IPS-Nathan Lecture II: US-China Rivalry: Inevitable War or Avoidable War?

[Music] good evening ladies and gentlemen welcome to Odysseus ideas not an extra series by Professor chen jingchou or 7sr nada and fellow for the study of simple today Rothschild will be giving her second lecture which is the us-china rivalry inevitable war or avoidable war following her lecture Rothschild will take questions from our Facebook comments the QN is I shall be checked by Professor Joseph Leo Dean College of Humanities Arts and Social Sciences Nanyang Technological University here are some housekeeping rooms at the start of our event the lecture is being streamed live on Facebook it will also be recorded and uploaded on the IPS website and Facebook page later please submit your comments and questions at any time through our Facebook page we will try our best to answer as many as we can we also would like to hear your view on the ebed there will be a link on our Facebook page which you can click to submit your feedback - invite Professor Chadd to give her lecture thank you director of IPS Jana - Devyn professor joseph liao the us-china relationship is in a bad place today for the United States the China relationship has never been easy to define Americans have always been ambivalent about how it should regard China is China a partner a competitor or an adversary during the Cold War China a communist regime was an adversary lumped together with the Soviet Union but for much of the time the focus was on the Soviet Union as the lead adversary it was the other superpower in the bipolar world China was then still considered backward and not a major industrial power the Communist world and the free world were two separate bounded orders President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 was the game changer according to Henry Kissinger around 1969 China and the United States found strategic congruence in that international outlooks the sino-soviet dispute had deepened with China regarding the Soviet threat as an imminent one even before he was elected in the 1968 presidential election Nixon had been feeling his way towards China Nixon was concerned to end the Vietnam War and about the post-vietnam security scenario he probably understood he could not end the Vietnam War without talking to China in a foreign affairs article in 1967 Nixon wrote and I quote we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of Nations their to nature is fantasies cherish is hates and threaten its neighbors there is no place on this small planet for a billion of his potentially most able people to live in angry isolation unquote in fact he called for dialogue and made an appeal for reconciliation Richard McGregor and in Australian China hand clearly identifies Nixon as the intellectual Godfather of the opening to China and will he relied on Kissinger to bring it about the two men then worked closely to plan and shape policy the Shanghai communique normalized the bilateral relationship between the United States and China with both sides agreeing to conduct their relationship on the basis of non-aggression non-interference equality and mutual respect on Taiwan the United States acknowledged that for both sides of the street there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China and reiterated is interest in a peaceful settlement when done shopping said China on the four modernizations path in seventy-eight in effect overturning the central principles of the command economy to experiment with the market economy he multiplied the possibilities of cooperation with the United States and the West this was seen as China opening up to the world the path of engagement was volatile nonetheless it was remarkable that for almost 40 years 1978 to 2017 the United States and China was in a relationship which could be described as strategic engagement the us-china relationship flourished so long as both sides could focus on checking the hegemony of the Soviet Union in fact it was not so simple the United States had to manage the complex triangular relationship of Washington Moscow and Beijing although it was more tilted towards China throughout the late 70s and 80s as the Soviet Union was seen as the bigger threat because of his expansionist policies in Asia the Tiananmen episode in 1989 where Chinese tanks were brought out to fire on student protesters shot the world and cost the u.s. to view China again as an ideological adversary this was followed a few months later by the fall of the Berlin Wall and revolutions in Eastern Europe which toppled the communist regimes leading in the end to the dissolution of the Soviet Union both developments ended the bipartisan Congress consensus in America on the need to work with China nonetheless American presidents in subsequent years George Herbert Walker Bush Bill Clinton and George W Bush continued to engage China expanding their power to casual and persuade Congress to grant most favored nation MFN to China support is joining WTO limit arms sales to Taiwan and expand trade relay Asians with China Barack Obama placed importance on cooperation with China to work on climate change pandemics and other transnational issues now Jeff Bader the point person in the Obama White House for Asia and someone I worked a lot with said the period of working with China needed many benefits for the United States firstly us-china cooperation led to the containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War and ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union secondly the ending of hostility between the United States and China led to a long period of peaceful cooperation and bilateral non-aggression certainly with nudging from the United States and some pressure China joined the other nuclear powers to oppose the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction now this period also benefited China firstly working together ASEAN China and the United States put sufficient pressure on Vietnam to force its withdrawal from Cambodia to agree to a comprehensive UN settlement and UN supervised elections for China this outcome ended the Soviet role in Cambodia demonstrated as a Soviet Union could not protect his ally Vietnam whilst it could protect Cambodia and Vietnam could not overturn a regime in Cambodia friendly to China secondly after the normalization of relations with the United States and joining WTO China grew unstoppably adding to global growth and u.s. prosperity at the same time that working relationship has come apart and I would like to use the rest of the lecture to answer three questions why did it come apart how far will the relationship slide and will we see an inevitable war or an avoidable war why did he come apart many point to the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States and seating Ping as president of the People's Republic of China as the inflection point of the us-china relationship now that would be a simplistic answer while the two personalities ascending on the global stage at the same time may have affected the tone of the relationship the real cause for the sharp deterioration was because the United States and China had moved to us an inherent instability of a structural nature it has arisen explains Kevin Rudd because China is now of sufficient economic military and technological mass that it represents a structural challenge to long-term American dominance of the global and regional order unquote the China challenge for America is now no longer a theoretical question in addition this is made worse by the fact that these two countries represent radically different political cultural and ideological systems grim answers to Sidda t-strap documents that in 12 of 16 cases where the rising power challenged the established power war ensued it seems that the chances of conflict are most acute when the challenging power comes close in aggregate power to the established power Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin and Hugh Jintao each had used their leadership to move China along the track of strong economic growth and acquisition of military power to regain his position as a power to be respected in the region and the world guided by the dictum Pao Wang Yang gray president seating Ping followed the same course but he was different when he took office he launched two visions clearly