When Will The Passive Bubble Burst? (w/ Mike Green and Ash Bennington)

it's friday july 31st 2020 just after market closed in new york this is the real vision daily briefing i'm ash bennington joined shortly by logica's mike greene but first with today's stories jack farley thanks ash i'm sure you're looking forward to your talk with mike green i know i certainly am facebook amazon and apple all posted phenomenal earnings reports yesterday trouncing estimates from analysts amazon reported a record quarterly revenue with its earnings of 5.2 billion exceeding estimates by a wide margin apple also reported strong growth crushing q3 expectations with higher than expected sales in products as well as services the results are especially impressive considering the damage that the pandemic has inflicted to global supply chains and facebook too showed resilience in the face of a crisis growing revenues 11 and beating earnings estimates handsomely as well the outperformance of tech against other sectors has been a defining feature of this crisis this year but today the bifurcation was particularly noticeable as facebook amazon and apple rallied hard on the good quarterly results the bullishness for big tech names can be seen not only by looking at the historical prices in stocks by looking at the derivatives markets as well you can look at the right tail sku for the fang stocks indicating that the calls in these big names are being bid up this is something that chris cole pointed out on today's ahead of the curve this ahead of the curve was a deep dive into volatility for this we wanted to explore val not just as a little feature of the market that you know you need to keep your eye on but as an asset class within itself and arguably the ultimate asset class so it's a three-part series it's hosted by jason buck who many of you know and we said to jason we want the legends in the space bring us the best you got and he didn't disappoint we started out with an absolute giant jerry hayworth of 36 south jerry has 30 years in the vaul business and he has a proven track record of hedging against left as well as right tail risk he specializes in trading long dated options or leaps and he's one of the best in the world at it then jason spoke to bastian balesta of deep field capital who's an absolute wizard at profiting from dislocations within the vix he's an expert at arbitraging the vix futures curve as well as taking advantage of the negative correlation between the vix and the s p it's a very technical piece meant for serious traders and bastion has shared some remarkable charts with us so definitely watch that one and lastly today we ended with the bang with real vision favorite chris cole chris is an outspoken critic of the 60 40 stock bond portfolio since those asset classes are inextricably correlated in that they're both short ball if your goal is to truly hold a diversified portfolio that will stand the test of time chris says that you need to invest in an array of assets including stocks bonds long vol gold and commodity trend the combination of these components culminate in chris's famed dragon portfolio now chris came on real vision in february with danielle di martino booth and gave a glimpse of what the dragon portfolio entails but since then volatility has exploded both during the massive sell-off in march as well as during the shock at market melt-up since then put simply the dragon has been unleashed so that's why chris's conversation with jason is especially important so check out the ahead of the curve if you can it's on the plus tier as the subject matter is for advanced traders but a cut down version will be made available tomorrow for essential members and with that let's go back to ash and the great mike green thanks jack welcome mike green hey it's great to be here ash it's a pleasure to have you you know mike this is really interesting you have been on the platform i think of you as one of the great friends of real vision i think you started coming on in 2016 and i also think of you as the king of the deep dive interview you do these really in-depth interviews with folks often uh who have phds and things like particle physics and it's cool to be able to have you on this show where we can do more of a 50 000 foot overview like mike green's greatest hits well if there are greatest hits i'm happy to do them i i have enjoyed the opportunity to have kind of the extended charlie rose type interviews i would defer to him in terms of being the king of that but it has been a real pleasure yeah i mean to to see you sort of sit down the way you conduct these and do these really deep dives about you know topics that are very uh they're very technical uh i think it's something that people don't really get to see elsewhere the feeling you get is being in the room uh where decisions are getting made and it's something that's uh it's really hard to come by well i'm glad i'm glad that people enjoy it i certainly have enjoyed using it as part of my research process it it has actually facilitated a number of conversations that would otherwise have been difficult to have and i think that's one of the reasons why viewers may enjoy it is because i'm actually gaining something from that it's not just me doing a job i don't work for real vision i'm taking advantage of the of the opportunity that the platform provides and so i think that's that's one of the keys yeah so let's start talking a little bit about some of the things that that i think our viewers our real vision subscribers have come to know uh from you the first topic that was on my list uh was passive indexation and the role that the rise of passive indexation has played in markets well this has been one of those things that has fascinated me for years and it's candidly one of these areas where i think people have allowed themselves to be seduced by the language right i i joke sometimes that passive has the world's best pr department certainly that's true in the case of vanguard where it's perceived as harmless right by definition right nobody goes home