- Good evening and good morning
to our friends in China. Welcome to the panel discussion on China and the US in 2021 and beyond. I am Winnie Yip, acting director of the Fairbank Center
for this academic year. When I first took office in
August, I met with Bill Kirby, and we discussed what
the Harvard China Fund, which Bill directs, and Fairbank
Center could do together. And we thought that given the
unusual China-US relation, it would be important to have
an opportunity to listen to and learn from knowledgeable
colleagues on their insights on how we should think about
the two countries' relationship in 2021 and beyond. And that was the history
of tonight's panel. Today, as the US prepares
for a new presidency, it is most timely to hold this
kind of discussion to explore different aspects of the
hopefully more positive China-US relation from
trade to the economy, international relation, and of course, one area that we are most
concerned and interested in, in higher education as well. It is our honor to have
professor Kirby himself moderating the discussion. He needs no introduction to this audience. He's the director of
the Harvard China Fund, a renowned historian of modern China, and his work examines
China's business, economic, and political development
in an international context. And if I were to read Bill's CV, we will not be able to have
time left for the discussion. And so with that, I'm
going to turn over to Bill to introduce our esteemed panel and to start the panel
discussion, Bill, please. - Thank you very much, Winnie. And my sincere thanks to
our distinguished guests, both on the panel and in the audience. We're here for a discussion on
a very, very important topic. As we all know, the
United States and China are global economic and
military powers today. We have together a rich
history of commerce, a friendship of alliance
and of antagonism. We were allies in World War II. We were enemies in Korea and Vietnam. And we have since been
both partners and rivals. And it's fair to say that
both of our countries have been shaped and reshaped by the nature of our mutual relations. This relationship is now in a real crisis. And the outcome of that
crisis will do much to define the world of the 21st century. I'm interested in this, of course, as a citizen of this country
of the United States, but also as someone who
has been engaged with China for many decades, interested also, as I have been teaching a
new university-wide course here at Harvard on the United
States and China this spring. And frankly, from our panelists,
I could use some advice as to how to think of the present and the future of US-China relations. What are our enduring patterns? How do our two countries
perceive each other? How does trade shape our relations? In one way or another, it has
from the Opium War to Huawei. How can we cooperate on global crises such as climate change? And since we're all at, or have been at
distinguished universities, what is the role of American
and Chinese universities such as Harvard or Tsinghua
or Peking University in shaping our collective future? We have a very distinguished
panel here before us. And to help the audience
engage them in questions after their initial seven
to 10 minute presentation, we have the chat function
disabled for the event, but you use the Q&A box. And we request that you use the Q&A box at the bottom of your screen, that you identify yourself
with your name and danwei, your name and affiliation. But if you don't wish to do so
and wish to remain anonymous, you may submit your question
anonymously as well. Let me introduce our first speaker who is Professor Yuan Ming. Yuan Ming is Dean of the Yenching Academy of Peking University She also serves as Associate
Dean of Peking University's Institute for International
and Strategic Studies. She's the director of its
Center for American Studies. She is professor at its School
of International Studies. She studied and graduated at Beida, has been a visiting scholar
at Berkeley and at Oxford, and has been at many American
leading institutions. The Carter Center, Carnegie Endowment, Brookings Institution, and happily he's even visited Harvard. She's a member of the Zhengxie, of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference and its Committee on Foreign Relations and has been a trustee of
the Asia Society in New York. So Yuan Ming, let me
just start by asking you, you're Dean of the Yenching Academy, a place at Beida that brings
extraordinary students from all over the world to Beijing. You teach a very famous course at Beida on US-China relations,
actually on American culture and American society. How has your course on
the United States changed, or how do you imagine it changing in the light of the tensions
of the last four years? And how do you imagine it might conclude maybe differently four years from now? Can you start with that please? - Oh yeah. Thank you very much, can you hear me? - Yep. - Okay. Well, Bill, thank you for
giving me this assignment. I could talk about two hours at least, but you only give me like
10, less, eight minutes. So let me be very brief. I started teaching this
course 20 years ago at Peking University, and students, young people really like it. So every year we have
about 400 young students, undergraduate students
from all over the campus, different disciplines to join us. It's called the, Chinese, excuse me American Culture and Society. I have a book here, it's a textbook. So in the past four years, the students still register every year. They registered for this course around the number 300 or more, but this year, 2020, maybe
because of the pandemic, everything has to be online so the number dropped
very quickly to around 60. So for the past four years,
I just thought this course, let me say stable. The faculty, it's a joint faculty from different kinds of disciplines, all of Peking University. Those leading ones in his or her view, all had personal experiences
in United States. Some got a PhD from American
higher education institution. And some just work as
Fulbright Scholars in the US. Very good teaching team. I would say maybe the
highlight, four years ago, I invited those young people
from the Yenching Academy from United States, American young people to join me in the class. But my personal feeling,
the Chinese counterparts just love it because younger generation, when they meet each other in the classroom and started their personal stories or personal experiences is very good. If you asked me four
years from now what I see, I would say the course definitely would be on the
university teaching list in our curriculum, no doubt about it. Then the teaching team would do more. Like I already sent out the
invitation to ask colleagues all over this campus to do some evaluation of this course. And I believe more
joint work will be done. Especially after the election in the US especially when we see a
highly divided America, how we as Chinese faculty, team members of teaching team to tell our
young people about the country on the other side of the Pacific, how we see history, culture
or as a whole, America. And the third point in
my mind is we imagine in the coming four years, the big uncertainty on
this side is the students. How many people will continue to register, to join the class? It's hard to say now. Pandemic will be over, but the whole that especially the
students, young people, if their opportunities to
