Four Nordic countries. One military superpower. Tens of thousands of active army troops versus
hundreds of thousands of Russians. Would Russia’s three thousand tanks fare
well in the snow? And would its five times larger air force
crush the defenders? Perhaps it would be another Winter war, where
Finland ultimately lost, but badly bruised the Soviets? Or maybe Russia would steamroll over its northern
neighbors? Watch the video to find out! Binkov decided to throw in Finland in this
scenario as well, though it’s not strictly part of Scandinavia. Culturally, Scandinavia grew from the region
of Scania. Initially danish, but later on Swedish territory. Of course, this scenario wants to see how
the militaries and economies could fare in a war. So it's a fight to the death. Or... surrender. Four nordic countries fight as one,. The war starts suddenly, there is no outside
interference, no nukes used and the starting morale is the same for all. Finland, would, obviously, be the most exposed. It shares a long border with Russia, and lacks
strategic depth. It would need rapid reinforcements. But the other countries are not that close,
actually. To move tens or hundreds of thousands of troops
with equipment quickly, roads and rail are pretty much the only options. And going up north takes time. Of course, Russia too is huge. But most of Russia's troops are already geared
to defend its western borders. Russia has almost 45% of its entire military
stationed less than a thousand miles from finnish borders. As mentioned, Russia’s active military is
much larger. But comparing numbers is always a tricky job. Active army units don’t represent ALL of
the units available. There’s also marines, airborne, various
joint military units et cetera, which are often not cited in basic figures. Adding all those in, the figures become a
bit different, though perhaps favoring russia even a bit more. But the two sides don’t even have the same
defense systems in place. Russian forces don’t really have a big reserve
system. Most of their forces are active duty soldiers. And most of those are professional soldiers. While all the scandinavian countries are very
much tailored around their reserve units. As the rest of the scandinavian countries
try to rush in their troops to aid Finland, Russia would try to prevent those reinforcements
from coming in. By sea, the clearest route would be from Denmark
and Sweden to the finnish western coastline. It’s not a big distance, but managing to
keep the ports operating under russian air strikes would be a challenge. And the baltic sea itself might be quite dangerous
to traverse. The Russian baltic fleet is fairly large. While most of its ships are under a 1000 tons,
they’re suitable for the baltic sea. The other countries would assemble a force
of their own, of course. Of the four, the finnish navy is the most
defensive in nature. But all four countries would try hard to secure
those sea lanes to finland. Submarine wise, they’re quite ahead of the
Russian Baltic Fleet. With their coastal anti ship missile units
and the surface ship fleet, which is on average more modern than Russian ships, - they might
be able to hold the Russian ships at bay for as long as Russia doesn’t enjoy air superiority. But getting ships to Finland would also be
hard if various islands en route are taken. And that’s something that Russia might very
well try. Sweden’s Gotland island and especially the
Aland islands between Finland and Sweden might see masses of russian airborne units. Of course, Russia is likely to risk that only
after it concludes it can control the skies enough to keep supplying such units. But perhaps a bigger target for the russian
airborne corps, which is the biggest in the world and considered the elite tip of the
spear of russian forces, would be to sever the northern routes into finland. Since they can’t hold on indefinitely, they
WOULD need to be relieved by the regular army, fighting their way through from the east. Such a move, if successful, would sever the
two biggest routes through Finland, from north to south. While the ground war is heating up, as troops
get gathered and slowly start pushing over the borders, the air war would already be
in full swing. Russia has most of its air forces positioned
in the west. And unlike the ground troops, some of which
might need weeks to relocate from the far east to near finland, the aircrew personnel
and planes could be relocated far quicker. Norwegian and Danish air forces would too
need to relocate, probably to Sweden, so they are close enough to react in a timely fashion
to russian air force incursions. All combined, the scandinavian air forces
are potent, but visibly smaller than their opponent, which eclipses them almost five
times over. All of Scandinavia's combat planes can be
used for air combat. They’re also on average a bit more modern. But they’re also smaller, which limits their
capabilities. Over a third of the russian fleet is simply
not suited to air combat at all. Sheer russian numbers would mean the Scandinavians
would need every single plane for interceptions. Even so, it’s unlikely the blue side would
enjoy a great kill ratio, as its own airfields would often be under attack. The russian air bases would mostly be well
protected by a wall of air defenses, even if blues could afford to occasionally use
some planes for attacks. Russia has a massive number of air defense
systems and they are quite modern. The russians would also have to deal with
scandinavian air defenses, but those are all systems of limited reach. The blue side would require all hands on deck. Including tasking all of their ships with
air defenses with defending the baltic sea airspace. That WOULD leave norway quite exposed to the
Russian Northern Naval fleet, but NOT doing it might prove to be detrimental to the whole
war effort. Various short range systems would also be
in play, but those would more likely deal with helicopters and low flying planes on
attack missions. Despite all those air defenses and the fact
