Ames Moot Court Competition 2016

JOSEPH POSIMATO: Good afternoon, and thank you for being here. My name is Joseph Posimato and on behalf of the Board of Supervisors and Dean Minow, I want to welcome you to the final round of the Ames moot court competition. The case before the court tonight is United States v. Papaya cellular and was written by [INAUDIBLE] and Elizabeth [INAUDIBLE], both graduates of this law school. The case presents two questions. First, where the Court of Appeals erred, concluding that would cause an undue burden in Papaya Cellular within the meaning of the Stored Communications Act to require it to write software to override encryption technology and just aggregate a particular subscriber's historical cell site information to assist in an ongoing terrorism investigation. And second, where the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the disclosure of the historical cell site information would violate the Fourth amendment. Petitioner, the United States is, represented by the Daniel J Meltzer memorial team, Luke Beasley, Benjamin Burkett, William Ferraro, Amanda Mudell, Trenton Van Oss, and Connor Winn, comprise this team. Amanda Mundell and Connor Winn will present petitioner's argument. Respondent, Papayas Cellular, is represented by the Lucy Stone memorial team. Michelle Adler, Victoria Hartmunn, Helen Rave, Caroline Trusty, Stephanie Tubs, and Mengjie Zou make up this team. Caroline Trusty and Mengjie Zou will present respondent's argument. This afternoon we are fortunate to be joined by three extraordinary jurists, the Honorable John Paul Stevens, associate justice of United States Supreme Court, the Honorable David J Barron, judge on the 1st circuit court of appeals, and the Honorable Allison J Nathan, judge in the district court for the Southern District of New York, will preside over today's case. A few house rules before we get started. No photography of any kind is allowed at any point before, during, or after the argument. We ask that you please remain seated while the oralist is speaking, and turn off all cell phones at this time. Please hold your applause until all oralist have finished speaking, and remember that the petitioner will make rebuttal arguments after the respondent has spoken. Again, on behalf of Dean Minow and the Board of student advisors, welcome. Good luck to both teams, and please enjoy the argument. SPEAKER: All rise. the Honorable, the Chief Justice, and the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Welcome. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: You may be seated. SPEAKER: Oyez, oyez, oyez. All persons having business before the Honorable, the Supreme Court of the United States, are admonished to draw near and give their attention for the court is now sitting. God save the United States and this Honorable court. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: OK, today we're going to hear number 16611, United States of America versus Papaya Cellular. We'll hear first from the petitioner. AMANDA MUNDELL: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. My name is Amanda Mundell and I along with my colleague, Mr. Connor Winn, represent the United States of America. Today I will be addressing the first issue before the court, the meaning of the phrase undue burden. And my colleague, Mr. Winn, will be addressing the fourth amendment issue. To protect the government's legitimate law enforcement needs, the Stored Communications Act requires a cellular provider to disclose customer information upon a court order, unless doing so would pose an undue burden. We are here today because a 650 person company refuses to disclose that information, even though it might help prevent a fourth terrorist attack on Ames. For three reasons this court should hold that Papaya Cellular cannot claim compliance would pose an undue burden here. First, the burdens contemplated by the SCA are resources, and Papaya admits it faces few. Second, Papaya's other claims burdens relating to its brand or the future consequences of compliance are not cognizable burdens under the SCA. And finally, balancing Papaya's burdens against the government's interests weighs in favor of the government. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: How are we supposed to think about what an undue burden is? So the statute tells us that if it's voluminous records that are being requested that's too burdensome, right? AMANDA MUNDELL: That's exactly right, your honor. We believe that's-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: OK, so then here you're doing something relatively unusual. You're making them actually build out code to solve it. Why wouldn't we just say, if getting lots of records that are already there and amassing them can be too burdensome, certainly requiring three engineers to sit in a room for a week and figure out code would seem-- I don't know how to measure that. Why is that not just as burdensome? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, Papaya has actually admitted that spending three of its engineers in less than a week of work here would not be unduly burdensome under the SCA. It challenges the burdens in different forms, but it's also worth noting that Congress actually envisioned that a company may be required to do some type of decryption to comply with government investigation. JUSTICE NATHAN: I'm sorry some type of? AMANDA MUNDELL: Decryption, your honor. To comply with government investigations with amendments. JUSTICE NATHAN: Where do you see that? AMANDA MUNDELL: That's in the CALEA, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which amended the SCA in 1994. Congress wrote that, I believe it was section 1002(b)(3). In that instance, your honor, we can think about the burdens related to the resources spent on compliance and assess-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: I don't recall that in your brief. JUSTICE NATHAN: Nor I. AMANDA MUNDELL: No, your honor. JUSTICE NATHAN: I thought you said that. I thought-- I thought I'd-- AMANDA MUNDELL: No, your honor. This jurisdiction has a very strict word limit, and that's just another reason why, in this instance-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But, I guess, I don't quite follow the significance of that. So we have a statute here which is talking about an undue burden in these terms. And the only reference that gives us purchase as to what that means is the sort of lead into that, which talks about the volume of the records being requested. How do you get from that to, oh, well, obviously they meant you could also force people to actually write code to decrypt? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well certainly, your honor, at the time that Congress crafted that act it didn't include that as an example of something that's burdensome. But what we can do is we can look at what unusually voluminous does to the meaning of the phrase, undue burden, by limiting it to the resources spent on compliance. And then in Congress's own way balancing that against the government's interests here when we assess how long it would take to comply, what resource it would take to comply, and weigh that. JUSTICE NATHAN: You say resources as to compliance focused only on the specific dollar costs of the labor to write the code, and you say ignore Papaya's arguments as to other expenditures, including lost value to the brand and the like. I mean, those are resources. It's all-- one could put dollar signs on them, no? But you have an argument which I don't quite track as to why resources as we think about burden should be so limited to what you've pointed out, labor and the like. AMANDA MUNDELL: Well your honor for that we can turn to the text of the SCA itself in a couple of provisions. For one, Congress wrote compliance with such order would cause an undue burden. And when we look at that phrase we know it's that the resources spent on complying with the order. Now a company doesn't really spend its brand on compliance the same way it would spend its personnel or its time. But knowing that unusually voluminous hints at the meaning of undue burden, to limit it at resource specific costs, we can actually look to a neighboring provision of the SCA where Congress used those exact pairing of phrases, unusually voluminous, and undue burden, in an unquestionably resource specific section. That's section 2706, the cost reimbursement section. There again Congress wrote that an exception for reimbursable costs would be in cases where the records requested are unusually voluminous or where compliance would pose an undue burden. JUSTICE NATHAN: On your reading of the cost reimbursement section there can be no undue burden. The costs are the same, so if we reimburse the costs it can never be unduly burdensome. Isn't that right? AMANDA MUNDELL: Respectfully, your honor, we would disagree with that, and that's for a couple of reasons. For one, the cost reimbursement section only looks to reasonable reimbursement. So there certainly is a circumstance where a company may spend a lot of time or money, but not get reimbursed fully for the amount that they spent, and the gap might actually pose an undue burden. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Could you explain why a voluminous request is undue? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well, your honor, there are certainly some circumstances where courts have found that production of 39,000 e-mail accounts would be unduly burdensome. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But, why? I mean, so you would pay them the reasonable cost of doing that. Obviously the drafters of the statute thought, even though you could give them reasonable compensation for the labor and the effort of doing it, it was still too much of a burden on the company to make them do them. Well, why? AMANDA MUNDELL: That actually leads me to the second point I wanted to point out with Justice Nathan's question, which is, it's not just that they might get reimbursed. It's still the balancing of the interests at stake. And here in that circumstance courts have looked to the government's interests to decide whether that was weightier than forcing a company to produce so many voluminous records. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But if I took that logic, why wouldn't it make sense to read the statute this way, it refers to records or information that the company had? And that it talks about voluminous production of records. So the contemplation, at least as I read it, was that the record was there and it was simply a matter of amassing it. AMANDA MUNDELL: That's certainly possible. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Why wouldn't we say that this is different in kind in that you're now effectively making them create the information, which is not otherwise available to them at all, even to the company. And in that circumstance why don't we say a difference in kind like that is an undue burden? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well respectfully, your honor, the information does exist in Papaya's servers. All it has to do is unlock the key-- unlock the door and open it to those information. In fact, Papaya admits that that is something that would be easy to do in these circumstances, it just hasn't done it yet. JUSTICE NATHAN: But you do want them to do more than disclose the information you have. You want them to do something more than that, right? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well, your honor, in this case it would require Papaya to build the type of software program to unlock it. That's right. JUSTICE NATHAN: And that's more than disclosure? AMANDA MUNDELL: That's right, your honor. That's a necessary step. JUSTICE NATHAN: So it seems to me that perhaps we're focusing on the wrong part of the statutory text. You get to the unreasonable burden question only upon it being authorized by the court. Looking at the language of the statute, what the statute specifically authorizes is the disclosure of records. And so maybe we don't even get to undue burden because you're seeking more than the disclosure of records. AMANDA MUNDELL: Well it certainly would be odd, Justice Nathan, to allow a company to adopt a business strategy that prevents it from disclosing information simply because it has decided it wants to keep that information hidden. