The Ukraine Crisis and U.S. Security Strategy

welcome to the Center for strategic and international studies and thanks for joining us I'm Sam Brandon a senior fellow in the csis International Security program uh and I'm privileged to be joined here today uh by three of my favorite foreign policy and security commentators and experts the people whose opinions I really want to hear on this issue so we're going to turn to them today to discuss the Ukraine crisis and its implications for US security strategy Andy Cutchins Clark Murdoch and vickram Singh uh before I turn it over to them though I want to provide a little bit of Framing and then I'll let them take it from there and we'll open to questions with you at the end of the session events over the past several days in Odessa Clans and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine have underscored the growing danger of a prolonged civil and sectarian conflict and as high as the stakes are within Ukraine they are even potentially greater for the United States not just in Europe and Eurasia but globally fundamental questions about us security strategy are being asked not just in Washington or on oped pages but in capitals around the world consider this framing of the crisis by Russian President Vladimir Putin two days after the March 16 Crimea referendum vote he said like a mirror the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades after the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet we no longer have stability I doubt many in this room would agree with Mr Putin's analysis but would agree that events in Ukraine over the past several months are forcing reflection on what the next decade has in store for the US and its allies and partners globally at the risk of oversimplifying a very complex set of issues let me offer four key areas we can go into today first Ukraine has opened questions about us Russia policy dating back to the end of the Cold War specifically questions have been asked of whether the Clinton Bush 43 and Obama administrations somehow fundamentally mishandled Russia did they fail to properly acknowledge its interests and did they humiliate it in ways that haunt us today or did they try too hard to accommodate a Russia that simply acts in ways contrary to International order and stability how does this change the way we must think about the salience of nuclear weapons second Russia's coercive and so far largely successful use of diplomacy information operations irregular and covert Warfare and large-scale conventional signaling has raised immediate questions about the security of other states in Russia's periphery including NATO allies bellarus mova Kazakhstan Poland Latvia Lithuania and Estonia are of most immediate concern to date the United States has responded with relatively smallscale rotations of its forces and its NATO and its NATO allies have done likewise diplomatic messaging has occurred sanctions have been taken but so far these appear to have had little impact on Russia's decision-making in the crisis moreover it has raised questions about NATO long-term ability to stand up to this challenge Secretary of Defense Hegel last week suggested that the next NATO ministerial must include Ministers of Finance noting that today America's GDP is smaller than the combined gdps of our 27 NATO allies but America's defense spending is three times our allies combined defense spending third just eight months after the Russia brokered Syria chemical weapons disarmament deal there are again tough questions being asked about us willingness to use military force when push comes to shove from allies and partners in the Middle East and Europe I personally have heard sharp concern voiced about a United States that is vacillated from drawing red lines it would not enforce to United States that refuses to set red lines at all their words not mine on this point the potentially most damaging to this presidency and US Global standing President Obama weighed in last week during his trip to Asia my job as commander of chief he said is to look at what it is to keep to excuse me my job as commander-in-chief is to look at what it is that is going to advance our security interests over the long term to keep our military in reserve for where we absolutely need it there are going to be times when there are disasters and difficulties and challenges all around the world and not all of those are going to be immediately solvable by us there where we can make a difference using all the tools we've got in the toolkit well we should do so and if there are occas were targeted clear actions can be taken that would make a difference then we should take them we don't do them because somebody sitting in an office in Washington or New York thinks it would look strong finally those who have been watching the asia-pacific rebalance closely have wondered how Ukraine might deflect resources and attention from the nation's foremost strategic priority particularly in a time of overall significant fiscal pressure on the Department of Defense they have also asked how us response may be viewed by that Region's fast rising power China with that let me say how grateful I am to be joined by three tremendous foreign and security policy experts who will sh share their views on these issues and others today I will introduce them in the order they will speak to my immediate left your right I'm joined by Andy cutchin Dr Kutchins is a senior fellow and director of the csis Russia and Eurasia program Dr Kutchins has written and commented extensively on Russia particularly over the past 6 months as demand has skyrocketed to understand Russia's role in Syria the Edward Snowden Affair the Sochi Olympics and now Ukraine he has also just recently returned from research travel in Central Asia where he was able to G key gauge key officials views of events though he broadly supported the need to reset relations with Russia and find more areas for cooperation during President Obama's first term Dr Cutchins has not minced words regarding the administration's handling of Ukraine in a March 30th commentary he wrote Barack Obama is now making Jimmy Carter look like a till of the Hun with a series of empty threats and too little too late punitive measures against Putin's Russia I'll let Andy add some context around that remark next to Dr cutchin is Clark Murdoch Dr Murdoch is a senior adviser at csis and director for the defense and National Security Group in the project on nuclear issues Dr Murdoch is an expert on defense planning the nuclear Mission and strategy with Decades of executive branch Congressional academic and think tank experience his recent work has concentrated on understanding the military force structure impli ations of continued sequester level cuts to the Department of Defense Dr Murdoch also spends considerable time thinking about how to use hard power smartly in a late 2013 analysis of Lessons Learned From the Syria crisis Dr Murdoch wrote that there are three primary factors that should guide us policy makers on use of force and maintaining credibility first mean what you say and say what you mean second prepare both to carry out your threats and to deal with the consequences and third since actions always speak louder than words use force from time to time to demonstrate your resolve last but certainly not least I am very glad to be joined by vickram Singh Mr Singh recently joined the center for American progress as vice president for National Security and international policy prior to departing the admin the Obama Administration after 5 years of service he was most recently the deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia at the Pentagon where he was on the front lines of the asia-pacific rebalance before that Mr Singh was the deputy special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the US Department of State in a recent commentary on Ukraine Mr Sing wrote about a range of non-military options still available to the administration but cautioned that failing to impose a meaningful cost for Russia's forceable annexation of foreign territory would further embolden Russia to take similar steps in other neighboring states it would also affect the Strategic calculus of other nations in territorial disputes increasing the willingness of states to use coercion subterfuge and military force with less fear of significant International backlash let me turn it over to Andy to get things started thanks so much Sam you know I think we could go right to the question and answer you you addressed all of the key questions and it sounds like we all agree from what you quoted from us um the only good news I have to report about what's happened in the last couple of months uh in Vladimir Putin's quest to become dictator for life is that uh it's great job security for me uh and the likes the likes of us um before I address Sam's questions let me say what I think is actually motivating of Vladimir Putin uh in Ukraine right now and to me it's fundamentally about domestic politics in Russia and it's about a new political strategy which he has for himself for most of the time in which he has been de facto dour leader of Russia there has been kind of this economic social compact uh Russ Russians have lived more prosperously Russian the Russian economy has grown robustly while Putin has been president and uh prime minister with the exception of the period uh of the global financial crisis uh and then shortly after he became president again in 2012 now what's happened in uh since he became president in 2012 when the Russian economy was still growing at a rate of about 3 or 4% underperforming uh uh but still performing reasonably decently uh the growth before the situation in Ukraine uh started had already come to about about zero and he faced a fundamental decision was he going to take the measures to restructure the Russian economy so that it would be more efficient and then to do that he would have to build in more transparency better governance address corruption improve the investment environment etc etc because he couldn't count upon a multiple increase in the oil price as occurred uh during his first two terms in power he couldn't uh count on a 50% increase in oil production as happened during his first term in power and he couldn't uh count on a virtual Global Money Party in the latter part of his second term