hello my name is Alison Hammond and I am a member of the Dole Institute's Student Advisory Board welcome to the Dole Institute of Politics and thank you for attending tonight's presentation the dole Student Advisory Board is composed of K U students committed to the work of the Dole Institute we attend regular meetings assistant events like this one and plan an essay be sponsored program every semester members of the SI b receive great opportunities to network with our special guests if you're a student would like to join please contact the Dole Institute the Dole Institute would like to hear from you if you enjoy tonight's program please let us know by contacting us on facebook twitter or through our website email your attendance and feedback help shape future programming before we begin tonight I'd like to remind you to please turn off your cellphone's after the interview we will have some time for audience questions and answers if you have a question please raise your hand and a student helper with a microphone will come to you please ask just one brief question and now please welcome Dole Institute director Bill lacy thanks Alison thanks to all of you for coming out tonight we really appreciate your support of this program we had about a hundred and eighty people here this afternoon some watching out here on video on the video screen I want to know how many people were here for the afternoon session so did you like the afternoon sessions excellent excellent so it's all the cause of the great group of folks that we've assembled for this program and I'm going to introduce them very very briefly in just a moment I'm going to make a couple of quick announcements first there is a big date coming up for the Dole Institute on July 22 will not only celebrate our tenth anniversary of our dedication but also Senator Bob Dole's 90th birthday now to honor Senator Dole in the occasion we have a huge birthday card back here which would encourage everybody to sign and put a little note on so if you didn't see it and sign it on the way in see it and sign it on the way out it will be here at the Dole Institute for a few days before the 22nd you're also all invited back to 22nd it's the afternoon of the 22nd will be having cupcakes and a party in honor of Senator Dole it will be kind of just drop i signed the card get a cupcake say hello and just to bid him a happy birthday so we hope some of you can join us for that second announcement i wanted to make tonight is we have all of the books there there is in your program tonight a bibliography that the panelists pulled together of important gettysburg books that they thought you might like to read if you have time to do that they are those books are all on sale out front from the kayuu bookstore so please take advantage of that and pick up some of those books on your way out tonight now the success today has really been driven by our six participants they've done a fabulous job we debated for a long time how to introduce them tonight because we gave them all proper introductions we'd be spending about 20 minutes on ta introductions rather than on the program and so I'm just going to simply ask each of them each of our historian experts we were to my right to stand as I as I name them and asking you to applaud and welcome them to the Dole Institute pay you and I'm going to ask you to read their BIOS which are in your program to find out more details let's start with dr. Terry Beckham hall from the US Army Command and General Staff College Terry next is doc dr. Ethan rape views of the US Army Command and General Staff College Ethan axes dr. Deborah Scheffer from Park University Deb and last but not least certainly KU's own dr. Jennifer Webber Jenny these guys are going to cover each one of the seven critical decisions that we discussed tonight on stage with me tonight our dr. Steve Lowery u.s. army of advanced military study Steve is right to my left and to his left is dr. Kevin Vinson US Army University of foreign military and cultural studies and as your program says Kevin actually played a critical role in putting all of this program together recruiting the panelists and really being of great assistance to me in the dhol Institute of Politics let's go ahead and get started on the program and I'm going to direct the first question tonight to heaven but Steve I want you to jump in on it too but how the panel kind of discussed the seven decisions how what was the methodology how did you select the seven decisions when you asked me to start bringing this together back in February I asked Jenny and Steve first they're the first two folks I started to talk with what do you think what do you think the seven most critical decisions that were taken I got their feedback I drew up my own and then floated them out to everybody and we kicked it around through email and Ethan Terry and Deb made terrific contributions to this too so the end result of the the seven decisions that we came up with was really consensus from from all of us with again great feedback from all of the the real Civil War historians because I'm I am NOT one I just like to read about it where did seven come from seven is just an arbitrary number bill actually suggested it and I deferred to him because I figured well seven that'd be a good number to be able to discuss within the time limit that we have tonight so was there pretty much a solid consensus or did a couple