and says i got my butt kicked by a passive person right and yet that's what's really happening is that because we have improperly labeled passive investing we've relied on the very brilliant bill sharps paper in 1991 called the arithmetic of active management it's very approachable it's something i would encourage many people to to read to understand kind of the baseline components you know the idea was very simple that active management is a zero-sum game that all managers have to own in aggregate the same portfolio and if one's going to succeed another is going to fail and so by piggybacking on that and offering lower fees passive would be a piggybacking on the work that was done by the active managers not having to make the effort in terms of the insights that they would then be able to piggyback and by virtue of lower fees outperform the majority of managers the problem with it is that it made a number of assumptions about what passive is right including the idea that they never transact and we know that passive players took in in excess of 400 billion dollars last year all right sure let's just jump in there and do a quick definition of what it is uh and a little bit of the history of how we got to where we are today to it became a 400 billion dollar transaction well as i said that's 400 billion dollars a year right so now we're talking crazy amounts of flow the underlying dynamic in terms of how passive emerged in the early 1970s first wells fargo and then john bogle most famously through vanguard recognized that there was an opportunity to offer participation for investors in all securities in proportion to their market cap the idea was very straightforward it was an outgrowth of the efficient market hypothesis the idea that whatever prices were in the market today were the best prices in aggregate that could be arrived at by all the active players and interestingly enough john bogle actually began this as a workaround in his non-compete with wellington management which had fired him and and created the opportunity for him to grow vanguard so it wasn't completely altruistic that he chose to do this but it was a strategy that because of its low cost and because of its perceived investor-friendly dynamics began to grow not just by virtue of performance and low fees but ultimately has become quite a favored player in the regulatory framework right and so the general idea is in the regulatory framework that most asset managers are trying to hoodwink or steal from their clients by charging excess fees and so the idea of a passive player that charges the minimus fees under the framework that they are indeed passive and just riding along that this is harmless and ultimately in the best interests of investors the various forms of legislation in particular the dol fiduciary rule in 2017 accelerated this process other rules that have been changed in 2005 we changed the dynamics of how 401ks are allocated in 2012 we changed them again in both situations favoring passive in 2019 with the secure act we again further favored passive investing and so we've created a regulatory framework that is basically creating conditions in which all the new money that is going into the market is coming through in passive vehicles and so it's just it's reached epic proportion at which point when you start thinking about that dynamic that the assumptions are passive that they don't transact and yet somehow or another we need to digest in excess of a billion dollars a day of net buying into the passive universe they can't be passive they have to be active players and when you start evaluating them under the framework that they are active players then suddenly a lot of information that we're seeing in the markets that feels crazy starts to make perfect sense yeah and that gets just to the next question i was going to ask you is you know based on that what are your conclusions about the impact of the role of passive investing currently well the the single biggest impact that they have is they assume that whatever price was the last price is the right price and so they are more than willing to transact at any price no matter how insane any other investor thinks so while a very active debate can ensue about the value of tesla in the active manager community at the end of the day the vast majority of the net flows coming into tesla are coming in via passive vehicles that don't have that debate whatsoever and by virtue of coming in they're effectively injecting energy or momentum into the tesla share price that causes its price to rise even further right so we have absolutely seen an inflation associated with passive now most of the academic research is focused on the dynamics of index inclusion when a stock makes it into an index like the s p 500 and there you very clearly seen the impact in terms of increase in multiples and higher valuations but almost none of the academic research is focused on the continual flow into those vehicles and the same underlying dynamic where they're receiving favored funds it becomes very hard to evaluate in that context unless you apply a number of tricks in terms of your analysis yeah and i should probably say this is a conversation that you had actually today fresh out on the platform with rob arnott of uh research advisors uh to a deep dive on this very topic yeah so rob is with research affiliates but um it is absolutely a an area that we have allowed the language of passive investors to dominate right again it goes back to this pr component and i you know highlight that in my conversation with rob as you point out this came out today and i would encourage people to watch it we know they're not passive right and yet the regulatory framework and the general uh view of them is that they are by definition passive right that's just not true yeah i was struck by that very point as well and also by the notion uh that is it's become a significantly larger proportion of the market that the forces that of distortion become greater and greater yeah yeah i think that's right i mean you think you need to