Choisy-le-Roi. In this quiet street, half an hour from Paris, the few retirees who live there are intrigued. They only have eyes for one villa, at number 11. In the greatest discretion, sheltered by closed shutters, two men face each other: Henry Kissinger, special advisor to President Nixon, Lê Duc Tho, special advisor to President Ho Chi Minh. From 1970 to 1973, far from Vietnam, these two men held secret negotiations in Choisy-le-Roi, Gif-sur-Yvette, and Saint-Nom-la-Bretèche. Even today, no one knows that hundreds of hours of their interviews were recorded. Everything opposes them, their culture, their ideology, their background... They are at war. How will they make peace? Finally, listen, let's hope that this war story, which is starting to be very long, works out for the best. A war, which has lasted for more than 10 years, led by the leading world power against a small country of poor farmers. Faced with American relentlessness, Vietnam demonstrated determined resistance. Unable to win the war, each side wants to force the adversary to negotiate peace to their advantage. But each progress in these negotiations is hampered by the pro-American regime in South Vietnam, in full swing in the face of strong political and military opposition, the electoral deadlines in the United States, and more generally by the fragile balance of East/West relations. in the midst of the Cold War. The fate of an entire people depends on these negotiations. Two years before the first meeting between Lê Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger, a new political force emerged in this war: American public opinion. But not only that, the whole world is calling for peace and demanding the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. At the end of March 68, the military situation worsened, the American army was in difficulty, President Johnson chose to negotiate with North Vietnam. Two months later, the talks which began in Paris between the North Vietnamese Minister Xuan Thuy and the American Ambassador Averell Harriman quickly proved ineffective. It takes them 8 months to decide who should sit around the conference table. Because in Vietnam, on the ground, four armed forces clash, divided into two camps: North Vietnam, capital Hanoi, is a communist state chaired by Ho Chi Minh. The father of the struggle for the independence of Vietnam, saw the Geneva Accords in 1954 impose the separation of his country in two by a demarcation line at the 17th parallel. Hanoi supports the South Vietnamese opposition. To the south, the anti-communist regime of Saigon, supported at arm's length by the American army. For this America which claims to be sheriff of the world, the challenge is to stem the rise of communism, to stop it at the 17th parallel. Since Mao Tse-Tung came to power in China, followed by North Korea and then North Vietnam, Americans have feared a contagion phenomenon... For Hanoi, what is at stake? At the end of 68, when the official negotiations took place on Avenue Kléber in Paris, this strategy of containment had already cost the Americans dearly. The GI's, demoralized, containment strategy has already cost the Americans dearly. The GI's, demoralized,
no longer believe in a military victory against an enemy as elusive as a fish in water. From now on, for Washington the objective is to get its troops out of this quagmire, with their heads held high. The other force at the negotiating table is the power in Saigon. At its head is General Nguyen Van Thieu who is totally dependent on support from the United States. Thieu is worried: isn't America going to abandon him on the altar of peace? He then begins to maneuver to sabotage the negotiations, and becomes a cumbersome partner for the Americans. We South Vietnamese do not want to oppose these conversations because we will be accused, right, of working against peace. But we told the Americans who began the conversation with the North Vietnamese that the future of Vietnam depends on the Vietnamese, not the Americans. The last piece of the chessboard, the fourth military force, the FNL, National Liberation Front. Nicknamed the Viet Cong by his adversaries, he created his political branch, the GRP, Provisional Revolutionary Government, represented in Paris by Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh. A resistance fighter from the start, a former political detainee in Saigon, she is the voice of the armed resistance which controls part of South Vietnam and shares the same objective with Hanoi: to force the Americans to leave Vietnam and bring down the Thieu regime. We want what we call negotiating while struggling; a sort of tactic. We must fight on three fronts: the military, political but also diplomatic fronts, to try to bring more strength to our fight. As each party sticks to its positions, negotiations bog down. The journalists said that these were discussions between the deaf, because everyone declared their position, and after a short exchange of criticism, and that was it. For three years, it's always almost the same thing. This time, like last session, there is nothing new. The new American president, Richard Nixon, then proposed to Hanoi to negotiate secretly. In