as as president uh which made uh the International Community ready to lend uh to to Russia Al lot so but the problem was and it to me it kind of it's a reminder of the Soviet Union uh around the early 1980s let's say 1981 the year I graduated from college that despite the fact the oil price was at a uh a high and oil production in Russia had grown tremendously in the 1970s Soviet economic growth was at about zero now did the Soviet leadership under Mr bnv or his successor Mr andropov or his next successor Mr chenko in the rapid succession actually want to deal with that and structurally reform the system no because it was too politically risky they didn't do it and that's the choice that Mr Putin has made so where is he going to get the the the base for his political support in the future well the new strategy is a combination of sort of a return to what Nicholas the first uh uh policy of um official nationality in the second quarter of the 19th century autocracy Orthodoxy Russian nationality and combined and more importantly to that this greater Russia project that he has in mind Russia has to be despite the fact it's x times larger than any country of the world it still needs to be larger and and here comes and that combined with foreign policy successes of the nature that you might have we might have regarded Putin's performance on Syria in the in the summer so I think that's a fundamental starting point for kind of where how we got to where we are from late February to today and unfortunately I think it's a very very very dangerous and risky strategy on his part not only dangerous for him it's probably going to result in ultimate ultimate failure but there's going to be tremendous collateral damage all across the board one of the first things that hit my mind on February 28th uh when Crimea was was seized by the polite green men was that gorbachov in the USSR went out with a whimper and something to my bones tells me that Vladimir Putin is not going out with a whimper uh it could get very very very ugly and we're still only in the early early part of it and it's the the March 18th speech that he gave to the federal assembly uh in Moscow right after the annexation of of Russia which was really a Mindbender um probably the most significant speech he'd given before that was in Munich in 2007 and actually I could agree with a lot of what Mr Putin had to say in the the the famous Munich speech economic balance of power changing in the world that's typically followed by a change in political power the unipolar world is over the United States needs to adjust Etc Etc even his New York Times editorial that got a fair amount of criticism uh I could find a lot to agreement to agree with but this March 18th speech this to me marked a new Putin uh and a very scary Putin um it uh in a congressional testimony I concluded that future historians may regard this as the point at which uh Russia tipped into becoming a fascist State I mean look up fascism you'll see I think a picture of Mr Putin and Russia on the map I don't mean to be flip about it but it is that's kind of what it is Extreme nationalism a very corporate type of political economic uh uh linkage uh in the uh the political political system uh quite repressive to any uh any dissidence and a focus on territorial acquisition and an aggressive foreign policy that's it and you know if he's talking about borders it's not just the post Cold War borders it's not just the post uh World War II borders it's actually virtually any border that Mr Putin thinks is is illegitimate that's illegitimate and that who is he ready to defend is it ethnic Russians is it Russian speakers well it's even saes Niki compatriots it's a very very broad category which could be can be very flexible I found that an extreme extremely frightening uh Speech and quite a Quantum Leap in the evolution of Mr of Mr Putin so I see uh there will be increasing pressure on all neighbors uh there's essentially an attempt to unwind 1991 and perhaps even earlier uh that and that this will not stop as long as Mr Putin is in power because if I'm correct and that the starting point is this is part of the strategy for maintaining support and he's gotten a huge binge in popular support for what's happened so far you know you have to keep on feeding the Beast if you will and that is uh not a uh a happy scenario now let me turn quickly to Sam's questions um all right his first question had to do with what is your view of US policy since the outset of the Cris in Ukraine and following the annexation of crime has it been weak provocative or about right it's like little red writing Hood well I think weak and provocative are not sep mutually exclusive categories so I think from the outset I think it's been weak and thus provocative and for me it really started with the uh the initial response on February 28th already the uh the airport in sopel uh had been seized by military forces clearly that it had to be at the behest of Russia um the parliament had been seized the speaker of the parliament had been seized and when Mr Obama came on at 3 p.m. Eastern Standard Time I remember it well because I was at the University of Indiana for my son who's a freshman there for the Father's son fraternity weekend uh I was watching the the press conference and one would have thought that that none of that had already happened President Obama talked about that there would be costs for Russia doing X and I'm thinking dude I'm here in Indiana and I mean X has already happened a lot of X is already already happen and I was very disheartened to read a story in the Wall Street Journal I can't confirm whether it's true about 10 days later about the disagreement within the intelligence Community as to what it actually what it actually happened um I'm afraid that a lot of our intelligence assets certainly human assets uh are not available in that region we had nobody on the ground actually in Crimea if the story is true and it was very very clear if there was any weak spot in Ukraine it would be Crimea and looking at you know kind of February 2122 um secondly I mean do we not have eyes on what was happening to the sopal airport what was going there on on the ground so some kind of intelligence failure failure happened and I think that's something we're going to need to uh to look to look into but that with that it kind of began the the uh the series of of kind of too little too late uh response one I think the there's been too much emphasis on a a search for the offramp the Diplomatic solution of course we need to do that but there was never a shred of evidence to actually support that Vladimir Putin was interested in a diplomatic offramp uh during this uh uh during this crisis um secondly and this is kind of controversial but I think that the the United States needed to take a firmer role in leading the alliance given Europe's you know deep economic uh investment with Russia it it was not realistic to expect them to to take a leading role given the differences in Europe in general um I think we need to be a little bit more forward leaning and for example when President Obama was getting ready to leave on his Europe trip uh in the latter part of of March and the second round of sanctions was announced what was striking to me that was that while these were more significant sanctions none of them were actually really going to have a negative impact on the US economy so we weren't going to be able to go to Europe and say look we think this is such a a significant problem that we are ready to take a hit on our economy and if we're not ready to take a hit on our economy how can we make the case to the Europeans who are much more deeply vested thirdly uh I think there has been too much emphasis on punishing Ukraine excuse me punishing Russia uh rather than trying to help Ukraine now unfortunately the Ukrainian uh government has been in ways criminally irresponsible for at least since the orange Revolution probably longer leave themselves in an extremely vulnerable position to uh to Russian to Russian pressure but this is the core of the problem and if Mr if Ukraine can succeed that's how Mr Putin loses okay uh and I'll get back to this because of the economic sanctions question a little bit little bit later so we needed more on that and there I was extremely disappointed with the speech that uh the president gave uh in Brussels in in late March a lot of uh platitudes uh you know Mom and apple pie and beautiful values but virtually nothing concretely said about what we were doing and ready to do to support the sovereignty of Ukraine politically economically militarily or or otherwise my conclusion was in Moscow They're laughing and in Kev they're cry um okay the second question I'll go through these faster Sam I know okay leave leave a question or two okay leave a question or two well okay I'll take the take I'll leave the military option off the table qu question for you I say justan I I feel really sorry for Vi who has to follow both of us because we both occupy a little bit of space all right all right okay good point good point okay okay um I was just following trying to follow instructions the uh Asia with Asia rebalance of course this is going to affect the Asia Asia rebalance how could it not affect the Asia rebalance we thought the European security was virtually solved so to some extent that and the pie is and the pie is not growing but uh I will leave it to uh uh to my distinguished colleagues with the details let me say something about China China what China's perspective on this I think it's pretty clear that the the stock of national sovereignty is sort of a sacred pillar of Chinese policy is is a cell a slow cell uh it's its value has has reduced um nevertheless I think there's quite a bit of IG am ambiguity uh in China about this at some level I think Xi Jinping has to kind of admire Vladimir for what he did in Crimea I mean that was quite a brilliant operation Vladimir you know helped me do this elsewhere um now China's going to benefit economically and politically from Russia's estrangement uh with the west but I think it will be very very cautious uh about signing up for vlad's new Cold War um now we can watch very carefully to see what happens with Mr Putin when he goes to China at the end of at the end of May certainly Russia's position has weakened he's going to get a lower price