think about it in like a predator-prey type dynamic right ultimately there are the part of the reason why bill sharpe's analysis was so compelling is because there's truth to it right ultimately every buyer has to have a seller and so the dynamic becomes a question of what are the rules under which those buyers and sellers work right and passive operates under very different rules than we've ever seen before right it assumes whatever price is there is the right price we've just never seen that before we've never seen this type of buying pressure under that type of framework and so it kind of creates a situation in which i i i genuinely believe that for the most part history isn't actually a very good picture anymore yeah you know it's interesting it reminds me it's almost a recurring theme in your research i remember in a different interview i'm not sure which one you were talking about how the black scholes formula uh had some assumptions at the time which when they were originally created which were good enough not quite accurate but good enough for the time being and then as the rise of options volume increased it became more and more misaligned with markets it's sort of reminiscent of what you're sort of saying here on uh on the rise of passive indexation so yeah i mean the the the legend in this space of course is immanuel durman with his you know idea of models behaving badly right and the general idea that all models are are false some are useful right it was helpful in a world that was constrained by computing capacity to make assumptions about how securities worked right to assume that whatever price existed was the right price we simply didn't have the tools benoit mendel brought who talked about this 30 years ago recognized very quickly that these models were not accurate it seemed taleb has spent a lot of time arguing that these models are not accurate the crazy part for me is that the actual simple assumptions about how the game is played are not accurate right and so i've continually directed people to the work of olay peters who has written on this dynamic of what's called the ergodicity problem in economics right and we see this very clearly in financial markets where we use terms like monte carlo simulations where we talk about the the idea that in games of chance we will see outcomes that look like this well that's true in a casino because no matter what you do you can't affect the odds of the dice or the roll on the roulette wheel but in markets every transaction actually does change the future distribution of outcomes right by definition you're changing it right and so all of those tools that we use and all of the language that we think about the world the financial markets they're approximations and approximations break down at extremes yeah and i remember you saying that uh the perhaps the greatest impact that's not accounted for in these models is often as you were suggesting market impact of the trade itself yeah yeah that's right i i i referred people to an interview that jim simons did recently um on a podcast called number error or numera i'm sorry and you know in it he calls out that it is very clear that the efficient market hypothesis is untrue right and that that is the easy part of the problem right the hard part of the problem is figuring out what your impact is on the market as you transact and you know to put it simply jim is 10 billion dollars in assets in his primary vehicle the firm assets in total are about 70 billion dollars if i look at firms like vanguard and blackrock right their numbers are in the trillions i mean they're taking in as i mentioned before you know vanguard in the neighborhood of 300 billion dollars last year they took in four renaissances right and i know for a fact they're not as sophisticated as jim simons is in terms of thinking about the impact of their positions and so the the idea that they're not meaningfully impacting the markets to me just feels absurd yeah now to take it back to the option space which is where i specialize you know that brings up the idea of how should you actually think about options right and so the black shoals models that most people are familiar with at least in in terminology you know these were tools that were developed not to properly price options but to give a close estimation of how options are priced in the market right and for the most part it did a better job of explaining prices and options and many other techniques there's a lot of other techniques that have similarities to them binomial option pricing models etc but at the end of the day the the black scholes model requires the assumption that there is no what's called drift right the today's price is the best price and therefore the future price can only differ by the dynamics of the risk-free interest rate and cash payment of dividends that's just not true in a world in which the the markets are dominated by predictable flows right they can't actually adjust to reflect a future action because the markets themselves are not frictionless right the basic assumptions of emh are not true yeah it's interesting to hear you talk about the origins it reminds me of goodheart's law the idea that when a uh when i when a measure becomes a target it becomes neither target nor a measure yeah i know i think that's actually a great uh articulation of it right when you think about goodheart's law the one that i'm i'm immediately drawn to um one that's near and dear to my heart was the blow up of the xiv and the vomageddon of february 2018. you know when we were researching our positions uh and taking our positions in those securities we were we actually turned back and looked at the work that paul tudor jones had done going into the crash of 87 and it was the exact same underlying dynamic right where a strategy had become so large that the market was incapable the market had traded in was incapable of adjusting uh and absorbing those trades right so many people have seen the paul tudor jones uh documentary trader that was on pbs and it's an incredibly enjoyable