important result or the most surprising result to us, at least, was the absolute dominance of insiders. So there's this view that there is this vibrant market for managerial talent out there, that companies are competing with each other for talent and are chasing each other's employees, hiring their top executives away, the war for talent. Now, this may well be true below CEO level, but the moment we hit the CEO level, think large public company CEOs, it just plainly isn't true. So a few numbers, more than 70% of all new S&P 500 CEOs are simply promoted internally. So you just take your number two or your number three guy or one of your division heads and you promote her to be the next CEO. Now, look at the remaining 30%, about ten percentage points of those, so another 10% of all new CEOs hires, yes, they aren't current employees, but they're former executives of the same company, or current or former board members. So you add those two together, and we have 80 to 81%, I think it was about 81% in our sample, 81% of new S&P 500 CEOs in the last 30 years were effectively insiders to the company. Now, in many ways, this immediately tells you that it's not a very vibrant market, right? Because the moment you look predominantly inside the company, you're looking at two or three candidates, you're not looking at some big pool of managerial talent out there you're trying to hire. Interestingly enough now, focusing in on these 19% outsiders, right? So if we have 19% of them who are actually genuine outsiders to the firm, more than half of them are current or former co-workers of the hiring firm's directors. So let me just say this very clearly. Even when a board of directors decides, all right, we're not finding an insider we like, let's go for an outsider. More than half the time, they go for somebody they personally know really, really well because they have actually worked with that person. So then you add all of that together, and we have said more than 90% of all new S&P 500 CEOs are either current or former employees, current or former board members, or co-workers of the the firm's directors. Another interesting one, speaking of this sort of view of the world where companies are chasing each other's top executive talent, less than 3% of new CEO hires are poached away from other companies from the CEO position. So less than 3% of the new hires are current CEOs of other companies. So this idea that they're trying to snatch away other CEOs, it's just not in the data, it almost never ever, ever happens. And by the way, in the rare circumstances that it happens, the company doing the poaching, doing the snatching away, it tends to be four to five times larger than the company from which they're hiring, right? So this idea that, you're kind of going to a company that just a bit smaller, your competitor, you're snatching away their CEO, forget about it, absolutely not happening. You're going to a company that's way smaller, and you usually do that when you're in a bit of a crisis situation, right? When you just desperately for some outside talent, and then you're basically stealing a much, much smaller company's CEO. All of that sort of suggests, first of all, that there are sort of frictions, as we economists say in this market. But also very importantly, to finally get back to your question, when we're thinking about how to become a CEO, it means you gotta become CEO in the company in which you are an executive. Or to put that a little bit more constructively, you want to join the company in which you will become a CEO, in which you're trying to become a CEO, at least five, ideally ten years before you're ready for that next step, before you're ready to be promoted to CEO. And to make it a bit more practical for our audience here, if you just look at the CVs of the people who actually then become CEOs in the end, there has been a big shift in the last 50 years. So let me stereotype. 50 years ago, typical CEO would join a company out of college, typically an engineering degree, almost inevitably a man, coming with an engineering degree out of a decent but often not great college. But join the company and then work his or her way up through the company ranks for the next 30 or 40 years, and then at age 58, on average, would be promoted to be the CEO. One company, lots of knowledge about that company, but really very little knowledge about anything else. Modern CEO, sort of 2020 CEO or 2023 CEO looks completely different. Fortunately, we got a bit more gender diversity, but it's still predominantly male unfortunately. But arguably more interestingly, typical CEO CV these days is obviously still a college degree, more so than 50 years ago I should say, but probably college degree, less engineering than before, but still quite a bit. And then, a first job, which can be in a bank, it can be in a manufacturing or industrial company, it can be in a consulting company, then probably an MBA. Then probably at least one or two other companies before joining the company in which he or she will finally be the CEO, and having worked in a range of functions across finance, operations, sales, etc, etc, etc. So much more broadly educated, much more broadly trained, what we in the management literature call general managerial skill. So if you sort of want to