study in the United States, the whole environment getting worse, how would they think about their future? Which certainly relates to their interest in this particular class. So we will see. So Bill, I think I'll just stop here. - Thank you, Yuan Ming. Let me just one follow-up if I might. You've been following
the US-China relations, for many times have been
an important observer, commentator, and actor in it. Is this, in your
experience, the low point? Have we reached the bottom? You have to, you're muted, Yuan Ming. - Well, I'm certainly concerned very much about the ongoing situation, but never, you know me, I would say, well, it's just a difficult time,
but we have to work on it. - Okay, thank you. Thank you very much for
starting us on this. It's an interesting, you
know, "The Economist" just had an article about how
Chinese studies, they argue, is in decline in Britain
and in the United States and interest in China. These could be mutually
reinforcing and unhappy trends. Let me turn to another optimist, however. Always an optimist in my experience, Professor David Daokui Li, Li Daokui, who is the Mansfield Freeman
Chair Professor of Economics and was the Founding Dean
of Schwarzman Scholars at Tsinghua University, two great programs right across the street from each other, bringing extraordinary people from around the world to Beijing. He's one of China's leading economists, active in policy advising and discussions. He served on China's
Monetary Policy Committee and has been an external
advisor to the IMF. He too is a member of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Committee and a member of the Global Agenda Council of the World Economic Forum. So David, so you're the
founding dean, you know, and Yuan Ming, the
founding dean of Yenching, you're the Founding Dean of Schwarzman So both deeply engaged in
internationalizing missions. You created this
extraordinary Center for China in the World Economy,
something that is much more about coupling than decoupling. How do you see China's
role in the world economy evolving now in the light of
changes in US-China relations? Where do see us, if you
will, in four years' time? - Well, first of all,
Bill, thank you very much for organizing this and also
for Winnie for organizing this. This is a tremendously important webinar. And I was halfway joking with Bill before the start of this program that we all look better
than before the pandemic because actually while we travel less because of the pandemic,
we actually become closer because we are forced
to use this technology, this internet conference technology which proves to be better,
much better than we thought. So we really should do more than we have been doing this way, right? And also Bill, thank you
very much for helping us at Tsinghua University in setting up the Schwarzman Scholars program. So every time you and I meet together we keep on thinking
about the good old days when we worked so intensely
right before the start of the Schwarzman Scholars program. Now, you had wonderful questions. Let me give you my central
argument or central view before providing you with some
more detailed arguments okay? My central view is that China and the US of course are now in a
very difficult situation in their relationship. I strongly argue that
we need, and actually we are actually doing
this, we need to reset. We should pause like in
a basketball game, right? We are not doing well
in the fourth quarter. Let's pause, let's have a long time out. Let's rethink what has happened, right? And let's reset the relationship, let's reset the game, right? We were not doing well. Both teams are not
running the best strategy. The game becomes ugly, right? Let's reset with each
other, and the key players in resetting the
relationship are universities like Harvard, Peking University, Tsinghua, and also like intellectuals like yourself and also like Dean Yuan and
also Fred Hu and Shelly, all of us here, right? So we need to have a big time
out, we need to have a reset. Why is that, why is that? Because I have a very simple observation. That is, the two economies,
the Chinese economy and the US economy of course
still have tremendous room to cooperate, however,
we cannot simply rely upon the economic relationship
to repair the relationship. Instead, we need, we deeply
need a process of rediscovery, rediscover each other. We have to rediscover each other, right? We used to think we know
each other very well, but actually President
Trump, thanks to him, we suddenly discover that we
do not understand each other as well as we thought. Now, why is that? Well, let me be very specific, okay, let me go to the specifics. Okay, on the Chinese
side, we used to think we understand the US very well. We watch your election with more interest than watching our
National Committee Meeting of the National People's
Congress, frankly speaking. And for us, it's very important, and also sorry to admit, it is
also quite entertaining to watch your election
campaign, the speeches, debates. Okay, I'm sorry to tell that,
but it's the case, right? In our internet every morning
we have hundreds of postings after each turn of the election. However, in China we do not
really understand the US including people like myself. At least we have not been able
to understand properly why because we tended to forget
that there's another half of the US who voted 73 million votes for Donald Trump despite the pandemic, despite the Black Lives Matter movement, despite the interesting
characteristics of President Trump which has been shown in the process. Let me say this way, okay,
interesting personalities. I wouldn't use other words, okay? Okay, so despite this that
person, President Trump, still got 73 million strong votes. The largest number of
any incumbent president. So let's understand for the Chinese, the other half of the US who
are maybe deeply religious, who have not been doing well economically for various reasons and
also, let's understand, for the Chinese that democracy,
at least the US style, is actually quite fragile, is
more fragile than we thought. We used to think that
America is wonderful, America is very robust, America is able to correct itself for any mistakes. Actually it takes a longer process and it's more fragile than we think, okay. So on the other hand,
to our American students and American scholars, I would
also like to say that please, rediscover China, rediscover, especially, rediscover the Communist Party,
how the party works, okay. So it's very popular and wrong in the US to view China as authoritarian state. It's very popular to view
the Chinese Communist Party as the same party that used to rule the former Soviet Union. Actually, it's very different. And Bill, you know the best, I think among American scholars, among American intellectuals,
the Chinese Communist Party actually was very seriously thinking about changing its name about 20 years ago under Secretary General Jiang Zemin right? And in the end, they did not change. This is very much open, okay. No, why is that? Because the debate about
whether changing the name of Communist Party, to drop
out the word communism, communist, right, was because
of misunderstanding in China and outside China. The Communist Party actually is a party following 2,000 years of
Confucius and Mencius tradition. And here I emphasize the
tradition of Mencius. The Mencius tradition is,
the Mencius philosophy, political philosophy is that
people are like the water. The water can float a boat. The water can also turn down,
undermine a boat, right? So as a ruling party you
have to be always very, very careful in watching out