and boldly the first vision was China dream in 2030 to inspire the Chinese people to strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation the other was the belt and growth initiative Bri as we know it a breathtaking an ambitious project followed by the AI I be the Asian infrastructure investment bank many major powers saw this not as just another economic and development project but as a strategic challenge what could the United States and other countries on notice was presidencies 19th Party Congress speech the abolition of term limits for the President and vice-president at the Lian cray C's book of China moving center stage in this era he held out that by 2035 China would be a modern socialist country a global leader in terms of composite strength and ready to make a contribution to the world by 2050 now in themselves these statements are legitimate aspirations of any major power but the speech following activities in the South China Sea Bri and AII be was read by the United States and the West as China offering an alternative model and seeking predominance in the global system I didn't read it as such in fact it is not just the American defense establishment security analysts and think tanks and Congress that see the strategic competition Chinese security intellectuals and policy elites also see this see it in this way now unlike their American counterparts Chinese analysts take the strategic competition between the US and China as a starting point many see it as a structural issue an outcome of the redistribution of power in the international while some write about cooperation and competition in the relationship and competitive interdependence a retired colonel senior colonel looming fool asserts in his book jungle among the China dream that us-china conflicts are inevitable no matter how committed China is to a peaceful rise us-china relations is a marathon where in a face-off of the century would be C and professor Yin Shaitan a respected Chinese strategic thinker from Ching hai University well-known in international forums bluntly recognizes that the United that the us-china strategic competition is inevitable between the hegemon and the rising power yin says China has an has been narrowing the gap of his comprehensive national strength with that of the United States the root cause of the growing competition yang believes the instability of the us-china relationship is due to both sides pursuing a policy of and I caught him pretending to be friends unquote the Trump administration dropped that pretense in October 2017 vice president Mike Pence delivered a hard-hitting speech at the Hudson Institute on Chinese economic aggression and interference in u.s. politics many analysts saw this as a trump administration declaring a new policy and likened the speech to Winston Churchill's iron curtain speech this was soon followed by the release of the NS s 2017 report national security strategy and the national defense strategy and D s report in the NSS report China was identified as a revisionist power seeking to and I quote displace the US in the indo-pacific region expand is reaches of a state driven economic model and reorder the region in his favor uncaught the NDS in 2018 the defense survey the defense strategy clearly views China as a strategic competitor now let us take a moment to look at the picture of the relative power positions of the two great powers and how they stack up this is a snapshot really of that great powers blue is the United States China is red and you can see if you add up all the other 14 countries and compared to the United States the United States is almost you know the defense spending is almost as much as the other 40 the and in fact five years ago the u.s. picked the 15 the other 40 the next highest spending 40 now we come to those key defense that statistics and as I said I am giving a snapshot of the relative strengths red is China blue is America India is green Russia is brown United Kingdom is light blue France is purple and now looking at the can we move the slides please looking at these slides what you get is really a sense of the military SS but it's not just being counting you have to look at this the generation of the weapons and the kind of military SS and the sophistication of the military assets military analysts will go into detail to tell you but it seems clear to me from this snapshot china is large stronger as a land power for now United States has strength in naval power and air power which the naval power I think China is building up now makes please PLEASE move looking at the tables it is clear the United States is far ahead of China in military terms but China now has a larger share of the world's economy can we move the slides please thank you but China now has a larger share of the world's economy using PPP exchange rates the IMF has given China the top spot in the world's economies and ranks the United States as number two and India as number three but according to the World Bank u.s. GDP when you take it and not at PPP is twenty point five trillion dollars whilst China's is thirteen point six trillion dollars now it is said the United States still leads in soft power though there has been an erosion in recent years because the China the u.s. itself has changed can we have the next slide this shows figure 4 shows the Lowy Institute Asia power index and the United States is seen as the number one power total score is eighty four point five China is seventy five point nine and the LOI index uses economic military diplomatic cultural resilience and a whole bunch of other things interestingly Singapore measures eight look at the screen and and this surprised people because bigger countries like Indonesia Vietnam Thailand Malaysia Pakistan did not you know rank as high as US now David Shambo a well known China expert American China expert says China is no match for the United States but it is perceived to be military but and perception matters it is not just the amount of monies but the lead that has been accumulated for years and how equipment men training culture leadership come together there is also the fact that the US armed forces have been war tested over the years and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq whilst the Chinese military has not been in the war since 1979 against Vietnam what is important is that many Americans believe China is catching up fast speaking at an aspen security forum in july 2019 Admiral Admiral Philip Davidson the commander of the Indo Pacific Command said and I caught and is important what he says because of who he is while China's capabilities don't outnumber America's in the region for now it's possible they could overtake the United States in the next five years unquote there's a mood of minor hysteria in Washington these days while the Republicans and Democrats do not agree on much they share an anti China hostility they believe China's rise has come at America's expense and the US needs to take a much tougher position with China it is unfortunate for the relationship that the presidential election in November increasingly will make who is tougher on China and issue on the ballot box president Trump would want to use China to shift the scrutiny away from his handling of the kovat 19 pandemic and and an anti-racism now the Chinese themselves do not believe they are on the same level of power as the US in fact in 2019 when China hoisted in the tense mood and the increasing talk of containment the u.s. pushback on Chinese activity believing that China wants to push them out of the region the u.s. defense Minister general we found her surprisingly set at the shangri-la dialogue before a gathering of the world's defense ministers he said China does not have the intention nor the capacity rui ya wooly to vie for the number1 position with the US in the world China could be adjusting his rhetoric as it realizes the United States is responding fiercely to smash the competition I believe people think China is powerful perhaps more powerful than it actually is at this moment because a great power is inherently endowed with soft power because of weight and size China has soft power by being and that amplifies all other aspects of power us - soft power by be thus strategic competition for dominance is the most salient reason unraveling the