Paris, on August 5, 1969, Henry Kissinger, Nixon advisor, and Xuan Thuy, North Vietnamese minister, met in an apartment on rue de Rivoli. The one who welcomes them is none other than Jean Sainteny, former general delegate of France in Hanoi. The American government, more precisely President Nixon and his advisor, felt that the Avenue Kléber negotiations were getting bogged down, and that in parallel with these conversations, it was necessary to have more direct contacts, but that these contacts had to be be as discreet, not to say secret, as possible. And they asked me to organize them. What was done. Secrecy, the keystone of negotiation. For these shadow diplomats it allows them to maneuver, bargain, threaten, guess the adversary's game, and anticipate political and military issues. The closed session frees up speech without having to answer to cumbersome partners. Because as long as the secret is kept, what they negotiate is their own responsibility. Henry Kissinger and Lê Duc Tho are fine diplomats drawn into a game of chess where the clock is cruelly ticking. Kissinger knows that Lê Duc Tho fought the French and was tortured in the penal colony of Poulo Condor; that he is highly placed in the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam, but he is unaware that he has in front of him a resistance fighter, one of the leaders of the liberation army, who has just left the combat zone in South Vietnam . Lê Duc Tho, for his part, knows Kissinger's journey . His flight from Nazi Germany in the 1930s, his proximity to Nixon, his profile as an intellectual, professor at Harvard, a public man, accustomed to the lights of the great world. But the first meeting between Kissinger and Lê Duc Tho is delayed by a major event: in Hanoi, September 2, 1969 Ho and Lê Duc Tho is delayed by a major event: in Hanoi, September 2, 1969 Ho and Lê Duc Tho is delayed by a major event: in Hanoi, on September 2, 1969 Ho Chi Minh died. At his bedside Lê Duc Tho and the other leaders of the country. In the midst of war, national funerals were organized. Will the death of the emblematic leader influence the morale of the fighters? Washington wonders . In these days of mourning, an entire people echoes what Ho Chi Minh proclaimed: “Never, never will the Americans defeat us” February 21, 1970, first secret session between Lê Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger. It is the Vietnamese delegation which receives, in a villa which it has rented, far from avenue Kléber, at 11 rue Darthé in Choisy le Roi. The appointment is set for 9:30 a.m. Lê Duc Tho, foreseeing and meticulous, arrives early. Henry Kissinger and his four collaborators, confident, are on site at the appointed time. This is the first time that Lé Duc Thô and Kissinger met. They shake hands, and then exchange, you see, a few words of formal courtesy. There are 10 of them, including interpreters, around a large rectangular table. The two delegations face each other. The shutters are closed. A cozy atmosphere, far from the tumult of war. The two men size each other up. In the secret meetings, we talk about questions, the word that Henry Kissinger used : substantial questions. This first meeting will last almost 6 hours. It's 9:40 a.m., the countdown to the secret negotiations begins. Lê Duc Tho expresses his distrust in the loyalty of the Americans. You talk about peace, but you make war. We are suspicious because we have often been deceived. In 45, we signed an agreement with the French, but they sent us the troops; 9 years later, we concluded an agreement in Geneva, which will be torn up as soon as it is signed. So I wonder if your good will is sincere. I suggest you talk to us frankly. During these 10 years of war, you spent a lot of money, without gaining anything in return. I don't understand: what is your interest in continuing this war? » In his report to Nixon, Kissinger allows himself an optimistic note: “We completely disagree on major points, Mr. President, but this first meeting remains positive. After lunch, each person taking his or her own part, the discussion resumes. Lê Duc Tho addresses several points at length. The withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. So we settle the question of the administration of Saigon, then the question of the North Vietnamese troops who are in South Vietnam ; And then the question of the demilitarized zone. Kissinger sets a priority for the next meeting: our first objective is to reach a reciprocal agreement, we withdraw our soldiers from South Vietnam, and you repatriate yours to North Vietnam, as well as your troops present in Cambodia and in Laos. The two men met again in March and April 1970. For Lê Duc Tho, it was obvious that sending American troops to Vietnam was illegal. Kissinger replies that the presence of the North Vietnamese army in the South is also illegal and sets a condition: "I will withdraw our troops only if you withdraw yours, Mr. Special Advisor." Lê Duc Tho does not give in; he says it, repeats it constantly: “Mr. Special Advisor, we are at home, it is a matter between Vietnamese, you are the aggressor. » Barely a month later, a new American attack put an end to talks between the two men. On April 