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: What? Why would it be odd? Unless-- maybe we think what's odd is to read a statute that didn't contemplate ordering people to decrypt things to decrypt them. AMANDA MUNDELL: Well that's because, Chief Justice Barron, we can look to Congress's intent when section 2703 was enacted in 1986. And looking at the legislative history, it's clear that Congress intended to allow the government to seek this type of information. And that it didn't want companies to prevent it from accessing it, unless it would be unduly burdensome. In fact, really, the only burden that Congress discussed in that legislative history was producing overly broad-- was overly broad request, produce so many records it would overwhelm and become burdensome. So here, because these types of resources that Papaya would be devoting to decrypting those information are minimal, we believe that this order would not be unduly burdensome. And for that we can really turn to the balancing of the interests at stake. Because both sides have admitted that inherent in the meaning of undue burden is a balance between Papaya's burdens one side of the ledger and the government's interests on the other. Now Papaya has added several other burdens to this analysis that we don't believe fits with the SCA. And I'd like to address those in turn. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Before you get to that, I'm not sure I follow why we would think that there is a balancing based in the statute. And that it goes to the point that they've carved out voluminous requests as being kind of per se burdensome. So I don't really follow what-- the statute could have easily been written as a general test of if there's a really strong interest, then maybe even very burdensome things are permitted. But they seem instead to have written the statute that very burdensome things are just too burdensome. No matter the interest, which is the case for a voluminous records request. So if we thought that requiring you to decrypt is of that type, why would it matter how strong the interest was? After all, the fallback is you just get a warrant, right? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well, your honor, I will address those several points perhaps in turn. But first, to get to the difference between the unusually voluminous exception and the undue burden one, Congress chose a different word for the undue burden exception, and that's the word undue. That's different, say, from the word unusual, which is just something that's out of the ordinary, something that wouldn't necessarily entail balancing. But the word undue has the meaning of inappropriate, unacceptable, unwarranted, and that requires a comparison to some baseline. And Congress answers the question of what baseline that should be in the legislative history of the SCA when Congress indicated that we should be looking at the appropriateness of the government's request. That deals with the government interests, whether the information is necessary to the government's investigation, whether it's critical or important, and whether the government has shown enough. And that's not true just of the legislative history, that also comes again from the texts of the SCA, which requires the government to make some showing initially before it can even get the order. But turning then to what the balance would look like then in undue burden, we believe that that does entail a balancing of the government's interests. Because the SCA also allowed the government to seek this information under an order, not under a warrant. And I know that Mr. Winn may be addressing the warrant issue later in his argument. Let's go back for a moment to Papaya's claimed burdens. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: If that's right, you want the judge to effectively do an all-scale, all things considered, reasonableness analysis of the kind that we would normally do under the warrant. AMANDA MUNDELL: Well, your honor, we think it's a little bit more limited than that. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: How so? AMANDA MUNDELL: It would be looking at the government's interests in the information requested here. And that's a little bit more narrow than just say the government's interest generally in prosecuting crime or investigating terrorism. It's tied to the information. That seems clear from the fact that the government does have to make some type of showing initially that the information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing investigation. So let's look at that balance then. Putting Papaya's claimed burdens on the ledger, it's three engineers, less than a week of work. Even its brand, or its future hypothetical consequences, of compliance. The government's interest here is weighty. It's based-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But not so weighty that you could get a warrant? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well, your honor, we don't think that we necessarily-- or that at least the government had probable cause. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Well don't we have to decide the case on the assumption that you couldn't get a warrant. Because there's no reason for use-- to use this statute if you have probable cause, is there? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well no, your honor. Actually the SCA authorizes the government to seek this information under a warrant, in the same provision that authorizes the government to seek it under-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But the provision you're relying? AMANDA MUNDELL: I think the court's asking about section 2703(d) specifically? CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Correct. AMANDA MUNDELL: That's right, your honor. That section pertains only to the order, the undue burden analysis there. That, of course, would not come into play-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But you're trying to use, I thought, the authority to get in under the reasonable suspicion test, as opposed to probable cause test. Is that wrong? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well that is the showing that is required under section 27-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And that's the only showing you're representing to us that you're prepared to admit. AMANDA MUNDELL: That's right, your honor. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Right. So that's what I'm saying. That you could-- in weighing the weightiness of the governments interest, don't we have to discount the fact that it's not so weighty an interest. Given you don't have enough to get a warrant? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well your honor, it's true that if the government had probable cause showing, or even knowing certainty, that this information would lead to the fourth attack being stopped upon Ames that that would make the government's interests paramount. But here there are a confluence of factors that render the government's interest strong here, and stronger still than Papaya's burdens. That's because the government's request is not based on mere speculation. It's based on a credible tip from a source who allegedly has involvement in this type of terrorist organization. That adds to the government's burden here-- or, I'm sorry, the government's interest. JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you a question about your brief? Did your brief comply with the Supreme Court rules? AMANDA MUNDELL: We believe it did, your honor. JUSTICE STEVENS: Does the rule provide for a preliminary statement? AMANDA MUNDELL: Your honor, there's no provision against it. And we thought it was appropriate given the length of the brief and the issues here to include something ahead of just the statement of facts. JUSTICE STEVENS: And what do the rules provide with respect to the color of your brief? AMANDA MUNDELL: Your honor, again, the rules provide that we have to have a blue cover for our opening brief, a yellow one for our reply brief, and text-- JUSTICE STEVENS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear that. AMANDA MUNDELL: I'm sorry, your honor. We have to have a blue cover for our opening brief, yellow cover for the reply, and then text-- JUSTICE STEVENS: Shouldn't there have been a gray cover on it? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well, your honor, apparently in this jurisdiction for the Supreme Court it's required to be blue. JUSTICE STEVENS: Oh. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: We'll reconsider it for next year, though. AMANDA MUNDELL: Perhaps we may change it to gray, your honor. I'd like to take a moment and just address briefly another argument that Papaya has raised before I sit down, and that's a First Amendment challenge to this order. And we don't believe that this order violates the first amendment for a couple of reasons. That's because the order seeks a specific result, unlocking those location information. And not specific content or specific code to get there. And, in fact, Papaya admits that there are several ways that this code could be written in order to effectuate the government's request. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But they're not making a first amendment challenge to the statute. I take it this is in service of their general argument, that this is a unusual kind of requested disclosure. And one of the ways that's unusual about it is that compel somebody to actually produce code. And that's just another way in which they're making the argument that it's undue. So viewed in that context what's wrong with what they're saying? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well your honor, it doesn't seem that first amendment would stand as a burden under the SCA because Congress didn't need to include that as a burden when it could just be a simple challenge under the constitutional law to the face of the act or to a particular order. I see that my time has expired, your honor. Thank you, and we request that this court reverse. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Thank you. Please go ahead. CONNOR WINN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the court. The fourth amendment balances privacy and security. Yet the focus of this case, John Doe's location information, that was never private to begin with. And even if it had been, and even if there had been a government search, that search would have been reasonable. Those conclusions follow for three reasons. First, Doe voluntarily conveyed his location information to Papaya cellular, a third party. Second-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Have we ever decided the third party case in which the recipient of the record vigorously opposed the disclosure? CONNOR WINN: Your honor, I don't believe that this court has ever dealt with a case similar to that. And that's because generally there would be a fourth amendment standing challenge that the government would raise. We've waived that challenge here for purposes of our investigation. So we haven't confronted a case just like this. Now there's two additional reasons why this court should reverse the judgment of the Ames circuit. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But doesn't that make it then a little hard for you to rely on the third party disclosure? Because as the case comes to us we've got the recipient of the companies not cooperating with the government, which sort of adds to the notion that the person who disclosed the information thought they were giving it to somebody who wasn't going to disclose it. And in fact, that person isn't disclosing it. I mean, the secret agent cases/ you know, you give it to somebody you think isn't going to disclose it, but they do disclose it. But, you know, it's pretty clear there you've lost your interest. But when you give it to somebody you think isn't going to disclose it, and they don't, now the government is trying to force them to. Why does it make sense to say in that event that there's no fourth amendment problem? CONNOR WINN: Mr. Chief Justice, this court's precedent in the United States versus Miller actually helps to clarify the reason why that is. Because in Miller, this court held that even when a person confides their information to a third party for a limited purpose and with confidence that that information won't be disclosed to the government, that doesn't mean that they retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Was that in a commercial setting? CONNOR WINN: Yes, your honor. That dealt with-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So the most analogous case we have is Smith, which is a personal setting. CONNOR WINN: Yes, your honor. That's correct. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: In that case, wasn't the phone company cooperating with the government? CONNOR WINN: Yes, your honor. In Smith, the company did cooperate. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So we never held that individual person who's conveys personal information outside of a commercial setting has no expectation of privacy when the company they give it to doesn't want to disclose it to the government. CONNOR WINN: Your honor, I don't believe this court has ever confronted a situation just like that. But the federal courts of appeals have. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Why would Miller-- why would it make sense to extend Miller to this case? Why would we want to take a rule designed for accountants and commercial business and make it apply to every citizen in the country? CONNOR WINN: Because the underlying logic of the third party doctrine at play in Miller is equally applicable here. The key is when you give over this sort of information to a third party you've surrendered your expectation of privacy. You recognize that it's no longer a matter just for yourself. That's equally true in Miller when you give it in the commercial context to a bank. JUSTICE NATHAN: You say, counsel, you say give it over but there's a certain impassivity to the information being provided to the third party here, right? I mean, if you receive a call, for example, your location information is being provided. So when you say give over it sounds as though there is an affirmative action taken that I think is lacking here. CONNOR WINN: Justice Nathan, we think that there actually is an affirmative action here. And that action comes into play in a variety of different formats. First, before anyone can ever transmit their location data to Papaya Cellular, they have to turn on their cell phone, insure that it's connected to a cellular network, and then they either have to make or receive a phone call, send or receive a text, or otherwise use their cellular data. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: What's the affirmative action receiving a phone call? CONNOR WINN: The affirmative action in that case is-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Turning on the phone. CONNOR WINN: Turning on the phone and ensuring that you're connected to-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Or forgetting to turn it off? CONNOR WINN: With respect, Justice Barron, once you've turned on your phone it's like the mailbox. You're indicating that you're open to the receipt of information from a third party. And at that point you've signaled that you're willing to surrender at least some expectation of privacy in your personal information-- JUSTICE NATHAN: Can you search my mailbox without a warrant? CONNOR WINN: No, your honor, the government could never search your mailbox. JUSTICE NATHAN: But I put that mailbox out there, so I'm open to the receipt of information. CONNOR WINN: Well consider this court's jurisprudence in ex-parte Jackson. There, this court noted that when you put a letter in the mail, the contents of that letter, those are private. A postal inspector can't look into those and convey it to the government for use in prosecution. But the exterior of that letter, the routing address, the return address, that's always been accessible to the government ever since 1877. So that's the instance in how it would come into play with the mail there. During the transmission from one party to another that address non-content information would be available to government agents. Now, John Doe also disclosed his location information to Papaya knowingly. You see, Papaya tells each and every one of its customers in its advertising and its privacy policy that not only do they have the capacity to locate this sort of location information, they actually need to do it in order to provide service. So Doe knew far more than the defendant in Smith or even the defendant in Miller. He was aware that Papaya would be obtaining this information every time he made use of his cell phone. Because this affirmative requirement which Justice Nathan and I just spoke about, and the knowing requirement suggested by Papaya is met, Smith controls this case and it falls within the third party doctrine. Thus no fourth amendment search occurred. Perhaps that's why Papaya has proposed that this court deviate from it's fourth amendment jurisprudence in two ways. The first, it suggested that this court should overrule the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, emanating from Justin Harland's concurrence in 1967. And second, it suggests that this court shouldn't apply the third party doctrine to digital communications. The government respectfully thinks that neither suggestion are sound. First as to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy text, when we're determining whether or not this court should overrule its precedent generally we look to considerations of stare decisis, the workability of the doctrine, the reliance interest generated by that doctrine, as well as whether that doctrine has become an outlier among our fourth amendment jurisprudence-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Even if you don't jettison the entire test, I think that question is how do we apply the test in this particular context in light of the unusual nature of the amount of information that's being requested by the government? Given that what you're talking about is information that-- I think this is true, you're assuming every person necessarily is giving up all the time. Correct? CONNOR WINN: Mr. Chief Justice, we think that that's an assumption that this court is safe in making, because it's made that assumption before in Smith versus Maryland. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Well-- but in Smith, as I was saying before, the company to whom you gave it up to was willing to itself give it up to the government, correct? CONNOR WINN: Yes, that's correct. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Well when the company isn't willing to give it up to the government why does the government nonetheless have the right to say, well you willingly disclosed it to somebody? It's true, I willingly disclosed it to somebody who told me they wouldn't give it up, and who now is trying not to give it up. CONNOR WINN: Because, Mr. Chief Justice, the key is that Papaya is asserting John Doe's fourth amendment rights. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But you waived any concern about that. You said he's entitled to waive John Doe's fourth amendment right. CONNOR WINN: We've waived prudential standing as to allow them to raise this challenge now, but that doesn't mean that Papaya's fourth amendment rights and John Doe's fourth amendment rights somehow become mixed and-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: No, but what they are raising is the fourth amendment interest that John Doe has. JUSTICE NATHAN: Usually waving an argument works to your disadvantage, but you're trying to use it to your advantage here, which is clever. CONNOR WINN: And we had to waive it, your honor, because if we go and secure John Doe's location information and there's a later motion to suppress we'll have already declassified our investigation in a highly sensitive terrorist case. At that point there's no taking the cat back out of the bag. So it's a choice that we had to make here. But we don't-- JUSTICE NATHAN: We're proceeding with an anonymous name here. You could proceed just as well in that context, anonymously, couldn't you? CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Or you could have sought a warrant. CONNOR WINN: Well actually, Chief Justice Barron, we don't believe that we could have sought a warrant in this case. Because we don't believe that we have probable cause as to John Doe's involvement with redemption. We do have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, but a warrant wasn't an option in this case. Indeed, that's why we're seeking the location data, to further our individualized suspicion and therefore develop probable cause. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So-- but I take it you're not conceding even though you waived the fourth amendment prudential standing point. You're not conceding that the government-- in order for the government to win you think you can win even without the third party doctrine going your way? CONNOR WINN: That's absolutely true, Mr. Chief Justice. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Not withstanding the fact that you don't have probable cause. CONNOR WINN: That's correct. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And how can that be? CONNOR WINN: The reason for that is even if the third party doctrine didn't apply to this case-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So he has a fourth amendment interest that he can still assert. He has an expectation of privacy in this information. You nonetheless can get it without probable cause, because? CONNOR WINN: Because this court's jurisprudence teaches us that a reasonableness analysis would make it appropriate in this case. You see, when the government has a special law enforcement need this court reaches a sort of reasonableness case by case individual balancing approach. And here there's a special law enforcement need, preventing a terrorist attack, the fourth one in the state of-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So how broad does that go? You can go into his house just with reasonable suspicion? CONNOR WINN: No, Mr. Chief Justice Barron-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: What's the difference? It can't be just because it's a terrorism case. CONNOR WINN: No, it can't. And the reason that this location information should be available is because it's not precise, and it doesn't reveal the personal or intimate details of Doe's life, like an invasion of the home would. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: In other words, it's not that helpful to the government. CONNOR WINN: That's not quite right, Chief Justice. It is helpful to the government because it will show us Doe's-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: I said not that helpful to the government. CONNOR WINN: It's not as helpful as, say, GPS tracking would be, but that would certainly constitute an unconstitutional fourth amendment search. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So in the balance of interest, you have something where you don't have that strong of evidence that you need it, because you don't have probable cause. And it's not that good of information because it's not that precise. Yet he's got a privacy interests on the other side. So how am I supposed to do that balance in a way that comes out for you? CONNOR WINN: Well Mr. Chief Justice Barron, even if Doe didn't have-- even if he does have some expectation of privacy, enough to call this a fourth amendment search, the government doesn't believe that it is a full and complete expectation of privacy. Indeed, we think it's a diminished one. And that's because even if the third party doctrine didn't apply Doe has knowingly exposed his location movements to another individual. Now he does that when he goes out and about and walks through the streets, but he's taken an extra step here and conveyed it to a third party, Papaya Cellular. So even if the third party doctrine's considerations aren't taken into account in the front hand, they should be taken in account here with the reasonableness. And when defendants have diminished expectations of privacy this court has approved searches that can be reasonable as long as they're minimally intrusive. Let me give an example of what the government's thinking here. We have a special law enforcement need, and this location data isn't seriously intrusive in any way. That sort of circumstances calls to mind this courts-- JUSTICE NATHAN: Just, I have to pause you there. That it's not seriously intrusive, the notion, just as a matter of common sense, of the government being able to know my within a couple blocks radius location. Historically, that certainly has a feeling of intrusiveness to it. I mean, is there not some expectation even of subjectively reasonable expectation that where I've been and what I've done is not for the government to know? CONNOR WINN: Justice Nathan, this court held in the United States versus Karo and United States versus Knotts, that when you go out and about in public and you're conducting the activities of your daily life you're exposing location information to the public. Now even though we might want to think it's private, and maybe that's good cause to have Congress amend a statute or enact a statute making it that way, in a sense allowing them to supplement fourth amendment protections, for the purposes of the fourth amendment it's not protected, even though it might seem intrusive. JUSTICE NATHAN: Let me ask you a tailoring question then. What length of time would-- why limit the length of time that you sought here? CONNOR WINN: Well we limited the length of time we sought here because the government didn't want to learn everything that Doe's ever done over the course of his entire service with Papaya? We're specifically interested in these six months, because these six months are the period in which the terrorist attack, and conceivably the planning that would lead to those attacks-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But to judge Nathan's point, if I follow what you're saying, if being out and about is something you have no privacy expectation in there's no reason for you to limit it as a constitutional matter, right? You could go back from birth. CONNOR WINN: We don't know how true that is. Because if we're proceeding in a reasonableness analysis, Chief Justice-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: What-- you don't get to the reasonableness unless they have an expectation of privacy, I thought. CONNOR WINN: That's true. I was speaking to the reasonableness analysis, but with a third party doctrine, no, we wouldn't reach that point. So there is no constitutional-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Even aside from the third party doctrine, which is the directly [INAUDIBLE]. I thought you said the government's position is being out and about is something you have no privacy interest in. CONNOR WINN: That's certainly correct, Chief Justice. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So then you're saying location information is something that whenever the government asks for it there's just no fourth amendment analysis to do, no matter how much of it it wants. Is that the position of the government? CONNOR WINN: Well, your honor, we think that depends on whether or not there's a third party involved. This court's decision-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So, no. Being out and about there is a third party involved. Because you're out and about. CONNOR WINN: That's correct, your honor. And so it matters here how-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So on your view anytime you leave the house all information that anybody happened to collect about that? CONNOR WINN: That's true. And we-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Even if you didn't know they were collecting it, because you knew you were out. Is that the government's position? CONNOR WINN: Almost, Chief Justice Barron. We do think there's an important limitation on that. And that is that the government cannot collect this location through direct government surveillance when a person is out and about. This court's decision in the concurrences in the United States versus Jones suggests that such direct government surveillance is a fourth amendment problem. But that's why it's critical that the information in this case is coming from a third party, Papaya Cellular. And even if this court doesn't conclude that the third party doctrine should remain intact or should apply to the facts of this case, those considerations can come in on the reasonableness analysis. JUSTICE NATHAN: Can I ask your record question, counsel? Just on the tailoring issue? Certainly your application limited it to six months. I must be missing it. I've read the district court order, which is what's on appeal here, are a number of times. I don't see the six month limitation in the order-- if I'm looking at the right order it's pages 22 and 23 of the joint appendix. Is there actually a six month limitation to the order that in fact issued here? CONNOR WINN: Justice Nathan, I'd have to go back and look at the order, but I don't believe the order made an explicit limitation. I think the order said that the government's motion is granted, and in the government's original motion, in an appendix, we've requested that that information be for six months. JUSTICE NATHAN: The judge I clerk for told me to pay special attention to the record in the case. And if you look at the record here it orders all of the information that 2703(d) provides. There is no temporal limitation. Seems to me we should at least remand to the district court to get that order amended. CONNOR WINN: I see that my time has run out. May I answer the question? CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Yes, you may. CONNOR WINN: Justice Nathan we don't believe that a remand is necessary here on those grounds. Because the third party doctrine would make even that long and expansive a request for information permissible under the Fourth Amendment. But if this court chose not to do so then a remand may be appropriate. We think that this court should reverse the Ames circuit. Thank you for your time. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Wait, did you reserve time for rebuttal or not? CONNOR WINN: Yes, your honor. Time has been reserved. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: OK. Thank you. Please begin. MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the court. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Can you lift up your microphone so it's right-- you're speaking right into it. MENGJIE ZOU: Sorry. Is this better Mr, Chief Justice? CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Little better. Could you get a little closer to it. There you go. MENGJIE ZOU: How about this? CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Excellent. JUSTICE NATHAN: Great. MENGJIE ZOU: Perfect. Well Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the court. This court should affirm the lower court's finding of undue burden. The government is limited in what it may compel a private party to do in order to aid an ongoing investigation. This limitation is recognized in section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act, which allows courts to quash any order that imposes an undue burden on a private telecommunications provider. The government reads this undue burden analysis narrowly, as encompassing only resource in order specific concerns. However, neither the text of 2703, nor common law case law in analogous context, supports such a narrow interpretation. First, the text of 2703 sets out two categories, which addresses two different concerns. It states that an order may be quashed if the information requested is unusually voluminous, or if compliance with such order would otherwise cause an undue burden on the provider. The first part, the unusually voluminous limitation, addresses more of Congresses concerned in protecting an individual subscribers privacy, which is the only legislative history we have here. The legislative history says nothing about the Congress limitation on how much can be imposed on a telephone provider. And that is addressed through the undue burden limitation. In addition, section-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: I'm not sure I follow that. The voluminous request could be talking about the burden on the provider? MENGJIE ZOU: Yes, Mr.-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And how much stuff you have to gather, and how time consuming that would be. And I had thought that if that's too voluminous then, OK. It's too much, and that's too much of a burden to put on the carrier. Why wouldn't it make sense to say that where otherwise undue burden, we would then be looking for similar types of burdens on the carrier? MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice, the unusually voluminous is directed at the information with no reference to the provider. The provider only comes into the second clause, which is whether or not there is an undue burden. And the otherwise just implies that this is a separate concern from unusually voluminous. As the legislative history states, Congress was worried when passing the Stored Communications Act about a balance between the privacy interests of phone subscribers and the interest in the government being able to obtain information. And therefore, Congress wrote that unusually voluminous language in to make sure that the government can't get too much information about the subscriber, even if that wouldn't oppose an undue burden. For example, you can think of a case in which the government asked for 30 years worth of information. And the cell phone provider says, that's fine. We have that all on one tape. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Why wouldn't that been taken up by the concern you're raising about the privacy interest of the individual? I would have thought would be handled by the reasonable suspicion requirement? You have to have a clear articulable facts of a reasonable suspicion. If you do, why would we arbitrarily cut off the records that you could get, save for a concern about the burden that it imposes on the provider? MENGJIE ZOU: Mr Chief Justice, the reasonable suspicion is a minimum bar. So Congress has decided that without reasonable suspicion no information can be gotten, but Congress also recognized that it did want to balance the interests of the privacy of phone subscribers against how much information the government could get. And that's why they also set levels in terms of content, for example, would require additional beyond reasonable suspicion, a warrant here. And in that spectrum Congress also wanted to make sure that if you're requesting even subscriber information 30 years or for 100 people, then in that case that could still be unusually voluminous and should still be restricted. JUSTICE NATHAN: Counsel may I ask the government this-- just maybe you can see this argument. It seems to me looking at the statute you only get to the undue burden analysis upon an otherwise authorized order. Do you concede that this is a-- that all they're asking is for a disclosure of a record. That that is to say that what the government is requiring Papaya to do is authorized? Or would you argue that, in fact, as a statutory matter, all you're required to do is to disclose an existing record, not engage in other verbs that aren't in the statute? MENGJIE ZOU: Justice Nathan, we believe that historical sale sight data is covered under section 2703, or at least Congress intended it to be covered, and similar orders have been issued under 2703. Not necessarily requiring decryption, but for historical cell site data. JUSTICE NATHAN: OK, that's fair. What I'm asking is whether there's an argument that perhaps you're waiving that you don't need to engage in the act of writing the encryption software, because that's not authorized by the Stored Communication Act. What the Stored Communication Act requires under certain circumstances is the disclosure of an existing record, not the engaging by the provider in other conduct that's not explicitly provided for in the text? MENGJIE ZOU: Yes, Justice Nathan, Papaya would agree that the decryption code is questionable under 2703, but even if Congress did intend a decryption to be authorized under a 2703(d) order, that should definitely be considered as a burden on Papaya. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But the problem is if you say generally decryption is permissible, then you want us to set a rule in which decryption is only permissible if the company really doesn't want to do it. That's surprising that Congress would have written a statute that contemplates companies choosing at their election whether to comply with the order. Where as I understand if the argument is per se, decryption requirements were not in the contemplation of the statute, so this provision doesn't authorize this kind of order. But your argument reads as if what you're really saying is, for companies that really want not to decrypt they don't have to. Everybody else must. MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice, if a company is willing to aid the government and disclose its information, for example, Google has built their brand and hired people to help government investigations. And they're very open about that. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But suppose I'm just a company that I do, you know, encryption. I just don't make a big deal of it. But Papaya, you make a big thing of how Papaya's brand is that it's got super duper encryption. But suppose, you know, it's mild encryption. Is that going to be a different case? MENGJIE ZOU: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. Because Congress- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But see, why would we read the statute to have Congress intending to draw that kind of distinction and having judges make that kind of analysis? MENGJIE ZOU: Chief Justice, Congress would have wanted to have the government be able to obtain information if the third party, a different company was willing to provide it. Perhaps Congress wanted that as part of the balancing. However, Congress also recognized that there is a limitation on what a government may compel a third party to do if they're unwilling to aid the government, or provide this decryption. And in that that's why they put in this undue burden analysis, to make sure that the government is not overreaching and compelling private parties to do things they're not willing to do, without limiting willing parties from aiding. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Just so I understand the scope of your argument. Your argument is that any company that has encryption software in place, such that compliance with that order would require decryption, is protected from this order? MENGJIE ZOU: No, Mr. Chief Justice. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: OK, so what is the argument? Is the argument that only those companies that brand themselves as ones with that encryption are protected? MENGJIE ZOU: No, Mr. Chief Justice. Our position is that the undue burden analysis is a broad analysis that includes all of the factual situations, including the government's interest on one side and the burdens imposed on Papaya on the other. So including the damage to Papaya's brand you would also need to consider the resources, the three engineers, as well as the possibility of future orders, or the possibility of hackers in the situation as well. So all of those factual circumstances are considered. So if a company had none of those other burdens, or the first amendment implications here, that company would not necessarily-- even with a vast amount of branding-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Won't every company that decrypts-- that encrypts this information be in the same position as your company? Or are you saying that your company is differently positioned than other companies that encrypt location MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice, Papaya is different because it is the only company that built its own cell towers. It is also the only company that aggregates all of its location for information and doesn't keep individualized data. However, these are very factual specific findings, and the undue burden analysis is a factually based determination. And so, just because a different company may brand, does not necessarily mean that in those cases there would be an undue burden. JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you a question on another issue? Just as a general matter, is the seriousness of the crime relevant on the issue of undue burden? MENGJIE ZOU: Justice Stevens-- JUSTICE STEVENS: I think that's a yes or no question. MENGJIE ZOU: No, Justice Stevens. The seriousness of the crime is not of consideration in the undue burden analysis, because there is a difference between the government's interest in obtaining this particular information versus the government's general interest. And Ames here has suffered tragic attacks and is rightfully fearful, but the government has conflated the two. The district court could have reasonably found that there was only a tenuous relationship between John Doe's location information and preventing future terrorist attacks in Ames. And similarly, the district court could have found that it wasn't necessary for the government to get this information in order to investigate John Doe, or to further this investigation. There are other traditional surveillance methods, such as calling witnesses, or pulling traffic cams. And if the district court did make those factual findings it was completely reasonable for it to determine that they heavy-- JUSTICE STEVENS: I'm not sure I'm getting your answer. Is it relevant at all on the issue of undue burden? Yes or no? MENGJIE ZOU: Justice Stevens, no it is not relevant in the sense that directly the seriousness of the crime-- JUSTICE STEVENS: So this would be the same case if we were trying to find out if a person was guilty of pick-pocketing? MENGJIE ZOU: Justice Stevens, the more-- it is relevant in the sense that the connection between John Doe and the information requested is relevant. How relevant and how close that connection is is relevant on the government interest side. And so, Judge Stevens, it is relevant in that sense. The important-- the importance of the crime, or the height of the crime, is relevant in an indirect sense on the government side, but not directly. Because the relevance is focused on the relevance of the specific information. JUSTICE STEVENS: Thank you. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So just to follow up, we do look at the government's interest in the information on one side of the ledger in determining whether the burden is undue. MENGJIE ZOU: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. However, the government-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Unless what they're requesting is an unusually voluminous amount of information. In which case the statute tells us we don't care what interest the government has? MENGJIE ZOU: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. However, in that case the court can just modify to resolve the unusually voluminous question if it believes that the government should get some of that information. In addition, section 2706 of the Stored Communications Act also shows that this undue burden analysis should not be as narrowly limited as the government contends. Because section 2706 creates automatic cost shifting and costs reimbursement for all 2703 orders, only excluding certain subscriber information requests, which we don't have here. That means that if undue burden is interpreted to only deal with resource specific concerns that would basically write that limitation out of the statute since all costs are already reimbursed. The government's contention that there's a difference between actual and reasonable costs is also unpersuasive. The text of 2706 actually reads that cost reimbursements are limited to reasonably necessary costs. So the reasonable there describes necessary. And reasonably necessary acts as a check to make sure that the provider is only doing the work that's necessary, and not conducting extra work for extra pay by the government. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: If we put aside the first amendment issue that you raise, and we put aside the branding issue that we raise-- that you raised. And if we put aside the issue about how other people will request similar orders that you also raised. And we just ask, how burdensome is it to have three engineers working to write new code over the course of a week? Is that alone an undue burden? Or are you, as the government suggested, waiving the contention that that alone is an undue burden? MENGJIE ZOU: No, Mr. Chief Justice, we are not waiving that contention. That would be a very fact specific inquiry and it would have been-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Well that's the facts, right? So we've got three engineers for what? A week. MENGJIE ZOU: Right. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Five days. I forget exactly which-- MENGJIE ZOU: Six days. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Your contention is that alone is an undue burden? MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice, the district court could have determined that those three engineers-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: No, I'm asking you. Do you think that alone is an undue burden? MENGJIE ZOU: Well those three engineers could have been indispensable to the business. So six days for them could have imposed an undue burden. Unfortunately, based on the sparse record we have here we have no way of knowing how much impact those three engineers away from their work for six days would have on Papaya. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And who's got the obligation to produce the full record that would be helpful? MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice, the obligation would have been on the district court to make those factual determinations and to see-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And who would have been obliged to give the information to the district court so it could make that determination? MENGJIE ZOU: Papaya would have needed to give that information. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: So the sparseness of the record, we could say that's Papaya's fault, right? MENGJIE ZOU: Well the record here is very sparse in the sense that it only includes joint stipulations and a couple of affidavits. Clearly Papaya wasn't allowed to bring up all the affidavits and factual experts that it would have been able to bring up in the district court contesting and asking for a quash of this order on-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: On the facts that we have in the record, which is that it would take three engineers five days to produce it, is Papaya's contention that that-- just on that record suffices to demonstrate that it's an undue burden? Or do we need to also find the first amendment interest? The branding interest? The repeated orders in order for you to win? Or can you win alone on the argument that your decryption order of this significance itself is an undue burden just because of the time and unusual nature of the work that would need to be undertaken to comply with it? MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice, Papaya's position is that alone could constitute an undue burden given-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And so, why? How would we think through why that would be? MENGJIE ZOU: Mr. Chief Justice, because the government interest here is diminished given that the only relationship between John Doe is this anonymous caller, and no one is sure how this anonymous caller got this information. And because the three engineers here could be indispensable to Papaya's business here in that the six days they're away from their ordinary work would have a significant impact on Papaya's running smoothly as a business and as a phone provider. Given this balancing it would have been reasonable for the district court--and Papaya contends it is reasonable for the district court to have found that given this balancing of interests there was an undue burden imposed on Papaya. And this court generally reviews such fact specific determinations under a deferential standard. And the undue burden question-- JUSTICE NATHAN: Let me ask you about that, counsel. The question of what goes into the calculus, for example, you've made an argument that we should consider the floodgates of future orders coming to you as part of that analysis. Does it-- shouldn't-- don't we decide [INAUDIBLE] novo the question of what goes into the calculus? You want us to defer to the district court's decision, for example, to include that. Why is that appropriate? MENGJIE ZOU: Justice Nathan I see my time has elapsed-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: You can go ahead and answer. MENGJIE ZOU: Justice Nathan, the undue burden question has always been reviewed differentially because it's heavily intertwined with factual determinations. The fact that undue burden is determined generally based on a balancing of the government's interests against burden's imposed is well settled. And in that all of the case law-- there's no case law that forecloses any consideration, including future considerations or branding considerations. And because of this it is a well-settled principle and everything underneath that are really based on the specific facts of this instance, and the district court is the best place to determine that. And the court has held that when making all of these discovery motions and requests for information decisions a matter within the discretion of the trial court. And for these forgoing reasons this court should affirm the district courts finding of undue burden. Thank you. