Deadly Mistake! The DARK Story of the Los Angeles Runway Disaster

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(plane whooshing) - Two aircraft, two sets of crews and passengers who are all traveling somewhere for a purpose. Maybe they have plans to visit relatives or going on a work trip or maybe this is just a regular day on the job. No matter what the circumstances are, these passengers and crew will all be soon forced to share something truly terrible. Stay tuned. The 1st of February 1991 was a nice, crisp day in California, United States. The visibility was good with only some few high clouds and the air traffic coming into Los Angeles International Airport was flowing smoothly. As the afternoon went on, the air traffic controllers in the tower went about their duties like on any other day and nothing seemed out of the ordinary. Los Angeles Airport or LAX, as I will refer to it here, was already, back then, a sprawling huge airport with four active runways. Now, at LAX, the controllers operated a bit differently than in other US airports, in that all of its runways could be used simultaneously for both takeoff and landing whilst the other airports normally assigned some runways for takeoff and others exclusively for landings. The fact that LAX didn't do that meant that the workload in the tower could at times be quite high, but this afternoon it was relatively calm with only a quite moderate flow. On that same day, a Fairchild Metroliner from SkyWest Airlines was scheduled to operate several short flights within California. Eventually, there was a crew change at Inyokern Airport where the two new pilots took over the aircraft and then initially flew it over to Los Angeles. They then continued operating to Fresno and then back to Los Angeles again where they, around 1730 local time, were finally getting ready for a flight over to Palmdale. This Metroliner had seats for up to 19 passengers and since it was operating under FAA Part 23 commuter regulations, it was allowed to operate with only two pilots and no cabin crew, so on this leg, over to Palmdale, there were 10 passengers and two pilots on board and they were using call sign SkyWest 5569. The Metroliner was a great little aircraft, powered by two turboprop engines on a low-mounted wing. And even though it had a pretty tall landing gear, the whole aircraft was still pretty low, especially compared to a Boeing 737. And that will become important later on in this story. The other thing that is worth mentioning here was its external lighting. It consisted of a standard green and red navigation light on each wing, together with white flashing strobe lights on the wings and tail, a white nav light, also on the tail and a red anti-collision light mounted on the top of the tail fin. This anti-collision light had a brightness of 100 candles or 1257 lumen which was about four times weaker than the current standard was back in 1991 but since this aircraft had been certified back in the early 1970s, it was still approved. Another peculiarity with this anti-collision light was that it was partly obscured by the rudder cap, meaning that it was hard to see at angles of around 5.4 degrees above and behind it. Now on top of all of those lights that I just mentioned, there were also forward-facing landing lights, taxi lights as well as a couple of ice-detecting lights that was illuminating the wings. All of this aircraft lighting, basically had two primary purposes. The first was just like headlights on a car to illuminate where the aircraft was going when it was taxiing, landing and taking off. And the other, more important purpose, was to make sure that the aircraft was visible to other aircraft as well as to air traffic control. But this was primarily something that was thought of as being important when the aircraft was airborne. On the ground, only certain parts of this lighting like the taxi light, nav lights and anti-collision light was normally used in order to not blind other traffic around. Whilst the SkyWest pilots were working on helping their passengers to board, another aircraft, a Boeing 737-300 from US Air, was already airborne and inbound towards Los Angeles. It had started the day in Syracuse and was heading to its final destination in San Francisco with intermediate stops in Washington DC, Columbus, Ohio and Los Angeles. There had been a scheduled crew change in Washington, where the current pilots had taken over. And since the captain had flown the first leg to Columbus, the first officer was now pilot flying on flight 1493 and they had 83 passengers on board. The day had been running really smoothly so far and the two pilots were in a great mood as they continued their roughly four hours and 40 minutes flight at a cruise altitude of 35,000 feet. The captain was 48 years old and was very experienced, with a total time of 16,300 hours of which 4,300 had been flown on the Boeing 737. He had upgraded to the captain position about six years before this flight and was very comfortable in his role. The first officer was 32 years old and had just over 4,300 hours of total time, 982 of which had been flown on the 737. He had previously been flying on Learjet before getting hired by US Air just over two years prior. The pilots were joined by four cabin crew members and one of them had, during the boarding, stopped at the overwing exit and asked a passenger that she saw was very, very young whether he would be able to fulfill the duties of an abled-bodied person in case of an evacuation. Now, an able-bodied person is someone who will be able to assist the cabin crew with things like opening emergency exits, potentially helping other