of suggestions not make the list we're going to get into the more it's a list many years Mazal it okay that's okay no it was it really was there's a lot of great give-and-take and you know what stands out to say my new colleague and best friend Terry Beckham Baugh proposed a list after I floated the one that I'd come up with with reasons that were outlined that we're really terrific and that's the value of having folks who really have made a personal study of this broad topic the Civil War participate in something like this so yeah there were some that didn't make it and you know why not some didn't maybe didn't raise to the level of what's a grand kind of decision what in the consensus of the group was one that was truly had an effect on the either the day of a particular day of the battle or you know the battle itself so that's pretty much what we did Kevin is actually minimizing the effort here because when you get a bunch of PhDs together who have asked a bunch of questions how there's a lot of questions so at one point kevin refereed said all right we're done no more quick let's just pick a seven and go so pH these are that way okay what I'd like to do now Kevin and Steve is have you guys have her you figure this out to kind of outline the main actions that are taking place on the first second and the third day during the battle so everybody kind of has a basis of knowledge as we go into the seven decision so you can do this briefly but just let's start with day one what are the key things folks need to know okay and I'm going to I know that my my colleagues were here going to help me on this especially if I stray this is in the in the vernacular that I grew up with in the army it was a meeting engagement the cavalry the Union cavalry came through Gettysburg and there was initial contact with Confederate infantry and the cavalry commander took the decision that I'm going to stay here this is good ground he communicated that to the the Union wing commander Major General John Reynolds so the Cavalry's going to stay and cover until the Union interest comes up the Confederate infantry I'm not going to be discomforted by cavalry so they uncoil come on blind of battle begin the fight Union infantry come in more Confederate forces come in the eleventh Union Corps is on the ground that the first Union Quran is on which is good ground does not quite as was discussed earlier today favor the defensive positions of the 11th Union Corps instead of having nice rolling terrain where I'm on high ground the Confederates have got to come up the valleys are running north and south and it doesn't afford anyone any advantage it's tough to dig in so the Confederates have the advantage on the right flank in the first day of the battle the battle ends that first day there's two Union Corps who are essentially crushed which is what Lee wanted to do you know take elements of the Union Army and defeat them in detail Union Confederate forces are still coming up Union forces are still coming up there's significant pieces of ground that for other one reason or another the Confederates don't seize Cemetery Hill Culp's Hill just south of the town of Gettysburg but it sort of shakes out into a rather victorious first day of battle for the Army of Northern Virginia let me take a step back beyond that just to set that stays a little bit for you though the Union and Confederate armies had just fought the Battle of Chancellorsville which shows a spectacular Confederate victory and then the decision was made to advance into the north to take the war to the north and as our panel discussed earlier today the idea was that Lee's army going into Pennsylvania was a an army of looters if you will foragers they were going in there they're widely separated on widely-separated avenues of approach to give the army the maximum capability to punish the north to take through the north that they were doing to the south in Northern Virginia give Virginia a break basically if we can win a battle we can keep them the north at bay the media engagement that Kevin describes is the worst possible thing that could happen for an infantry force is to run into the main force of your enemy without knowledge and so the idea that general Stewart had left the Army did not follow these direction to guard the right flank of excuse me see general Stewart was a cavalry calendar for the South's so he is he has taken his four brigades of cavalry and has disappeared somewhere into Maryland Pennsylvania the so he literally generally is surprised by this action that kevin has just described and he reacts as Kevin said he reacts very quickly take advantage of the situation he's given and he attacks and in drives to Union Corps back onto what becomes the ground that you're all familiar with on the second day of the battle perhaps the bloodiest day of the battle the action starts the main action starts relatively late in the day for a number of reasons one the the idea that the intent of robert e lee is to attack in concert on the extreme right flank Culp's Hill Cemetery Hill and down south to in an attempt on one side or the other to break the Union line and roll it up on a flank the battles take place more or less simultaneously not more serendipitously than then by design the because of problems in finding a route down to the area of Little Round Top down the the peach farm and the wheat field in the south Longstreet's group