on in the gas deal etc um let me just conclude with uh uh something on the sanctions um Can economic sanctions uh substitute for use of force well clearly no that's sort of obvious but it's really a problem on economic sanctions if your adversary feels himself somewhat impervious to taking a significant economic economic hit and here's a problem with with Putin's strategy since he's you know he knows that the econom is in trouble sanctions come on board that simply gives him the argument that well it's the West it's The Outsiders they're trying to weaken us they're punishing us this is the source of our e economic economic problems so it's going to play pretty well into his into his political narrative the second point I would make is that you know the tools are designed for you know the war on terror and and Rogue States and it's it is economically it's it's just impossible to isolate Russia this is the sixth or eighth or 10th largest economy in the world depending upon your denominator and uh there's just too many uh states in the world including many European allies which aren't really ready to enthusiastically sign sign on to this and um a last thing I would say about that is that these sectoral sh sanctions could possibly be interpreted by by Mr Putin as an act of war and I think we better be aware of all of our own vulnerabilities because we can be damn sure that he will be coming back at us very very very hard and uh I think we're going to be in a very long Hall and difficult time with Mr Putin uh as long as he is leading Russia not only did you follow instructions but that was a great opening thank you Andy Clark how do I turn this on and then I I am not worried that vicam can hold his own after you he was specially selected from the thousands of Washington experts as the only man capable of following you that's right all right is it on y okay um I was happy you didn't use the word Redline because I want to talk about red lines uh um sort of talk about the way Obama and and the United States and others have acted more at the Tactical level in terms of how you use Force to get somebody to do or not do something you want to do because I think from a broader perspective strategically people are saying that Obama's weakness and Washington Post has been really tough on them lately blathering and dithering and so on that that's responsible somehow for Putin's grabbing Crimea well I don't think so I just think Putin's plan a failed you know when his guy suddenly fled Moscow and the Maiden Square revolutions as with the rose Revolution as with the other flower re revolutions led to a change of power um he had to change his game plan because he has a lot at stake in terms of Ukraine and I think for many of the reasons that Andy was talking about so that from a broad strategic sense it wasn't Obama's weakness that led Putin to do what he did in Crimea it was the fact that Putin's first option for doing what he wanted to do with Ukraine failed so he went to a backup option now I would also argue however that Obama's failures at the Tactical level in terms of how you use red lines to fail people undoubtedly LED Putin to underestimate him uh in terms of Obama's ability to play the game uh to me I go back again to the the group of eight meeting in Mexico where you see the two of these leaders uh in the same room together apparently there's a I haven't gone on the blog cuz I'm such a lite but apparently there's a film that shows the language of these guys next to each other for about five minutes and the disdain that Putin had for Obama was almost palpable during that time you could cut it with a knife you could just cut it in pictures much less in terms of the video on that and so I don't think Putin had much respect for Obama as a competitor in the great game whether it's chess Checkers or dodgeball during this time time and uh and I also think that same issue on the Tactical level is something that's really bothering our allies and I'll just have a few quotes on that because there's no question uh is Doug Paul said when he was talking about out in the Asian you know all the big players out there watched what the United States did in Syria and were appalled and worried about what the United States do the same thing if things went South for them on a particular issue and certainly when you're dealing with the China makes no bones about its territorial Ambitions that's something they need to think about during that time uh I go back to Obama's use or non-use of red lines in Syria where he was very specific about the red line issued first in August of 2012 you know where he says clearly we have been very clear to the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving or being utilized that's crossed it at after that he said a number of times that's a game changer for us that changes our calculus so then we go through at the same time he's talking about game Cher is when the French and the British went to the UN and said uh we think he's been using chemical weapons and small scales well it took the United States another three months to confirm well yes indeed he has been using them on a small scale and the actions then is it's one of uh Sam's favorite things as I said a third tier White House official announces in the beginning of June the ubiquitous Ben roads announces well we are going to take some action we're going to increase our assistance you know and and and we're going to meaningfully engage on this but doesn't say anything about punishing Syria for its use of chemical weapons then of course on August 21st there is a massive or a much larger chemical weapons attack that kills 1400 people including 400 children so then then that starts a swivet where the first thing is and it took quite a while to Obama to come there looks like he's about to use force and launch some retaliatory attacks against Syria and they said nope he's going to go to Congress and then when it's clear the Congress is going to hand his head to him uh he reaches out to this former good buddy uh Vladimir Putin who comes up with this issue of removing chemical weapons as a way of taking the place of the ultimatum that the United States had set down with its road line red line on the use of weapons now one of the things I find disturbing about this of course is it's led to a reinterpretation by Administration spokesman of what this was all about uh people probably noticed that when Obama in his press conference with aino during the recent trip a very very defensive uh you know attitude prickly attitude uh Crow Hammer was one that point pointed out 969 words in this particular response and Obama says quote and I would note that those who criticize our foreign policy with respect to Syria they themselves say no no no we don't mean sending in troops well what do you mean well you should be assisting the opposition well we are assisting the opposition what else do you mean well perhaps you should take a strike at Syria to get chemical weapons out of Syria well it turns out we're getting chemical weapons without a strike so what else are you talking about and at this point the criticism Trails off let's ridiculous because just that previous weekend Samantha pow has asked on TV the problem the person who wrote the problem from Hell about Rwanda is asked about what about these reports that they're using chlorine gas well she says we're going to run that down right away we're going to get to the bottom of that and see what's going on well within a day it's confirmed yes they are using chlorine gas and then well how are we going to deal with that well a Us official said I want to make sure I have the right quote here I don't know if it was Ben rhods could have been but usually when it's a senior official Administration talking to the New York Times you can bet that that's what it is asked the question well we really don't want to draw much attention to it because there's really not much we can do about it because we can't ask them to get rid of all the chlorine in Syria well yeah you can't ask them to get rid of all the chlorine but they agreed not to use chemical weapons that's part of embracing the chemical weapons treaty and they use them and when you're trying to deter the use of chemical weapons what you're about is deterring the use of chemical weapons not using forc to impose an elimination of all chemical weapons particularly when you're doing it in a context that in Libya when Gaddafi apparently gave up all of his chemical weapons back in 2002 we thought there was a great well it was only about 8 months ago that they announced that the last chemical weapons in Libya were gone he had hidden a bunch of chemical weapons well what a surprise during that time and to think that Assad's going to give up all of his chemical weapons now not the way it works during that time so it strikes me that when you start looking at the track record of how this Administration is used Force at the Tactical level to try as an element of coercive diplomacy excuse me that it has failed at that our adversaries don't fear us and respect us they don't think we're going to hold them accountable our allies are worried about what we will do under similar sorts of circumstances when we make those kind of commitments because when Sam was talking about and I apologize for getting personal but actually when it comes to using force it is personal because it wasn't just those three lines about meaning what you say say what you mean think through the consequences be prepared to do it president has to have the right stuff when it comes to using Force the right stuff and this president he's asked about red lines on this most recent trip well he doesn't like red lines anymore he was asked well what about Japan's territorial interest in Kaku Island say no no no first of all the treaty between the United States preceded my birth so that's not my red line I didn't create that red line uh us Japan treaty before he went over for this trip he sends a message a written message saying that we support Japan's right to administer these territories and then he's asked about it at a press conference he says that happened before I was born not my red line well what do you think if you're an ally concerned about your territorial Integrity you know you've had it uh ex-defense Minister from uh laia points out says well we need some real red lines