some of the blue sides’s technology, like the norwegian F-35 fighters or Swedish Meteor
missiles, would be superior to the best russian technology - the sheer numbers would still
work in Russia’s favor. Scandinavian air forces would be under constant
attack. Dispersion would save some of them from various
missile strikes, but also cause lower sortie generation rates. And the Russians do have a lot of missiles. Compared to that, scandinavian stand off missile
force is pretty paltry, particularly lacking range to seriously endanger targets well inside
Russia. That’s not to say the Russians would not
lose A LOT of planes. Probably hundreds. And the Russian ability to perform air strikes
over scandinavian troops would likely be limited. Not least because the russian air fleet does
not use precision weapons nor modern ground targeting systems in large numbers. Still, even sporadic support from the air
could further endanger the finnish position on the ground. Which would be quite grave. The numbers would simply not work in Scandinavia's
favor. But the blue side does have one ace up its
sleeve. Since all four countries have fairly low population
numbers, they can’t afford a large standing army. So they devised a network of reservist formations
which train regularly and are meant to mobilize within days, for the most part. Adding those in, the figures do become more
equal. Interestingly, over half of the reservists
come from Finland. Bordering the Soviet Union, which attacked
it in 1940, and later bordering Russia, it has kept a pretty vast reservist system in
place. Just to be on the safe side. Keep in mind, those are just the reservists
that get periodical training. Russia for example has an obligation, on paper,
for 2 million reservists. But the majority of those do not participate
in any exercises. Similarly, Finland plans to increase its armed
forces to over 280 thousand troops in wartime conditions. In theory, up to 900 thousand troops can be
mobilized, but that’s also quite a paper figure, much like the russian 2 million figure. At least if we’re talking about quick mobilization. Still, with the reservists called up, the
balance of infantry including both the active army forces and the trained reservists would
not be AS gravely in Russia's favor. At least during the initial months of the
war. As the fight drags on, Russia would be able
to tap into its vast population pool. After some 6 months of training, even an inexperienced
civilian could be somewhat useful in military operations. In such total mobilization of whole populations,
Finland would be hard pressed to find more than the mentioned 900 thousand troops due
to its size. Actually, even that figure may be a bit unrealistic,
as it represents 16 percent of the total finnish population. For example, at its peak, the Soviet Union's
army mobilized some 6% of its entire population in late world war two. Anyway, if Russia mobilizes 5% of its population,
it could in theory field an army of over 7 million troops. As mentioned earlier, Russia would do its
damndest to stop the influx of all those reservists into Finland, trying to deal with the scandinavian
countries piecemeal if possible. The issue for Russia would be the same it
was faced with back in 1940, against finland. The territory of Finland is just not hospitable
to masses of army formations. Back then, the combination of snow, forests
and lakes, all helping the defender, and the poor quality of russian military leadership
and doctrine at the time, led to horrendous losses. Indeed, one look at the geography of Finland
shows how hard it is to attack. The border with Russia is riddled with lakes.
and covered in forests. So the vast numbers of Russian armor would
simply not have room to maneuver around. Most of the Russian offensive would be channeled
by mother nature. The southern route would be obvious, but it's
so narrow that the fins would likely be able to hold on for a long time, losing perhaps
just a few miles of their territory per day. It’d likely be a route of absolute carnage,
russian artillery flattening everything methodically, slowing down Russia’s own progress, but
at the same time partially protecting the russian armor from thousands of portable guided
anti armor missiles that’d otherwise swarm the area. The list of missiles shown is NOT exhaustive,
and it’s possible the real figures are higher than the ones shown. The middle route to connect with the Russian
airborne units would perhaps be covered a bit faster. It’s there where the biggest tank battles
might occur. Compared to some of the european countries
which are larger than them, scnadinavian countries do use a surprising number of tanks. Of course, compared to Russian tanks, it’d
still only be a token force. A third to a half of the tanks are Finnish,
so they wouldn’t take long to participate in battles. With infantry fighting vehicles it’s a different
story, as all four scandinavan countries very much rely on such platforms. Russian numbers there are equally staggering,
as pretty much all of their units use armored vehicles of some kind. But the main source of firepower for the Russians
would be their artillery. Their doctrine hasn’t changed that much
in that regard for decades. Level everything with guns, paralyze the enemy
with rolling fire areas in front of their own advancing units and encircle the enemy
with mobile, armored units. The difference in artillery tubes is pretty
big. Of course, with such narrow passages through
Finland, the russians would not really manage to go around in pincer maneuvers but would
be met head on with many opponents, wherever they tried going. Local numerical advantage for the Russians
would not be assured, in such cramped spaces. Russia has a huge number of ex soviet hardware,
most of it in bad condition and hard to get back in service. Scandinavian excess equipment is better stored,
for the reservists, but there’s little of it. Scandinavians also have some 60 more fighter
jets stored, as it is too pricey to fly all of them. But those planes would not significantly change