the complaints of the people. So today the Chinese
Communist Party's new motto is that people-centered development, people-centered politics, right? People-centered pandemic
prevention, people-centered. That's Mencius tradition. And on top of that, the
Chinese Communist Party, before assuming national
power fought for 22 years brutal war, brutal war first
against the Nationalist Party and then against the Japanese, right? Military wars 22 years, much more so than the Russian Communist Party meaning that the ruling party must be very pragmatic, very adaptive. So in the popular word called
the seeking truth from facts, otherwise the party would be finished. The party actually almost
was finished, right? Around 1927, as you know,
1927 to 1930, right, because of Soviet influence, right? And Mao of course came
out and rescued the party. So that's the tradition. So I strongly argue that Americans rediscover Chinese political system, stop using the word authoritarian state. And in fact, let's go beyond. Let's understand the
process within the party to choose its leaders. In China, it never would be the case that reality show anchor becoming the number one
party leader in China. Okay, instead, number one leader in China has to go through, has
to rotate in the jobs of major provinces and counties and has to go cover a wide range of jobs before assuming the experience. So these are the things
of what I try to teach. I try to teach in our Schwarzman College. Every time whenever there's
an important meeting in Chinese politics I would come out and teach our students what's going on, how to decipher the rhetorics
in the Xinwen Lianbo in Chinese evening news, right? So these are the things I
urge that the incoming cabinet of the Biden administration
really, really come to Harvard, come to your class. Bill, offer a seminar
to these people, okay, tell them to rediscover
the Chinese politics. Rediscover Chinese
political economic system before the US can deal
properly with China. So my bottom line, to reiterate, is let's have a long time out like in the basketball team, okay? Both teams got technical fouls, okay? The referee gave us technical fouls, okay? Let's pause, let's control our emotion. Let both parties, both teams come back and rediscover each other and come back with a better strategy. Let's cooperate in many, many areas in terms of in economics
and in science technology, in academic exchange. Meanwhile of course we compete. If you don't compete, how can
we have human progress, right? Competition is very
important for human progress or society progress, right? So let's rediscover each
other and in the process I pin very high hope
for Harvard University, for Bill and your colleagues
because Biden administration, different from Donald
Trump's administration, attaches much more value to academics and respect much more to
academics and to researchers to deep thinkers, okay, so
I really, I'm optimistic, as you said, because of
Harvard, because of you, okay. Because of Fairbank Center. Thank you very much. - Sorry, thank you very much. So I think that then we
should just take a time out. (laughing) We won't do that right now, but you know, it's an intriguing
possibility, which obviously, not doing something sometimes is often better than doing something in international relations. It's not to get to know
each other more easily if the United States
does indeed keep members of the Chinese Communist Party from visiting the United States. Some, I think at 92 million members. That's actually a lot of people. That makes it more difficult
than one could imagine. But we're gonna, I think, I'd like, we're gonna come back to you, David, on the other issues as well, but I think that's a great
comment to leave us with. And I'm going to turn now to
Fred, I'm sorry, to Shelley. Not to Fred, but to Shelley because if you think of
the US-China relationship as a partnership or as
a marriage, you know, we all remember that old phrase
that was often used for it that is tong chuang yi meng, that is, sleeping in the same
bed with different dreams. I always tell my students, particularly those who have been to or are from China that the
United States and China are now, are really married together. We are an old couple, maybe by an arranged marriage originally with a common enemy, but an
old couple that is working through very difficult
issues in its relationship. And we have children, including many of the people
watching this seminar, including the hundreds
of thousands of Chinese who have studied in this country and the tens of thousands of Americans who study and do business in China. But we're also part of a menage à trois because across the street the
Republic of China on Taiwan has been a central issue in the US-China relationship since 1950. And it is an actor that
has been a force at times for great stabilization
in this relationship. It's an actor that has
done remarkably well in economic terms over times. It's a Chinese political entity
that has embraced democracy. And to help us with this is
Professor Shelley Rigger, the Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College. She is a distinguished
doctorate of this university as are David and Fred. She has been visiting researcher at National Chengchi University in Taiwan and a visiting professor
at Fudan in Shanghai. She's the author of
multiple works and books on Taiwan's domestic politics,
"Politics in Taiwan," "From Opposition to Power." And her monograph, her most recent book I
actually have right here, Shelley, and I've forgotten
the title of it and I... - "Why Taiwan Matters."
- "Why Taiwan Matters." Why can I not remember a title like that? And I'm going to be assigning it 'cause I just read it last week again. I'm going to be assigning
it for this US-China course. So Shelley, as the leading, really the leading of
American expert on Taiwan and this triangular relationship, how do you see it evolving? How might tensions be
diminished if they can be? What confidence building measures might take place haixia liangan? - All right, well, first of
all, thank you very much. First of all, thank you very
much for assigning my book. I hope there are a lot of
students in that class. And for including me on
this really excellent and august panel, I'm
very honored to be here. And I don't know that I'm going to be able to solve the challenge of
the Taiwan issue tonight, but I will try to at least offer
a little bit of perspective through the lens of two paradoxes. They may not seem like
paradoxes to everyone listening, but I think they are paradoxes. One is really a paradox for people in the People's Republic of China and the other is a paradox
for many Americans. So the first paradox of the
Taiwan issue, if you will, is that progress in
cross-straight relations, so in the relationship
between Taiwan and the PRC, is more attainable when people in Taiwan feel relaxed and confident than when people in Taiwan
feel anxious and threatened. And this is hard for many
PRC folks to understand because it seems to them that
when Taiwanese feel confident, they're more likely to try
and run away in the thinking of many in the PRC or put
some distance between Taiwan, political distance, economic distance, military distance between
Taiwan and the Mainland. But in fact, when Taiwanese are confident that they're not going to
come under intense pressure or have their interests undermined, that's when they're most willing to interact with the mainland. This dynamic is evident
in economics and politics. So at a time when the