Longstreet's Corp is moving they appear that on the route they're taking appears are going to be seen so I have to double back and take another up to come back so further delays the attack until nearly very very late in the afternoon very very late so by time they're starting to attack after four o'clock in the afternoon it's going to be dark soon the advantage that they have in this part is that one of the Union commanders general citizens sickles has moved forward and not told as commander General Meade so he's taken and put the entire federal position at risk that's the place where Longstreet attacks that Corps is handled very roughly and driven back the Battle of Little Round Top the battle at Round Top all those battles occur Joshua Chamberlain and the Curt and that those brigades that drive the Alabama trips off of Little Round Top and that settled position in the south for the final day all of those battles occur on this second day in the south and the north end of the battlefield the right side Colts Hill the because of the battles in the south the Union General Meade has pulled forces from that area and given them to reinforce here one of those units that leaves leaves it's entrenchments and when the Confederates attack they cease does entrenchments but they are held in place they very powerful and significant Union action with very small forces against very large forces so at the end of the second day what you find is the traditional fishhook that you all remember from school the Union lines going north from Little Round Top around Cemetery Hill cops'll and back and that's the end of the day on the second day that evening generally we'll plan another attack in concert we intend to take fresh forces coming up and remember that all these you all these Confederate forces had been scattered all over to do the foraging the looting if you will of Pennsylvania they're still coming into the battle on the afternoon of the second they're still being collected if you will to concentrated so with that set up well day three general Pickett shows up with his division after a long march jeb stuart the Confederate cavalry commander finally comes back and the bat of the attack that Steve was describing again was an attempt to and as the story is told there was an attack in the north there was a in the South the center must be weak therefore we'll attack there was a little bit more than that because there was an action again on the right on the Union right the Confederate Left Culp's Hill again to at least try to draw off more forces from the center to make to enable a penetration in the center by pickets fresh division and not too badly used from the first day sort of a division - and a full division from another Confederate Corps all under the command of Longstreet the Confederate Corps commander who's in charge of this fight there's a long cannonade there's delay in launching the battle does it start in the morning should it get underway then and we talked about the why it didn't happen during the afternoon suffice to say though this attack is launched when it is launched after a very long cannonade picot Trimble and Pettigrew's divisions attack across roughly 1600 meters about a mile open ground lots of artillery fire they're held up by the undulating ground and some fences that are there but they actually do get to the center part of the Union line there is a moment when it might have been possible for a penetration but the attack culminates there and the Union forces defeat the Confederates in the center the Confederates retreat and that's the way the day ends with a lot of losses on both sides but the Union holding the ground thus victorious there is no immediate counter-attack for which the Union commander Meade is is criticized the criticism builds over the years after the war ends so it's now battles of reputation among general officers reputations of regiments but at that moment on that day that was a significant victory for George Meade the Union and the Army of the Potomac Lee gathers his forces it rains on the 4th and they begin the long and painful withdrawal back across the Potomac there's a half-hearted pursuit the cavalry actions on the side of the part of the Union tried their best to disrupt the withdrawal but Lee at the end of that period is successful in withdrawing the bulk of the remnants of the Army of Northern Virginia George Meade takes the Army of the Potomac back across the Potomac and they're really back where they started and the war lasts two more years ok we're going to go to our 7 decisions out of one more that ok exactly we're going to go to our 7 decisions after one more question but we found out one of the things that I found fascinating about the discussion this afternoon is that a lot of people are informed by the book The Killer Angels by Shara or by the movie Gettysburg which is based on that and a lot of the facts are essentially correct but essentially our plate-up are focused on to the complete lack of focus on other things and so I'm kind of curious Kevin Steve what are some of the decisions that people may have come tonight thinking oh that's got to be one of the seven that gets on there there are two portrayed in the movie I think and then there's one that that is not I don't recall as portrayed in the movie so let's talk about it one of mine that didn't make the first Minnesota yeah that's one that may not be quite as