passengers, in case it would be needed in an emergency. And only people who are able to do so can be seated next to emergency exits. In this case, the passenger responded that he was 17 years old and thought that he would be able to do it. Now when she heard this, the cabin crew agreed but still decided to brief him and the other passengers about how to operate the emergency exit, something that wasn't standard actually back then. Keep that in mind. Now most of you are probably quite familiar with the Boeing 737 already. But for those of you who aren't, the 737-300 is a twin engine jet aircraft with a passenger capacity, in the case of US Air, of 128. From a technical standpoint, this was a very modern aircraft at the time and this particular individual was six years old with largely original interior panels and furnishings. There were no technical defects recorded on it but one thing that's worth pointing out here is that in 1985, new rules concerning the fire retardant properties of furnishings in aircraft had been implemented. These new rules required that the materials used in new aircraft had to be very flame-retardant but this aircraft was manufactured just before these rules came into place. Now it did have a partial refurbishing in 1989 but most of the overhead bins and the interior walls were still made from the original materials. Another technical aspect of the 737 is where it's storing its flight crew oxygen cylinder. In case of a rapid depressurization at high altitude, the passengers will be fed oxygen from masks which drops down from the overhead bins. I'm sure you've seen that. These masks are connected to oxygen generators who, through the combination of chemicals, will produce oxygen for around 13 minutes or so. This is generally well enough to allow the pilots to perform an emergency descent down to 10,000 feet where the air is then fully breathable again. But the pilots does not get their oxygen from an oxygen generator. Instead their masks are fed from an oxygen cylinder which is located under the cockpit just forward of the front cargo hold. And this oxygen cylinder will soon play an important part. Anyway, around time 17:40, the crew of US Air Flight 1493 received their first descent clearance down towards LAX and the area controller told them that they were cleared for the CIVET TWO arrival and descent profile. The captain read this back and the first officer initiated the descent whilst also verifying that this was the arrival route that they had already briefed and prepared for. The sun had just set beneath the ocean in the west and it must have been a beautiful sight as the pilots were now descending into the darkness below them. The aircraft was cleared to descend in steps down towards Los Angeles and they were also told that they could expect Runway 24 Right or Left for landing but that they would be advised later on, which one of those runways it would actually be. The pilots continued following normal procedures, including advising the cabin crew when they were about 15 minutes away from the airport. And that prompted the cabin crew to secure the cabin. Everything was working just like clockwork. At time 17:57:28, the LAX Terminal Radar Approach Controller, TRACON, instructed Flight 1493 to intercept the localizer for Runway 24 Right and then continue their descent down to 10,000 feet. About one and a half minutes later, the same controller then also asked the pilots if they had the airport in sight. Both pilots started peering out through the cockpit windows into the now dark evening and could just about make out the lights of the airport in the distance as they were about 25 miles away at this point. The captain answered, "Affirm," which prompted the controller to then clear them for a visual approach for Runway 24 Left and he also told them to descend to cross an RNAV point called DENAY at a minimum of 8,000 feet. When he heard this, the first officer disconnected the autopilot and then started visually transitioning over towards the centerline for Runway 24 Left. The captain read back the clearance but since they had been following the ILS localizer for Runway 24 Right up to this point, the first officer asked him to please confirm that the clearance actually was for Runway 24 Left and not Right, which the captain then also did. The controller confirmed that they had heard right the first time and the weather was absolutely great, so I'm sure that the first officer was really enjoying some hand-flying here. I often disconnect a bit further out myself when the conditions are right to actually feel and enjoy the aircraft a bit. It's part of what makes this job so fun. Now the two runways ahead of them were at the same distance. So even though there was no instrument landing system active for Runway 24 Left, the first officer could still use the glide slope indicator for the other runway as a way to help maneuver vertically. This had all of the hallmarks of a great approach but what the pilots didn't know was that ahead of them, several now very unfortunate circumstances were starting to align with each other and I'll tell you all about that after this... Have you ever been in a situation where you're somewhere overseas desperately trying to access some crucial online service only to be met by a blocked website? Well, if you haven't... And good for you... But I certainly have and that's why I'm using NordVPN, today's sponsor. With Nord, I can just change my IP location virtually to basically anywhere in the world with just the click of a button and still receive great internet speeds, thanks to their over 6,000 servers. 