On April 5, 1982, the Soviet army in Afghanistan
launched an operation to destroy the mujahideen base in the remote settlement of Rabati-Jali.
Early in the morning, 79 helicopters delivered more than 600 Soviet soldiers, who successfully
launched the attack on the base. Since the beginning of the Soviet invasion, this was
their largest airmobile operation, and General Tabunshchikov, who was watching the operation from
the Antonov An-30 circling above, would have been pleased with the spectacle, if not for one thing.
The object that the Russians attacked was not the base of the Afghan mujahideen. In fact, this
object was not even located in Afghanistan. The base that the Soviet troops destroyed turned
out to be an ordinary asphalt factory in Iran.
With the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,
the Soviets found themselves in a somewhat unusual combat situation. The 40th Army, which became the
land forces arm of the Soviet occupational force in Afghanistan, was a strong and well-trained army
by Soviet standards. However, it quickly became apparent that the Army was not prepared for the
type of war it had to fight. Unlike the classic warfare that the Soviet troops were primarily
trained for, there was no clear front line in Afghanistan. The Afghan mujahideen were perfectly
aware that they had zero chance in direct confrontations with the Soviets, so they relied
heavily on guerrilla tactics: they disrupted supply lines, conducted raids and ambushes,
and then quickly withdrew to their hidden bases. Such raids slowly drained the resources
of the Soviets, and one of their responses was an attempt to eliminate the problem at its
root they decided to cut off the mujahideen's access to weapons supplies by targeting their
caravans, transit bases, and training camps.
One such base was located near the
abandoned settlement of Rabati-Jali, right at the junction of the Afghan, Iranian,
and Pakistani borders. The first information about the large base of mujahideen at Rabati-Jali
was received by Soviet military intelligence in early 1982. According to their agent s report,
the base contained warehouses with weapons and ammunition as well as a large amounts of drugs,
which the mujahideen exchanged for weapons from nearby Iran and Pakistan. The base was guarded
by roughly sixty people; however, large groups of mujahideen were regularly stationed at the
base, undergoing military training or arriving for new weapons and ammunition. Most interesting
for Soviet intelligence, however, was information about two dozen wooden crates containing long
tubes. Based on the description, these could possibly be Strela portable surface-to-air
missiles, presumably delivered from Egypt.
The intelligence about the Rabati-Jali base was
then sent to Moscow, to Marshal Sergey Sokolov, who was in charge of Soviet ground forces
during the war. In mid-March Moscow responded with orders to prepare an operation
to destroy the base at Rabati-Jali.
The operation to destroy the base at Rabati-Jali
was given high importance and received a very promising and set-for-success codename South .
Leadership of the operation was assigned to no less than General Vladimir Vinokurov, Deputy
Commander of the 40th Army. Another fact that showed the importance of the mission was
that all the preparations were completed in total secrecy and the operation was to be
carried out using only the Soviet military, without any involvement of the Afghan Army
or Afghan Intelligence Agency KhAD.
According to the plan, the operation would
start early in the morning of April 5, 1982, with an air strike by 12 Sukhoi Su-17
fighter-bombers to suppress the air defenses of the base as well as the outside guard.
Immediately after the air strike, helicopters were to deliver assault regiments, whose task
would be to capture all the dominant heights around the base, launch the attack and eliminate
the remains of the mujahideen soldiers inside, destroy the drugs and weapons warehouses, and of
course, seize the MANPADS. To complete all these tasks the assault groups were given 6 hours, after
which they would be evacuated by helicopter.
To execute this mission, Soviet command allocated
3 airborne assault regiments, 1 motorized rifle company, and a company of Spetsnaz GRU. All in
all, more than 600 personnel. No less impressive was the aviation group, which consisted of the
280th Separate Helicopter Regiment commanded by Colonel Valery Savchenko. In addition to 61 Mi-8
helicopters in various modifications, Savchenko also received under his command 18 gigantic
Mi-6 helicopters from the 335th Regiment.
It was decided that the Mi-24 attack helicopter
would not be used in the operation due to its limited combat range. The distance to the target
was far, and the use of the Mi-24 would require multiple refueling points, which would only
magnify the already complicated matter of refuelling. For the Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters, a
transit point was created 47 km from the target, with ground prepared for helicopter landing
and refueling. A few days before the operation, some of the Mi-6 helicopters delivered
necessary materials, as well as huge rubber-fabric containers filled with fuel.
The preparations for the operation began on March 30, 1982. All the equipment was
carefully examined, and if necessary, quickly repaired. The attack Mi-8s received extra
armament and ammunition; on the contrary, the troop-carrying Mi-8s were lightened by removing
the defensive machine guns, which allowed them to take onboard an extra trooper. It was also ordered
that red stars and tail numbers on all helicopters must be painted over, an order whose purpose still
remains unclear today, since the Soviets were the only power around that had such helicopters.