well now the and again this was a wonderful process give-and-take among professionals and yeah I did have to put a good idea cutoff date because I owe these to bill so that he can develop the rest of the program a wonderful process just and again this is just from Kevin Benson's readings and I am NOT a Civil War historian as my colleagues are but I have spent a fair amount of time over my army career and subsequent to that studying this significant part of American history I'm sure one of them was because Michael sharrows book was very popular and it's Ethan everyone's to bide the Joshua Chamberlain t-shirt at at Gettysburg at the gift Center but the action of the 20th Maine and Little Round Top and the bayonet charge that's what the Confederates from the field we discussed that this afternoon but again among the consensus that wasn't one of the critical decisions that played heavily in the totality of the three days you know again that was the consensus we discussed whether or not Buford's decision to recognize that there was good ground on the ridge lines in front of Gettysburg and he would delay the Confederate forces there and convinced Reynolds and Meade that this is good ground and this is where we fight and again we went back and forth and you know this is really the expectation of what a good cavalry commander is supposed to do so okay that's you know just in an incident upon which others build my personal favorite again this is just from study and again I why it's the action of a very small regiment the first Minnesota on the second day of the battle as Steve so well described and we talked in length about this afternoon sickles core is badly handled roughly handle roughly and here come the the Confederates in there screaming up and you know some disorder some good order them the issue is in doubt a corps commander Winfield Scott Hancock is on the scene and sees that there is but a union regiment that has arrived here come the Confederates Hancock a very bright man a in a one who continued to study his his profession after he left the military academy recognizes he has to buy time and how does one buy time in the Civil War Colonel commanding first Minnesota sir go and take those colors and the colonel commanding you know I and Steve and I when we were young men at going to school together we walked that ground and I could instantly flashback to that thinking Here I am colonel commanding I've got less than 500 soldiers and my corps commander has just told me to attack into about five or six thousand and I know it's to buy time for the rest of the Union forces to come and I don't hesitate involve as a result 47 men came back out of how many a little less than 500 okay any other decisions gentlemen that didn't make the list you remember I think we had pretty good consensus over all the rest of them didn't we okay okay let's go to the decisions now some of your sitting out there reading your program and you're saying why didn't you put the seven decisions in the program I was right what not well it's because if we did that you'd be reading the program instead of listening to the experts so you don't have to write them down though we have a list for you that you can pick up on your way out okay so we're trying to think ahead a little bit here so seven decisions we're going to count them down backwards okay so we're going to start with the seventh most critical decision at Gettysburg the seventh month critical decision was Lee's decision to invade the north and for our expert commentary we're going to go to Professor Ginny Webber Ginny good evening good evening thanks for coming out is this on apparently not okay no no no no we got to have the mic on you want to flip the switch okay how about that me get it okay all right great I think I could project to the back of the room but it really would have tried my voice so this is better video either yeah that's true okay well anyway thankful thank you all for coming out tonight it's good to see you and Steve set up part of this for me already uh Lee makes the decision to come north after this tremendous victory that he had had at Chancellorsville in May of 1863 he was outnumbered by about two to one he had divided his army into three and yet he had prevailed over this overwhelming force it was a tremendous victory for him so lead now has come to believe that his troops are invincible and his troops have come to believe that they are invincible as long as Lee is their general so there's a great deal of confidence in this army that's one piece of it second piece is that the Union and Confederate armies have been moving back and forth and back and forth and back and forth across Northern Virginia by this time for really two years the better part of two years and Northern Virginia is pretty wiped out in terms of things that an army would need in terms of crops in terms of fuel would in terms to a lesser degree of livestock the the armies have used all this up the Union forces are pretty well supplied less true for the Confederate forces which are having difficulties already in feeding the troops complete rations keeping them clothed keeping them shod and Lee thinks that if he takes his army up into the north at least they'll be able to eat better for some period of time however long he's in the north where is he going we don't know he never said that is one of the mysteries of the ages and we just don't know the