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As they started taxiing out towards their departure runway, 24 Left, the first officer completed the safety briefing with the passengers since there was no cabin crew on board. The aircraft proceeded from terminal six, via the North Route to Gate 32 and then towards the holding point for Runway 24L. But because the Metroliner was a relatively small aircraft, they wouldn't need to taxi all the way down to the end of the runway for departure. Instead, they were planning to use what's known as an intersection takeoff position, further up on the runway. We pilots often do this to minimize taxi time and it's perfectly safe to do so as long as the performance has been calculated with that in mind. Now at this point, we also have to start talking a bit about the air traffic controllers who were working this night and the way that they were dealing with the traffic. LAX had, like I mentioned before, four runways and they were divided into two sets of parallel runway pairs. Runway 24 Right and Left made up the northern pair and Runway 25 Right and Left, the southern. In between the runway pairs, the main terminal buildings were situated and just to the east of them, the air traffic control tower. Inside the tower, there were six controllers working this afternoon: four fully-qualified controllers, one developmental controller, handling one of the ground frequencies and one area supervisor. Now when several air traffic controllers work together, they have to do so using some kind of organized system. And the way things were done back then and mostly even today, is by the use of something known as flight progress strips. These strips are filled up with information about a particular flight and is then passed from one controller to the next when they hand over the aircraft between them. That way, the controller in charge of the aircraft knows that he or she have the responsibility for it, what clearance it has already received and, approximately, in what sequence that aircraft is in relation to other traffic. Normally, those strips would then follow the same sequence as the handovers do, so from the clearance delivery to ground and then onto the tower controller who would be handling the takeoff. But at LAX, they had decided to change this slightly so that the strips would go from the clearance delivery controller directly to the tower controller in order to reduce some workload for the ground controllers. This meant that an aircraft could, at any time during taxi, get directly into contact with the tower and request, for example, an intersection takeoff. Now, this was very convenient for the crew of the aircraft, but it put a lot more workload on the tower controllers who now had to, on top of separating landing and departing traffic, also sometimes look up and try to localize traffic on the airport in order to answer their requests. The work of the controllers were done mostly visually. But they were also supposed to have some electronic aids at their disposal. One of those systems was called the Airport Surface Detection System, or ASDE, and was essentially a surface radar built to detect principal features of the airport, including aircraft and vehicles and then present them on a radar screen for the controller. But this was a very crude system and prone to malfunctions, especially when used for longer periods of time. And on this particular afternoon, it was not working. Another more advanced and reliable system had been requested to replace it, but for some reason, its implementation kept getting delayed, and that meant that on this afternoon, there was no surface radar system available to help the active controller. Another factor that will play a role in this accident was the placement of the tower in relation to the northern runways. Since the tower was situated quite close to the Runway 24 ends, the controllers could see the beginning of the aircraft take off rolls perfectly, but as the aircraft started rolling further down the runway, four sets of ramp lights had been built to light up the ramp next to Terminal 2. These lights were constructed so high up and in such an angle that during the time of darkness, their glare would restrict the controller's view of the Intersection 45 and 47 to Runway 24 Left. This had been brought to the attention of someone who, according to verbal reports, had apparently changed the angle of those lights, but even though this issue had been reported as solved, the glare was still there on the evening of February 1st. And then we get to the controller herself. The tower controller in charge on this evening had only been working in her position as a full-performance level controller for about two and a half months. About one month after her initial certification, she had undergone an assessment by her supervisor at the time, as she was working in the tower, and this assessment was made in an effort to find weaknesses that could be used for further training events under something known as the Technical Appraisal Program or TAP, and it was therefore not a pass or fail event. In the assessment, her supervisor identified a few key weaknesses in her performance, and those included a loss of awareness of aircraft separation, the misidentification of an aircraft by the use of an incorrect call sign, the failure to complete two required coordinations with other controllers, and a failure to issue a required advisory to an aircraft. These deficiencies were then debriefed with the controller after the check, but no other remedial action was taken, like extra training, for example, partially because the supervisor was unsure about how the TAP program was