Good morning.
Secretary, thank you so much. It's good to be with you.
Well, first off, as I just mentioned, Secretary Blinken, thank you so much to
you and your team for your time this morning.
I know you're very busy. We have an on the record discussion this
morning with the secretary for about 30 minutes with a 10 minute Q and A.
We just have one housekeeping item. Since we're not live streaming this, we
are asking if you would hold your tweets, headline stories until we wrap
the discussion just for a flow of conversation.
But again, we're very much looking forward to the conversation.
Thank you all for taking time to be here.
So let's get started. Q Secretary, so just this morning, Putin
is overseeing some annual nuclear drills with Russian forces.
How concerned are you that Russia could use a dirty bomb and blame it on the
Ukraine and. Blame it on Ukraine?
Look, we're concerned about two things. We're, of course, concerned about the
rhetoric we've heard from Putin and from other Russian officials going back some
weeks now over the possible use of nuclear weapons.
We're watching that very carefully. We haven't seen reason to change our own
nuclear posture. But it's something that we're tracking
very carefully. And we've also
communicated directly and very clearly to the Russians, to President Putin,
about the consequences that would flow from any use of a nuclear device.
Separate apart from that, we've seen these
allegations coming from the Russians that somehow the Ukrainians are looking
or contemplating using a so-called dirty bomb,
which is an utter fabrication and something that is also the height of
irresponsibility coming from a nuclear power.
In fact, the IAEA is now at Ukraine's invitation in Ukraine, visiting as
they've done in the past. The nuclear facilities that the Ukraine
has. The reason this particular allegation
gives us some concern is because Russia has a track record of projecting, which
is to say accusing others of doing something that they themselves have done
or thinking about doing. But there again, we communicated very
clearly and very directly to the Russians about trying to use this false
allegation as a pretext for any kind of escalation on Russia's behalf.
And just to hold on that for a second, what would be our response if Russia
does do something like that in terms of a mirroring and that.
Well, I'm not going to get into speaking publicly to what we and others would do
other than to say that we've communicated that very clearly and very
directly to the Russians, including president to the stand on Ukraine for a
minute, a little longer in terms of more broadly, we're heading into the midterm
elections. We are hearing some concerns grow louder
about support for Ukraine, the cost of it.
What assurances are you giving to Ukraine, our allies, that we are going
to stay supportive for the months ahead? Look, what we've seen today is a
remarkable bipartisan consensus and bipartisan support for Ukraine, for
putting pressure on Russia to cease its aggression, for taking the steps
necessary at NATO to shore up our own defensive alliance.
I visited Ukraine. I visited neighboring countries with
bipartisan delegations from Congress, from both the House and the Senate.
And that consensus, that strong core, I think, remains strong and we'll remain
so going forward. Vitally important because it's in the
national interest. And yes, of course, there's deep concern
about the horrific destruction that's been done in Ukraine, the brutalization
of the Ukrainian people. And that, I think, touches Americans
across the board, irrespective of whether they're Republicans or
Democrats, members of Congress or citizens.
But we also know that this is an aggression against the very principles
that are at the heart of the international system necessary for
keeping peace and security principles that grew out of the experience of two
world wars and a conviction that we had to find ways to make sure that those
couldn't be repeated. And so there was an agreement that you
can't simply go in and seize territory from another country, that you can't
change the borders of another country by force, that you can't try to race its
independence and sovereignty from the map.
And if we allow that to go unchecked, if we allow that to proceed with impunity,
it opens a Pandora's box around the world for would be aggressors.
That's going to create conflict. And we know from history that draws us
in. I think in my conversations with members
of Congress, Republicans, Democrats, House or Senate, there's a shared
conviction that this is important. It's necessary.
And we're sticking with Ukraine. You were just referencing history a
couple of times there. And I know you have written about,
studied, worked on foreign policy related to that intersection of the
U.S., Europe, Russia, particularly around energy for a long time, even
writing a book, al resolve on it in the 1980s.
So if you fast forward to today. What is your view on whether Europe has
finally learned its lesson on energy dependence with its neighbor?
What we've seen over the last nine or so months since the Russian aggression
began is remarkable in terms of actually moving Europe away from this dependence
on Russian energy that's built up over decades.
Europe in general, leading countries in particular, have done more of the space
of nine months to break that dependence than anything we've seen in years.
And we see that in the already dramatically reduced dependence on
Russian gas, in particular on Russian oil.
And that's vitally important. And it's going to have profound
strategic impacts going forward over the coming years and decades.
