British Armour Doctrine & Tactics World War 2 with David Willey of the Tank Museum at Bovington

hello everyone we are today here at the Tank Museum at Boeing and he is there with really the tanker rater and we will talk a bit about interwar and well the two British tank doctrine and tactics so basically I read a bit up on it and what I realized the British had this concept of the infantry tank and Cruiser tank and organization and what was the idea behind this so the British are learning their lessons from World War one we had a plan in World War one called plan 1919 and it was going to be a massive tank attack but using newer types of Tanks that were just coming into production in 1918 and they weren't ready in time and of course the war ends in November of 1918 but as part of that theory they realized instead of using the traditional cavalry to go through a prepared position like a frontline and exploit the gap that something like the slower heavier tanks tanks like the mark-5 might have made in a frontline you then have faster vehicles and we were just coming in with a whippet tank and then we were going to have a tank called the medium a and the medium be they would end up going through the gap made exploiting going faster than the slower mark-5 tanks now that theory that they had for 1919 they experimented with something called the mechanized force in the 1920s in the late 1920s and for the first time in Britain and pretty much the world what we did was we got a medium tank so that was a tank that was much faster than the traditional three miles an hour tanks of World War one that were there to lead the infantry on the attack so they got a medium tank they got scout vehicles little track vehicles to go ahead to scout the ground they had for the first time artillery that was being towed by tracked vehicles radio communications between these vehicles and infantry on trucks as well so we have what we now call a mechanized force and they experimented in wargames up on Salisbury Plain a British training area and the ideas that came out of that were that let's not only think of the tank as something to punch through a front line but it can be something that we can exploit go for communication points actually do what we used to know the cavalry used to do and called mayhem behind the front line and bring things with us that traditionally came on horseback or carried by soldiers the engineers the artillery let's make it all mobile and that theory they're discovering all they're testing in the 20s and 30s Britain however we come to the conclusion that actually having tanks to exploit the gap is great we then call those cruiser tanks but for an infantry tank we still think we need the idea of a heavily thickly armored tank can be slower to do that initial breakthrough so a lot of the soldiers are still thinking like world war 1 big trench systems if we still need to break through in the first place we're going to have trouble so we need a tank and they then call these infantry tanks because they're going to help the infantry on the attack to go forward across the barbed wire we sometimes called it in Britain the held area tank so we think of it like a First World War battlefield where the artillery fire is going if we need to crush down that barbed wire protected tank doesn't have to be fast it needs to be supporting the infantry then we'll go forward that way we start with the Matilda one it was a stopgap measure Matilda to a much better tank that was a theory behind it let's go slow with the infantry and once that gaps been made that's when we let the cruiser tanks off and again we had a series of Cruiser tanks being developed much faster lighter armor because their role was to exploit the gap cause mayhem maybe you might bump into an enemy tank that wasn't really what they were designed for it's making the most of the gap that the infantry tanks have already made so basically you have a breakthrough force and then you have an exploitation force and the infantry tanks would be an armored division of what to be attached to an infantry division so we change this as we go through and one of the big issues that hits all the armies in world war ii is a difference between theory and practice so we start off by liking the idea of support or infantry tank brigades put the tanks and allocate them to infantry units whereas we're going to actually look at the main armored division as the exploitation of force now as the war progresses we try different formations and different ways to get the best from this the British attitude to the infantry tank don't forget a number of our tanks like a Churchill tank is really an infantry tank we still go ahead with the idea of the infantry tank in its development actually on the battlefield how these vehicles are being used are very different and there is a tendency we all know today where we judge certain vehicles because as if we're playing Top Trumps here's this vehicle against that vehicle actually the design of this vehicle and that vehicle may have been very very different but we now sort of look at them just because they've got tracks and a gun on we compare them to with each other when their roles were very very different the American Sherman in essence is designed as a cruiser tank for exploiting a gap they never thought that the Sherman was going to be designed for taking on German tanks and