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Thank you. Go ahead. CAROLINE TRUSTY: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the court. This case is about how far into a person's life the government may go. Here the government is trying to go too far. The government wants six months of John Doe's cell site location information. That's six months of a detailed and comprehensive record with approximately 18,000 references to John Doe's location, both in public and in private, down to a specific city block any time he carried his cell phone. The government wants this information without a warrant, without probable cause. The fourth amendment prohibits such an intrusion and so should this court. Now Papaya would like-- JUSTICE STEVENS: You say without probable cause. Has there been a determination that there was no probable cause? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Justice Stevens, there has not been a determination that there was no probable cause in the record. However, the petitioner has just conceded that it does not believe it has probable cause in this case. So-- and the fact that the petitioner has not asked for a warrant means that there has been no demonstration of probable cause. JUSTICE NATHAN: Does Papaya share the concession? I mean, it's an interesting question. If you didn't concede that there's prob-- if you say there is probable cause, then it would be easier for you to say they should go get a warrant. So I'm curious if you could share that concession that there's not probable cause? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Justice Nathan, Papaya believes that the government does not have probable cause in this case. But in truth, Papaya's belief doesn't really matter because the government has not tried to ask for a warrant, which means it has not demonstrated probable cause in this case. JUSTICE STEVENS: On the probably cause issue, what is it you're trying to find out? Probable cause to do what? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Justice Stevens, the probable cause inquiry is whether it's likely or not that the individual has committed, or is in the process of committing, a crime. So more probable than not, that's the probable cause question. And here, because there was no warrant, the government has not demonstrated that bar. And thus, it is executing a search that is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Now Papaya would like this court to recognize that what the government is trying to do is intrude into John Doe's person, a protected-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: I take it you do concede that they've met the 2703(d) standard of having clear and articulable facts sufficient to give reasonable suspicion that they've committed the crime? Is that right? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Well Justice Stevens, that's partly-- or Justice Barron, excuse me, that's partly correct. The government has demonstrated reasonable suspicion that this information would be relevant to their ongoing criminal investigation. But that's not the same thing as saying they have reasonable suspicion that John Doe is in fact a member of redemption. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Right. OK. Got it. CAROLINE TRUSTY: So this court should recognize that when the government-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But that's all they would need to-- would they need to show more than that under the probable cause standard? In other words, if they showed that it was probable cause that this information was relevant to their ongoing terrorism investigation, would that be enough under the Fourth Amendment? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Mr. Chief Justice, no, I don't believe that that would be enough. They would need to show-- they would need to show probable cause in order to intrude into John Doe's fourth amendment rights. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But this was Justice Stevens question. Probable cause of what? Would it be probable cause that the information would be relevant to the ongoing terrorism investigation? Or probable cause that this person whose information they're trying to collect committed the terrorist act? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Mr. Chief Justice, it's the latter, because the fourth amendment protects John Doe and his person. It's not necessarily about-- I don't believe it's necessarily about the on-- JUSTICE STEVENS: You said they needed to show probable cause that this person was the perpetrator of the bombing? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Well, Justice Stevens, either way-- to be honest, I'm not quite sure. But either way-- either way if they have to show probable cause into-- it they have to show probable cause determining about the criminal investigation, or they have to show probable cause about John Doe as an individual, either way they have failed to show probable cause here by failing to ask for a warrant. And that failure to ask for a warrant renders this search-- renders the search unreasonable. And thus it cannot happen without violating John Doe's fourth amendment rights. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But if that's right, it does raise the concern that in a very serious case involving a very serious law enforcement interest, such as the case before us, even though the government has clear and articulable facts showing reason to suspect that there is information that would be quite helpful to the pursuit of that very important criminal investigation, they'd be barred from getting it, right? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Well Mr. Chief Justice, they would be barred from getting in on these facts that we have in front of us. As this court recognized in Mincey, the seriousness of the crime doesn't mean that the warrant-- is not an exception to the warrant requirements. So while Papaya recognizes the weight of the government's interests in-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But they're not trying to get into his house. They're just trying to get-- I mean, if it was the case in which there was saying because it's a terrorism case we can go ransack his house without a warrant that's one thing. But what they're saying is when you weigh the government's interest, which is supported by clear and articulable facts that there is reason to suspect the information they're trying to get is relevant to this serious criminal investigation, and you weigh the nature of the information that they're trying to obtain, why doesn't it make it reasonable for Congress to have struck the balance where it did? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Well Mr. Chief Justice, that is a balancing test. And because this is a generalized law enforcement criminal investigation, this court doesn't apply the balancing test in this type of a situation. General law enforcement is not an exception to the requirement, nor is it a reason to apply a balancing test in this case. So that is the reason why it still unreasonable without a warrant. And just to go to that first point-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But those cases don't involve this kind of information. I mean, that's what's tricky here. Because this was information conveyed to a third party, which was information that was disclosed by that party by virtue of what they were doing. And it's held by a company that's just holding business records. Normally we think that the company doesn't have much of a fourth amendment interest in the business records that it holds. So when you put those two things together we don't have the typical case in which we say, gee, the government's interest in the criminal investigation is not sufficient to make an exception to the [INAUDIBLE] requirement. That's true. But here I think for you to even get in the door on the fourth amendment you've got to say there's some expectation of privacy in a situation in which a person has disclosed information to a company and the company has that information. So that's the real balance. Is that relatively diminished privacy interest as against the government's interest in pursuing a serious criminal investigation. CAROLINE TRUSTY: Mr. Chief Justice, John Doe doesn't have a diminished expectation of privacy in this case. The government, as I said earlier, is trying to intrude into his person in this case. The government is seeking to intrude into his person without a warrant. His person is a protected category under the Fourth Amendment. By trying to see everywhere that John Doe has been over the past six months the government is able to gain access to private aspects of his identity as Justice Sotomayor stated in her concurrence in Jones. Now the government argues that Papaya's approach to this case has no limiting principle. But that argument ignores the fact that Papaya is asking this court to do essentially a 2-step analysis. So the reasonableness inquiry that the government is trying to do here, that assumes that John Doe has a diminished expectation of privacy, but he doesn't. Now the 2-step inquiry that Papaya is suggesting this court perform, the first step would be to determine whether the government's conduct implicates an aspect of John-- implicates a protected category under the Fourth Amendment. The second step would be to determine whether or not the government's conduct is an intrusion into that protected category, CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But to ask it another way, have we ever decide the case in which the information that sought is information held by a business that it obtained from the individual asserting the fourth amendment interest just giving it to that company? We've never held in any of those cases that there's even a fourth amendment expectation of privacy, have we? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Your honor, I'm not quite sure I understood your question. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: In all the-- this case is, the information you're claiming is his person, is in fact information that was disclosed to a company by that person that that company now holds, right? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Yes. That-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And they're trying to get that information, which the company holds, from the company. CAROLINE TRUSTY: Yes, your honor. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: And we've never held in any of those cases that the fourth amendment bars the government from getting it. So I understand you're now saying we should hold that, but to say it's just like these other cases in which the person was in their house, or was their papers in their own personal office space, it's pretty different. CAROLINE TRUSTY: Well I have two points in response to that, Mr Chief Justice. The first point is that it's not as different as it may seem. If you look at Smith under the test that Papaya is asking this court to apply, while the bright line wouldn't-- the bright line in Smith wouldn't apply here, the facts of Smith would come out the same. So in Smith, the government was using very limited technology, a pen register, and it was only using it for two days. And so looking at that-- looking at those facts under an intrusion analysis you would get the same result. So what papaya is asking for here is not radically different. The only difference is that we are asking this court to look at whether there was an intrusion into a protected category, rather than an intrusion into an individual's reasonable expectations. So, Mr. Chief Justice, the second thing that I would like to say in response to your question is that it makes sense that this court hasn't looked at the breadth of the person category the way it's looked at a house or an individual's papers and effects. Because until recently-- electronic surveillance has just only recently made it possible to gather large amounts of information about a person without touching or physically intruding on that person. So as this court stated in Johnson, because one of the underpinnings of the fourth amendment is the freedom from surveillance, it makes sense that the person would extend beyond the tangible physical person and into the intangible parts of the person that are subject to surveillance, like the person's movements. Here the government is trying to track John Doe's movements, which would be an intrusion into his person. So while this court hasn't explicitly held that, if you look at this court's fourth amendment jurisprudence it has already been protecting an individuals person under this type of analysis. So take Katz, for example, where-- to take Katz, for example. There the court protected the individuals person by protect-- by limiting the way the government could monitor an extension of that person, the contents of that individual's communication. And this is a protection that has lasted notwithstanding the third party doctrine-- not notwithstanding the third party doctrine. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But you want us to extend that protection beyond the contents of communication? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Well, your honor, it wouldn't be an extension beyond the content of a communication. It would be protecting the person by protecting an extension of the individual's person. And we would argue that an individual's movements are just as much of an extension of their person as what an individual says. Which makes sense when you look at-- JUSTICE NATHAN: Why isn't that akin to saying finding out the address where somebody's lives is akin to searching the home? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Your honor it's not the same thing because that information doesn't give you any insight to what is inside the home. So an important distinction to make is that not every inspection of an extension of a person is in fact an intrusion. That goes to the limiting principle of this rule, where there is no intrusion there is no search. So, for example, in Kyllo, this court held that pointing a gun at a home that measures heat waves coming out of the home that is a search. But if the government had just been looking at the house, looking at the exterior of the house, that would not have been a search because there was no intrusion. Just looking at a house doesn't give you any insight. JUSTICE NATHAN: So what's the test for an intrusion now? What words should we put on that page that explain what the boundary is here? CAROLINE TRUSTY: So Justice Nathan, the test for an intrusion is the same here as it is in all of this court's tracking cases. It's a matter of scale. So it's the quality and the quantity of the information that the government is able to gather based on its conduct. So for example, in Knots, this court found that while there might be-- this court found that while following someone's public movements wouldn't be an intrusion, following someone for 24 hours constantly might be an intrusion. JUSTICE NATHAN: But give me the test then that-- you've outlined what isn't and what is, but how do we articulate this-- I would say new rule, but you want to say old rule, that allows us to know what counts as an intrusion and what doesn't? CAROLINE TRUSTY: So Justice Nathan, it would be a question of scale. So that would be a case by case analysis. And if this-- sounds like, perhaps, this court is worried about the line drawing issue that this potentially would pose, but this court doesn't need to worry about it. JUSTICE NATHAN: I'm just worried about the opinion we have to write. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: I'm worried about the line drawing issue. CAROLINE TRUSTY: Well, Justice Nathan-- JUSTICE NATHAN: He's going to assign me the opinion. CAROLINE TRUSTY: Justice Nathan and Mr. Chief Justice, in the opinion all you would have to say is that this court is just putting words to what it is essentially already doing. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: No. No. But you want is to draw some line. So what are the features of this case that make that line too much. Is it the six months? Is that the problem? CAROLINE TRUSTY: That's one of the problems, your honor. This case-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: What's another problem? CAROLINE TRUSTY: So this case goes beyond what this court has already said was the line. So the problems are, first of all, they're asking for information that gets John Doe down to a specific city block. It's worth noting that the map the petitioner supplies in its reply brief isn't helpful in this case because it shows a three block range. But that only shows what the government might be looking for. It doesn't nearly get too close to what the government could actually find upon obtaining an individuals cell site location information. The government-- the government would be able to see- JUSTICE NATHAN: So the information that is captured on the map of the reply, that wouldn't be an intrusion? CAROLINE TRUSTY: It might very well be an intrusion, but it's well beyond what the government could get. JUSTICE NATHAN: But again, where's the line and how do we articulate the standard? Is that three block radius an intrusion on the person? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Your honor, it might be. It might be. Given how small cell phones are, and that you carry them everywhere you go-- given how small cell phones are and that you carry them everywhere you go, it's very possible that the government will be able to follow an individual in and outside of-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: But you're not saying you can get location information only so long as it doesn't show where you are? CAROLINE TRUSTY: Mr. Chief Justice, what Papaya is saying is that location information, especially added up over six months, can show very-- can show details-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Well, again, that's what I'm asking. What is the feature of it that you want us to draw the line? Is it the persistence of it? Because the government says, look, this is not precise moment by moment tracking. It's a little bit random. So, you know, that-- I'm sure they're disappointed that that's true, but you'd say, well, that's a point in their favor. Right? Because it's not that great of information. So then you say, but there's too much of it. So how little of it should there be? A week of doing that would be OK? I mean, we have to actually have some idea what the guideline is in order to rule for you. CAROLINE TRUSTY: So one data point of sale site location information, that wouldn't show very much at all. However, the six months that the government is asking for ends up showing a detailed and comprehensive picture of an individual's life. So if this court feels like it needs to draw a line, which it doesn't in this case, but if you wanted to draw a line, you could say one data point of sale site location information, that doesn't show very much. But just as one trip to the doctor's office wouldn't show very much, but several trips to an OBGYN, followed with trips to a baby store, followed with trips to a maternity clothing shop, that would show a very detailed and comprehensive picture. I see my time has expired, so we would ask this court to affirm the lower court's decision. Thank you. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Thank you. AMANDA MUNDELL: Mr. Chief Justice, there are two points I'd like to raise-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Pull it up just a little bit higher, the microphone. AMANDA MUNDELL: Sorry, your honor. Is that better? CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Well if it's not cooperating don't get-- AMANDA MUNDELL: I'll lean in on your honor. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Good. Good. [LAUGHTER] AMANDA MUNDELL: There's two points I'd like to-- CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: We're supposed to have the good lines. [LAUGHTER] AMANDA MUNDELL: Your honor, both of the points I'd like to raise, the first with respect to the fourth amendment and then the second with respect to the undue burden issue, stem from respondent's argument that the government is trying to go too far here. So I want to pick up on where respondent left off with respect to extending the person category of the fourth amendment to include their actions. Setting aside the fact that that would be entirely unprecedential. That this court would have never done that before. It's also far too broad. It would allow a fourth amendment challenge any time someone observes someone's public movements. So if I understand respondent's argument today correctly, it's that really their test is two steps. The first is to look at whether it's an invasion on a protected category, so if we treat person to encompass actions, we'd still need to move to their second step. But at that step I think Papaya's arguments still fails here, because the question is, at least in their frame, is there an intrusion? And really the answer to that task that I think they were trying to get at in response to Justice Nathan's question was really just, is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information? Does it reveal too much private information about a person? And the answer to that question is no. JUSTICE NATHAN: But it's-- and at some point, though, in the aggregate, doesn't it? Right? I mean, it reminds me of our decision in Rylie where you say, well, all of this-- you might have a picture of your kids in your wallet. And you might have your diary in your pocket. And you might have notes in your briefcase. But when you search a phone you put all of that together. You put all of that together, and it's too much. Yes, you might be able to observe somebody out on the street. And we might know certain things about their movements, but when you-- and really I think your argument is that there need not be a time restriction. And, in fact, the order you got from the district court doesn't include one. But when you put all of that together again, isn't that just too much? Isn't that an intrusion and upsetting of our reasonable expectations and privacy? AMANDA MUNDELL: Your honor, we don't believe that's the case here because the information requested is not akin to GPS tracking technology, or even akin to the types of content someone might put in their phone. Instead, even on that map of Portland that we included, if you were to look at just a one block radius, which the government isn't even requesting here, you would still struggle to find those personal, sexual, political preferences like-- JUSTICE NATHAN: Well what if I'm not supposed to be in that area at all? If I'm meant to be at work during that time, but there I am in that three block radius. Isn't that an invasion of privacy? AMANDA MUNDELL: Your honor, I see my time's about to run out, may I respond? CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: You can. Then I have one last question for you. AMANDA MUNDELL: Well your honor, no, again, because of course that leaves still some questions. Were you taking a break from work to pick up a gift for your daughter? Were you driving to a doctor's appointment? Were you voting in the upcoming election? Those questions don't have clear answers, and that's why we don't think that's so heavy of an intrusion. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: OK, so the argument you're making on the fourth amendment I understand. And the risks of us trying to constitutionalize all of this. But then that just leaves us to the statutory issue. And I guess what I'm wondering is, given that there is a, as you can see, a circumstance in which one could be worried about government effectively tracking your every moment, every movement at every moment. Why does it make sense to read a statute like this with as many vague terms as it has in it? Disclosure, we're not quite sure what they meant. Undue burden, we don't know whether they really meant just burdens like voluminous or exactly what they were getting at. There's nothing in the legislative history that talks about decryption. Why wouldn't it make sense as a principle that if we're not going to have a robust fourth amendment protection we should at least be making Congress actually make these choices, rather than reading statutes which are vague like this in the government's favor each time? AMANDA MUNDELL: Well your honor there is a lot to unpack there, but I know I'm over time so I will try to keep it brief. The first instance is that we don't believe that the SCA really isn't ambiguous on those terms, for reasons I've addressed earlier. And that's why this court doesn't need to engage in a type of constitutional avoidance analysis on the fourth amendment. But we do believe that Congress did strike a balance here when it required the government for non-content information, like the location information that Papaya has admitted today falls within the SCA order. For that information the government can seek an order with a reasonable suspicion standard and not a warrant. Congress made that choice clear in the listed enumerated alternatives in section 2703C. We'd ask that this court reverse. Thank you. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Thank you very much. OK. We'll be back with our decision. [APPLAUSE] SPEAKER: All rise. All rise. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: You can be seated. So this is a pale act of imitation. But it's an effort at emulation. For Judge Nathan and I, it's an honor to be at Harvard Law School and an honor to hear the terrific arguments from the students, but for us a particular honor to sit with a justice whom we each clerked for and who we greatly admire. And we want to make sure to say, thank you. [APPLAUSE] OK, so what we're going to do is we're going to announce the winners and the prizes from today's arguments. And then Justice Stevens will say a few words, Justice Nathan will say a few words, and I'll say a few words. You know, all of us do these moot courts, because as Dean Minow said at the brunch this morning, we are committed to our justice system and the role of advocacy in it. And there's really no better way I can think of to both restore one's faith that the next generation is going to be strong in continuing that tradition then coming to these. And particularly on a day like this when we see such stellar arguments, both in the briefing and from the presentations that you made to us. It doesn't make it easy for us to decide, but I suppose it at least beats having to decide the case itself. So for best oralist, Amanda Mundell. [APPLAUSE] For best brief, the Daniel J. Meltzer Memorial team. [APPLAUSE] For best overall team, the Daniel J. Meltzer Memorial team. [APPLAUSE] I want to say one thing before Justice Stevens speaks, which is that, although the prizes all went to one side, it was by no means an easy decision on each one. And to get to this competition I know firsthand, my wife was an oralist in the semifinalists round in a moot court competition several years ago, and the amount of effort that you put into it and the talent that you reflect means that there truly are only winners when you get to this level of competition at this law school. So we really appreciate all the work you've done. Justice Stevens? JUSTICE STEVENS: First of all, I'd like to say I've enjoyed being here, and I intended to ask more questions, but I'll explain why I didn't. And I also wanted to say before I say anything more, that both sides were awfully good. And it was a very difficult decision, but we did agree on the outcome. But I want to compliment the losing team for the fine presentation that you made. You really were very fine. The second thing I want to say is that my hearing is not as good as it used to be a few years ago. And when I was younger than anybody in the audience, I remember my father telling me one time that when you're faced with the question as to whether you should speak up and perhaps make a fool of yourself, you're better off to be quiet and read-- and not-- and-- and not-- I'm sorry. I can't even explain this. You're better to be silent so you will not remove all doubt on the issue. So I was following that advice. And I was also thinking as I was listening that sometimes my good friend Clarence Thomas is very wise in his practice, you know? For years he'd go along without answering any questions. And many people in the audience sometimes were critical of him, and assumed that he wasn't very well prepared at the time. But I can assure you from firsthand knowledge and actual knowledge he knew what was going on in the courtroom. And his general philosophy was he'd rather listen to the lawyers than to have them listen to him. Because they were there in order to educate him rather than vice versa. And I've always thought there's a lot of sense to his point of view, because often the questioners tend to dominate an argument more than letting the advocates say what they want to say and get the point across. But then there's a second incident that affected my silence this afternoon. I think I may have mentioned it in a book I wrote a few years ago, but in my last couple of years on the court there was a change in the conference room. The conference table used to be at the end of the room and it was pointed in-- it went east/west when the room went north/south. And then a couple of years before I left the-- I think Justice Kennedy was the chairman of the committee that decided to move the conference table to the center of the conference room in the courthouse. And that had a change. It made everything look better. It was a very, very handsome room with the move from the end of the tab-- end of the room to the middle. But it had an effect on the acoustics in the room, because it had kind of a high ceiling. And when you're sitting at the end of the table, as I did in my last couple of years on the court, I used to hear very easily when the table was where it used to be. But when it was placed in the middle of the room I had difficulty hearing Ruth Ginsburg at the other end of the table, because she tends not to speak very highly-- very loudly. And even at times I couldn't even hear the Chief Justice as clearly as I liked to, because he's very articulate when he speaks. But anyway, I suggested that perhaps thought should be given to the fact that those whose hearing is not as good as it used to be might rather have the table moved back to where it was. Well I prevailed on that issue about as well as I prevailed on an awful lot of other opinions that I wrote over the years. But I will say that I did achieve one convert, Nino Scalia tended to agree with me because he was down at my end of the table. So that was one issue on which we may have seen eye to eye, even though we had other issues we didn't. But I want to just end by saying it's a very fine performance by all four of the advocates today. And it was a very interesting issue on the merits. And of course, I would like to discuss the merits rather than the merits of the arguments, because I happen to think on the merits the government got it right on that side too, which I think is another reason it's kind of hard on the other side when you have the tougher side of a case to present. It makes the writing the briefs and all a little bit harder. But I've enjoyed it very much, and I wish I had had more to say during the argument. But I think maybe you'll understand with this explanation. [APPLAUSE] JUSTICE NATHAN: first let me thank you for inviting me and including me here. I think I've basically had one thing on my bucket list, and that was to sit on a bench for Justice Stevens and judge Barron, and so I'm done. So thank you. I mean this without any exaggeration that both sets of briefs and both sides of the argument were as good or better than most of what I see in the courthouse every day, and that is without exaggeration. You should be phenomenally proud of the work that you've done, and what you've accomplished, and how far you've come. And we have to pick a winner. We have to decide cases. I can tell you that when I see resumes it makes no difference to me whether you're a semi-finalist or a finalist in this competition. I know the level of skill, and work, and diligence that went into it. And you all have surpassed my expectations of what this competition would be like. So you should be very proud of yourself. I think at an-- I'll make some general comments, which is that oral argument at it's best is a conversation with your decision makers. I think judges do oral argument well when they have genuine questions that they're trying to get answers to. Certainly that's something that judge Barron and I learned clerking for Justice Stevens. He says that he wasn't particularly active today. In my experience, because he did care what the lawyers had to say, he always came with one or two questions that inevitably was something not quite what the litigants expected, and yet went to the core of the case. And I actually thought he did that today despite the challenge of the acoustics. But what you did as oralists was answer those questions. And this is a moot court and sometimes the problem can be artificial and you can get boxed in, but you dealt with that and you dealt with it well. When you were pushed into a corner you did give direct responses to the questions, which is what we're looking for. And yet you told us where you wanted to take us after that. And that conversation, that responsiveness, that not just reading from a checklist on your notes, is truly what oral argument is about and what we as judges gain from the process of argument. And that was done phenomenally well. I thought the briefing, both sides was exceptional. There was creativity in the arguments. There was muscularity in the writing. There was organization in the structure. You took me with you. And I have to say, even to the extent that I found the government's arguments more persuasive, there were some that I had given up on by Papaya's side that you brought me back to in the course of the oral argument. And that again at its best is what our argument is about. So your attention to the nature of the writing project, and your attention to the craft of oral argument was exceptional. And I'm delighted to be here. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Well two thoughts. One is just for the-- are there parents here of the oralists? Yeah, well you should all be, as I'm sure you are, proud. But for you and for the students who are here, who probably know this, but just to reinforce it, it's scary, you know, to get up. Particularly with all these people here, people that you care about, knowing that you're being judged, and then having judges judge you. And question you vigorously, that they're trying to look for flaws in the argument, right? And you're aware that there will be flaws in the argument. And in front of everybody you have to on your feet be prepared for that. So just the ability to do it with as much poise as all of you were able to do it, that's quite a gift that you've either developed here or had to begin with and then honed here. But it's going to stand you very well in whatever aspect of law that you pursue. The second thing is just the teams as a whole. So the oralists are the stars of the show today, but they know, and I know the family members of the other people on the team, and the other people on the team know, that these are team efforts. You've all mooted each other more than we mooted you. You probably think they didn't ask half the harder questions as we asked each other. And if you did your job right as teammates, that's probably true. And of course you all participated in the brief writing and it reveals it. And what's nice to see is, at least was evident to me, as it always is when I go to these, it to see the other teammates really pulling for the oralists who are participating. Because increasingly in law practice, in any kind of practice that you engage in policy work, your ability to work as a team is going to be as important as your ability to be outstanding as an individual participant. And all that you've learned about how to be a team together are skills you should not by any means forget or think are secondary to what the product that you produced. But it was a great privilege to be back at Harvard Law School. Particularly a privilege to be with Judge Nathan who I worked in the government with. And, of course, with Justice Stevens. So congratulations. Justice Stevens? JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me say one more thing. I'm very grateful for my former law clerks who came in appropriately attired. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: At last. JUSTICE STEVENS: At last. And I also should mention that all you should know that our chief judge has a book that's just been published. It's well worth reading. And it's definitely worth [INAUDIBLE]. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: There's nothing wrong with telling them the title. [LAUGHTER] JUSTICE STEVENS: And of course I'm-- and with the winner of the Morris P. Lucian award from her law school. And one of the many things that made me pick Allie as a law clerks was the fact that I knew Morris P Lucian. He was a very good lawyer. So she had an advantage. JUSTICE NATHAN: I always joke that winning that award-- I joke that it was what got me out of the pile and in front of Justice Stevens. It was true. So you never know. CHIEF JUSTICE BARRON: Congratulations to everybody. [APPLAUSE]

Channel: Harvard Law School

Views: 184,647

Rating: 4.9222856 out of 5

Keywords: Ames Moot Court, Ames Moot Court Competition, Harvard Law School, HLS, Harvard University, John Paul Stevens, David J. Barron, Alison J. Nathan

Id: whFTT9tWxzo

Length: 96min 35sec (5795 seconds)

Published: Fri Nov 04 2016