PRC and Taiwan economies were very complementary, the Taiwanese were very willing to engage. As they have become more competitive, Taiwanese have become
less willing to engage. We see it as well in politics. And we even see it in the security realm, which is why the US has always
resisted Beijing's logic that Washington should stop
selling arms to Taiwan. Washington's response
to that has been, look, the Taiwanese are not going to talk to you or engage with you if
they don't feel secure. So our weapon sales actually help them to have the confidence and
security that they would need to begin a dialogue under
conditions where that is possible. So that's the first paradox. The second paradox is
that Taiwan is most secure when US-PRC relations are
stable and constructive. This one is hard for many Americans because a lot of Americans
assume that Taiwan applies a basic, the enemy of
my enemy is my friend logic to the triangular relationship. But in fact, the PRC
is not Taiwan's enemy. It is a difficult relationship, the relationship between
Taiwan and the PRC, but Taipei would like to
avoid hostility with Beijing. And in fact, along certain dimensions, successive governments in Taipei have sought to build
cooperation with the mainland. Also, tension and conflict
between the US and the PRC tends to pull Taiwan into
that conflict in a way that has lots of danger for
Taiwan and very little benefit. I should add that when I
say it that Taiwan does best or thrives best when there are stable and constructive relations
between the US and the PRC doesn't mean that I think that it thrives when there's no disagreement. There will always be disagreement between the US and the PRC. But what I mean by stable
and constructive relations is that the two sides are
managing their disagreements, not letting them spiral out of control. So hearing professor Li say, you know, "We need a timeout," I
think that's a good idea because I think right now our
disagreements are spiraling out of control and we have
kind of lost some perspective and we need to get a grip, both sides, all sides need to get a grip. So if I were the referee, and I do have experience as a referee, not in basketball, but another sport, I would be blowing the
whistle and throwing the flag about this time in the game. So where are we now? Taiwanese do not feel confident
or relaxed at the moment. Anti-PRC sentiments are
running high in Taiwan. I can talk more about
why that is in the Q&A if people are interested, but
it has to do with economics. It has to do with the
domestic situation in the PRC. It has to do with the Hong Kong crisis, the COVID pandemic and military pressure. So there are many reasons
why anti-PRC sentiment is at a high ebb in Taiwan today. And at the same time
opportunities for warmer relations between Taiwan and the
Mainland seem very limited. So a lot Taiwanese are kind
of looking for alternatives to engagement with the Mainland because they see engagement
with the Mainland as unlikely or nearly impossible at the moment. On the other dimension, US-PRC relations don't seem very stable or
constructive at this moment. So Taiwanese are trying to figure out how to operate in that scenario. So ideally, US and China would have stable, constructive relations. When they don't and when there's
no opportunity for Taiwan to have improved relations
with the Mainland it's, I suppose, logical that
Taiwanese would try to make the most of
Washington's willingness to pay attention to Taiwan
while at the same time, trying to avoid getting
pulled into the middle of worsening great power competition. So you also asked, you
know, what can we do? And just very briefly, a few things. First of all, the US and China need to dial back the
confrontational rhetoric. They need to focus on resolving
issues that can be resolved, disagreeing constructively,
or at least not destructively on things that can't be resolved and cooperating on
matters of shared concern, including climate change and the pandemic. There will be another pandemic,
and we have to work together to address it before it gets here. I think on the PRC side,
it would be helpful if the CCP leadership
could show increasing, not decreasing tolerance for political and social diversity within the PRC. The message that diversity,
autonomy are not well tolerated within that system is
alienating Taiwanese people just as it alienated Hong Kongers and a lot of other
people around the world. So that's something the
CCP maybe could work on. Taiwanese need to be realistic about the situation they are facing. People need to stop
pressuring their government to do things that feel good, but actually make Taiwan's
objective situation worse. So for example, trying to
encourage their leaders to reject the Biden administration. This is a bad idea, and it needs to stop. Similarly, on the other side
of the political spectrum in Taiwan, demagoguing on the meat issue. And again, if people have
questions about that, we can talk about that later, is another bad idea that needs to stop. What about Americans? There are many things Americans should do, but I'm just going to mention one, which is directly relevant
to the Taiwan issue. Americans need to make Taiwan
policy that's about Taiwan, not about tweaking the PRC. We need to make Taiwan policy that attends to the real virtues and interests that are at stake for the US and Taiwan, not to try to use Taiwan as a tool in a particular kind of
relationship with the PRC. I hope I've given some food for thought and discussion later on. I'm going to end it here, thank you. - Thank you very much, Shelley. So can I take it that perhaps
it wouldn't be a good idea for Mr. Biden to call up President Tsai before talking to
president Xi, in your view as happened in the
previous administration? - You know, I think the
most important thing is just to keep it quiet, whatever you do. This doesn't need to be front
page news, that's for sure. - Okay, great, thank you very much. Well, let me turn to our
cleanup batter, Fred Hu who is the Founder and Chairman
of Primavera Capital Group which is a China-based
global technology company. He has been chair of Greater China and partner at Goldman Sachs. He served at the IMF in Washington. He was co-director for the National Center for Economic Research and
professor at Tsinghua University. He's the chairman of Yum China Holdings. And he sits on the board of a
recently very famous company, Ant, the Ant Group also,
and still very famous, ICBC, UBS Group, and the Hong Kong
Exchanges and Clearing Limited. He's also co-chair of Nature Conservancy's Asia Pacific Council, and a member of the Council Foreign
Relations Global Advisory Board, as Yuan Ming has been. And he's a member of Harvard's
Global Advisory Board. And Fred, you are a
distinguished economist and a leading practitioner
in the worlds of business between China and the United States. Where in your view are there
opportunities and risks now? Where are the opportunities
for deepening cooperation in the coming year and beyond? And as obstacles appear,
how might they be overcome? Can you take those very easy questions? - Thank you, Bill for putting together this distinguished panel so
that I have the opportunity to see my old friends Ming and David and also have the pleasure to meet Shelley and benefit from her really
deep insights about Taiwan. First, maybe a disclaimer. You might have noticed
that I share the same virtual background with Winnie. But to make clear, I
have not stolen, robbed, or cheated so there should