29, 1970, B52s heavily bombed eastern Cambodia, along the border with Vietnam. They will do the same a few months later in Laos. Objective: destroy the headquarters of the North Vietnamese general staff and the FNL / cut the Ho Chi Minh trail. A Ho Chi Minh trail that has become a network of several thousand kilometers, an umbilical cord between the north and the south through which supplies, military equipment and troops pass, a network of trails that the Americans have bombed in vain for 10 years. The intervention in Cambodia provoked significant demonstrations of indignation, violently repressed by the Republican Guard. On the Kent State campus, four students are killed. Aware of the power of the peace movement, Nixon began his mandate in 1969 with a plan to disengage the American army. Blocking the road to communism is no longer the priority of the moment because America has lost much of its credit and prestige in the world. Richard Nixon wants to leave Vietnam, but must do so with honor, without humiliation to restore the American image. An initial withdrawal of 50,000 men out of a workforce of 536,000. At this rate, Vietnam is far from being at peace. South Vietnamese soldiers must take over from the Americans. Objective: In 3 years, recruit 400,000 men, equip them, train them. Create from scratch the largest military force in Southeast Asia. More than a year had passed when Henry Kissinger and Lê Duc Tho met again, in July 71. Is this long-awaited peace getting closer? Are they trying to save time? Their strategy has not changed. Hanoi demands total troop withdrawal Americans, and Washington is playing for time by the gradual withdrawal of its soldiers as the ranks of Saigon's army strengthen. Time for Hanoi and the FNL to catch their breath after months of fighting, probably. The conversations in Paris between Kissinger and Tho continued because the North Vietnamese were used to what we call in Vietnamese talks and military offensive at the same time. We are fighting over the ground, you can say that. We also have very hard years. At the end of 69/70, even let's say 71, because American armaments are also very deadly. For 10 years, until 1971, tens of thousands of tons of chemicals For 10 years, until 1971, tens of thousands of tons of chemicals For 10 years, until 1971, tens of thousands of Tons of highly toxic chemicals , including Agent Orange containing dioxin, are dumped in South Vietnam. Code name: *Ranch Hand/ farm worker*. Objective: destroy the vegetation to kill the enemy hiding there. But the victims are also civilians, men, women, children. Science at the service of the unspeakable. A methodical, systematic spreading technique. The longest chemical war the world has ever known. An ecocide. Even today, dioxin sows death, handicaps and bruises. In Paris, negotiations are stagnating, peace is slipping away. . No meeting took place between the fall of 71 and the beginning of 72. Nixon went to Beijing, it was the first visit by an American head of state under Mao's regime. Then Moscow. The time has come for East/West relations to warm up. A historic moment for balance and world peace. The opportunity for Nixon and Kissinger to ask the Chinese and the Soviets to reduce the military aid provided to their North Vietnamese ally and to put pressure on them. “Tell them to make concessions!” » They will not be heard. We received heavy weapons from the Soviet Union and then light weapons and especially logistical aid from China; but we use weapons to wage our own war and not with the presence or participation of foreign soldiers on our land. In Vietnam, it is a war of liberation and not an international war, a World War. In 2 years, Lê Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger met around ten times. Always secretly. Can these face-to-face meetings really end the conflict? They force them, by confronting their arguments, to draw up a peace project. They learned to measure themselves, to note the qualities and weaknesses of their adversary, to understand their psychology, to test their pugnacity. In my opinion, Kissinger is a very intelligent man. Lots of humor, a man, you know, who has a lot of experience in negotiations, but a man of maneuver and an impassive man. Lê Duc Tho, he fights, he also fights in a very courageous but also intelligent way. That's why I'm told that with Mr. Kissinger, who is a very self-confident man and can be a little vain, he must still face Lé Duc Thô, I don't know if I'm using the correct word , but he must bend. The military offensive of spring 72, the North Vietnamese conquered Quang Tri province. For the first time since the Geneva Accords in 1954, the North Vietnamese army took the risk of crossing the demarcation line of the 17th parallel. Objective: The fall of Saigon. And prove that they will stop at no obstacle to drive the Americans out of Vietnam. To show his desire not to give in, Nixon responded. After four years of interruption, the B52s returned in April 72 towards North Vietnam, bombing the ports, the suburbs of Hanoi but also the base of dikes to cause their destruction. Ramsey Clark, former attorney general under Johnson, went there with a delegation of American peace