actually supposed to work. When SkyWest Flight 5569 had taxied about halfway towards their departure point, they were shifted over to a new ground controller frequency. The first officer advised this new controller that they were number two on taxiway tango behind an Aeroméxico aircraft ahead. The new controller acknowledged this and told them to hold position initially and then, whenever ready, turn right onto tango and then at 45, transition to uniform and hold. 45 in this case was an intersection with Runway 24 Left, and as it turns out, it would suit Flight 5569 perfectly as a starting point for their takeoff. The first officer read back the clearance and then the Metroliner continued to taxi with the pilots inside completing their pre-flight takeoff procedures. Intersection 45 was situated just beyond the touchdown markings for Runway 24 Left and within the touchdown zone. It was also one of the intersections that were affected by those glaring light poles, sticking up between the tower and the intersection. At time 18:03:38, the first officer in the Metroliner was advised to contact the tower on frequency 133.9. He did so and when he called up, he advised the tower controller, "Skywest 569, at 45. Would like to go from here if we can." The tower controller responded and told them to taxi up to and hold short of Runway 24 Left, which the first officer acknowledged. And so far, nothing was out of the ordinary here and everything was still under control. The SkyWest crew was getting ready for an intersection takeoff like they almost always did at LAX and the controller was well aware of where they were and in what sequence they were in the traffic. As this was happening, US Air Flight 1493 was still on final and talking to the approach controller, so they didn't hear this initial conversation between the SkyWest aircraft and the tower. Remember how I said that air traffic controllers are using flight progress strips to keep track of their traffic? Well, the tower controller did have a strip for SkyWest Flight 5569, but the strip for another Metroliner, which was taxiing behind Flight 5569, had not been given to her due to an error by the clearance delivery controller. Remember that. Inside the cockpit of US Air Flight 1493, the approach was going well and the two pilots were in a really great mood. They were about seven nautical miles out and had just selected gear down since the controller had asked them to expedite the descent down to 4,000 feet due to crossing traffic above them. And the drag from the extended gear would allow them to increase their descent rate without increasing their speed, which is important when you're on approach. Once they had passed 4,000 feet, the approach controller thanked them for their help and then told them to contact Los Angeles Tower on frequency 133.9, which the captain also read back. After this, the first officer started asking for flaps to be extended, speed to be reduced and for the landing checklist to be completed. Remember, he was still hand-flying here and the captain did all of this before calling up the tower. This meant that the time that they would have on the tower frequency became a bit shorter, but it was still long enough since they hadn't reached the mandatory reporting point yet. At time 18:04:33, US Air Flight 1493 finally called up the tower controller and advised her that they were established on final, inside of ROMEN, the outer marker position, about 5.3 nautical miles away from the runway. This call was received by the controller, but she never answered to it and the reason for that was that she was now getting increasingly busy with a developing problem further down the runway. You see, just before Flight 1493 had called up, the tower controller had been dealing with an aircraft departing from Runway 24 Right and just after that, she was trying to reach another aircraft, which was due to cross Runway 24 Left further down on the runway. But the pilots in that aircraft had managed to switch over to another frequency, which meant that the tower controller couldn't get a hold of them. As she was continuing to try and reach this aircraft, she also made a call to SkyWest Flight 5569 and she told them to taxi into position and hold Runway 24 Left, traffic crossing downfield. The first officer of Flight 5569 read back that clearance, released the brakes and then started lining up on the active runway. Another important detail here is that the standard operating procedures in SkyWest at the time, instructed the pilots to only turn on their landing and strobe lights once the takeoff clearance had been received. This meant that as the Metroliner was now lining up, the flashing strobe lights on the wings and tail was not yet activated. As the SkyWest aircraft started moving, the tower controller continued to try and reach the other aircraft to get them to cross the runway before the traffic situation made it impossible. At the same time, another aircraft, Southwest Airlines Flight 725, which was a Boeing 737, came onto the frequency and told the controller that they were ready in sequence, meaning that they could accept the takeoff clearance whenever it was possible. The tower controller told them to continue taxiing down towards the holding point from Runway 24 Left and to hold position there as they would get to follow the Metroliner in front of them after that. Now, what this exchange actually meant was that, at this point, the controller's situational awareness was still intact. She knew that SkyWest Flight 5569 was on the runway awaiting takeoff clearance here. But now, as you can see, things are starting to become more complicated as