other thing that Lee is looking at is the political situation in the north I think that one thing that people often overlook about Lee is he is extremely astute politically and what he understands is that there is a great deal of dissent in the north and the summer before already things had gotten so bad and so ugly for the Union forces particularly in the east that there were a lot of people in the North who were ready to throw in the towel on the war since then you have the very divisive measure of the Emancipation Proclamation and the equally divisive measure of a draft law in the North Lee is hoping to capitalize on all of this and he's hoping that with a significant victory in the North on northern territory that he can knock the props out from under northern civilian will and force some sort of a resolution to the war one way or the other and PS you have important gubernatorial elections coming up in the fall in Ohio and Pennsylvania so this is what these factors are all what brings him to the north and leads his army to accidentally bump into the Army of the Potomac okay thank you Janney sixth most critical decision Reynolds decision to fight at Gettysburg Kevin Steve what are your thoughts on this decision what what other options were in play it was Reynolds decision to fight Reynolds a very experienced commander he's not only commanding his core he's actually commanding a wing which is how Meade wing name hit three Corps together the nine core the federal forces are divided into three wings commanded by a senior corps command corps commander within each wing he's given essentially authority to go forward and to fight develop the fight as it comes forward Meade's idea is to fight farther south closer to his line of supply to position he feels is very strong south of Gettysburg Reynolds when he encounters the infantry of the Confederate Army decides to fight and find good ground to do that fight on essentially he commits the arm the Army of the Potomac to fight on ground that this commander is going to choose it is in fact not what General Meade intended but when general me discovers that he's done this general Meade immediately comes forward concurs in the decision and brings the army of potomac forward so in terms of a commander given responsibility for a large part of the one-third essentially of the Union arm of the Union Army of the Potomac it appears that Reynolds makes not only the good decision but it makes the right decision based on what he finds on the ground and Meade in turn supports him in that decision and I think this is why when we reached consensus that the decision that Brigadier General Buford who's the cavalry commander took recognizing good ground I'm in possession of good ground I will hold it was that's why that really didn't rise to the level as as my colleagues pointed out that it really took the act of the Wing Commander general Reynolds to recognize that this in fact was good ground this was the good the ground on which we should fight a battle and that committed the significant portion of the Union Army thus the army commander validating that decision and concentrating the Union Army on that piece of ground so it that made a great deal of sense as we as I reflected on it as I the wisdom of our crowd here but that's a tremendous decision that really precipitated the battle itself as Jenny pointed out this didn't happen by accident there were decisions taken and that's why this decision rose to that level I believe okay we're going to go to the fifth most important decision and that was eul's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill or seize Culp's Hill Ewell is that an important character in this drama because as you recall in or you if you don't recall yeah the Stonewall Jackson dies at Chancellorsville Stonewall Jackson is Lee's most dependable or most depended upon Commander in terms of his maneuver he mourns the loss of of Jackson the army mourns the loss of Jackson you will take his part the reorganized Corps Yul's action as he moves into Virginia he leads the army into Pennsylvania he is given the direction to advance forage loot as much of Pennsylvania as you can send it back to the army and get to Harrisburg if you can if you imagine the geography now of this part of Pennsylvania if you take put Gettysburg in the center and you see that you will travel through Gettysburg it would go up to the Susquehanna River to a town called York where there's a bridge and off to his left is Carlisle and then Harrisburg when he gets to York on about the 28th of June he the Federals burned the bridge so he doesn't cross it he intends to cross that bridge and burn and destroy the parts of the Baltimore Ohio Railroad the main railroad between East and West and in that party United States they burn it he gets word from at the same time at his foot he's got forces now in Carlisle he's three or four miles from Harrisburg and intends to go in occupy Harrisburg and he's told Lee has information worthy that the Union army is massing and concentrating against him in the south and turns them around you'll up to this point has been the equal of Jackson he's moved faster farther harder than anybody else he's collected more cattle more stuff stolen from Pennsylvania bought with Confederate money but with her same stolen belt with him fair money here I'll sign it for you you can give that to you tell my ticket the so you at this