not become a new irritant over intellectual property
rights between our two countries. - To just say, it's a Harvard
University Library background. And all of the books have
been returned on time. - And actually we're encouraged
to use that as a background during the pandemic. Yeah, so on Bill's question, despite the alarmingly high tensions between China and the US right now, both sides really should
step back and realize, disputes and quarrels aside, there are actually a broad array of shared or convergent interests
between China and the US. Hence, rational and
forward-looking leaders should seize every possible
opportunity for cooperation between the two countries. I will start with the pandemic. You know, US has been hit
so hard by the pandemic to a large degree because
of failed leadership. The incoming Biden administration will surely make this a top priority. Instead of mutual accusations
as sadly has been the case throughout this pandemic, China and the US should
really work together to lead a coordinated global response to a true global pandemic. It includes everything from sharing data, sharing experience on virus containment and public health crisis
mitigation-based practices to vaccines and therapeutics. So instead of going separate ways to use the pandemic as a geopolitical tool to vie for influence, US and China should really work together
and lead the concerted global efforts to assist
poor, developing countries especially in Africa
with affordable vaccines and possible economic aid to help those crisis-stricken
economies to recover. Second, climate change. President Elect Biden
has publicly committed to bring the US back
to the Paris Agreement. That agreement, as we
know, signed, ratified by more than 160 countries
except the biggest economy under Trump administration. So partially to undo the
damages caused by Trump President-Elect Biden has also committed to a zero net emission goal by 2050. So coincidentally, President
Xi Jinping has also announced at the UN General Assembly in September that China commits to
carbon neutrality by 2060. So hence, as we see, the
two largest economies, largest energy consumers
and the largest emitters have both embraced climate
change as a national and an international strategic objective. So clearly there's shared a vision here and shared interest in the
commitment to climate change between the US and China. So this, I believe, may well be the most significant opportunity
for our two countries to partner and collaborate
with each other. Third, I will quickly, on
nuclear nonproliferation, President Trump has torn
apart the multilateral Iran Nuclear Deal and failed
on his high-profile summits with Kim Jong-un on North
Korea denuclearization. The Biden administration will need to salvage the Iranian deal and continue to press North
Korea on dangerous WMDs. So again, both China
and the US are aligned in terms of end goal. It is fair to say, US will not be able to make any meaningful headways unless it is prepared to
work with other countries, but especially with China, certainly in the case of North Korea. So finally, aside from
a Trump administration's reckless trade wars,
the unjustified assaults against Huawei, TikTok, WeChat, and may other Chinese tech companies. Perhaps the most damaging
of all recent US actions to the broad relations
are the restrictions or threatened restrictions on
Chinese students and scholars studying and doing research in the US. Bill, you are not only the
distinguished historian on China, but also a really
distinguished authority on higher education, and
we're looking forward to your new book. As we all know an open
higher education system is one of the most enduring
competitive advantages of America, enabling the US to attract and oftentimes retain the top talent from around the world including China. Since 1979, Chinese
students have made America the single most important
destination for study. The majority of our Chinese students, when David and I both
were in graduate school in the later 1980s and early 1990s, have chosen to stay in the US, becoming American citizens
and serving on the faculty and research labs across
US university campuses. As for those of us like David and myself who have returned to China,
we have also been promoting the ties between our two countries. So educational exchange
really brings about numerous tangible and intangible benefits to the two countries and
to the world at large. So should and will outlast
whatever administrations in either capital and
transcend domestic politics in either country. So I'd like to thank Harvard and Bill for your leadership to
make sure Harvard, for one, remains deeply invested
in and engaged with China no matter how the political
climate may have changed. So I close by saying that restoring and maintaining two-way
education and cultural exchange are just absolutely
essential for a healthy and sustainable bilateral relationship, hence a vital opportunity of cooperation not just for the next four years, but for many generations
to come, thank you. - Thank you very, very much, Fred. Before we turn to the audience, we have a bunch of questions
coming in and I urge people to send in questions via the chat. I'd like each panelist now to
take one minute to think of, in just one minute, what is the one thing or the first thing, we've
just had an American election. We do have a president-elect. There will be a new administration no matter what you've heard out there. And it will take office on January 20th. What is the first thing
that Mr. Biden should do on January 20th or that the US could do? And what is the first thing
that China could do if, as it seems this panel broadly agrees, there is the opportunity for a reset or to look for areas of cooperation? So let me start with David,
let me start with you. What's the first thing Biden should do? And what's the first thing
President Xi should do? - The first thing
President Biden should do is to invite a famous
professor named Bill Kirby to host a seminar for the White House. Seriously, for the cabinet, for the cabinet to talk about
the new reality of China. - What's the second thing he should do? - (laughs) Second thing
he should do is to really, to form a committee on US-China relations. A permanent committee to start
from deep philosophical notes to reset, to start from deep philosophical relearning of China. On the Chinese side, the first thing President Xi Jinping
should do, in my view, is also to hold an internal
work conference about the US. And also it's very timely because China is now working on its 14th Five-Year Plan and also its longterm
goal of leading to 2035. So frankly speaking, the
single most important external uncertainty,
external factor of uncertainty is the USA, okay, how to deal with the US if China was still continually
carving the path of rising. - Great, thank you. Professor Rigger, what is the first thing that Mr. Biden should do vis-a-vis Taiwan? And what should Tsai Ing-wen do? - Oh, you tricked me with a question. I was, I was thinking about--
- Yeah. - (laughs) I mean, I
think vis-a-vis China, the first thing President
Biden should do is to declare the US back in the
Paris Climate Agreement. And I think he should do that China, no China, Taiwan, no Taiwan, but I guess the first thing
that President Biden should do with respect to Taiwan is to say, we start from scratch, we start fresh. I understand that there has
been some kind of a conversation about me over there,