she was still trying to get into contact with the other aircraft needing to cross the runway. At time 18:05:09, the missing aircraft finally came back onto the frequency and apologized for having messed up earlier. The tower controller told them that it was okay and then she finally issued the clearance for them to cross the runway and to contact the ground controller when they were clear of the runway. The pilots read this back and then apologized again, to which the controller just repeated the same clearance, but with an incorrect call sign this time, a call sign that she had actually dealt with about five minutes earlier and this could possibly have been an indication of her stress level starting to rise. Remember, she still had one aircraft on the runway and another one on final, which was just getting closer and closer. Now, since the captain of Flight 1493 never got a response to his first call, he tried again at 18:05:29. But also this time, there was no response from the tower, who was now busy telling a departure aircraft to change their frequency. And just around here somewhere, something must have started to happen to the tower controller. Somewhere, during the conversation with the crossing aircraft, the departing traffic and the US air flight on final, she must have forgotten about the SkyWest aircraft that was still waiting on the runway. She now asked the SouthWest 737 to confirm that they were holding short of the runway and when they did so, she cleared US Air Flight 1493 to land on Runway 24L. Now you might ask, how could she forget about an aircraft like this? Didn't she have a flight progress strip in front of her that was supposed to remind her? Well, the answer to that is yes. But unfortunately, the other Metroliner that I mentioned before with call sign West Wing 5072 had now appeared on the frequency and they did not have a strip since the clearance delivery controller had forgotten to transfer that strip to her. This fact just further increased the workload as she now had to start looking for that strip in the middle of everything else. And in that confusion, and with the number of strips in front of her matching with the only two aircraft that she could see, not the three that she actually had, because remember that third aircraft on the runway might still have been hidden behind those glaring lights, the error simply slipped through the crack. And there was no one there to notice it and no warning system available to notify her. Now, if air traffic control fails, the remaining safety barrier then becomes the pilot. This means that the four pilots involved in the situation, plus maybe others on the frequency, were now realistically the only ones that could stop this impending disaster. The pilots inside the Metroliner on the runway should have heard the tower clear the 737 behind them to land. Believe me, when you're standing on an active runway, you're really putting all your attention on that frequency, just awaiting your takeoff clearance. But there is, of course, a possibility that they were busy maybe completing the last part of their checklist or discussing something else. We would have known this if we had the cockpit voice recording from them, but, unfortunately, this category of aircraft had not yet been mandated to carry a cockpit voice recorder at that time. There was a rule being implemented in October that same year, forcing the implementation of CVRs and in a really cruel twist of fate, SkyWest had actually asked the FAA to allow them to install voice recorders early. When they did so, they had also asked the FAA to get an exception from the rule of being grounded if a CVR didn't work, up until the official implementation date of course. But the FAA had just said no to that. If they installed those devices early, they would also need to work for the aircraft to be airworthy, and obviously the airline didn't want to take that extra risk. This, in my view, is red tape at its absolute worst. Anyway, that's why we won't know for sure why the pilots in the Metroliner didn't speak up when they heard the landing clearance of the aircraft behind them, but what about the pilots inside of the Boeing on final? Well, after they had received their landing clearance, the captain switched on their landing lights and made sure that the landing checklist was complete. They were completely stabilized as they passed 1,000 feet, and when they did so, the captain only made some remarks about how it was all looking real good. There were no discussions in the cockpit about any potential traffic conflicts. That could have been because the Metroliner had only been cleared to taxi into position and hold less than 10 seconds after the 737 had joined that same frequency, meaning that that call or the significance of it might have been missed. There were also a lot of other calls around that same time, and the phraseology, "Taxi into position and hold," is somewhat ambiguous and could potentially refer to several different things. So there is a possibility that it didn't raise the type of awareness that a clear line up and wait clearance would have done. That's, by the way, why we today are very careful with using the exact phraseology intended for line up and take off clearances. But this still doesn't explain why the 737 pilots didn't see the Metroliner on the runway in front of them. The weather was fine and the visibility was great, even though it was completely dark at this point. But here, another sad fact comes into play, one that I have already mentioned earlier on. Remember how SkyWest had, as a procedure, to not switch on those strobe lights until they had received their