not like the one in Syria but one that you know really mad because we're in NATO or you have secretary kery saying you know pound on the table saying NATO's territorial Integrity is inviolable mispronounce the word I apologize for that we will defend every piece of it well how credible do you think that is how credible do you think that is it is personal and the consequences of not understanding that when the United States makes a red line draws a commitment draws a line in the sand it is the president's job to make sure that that line has consequences we could call it a Line in the Sand red lines have too many metaphors pink lines lines written in pencil lines creeping red lines we have lots of creeping red lines in Korea but when it comes to saying don't do this or we'll do that and then you don't do it when you make empty threats how do you have a architecture of security guarantees over to you V okay on that optimistic note the floor is yours vicam thank you gentlemen and uh thank you Sam and csis for having this event obviously this is an issue that uh I think uh we'll be talking about for quite a long time because this is not a small tactical action this is this is a major Choice by by a large power and it's a choice to do something that perhaps we in the west had thought was uh was a thing of the past the annexation of territory especially so close to Europe um and a thing that I think a lot of uh commentators uh are are trying to say that there might be easy ways to deal with there simply are not easy ways to deal with this kind of um behavior from Russia or really any other power this is a tough problem um it's not something new Americans seeing Russian leaders take actions that we vigorously object to but don't necessarily have a pat solution to or an easy way to to to quickly address um President Eisenhower had to see the Soviets go into Hungary uh obj had to see the Soviets uh cross Czechoslovakia um President Carter saw the Soviets roll into Afghanistan President Reagan saw uh Korean Airlines 007 shot down President Bush Jr uh saw Georgia invaded by Russia and others in the neighborhood have faced Russian aggression in recent years as well um in none of those cases was was there an American response that would somehow magically roll back what had happened in none of those cases was there something that would not be subject to lots of pontificating by people like us about what we could or couldn't do so I think it's important to take a step back and say uh what are America's interests here what are the things that we are that we need to be willing to do in response to this kind of this kind of action and uh and and actually to find a way to build consensus because one of of the things that were that has that that serves Us best as a country in issues like this is when we're able to find consensus over what we could do what we should do even if there's debate about the tactics and for all the critics that we're hearing right now about what policy choices have been made they're primarily debating about tactics there are not uh a lot of people advocating for for example military action to roll back uh a Russian uh a Russian annexation of a piece of Ukraine that said um this is a pretty egregious violation not only of international law but also of an agreement that uh Russia Inked with the United States the United Kingdom and Ukraine uh The Budapest agreement basically says we will you know these countries we will not use Force to violate Ukraine's territorial Integrity or sovereignty um it reaffirms that they won't do that so Russia has both violated the UN Charter and also has violated an agreement that they Inked with us um not to mention that it's you know it so the so the fragmenting of uh of a Sovereign Nation by force uh is something that really merits a response the world of that response comes in the kinds of costs we're willing to impose not just today but over time so I think the best the best critiques right now of the response are that it hasn't been clear enough what those costs are going to be in the near term and it hasn't been clear enough how long and and enduring the cost imposition from the United States will be uh the my concern about whether uh the the immediate response reflects on us the United States stature in the world comes primarily from the fact that it's looked fairly confused and I think we've had that we've had that problem in several cases uh I think it looks fairly confused because these things are hard to deal with how far do you go do you unilaterally move forward on sanctions and hope that Europe follows you do you get together with your allies and try to come up with a coordinated response these are difficult things to do in my view fairly uh clear steps to at least Target one sector of the Russian economy that would do what Andy said cost us something as well as cost them something and a demonstration that we're willing to to keep that up for a long time uh would have served us better than incremental steps on sanctions that look like they're reactive the bottom line here is that the annexation of Crimea that in itself requires a fairly clear response from the United States and that is probably a response that's going to have to stay in place for some time so we need to figure out what kind of steps are we willing to take to say we don't accept this action and we want to imp we're going to impose some costs on you that willing to keep in place for 1 five 10 years um in my view that should be uh probably targeted at the banking sector where a longtime European and Western uh willingness to sort of look the other way in terms of money laundering and other Financial crimes would be could very easily be ended and could allow us through enforcement actions and targeted sanctions to really uh really constrain Russia's uh Russia's financial sector um those those are things that we that we absolutely need to do um but the but I think the idea that uh that somehow uh the recent developments cast into doubt the very framework of American alliances I think that's really overwrought um the the the the fact is that we have treaty commitments to our allies they to our allies they are not to the rest of the universe they are not to the rest of the world there to those countries with whom we have entered into those agreements and I think the president has been very clear both on the NATO front and certainly in Japan was extraordinarily clear um despite the the quote that Clark was was putting out there was extraordinarily clear that he said the Article 5 treaty commitments do apply to the senkakus um so you know the the the the value of ambig ambiguity and the value of uh of strategic flexibility in Alliance relations Is extraordinarily complicated and it's been muddied by both sides both on the side of red lines and on the side of what would you do talking about what would you do in a given circumstance um being declarative and so clear about what you're going to do when your interests are challenged uh is really not the best way to practice International policy when You Face challenges you need to be willing to make responses when you're willing to take a concrete action you need to be be clear about what that is and and and sustain your action when you take it but you also want to leave room for a variety of actions and you want to leave some uncertainty in the minds of potential opponents and so I think there's a there's a there's a lot of discussion right now about uh how we could have somehow how we could be handling and responding to these situations in a fundamentally different way uh I don't think that's true I think the quibbling should be limited to what tactically should we be doing and what should we be doing in a in a you know what where could we take stronger action um where could we potentially have a better approach even John McCain's uh proposed legislation doesn't actually get you out of the realm of the fundamental strategic nature of this administration's response to this challenge uh at the end of the day uh Vladimir Putin as Andy's uh said has chosen to take uh take on sort of a zaris mantle um it made me actually you know think back uh if you if you look back to Kenan uh Kenan didn't analyze the Soviet Union in terms of just a Soviet you know Bolshevik ideology and a Soviet um uh socialist system he put it in the in the scope of Russian history and he talked about the neuroses of Russian leadership going back centuries and he said um that Russian leaders have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total Destruction of rival power never in comprom in in compacts and compromises with it I think that might be one of the most informative places for us to go so not a global ideological ideological struggle but a Russian leader behaving in a way that Russian leaders have long behaved a way that has never been something that gets managed quickly and easily by you know a of phrase or a particular action but a a way of Behaving that requires a clear response the United State needs to lead the International Community in rejecting the annexation of Crimea and in resisting further uh dismemberment of the Ukrainian body politic I do not believe that any kind of even the kind of sanctions I had hoped for early or the kind of sanctions that were implemented I don't think any of those were going to change the decision calculus of Vladimir Putin and I think we get into very fuzzy territory when we talk about changing the Strategic calculus of another country be that of Pakistan or Russia what you do is manage the situation you find yourself in protect your interests as best you can and be clear about what costs you're willing to impose um when Behavior by States violates the norms for which you stand that means focusing on a steady steady set of things we can do both to impose costs on Russia but also critically to support Ukraine and other states in the periphery of uh Russia and potentially in Vladimir Putin's sites I think the most disappointing thing in our response thus far is that Congress uh authorized a fairly uh a fairly small package of assistance for Ukraine I think that if we look at the uh the response today is actually objectively better than the response that we made in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia but given the scale and of of the uh activity in Ukraine and the