watch but it really does paul a disservice by presenting it as like he's looking with you along with peter boris he's looking on tick by tick comparison to 1929 it's not actually what he was doing he was doing something very similar to what i did which was figure out the capacity of the market to absorb what was called portfolio insurance and the need to buy and sell s p futures and he figured out correctly that on adverse events the quantity of futures that would have to be sold in the portfolio insurance schema would exceed the capacity of that market that's the exact same thing that happened on valmageddon right the xiv and like of all etfs were too large to be absorbed by the ux futures market the vix futures market right and as a result it caused a crash yeah you know it's so interesting i think very few people uh who in the retail space who are exposed to those products did a lot of thinking about what it took at a mechanical level to rebalance those portfolios for the etf and how that role worked i i wouldn't put it simply on the retail right i would suggest that the exact same dynamic happened in the uh in the professional space and i know of one uh extremely well-known macro trader uh who literally did not understand that there were navs posted against these etfs right so xiv had a price that was on the screen and then an nav against it um you know this trader uh you know bought at 72 when the nav was 11. right and so i mean it you can't just put it on the hands of retail there's a lot of people who didn't understand the dynamics of what was actually transpiring yeah you know you you do an interview with your uh partner at uh logica wayne himmelsin that touches on some of these points in a great deal of detail on real vision and i'd encourage our subscribers to go and take a look at it because it's really a very detailed piece that gets very granular about precisely those issues yeah i mean i can't say how fortunate i've been to get to know wayne and one of the other interviews that i actually point people to is in september of 2019 i interviewed wayne when i was still working with peter thiel at that point i was considering adding wayne as an external manager to peter's portfolios and ultimately found myself in such concordance and you can actually see it in that interview that uh wayne and i decided to partner and uh incredi again incredibly thankful to rv for having created the opportunity for that because it's been a great experience for me yeah it's a cool back story and it's also interesting one of the other topics that i wanted to bring up was you talk about in that interview something that i think is just broadly more interesting which is the distinction between a quantitative versus the qualitative uh investment framework and how you and wayne partner together on that i think is interesting but also more broadly different ways of seeing the world yeah so in general quantitative investors and qualitative investors differ in the degree to which they are sticking to a process right and so a qualitative investor um let's put it in in vol terms for a second here right so in general if i'm going to go through the process of systematizing and automating my response to stimulus which is really what a quantitative manager is doing right they're saying when this happens the machine is automatically going to do this action right basically a programming process qualitative managers have the flexibility to say i'm not going to rigidly stick to that and that creates both risks and it creates opportunities right from a risk standpoint you can find yourself justifying almost anything if a security is moving against you you can convince yourself well the fundamentals are robust and therefore this is just a better opportunity right a quantitative manager certainly can make that choice but they tend to have pre-programmed stop losses they tend to have pre-programmed uh dynamics and they recognize that going against the model very rarely is helpful right the other thing that it that differs for if i were to split the quantitative space it splits into what i would call the empirical finance or statistical arbitrage space which says i don't know why this happens but it happens right and therefore i'm going to treat history as indicating a probabilistic outcome in the future traders that have that have pursued those types of approaches with varying degrees of success would include traders like victor niederhoffer right who very consistently would place large bets on um you know the statistically probable outcome right basically going for high frequency the problem is that then opens you up to extreme events right so the thai bot crisis uh in 1997 or uh the u.s uh quant quake and various meltdowns that occurred in 2007 and so you know that strategy by definition is designed to take advantage of what are perceived to be human procedural errors where we become frightened or worried about adverse events occurring and by definition actually exposes you to what if those of those fears were actually well-founded right the other way to approach quantitative finance is the way that i would argue wayne approached it which is to say how can i systematize or how can i create a probabilistic stochastic type weighting schema to the behaviors that i see traders doing right so sometimes traders will do x and other times traders will do y how can i program a system that allows me to think about that and what impressed me so much about wayne and what i what i found so concordant was actually the way that we thought about options right that they provided you with a way to express a probabilistic bet that has a convex payoff in the direction that you're hoping for but limits your losses in the opposite direction right and so that actually becomes very powerful when you think about it in the context of if there is a mispricing if there's a fundamental change where most people are looking at options in an implied versus realized volatility type space right and instead you're looking at it and saying no this allows me to place