But like any transition, especially a transition from something that's built
up over so many years, it's challenging. It's not without difficulty.
It's not without pain. And Europeans are facing that square on.
We're working to do everything we possibly can to help, especially to get
through this coming winter and the winter beyond.
As you know, ever since the Russian aggression and even going back before
that, we've been working to, first of all, to make sure that there's enough
energy on world markets to meet demand. We've worked very closely with Europe in
particular in the short term to make sure that we could get a surge of LNG
supplies, liquefied natural gas to them to make up for what they were losing
from Russia. We've worked with partners and allies in
Asia to divert supplies of LNG that were going to them to Europe.
We've increased our own production of oil and gas to actually to record
levels. And of course, the president has drawn
down for us to fully reserve in part to keep prices in check.
One of the things that's happening in Europe now is because of the very
important moves that they've made, including to try to decrease demand
during this critical period, to pursue the transition away from Russian energy
and to take other steps. The supply that they have on hand going
into the winter will probably be, you know, what's necessary to keep things
going and to keep people warm and comfortable.
However. The impact on price is what's the
immediate concern? Because that has the potential
to make it harder for industry to get the energy it needs to keep producing
things that has economic impacts, et cetera.
So one of the things that we're working on and it's something, of course, that
affects our own citizens is not only making sure that the supply is there,
but making sure to the best of our ability, the prices are kept in check.
And this is in a moment, of course, of global inflation.
So all of that things we're working on, we're also working on the longer term
with the Europeans. We established a task force with the
European Union to work on this longer term transition.
Last thing I'll say is that it only accentuates the need as Europe is moving
away from dependence on Russian energy to also pursue this energy transition to
renewables. That, too, takes time, but it only, I
think, emphasizes the imperative of doing that, not only in terms of dealing
with climate, but also in terms of dealing with
dependencies on. Fossil fuels, particularly coming from
specific countries like Russia. So you just hit on a number of things
there that we cover so closely here at Bloomberg Energy Markets, inflation both
in the global economy and certainly in the US right now.
And it's also make me making me think of Saudi Arabia in terms of relations
there. They seem to be at the lowest that
they've been in a really long time. You know, what can you possibly do to
potentially recalibrate that relationship?
Are you preparing to try and do something like that and re-engage the
crown prince at the G 20 coming up, for example?
First thing to note is this. This is a relationship that has been
built over many decades, over many administrations, different leaderships
in Saudi Arabia. It's been built up on a bipartisan
basis, taking into account a multiplicity of interests that the
United States has in that relationship and ideally in that in that partnership
and. As we're looking at where we're going.
We're going to do it in a very deliberate fashion in consultation with
members of Congress. The president said to make sure of this,
that the relationship better reflects our own interests.
So we're looking at how to most effectively do that.
Since the decision biopic plus, which we've not been,
you know, not not been shy about making very clear
the extent to which we view that as a wrong decision
and one that. Does nothing actually to advance our
interests. On the contrary.
The potential for prices to go up to further align Putin's focus at a time
that is committing this aggression to have prices rise.
If they were to rise at a time when the world economies are trying to recover
from Covid as well as dealing with global inflation.
So we've been very clear that this was the wrong decision and also the wrong
decision in terms of CAC plus itself. And in Saudi Arabia, because there was
nothing to suggest in the analysis that we have and that we shared with the
Saudis that we were looking at prices plummeting in ways that would be
problematic for them. But having said that, since the
decision, we've seen a few interesting things.
The Saudis supported the important resolutions at the United Nations
condemning Russia's aggression, particularly the resolution that went
forward in the General Assembly, condemning the purported accusations of
Ukrainian territory. We've also seen the Saudis come forward
with about 400 million dollars in humanitarian assistance for Ukraine.
So these are positive developments. They don't compensate for the decision
that was made by CAC close plus on production.
But we take note of that. The other hand says this.
Right now, we have actually not seen prices go up because we've taken steps,
presence taken steps, including further released Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
Additional steps on our own production that are keeping prices in check.
In fact, they've actually gone down a little.
And of course, the actual production cut has not gone into effect.
This was an announcement of a decision. We haven't yet seen the production cuts
go into effect themselves. How much of a risk, though, do you see
if energy markets in Europe really do tight now tighten up?
We see some blackout blackouts or even we see in places like the northeast in
the US start to struggle in terms of access to energy this winter.