direction it seems that Russia is going um I think we we actually need to find the resolve between in in ourselves and with our European partners and with other countries around the world to have a fair a much more robust response so there are there are there are things out there that we did in the wake of a cold war that we've let fade in prominence and importance things like the partnership for peace which involves a few dozen Nations and helps bring them up to Modern military standards through assistance and and training and education and support those are the kinds of programs we need to be looking at ways to reinvest in and I fear that domestic gridlock and the uh atmosphere of fiscal constraints is getting to the point that it's making us actually uh really overly narrow what we can do as a country uh when you ask about can we do Asia policy and handle Ukraine of course we can we are still the largest economy on Earth We're still spending over $600 billion dollar a year on defense we have plenty of resources we have to have the willingness to apply those resources where they need to be applied we have to have the willingness to make some tough decisions and uh we seem to be in a political environment where gridlock is the watch word and tough political decisions don't come no matter how SE severe the provocation or how important the need and that is really what challenges American leadership in the world the gridlock is the issue much more than the specifics of Any Given response because the world understands how complicated these sorts of issues and responses are so I'll wrap up with that and look forward to a Q&A thank you very much let me me just ask a few questions to the panel to to pick up on some of the themes that I heard throughout the comments the the first one is a question vicam referenced uh perhaps the utility of ambiguity in terms of of options and leaving some space for yourself as you manage a difficult problem one of the first things the president did and has repeatedly done was to take the use of military force off the table as an option uh Andy you had said before that the use of economic sanctions themselves may be escalated in ways that we don't anticipate I I would assume that uh taking military force off the table was done in a way to try to diffuse the crisis a little bit what what's your view of of how Putin May perceive those statements by the president and does that need any policy correction going forward um thanks um Sam and great comments by both Clark and uh vickram uh my you know main problem again started on February 28th in the in the initial response to me it was to me it was clear that actually Crimea was was gone and what we were playing for at that point was for the rest of Ukraine and it was clear that for Mr Putin winning Crimea and losing the rest of Ukraine would never be satis satisfactory and that is why the response right from the get-go had to be much stronger and firmer now granted that's a very hard thing to do when you see such a stealthy and frankly surprising action that was that was taken um but the in but even you know you go a couple days after that and a week after that and a week a week after that and the problem is you're you're the the sense of a very permissive environment for Mr Putin that is what was in in his head I think and led him to think we we can never run the counterfactual and know what he would have done you know with a different response but uh and this gets to you know taking the use of military force off off the table um I'm a huge believer in deterrence and you know the counterargument often made by the administration that uh you know any kind of military action or certainly s military support for Ukraine the concerns about it being perceived as provocative to Moscow to me they just didn't really make just doesn't make make sense what I saw as more provocative was creating the uh the impression in Putin's mind that there was a more permissive environment now clearly you can't say something not that's not credible uh that's a core problem so if you're if you're thinking to yourself that you're taking military action off the table well fine just don't say it why say anything about it what's the point in saying anything any anything about it why not create a little ambiguity as vicam is saying in your adversaries mind and but maybe more importantly on this point I think there are because the administration would critique people like me and and accuse us of being warmongers uh uh for you know I wasn't never suggesting we provide an article five guarantee for Ukraine or American boots on the ground or anything like that that's that's nuts but there's a whole range of options in between that and you know sending 300,000 you know meals ready to eat so I think there are people far more expertise on what those options are now granted there is a problem in that the security forces of Ukraine are so penetrated by Russian intelligence that's that's a big worrisome issue for sure but I think that uh uh there there could have been more done there in a in a nuanced way that might have somewhat changed the the calculus of Mr pu but like I said we'll never know Clark do you want to you want to jump in on that um first of all I go to exactly what it was that uh President Obama said he said many things but on 26th March he said quote of course Ukraine is not a member of NATO in part because of its close and complex history with Russia nor will Russia be dislodged from Crimea or deterred from further escalation by military force and then again is this ubiquitous senior Administration official says quote the American people are not going to war with Russia over Ukraine comma full stop okay like Andy I also am not a warmonger well maybe I am a little bit but still there are lots of things that you can do short of launching a Desert Storm form like invasion of Kuwait for example you might actually move forces into what they're now calling the Frontline states that is NATO allies that are on Russia's border during that time uh you said well n NATO has well actually NATO has not what has happened is that the United States sent to each of the three countries in question 150 paratroopers and those paratroopers were delivered by commercial transport because we were worried that having them much less jump out of the sky or be delivered by military transport would be somehow too provocative to the Russians during that time so that's sending 150 pair of Troopers in when you've got what 25,000 forces masked on Ukrainian eastern border you know doing constant exercises penetrating uh airspace over Ukraine and so on uh there are lots of things things that we should have done and in fact I think Obama's been a little bit better on the economic side than it has been on the military side because NATO after all is a military Alliance and we should be doing things to indicate to our NATO allies the new Europe as Don rumo used to refer to them that we are really there for them and we haven't during that time so uh for me strategic ambiguity about when you're going to use Force that's a complex that's a concept that was developed in terms of the use of nuclear weapons that was not a concept that was developed in terms of the use of 150 paratroopers to Signal intent into a NATO Ally during that time so there's lots of deployments lots of things that could have been done on Military side that would have demon demonstrated a much firmer intent than we have here to for and shown the the only thing I I'm gonna throw into this mix is that I think I think a lot is made of sort of this as if there's a notion of high-speed tactical deterrent isn't so there is the the the idea that had we just gone X oh then he would have said oh well never mind I want to I'm going to leave Crimea or I won't I won't medal in the rest of eastern Ukraine that's unfortunately not accurate and the reason he's was not deterred is not doesn't find its roots in what in the in the current crisis it actually finds its roots in how we responded to the Georgia incursions in 2008 which remain in place so that that Russian invasion which was much more sloppy it was loud it was noisy it was messy and it claimed several hundred I think something like 500 Georgian lives um that was met with no response by previous administration so Vladimir Putin has tested the waters and has determined that in his immediate neighborhood he's not going to face a military response um from from the United States and so I agree with what my colleagues here are saying in terms of uh reassurance and bolstering NATO and sending signals and signaling is complicated and again you can debate about the tactics but the failure to deter uh in this this particular set of circumstances which is essentially Vladimir Putin steadily encroaching on and grabbing the Russian enclaves of neighboring states like mova like Georgia like Ukraine and potentially others like aeran down the road the that that is a that is a a proposition that he tested over years and um the and so I would I would say more than what we've done in this crisis what we didn't do in 2008 has affected the the uh the world we're looking at today one last question before I turn it over to the audience been patient uh the question is that there has not yet been a a release of an Obama administration second uh term National Security strategy so there's opportunity to put something in there about this issue to Signal very publicly uh on this issue set that we've brought up here uh what what would you recommend uh be in the National Security strategy uh I'm not saying that Putin's necessarily going to read it but it's it's a chance to uh have a have a discussion internally in the administration like we're having here what are some of the issues that that they need to take a a look at and then the second part of that question is we've just had the release of a new defense strategy in the form of the 2014 quadrennial defense review did that strategy adequately capture the space that we're in now with Russia is is Russia properly accounted for in our defense strategy if it's going to be the kind of long-term challenge that that you all believe that it is going to be whoever feels most comfortable going first I'll go first on that um I'll start with the easier question first uh the the 2014 QDR little bit like the QDR that came out 6 weeks