All in all the aviation group consisted of 79 helicopters and 38 airplanes, which, in
particular, included 8 MiG-23 fighters to provide air cover, and an Antonov An-30 carrying
General Tabunshchikov, who was to oversee the operation from the air. Direct command of
the operation was entrusted to the deputy commander of the 40th Army s air force, Colonel
Aprelkin, who, according to some accounts, was promised the rank of general and the order Hero
of the USSR if the operation was a success.
At dawn on April 4, the whole helicopter group
headed to the transit refueling point. However, the relocation didn t go smoothly due to a
sandstorm in the area, which significantly reduced visibility. For safety reasons the
group had to break down into smaller divisions, which significantly delayed the time to get to the
refueling point. The last helicopters landed at dusk. The group spent the night manually refueling
the helicopters until the morning of April 5.
At 6 am, the Mi-9 command helicopter piloted by
Captain Yuriy Serebryaniy, with Colonel Aprelkin onboard, took off and set a course for the target.
The rest of the helicopters were to follow at specific time intervals. At the very same time,
the Antonov An-30 with General Tabunshchikov took off and headed to the target area. At 6:40
am, 2 Sukhoi Su-17s found the Rabati-Jali base and marked it with 4 luminous parachute bombs,
and in the next 15 minutes 12 Su-17s struck the Rabati-Jali base with bombs and missiles. And
it is then that a chain of unforeseen events occurred that, combined with some ridiculous
mistakes, made Operation South go south.
What happened was that the luminous parachute
bombs were dropped roughly 400 meters from the target, which wasn t a big deal for the Su-17
pilots who were familiar with the area. However, by the time the air strike was completed and the
helicopters were approaching the area, the desert wind had carried the parachute bombs way further
from the target, right into Iranian territory.
The leading command helicopter with Colonel
Aprelkin saw the luminous bombs, and then headed towards those bombs, leading with them
the entire helicopter group. After a short time, Captain Serebryaniy noted that it looked like
they had crossed the border of Afghanistan, but Colonel Aprelkin insisted on continuing the
flight. The captain tried to convince the colonel that they were already in Iran, but the colonel
gave a direct order and even marked on the map with his finger the place he thought they were.
Meanwhile, the helicopter piloted by Major Nikolay Babenko reported that they had discovered an
asphalt road which wasn t indicated on their maps. There was a bus peacefully driving down the
road whose passengers were not reacting to the overflying helicopters in any way. But strangest
of all were the wooden poles along the road, which told the pilots there was no way they were
in Afghanistan. Wood was extremely scarce in the Afghan desert and worth its weight in gold. If
this was Afghanistan, those poles would have been chopped down long ago. But the moment
the pilots were coming to this realisation, the group saw a compound ahead of them which
matched the description of their target. There were warehouses in the center with guard towers
along the sides. And Colonel Aprelkin made the decision to execute the assault operation.
Strangely, the absence of any signs of destruction from the preceding air strike somehow didn t
confuse Colonel Aprelkin. The landing started at 7:03 and lasted for 17 minutes. More than fifty
Mi-8s landed and stretched across the desert in a line several kilometers wide. Heavy Mi-6s
landed nearby and started the refueling process, while assault groups attacked the base
with machine guns and mortar fire, gradually destroying the buildings and equipment
of the base. For a moment it may have seemed a perfectly planned and executed operation if
not for one thing the object under attack was not the mujahideen base at Rabati-Jali but an
ordinary asphalt factory in the Iranian city of Harmak. It was pure luck that at the time the
factory was still closed and had no workers on site. And the only victims of the mighty Soviet
military became 2 unlucky security guards.
Meanwhile, 1st Lieutenant Ryaboshapko
from the An-30 with General Tabunshchikov onboard had sorted out the situation and
immediately contacted the helicopter group: You are 12 kilometers away from the target,
in the territory of Iran. Urgently evacuate the troops and leave the area."
The helicopters received the message but suddenly heard a loud roar of engines. At
first, they thought this was the MiG-23 from their air cover having fun. But these were Iranian
F-4 Phantoms. The Iranians passed over the landed helicopter group on their first approach; however,
then they turned around and fired two Sidewinder missiles. Neither of them hit the helicopters,
with one hitting the ground and exploding, while the second one fell flat and simply broke,
becoming a trophy for the Soviet soldiers.
At this time, a second pair of Phantoms
approached the area and started shooting the helicopters with their guns. The Soviet MiGs
meanwhile reported that they had missile lock on the Phantoms but were under strict orders not
to engage in the fight by General Tabunshchikov, who had rightfully judged that Iranian F-4s
shot down over Iran would definitely lead to a huge international scandal.
Meanwhile, the Iranians regrouped and continuously watered the helicopters with
their guns. Two helicopters were destroyed, while several others received various damage.
Fortunately there were no human casualties, except that one of the helicopter pilots, 1st
Lieutenant Troudov, was slightly wounded.
Not long afterwards an Iranian motorized battalion
arrived and pulled up to the Soviet helicopter landing zone. However, by that time most of the
Soviet assault troops had already been evacuated from the area, and the rest of them had to
quickly leave Iranian territory at gunpoint.