How destabilizing could that be in terms of our support for the war in Ukraine or
just the global economy? Look, my own assessment is this and I'm
not not the leading expert on this. So maybe Secretary Granholm can come by
and others. But based on the steps that the
Europeans have taken over the last six or seven months, and particularly over
the last few months, including the summer, they've done a number of things
that are very significant that I think will help keep things in the right place
through the course of this winter. One is to make sure that their own
reserves were as full as they possibly could be.
So they've done a very good job in doing that.
But too, was to take very significant steps to decrease demand.
And that's making a difference. And three, of course, is the work that I
alluded to that we've done to make sure that we could help search to them
supplies of energy that would compensate for any losses that they're getting as a
result of moving away from from Russian oil and gas.
And so, again, on the LNG research that we've diverted, supplies that were going
to Asia, we increased our own production.
All of this together. I think it's having a very it's having a
positive impact. And look, we'll we'll see how things go
in the coming months. There are things we can't control like
the weather. So we'll see what the winners like.
But my own assessment is that the Europeans have taken very important
steps to make sure that they can get through
the winter in good shape. So let's turn to U.S.
China relations. Last week you made some comments related
to thinking that China won't wants to see Taiwan on up.
As you said, much faster timeline. What are you seeing that made you think
that this is speeding up? What we've seen is this and it goes back
a few years, not a few months, and actually let me go back take a step
back even further. One of the hallmarks in the relationship
or going back some 50 years was the way that we handled the issues surrounding
Taiwan. And in particular, there was a
fundamental understanding in the relationship between
Beijing and Washington that differences over Taiwan, between Beijing and Taiwan
would be managed peacefully. That there would be no unilateral
changes to the status quo and that fundamentally our interest was in peace
and stability in the Taiwan Straits. That was the basic understanding and
that understanding held for decades. And I think it was very successful in
doing a few things that allowed Taiwan itself to flourish and its people to
flourish. It also made sure I helped to make sure
that there wouldn't be conflict between the United States and China over over
Taiwan. What's changed is this.
A decision by the government in Beijing that that status quo was no longer
acceptable, that they wanted to speed up the process by which they would pursue
reunification. And they also, I think, have made
decisions about how they would do that, including exerting more pressure on
Taiwan. Coercion, making life difficult in a
variety of ways. On Taiwan, in the hopes that that would
speed reunification, but also holding out the
possibility. If that didn't didn't work of using
force to achieve their goals. That is what is fundamentally changed.
And we've seen that manifested in actions that the Chinese taken,
including with various military maneuvers, the Taiwan Straits, the
deployment of forces, et cetera. Now.
As we see it, this is first and foremost an effort, as I said, to turn up
pressure on Taiwan and as to what Beijing might do and what
it might do it. You know, I can't be any any more
precise than that. But the.
The fundamental change has been this. This is changing in China's view that
the status quo is acceptable. This should be a concern for not just
the United States, but for countries not only in the region, but around the
world. Why?
Because if there's any crisis regarding Taiwan, we've got 50 percent of
container ships on a daily basis travelling through the Taiwan Straits.
The implications of a crisis, if that were disrupted or for the world economy.
Supply chains are significant.
More than six million. Semiconductors.
Chips. As everyone knows by now.
The 90 percent of the sophisticated chips are produced in Taiwan.
If that were for any reason disrupted, it would have deeply significant
consequences for the global economy. The chips that are in our cell phones
are dishwashers or automobiles. If that's disrupted, if if that's taken
out of the supply chain, everyone has a big problem.
So everyone has a very big interest, I think, in making very clear to all
involved, starting with Beijing, that the world does not want to see any kind
of crisis regarding Taiwan, any kind of
disruption. And the world believes that these
differences need to be resolved peacefully and that peace and stability
needs to be preserved in the Taiwan Strait.
So you were just explaining that change that you're seeing in China's approach
and the status quo. From our point of view, does that then
mean that the era from the US's approach of strategic ambiguity is that era over?
I think what's very important to to recognize from the get go is the
relationship as a whole with China. First of all, it is among the most, if
not the most consequential that we have. It's among the most complicated, if not
the most complicated that we have. And it also can't be reduced to a bumper
sticker. We clearly have a competition.
And in part, it's a competition to shape what the world looks like going forward.
Where we've really reached an inflection point, inflection point, because the
post-Cold War era is over. There is a competition to shape what
comes next. China, the United States are two of the
biggest players in that. And we just have different visions for
what the world should look like going forward.
I think China wants a world order, but there's would be an illiberal one.