after 911 I mean it was legislated to come out at a certain time so it came out at the time it was legislated to come out and it was adjusted at the very last minute to talk a little bit about 911 but the whole thing had been written before 911 occurred same thing is true right now legislative mandate 2014 QDR uh we're still talking in that QDR about you know we want to shape the evolution of both China as a responsible stakeholder and Russia as a responsible partner as well that was a language that was in there can't rewrite those they're coming out the Bucks they had probably already gone to the printers before it became you know in mid January before it was clear what was going on right now with Russia and Ukraine now as far as National Security is concerned don't put another one out out last time the last time you want to put something out was right after you're sitting there with egg all over your face and people wondering about your resolve and I would argue you have to rebuild your credibility for action or reputation for Action to use a term that Thomas shelling used you have to rebuild that sort of one red line at a time you know there's recently an article uped by Michael cherof said we need to reset our foreign policy and have a whole architecture of red lines set we know darn well if we try to put out five red lines we're going to get a number of them wrong no matter how strong your president is because we don't know what our Toleration for pain is and we don't know what the people were trying to affect you evolve these kind of things over time that is a longer term thing and so I would argue right now if you have to put out a national security strategy uh you probably should have done it two years ago you didn't don't do it now I I mean I think I have to agree with Clark I don't think the QDR uh accounted for this sort of this severe a turn in events the B the the the fact is the International Community has rejected what Russia has previously done in terms of these kinds of action in its region so nobody recognizes um abazia and South otia as Russian uh territory but had but had uh attempted to move on and figure that okay there's going to have to be a resolution at some point and you know we we had continue to try to encourage Russia to be a part of a responsible Global Order and any logical uh you know if you take a longer term not Putin's political uh calculus but a longer term calculus for the welfare of the Russian people and the welfare of Russian society and the Russian Nation um that's a much better course of action right so I mean long term Russia would do well to make those reforms that Andy was talking about to open up its Society to actually have a free media to invite to make to be attractive to Capital again to establish the rule of law and to build a a Russia that actually has a decent future in the 21st century um this is taking Russia down a path that will not have a decent future in the 21st century uh and it is uh and and that is something that I think does need to be factored into National Security thinking um you know I you know I would imagine National Security strategy is not the top of anybody's list at the white house right now given the number of challenges they're they're facing um but obviously the shifting dynamics of power and how sovereignty disputes that had been sort of muffled or very rarely acted on in recent years how those might play into uh cha challenging uh the international order and undermining Security in large important regions of the world including in the Asia Pacific that has to be something that we that we look to address Andy um thanks um of course the QDR could not account uh for this there there are two sides of it one is capabilities the other are intentions um now we know the Russians have been working for the last uh five or six years to improve their military uh sector and I think this deserves a lot more attention looking at the kinds of capabilities that they have there's been a lot of focus not surprisingly on access denial types of types of weapons uh to uh raise the cost in particular of uh military interventions of the kind that the United States and its allies have led over the last 10 or 15 years that the Russians have found so noxious uh to their to their interest I would look really really very closely at uh the nuclear uh the nuclear balance and look at what the Russians are doing there with their modernization program and what we are or not are not doing with our our program and I leave it to to Clark to to make a comment to comment on that you know uh on on bcrams comment about uh you know the long term look Vladimir Putin is 60 1 years old and uh he takes very very good care of himself he plans on being in power for a long time and so you may sure we would like to wish for the return back to uh a reforming Russia but I just don't see that happening anytime anytime soon the logic of what he's done uh and where he's moved is has has constrained him and is actually encouraging him uh to to go to go further so I'm afraid unless something happens uh to him personally uh I don't see any way that we're going to be dealing with him for a long time so that has to be accounted for I think in the strategy because that's where the intention has shifted the intention has very much shifted in a fundamental way way is from being a quasy partner of friend ofy to clearly an adversary and an adversary which I'm worried is ready to again inflict and sustain major losses all across all across the board um you know I know this is a kind of a crazy thought but I had these crazy thoughts for the last two months they they hit me like I don't even think about them they just hit me I was reading Leon eron's piece uh last Friday and the thought hit me it was Clark you know this the greatest achievement of the Soviet Union besides winning World War II of course was achieving nuclear parody with the United States what would really rock Vladimir's world I me would be able to somehow acquire a first strike capability I know it's a crazy idea it was don't even even thought about for for decades I think you need some thought reform that's what yeah he uh but look I just don't don't we this this cannot be underestimated in any way shape or form but you know what since we have frankly we actually have little uh capacity to influence Russia I think we have to think about much more strategically is how we support the sovereignty and the uh uh Independence of the states on Russia's borders from East Central Europe to the southern caucuses to Central Asia I just came from Central Asia spent a couple of weeks there and uh you know for example some very thoughtful kazak analysts who said that you know Crimea may be their 911 and how they think about their their security and their and their position so I think that uh that whole area we need a Eurasia policy not just a Russia policy uh and because the again the core weakness was Ukrainian Ukraine's own uh sovereignty itself let me turn it over to audience questions I would ask that you please uh identify yourself and and please do keep it to a question so we can hear more from these gentlemen that somebody will come with a microphone sir in the back I saw your hand uh thank you uh this has been great comments uh Bill Courtney a retired Diplomat uh over the years uh the US uh Ukraine military to military relationship has been considered to be one of the best aspects of our bilateral relations uh the police have performed pretty poorly out there but now that the military are engaged um is it likely that the U bilateral military to military relationship is going to Bear some fruit and the quality of the performance of the military and then secondly related to that um there have been s suggestions from some observers that uh the West should provide uh defensive Weaponry uh anti- armor other kinds of defensive Weaponry to the Ukrainian military to help them uh defend DET deter and defend U and that kind of Weaponry of former Soviet manufacturers available on the market so it wouldn't be a question of providing them Weaponry they didn't know how to use would that have been an effective Western strategy over the last several months want to jump in on that viam do you want to do more than one want or you want to just what don't we Ser those um so I think the I think the provision of uh defensive weapons would not be again it would not I don't think it would be decisive I actually I I truly don't think that in this power Dynamic there's a there's a step that would be decisive in the immediate term I do think that Ukraine needs a heck of a lot of help and it needs a lot more help than what it's gotten um the the milto mill relationship with Ukraine has been good I I I understand that from um you know knowing that it's been one of these countries that we've partnered with over the years but it was no nowhere nearly as good as for example the milto mill relationship with Georgia um so I think you could see a situation in which uh perhaps it's not just it's not just an American issue but you know the United States could be providing a lot of higher-end uh Military Support in terms of how they do things and how they manage their military and how they can run things and how they can integrate the various parts of their security services and um European countries could be providing additional um equipment and other things to to support their military Ukraine makes a lot of military equipment I mean the Ukrainian Army has it has stuff and ukrainians are in the Army I mean they have a military um the real question is do they have the command and control and the integration that they need to deal with this kind of complex threat and I and I think that would be that'll be that will be uh that'll be tested uh if we see further military incursions you know I don't think you'll see a Crimea situation where it just where nothing happens I we're seeing the violence and we're seeing things being contested now and I imagine that I mean there is a point at which the ukrainians will stand up and you know they need to be they'll need to be backed up by um by by by countries around the world that don't think they should uh you know have their uh country dismembered uh just because uh there was a popular Uprising and you know one corrupt leader ended up fleeing from Office uh unfortunately for the Ukrainian