it was it wasn't you know that that's why the Americans designed tank destroyers in Britain we thought our infantry tanks would just be doing that initial assault rather than then being the tanks it would be the anti-tank Gunners if German tanks did appear and this classic position were in now of after world war ii we see it as tank battles at the beginning of world war ii the chances of tanks pumping to each other both the armies were very sort of that they didn't think this was going to be a major concern during the course of the war so that development that goes on so we still use our infantry tanks in Britain we still have them supporting even as far as 1944-45 Churchill tanks are tended to be the tanks to support the infantry the cruiser tanks such as American Sherman's or British Cromwell tanks are there for exploitation and they do at certain times use those in specifically those roles but so often they end up having to do both roles which is why by the end of the war we start coming together certainly in Britain of thinking of this phrase the universal tank and that's why we lead on to actually let's put those combinations of items together because the chance of you having the right type of tank in the right place at the right time is pretty slim so let's make a tank that can do most of these roles together and that's why in Britain we come up with the Centurion and we see that as a combination of the cruiser almost like an infantry when you actually look as it's firepower its armor protection greater than those early war infantry tanks and yet it's got a meteor engine in it to give it some speed that can cross ground and if it does meet enemy armor it's got firepower that can take on enemy tanks as well so that's very interesting this concept of both so basically determined similar with the machine guns meant for general purpose tank was the British develop those both and probably the reason for that and it's just a speculation that you have initially more resources but you had cut back and Germany just needed everything so when to pull out all the money and went for a general purpose tank it's very interesting to see and on the battlefield in tactics wise so basically was there change during World War two in terms of tactics that you actually made certain doctrines and adaptions to use the infantry tank differently or was this more on the fly and there it is it does become doctrine and that changes it is again this idea of contact with the enemy changes every think so the theory is one thing and the adaptation of your equipment when you're in the circumstances so the cruiser tanks for example they were often being manned by cavalry regiments early in the war in North Africa there was a terrible tendency to use those cruiser tanks almost like a horse let's charge the enemy and in North Africa in a number of the early battles we have terrible losses that were avoidable because there was this great desire let's use our speed listen Vance on the enemy as quickly as possible but the Germans very sensibly had laid out their anti-tank guns and the British tanks were getting destroyed that way so that led to there was arguments about the equipment but also the tactical doctrine for using that equipment so we learn that lesson and then in the later desert battles we are stopping ourselves being tempted to we may have caused a German frontline some damage but don't go sweeping down the hill and lose that advantage of a prepared position of well sited anti-tank guns just because you almost feel like now's the time for the cavalry charge let's clear the battlefield off because we've done damage already maybe with artillery air power that feeling that they then had to learn no look at your equipment look at its tactical capabilities learn from the mistakes you've made already and so again in other areas we get the American Sherman tank we know it's 75 millimeter gun very effective high explosive reasonable capacity armor-piercing but if we're facing later war German tanks let's not find ourselves getting embarrassed by losing these tanks so we put the 17 pounder gun on a Sherman and they tended to act in what you might now call an overwatch position so tactically for every troop of three or four Sherman tanks you'd have a Sherman Firefly that would sit there as an overwatch position while your standard Sherman's advanced then it would move forward on another bound so again you adapt your doctrine in your tactics as the equipment comes along the danger of course is you write your doctrine try and adapt the tanks to that doctrine and the reality of combat may just not make that work there's some areas you know that that we still learn we are teaching establishment here at the Tank Museum one of the big things that they learnt in world war ii if you are going to be using a combined armor and infantry on the attack if you train with that infantry unit that you're going to fight with you do much better in combat and that lesson was really hard we tend to forget it and probably that training bond is better than the equipment issue if these guys know what they're doing and they're experienced and they're trained so all the time there is a tendency we always talk here at the tank museum we talk about the caliber of the gun the thickness of the armor all just rubbish if the men inside don't know how to use it they're not trained well enough