We want a world order, but ours would be inspired
by liberal values. So there's a fundamental difference and
we're in a competition about that. We're not we're not shy about it.
Neither is. Neither is Beijing.
But we also continue to have and I think the world expects us to have cooperation
on big issues that are affecting the lives of not just Chinese and not just
Americans, but people around the world on things like climate and global
health. And so where our interests continue to
align. We'll continue to look for ways to
cooperate. And then to the extent that the aspects
of the relationship are adversarial, we'll clearly stand up and stand up
strongly for for our interests. We don't look for conflict.
We don't want a Cold War. We're not trying to contain or restrain
China. But equally, we're resolute in standing
up for our interests, standing up for our values.
And again, when it comes to Taiwan, standing up for the proposition that's
held for decades, that these differences need to be managed and resolved
peacefully, that there cannot and should not be unilateral changes to the status
quo, particularly by force, and that we have an abiding interest in peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait. That's a that is a strong basic interest
of the United States and one that we're determined to uphold.
So you were just talking about that competition between us, but also that
the relationship is complicated. When you saw this weekend Xi Jinping
when another term as leader of China and also surrounding himself by even more
loyalists, concentrating power even more.
Does that make your foreign policy approach with China more complicated or
in some ways easier? Because you know exactly who you're
dealing with. First, you have to start with, I think,
a basic proposition that. What we can do with our foreign policy
and by the way, with our domestic policy she'll come to second, is to help shape
the environment outside of China, in which kind of makes decisions.
We're not going to be doing anything to shape the internal.
These are decisions that China will make and that we can't make, but we can shape
the external environment in which China is acting and making making decisions
about its its policies in the world. That's one thing.
One of the most effective ways that we can do that is exactly what we've been
doing over the last couple of years. First.
Making the necessary investments in ourselves so that as we're competing
with China, as we're working to to shape the international
environment for what comes next, that we do it with the strongest possible hand.
We just had a almost historic, I would say historic
success with the chips and science CAC. Making massive investments in our own
ability to retain technological edge when it comes to chips and
semiconductors and not just in their production and making sure that we're
producing more here, but also investments in the basic science and
research and development that will preserve that technological edge.
Similarly, the Inflation Reduction Act has historic investments in our ability
to deal with climate change, in particular by making sure that we're
developing the technologies here in the United States to do that.
So these investments make a huge difference in the investments that we're
making across the board in infrastructure and education, as well as
in research and development that goes to our fundamental strength at home, which
in turn goes to our standing in strength around the world.
But the second piece is this, and this is so vital.
One of the first instructions that I got from President Biden in taking this job
was to invest in virtually every single minute of the day in revitalizing
rejuvenated re energizing our alliances and our partnerships
and as necessary. Creating new alliance countries that
were fit for purpose on any given issue, and that's exactly what we've done.
But a big part of that is goes to the competition with China.
When we have greater alignment with other countries, whether it's in Europe,
whether it's in Asia, whether it's in every other part of the world, then our
ability to. Deal with his competition effectively is
enhanced to strengthen. For example, when we see practices that
China's engaged in economically that are fundamentally unfair to our workers
and to our businesses and we want to see changes.
For dealing with those issues on our own, we're 20, 25 percent of world GDP,
significant to say the least. But when we're dealing together with
Europe, with the European Union, with partners in Asia, we might be 50 or 60
percent of world GDP. That's a lot harder for China to ignore.
So this alignment with others, with Europe, with Asia, with other countries
around the world on issues where we have a difference in interests with China,
that's a powerful part of what we're able to do to shape the choices that
China makes. Great.
I want to turn to Cuba and and just one minute.
But when you look ahead to the next year, Secretary, what are you most
focused on in terms of at the department working for both, you think?
As I said, the what's fundamentally motivating us is this strongly held view
that we really are at an inflection point, that this is a moment when the
post-Cold War era is clearly over and there is this competition to shape what
comes next. And so making sure that we have the
tools that we need to be doing as much of that shaping as possible is is front
and center in what I'm thinking about. And as I said, that goes to many things
we're doing at home in terms of the investments we're making ourselves.
For my part, in terms of what I'm responsible for, it's in building the
strongest possible partnerships, creating the greatest possible alignment
with other countries, like minded countries of one kind or
another. Democracies, but also countries that may
not fit neatly into the democratic camp, but have a strong interest in having a
world order that's actually shaped by rules that everyone plays by.
We're working together with many countries to to achieve that.