summarize this in buzzwords, well, what people have been saying is that we've had this shift from firm-specific skills, where you know a ton about one firm but not much else, to general managerial skills. Sort of the modern CEO is capable of running a whole range of companies. So if you want to be a CEO, that's kind of what you need to do. Build up this broad portfolio of skills, but then, and that's sort of the new insight here, join the company in which you want to be a CEO five to ten years before that promotion. So if you are in a company right now in which you don't think you have a clean shot at becoming a CEO, either because there are people ahead of you in the pecking order, or because you just have a new CEO who's going to stay for another 15 years, get out, right? Don't just sit there as a department head or divisional head and hope somebody from the outside is going to come and hire you as a CEO, it's not going to happen. That's really not in the data. You gotta go out, you gotta get yourself hired right now as a divisional head or president or chief operating officer, and then you have a clean shot at being internally promoted. >> So does that also then mean that if there's not this market for CEOs, that most people are only CEO of only one company, or are people CEOs of multiple companies still? >> So the vast majority, this is another great one, and we're still doing work on this, I should say, but based on everything I know and everything I've seen, the vast majority of CEOs are only CEO of one company. Which also means the notion of you have still massive career concerns if you're a CEO because you want to become the CEO of a larger company afterwards, a lot of people are talking about that. We looked for it in the data, we actually wanted to write about that. And frankly, we were disappointed because it simply doesn't seem to be a thing for the vast majority of CEOs. Typically, you're going to be the CEO of one and only one company. >> And Dirk, how common is the Steve Jobs route where you start a company, you sell the company, you say, that's it, well, Steve Jobs was kicked out, but generally, you say, that's it, I'm out of here, and then the company grows, does badly, and then you come back as CEO? >> Yes, now, this is a really, really good point, we do see quite a lot of that, it was part of the numbers I rattled down very quickly earlier. I mean, if you look at the external hires, about a third of them are ex-executives, current or former board members, right? And there's a lot of overlap obviously between these two categories because of these ex-executives, quite a few of them are currently on the board. And you're exactly right, you usually bring those in in a crisis situation. Which, again, for us corporate governance types, trying to understand what companies are doing and why they're doing it, it's genuinely interesting. Because it says, you're in a crisis, your current management team may not have done particularly great, you don't like him, you're not going to promote internally. So you're trying to go external, but you're not going to the big managerial labor market. I mean, you're an S&P 500 company, you'd be hiring a lot of executives from a lot of companies out there. What do you do? You go back to your former CEO, and it doesn't even need to be the former CEO, sometimes it's a former president, a former chief operating officer. Again, suggesting, especially in a tough situation, in a crisis situation, the board goes after somebody who either knows the company already really, really well. Or who they know really, really well, right? And this is exactly one of these things that we're trying to figure out right now in our research, which one of these two factors is it, right? Is it about these firm-specific skills, so we want somebody who knows the company really well. Or is it about us the directors would like to hire somebody who we know really, really well and who we know we can trust. But yes, that's exactly what you do, you go to a former insider. >> So, Dirk, I have this expression which is, leadership is everything, and I really believe it. I think with that, that there really is nothing else. You can take mediocre workers with a great leader in producing outstanding firm and outstanding work as the poor leader and you have trouble on your hands. So with that in mind, the decision to hire CEO is a hugely important decision. So one interpretation of the fact that CEOs are generally internal hires is because it's such an important decision, you really have to restrict yourself to people you know. >> Yep. >> And so therefore, it's an optimal thing to do. And I know there is a literature out there that has a different view that there's really just people hiring their buddies, which do you think it is? >> This is in many ways the billion dollar, I guess at this point, I should update the trillion dollar question, right? >> [LAUGH] >> And I agree with you, leadership is incredibly important, right? And when whenever people say, it's not we don't really think it's important because Gee, when one of those CEO leaves the next guy comes in and doesn't do things differently. My reaction is always just let me run Apple for five years. Trust me, you will see a difference. >> [LAUGH] >> It's a little bit like