relationship there is another the u.s. had hoped the integration of China into the international economic system would lead to a gradual opening up of the Chinese political system resulting in a more open economy and society that did not happen instead they watched the new emphasis on party and ideology and the strengthen strengthening of party committees in public and private firms this triggered disillusionment and some serious re-evaluation especially in the foreign MNCs the divergences in value systems as well as the operating systems have been noted by American leaders and commentators now in fact quite early on Minister mentor Lee Kuan Yew cautioned Graham Allison and Bob Blackwell when they interviewed him for their book Lee Kuan Yew said unlike other emergent countries China wants to be China and accepted as such not as an honorary member of the West the Chinese will want to share the century as co-equals with the United States now when strategic competition and differences in value systems combine the rift in strategic the rift is strategic and ideological which has led to talk of a coming second cold war the trump administration is convinced that China wants to offer an alternative model and shape a world antithetical to the values and interests of the United States China on the other hand believes the United States cannot accept China as a communist country and deep down wants to change China's political system there is no strategic trust between the two powers and China believes the u.s. is seeking in different ways to contain China's rise now let me talk of the conflict I see in trade investment and technology the bilateral the bilateral relationship has been under constant train strain over trade deficits and disputes non-proliferation Iran North Korea and human rights but was managed within bounds market access was always a sore point for American companies and increasingly IP protection Trump had long spoken out against trade deficits in 1988 he was going after Japan during the 2016 election campaign he called China a currency manipulator charged that China was raping the US and said he would cut a better deal to help American businesses and workers compete in 2018 president Trump pushed the trade dispute into a trade war we soon expanded into an investment war and a technology war we are familiar with the difficult route to the eventual Phase one trade deal settling that was hard and the global economy was highly sensitive to the outcome throughout 2018 and 2019 trade investment and technology issues were caught up in the dynamics of the larger us-china strategic competition and progressively the issues move to include ideology and values now in the 20th century national power national strength and global dominance will be decided by technology it is in the area it is in the area of the technologies of the future that the us-china strategic competition will be hard as fought and where red lines will be drawn technologies based on data and AI will determine productivity competitiveness and have an impact on national security in fact the two countries have been moving towards this realization for some time during the Obama administration there was increased awareness that Chinese venture capital firms sometimes with support from state backed sources were structuring deals to bypass Sophia's to investing and to invest in and by Silicon Valley technology in announcing made in China 2025 China immediately put American business and government on alert and created alarm in security circles this is a ten-year blueprint for Chinese technology self-sufficiency domestically and technology dominance internationally in a long run in the long run funded by the state there are other roadmaps such as the document China's next generation artificial intelligence development 2017 aimed at making China the world's number one in AI innovation by 2030 now as high whoreson the former US Secretary of Treasury and an old friend of China put it for Americans made in China 2025 signals that foreign firms are not needed in many areas but in the meantime they are expected to act in ways that bolster China's indigenisation of Technology knowledge and business processes it is not just that foreign technologies are being transferred and digested it is that they are being reworked so that foreign technologies become Chinese technology through the indigenous Asian process that many of the multinational CEOs I talked to that's Poulsen to build that they believe is grossly unfair to the innovators and dreamers at the heart of their companies and that all is Hank Paulson Paulson warned that this technology competition will spill into a technology war and an economic Iron Curtain would build new walls on both sides and unmake the global economy and that would lead to decoupling we see now segments of the administration and Congress pushing for the technology containment of China in 2019 and 2018 and 2019 the Trump administration introduced measures seeking to contain China's technology rise first there was the passage of Pharma the u.s. foreign investment Risk Reduction Modernization Act which governs the reviews under Sophia's and then there was the Export Control reform act accra firmer and accra together these two pieces of legislation expanded the range of deals the US government could review and block and the range of technologies which would trigger a mandatory review secondly there's a systematic review of the supply chains of the Defense Department seeking to read out the over deeper turns on china-based ICT supply chains to ensure supply chain security thirdly the administration targeted Huawei as the Chinese icon which epitomizes the technology wall it has made it harder for Harvey to do business in the u.s. placing the company and is 68 of his affiliates on a list that US companies cannot sell to without government approval and China has retaliated with this own list but the administration has since then expanded than this a couple of times adding more companies and these companies are entities that US agencies are prohibited from using and US firms cannot deal with them high vision is the next big target and Chinese companies also with military ties in May 2020 US Senate passed legislation to force US companies listed on the US Stock Exchange to delist unless they complied with US laws this is denying Chinese companies access to US capital markets the administration has gone further and has gone to his allies and partners around the world to put pressure on them to exclude borrowing in there and fight reroll out and third countries are under pressure to to size countries are bracing for the decoupling and emergence of to technology orders each using different standards and norms but there is a push back reports throughout 2019 and the first quarter of 2020 suggests that US business is pushing back as the administration attempts to cut off China from access to American products companies that specialize in microchips AI biotechnology and other industries are alarmed by attempts to restrict the flow of technology to China this and the restrictions on Chinese investment in the u.s. are seen as funding the sector's growth in the US the tech industry is warning that limiting access to the Chinese market with American companies and end up undercutting the US as the biggest global hub of R&D as revenues from the mark that market fuel research innovation and to give you an idea China accounts for 36% of the revenue of u.s. semiconductor produces a New York Times report in 2020 February suggests that foreign companies are moving away from American components and technology to true concerns that access to parts could be abruptly cut off because of policy turns ironically decoupling is taking place in a different way American companies are being driven to invest in research centres in Canada Israel and the UK to be out of reach of the American government US companies share the administration's view that technology is a national security concern and needs protection but they believe the regulations are too sweeping and broad iBM has written to the Commerce Department asking for a redraft of the policy which they argue will lead to the disengagement of US business from global markets and suppliers they are uncomfortable with the policy of including economic threats