but I wasn't listening. I don't care, I don't take it personally. We're moving on. And the first thing Tsai
Ing-wen should do is say, thank you very much, I am
completely in agreement. Let's move on. And there's been a really toxic debate about Biden in Taiwan. And I think it's very
important that it not poison the relationship between
the Taiwanese government and the US government going forward, and I don't think it will, but it would be important for it not to. - Thank you, thank you. Yuan Ming, your thoughts,
first thing Biden, first thing President Xi,
President Biden, President Xi. - Well, I have many thought in my mind. - You only get one, one each, one each. - One each, well, I regarded
the current pandemic situation is such a one which opened the door for both sides to join in. 'Cause I just have talked
with a return student from America who is a member of American Association of Sciences and has been doing wonderful
work in the city of Beijing as one of the founders of
a leading research center. He and I talk a lot about current, globally the vaccine projects. All over, of course, all over. Mainly in US and in Europe. And China certainly put in
a lot of human resources and money in this huge field, for how both sides could
find a way to work together. Anyway, it's human. And both leaders need that kind of support from their peoples so I really regard this public health crisis that we are here and we have this window of
opportunity for collaboration, at least as a first step. So I put this public health
issue as a top priority. - Thank you very, very much. Actually, you've, addressed
actually one of our questions from Alec Gregorian from the
Harvard College class of 2019, just on that issue, so thank
you very, very much, Fred. - We hope that the first
thing the Biden administration would do is end the disastrous trade war. It really hurts America
as well as it hurt China. You know, and it's
Trump's signature policy. Let's put it to an end once and for good. And that will send a very
powerful message to Beijing and be very well received. And of course on pandemic
as professor Yuan said, and there's a vast scope for collaboration in nuclear nonproliferation
and climate change above all. There's a vast scope. You know, so what I
think the simple message from the White House should
be, deescalate, reengage, and compete where there's a
really divergent interest. I think China will take that very well. - Thank you. Winnie, do you have
anything to add on that? Because from our School of Public Health you've been most deeply engaged
on pandemic cooperation. - So first of all, I want
to thank all the panelists for a very insightful analysis, but I'm also very positively
encouraged because many of you are laying out agendas on
what the two sides can do. And I definitely agree that
both public health and climate are the two areas that are potential for the two countries to work on. But actually I was going
to ask each of you, you all have thoughts about
what the two countries should do, ought to do to improve. What do you see as the
most important challenge for the two countries to not
do what they ought to be doing? - Any comments by any? You're kind of asking, what
are they really going to do? - Yeah, Winnie, let me try, okay. This is a very, very interesting question. Thank you very much, let me try. Okay, I think both for both
sides, it's the same challenge, same kind of a challenge. That is how to ring in the extreme views from domestic politics. On the Chinese side, we
do have a large contingent of leftists, we call leftists, okay, who attack the US
violently on many issues. On the US side, you
also have extreme people holding extreme views. I'm sorry to name a
person, okay, for example, your incumbent Secretary
Pompeo and his advisors. I do not think they are serving
the US interests the best by attacking the ruling party in China and by attacking a lot
of institutions in China. So let's try to stop those people who are holding extreme views
from influencing our policies and influencing our media and
influencing our population. That's the most important
challenge to tackle with. - Great, thank you. I'm going to turn to some of
the questions that have emerged in chat, and one of them is
from an MBA student at Wharton although formerly here in
research at HBS, Yuan Wang. What is the prospects for real compromise? Everyone is in favor of it, but compromises have to
happen or have to be found. And how likely, how dug in, you
know, if Biden, for example, does not follow Fred's advice
and continues the tariffs, as he seems to have
indicated that he might do, at least in the interests... How should Zhongnanhai respond to that? Fred, you want to take that? That's a slightly hotter potato. - Yeah, I will try. You know, I said earlier trade
war is not nice, is nasty. And trade wars are not easy to win, as nobody ever wins from a trade war. So regardless of what Biden
administration might do or not do, I would hope Beijing would unilaterally end the trade war by getting rid of all the tariffs. Just, you know, in response
to Trump's actions. Not only that, Beijing
could go even further to in fact lower tariffs across the board to really become a champion
for global trade liberalization and to make WTO work again
for the world economy. So if China does that, I think a lot of anti-China sentiments in
the US and the protections and limits in the US
might eventually subside. - Fred, Bill I'm sorry to cut in. Okay, I completely agree with Fred, okay. The Chinese side actually,
if you watch carefully, has shown very positive signals in the past two weeks, maybe three weeks. First, President Xi announced
that China is joining Japan and many other countries
in the negotiation of the so-called CPTPP,
Comprehensive and Progressive Trade Partnership, I think
that's the right word, CPTPP. Okay, and also China announced
that it has just assigned RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership. And also President Xi
last week three days ago made a video speech to the
International Advisory Board of the Tsinghua School of
Economics and Management. You may think this is
only the small potato, but actually that board,
that advisory board is the most, I'm running out of words, most interesting and high-profile
board of all schools. Okay, the CEOs of all major
corporations are there. So why would President Xi
Jinping make that speech, that video speech to that board? Of course a virtual meeting. President Xi Jinping
wants to send a signal that China is willing to talk, is willing to push for
continued globalization. So Fred, I'm completely with you, okay. China is actually already
sending out olive branches. - You know, among the
questions that have come in in our chat are ones that remind us that the US-China relationship is not only about the
United States and China. One comes from Louise Liu who says that there's a third party. Actually, now it's a fourth
party in the US-China marriage. And that's the EU or Germany. And she quotes Martin
Wansleben, from the CEO of the German Chamber
of Commerce and Industry who said that there's a German saying, when two peoples quarrel,
the third rejoices. But as Shelley as said, that's
not necessarily the case in the case of Taiwan. And it's not necessarily the
case in the case of the EU. How can a third party,
what role might, say the EU or largely German influenced EU play in resetting, if any, the
Chinese-American relationship? Hm. (speaking in foreign language) I have, but... No takers? - Bill--
- You're the world economy. You can do this.