While most of the Soviet troops were evacuated
from Iranian territory on the helicopters, some of the regiments had to leave on
their own feet. Roughly 3 hours after the landing in Iran they crossed the border,
and then 2 hours later they joined the rest of the troops near the Rabati-Jali base. Yeah,
they still had to complete their mission.
At 12:30 pm the assault group completed
reconnaissance of the base and contacted the air strike group. At 2:30 pm the
Su-17s conducted a second air strike on the mujahideen base. And at 3 pm the assault
teams launched their attack on the base. By 7 pm it was all over, with the Rabati-Jali
base being completely destroyed. However, with the second attack there was no longer an
element of surprise; the mujahideen managed to safely move out most of the drugs and weapons.
The MANPADS were not found at the base either.
By dark Operation South had ended; however, things
were still going south. One of the helicopters, while taking off, became disoriented in the
blowing sand and dust, turned on its side and collapsed. Only thanks to the flight mechanic,
who managed to quickly open the aft hatch, did the crew and soldiers manage to escape the helicopter
before it exploded. But that was not the final loss. It turned out that with all this running
between Iran and Afghanistan there might not be enough fuel for the return flight. So Colonel
Aprelkin called for a couple Mi-6 fuel tankers to urgently fly from Kandahar. One of those tankers,
while on the way to the refueling point, ran into an ambush and was shot down from the ground. The
crew managed to land the damaged helicopter and were soon rescued; however, they had to destroy
their Mi-6 before leaving, adding yet another loss to the toll of Operation South .
Interestingly enough, by the time this happened the Iranian Government had already issued a
note of protest to the USSR. And the Soviet Government made an official apology for the
incident. Some accounts state that the Soviet government also issued a lifetime pension to
the families of the slain factory guards.
As for the Soviet army, Operation South serves as
a perfect example that no matter how thoroughly you plan the operation, there s always the
possibility that a small accidental event will ruin all your plans. Of course, on top of that was
the fact that the Antonov An-30 could have more accurately controlled and guided the helicopter
group from above. It was also unforgivable that the entire helicopter group had blindly followed
the leading helicopter without conducting navigation themselves and while ignoring the
surrounding landmarks. But the main problem, of course, was the blunt ignorance of Colonel
Aprelkin, who simply ignored all warnings from his subordinates, like Captain Serebryaniy for
instance. It is believed that the helicopter s flight recorder impartially recorded their dispute
about their current location, which later saved the captain during the investigation. All accounts
of this 1982 incident state that Colonel Aprelkin became the one and only culprit of this incident,
which led to him losing his high command position and being sent back to the USSR. Which at first
made me think of how how normal it was. I mean, the high-ranking Soviet officer made a mistake and
had to suffer the consequences of his actions. The real Soviet Army as it was supposed to be.
But then I noted the photo that I have here, depicting Aprelkin during one of the Panjshir
offensives, which were some of the heaviest battles for the Soviets in that war, and the
picture is dated June 1982. Meaning it happened after Operation South . A simple search shows that
Aprelkin remained in his position in Afghanistan up until 1983. Looks like the success of Operation
South didn t affect his position at all. Moreover, in the book The Scorched Sky of Afghanistan
by Viktor Markovsky, I found yet another interesting episode with Colonel Aprelkin. In
July 1981, roughly 1 year before Operation South, when supporting Soviet troops in a major
operation, Aprelkin led a group of helicopters tasked with delivering a group of engineers to
mine the road from Pakistan to the Afghan town of Jalalabad. They completed the task; however,
on their way back they realised that they had mistakenly crossed the Afghan border and mined
the road in Pakistan. The group flew back to remove their mines, but it was too late; they saw
some trucks already burning on the Pakistani road. Looks like Aprelkin managed to visit and leave his
mark in all the countries neighboring Afghanistan. Except maybe for China, but I have a feeling
I just need to dig deeper into his career.
To Aprelkin s defence I may say that
navigation in Afghanistan must have been quite challenging due to the lack of landmarks.
Funny thing, though, even with many landmarks, navigation errors can still occur, like the 1967
incident in Germany when a Soviet Mig-21 pilot, instead of landing at his home base, accidently
landed on a NATO airfield. If you want to learn more about this fascinating episode of the Cold
War, check out my video, which is now available on my streaming service Nebula. By the way, that's
where you can find my other exclusive videos, like the one about the mock fights of the
captured F-5 fighter against the MiG-21 and 23, which greatly shocked the Soviet Command; or the
episode on the Soviets' crazy attempts to mount huge cannons on small fighters, which became
known as the "Recoilless madness of the '30s"; as well as other episodes on Soviet Aviation
history. And more episodes are coming.
The reason for this growing number of my videos
on Nebula is simple the strict advertiser-friendly guidelines on YouTube in regards to historical
content. Unfortunately, it s very often that my videos get affected by those policies, and the
most recent example is my previous video about the crash of the Soviet giant PS-124 aircraft,
which was demonetised for I don t know for what, since recently YouTube quit providing the reasons
for their decisions. Of course, I may start to adjust my words and videos in full accordance with
the guidelines, but that would mean treating my audience like kindergarten children. I don t want
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