that is threat of competition as a national security threat still on May 15 the trauma administration moved to block global chip supplies to far away it expanded us authority to require license for licenses for sales - halfway of semiconductors made with US technology consequently expanding is hot is rich - hot exports to the Chinese company so if you're a foreign company a Taiwanese company using us technology to make semiconductors you can sell that to the United States TSMC in Taiwan it is difficult not to conclude the tech war is in full swing on the Chinese side that companies are moving to limit or exclude American components in their supply chain one can expect the Chinese to accelerate their plans to achieve self-sufficiency given the u.s. threats and measures so they too are making decoupling happen an analyst suggests however that for now there is a quiet continuity going on China remains a very attractive productive production base for companies because of its trained labor good infrastructure and dense ecosystem of supplier networks Southeast Asia apparently cannot replicate this electronic exports from China have risen steadily because of dense networks and China is courting companies to stay in fact the US FDI foreign direct investment from 2010 to 2019 held steady in spite of Trump rhetoric in 2019 tells about a five billion dollar investment for his Giga Factory in China ExxonMobil committed to a 10 billion complex in Guangdong in 2018 so total economic decoupling is not really happening but semi-conductor decoupling might happen because of US restrictions and I think further technology we should watch what happens next now I have tried to give you an idea of how the rivalry and competition has expanded from trade and national security to investment technology and values I would like to highlight briefly to other areas to show how the issues can broaden not only is technology dominance an issue the type of technology development by China has also come under criticism mike pence warned that China was using the Bri to spread Chinese technologies standards and values at the expense of the United States and Western values the US says it is uncomfortable with Chinese AI technology for surveillance that is face recognition branding this as Technol authoritarianism but a Carnegie Endowment for international peace study and this is a u.s. think-tank found that AI surveillance technology is spreading much faster to a wider range of countries than commonly understood 75 out of 176 countries globally are actively using AI technologies for surveillance sixty-four use face recognition systems 36 of them are Bri countries and 50 to do smart policing and it is not just China exporting AI surveillance technology many companies in liberal democracies like the United States Japan France UK Germany Israel South Korea also sell sophisticated surveillance technology to quote-unquote unsavory regimes according to Carnegie now the second area of expansion this covent 19 outbreak has become another platform for us China rivalry since the outbreak late in January American and Western media have been far more interested in using the virus epidemic in Wuhan to investigate and criticize China for the failures of an authoritarian system the lack of transparency see the suppression of information and the weirdness of Chinese eating habits rather than what is being done to tackle a major public health problem allegations of the virus coming from the Wuhan lab were made without verification the handling of the pandemic became an opportunity to score ideological points about democracy versus authoritarianism and against China now it is true China was initially slow in providing information and whistleblowers were muscled but the reports were one-sided as covert 19 spread around the world and countries struggle to contain the virus it is now grudgingly acknowledged that the Chinese actually handled a situation very well China on his part has hit back China is offering Kovach 19 assistance to other countries to improve his image a coronavirus diplomacy and to gain soft power once its own situation is under control there have been counter allegations by China that the virus may have originated from the United States but China should do this carefully they have been criticisms and there's a backlash on wolf warrior diplomacy I mentioned this period because if you consider the reports in 2008 on SARS us-china competition had not reached as high points then the media reports were serious are more objective and internationally the global community pulled together faster now let me go to the next area of discussion which is is this going to be an inevitable war or avoidable war no where is the strategic competition played out more keenly than in the ASEAN region ASEAN is in a sense a swing constituency the US has been the hegemonic power for the last seven decades in Asia providing a strong security and economic presence the rise of China has been welcomed in Southeast Asia as both an opportunity and a challenge although there are two u.s. treaty allies in ASEAN Thailand and Philippines they are less enduring allies for the u.s. unlike Japan or South Korea as they are not driven by the same existential need for the treaties in recent years the Philippines under president of 30 has rebalanced its policy pivoting to China but it continues to maintain US military ties though it is ambivalent about whether to end the Status of Forces Agreement so far with the United States Thailand in recent years has gradually moved into the Chinese orbit Thailand Malaysia Singapore Brunei our non-communist non airline States whilst Vietnam is a communist regime and Laos and Cambodia one socialist states are close to China so we are a mix so Southeast Asia is an area open for sino-american competition in the inference game and for the support of the ASEAN countries and ASEAN is trying to do this by hanging together and creating a united ASEAN some analysts have taken to saying that Southeast Asia has now become the site for the new great game with uncomfortable implications for ASEAN the South China Sea is where the United States will directly confront China although the parties in the South China Sea territorial dispute China Taiwan and the for ASEAN claimant states Philippines Malaysia Brunei and Vietnam the u.s. is very much a player in the region and regarded by the countries as the only effective counterweight to China as the global superpower and the regions dominant power the u.s. 7th fleet has defended the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea the Taiwan Strait as well as the East China Sea China's nine-dash line claims and is increased activism in Reclamation's and military buildup in the South China Sea has not only alienated ASEAN claimants and increase anxiety in the region it has sharply escalated the potential for conflict between the United States and China the United States Navy has responded with regular and robust freedom of navigation operations called for knots the sail ships through the waters in the region's waters this has brought the two navies in frequent confrontation and the one that people remember most is October 2018 when the USS Takata and American destroyer was in near coalition with the Chinese ship warship in the Spratly Islands and there have been other four knots where the two sides are playing tricking the US and China are both party to an agreement reached in 2014 to reduce a chance of incident at sea called the code of unplanned encounters at sea to prevent escalation both sides expect encounters in the South China Sea to be the norm you know should it happen where the ships collide when a conflict happens should that happen one hopes what happened over the ep-3 incident in 2001 when a US surveillance plane off the coast of China was shot at by a Chinese plane trying to chase it away we hope that would be replayed what happened the plane landed in Hainan Island delicate diplomacy and ensured during sorry ensued during the George W Bush administration when the new conservative Hawks were in charge fortunately wise counsel from George Herbert Walker Bush Brent Scowcroft and Colin Powell prevailed the United States and China stared each other in the face and decided it was not worth war in the present period president Trump is in charge