people they've been besieged by you know decades now of corrupt leaders that have that have left their country in a position where it could be subjected to this sir right in the front here just a moment he'll come up with the microphone yeah um my name is Clen Mig and uh I'd like to see you one of you all comment on Army the ukrainians with stinger missiles so that the Air Force can't operate anywhere in their territory they pulled out of Afghanistan when the Afghans with very few Stinger missiles ran them out of Afghanistan so the Air Force was totally neutered uh and the Air Force seems to have a low tolerance for casualties to begin with the Russian Air Force does and then give them the Carl Gustaf on the ground so that when the Russians come playing across the water with their tanks and their uh and their uh armored vehicles that they can take them out both places put such a high price on the Russian game that the Russians have no chance of uh getting their people to put up with the casualty rate that they're going to incur if they come in there and I'd like your comment on that great and let let me take one more sir right here right over here blue tie thank you my name is Bell I'm representing the mcain Institute and I'm from Georgia so uh my question is uh on the the NATO potential contingency in the Baltic Direction uh today uh Russians officially notified Lithuanian side that they are suspending uh weapon information exchange on kaliningrad oblast um and this was the the formal notification they received I presume there will be some more enhancement with the Weaponry in kinr particularly maybe when isander tactical nukes but uh my question would be if uh in the future we would see polite green guys appearing in one of the Baltic countries uh Article 5 considers support of the uh Ally when there is an quoting armed attack on the uh member country so what would be considered as an armed attack or what is the NATO's contingency in the uh potential uh scenario thank you clar Clark would you like to take a stab at um I don't think you're going to see in Ukraine but I'll leave it to Andy to make a more authoritative statement on that um I don't think you're going to see a Russian invasion of Ukraine with lots of helicopters with lots of aircraft that are susceptible to being shot down with stingers uh remember Russia invaded Afghanistan in support of a public government and so they occupied the country and it took quite a while for the United States to develop the supply lines and stuff to provide them the wherewithal to start shooting down aircraft you know in Afghanistan territory um uh I don't know how far Putin is going there was a uh Royal United Institute for security in London published something said nobody including Putin knows what he'll do next as the situation changes you sort of agree with that do you think he knows how far he'll go uh during that time but I don't think it's going to be an invasion of that type I think it'll be lots more green men there'll be lots more violence in cities uh it'll be a creeping you know I think it won't end or it won't stay stabiliz until a larger chunk of Ukrainian territory has been lost to Russia during that time I think it will go that far uh because Putin has had more appetite for this than I thought he had already and he hasn't been confronted with the kind of opposition that's going to lead him to back off for a while um I think he looks at this as an oper he's playing a great game in his mind and playing it better than his opponents and he sees a feasible gain I think through another 6 months of this and you know there will be you know forced ethnic cleansing to use that kind of term which is much more out of Yugoslavia and so on but I think you're going to find that they're not going to be Ukrainian Freedom Fighters in that strip of Southeastern Ukraine that I think is likely to go Russian so I think the military aspect of it is not going to be part of it uh in terms of that as to your question um uh I think it depends a lot on how the world reacts to what's going to happen to Ukraine I mean I saw TV show foreign Min the ambassadors for the three Baltic countries talking with each other said well of course Ukraine isn't part of NATO it was clear that they were very happy to be part of NATO during that time and to have the defenses I don't think Putin is ready to take on that challenge yet unless we have a lot more dithering and ineptitude and passivity uh from the rest of the world in response to Ukraine so I don't see that replay happening right away but could it happen six months to a year from now depending on way events transpire I think in the Ukraine I think so but I don't think it will but it could Andy you want to pick up on that yeah yeah just to follow up I completely agree with what what Clark uh just said and I would offer what think salami tactics yeah the old term that we used during the during the during the Cold War but I mean we are coming up to a a critical moment with the presidential election it's been an essential part of the Russian strategy they've been able to claim that the current government in keev is illegitimate and they're going to want to make sure that they're able to continue claiming that the next government in Kev is illegitimate uh and so I think what we see the efforts to control and if not to control than to destabilize areas of Eastern and Southern Ukraine are going to intensify up the elections and of course May 9th the great victory in Europe holiday coming up on Friday is likely to be a very very very nasty day that may look like may take what happened in adessa last Friday looked like well I won't say a picnic because up but it just it's going to be a very very difficult day so when the elections are held the goal is to have as few people vote in those regions that the Russians either for the opposition forces control or have destabilized then with the election results the claim can be made that these results are illegitimate the voice the voice of these regions have not been heard their rights are being violated and then the Russians will declare the right to protect they've already been talking a lot about the right the right to protect now uh they're going to likely still want to avoid you know the fullscale military Invasion to to protect but I wouldn't uh exclude that certainly as a POS as a possibility but I think that's what we're going to likely to see to up to the point where you know on April 17th in his phone in program Mr Putin raised the term novaia new Russia a prearis term for the Eastern and Southern parts of of ukra Ukraine to me this is clearly what he wants this is the most industrialized part of Ukraine it is the most wealthy part of Ukraine it is where the heart of the Ukrainian military industrial complex is and if you want to have a greater Russia project then you want to have a greater Russian controlled military-industrial complex you sure as hell don't want the Ukrainian military-industrial complex actually competing for you with sales to China as they have been for the last couple of years uh so in some way shape or form the end game I think is going to be for a truncated Ukraine and it would probably be an annexation of that territory to to Russia I don't think that a uh a uh Frozen conflict Zone AA trans Dena Dena will be satisfactory and you'll be left with a rump Ukraine which is much economically weaker yes more F more focused and oriented to the west but much relatively uh weaker so um at the military supplies to the Ukrainian you know you know I I don't like to say this but I feel in some ways the the train might have left the station I mean we had to kind of been thinking about this you know two months ago in a more in a more strategic way uh nevertheless we do know we need to do what we can do but let me emphasize again okay mil to MTO Mill relations that Ambassador Courtney raised and by the way this is the distinguished former ambassador of Georgia uh who was so modest not to inform the audience that he is the former ambassador to Georgia Ambassador tella very good to see you again um there is wherever there are countries that have an appetite for a stronger military military cooperation relationship with the United States do it I mean secretary Hegel get on the airplane go to the South caucuses go to C go to Central Asia and see what uh people are looking for I can tell you just from my recent trip that I think there's certainly an interest in Greater mil Mill cooperation with Kazakhstan uh and uh and definitely with with usbekistan certainly an interest in a stronger relationship I think with the United States in in turkistan but much more cautious given their studied uh neutrality thanks let me take a question from this side of the room in the front sir and microphone's coming uh Peter Humphrey I'm an Intel analyst I'm in touch with the Ukrainian Colonel and he says give us tactical intelligence not MREs um in a country with a flat and increasingly Muslim population Putin just got himself a million Russians and he can get a couple million more by taking the southeast I think that's a big driver here and and and pu pundits have failed to note it to noted Putin will not stop until he bumps into some form of military resistance so is it possible to establish a training AKA trigger Force southeast of Kiev uh to to serve that purpose and also isn't this with he's out of office in 4 and 1/2 years something like that so he's got four and a half years to reestablish Nova Ria maybe he puts puppet midv back in for another he can sorry he can he there there elections in 2018 and he can run again he can yes so he for another six-year term which by current Constitution statutes he would be president until 2024 okay so how about the training trigger Force let me take uh another one in the back in the very back there hi Joshua Adams I'm a national security law student at GW earlier a mention was made of intelligence failures early on in this crisis we know Edward Snowden is now entirely in the custody of the FSB so and it has been reported that we have had significant losses of intelligence assets with regards to Russia so I'm wondering what the panel thinks is how big a a factor that is in the administration's decision calculus who wants to start on those ones Andy do you want to take the first one uh sure um well I'll take the I'll