And then within that, as we're thinking about that and working on that, we also
want to make sure that Putin's aggression in Ukraine remains a
strategic defeat for Russian, that we continue to pursue
alignment with other countries in dealing with competition with China, and
that we're finding new and ever more effective ways to deal with a
multiplicity of interconnected global challenges that are the things that are
really affecting the lives of people in the United States, but also people
around the world. And that's global health.
That's climate. That's food and security.
That is inclusive economic growth. All of these things which, you know, in
years past, we're not necessarily front and center in what the State Department
focused on. They now are they have to be because
more than anything else, they're affecting the lives of citizens in all
of our countries. And so the more that we're actually
working together with others to address those issues, which is exactly what
we've been doing, where the United States has regained reassert its
leadership in helping to try to move the world forward and addressing.
That's what we're going to make a big difference.
And that's what I'm focused on. We still have a greater ability, in my
judgment, than any country on earth to mobilize others in positive collective
action. And that action is more necessary than
it's ever been. Collective action, because not a single
one of these problems is any one country able to solve effectively on its own.
We have to find new ways to collaborate, to cooperate in partnerships.
The United States has been leading in the effort to do just that on all of
these issues. And the last thing is this.
One of the things I think we know from from history is that the world doesn't
organize itself. So if the United States is not engaged
in working to do a lot of organizing, then one of two things.
Someone else is going to do it and probably not in a way that reflects our
interests and values or no one does it. And then you have a vacuum and vacuums
tend to be filled by bad things before they're filled by good things.
Yeah. Or chaos.
Exactly. Well let me turn to the Q and A.
I'm sorry. Would you mind seeing your name and
affiliation? Yes.
Question Secretary and Brian Katulis and with the Middle East Institute.
Good to see you. Thanks for your service.
And I commend your team for trying to put diplomacy first on a number of
issues, including a run a year and a half now into it.
What's your assessment of the prospects of what you outlined?
Is your goal on that? And then how do things like the protests
and other things move you and your team to maybe start
thinking about what a Plan B looks like if the nuclear negotiations don't
succeed? As you thanks for our friend.
Well, first, the I think the eyes of the world are focused on Iran and
particularly on the protests. Today marks the fortieth day since the
killing of Mousavi, which is a day of significance in terms of commemorating
her life and her loss. And I think what we're seeing.
Across Iran is a quite remarkable expression of frustration,
anger at various policies pursued by the regime.
And we're seeing this spontaneously. We're seeing it in different parts of
the country. And it appears to be really from the
from the grassroots up. And I think the world is rightly focused
on that. We've been in terms of both the
solidarity we've expressed with people being able to express themselves freely.
And we've done that not only rhetorically.
We've also, in terms of the actions we've taken,
both in terms of sanctioning those responsible for the repression of the
Iranian people's efforts to speak freely, including the so-called morality
police, as well as those who were responsible for supporting the
repressive actions of the regime. Right now, the sanctions, but also in
trying to help ensure that technology necessary for Iranians to communicate
with each other and with the rest of the world,
that there are no obstacles to getting that technology
to the Iranian people. With regard to the JCP away,
the fact of the matter is this right now, I don't see a near-term
prospect for that that moving forward. Why?
Because the Iranians have continued to try to inject extraneous issues into the
discussions over the JCP away that are a dead end.
And unless and until they decide to drop those, it's hard to see the JCP moving
forward. We remain determined one way or another
to make sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.
We continue to believe that diplomacy is actually the best and most effective way
to do that. And when it was enforced, the JCP
actually put Iran's nuclear program in a box.
Unfortunately, since
the United States pulled out of the agreement, it gave the Iranians an
excuse to break out of the box that the agreement put them in.
And we've now seen them take steps that have made their nuclear program
increasingly dangerous. And one way or another, we and many
countries around the world need to deal with that.
And we will. As I say, we continue to believe
diplomacy is the best way but president and very clear from day one, even as we
sought to get a return to mutual compliance with the Jason Kelly, we're
not going to enter into a bad agreement. And we're certainly not going to allow
Iran to do things that are unacceptable in other areas for the sake of getting
back into the agreement. Courtney from Bloomberg.
Mr. Secretary, thanks for joining us and
onto another nuclear aspirants. North Korea continues to advance its own
capabilities and to resist calls for diplomatic engagement.
At what point does the administration have to alter its own approach, given
that it is not bearing fruit just in our hemisphere on Haiti?
And how do you attempt or how does the administration hope to help stabilize
the situation in Haiti, given the reluctance to send U.S.
personnel and obviously also the resistance in Haiti to do so
on North Korea? This.