saying look, if you kick out the goalie, sorry, for the American audience, this might not work very well. If you're kicking out the goalie of a football team, by which I mean a soccer team, when you kick out the goalie of a professional football team, nothing much happens because they just bring in another one, right? He or she is not even all that much worse. And again, it's the same story, just let me go into that goalie for a while and you will see a genuine difference, right? Yes, we are replacing one extremely skilled, well-matched person by another extremely skilled well-matched person. And because it's so important that job is done very, very carefully and very, very well, there's a lot of input and a lot of thought. So then as a result, you don't see these absolutely massive shifts, which is why we have to look at things like people dying in office to actually see some interesting action. But more concretely to your question, right? In many ways, why do board do what they do, right? Why do they focus so much on the inside, as why don't say use that managerial talent marketers that manage your labor market a lot more? One story is again, those firm's specific skills, that firm's specific knowledge, right? So knowing the company, its culture, its processes, its people, having a network of people inside the company who you know are good, right? That's incredibly crucial. Who you know, you can promote. If you can draw on, who you can get information from, that is incredibly important if you want to run an organization. And incredibly difficult to replicate for an outsider, if you've been there for five or 10 years, you have your people, you have your network, who knows who's good and who's bad. You trust people, you know who you can trust. People knows they can trust you, and that's an incredible basis for leadership. It's a really, really good reason to go for an insider. Now, here's another one. We as economists, we do talk a lot about adverse selection, right? And you as financial economists think about that all the time. It's a really big deal in financial markets. You're always worried that the party you're trading with on the other side has more information than you have and is therefore going to take advantage of you. Now, the same is true in the managerial labor market. And you know the people inside your organization a lot better than the people outside. Now, you have a problem, imagine you're trying to hire away a top executive from another company. What's inevitably going to happen is that the other company is going to make a counteroffer, right? They generally don't like the top executives to leave. But how generous that counteroffer is will depend on how much or how highly they think of that other person, right? How valuable they view that other person. So as in any standard adverse selection situation or any situation where you're trading with somebody who's got more information about the thing you're trading, here it happens to be an executive. So you have two reasons to go internally. Number one, they actually do have skills and knowledge and things that the outsiders don't have. Secondly, well, you know him really well and you're not going to suffer this adverse selection problem when you steal away the Executive of another company. But let's talk about the bad reasons, right? Jonathan alluded to one of them already. You're kind of hiring your buddy. To be honest, I don't think that's going on a lot. But I'll give you another flavor of the same story, sort of a different type of what we academics call an agency problem. Do you hire my own buddy thing? I'm pretty sure that happened quite a bit in the 1970s and 1980s. I'm pretty sure that might still be going on in much smaller companies. Large publicly traded companies 70, 80% institutional ownership, the institutional owners breathing down your neck, I really don't think that's happening very much. I mean, the outside directors on these public company boards, there are professionals and this notion of their all golf bodies and everything else, this may have well been the case for you 50 years ago. I think these days this is much less of a factor. However, think a little bit about the incentives of the directors on a board. I'm convinced that their incentives are such set down inevitably will be much more conservative than they should be, certainly from shareholders perspective. Let's think about the downside of hiring a CEO who doesn't work out. The worst situation for any board member is having to fire a CEO, that's just incredibly painful. The weeks and months leading up to that is an incredible nightmare. And then once you've done it, well, now you're in a new CEO search and you just have a crisis situation. It all happens to happen very, very quickly. And keep in mind, this isn't your main job, right, your main job is probably being executive elsewhere. You don't really want to spend that much time on that company, you're just an outside director. The moment you have to fire a CEO, and in haste find a new one, you will be spending a lot of your time on that company, which is taking you away from your main job. So the downside of hiring the wrong person is massive. It's incredibly painful. And obviously, if the person you hire does a lot of damage to the