larger bets but limit my losses and that actually became super powerful as you're trying to think about trading a bubble right because at the end of the day that's what i think we're in i think we're in an extraordinary bubble it's fueled by passive investing both on the bond side and the equity side and if you're going to trade a bubble you want to be able to use non-recourse leverage right this is exactly the dynamics of the housing market right what was what fueled the ability to participate in home prices going up non-recourse mortgages right options are even better in the equity markets and in other markets because i don't have to if i decide that my option is going to expire worthless i don't have to mail the keys back to the bank and take the associated hit to my credit rating right that's just part of the business in terms of options themselves and so that's what we're trying to take advantage of we just treat them differently we have a different way of thinking about pricing them yeah and and talking about uh bubbles risk and pricing you know one of the things that you've been uh on the real vision platform interviewing uh about is the topic of volatility strategies and i think it's a really interesting one it would be great if we could do just a 50 000 foot overview of that because i know it's a very technical topic and i just want to give our viewers a sense of what that space is like overall and why you think it's important right now well the simplest way to think about volatility strategies is that they are ways in which short volatility to be very precise here they are are generally an associated uh series of strategies that are designed to offer higher yields than could be obtained by investing in traditional bonds or risk-free bonds right and so a big chunk of the world the u.s included has seen a generational collapse or historic collapse within a generation in terms of bond yields and so korea would be a great example where 15 years ago you could have gotten 9 yield on a 10-year treasury in korean uh bonds today that number is well below 1 right so it's created conditions under which investors who had assumed that the assets that they had accumulated would allow them to have a certain level of income they're now being forced to find other ways to replace that income when you sell volatility you're actually converting most types of risk assets into something that looks like a bond right so if you think about a bond in the simplest terms it offers a payoff that says you will at most receive x right and you will take a hundred percent of the downside risk that theoretically this is worthless right now the trade-off is in most investment-grade bonds the odds of it being worthless are very low and so you're willing to accept relatively small premium associated with that volatility selling a great example would just be a call overwriting strategy where you own the stock and on a recurring basis you sell calls that limit your upside participation so think about what you've done you've sold a call you've received premium that becomes income if the stock price rises too much you don't get to participate so you max out your participation but if the stock price falls you theoretically lose 100 of what you put into it right it becomes bond and so that's the the easiest way to think about what's happening with volatility selling is that with the dearth of yield that can now be obtained in the fixed income space we've pursued all sorts of strategies that allow us to try to replace that income by converting other assets into bond like instruments yeah but aren't we all already short implicitly volatility in the sense that you know i wake up in the morning i assume my apartment isn't going to burn down i assume i'm not going to get fired from my job i'm not going to have a massive heart attack that day i mean we all assume that we're short volatility in that sense well the very basis i mean let's take it a step further we assume that we're not going to walk out and an asteroid is not going to hit the earth and end life as we know it right you know elliott associates um uh where i think they're brilliant by the way um you know has repeatedly talked in their monthly in their monthly and quarterly letters about the idea of a carrington event referring to the solar flare activity that killed all electronic communications i believe it was 1859 right you know those sorts of risks happen they happen with very low frequency which is part of the reason why we're able to go about our lives in a somewhat normal fashion and so yes short volatility you know short change is you know particularly catastrophic changes sort of the baseline under which we tend to operate right the problem emerges where you are investing in securities and creating synthetic forms of debt and i just would highlight this right that most debt has historically come with covenants that define your rights as a debt holder and protect you from the depredations of management right if you do that in equity form you actually no longer have that protection right you don't have any covenants associated with it the management team could do anything associated with the market's vicissitudes could cause anything to happen to your position right and so you've forgotten the upside participation which is part of the attractiveness of an equity-like instrument for what i would argue is very low premiums certainly were right they've with the increase in implied volatility they've become a little bit richer but they're still they still don't reflect the risks that i think the that are embedded in the market particularly with the change in structure that we talked about earlier with passive yeah you know the other topic that's come up uh repeatedly in your interviews is the notion of growth versus momentum strategy and that the impact that passive indexation has had on that can you talk a little bit to what your views are on that a broad level sure so so usually when people talk about growth they use is the the antithesis of growth value right so i'm a