This has been a story that's been playing out over.
Years, decades, in fact, ever since I've been involved in these issues, since
since joining the State Department in 1993 and successive administrations have
worked to grapple with this, and I think it's also fair to say that
obviously no one has succeeded in resolving the problem posed by North
Korea's nuclear program and the danger that that poses both in the region,
including to our close partners and allies in Japan and Korea, but also well
beyond the region. What we've seen North Korea do in recent
months is a very large number of missile tests of
one kind or another, including, as you recall, one that flew right over
northern Japan. This is in violation of a series of U.N.
Security Council resolutions. We've gone
to the United Nations, pursued additional sanctions against against
North Korea. We've also done a few things that I
think are vitally important, which is to continue to shore up the defense and
deterrent capacities of our partners, allies and ourselves in the region
working closely with Japan and South Korea.
So we're not standing still in the face of provocations from North Korea.
We're making sure that we're strengthening our own defensive and
deterrent capacity. We've made it clear the North Koreans
going back to the last year that we were ready to engage with them without any
preconditions to move toward the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. The North Koreans have not responded to
any of those any of those overtures. In fact, the response has been exactly
what you cited, which is the increased number of missile tests, the
prospect potentially of another nuclear test, which would be the seventh that
they that they've undertaken. So our determination is to
work even more closely with with allies and partners, to strengthen defense,
strengthen deterrence, to work ever more closely with other countries in the
international system, including at the United Nations, to exert appropriate
pressure on North Korea for the actions taken.
And, of course, to work with other concerned countries
to see what influence they can bring to bear on North Korea to stop the
dangerous, destabilizing actions that it's taken with regard to Haiti.
There are. A multiplicity of challenges that the
Haitian people are facing. Some of them nature made, some of them
human made, all of them exerting a terrible toll on the Haitian people.
So first and foremost, we want to do everything we possibly can to help
people who are who are in need. And we continue to do that, including
with significant humanitarian assistance.
But the fundamental problem right now is one of security, because in the absence
of security, virtually everything that we need to do and others need to do to
help Haiti. To help Haiti move forward politically.
To help Haiti move forward economically. To help Haiti move forward in dealing
with the cholera outbreak that we see there.
All of those are made much more difficult, if not impossible.
And so you have gangs that dominate a lot of space in Haiti.
Not, not not the state if the gangs are preventing.
Things moving freely from ports and airports to places where that where
they're needed, whether it's fuel, whether it's water, whether it's medical
supplies, then dealing with everything else becomes that much more difficult.
So dealing with security problems is, I think, job number one.
We've been working to do that in a few ways.
One is to shore up the capacity, the Haitian national police to actually
assert security on behalf of the state and not
have had the gangs do it. Just
a few days ago, along with Canada, play the lead role.
We got additional resources to the Haitian national police, including
armored vehicles that we think can help them in reasserting control.
Second, we need to break a nexus, a very noxious nexus between the gangs and
certain police, political elites who are funding them, directing them and using
them to advance their own interests instead of the interests of the country.
We just had at the United Nations sanctions passed unanimously at the
Security Council, including with the support of China, Russia and the other
members, the Security Council, to go at that nexus and to go at the very elites
who are in many cases behind the gangs, supporting them, directing the
financing. And if we are able to help break that up
as well as reinforce the Haitian national police, then I think the
government can get a grip on security as they're doing that.
We're also working to support the dialogue that exists between the
government, the Montana group and others to find a path forward for it, for Haiti
on on the political track and on getting to
two elections. And then, of course, if we free up the
space because of the dealing with the insecurity problem, that's going to
allow the assistance that Haiti desperately needs, including to help
deal with cholera, to get into the country more freely.
And of course, there's a migration aspect to this, too, because one of the
things we're seeing, of course, is Haitians, understandably,
in many cases, trying to go somewhere else.
Given the horrific challenges they face in Haiti, the more we're able to
effectively deal with those challenges, the more we're able to help patients
have a more positive life, the less pressure they'll be on migration as
well. So we're working on all of those fronts
together. Well, said the secretary.
We appreciate your time so much, I think you have a hard stop out at 12 15.
So we will say thank you so much. We're grateful for your insights and for
the generosity of your time today. I did just want to ask everyone in the
audience if you could remain seated while the secretary exits and then we'll
have lunch provided for any of you who'd like to stay.
Thank you again. Thanks very much.
Thanks, everyone. Good to be with you.