- (laughs) Okay, Bill. I'm sorry, I really, I speak too much. Okay, I just finished a
marathon of two-day webinar, a two-day webinar, it
was a record seminar, over the weekend with
European Union speakers, with British speakers, with US speakers and Chinese participants. You know, around the
clock, 48 hours, okay. And also Australian. Okay, let me report you the message. Okay, the message there
is from the US side. From US side your colleagues
Joe Nye and Kissinger, they're saying that the European Union should form a community of
democracy against China. Okay, China is not a democracy, okay. And the Chinese side, of course,
this sends a message, okay? So my view is that Europe is Europe. Europe should not take sides. Europe should be an independent
third party or fourth party and work and negotiate
with the US and China on issue on issue, okay. Don't force any alliance with anybody. Be yourself, okay. I think that way our world
will be more peaceful. Our relations will be
becoming simpler, okay. Let's don't forget that World War One started this way, right? I'm not a historian. You know better than I do, okay. Form alliance is very toxic, it's very dangerous for this world. Be yourself, take your own interests, take care of interests, right? Work on issue on issue. Don't side with the US
and don't side with China. - All right, well, one of our questioners, and I'm looking for the
question right now has asked, taking a historical perspective,
quoting Mr. Ratcliffe who recently said that
China is the greatest danger to world peace since World War Two. Is it your sense in
China that people believe that the United States
is the greatest danger to China since Japan? - Sorry, Bill, I'm sorry. I'm running the risk of
speaking too much, okay. I truly, truly disagree with this view that China is the single largest threat to international peace, okay? First, one superficial reason
one fundamental reason. The superficial reason is super simple. China does not have a single
piece of military base outside the mainland territory, okay? US, to my best, US I think,
I may be wrong, US has 300. 300 military bases. I may be wrong, okay. I'm not an expert, but
definitely more than one, okay? More than one in the US, okay. And also despite the
rhetorics about the threat of the Belt and Road program, despite the rhetorics of
China-Pakistan alliance, China does not send out
any single military advisor to any of the countries
including countries like Pakistan and Belt and Road countries, right? So that's very superficial. And also since 1979,
China is the only country, only large country not involved in any war, external war, okay? Australia is involved,
Britain is involved, Germany even sent out their army to one of the wars with the US, right? So this is a superficial reason, okay? The fundamental reason is this. Again, I'm, ban men nong fu,
speaking like an non-expert in front of expert, okay. You are experts, okay,
so help me please, Bill to tell me whether I'm wrong. I believe, here's my belief. My belief is that the Chinese
political social system is so complicated that
it's totally impossible to export, to duplicate
the system outside China. Unlike the case of the UK
democracy, US democracy, right? And also, you know, the Bible. It's much easier for the US, at least so far that's the perception. It's much easier for
the US political system to be duplicated, to be
exported to other countries. So China has no ambition and no capacity to expand beyond its border. All China wants, in my view, people talk about the grand
plan or grand ambition. There isn't one ambition. The grand ambition is
for China to come back to whatever days old, before
1840, okay, Opium War, okay, to become a real, respected country, a prosperous region with happy people. That's it, that's it,
so I do not think China is the threat of international peace. To the contrary, China
is actually potentially a stabilizing force
for international peace and to cooperate with the US to maintain international peace. Okay, I should stop, I talked too much. Please, Bill, you should provide answers. You're a historian, you
know better than I do, okay. - But you know, you've hit
on an issue, I think that is, we are in a moment and a
number of the questions really have this at their heart as well. We're in a moment of
great mutual suspicion, lack of mutual trust, and I would go far to say almost mutual paranoia. So if you look, and looking
historically at China today, China is at its most secure position geopolitically, strategically,
since the Opium War. That is to say, no one
threatens China's borders. Not Russia, not Japan, not Taiwan Not going to retake the mainland. Not Vietnam, not India. The only possible threat
that I can think of to China comes from, you know,
because you never know where a North Korean missile might land. And yet there is still a profound
sense of being threatened. And the United States, it's not a matter of
really a physical threat, but a great sense of inadequacy, of growing inadequacy, of falling behind. The Huawei business in part, because the United States has no company at the moment to compete with Huawei. It relies on Europeans or Chinese for the infrastructure
for its 5G networks. And there's a sense of falling behind and a sense of drifting behind
more than falling behind, but this mutual, do you have, in a world, and let me ask all of you this. In a world in which seemingly
increasingly many people in this country get their
information from sources of, at least from my point
of view, of dubious value and in China also, both
through the internet and through state controlled
media and censorship, often highly distorted views of what is going on in the outside world. How does one begin to get
beyond the fear of fear? The fear of fear itself to quote an another American
president taking office at a time of crisis, Yuan Ming? - Yes, I want to join in, partly join David's point. Those extreme views
actually on both sides. Not only there, with quite a wide spread they are feeding each other. It's not healthy at all. But I also want to say here in China there are quite different kind of views which is challenging those extremes and some publications certainly
here which I quoted a lot. Like recently I quoted
Professor Zhao Dingxin who is the head of the
Institute of Humanities and Social Science Research
in Zhejiang University. Professor Zhao is a student
from University of Chicago and plays a quite effective role in Chinese intellectual society. And he published an article in a journal not that familiar to me
called Wenhua Zongheng which becomes more and more
popular, well-known here. And what Professor Zhao said is exactly, Bill, what you mentioned. He put that in Chinese. Like in the historical long run, if we started from Yangwu Yundong, from that kind of historical perspective, China at the current moment
still is in the best, comparatively speaking over the past, in the best position to reform itself, to develop by shaping the world
mainly by changing itself. So I very much agree with
that kind of a point of view, and I think if we could
have this kind of views getting more known around the world, especially in the US,
which is very helpful. And also I wanted to say, people like, well, those
highly intellectual people like came also from Harvard, Kurt and Jake Sullivan
published an article last year in "Foreign Affairs." They talk a lot, of course, but one sentence really
caused my interest. China may ultimately present a stronger ideological challenge
than the Soviet Union did. Well, what does that mean? Bill, I hope you will give
me some answer to that. For me, this sort of
a conclusion or point, I certainly can understand
why they put their ideas like this, but people