take-off clearance? Well, what that meant was that the most conspicuous part of their aircraft lighting was now not activated. The aircraft would still have been reasonably easy to see when it was taxiing onto the runway and then lining up. But once it was standing still on the centerline, its white position lights would have blended in perfectly with the runway centerline lights. And on top of that, remember what I told you about the red anti-collision light on top of the tail? Yeah, that one would have been easy to see during normal circumstances, but it was unfortunately partly hidden by the rudder cap behind and above it, just where the approaching 737 was now closing in. And since the runway edge lights, centerline and approach lights would have been much brighter than the non-illuminated aircraft fuselage, it would also have essentially been hidden, and all of these circumstances meant that the Metroliner was now effectively invisible, as it was standing on the centerline bang in the middle of the touchdown zone. If it would have just lined up about three feet left or right of the centerline, it would have likely been another story, as the lights would have then been misaligned and much easier to see. Once the 737 passed 500 feet, the captain called out, "You're coming out of 500 feet, bug plus 12, sink is 700." The first officer checked to that and then he made sure that the landing lights were on and then started mentally preparing for the landing. He saw in the corner of his eye that another aircraft was taxiing towards them on taxiway uniform, but everything else looked perfectly fine. Now, we pilots normally aim for a point on the runway just before where we intend to touch down. So in this case, since it was dark outside, this would have likely been just in front of the main touchdown zone lights. We tend to use the PAPI lights for initial vertical guidance, but as we get lower, more and more of our focus is instead directed towards that runway itself, making sure that the touchdown point is not moving up or down in the windows. This means that anything beyond that, especially if it's not supposed to be there and hard to see, would be very hard to notice by the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring, which was the captain in this case, might have just been monitoring the instruments and therefore not have seen it. The threshold was passed at 50 feet with 130 knots and the flare was then started at around 30 feet. The main landing gear touched down at the 1,500-feet mark on the centerline exactly where it should be and the first officer then gently started derotating the nose to land the nose wheel, while simultaneously also selecting reverse thrust. But as he was doing this, his eyes suddenly caught a glimpse of a red light just in front of him and almost immediately the whole Metroliner appeared in view with the glare of his landing lights reflected in its propellers. The first officer immediately applied max braking, but it was clearly too late and there was no time to make any evasive maneuvering at all. The time has simply run out. (suspenseful music) At time 18:06:59, US Air Flight 1493 collided with Sky West Flight 5569 just abeam Intersection 45 on Runway 24 Left. The collision happened just as the nose gear of the 737 was touching down with the main brunt of the impact hitting the lower left side of the Boeing's nose, causing a huge fireball. Since the Metroliner was substantially smaller and lower than the 737, it got completely crushed underneath the weight of the Boeing, which now started dragging the twisted wreckage along the runway. The nose gear of the Boeing soon collapsed, meaning that all directional control was instantly lost and the sparks from the initial collision quickly ignited the fuel from the Metroliner, whose main body was now completely mangled on the left side wing of the 737. It is likely that all occupants of the Metroliner perished almost immediately from the initial collision, but inside of the Boeing, people were still alive. They had just noticed a seemingly normal landing followed by abrupt braking and then a strong jolt as the impact happened. This was then immediately followed by severe vibrations, a strange clear orange glow outside of the windows, as well as heat and smoke that quickly started coming up from below the floor. When the cabin crew first saw this, the two that were seated in the rear of the aircraft unbuckled their seatbelts to start getting ready for what they assumed would be an immediate evacuation, and so did several passengers. But the problem here was that this accident was still not over. The two aircraft were still moving at a considerable speed and since the pilots now had no way of controlling the trajectory, the flaming wreckage soon left the runway and careened over towards the left, where they crossed two taxiways before finally crashing into an abandoned fire station. As that happened, the two aircraft obviously came to an immediate stop, meaning that all of those people who had unbuckled their seatbelts now flew forward and into their seats, aisles and bulkheads. This is the reason why you need to keep your seatbelt fastened until we pilots turn off the seatbelt sign or the cabin crew tells you to. Fortunately, the two flight attendants that had unbuckled themselves didn't hurt themselves badly and were able to reasonably quickly come to their senses again. The impact with the building had completely mangled the forward left part of the cockpit, likely killing the captain immediately. And the fire that was now raging below the fuselage soon got into contact with the crew oxygen cylinder that