he does not want another war which would hurt his election prospects and the US economy and in his 2016 election campaign he promised to end Wars but he has hawkish advisors China is of course much stronger today than it was in 2001 but it is likely presidency given the many internal problems of China with a weakening economy and a recovery from kovat 19 may also wish to avoid war now can war between China and the US break out over Taiwan for China Taiwan is an enduring core interests it was always regarded it has always regarded the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland as something of an inevitability Taiwan however has long links with the u.s. establishment in Congress and in the State Department and Pentagon there is also a mutual defense treaty which obligates the u.s. to help Taiwan in case of an attack from China US defense allies in Asia such as Australia and Japan are bound by their defence agreements to fight alongside the u.s. to support Taiwan in such an attack now in 2003 President George W Bush sent a clear message to the entire on president Chen shui-bian who was pushing provocative six on the cross-strait issue and he did this during the visit of premier when JP up went kappa to the united states he said we oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo and the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally that changed the status quo which we oppose unquote now Bush drawing this line helped to stabilize cross-strait relations for a number of years president Trump's White House has a different attitude on Taiwan which borders on ideological and could lead to standoffs with China resulting in rash responses on both sides in January 2020 after the Taiwan elections a US warships sailed through the Taiwan Strait this was presumably a response to China's sailing his latest aircraft carrier the Shandong twice through the strait before the election the Trump administration is openly helping Taiwan expand its diplomatic space passing the Taipei Act which strengthens the scope of u.s. Taipei's ties and promises to help Taiwan gain access tying well at her second inauguration did not refer to the 1992 consensus in her speech and she maintained the Paha pass administration's opposition to China using one country two systems to resolve the dispute with Taiwan she said cross-straits relations have reached a historical turning point both sides have a duty to find a way to coexist over the long term and prevent the intensification of antagonism and differences China is deeply suspicious that chai would be moving towards the the Jura independence in the NPC meeting on May 23rd 2020 Premier Li Keqiang in his work report report was noted to have dropped the word peaceful from Yuri Yoona reunification which is the standard reference to Taiwan now this excited speculation that China would proceed to toughen on Taiwan and in the made but a week later in a May 29 press conference in reply to a question from China times Taiwanese paper Premier Li while reiterating the position that China remains committed to a one-china principle said they firmly oppose Taiwan independence but slit in this line we will continue to show maximum sincerity and do a very atmos to promote peaceful unification of China so the word peaceful came back but I would not read it as China changing his stance from the work report but that China is signaling nothing is off the table so the Taiwan issue bears watching of course there is now Hong Kong and the you all are reading about this every day the US government took the side of the protesters with Congress passing the Hong Kong human rights and democracy Act of 2019 and in 2020 with China's introduction of the national security law to cover Hong Kong the trauma administration will withdraw Hong Kong special status which it currently enjoys with the United States now whether it is the South China Sea the Taiwan Strait of Hong Kong neither the u.s. nor China I think want a conflict that is war with each other for many reasons but they will push their positions to the furthest limits for China Taiwan and Hong Kong our core interests and they have more recently defined South China Sea as called interest to for the United States it is about credibility as the guarantor of security and living up to the role of a predominant regional power the main concern of the region is a conflict or war started by accident between the two powers before I finish I am sure you would want to know so is this a second Cold War Henry Kissinger in November 20 19 cent we are at the foothills of a Cold War he is a man who have has lived through the Cold War Kevin Rudd the former Australian Prime Minister brought in foreign affairs recently that this is cold war 1.5 I would say the tech war is on and you see student visas withdrawn scientist visas withdrawn particularly for specific areas to do with AI computer science biotech so we are one foot in it is a tech cold war is it a cold war I think a cold war has a certain structure it has a military structure and an economic structure economically the United States and its allies all want to participate in China's growth market so the United States cannot shut China upped not so it's not the same as a cold war before not the US Soviet Union model of Mach 1 cold war if Biden is elected his team believes the US must work with China they had they will be firm there but they would not want to see the relationship you know a sharp confrontation they will work together on climate change pandemics other transnational issues I mean that's now let's see what happens with the debates when they go on but economically I think the United States and China will still have something to do with each other and so will Europe militarily during the Cold War I was reminded that the militaries of the United States and Soviet Union confronted each other everywhere you are not seeing this at this point so it's not a cold war now it is expected that middle sized and smaller countries will find themselves pressured by both sides to make choices in this contestation states like Singapore are trying to work with those who seek to help avoid wars to build a bridge to create space between the two great powers and I will take up this very important dilemma in my third and final lecture analyzing the delicate path Singapore and the region are taking Thank You professor Chen may not invite professor Joseph Lee out to start a Q&A session okay sorry thank you very well thank you professor Charlie for your lecture first let me apologize again to everyone for the depuis glitch want to be wonderful if the US and China could work together to sort out and introduce rollout 5g for us so that we won't have these kinds of problems but in any case I think what we've heard is a characteristically eloquent and thought-provoking lecture from Professor Shannon G and she's given us much food for thought I was particularly appreciative of the fact that she had set the sino-us relationship in its historical context and we need to bear that in mind when we look at what has been happening what is happening now in that bilateral relationship there have been a serious whole series of questions that have been sent in and of course we are constrained by time so I will try to accommodate as many as possible and probably group them as well but if there are any questions that don't get answered oh don't get conveyed please accept my apologies in advance but let me fire off the the first question prof chan you in your time as ambassador in washington DC you basically that period covered the Clinton Bush 43 and the Obama presidency and that's also overlapped with the terms of chance Amin in China which and how and and a little bit of sitting thing as well so in other words you must have accumulated wealth of observations following the dynamics so closely from a price ringside seat I wonder if you can share some of your your views and your observations about how the relationship has developed up to this point from that vantage I'm gonna try to be brief to taking many questions but it's hard to be briefed on this I hope IPS gives us extra time and you took time out because the system crashed okay yeah I would say that you know when I I was there I I arrived in the u.s. in 1996 John German no am I on Wow okay John German made his first