activists to see the damage. The Saigon army, supported by American firepower, regained control, one by one, of the lost cities. Six months of fighting, and a status quo: neither winner nor loser. It is demonstrated that only political negotiations can lead to peace. Mr. Kissinger began coming to Paris to meet other people in great secrecy. I can tell you now that we helped, and that I even personally helped: and that, curiously in France, the secret was perfectly kept. And then one day we moved, not of our own making, from secret to discreet, that is to say we no longer hide the meetings. We just don't say what's going on there. Negotiations then take precedence over war. The two men will meet again from July 1972. Nixon, with the presidential elections approaching, wants to accelerate the peace process. And Hanoi knows it. As the secret meetings are now known to the press the negotiators must change location. The French Communist Party, which supports the North Vietnamese, puts at their disposal the villa which belonged to the painter Fernand Léger in Gif-sur-Yvette. That day, I was present in Gif-sur-Yvette. We'll let Kissinger speak first. Kissinger returned from Saigon and made no progress on our demands. After that Mr Lê Duc Tho passes Kissinger a document in English. On the other hand Mr Lê Duc Tho explains the essentials of the graph, of the document. But the most new problem today is that we accept that Thieu's government will remain. For Hanoi, is this really a concession? Isn't their only objective the departure of the Americans and the reunification of the country? Thieu or not Thieu, once the GI'S leave, it will be a matter between Vietnamese. Kissinger and the members of the American delegation, they say like this: “Mr. Lê Duc Tho, you have given us a very important document. »And the next day, what do the conclusions say? We looked and they accepted more than 80% of our proposals. On October 20, we reached an agreement that Nixon considered excellent. In Washington, Henri Kissinger said “peace is at hand”, meaning that peace is within our reach. This draft agreement which was very very anti-South Vietnamese and very favorable to the North Vietnamese; that is to say that if the agreement is concluded, the North Vietnamese continue to have troops in South Vietnam, while we Vietnamese, we wanted all the North Vietnamese troops to withdraw from South Vietnam to return in Vietnam, in North Vietnam. The draft agreement negotiated by Kissinger ignored this question. For South Vietnam, it was a question of life and death. In Saigon, Henry Kissinger works to convince President Thieu that flexibility is necessary . He confirms their commitment to South Vietnam. After Thieu's refusal, Nixon gave a message to Hanoi. He asks us to continue the conversation. This is why on November 11, we returned to Gif-sur-Yvette for the second time. They proposed about 70 amendments on very important issues, i.e. they are again demanding the return of North Vietnamese troops, so we do not agree. It is Nguyen Van Thieu who imposes these amendments. He doesn't want to find himself alone facing his enemies. Nixon and Kissinger knew this and expected Saigon's refusal. But the American president is campaigning for a second term. He wants to be the man who made peace in Vietnam. During November the two negotiators meet. Lê Duc Tho refuses to sacrifice the October agreement that Nixon found just a few days ago excellent. Washington is faced with a dilemma: either abandon Saigon by returning to the previous agreement, or stand up to Hanoi, at the risk of getting bogged down again in war. Over the course of their interviews , Thieu's amendments fell one by one. At the beginning of December, only one important point remains to be resolved. This is the problem of the 17th parallel. Kissinger proposes a compromise, the 17th parallel which he wanted to be impassable, could be opened to the passage of civilians. This crucial point should no longer be a problem... Because our troops are beyond, 20km on the other side, already in South Vietnam. Lê Duc Tho transmits Kissinger's proposal to Hanoi who, against all expectations, rejects it. Lê Duc Tho said to Kissinger: I must return to Hanoi for consultations with our government. Lê Duc Tho thought that with the conversation suspended, the Americans could do something important, something dangerous. While Kissinger has just wished him a happy Christmas with his family, a rain of bombs falls on Hanoi upon his arrival. And immediately the Americans began bombing Hanoi to intimidate Lê Duc Thô. Despite the announcement of an imminent peace agreement, for 12 days hundreds of bomber planes Despite the announcement of an imminent peace agreement, for 12 days hundreds of bomber planes including 120 B-52s descend on the northern Vietnam. Operation Linebaker 2 is the most terrifying of the war. What Kissinger does not say is that he knew that these bombings would take place, whatever the attitude of Lê Duc Tho. As proof, this secret recording between him and Nixon on December 2, 1972, fifteen days before the bombings. Linebaker 2 will cause thousands of civilian deaths and injuries. Linebaker 2 will cause thousands of civilian deaths and injuries.