I mentioned before. That cylinder had likely been damaged in the initial impact and now started spewing pure oxygen into the fuel-fed fire drastically increasing its intensity. Black smoke was now quickly filling up the cabin, making the evacuation both more urgent and harder to do. And the fire, which soon also entered the cabin, could spread relatively easy in the older type overhead bins and wall panels. The flight attendant in the front managed to soon open the forward right door, but the main evacuation route quickly became the overwing exit on the right hand side away from the fire. The back left door had been partially opened with the slide deployed by the eager cabin crew while the aircraft was still moving, meaning that it was now inoperative and the back-right door was being used, but that area soon filled with dense black smoke. Now, remember that emergency briefing that the flight attendant had done with the 17-year-old boy, sitting next to the overwing exit? Well, it now turns out that this briefing likely saved several lives as the passengers clearly remembered what they had to do and therefore, quickly got that door open. Unfortunately though, one passenger who was sitting in that emergency row froze from pure fear, impeding the speed of the evacuation and on top of that, two other passengers at some point started fighting in front of the exit, slowing it down even further. This, together with a slightly damaged seat in front of the exit meant that some passengers and one cabin crew who was trying to help them sadly didn't have time to exit before they were overcome by the smoke. Out of the 83 passengers and six crew onboard the 737, 22 perished and 13 received serious injuries. On top of that, all 12 passengers and crew onboard the Metroliner had also perished, meaning that the total death toll with this horrible accident actually rose to 34 with one more added a few days later as a passenger died from his injuries. Now, in the tower, the controllers had immediately hit the accident button as soon as that first fireball was seen, but initially there was quite some confusion about what had actually caused it. The fire brigade quickly arrived to the scene and did an absolutely outstanding job. They helped with the evacuation, of course, and one of them actually climbed into the right hand cockpit window and managed to pull out the first officer and thereby saving his life. Another firefighter found a propeller inside of the right-hand engine of the 737 and called this into the tower as they initially hadn't been made aware that there were two aircraft involved in this accident. This information then finally made it clear to everyone what had happened and Sky West Flight 5569 was quickly identified as the aircraft that had likely been hit. When the investigation started, it showed that the accident was caused by a failure of air traffic control management at LAX to implement proper procedures to provide redundancy in case an individual controller would make a mistake. Specifically, the local decision to allow that flight progress strips to bypass the ground controller was deemed as highly inappropriate. This together with some other deficient procedures had then ultimately led to the tower controller losing her situational awareness and issuing that fatal landing clearance which ultimately caused the crash. The recommendations that came out of this horrible accident focused on improving ATC procedures specifically around intersection takeoffs and reinforcing the need for clear and unambiguous phraseology as well as for pilots to actively monitor the ATC frequency for potential threats. This also clearly showed the need for the implementation of crew resource management, CRM courses, which would cover things like communication and threat awareness, both of which were involved in this case. It was also later found that the captain of the US Air aircraft had been using off-the-shelf medication without clearing that with his AME and even though that had no impact on this accident, it was recommended to further highlight the potential dangers of doing this to the pilots out there. Now, one procedure that also came directly from this accident, which we all are using today, is to switch on the strobe lights whenever we enter a runway, no matter if it's active or not, and to also consider lining up slightly off the center line to make the aircraft more visible for traffic around. Now, of course, there were several other recommendations made in this final report as well and all of them, you can read if you click on the link here below to my website, mentourpilot.com. There you can also find aviation news and links to my sponsors. Check out these videos next and if you want to help me to produce these videos, consider sending a Super Thanks using the dollar sign button below or maybe buying some merch or you can join my inner circle of Patreons. There's a link here on the screen or in the description below to do that. Have an absolutely fantastic day and I'll see you next time. Bye bye.
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Channel: Mentour Pilot
Views: 910,943
Rating: undefined out of 5
Keywords: mentour pilot, airbus, boeing, aviation, viral video, plane, aeroplane, pilot, LAX, Los Angeles, LA, KLAX, Boeing 737-300, disaster, aviation disasters, Metroliner, Fairchild, Runways, Phraseology, Fire retartant, story, full episode, storytelling, plane crash, USAir, Us Airways, aviation disasters, how planes crash full episodes
Id: rWFtoqxj93U
Channel Id: undefined
Length: 39min 37sec (2377 seconds)
Published: Sat Feb 03 2024
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