visit in 1997 and it was like you know a hiatus of 12 years before Chinese president came to the United States and bear in mind that in 1997 China is not what is today you know gentlemen came to the United States and he wanted a good visit it was important for him to look you know he could get on with the United States and that he was a player on you know he was an important player that the United States would respect on the world stage so and this if you remember is after the you know this was a time when John Sapien was you know so the Taiwan Strait was an issue the visit was considered very good and I think it was gentlemen came and charmed everybody because he was humorous he had a sense of humor and I think the visit went well and he found that the United States had not changed his position on Taiwan that was his main concern you know and I during the Bush period as I pointed out there was initially you know this difficulty with the United States China and United States over ep-3 because you had Hawkes know Kong's Indy at the start but the early you know almost near war or near conflict because of ep-3 made everybody sober up and the us-china relationship was very good after that now let me point out that at any time the relationship between the United States and China is filled with competition cooperation and you know differences in views and the United States has learned to manage that quite well and China is learning to deal with the u.s. in fact you know I got the sense that they rather liked Republican administrations but when you ask the Chinese when I talk to Chinese diplomats they work out a relationship with China in the beginning the US will be bashing then they settled to a sudden way you know as one diplomat said you know if we are going to end in this position why don't we stop at the position we will end at rather than start from somewhere else because every president seems to stop a term fighting with China and also in China then they come round and settle into a relationship with China so that's the background competition cooperation and you know you begin being tough then they learn to deal with China but China in 1997 China during hooting doubts visit 2000 and you know the I think giant you mean step down in 2002 so from there who Jintao China was not yet the China that has grown to what it has what it is today China only entered WTO in 2001 so you know it's different you know and sitting ping came to Washington and this was in 2012 January or February I wa I left in July I attended a lunch you know and I walked in to a hall and many of the US official whispered to me you see this hall it was filled with people fill packed he said you know is a rising power you know so that was a sense but I think the relationship has really deteriorated you thank you for your answer we have we have a ton of questions on the Singapore and what Singapore needs to do but and you have a you have a lecture based on that so maybe we will set that that set of questions aside for now there's another set of questions on the international order so let me sort of break the question down into digestible parts or other questions so basically there is interest in whether a not China really does or doesn't want to be I think you alluded to that when you talked about the Chinese defense ministers comments in Singapore so I suppose do we take that at face value or is it you know covering up intentions to play a more active role so that's one question the second is we had we had a questioner asked this rather intriguing question why don't we let China me so that it actually will have a stick instability mm-hmm and a third facet to the international order questions is why did the US and Western countries think that integrating China into the liberal international order as they call it would change China's politics so a whole set of questions and actually Joseph if you could also tell me who the question came from already okay I said I can question and a lot of the viewers we you know Singapore is a small place we probably all know each other no yeah but thank you very much let me take well you gave me three questions why don't we let China be so it will have a stake in China lead the International Water leadplayer active role leading the order I think this is where it is difficult you know you had another question earlier about whether China now is what the general said was you know not an honest view but you know is it trying to be something else but will show his hand or later yeah you will note that throughout my lecture I would say for now you know the picture is for now because China is a country that is growing changing you know and so and positions change you know strains change they shift us also you know so I and or the other countries too so but for now I think China feels it is not in a position to challenge the United States you know now why don't we let China lead I think we first there are two reasons it's not that nobody's letting China lead China also doesn't really want to have a share of leadership means you are a stakeholder you have to it actually take on responsibilities and that could be shoring things up supporting and I'm not sure they want that role they didn't want to be a stakeholder when Bob Zoellick offered them the role of responsible stakeholder perhaps they didn't share in that world view that's one but also would they want to carry the burden of being the global pot global shun Dom or policemen you know to help deal with disasters with conflicts here and there so I would say you know the question is does China want to lead in that way I'm sure China wants to lead when it's ready to offer it and in a manner it wants to you know now I think is also very difficult for a power which has been predominant for so many years and has been you know is in a hegemon so its values its policies become acceptable to the rest of the world to give way you know to give its position and let another country lead and I've noticed that the United States gets even a bit you know touchy when Europe tries to take the lead so and when Japan tries to take a lead and these are allies you know so it's very hard from a predominant position to just allow another power to come in to lead which is why the adjustment in this redistribution of power is greatest for the unite the states but China I think just feels that at this moment it doesn't want to take that kind of primary leadership role because you know you would have to are you prepared to underwrite the security in different parts of the world and enter into conflicts and so on okay and then there was a question from Victor Mills the the one essentially about values so why do the US or the US and Western countries think that the the International the liberal international order free trade would change the political systems of China why did I even think that you know this is Western liberal thought that if countries if people get wealthier they they will be more open and when societies and countries get wealthier there's economic development it will change and they will all want a certain kind of political system which is open democratic and so on and this is the belief you know so I think this is what the United States and Europe thought that by bringing China into WTO allowing it to expand being part of the liberal order China will change but as Lee Kuan Yew said you know China is not going to be an honorary Western gentlemen I think we underestimate the change in order in the values and sorry is we underestimate that is hard to change values the United States in particular is a country that is messianic it wants to change other countries democracy is wonderful you know they believe in it and they will try to promote it in a way China is not messianic it doesn't want to promote values that way that's why as an alternative model China is not going to go around the world selling the Chinese model as Prime Minister said you know China is an oaken tree america is a young country it thinks every country should be like them and they would like to sell these values china is an old country and things no other country can be like them you know so they're not going to go around selling their values in that sense you know that is my own thing I you know I read the 19th Party Congress speech as China