For pilots, only one requirement: Fire and forget - fire and forget. There is only one requirement for pilots: Fire and forget. There is only one requirement for pilots: Fire and forget. In 12 days, the equivalent of all the bombs dropped on North Vietnam in 10 years will fall . Objective: Further weaken North Vietnam to give Thieu time to strengthen his regime without the Americans. And for Nixon and Kissinger to leave Vietnam with their heads held high. On the third day of the Linebacker 2 offensive, Washington sent a message to Hanoi : “If negotiations resume – STOP – We are ready to stop bombing – STOP” But Hanoi does not respond. We must not accept too quickly so as not to give them the impression that we are in a hurry to do this. With the B52 bombings on Hanoi during these 12 days, they aroused the anger, the discontent of all the people, including the allied governments of the United States, like the government of England. In my opinion, these B52 bombings really wanted to re-establish certain problems in the Paris Agreements. Because I think that like the text, the Accords were not favorable for the United States, for politics , first of all. And secondly, in my opinion they still wanted to weaken North Vietnam before their departure. They say that then we are under pressure from the B52 bombings, which is why in January 73, we proposed to return to the conference table. That 's not true. LineBaker 2 has violently shaken the peace process, which seems to have become impossible. However, a new secret meeting is finally set for January 8. Lê Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger meet again, in a more than tense atmosphere. So when Kissinger comes to Gif-sur-Yvette, we always open the door and there is someone who has come out of the house to show him the entrance to the meeting room. But that day, there was no one there. That day we left the door almost closed. The two parties do not shake hands, and do not talk about anything. And Lê Duc Tho begins his speech. So in a very logical, very calm way, but with a very strong tone. Condemn Nixon, condemn the American government, condemn the American bombings, condemn Kissinger's attitude, condemn everything. Very very severe. Kissinger, he's in a pretty delicate position, so he sat down, and he listened . I heard that Kissinger said this: “Mr Lê Duc Tho, please speak less loudly, because the journalists outside hear everything and say that you blame the American side. » Among all the sessions between Kissinger and Lé Duc Thô that I was able to attend, this is the most tense, the most severe session. Kissinger once said that if we don't come to a conclusion, I believe the bombs will continue to fall. Lê Duc Tho: I’ll stop you, we’re not afraid at all. Now you say like that... You have to take back your word. A final meeting took place on January 13, 1973, in Saint Nom la Bretèche, where the final details of the peace were settled. This is the end of their secret talks, after 45 working sessions in three years. The agreement that they initialed on January 24, Avenue Kléber in Paris, is almost the same as that of October 1972, which the Americans, under pressure from Thieu, had wanted to renegotiate. On January 27, 1973, the agreements were officially signed by the 4 protagonists of the conflict, avenue Kléber. Naturally with the signing of the agreement the Vietnamese people show immense joy and at the same time great pride. What did the Americans get from the North Vietnamese except the return of the prisoners? And it is for this reason that the North Vietnamese consider that it was a victory for them, and they are quite right to say that with regard to the Americans, it was a victory. There are all the forces of peace and justice in the world with us. We are victorious together. Not just Vietnam. The Paris Agreements will not be respected. Obviously, the ceasefire between the GRP and the Saigon government could not hold. How could we have hoped that on the same territory, South Vietnam, two governments, two administrations, two armies would coexist? Barely signed, the war resumed, a war which would end with the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. When Lê Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger were nominated together for the Nobel Peace Prize , Lê Duc Tho refused it. He does not want us to confuse the victim and the aggressor. In his eyes, Kissinger bears a heavy responsibility for the dramatic toll of the war. Between shadow and light, the history of secret diplomacy outlines its successes and failures, sometimes revealed, often hidden. In the great history of armed conflicts, since antiquity, the use of secret negotiations has always been the key to settling wars and disputes between peoples. Secret talks between Lê Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger lasted 3 years. 3 years during which these men held the destiny of their nation in their hands; a heavy burden; with each move played, they lose pieces; But those on their chessboard are men, women, children. Between shadow and light, a necessary secret diplomacy, a war of words, where a few letters can call into question the peace of a people.