take I'll take I'll take the first one and but just to point out with with Crimea M uh Russia has also inherited um more than 200,000 Crimean tartars uh who have a pretty difficult history uh with Russia and the and the Soviet Union and just over the weekend I saw that uh the uh a major political leader there Mr jamela was uh stopped at the border from re-entering uh Crimea so far the Crimean Tar this is the Muslim population has been very very very quiescent uh in in all of this but uh uh I I think that is I think that is going to be a problem uh for uh for Putin it might might also actually increase the the larger problem that he has with a um increasingly uh increasing islamification of significant territories of the Russian of the Russian Federation I mean this was kind of the thing we were talking a lot about before the Sochi Olympics it was the dog that didn't bite but there's no question that with the the uh the Rabid environment of Russian nationalism uh in Russia today and I this is just beyond anything I've ever ever ever seen or even con conceived of that is uh almost certainly going to increase the problem of the uh the Insurgency that the Mr Putin faces in the north Caucasus and also in other in other areas of of in in the vulgar region where there are significant Muslim Muslim populations Snowden I leave that it's above my fig right um I don't think there's intelligence failure is not the way I would characterize um what happened and the inability of of our intelligence agencies to predict the Putin would do what he was going to do there was an almost fatuous comment made by a pentagon spokesman talking about the 25,000 Russian troops that have been mobilizing and active on the borders of Southeast Asia where he said look uh we don't have a real good idea of what their intentions are okay you can't see those they're not right out in front you can see the forces you don't know what he's going to do with them uh I think a lot of us a lot of us were surprised I think including Andy were surprised that Putin did as much as he did and could go on to do as much as he's doing now and we're talking about people who've been doing nothing but study Russia and Russian leaders for a long time uh you don't get humans right just because you study them real hard uh during that time and I think that's the case with Putin during this time um Snowden uh it's weakened the United States a bit in terms of its allies certainly that was the case with Merkel when she was just here in terms of us German relations but that isn't explaining why the European reaction to What Russia is doing has been so weak uh it's not Snowden that's responsible for a former chancellor of Germany sitting on the board of the Russian oil company you know it's not uh Snowden that's responsible with the fact that the United States has a bilateral economic relationship uh with Russia of about 27 billion dollar a year and Russia uh Europe as a whole 370 billion a year you talk about my colleague talks about let's sanction you know let's sanction the Russian banking sector well let's London down the tubes that's London down the tubes right now so there's been a a case of interdependency uh or dependency depending on who you look at it created between Russia and Europe right now that Europe is not an independent agent is not likely to take very forceful actions which means that when we said in NATO well we're going to move with NATO as an alliance that means we're asking Malta we're asking um the United Kingdom we're asking countries right on the periphery who benefit economically greatly from the Russian Empire to take strong actions that will hurt their economies not gonna happen and it's for a trigger Force there's no trigger Force we can do in the near term that could stop the Russians what will stop the Russians from going further is a reading of their own interests that they've gone as far as they need to and why if you're Putin thinking about the kind of stability you know he's in a place where 40 45% of the population is Russian and the rest is Ukrainian well you push the ukrainians further away and you make sure you're just left with Russians what you don't do is take over an area that's 100% Ukrainian and then have to deal with it as we know too well occupations are tough and uh I think Putin is a little smarter about that yeah I I don't I I agree that I don't think Putin is looking to occupy Ukrainian uh predominantly Ukrainian parts of Ukraine so I don't think we're looking at you know the reabsorption of Ukraine into into Russia I think he's looking at what Andy was talking about Nova Ria um this once again though we you know we can very easily uh sort of move into the realm of talking about military options that may or may not be there there certainly are tactical decisions that could be made in terms of what kind of support to provide what kind of um you know how you how you reassure and reinforce and make clear that you know that the that the NATO alliance is going to stand firm on um on protecting alliance members from aggression but we should remember dealing with Russia as a civilization that we've had challenges with for a long long time and that's the situation we're in now if we're not willing uh to take uh actions that are punitive that impose some costs on us in the west then that will be the sign that we are not serious about the principles that we all claim we hold so deer and I believe that would be a step that we would eventually regret we're not going to like the economic consequences of taking some serious sanctions in some areas but it is not an all or nothing I mean you don't have Russia will have it in its interest to for example continue to sell arms where it can or continue in the energy Market or continue in the financial Market if some other sector has been sanctioned um and the United States can have a disproportionate impact in some areas so um you know it taking action in the banking sector is uh is a is a high order step if the you know rest of eastern Ukraine is going to be annexed I think it's it's really impossible to see a credible response that doesn't include uh steps that hurt both ways they have to they're going to we're going to have to see that happen now in in banking in particular where the United States goes so goes the world in a lot of cases because banks will have to self- select out of doing business with Russian Banks if sanctioned just by the us or targeted just by the US and so you will have you can have an echo effect but I don't I I I think it is important to be very honest about the fact that this interdependence has developed that you're absolutely right uh you know not only the economy but properties and all sorts of things in Mayfair and London are owned by lots of Russian oligarchs and Russian oligarchs are you know owned football teams and all you know this is this has been a we've welcomed in the west the flood of Russian cash they on the Brooklyn Nets on the Brooklyn Nets right so we have welcomed the flood of Russian cash uh and we're going to have to decide whether we're going to figure out a way to do with less of it um if we have to impose costs and I I just think it is I I believe that it has to be uh clearly something we're willing to call for and then it has to be something clearly the United States is willing to take action on even if Europe is uncomfortable about it or doesn't want to follow um we're going to have to lead on the imposing of costs um we have to do it just for the annexation of Crimea and certainly for further for further steps let me give Andy a final word and then uh and then we'll thank the panel oh uh two things one that's another collateral damage of economic cost for Russia is economic cost for those states that have very strong economic relations with Russia some of them which are very very uh fragile anyway for example let's say Tajikistan which 40% of its GDP approximately is is based on remittances from uh migrant workers in Russia uh kyrgistan around around 30 30% um all of those countries have strong economic ties uh from the south caucuses to Central Asia to uh obviously to berus I think that's that's something that needs to be thought about and when we think about you know what was the core weakness of Ukraine again it really is sort of the economic Foundation of its of its own own sovereignty so I think this you know the mid Mill cooperation is is is important but it's this Factor the economic uh uh engagement that really needs to get to get the attention uh and um I would like to see that to be a big part of it finally I think to get back to China for one one second uh because you know the logic is is that the Russians are going to be pushed more more closely to the to the to the Chinese the Chinese are going to be ambivalent about about this uh I think that maybe some of the when we look at uh the potential economic cost of of trying to isol isolate Russia and for countries that around around Russia this is I think this is something useful to talk with about to our Chinese counterparts and even more broadly about kind of where they are I would uh maybe it would be useful for for secretary Kerry or somebody to have a trip to uh or maybe a treasury secretary to have a trip to uh to Beijing to try to have a serious discussion with with them this is again where where Putin is going to be going at the end of at the end of May and this is a uh you know the Chinese did abstain on the UN Security Council on the uh on this sanctions question and I think it's worth uh uh trying to explore to what degree we can work together um in this uh uh con uh context as well so not only with our European allies thank you very much and let me uh thank TJ chipoletti who did all the work to pull this together Kathleen Hicks director of the International Security program and told me to stop complaining to her about Ukraine and pull an event together and my colleagues who joined me for the event to do just that thank you so much for coming this afternoon thank you well done [Applause] Sam good to see you to see you

Channel: Center for Strategic & International Studies

Views: 2,794

Keywords: CSIS, Defense and Security, International Security, Nuclear Weapons, Acquisition and Resources, Military Strategy, Eastern Europe, Europe, NATO

Id: e_QWx2g7w8I

Length: 92min 16sec (5536 seconds)

Published: Mon May 05 2014