asserting the position that that is the right system is that the Chinese system has brought millions of people you know hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and it is the right system so don't try to change me don't try to change my system and those of you who want to use a system fine yeah we get an impression that on the US side is very in entrench in the political psyche of the of the nation let's move on there's a question from Lally on folk Isis and it's an important one yeah because we've talked about the the rivalry and the risk now he asked under what circumstances would you see both the US and China one thing to do more to reduce their areas of contention and increase their areas of cooperation everything is possible in the United States you get the right two sites I think both see they do have some interests that are congruent the question is whether when you have different presidents you know you they may reach for different things all the presidents before the president the present president have worked with China in some ways now China has to give some it is giving some now and opening up his markets and so on they should have done that much earlier frankly and I think there could be some areas where they could work together they for us I've been reading the writings of potential policy makers in the Nixon administration and they all emphasize areas that they can work with China on largely climate change now you can add pandemics and there are transnational issues drugs and so on trafficking so I think that would be presidents that would work that way you know Joseph one of the things that I feel having lived in America you know for so many years America is a country that changes that's a strength it renews itself if you don't like it wait for the change you know the pendulum swings if it goes to an extreme it swings back to the other side and I was wondering you know watching what is happening whether we are beginning to see a start of another change you know I've been talking with this idea because now you are seeing this anti racism you know you are seeing the the just the courts in fact you know emphasize that LGBT is part of civil rights and you can put that under the Civil Rights Act so I think something is happening in the United States and this racism put that I'm asking myself has no conservatism run is cause has right-wing conservatism run its course when I say run its course I don't mean it completely disappears but different thinking comes in you know for in because we saw that happen counterculture anti-war you know that that period brought in the conservatives afterwards and now do we see a swing slowly it won't happen next year but you are moving towards then so I think in the thinking on China I'm thinking that something could happen but the rivalry between the United States and China be there because China the United States does not want to be number two it has always been number one in recent history in is you know so it would find it very hard to adjust so they will compete but does the competition have to result in war and I think they could work on other areas yeah as you mentioned at the beginning really it's very much a structural phenomenon at work but profit you've left the door ajar so I have to ask you we see a pendulum swinging in November this year you know we are still many months from the election then you know as you know in the United States it's like a lifetime in fact they say nothing really happens till after summer you know in September then you start look what happens so I you know I would not count president from Donald Trump out you know right the numbers don't look good for him but anything can happen yeah that's true that's true we have a question from drew Laxman on the decoupling so he asks who do you think will be the ultimate winner if there is a full decoupling of us-china relations it seems that the US has more to lose as China always has its large domestic market to fall back on if the US is closed off to them when you say for the coupling is decoupling in economics or you know in economic security every other sphere I just don't see that happening but if that happens because of the size of China you know I think it could be in fact split regions you know yeah and I think you will you may see the order if that happens you may have split regions let me just leave it at that yeah actually your your point about split regions nicely segues into another question by Raj Roger Linn and he asks how do US allies like Australia the UK and Japan how do they figure in this is bilateral standoff attention and particularly given the the support initial support for the economic overtures on the part of China you know the irony Roger is that in many many of the US allies in Asia have China as the number one trading partner you know the economy is very closely tied up with China and this is Australia China is the number one trading partner Japan South Korea you know even Taiwan or if you look at that but it's not is a is a territory you know the now how do they square right now I think most of them are choosing security to be with the United States but on economics is with China still they are wondering when China all US will say you know you cannot be you know with a foot in each pan you cannot have security with the United States and economics with China you have to come on the same side and when that happens is how do people choose you know but even as you mentioned these countries how would all stray Leigha choose how would Japan choose I think these countries have different leadership different parties the mood changes they can encapsulate the mood so you know right now it's certain leadership of certain countries take the cut the country one way but a change of party could take the country another way and I would argue that all the countries in the region all of America's allies in the region would like to keep the position as it is that they can you know carry on with China as a trading partner and economic economy is tied up with China although the top of now diversifying but still very much reliant on China and it's the growth story right now the first to come out of the gate from kovat you know yeah yeah and they would like to carry on with that and they hope that would be so and I am even I'm also cutting that even with Europe China is the market is the biggest market you know how do you leave out the biggest market so economics will take too many decisions yeah and this is where I think you we see the difference between the so-called old Cold War and what we are facing today the economic dimension a question on ASEAN from Kimiko Ishihara well ASEAN be able to put together a united front to address rising Chinese influence in the indo-pacific region what are some issues that ASEAN would have to overcome before being able to do that well as you know ASEAN is made up of ten countries each with a different strategic perspective and perhaps and foreign policy outlook you know they have varying outlooks and it has been frankly not so easy to get ASEAN unity is always a challenge but we manage when it comes to a statement so it is there and what is that there are structural reasons explaining this because ASEAN was created as a regional organization that does not seek the kind of integration that the European Union does is a cooperation is a project of cooperation now they've become much more integrated in many areas where this economics you know whether is even some views about you know how they're going to they want ought to be market economies now so you cannot make ideas so we are integrating in the economy and we're trying to work out security some integration in security but we have no pretense of coming up with a common foreign policy and we have our own defence policies so because of that I think whilst we all know we should stick together so that we can deal with the larger powers with the great powers it is a difficult exercise yet if you do not have us yen you would have to recreate hacia yes we have a question from Danny qua none other than Danny quad it's quite lengthy but and it's partly linked to Singapore but I think it's worth it's worth me reading it and you thinking about it now if in Singapore we are asked to choose between the US and China what should we look