they don't cooperate with they're all arms around them that is what's going to give them victory not just the quality of the material we're sitting in exactly a very good point because I remember reading German Panzer commanders complaining about infantry support that the usual thought that the pants I would do everything and they didn't knew about the drawbacks and everything and also much time when he proposed the stronger shirts that it should be an organic unit of an infantry division and not an external one and the very interesting point you said that the later on didn't start to charge for of if the cruiser tank in the desert would this to a certain degree explain because I I know Montgomery was criticized very much of the Second Battle of our mind then he finished off Romans troops the rest of the Africa Corps at this point and this was basically probably based on that that before the charged always in in this crime is it okay the cautions we broke through the line and let's be careful and not ride into another ambush is this ironic I think so I think there's the number of issues there with Alamein I think they can be criticisms of Montgomery that he did not exploit as best he can there's a number of other things that if you're there in the desert number one you've had the fatigue of a major battle yeah that affects everybody number two the weather changes that affects the landscape as well there's a number of things that come into play that it's easy for us to turn around to say if only they've done this if only we pushed a little further a bit quicker we may well have had a greater victory those those issues are Fireside generals as we all are now that we can criticize they do come into play and we do have to be careful without seeing a bigger picture all the Diaries all the accounts of people on the day because again this sense of we don't want to over expose ourselves we are traditionally we've been a very nervous force in the 8th army because so often we thought we've had the victory and suddenly the bike backs come and we've suddenly found ourselves retreating again so one of the issues of Montgomery does to the 8th army where he's put in charge is he gives solidity he gives a sense of leadership of determination we're not going for any further back but part of that is this calm clear way he is going to be directing the battle so the sense of yes we might miss a fleeting opportunity but all the commanders know this is the key elements are we're not going to lose men for no good reason if we are going to be attacking we're going to be attacking with a formed plan we know what we're going to be doing and there's a clarity and a confidence in all the issues so some of these things may come into play which stops our exploitation if I'm honest we had been earlier being able to exploit look at O'Connor's victory earlier in 1940 where he completely trances a massive Italian army and exploits opportunities one after the other to great effect so it's not that the British army can't do this but you can see at different times there's perhaps an idea and what we certainly didn't want to do you know there's a whole host of other issues we tend to forget about logistical you know we lose tanks all over the place the Americans luckily we managed to get a whole load of Sherman tanks available just before the Alamein battle you know they stripped the first American armored division that's training out in the desert to get them onto a boat to get across so there's other factors coming into play all the time that again sometimes you know I'd never say it's going to be one decision that makes that person do something at a certain time but certainly with Alamein that idea about we don't want to be too over no nervous we don't really extend ourselves and if we're going to do this and Montgomery's famous for it he wants a nice tidy battlefield let's end up making sure we do it stage by stage by stage great you know and when he does have a risk like it's something like Market Garden he burns his fingers so you can almost see how he feels his success is coming by a wealth fought and well staged battle rather than taking Gamble's and risks ROM all he's prepared to take those Gamble's and risks because he owes all them no other chance basically because he's playing against the time and so he took it wanted to Our Lady astray us as well yeah so that's another thing he's going to be doing so I thank you very much no problem to the Tank Museum and especially David Willy here be sure to subscribe to the YouTube channel and check out the videos on specific tanks or on specific events thank you for watching and see you next time

Channel: Military History Visualized

Views: 126,380

Rating: 4.9664936 out of 5

Keywords: Military History, History, Education, Visualized, Animation, David Willey, Curator Tank Museum, Tank Museum at Bovington, British Armour Doctrine, British Tank Doctrine, British Armour Tactics, British Tank Tactics, Cruiser Tank, Infantry Tank, El Alamein, Montgomery, Rommel, Breakthrough, Interwar, World War 2, WW2, Churchill, Matilda, the tank museum, Military Tactics, military history channel, british tank doctrine ww2, el alamein battle, british tank tactics ww2

Id: xjPQGIwhLpc

Length: 16min 46sec (1006 seconds)

Published: Fri Dec 08 2017

Reddit Comments

[u/Blackjack010]

SO THATS THE FACE TO THE AMAZING NARRATION VOICE!!