value investor i'm a growth investor in both situations you're actually i don't consider those to be the antithesis right so in in the case of value what you're actually saying is i'm looking to uh the historical fundamentals and saying that there is unrecognized profitability that can be generated from these assets were they to mean revert this is a really important topic and the discussion that i had with rob arnott this idea that mean reversion is ultimately the most powerful force in finance and i think there's a lot of truth to that right the idea that what goes up must ultimately come down or at least stop going up as much relative to everything else right the law of large numbers begins to catch up but that is a very different statement than value versus growth right so i would emphasize that value versus growth tends to be value is what's happened in the past right and growth is i'm discounting the future i'm looking at companies that are going to have superior fundamentals and i'm investing typically at a you know what i would think is a reasonable valuation relative to those forward fundamentals the most noted value investor of course is ben graham the most noted growth investor is a guy by the name of phil fisher who wrote a fantastic book called common stocks uncommon profits still in print 50 years after it was written and i would argue that many of the investors we see like warren buffett are a hybrid of the two right momentum is something very different it doesn't actually care what the fundamentals were it's just looking at what the price is and so what's happened to the change in price and so momentum by definition is actually assuming some variant of the efficient market hypothesis don't tell me what the historical fundamentals are don't even tell me what your estimate of the future fundamentals are the fact that the stock is going up in price tells you that investors are discounting something even better in the future right and so momentum tends to have a strong correlation with growth investing but it doesn't have to at all right and if i look at 2008 for example the summer of 2008 the momentum stocks were commodity stocks for example right they were oil stocks they were mining stocks through march of 2008 they were gold stocks right and so you know i i think it's important to just distinguish between those value and growth i would focus on the dynamics of of how they treat their fundamentals and then on the momentum dynamics i would actually say you need to think about momentum and anti-momentum and they are correlated but they're not the same mike we've talked about a lot of the issues that you're following but what's top of mind for you right now in terms of what's the thing that you believe has the most impact in the thing that people should take away from this conversation well the the single biggest takeaway from my work on passive is that the dynamics of the market are tied to the flow of investments and in this front i'm particularly paying attention to the ending of the supplemental unemployment insurance and many of the tools of support that we've taken for granted uh over the past couple of months as we've gone through the coronavirus shutdowns in particular there have been two quick changes one is is that we've begun to exhaust the paycheck protection program loans and we've increased the flexibility of corporations in terms of how long they take to deploy those and what fraction of those are going towards labor the problem with that is that that's now creating the conditions under which i think we're going to finally see layoffs accelerate amongst the higher income individuals those who tend to hold 401ks and you know this these changes began a couple of weeks ago we're now starting to see the impact on the market while the market is quote-unquote levitating and staying at high levels you know most would note that we've made no progress for kind of the last five weeks or so my analysis would tie that back to the dynamics that we're beginning to see these fun flows deteriorate so on on my math it looks like this last week of july we're actually starting to see the impact we're starting to see the unemployment hit these flows and in my analysis this makes the market very very vulnerable i'm quite concerned about the potential for a significant dip in risk assets mike let me ask you this what are you going to be looking at to determine whether or not that thesis is beginning to unfold well so i watch two things the one i i pay for proprietary access to mutual fund flows and then the second component is is that i watch very closely the flows into etfs and those are easier to obtain you can also obtain things like the the mutual fund flows with a lag from providers like ici etc but that tends to show up in price behavior and the single biggest tell that flows have turned negative is what's called the the moc right the um uh the amount of shares that need to be bought or sold at the end of day what are called market on close orders that dynamic tends to show up in prices that either accelerate to the downside or accelerate to the upside at the end of the day reflecting that net buying that needs to occur when you start to see outflows you tend to see end-of-day negative dynamics and i would argue that we're very clearly seeing that at this point mike i think we ran a little bit long here but it was worth it to get this deep dive overview in which is something that we don't generally get to uh get to do with you this was really terrific ash i really enjoyed it

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Keywords: Finance, Markets, Economy, Stock Market, Investing, Trading, Education, Financial Literacy, Recession, Interview, Conversation, Strategy, Insight, Analysis, Facts, Data, Fraud, Entertainment, Thesis, Short Seller, Real Vision, Equities, real vision finance, real vision tv, mike green, ash bennington, passive investing, bubble, financial bubble, indexes, ETFs, passive indexation

Id: M00Pi8l1sLk

Length: 35min 45sec (2145 seconds)

Published: Fri Jul 31 2020