at in how the US has treated China that should make us trust America so the question of trusting the US and he gives some examples of how the the US has shifted the ghost the go posts on China and yeah maybe in the interest of time I wouldn't read all the examples but the main point being that if the if the US has constantly shifted goal posts for China over the last decade and a half for other states not just Singapore can we trust America when I now unless I have the examples I do not know hi Danny I don't know what Danny means by changing the goalposts but I would say there are a couple of enduring principles of the United States that you can look at first democracy second security you know and it is a principle of maintaining this liberal world order that the United States has led over the last 70 years you know and it is an order which is anti-communist that is where the United States and the Western allies are leading the order now are you part of that are you not part of that you know they believe in democracy they believe in human rights and so the goalposts change sometimes if they as with any I guess any great power or even China will react in this way what is the major issue you are confronting at that time China will call it a principal contradiction you know if that is the issue then you adjust some of your principles on democracy and human rights and you work with some of the countries that you otherwise would not you know or under your principles you should not work with so you know security allows you to be a little elastic on who you choose as partners but in other places they will come out very strongly on human rights and democracy and we've always felt analysts and countries that you know if you are strategically important to the United States because you're a country that has oil or you are located somewhere where there's great competition between China and the United States you know you will be given some leeway but if you are a country that is stuck in a corner small known resources then they'll be really rough on you you know when it comes to human rights democracy and so on the u.s. change for post yes you know so but I think they have these principles as constants yeah anyway apologies to you Danny if I butchered your question but you have taken me ten minutes if I read your entire question now let's move on to to the next one and this one is a bit technical is from Jessica you now with the China Central and Eastern Europe investment cooperation fund and be are writable and roll initiative having the potential to box the u.s. out of future international deals how do you think this might impact the confidence level in the US the US dollar and the future of global trade and investment opportunities now this China you investment fund how big is it okay and can you box a u.s. out of future deals first you know us can always join you know it decided not of joint you know in politics everything is possible you know and another stage the US may say why not you know although I think it will not but I don't think they to a box the u.s. out of future deals because I don't think it would be so all-encompassing that there's no room for another player yeah and okay so we move on to the the next question and this is from Salman Bihari and someone asks could it be that the US and in some cases the rest of the world seriously underestimated the rapid rise of China how the China's WTO accession helped China's rise to what it is today I think yes probably the United States seriously and estimated and maybe all of us underestimated China's rise Napoleon did not I think Napoleon said Don what does it don't wake the sleeping don't wake up the sleeping dragon yeah dragon I think was it you know and I think you right I think his numbers it's the size and the weight of China and also the engine there are very smart people that in is the ingenuity the creativity you know so I I think they just you know that Chinese have done very well by WTO because all of us have done well frankly when the moment countries as you know Joseph even in Asia Southeast Asia the moment you open up your economy and move into the international realm you know you join the international system open economies the economy will take off and that was what persuaded a lot of countries in the region to become you know to open up export oriented not import substitution jointly you know world and we've been for a long time you were trying to persuade Miami to do the same if you open up you know things will happen and in China they opened up they joined WTO did all the right things and China is a huge market it's not just what China is doing outside China is a market so I think it's very attractive on all the investors so we should not have been surprised yeah okay I think we have time for one final question we've already gone 10 minutes overly so so I'll give the final question posed I know as I know Russia there some there are some arguments in China that the technological decoupling or change China's economies the Chinese economies focus to innovations and the development and emphasize Chinese techno nationalism and so his question is do you see these prospects do you see this happening you know China is trying self-sufficiency now because I think they are forced to do so and they will do it very rapidly is that technol nationalism you know every country is getting more nationalistic and I think you know United States is also showing some techno nationalism about their technology so you know if China succeeds and really achieving everything they want they would be not very proud of it they'll be very nationalistic about it and how will they deal will they be generous how will they share technology I you know that would be interesting and would and I think there needs to be some discussion about how you regularly a I globally you know how we use technology and with all the countries China u.s. every of the country come in to talk about common standards because it's very I am really I haven't figured out because I'm not techie how you know you are seriously going to run a world on split standards in a very real at some stage you know we have to discuss together and it being techno - illness means you world on to yourself and you don't want to talk with others and discuss standards and norms you know you know how are you going if you're going to export it it is going to be exportable then there has some discussion yes well I think I have to bring the the Q&A session to a close because we are really running short of time you know I always look forward to listening to professions lectures because you learn so much within that short period of time and again not disappointed so thank you very much prof really it was a tour de force not only on sino-us relations but really on the the broader canvas on which this portrait of this bilateral relationship is is being painted yeah and you saw I think the subtext to your lecture also makes a point that just as China and the US are shaping the world they are also being shaped by the world by larger developments as is their bilateral relationship I think this segues nicely into the question of how we in Singapore can should must position ourselves in relation to these dynamics but that's not for tonight that is for your next lecture which I encourage everyone to take note of the date I believe it happens after the election so no excuse so until the next lecture I think it now just leaves me to thank you on behalf of our virtual audience pravachan for a very fantastic illuminating lecture thank you very much and applause for you and we will now pass the floor pass the mic back to the MC Thank You profile can you prove triumph at a very interesting Q&A session I've come to the end of today's lecture relied to hear your view on the event please click on a link on our Facebook command to submit your feedback prof. chance sir let's show the take place on 15 July details will be on our website and Facebook page we hope to see you then thank you all for attending this evenings lecture good night [Music]

Channel: Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Singapore

Views: 13,175

Rating: 4.5466666 out of 5

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Id: VTTcaBHc_IA

Length: 95min 56sec (5756 seconds)

Published: Thu Jul 02 2020