the outcome of the air war. Eventually, the blue side would be left without
an air force. And what’s left of the Russian air force,
perhaps half of the starting numbers, would be able to roam freely, if sticking to altitudes
outside the range of shoulder launched anti air missiles. The Russians would be ahead in recon. They operate over a dozen recon satellites. The blue side’s governments don’t use
such assets though commerical operators do have some satellites that could be used for
recon. Russia also uses dedicated recon planes, while
the blue side relies on recon pods for combat planes. Most Scandinavian drones are tiny, with very
limited capabilities. The baltic fleets on both sides would very
much be battered, left with just a small part of their starting numbers. But various air incursions and helicopter
assaults would likely enable the Russians to hold onto the islands of Gotland and Fasta. Way up north, more islands would likely fall
to the russians. The Norwegian air force would, as said, be
tied up elsewhere, and even if their navy did try to fight the russian northern fleet,
it couldn’t do much against those numbers. Especially when in a few weeks time the russian
pacific fleet joins the battle, pushing their way through icy routes up north. Both fleets have only active duty vessels
listed. So various russian submarines and sole carrier,
undergoing major refits, are not listed here. There’s also enough amphibious assault ships
that the norwegian Svalbard islands, which are normally demilitarised, would get taken
without much effort. Islands in the Lofoten and Vesterålen archipelagos
would too likely be quite hard to hold onto for norway. If the Scandinavians would go all in to keep
those, its likely other parts of the very long norwegian coastline would fall to russia. It’d just be impossible to find the manpower
to defend it all at once, especially with the grave situation in finland requiring huge
troop numbers. It’s likely Russia would be able to cut
off southern Finland eventually, even though it might take weeks and absolutely decimate
the russian airborne troops. The frontlines in the far north would be quite
sparsely populated by the blue side, as it’d lack numbers. So it’s likely the russians would also slowly
nibble at norwegian territory there as well. But mountains and hard terrain would likely
mean russian gains would be quite limited The finnish defense industry would likely
be under so many airstrikes that it’d be hard pressed to make additional weapons. But the other three countries have pretty
decent and diverse arms industries. Big items such as tanks and fighter jets are
out of their scope, but they would ramp up production of other assets. Anti ship missiles, land attack missiles,
guided anti armor missiles, and short and medium range anti air missiles are within
their reach. As well as lighter armored vehicles and various
optical and radar sensors. And a good part of scandinavian factories
would still be too far away to be continuously threatened by Russian attacks, after the initial
cruise missile salvos. While some lines between Denmark and Sweden
would be severed, various cargo ships would freely transit, as the russian navy would
be unable to project its power so far away and inside the danish archipelago. Still, the Russian arms industry is far bigger
and more comprehensive. In a long war, it’d totally eclipse the
capacities of the Scandinavians in every field. Indeed, after some half a year, southern Finland
would basically be surrounded and fighting for its life; Leningrad style. But there’d be no hope of liberation. All urban centres would likely be turned to
rubble. Of course, one can hide even within rubble
and fight on. The Russians would still likely lose more
vehicles and men, per each finnish soldier that perishes, for as long as the fins have
supplies. Eventually Finland would surrender, though. And the Russians would be able to concentrate
more forces into sweden. It’s likely that by then the frontline up
north would also go well into sweden. While there’d always be insurgents inside
occupied territories, Russia would have mobilized enough men by then to deal with such issues. Besides fresh conscripts to do that job, there’s
also the russian national guard force. It is an internal affairs peacekeeping force,
but equipped with heavy weapons and armored vehicles, like an army. Going through norway and western sweden would
be very hard for russia, due to terrain. Eastern sweden is fairly flat and would better
suit russian mass armored formations. But most of Sweden is covered in forests,
so a painstakingly slow advance with ample firepower support would still be in order
for the Russians, unless they want to lose ten soldiers for each opposing one in various
forest ambushes. Perhaps by the end of year one, the Russians
could move the frontline almost to Stockholm itself. After suffering several times higher casualties
than the scandinavians. Overall, the casualties would likely dwarf
those of the 1940 winter war. But the question of who would be winning the
war would have an obvious answer. The only real chance the Scnadinavians would
have, long term, is if somehow the Russians suffered horrific morale after all their casualties;
with high desertion rates and an unwillingness to participate in further war efforts. While at the same time the blue side would
have to maintain unusually high morale, despite the horrible odds. The Most likely outcome would be, given unlimited
time, a russian victory. But paid with horrible, horrible casualties.
Skönt med lite low effort rysk propaganda som publiceras på första maj...
Inte första gången den youtube kanalen pratar om sverige och kanalen har för övrigt en pro-rysk vinkling på alla "jämförelser" som har med ryssland att göra.
Vad gäller den här sörjan så var det ju fel i nästan alla siffror och så givetvis tar han inte hänsyn till en rad faktorer som ligger till grund för de verkliga siffrorna som han inte vill presentera.
Man kan lugn konstatera att ryssland saknar kapacitet att bedriva ett landbaserat krig i norden.