Chairman Waxman Questions BP CEO Tony Hayward

thank you very much mr. chairman mr. Hayward when you became CEO three years ago you said that safety was going to be your top priority you would focus on it like a laser your website said safe and reliable operations are integral to BP success I want to ask you whether you think BP has met that commitment that you made when you became CEO since I became CEO we have made a lot of progress we have made it very clear to everyone in the company let's say for life have you met that commitment that you made and we made major changes we made major changes to well made major changes but now we see its disaster in the Gulf does that indicate that you didn't keep that commitment and one of the reasons that I am so distraught could you answer yes or no is that I don't want to know whether you're destroyed I want to know whether you think you've kept your commitment we have focused like a laser on safe and reliable operations that is a fact okay let me ask you be done let me follow up on that we had a hearing earlier this week with CEOs from the other oil companies they were unanimous in their view that you made risky decisions that their companies would not have made and in particular they criticized your decision to install a long single string of casing from the top of the well to the bottom on April 19th the day before the blowout they said this well-designed choice provided an unrestricted pathway for gas to travel up the well in the annular space that surrounded the casing and of course it blew out the it blew out the seal how do you respond to their criticism did BP make a judge a fundamental misjudgment and selecting the single string of casing I wasn't involved in any of that decision well but I want to know your view of it now did you know about it now that you know what your company did pursuant to your laser request that they be attuned to safety do you think that that was a mistake the original well design was to run a long string it was approved by the MMS but was then a discussion in the course of the drilling of the well whether a long string or a seven-inch liner would be most appropriate that is what I understand based on having looked at the documents and listened to our investigation team the decision to run a long string at least in part was to do with the long term integrity of the well well let me be fair to you because I'm asking you to look with hindsight as to what happened and the decision that was made but your own engineers warned in advance that this was a risky approach and I'd like to put on the screen what's called a plan review that your engineers prepared in mid-april warning against the long string of casing as you can see your engineers said that if you used a long string of casing quote it is unlikely to be a successful cement job you would be unable to fulfill MMS regulations and there would be an open annulus to the wellhead and I have that on the screen now those are serious risks a failed cement job a violation of MMS safety regulations and open pathway for gas to travel to the top of the well the same document says that if you use the liner and tie back approach which is what ExxonMobil and other companies said you should have used you would have avoided or lessen these risks and here's what the plan review said if you used a liner there would be less issue with landing it's shallow it would be a second barrier to gas in the annulus and a higher chance for a successful cement job now you've said that BP was supposed to be focused like a laser on safety yet BP apparently overruled the warnings of its own engineers and chose the more dangerous option how can you explain that decision by BP why were the safety recommendations of your own engineers ignored I wasn't involved in any of the decision-making it's clear that there was some discussion amongst the engineering team and an engineering judgment was taken it's clear to me that you want to answer our questions because isn't it true that you've served your life in the in BP you've only recently become the CEO but haven't you been in this business most of your professional life I've been in this business 28 years 28 years so you should have some knowledge about these issues and I sent you a letter in advance asking you're going to be asked these questions and to be prepared to answer it how can you explain this decision where you ignore that you yourself but people that work for you who should have known that was your directive to be a laser on safety how could they have ignored these warnings from people right within your company it was clearly a discussion between the engineering team as to what was the most appropriate course of action to take an engineering judgment was taken that involved long term Integris well it was more than an engineering judgment because on April 15th there's a document which is 5 days before the blowout that said that using the safer liner will add an additional 7 to 10 million dollars to the completion cost the same document calls it the single string of casing the best economic case for BP and the conclusion I draw from these documents is that BP used a more dangerous well designed to save 7 million dollars what do you think about that what's your response I believe that document also highlights that the longer voice I believe that document also highlights that the long term integrity of the well will be best served by a long string the long string is not an unusual well design in the Gulf of Mexico as I understand it again the long string is not an unusual design in the Gulf of Mexico well I am Jennifer hall a Birdman's witness who was interviewed by our staff that only 2 to 10 percent of those wells might use this particular string a fellow from Exxon Mobil and all other CEOs said they wouldn't proceed this way it appears to me that BB BP knowingly risk well failure to save a few million dollars and you were drilling 18,000 feet below the sea if you made mistakes the consequences of those would be catastrophic and in fact they've turned out to be catastrophic I don't you feel any sense of responsibility for these decisions I feel a great sense of responsibility for the accident we need to allow that for the decisions have made the accident more likely we need to determine what were the critical decisions and you can get my letter and did you review it I've read you ELISA chairman and I realize in the letter we asked you to be prepared to discuss these issues as I've said I've seen the documents following your letter and I can't pass judgment on those decisions even though you've worked 28 years in the oil industry you're the BP CEO and you said lays it like a laser you're going to safety is the biggest issue and you have people under you making these kinds of decisions and now you're reviewing them do you disagree with the conclusion that this was riskier to use this particular well lining I'm not prepared to draw conclusions about this accident until such time as the investigation is concluded well this is an investigation that's what this committee is doing is it investigatory committee and we expect you to cooperate with us are you failing to cooperate with other investigators as well because they're going to have a hard time reaching conclusions if you stonewalled them which is what we seem to be getting today unless stonewalling I simply was not involved in the decision-making process I've looked at the documents and until the investigations are complete both yours and others no no but that's somebody else's conclusion what's your conclusion I haven't drawn a conclusion mr. chairman I see my time is expired and I I'm just amazed that this testimony mr. Hayward you're not taking responsive you're you're kicking the can down the road and acting as if you have nothing to do with this company and nothing to do with the decisions I find that it I find that a response

Channel: Energy and Commerce Committee

Views: 51,167

Rating: 4.7352943 out of 5

Keywords: oil, spill, bp, exxon, mobil, chevron, deepwater, horizon, conocophillips, shell, markey, waxman, energy, commerce, and, committee, stupak

Id: Yj3ULzWpqt0

Length: 9min 4sec (544 seconds)

Published: Thu Jun 17 2010