company, there'll also be a big reputational loss for you, because everybody's going to look at you and say, well, you hired that clown. And that clown ended up destroying billions or tens of billions of dollars of value and we had to layoff 10,000 employees because of him or her. So an absolute nightmare. Now think about the upside. You're hiring a really, really, really great CEO. Okay, imagine a great CEO right now. I mean check Welch, which suddenly at some point everybody saw it was the greatest CEO ever. Has anybody here remember who hired Jack Welch? I mean, I do CEO research, I really have no idea why a Jack Welch, nobody knows. So you're not getting a ton of credit for hiring a superstar. Everybody's going to celebrate the superstar, nobody's going to celebrate you firing the superstar. And financially, you're not getting that much for the upside because the typical outside board directors has a little bit of act with tea, but frankly, it's not very much, you probably don't have any options at all, and compared to your wealth from your main job, it really isn't very much. So your upside from hiring a great CEO is really, really limited, your downside from hiring the wrong one is really big. It's painful to hire the wrong one. So inevitably, I mean, as a finance person you look at that kind of payoff structure risk reward profile and you go, well, I will rationally be conservative, right? I will rationally be very, very careful. My big concern are the bad outcomes, the left tail of the outcome distribution, I don't want to hire the really, really bad person. And then hiring somebody internally who you already know really, really, really, well, who you know knows the company, knows the culture, who you know is not crazy. Who you know have a pretty good idea, has not done anything particularly egregious in the past which might come out in 6 months time or 12 months time, that takes out a lot of the left tail of the outcome distribution. So all of that will, I think, push you towards being very conservative and is a promoting internally or once you go outside to go to somebody's incredibly well known experience probably in Axio, and as a result also very expensive. So I think that's sort of the agency problems that I'm really worried about. So, Dirk, you already alluded to it a little bit, but I think one last topic that we should discuss that has received tons of attention also in the media all the time, is what CEOs get paid, and why, and whether we can justify the pay that we're seeing. Now, there are two conflicting pieces of evidence I think that we've discussed, right? On the one hand, it's very clear that CEOs matter. So I think that piece, you said we can measure that, we have experiments that we can run and we know that they matter a lot. On the other hand, this magical competitive labor market for CEOs where as a firm you need to be worried that your CEO's who got hired away by another firm as the CEO at an incredibly high competitive wage doesn't really seem to be a mechanism that is at play. >> Yes. >> So can you comment a little bit given all the research that you've done on it, on how is CEO compensation structured? And do you think that people that criticize COE PA for being way too high, do they have a point or do they sometimes have a point? Or do you think that it's a pretty fair compensation schedule that we're seeing on average across firms? >> The question you're asking right now is an incredibly challenging one, and one that we've really been thinking about, personally, for 25 years, the profession for 50 or 60 years. I don't think we've got a fully satisfactory answer, but let me try to break it down a little bit. Let me start with the simplest point and I'm going to start by beating up a straw because that's always fun. When we're talking about CEOs and some of these S&P 500 CEO at the very top end, earn insane amounts of money. Insane not in any particularly judgmental sense, but from the vantage point of a badly paid academic those are insane amounts of money, 50 million a year, 80 million a year, a 100 million a year. It's absolutely stunning and even medium pay and the S&P 500 is going to be 15 to 20 million a year, right? So, these are just enormous amounts of money. In response to that, when often hear statements along the lines of nobody can be worth 10 million, 20 million, 50 million, 100 million a year. I work in the UK these days where pay levels are lower, exactly the same conversation, in fact, in a more aggressive manner is happening over here. Just the numbers are smaller, so nobody can be worth 3 million or 4 million or 5 million or 7 million a year. You don't in any way judge the words of the person just creates value that will justify paying that person $100 million, and the reason for that is simply the scale of these companies, it's as trivial as that. The market capitalization of the largest firms in the S&P 500, so think the Apples, Googles, Facebooks, Microsoft of the world, are all north of 1 trillion dollars, all right? So now, all the board needs to convince itself of is that candidate A is going to make the company 1% more valuable than company B, 1% of 1 trillion dollar company is $10 billion. So he convinced that candidate A is going to make your company worth 10 billion more than