like them, Kurt and Jake, now they will have more
influence on Mr. Biden's policy, if I may have a guess. I think their point in their
article in "Foreign Affairs" seems to me too simple. It's not that simple, Bill. Present a stronger
ideological challenge, what? First, ideology is not culture. It's different. And then talking about culture, how much do they know the Chinese culture? Bill, well, we almost all agree when we talk about one
American who can really explain or elaborate on Chinese culture, we'll recommend Bill Kirby, right? We won't say, well,
regard such a civilization like Chinese civilization, simplified it as a bad ideology, they put, so we are tuned in, America,
wow this is the world. This is a very complicated
world far back into history. How could we in the 21st century give some explanation with such a simple or simplest rhetoric? It will mislead you, especially misleading the younger generation who are
going to build up our future. So let's, Bill, come down to the bottom when we started those education, those mutual understanding. From where should we start? Certainly we can't start
from those kind of simple, ideologically China's
challenge is stronger than the former Soviet
Union, blah, blah, blah. Well, it's not helpful. I'll stop here. - David captured that
point of view very directly when he talked about the lack
of a political export model. After all, it is called
Zhongguo Tese de Shehui Zhuyi. Not necessarily special characteristics of Chinese socialism. One very direct question
on a very direct issue that I know several of you
know about from Helen Li from outside and for Fred
and David, if you wish, Helen Li would like to
hear the panel's thought on this suspension of
the Ant financial IPO and its implication, and
particularly its implications for US-China capital markets. Anyone with the courage
to address that one? - Bill--
- David, I think it would be best
for you to do this, yeah. - I'm not going to talk, okay. But my only point is that that question was tailored for Fred. (laughs) Fred, you have to answer. - Well, you know, so we all know the IPO much anticipated was suspended. I believe the Chinese
regulators, you know, wanted to strike a fine balance. Like other leading economy like the US, the rise of big tech on the
whole is a force for good. Has really raised the productivity, has really served consumer
interest very well, and has really made the
economy more digitized, therefore more resilient
in times like this in the midst of pandemic. So there are many, many
benefits China has reaped from the rise of fintech,
and of course the Ant Group is the undisputed leader in this country and probably in the world. So the temporary suspension doesn't mean that the company will not go public. And also China will continue
to promote our innovation broadly and in the
fintech area in particular because China partly competed the US, and the US has a very modern, well-developed financial system. China has an increasingly
successful financial system, but still developing, and
there are many, many Chinese who still do not have access
to financial services. So there's a present need
for inclusive finance and the Ant Group is very well positioned to deliver that desirable social benefit to hundreds of millions of
people at a very, very low cost. So I do think the Chinese government intends to continue to promote innovation and to enable innovators
like Ant Group to succeed, but they want to strike the fine balance, make sure they understand the implications of the fintech for financial stability, for consumer protection and so forth. So this is not different from
the debate on Capitol Hill. Congress tried to rein in the big tech whether it's on antitrust
grounds or privacy or consumer protection, so
a very similar phenomenon is happening in China, but
I'm cautiously optimistic about the prospect of
China fintech as a whole and Ant Group in particular. - Thank you very much, Fred. I'm mindful of our time
and heading toward it and I want to give our director Winnie Yip a final word, but you
know, this is a panel that is marked by, I think actually more
than cautious optimism, but at least optimism and realism and with the need for some space, some time, maybe a timeout
as David has suggested, to think and to reset
because the relationship is so important to both countries, to their neighbors, and
to the broader world. And I'm reminded of the kind
of intellectual connectivity that we see here with the shield of the Fairbank Center for
Chinese Studies, Feizhengqing. Professor Fairbank, a great
historian of modern China learned his Chinese history
at Tsinghua University under the chairman of the
department there, Tsiang Tingfu, who would go on to be a
great Chinese diplomat. And Fairbank would spend
the Second World War with our Chinese ally in
the consulate in Chongqing. He would then see an utter collapse and catastrophic collapse
of US-China relations during the Korean War. And he would found this center
in 1955 because of his belief that in the United States, as in China, but he couldn't do anything about China, but at least in the United
States knowledge about China had become so politicized, so poisonous in political rhetoric that there had to be a reset, as it were. And he wished to take an academic approach toward educating
Americans through research and through teaching
through colleges and schools in a broader way about China. I asked Yuan Ming before, are
we at the low point right now? For sure we are not at the low point in the US-China relations. We have been at the low point
in that catastrophic war from 1950 to 1953 and in
many other confrontations. And we had been at many higher points and aspire to more of
those, but let me turn in our final moment to
our director, Winnie Yip for even more positive words, if you may. - So thank you very much,
Bill for organizing this and also for all the
panelists for being so candid, sharing your views about
US-China relations. And I think this is one
of the very few panels that I have heard our panelists
to be just very honest and getting to the point of what we can do and what are the real situation. I'm definitely very
encouraged by the positivism that you have conveyed,
but also want to just say that I want to reinforce a common theme that all of you have said. In this difficult relationship,
the role of the universities and the academics and researchers, that we all have a role
to play to help each side to understand each other, help
each side to create platform and opportunities to work with each other. And it is this, I call it osmosis
process that is being used by the individuals like everyone of us that would help the
situation to become better. Politics will still
continue to run its course and there are still times
that it would be better for us to do our work. There are times that it is more difficult. We're in a difficult time,
but we cannot give up. We will have to continue
to make that happen. Today we were at the
China Fund discussion. We were just talking about the
latest Trump executive order of not giving visas for Communist Parties to come to the US and that's
going to be quite damaging for academic exchange and so again, I think it is up to all
of us here and beyond to work with each other
to make it happen better. So again, I thank all of you, and I hope this is the
beginning, not a beginning, a continuation of us working together to continue to make the
relationship as good as one can be. Thank you very much. - Thank you, Winnie, very much. And I want to thank Shelley,
Yuan Ming, David, and Fred. Very much appreciate you being up early on the Pacific side and up
late here on the East Coast for Shelley and Winnie. Ganxie, thank you all.
- Thank you, thank you.