candidate B. And now you're competing for that candidate against some other firm or you're thinking about making that candidate happy. It's easy to justify paying that person 10 million or 20 million or 30 or 40 or 50 million. So there's no way we can our priori rule out that those folks are worth, it's very easily imaginable that they are, that all right. There is, and you pointed to as that already, there's a really interesting tension between what we know about CEO hiring ,right? This massive dominance of insiders, it's not a really liquid market, but not stealing a wage as a CEOs and how CEO pay is set. So one thing we've done last year was a really interesting survey of directors and remuneration committees of UK companies. So we went to all large publicly traded companies in the UK, we tried to track down audit directors to have on the remuneration committee. So remuneration committee as a subcommittee of the board of directors, that's CEO pay. So we wanted to talk to the people who set CEO pay. And we asked them in essence, how do you think about CEO pay? How do you set it, do you think it's too high, it's too low, etc., etc., et. And what we found, again, and that's was also in the prior literature is an incredibly high weight and obsession with the pay of peer CEOs. So if you ask the board of directors what's the big main determinant of CEO pay, is it skill, is it value added, is it the? They look at you like you're from mass and they're going to say no, no, no, it's what the CEOs in our peer firms are being paid. Now, notice there's a tension here, right? I've just argued earlier that they are not hiring each other's CEOs away, right? They're not really trying to steal the CEOs of the other firms and they're not actually worried about their own CEO being hired away. So we asked them outright, yeah that makes a lot of sense to us, we economists, it's a labor market, you're worried about peer pay because you're worried about your CEO being hired away. Again, they look at you as if you're completely insane and they have a point and what they're going to explain to us very slowly in small words, because the thing is academics aren't that bright. Is they going to say look, the other companies they already have a CEO and there are only three large companies in our industry anyway, they all have a CEO. Where do you think our CEO is going to go? They're not trying to hire our CEO away, we're not trying to hire away. And we're like, okay, fair enough, we're idiots, we acknowledge that. But then why do you care so much about peer pay? How does that fit together? And the answer, probably obvious to anybody working on a board, wasn't obvious to us, is because that's what the CEO is using to assess whether her pay is fair. And that notion of pay fairness, very different from what you alluded to earlier, right? Isn't it unfair that CEOs are paid so much? What boards worry about is not at all, I mean, maybe a little, but not predominantly that, CEO pay is 100 times or 300 times or 500 times that of the median employee. What they're really worried about is that if I pay my CEO, not enough, she will look at the pay of her peer CEO's and go. Wait a moment, why doesn't my board appreciate my work? Am I not busting my tail end on a daily basis here? Am I not working 70 hours a week? Have I not achieved? And that will lead to a very, very tough situation and a very tough discussion between the board and the CEO that boards are actively trying to avoid. So boards have this very interesting model of CEO psychology. Which is that, look, CEOs are amazing high achievers, they are really intrinsically motivated, they want to do really well. And it's not about incentive pay or any such thing, but they also really care about being respected and appreciated and fairly rewarded. So it's almost a two step process. Step one, CEO looks at her pay package and decides whether it's fair or not, if it's fair check moving on. And then she's going to work extremely hard and her intrinsic motivation is kicking in and she's going to do a great job. And the policy needs to shape it in the right direction and tell her what exactly to do and what's expected. But ultimately, now we're off to the races and she's going to work extremely hard. If that first step fails, even that first step, she decides, wait a moment, this is not fair I'm not being paid as much as my peers, my mates in the other companies, you're in deep trouble. You're basically undermining the intrinsic motivation of the CEO, and at this point you're in a losing position. >> Dirk, thank you so much. I think that was one of the more interesting discussions of CEO that I have had the pleasure of listen to in a long time. >> Thanks so much, Dirk, this was really fantastic. >> Thank you for having me, it's been my pleasure. >> Thank you, Dirk. >> Thanks for listening to the All Else Equal podcast. Please leave us a review at Apple Podcast, we'd love to hear from our listeners. And be sure to catch our next episode by subscribing or following our show wherever you listen to your podcast. For more information and episodes, visit allelseequalpodcast.com or follow us on LinkedIn. The All Else Equal podcast is a production of Stanford University's Graduate School of Business, and is produced by University FM. [MUSIC]