point he is what Lee expects would have expected of Jackson when he turns around and head south now and the battle is occurring to the left to the west of Gettysburg the battle we talked about in the first day Reynolds first Corps 11th Corps are fighting above north and to the west of Gettysburg Ewell is essentially he is concentrated he has a large force coming to them he attacks and pushes the 11th Corps all the way back to Culp's Hill Cemetery Hill forcing first Corps also to return to the cemetery Ridge Cemetery Hill area it's dark when he does this now the light is gone he's pushed the Union the Union has moved up what is essentially a route they stopped on the top of Culp's Hill Cemetery Hill you will decides not to attack although Lee gives him the opportunity to he says take copes hill if you can essentially you will declines that decision in itself may have cost the Confederates a victory at that Gettysburg many reasons are occur for that that may have occurred for that it's dark his forces have come off open ground through Gettysburg meaning they're no longer in a formation that you can recognize these units are mingled and mixed together the Union forces are no better and no better shape up on top of the hill and it's also dark and fighting at night is very rarely done in the in the Civil War so at the end of the day nighttime has fallen the Confederates are below kolff's Hill Union is on top he makes a decision that many people believe Jackson would not have made many people leave Jackson would have continued on when you have them routed attack and don't let up until you beat them and to lose that high ground to the Union forces was something that many believe at Jackson would have done and that you will have the authority to do and perhaps was expected by Lee to do so but did not did you want to add anything well and must have been a heck of a thing to have the ghost of Stonewall Jackson riding next to you with urine command of some of the elements of his Corps so folks are looking up at you expecting you to be Jackson and you are not Jackson but there is that pressure but he is the corps commander they've marched a long way he's tired his troops are tired they fought a battle they've been victorious it's night now I can see why he wouldn't want to do that that being attacked take Cemetery Hill take helps Hill especially cemetery because it was flat good place for artillery the artillery of the time but there must have been enormous pressure on this man and high expectations and possibly at that moment you know takes an element of ruthlessness Tania Stonewall Jackson was pretty ruthless drive his people to drive the enemy you know the Union forces and I'm not sure that he had that element of ruthlessness certainly he was an intelligent man certainly he was a courageous man but at that moment that final drive to take the chance of I know my troops are disorganized I know they're tired but we're going to make one more effort and drive continue to drive the Union forces away we can't get inside the man's head it's been a hundred fifty years but I can see why he wouldn't have taken that decision new to command fought some minor battles on the way up but this is a big fight with the Army of the Potomac his foe for the past few years so caution prevailed and it was discussed I believe this afternoon correct me if I'm wrong that it wasn't a foregone conclusion that if he had tried that's true to succeed that he would have so absolutely I really can't I can't fault him he had a lot to live up to but he took the decision he was the commander on the scene his his instructions said if possible or practicable if he had that latitude my higher commander tells me it is within my purview to take the decision well then I'm going to take the decision my my instincts tell me my troops have done enough therefore it's enough and who knows what's on the other side of that hill okay the fourth most critical decision is sickles decision to move forward into the peach orchard in the wheat field and for commentary on that dr. refuse Ethan you uh coming after discussion of dick you'll another thing to keep consideration Gettysburg it was his first return to command since August of 62 at the Battle of second Manassas he was on one knee watching the fighting go on and what happened was a bullet entered his kneecap and then drilled down through his lower leg and that necessitated its amputation so he was out of action for a while but he also managed while being able to action to man to marry the love of his life the sink of brown it was sense that after the marriage Ewell was Ewell was so wrapped up in puppy love he couldn't run things and the joke was you know during the period he was out of action he lost a leg he lost a leg gained a wife and the Confederacy was the worse for both developments now the subject I'm talking about the VMB had the question the decision I've been given is Dan sickles something that I've been told I have three to five minutes on a subject that a book has been written on it called a caspian sea of ink I have three to five minutes let me first just set the situation for you it is July the 2nd 1863 the second day of the battle ok can you close your eyes have visualized sort of imagine the situation at the top upper right you have all Duke over here reverse you have Culp's Hill ok and then you move over in this direction you have what's called Cemetery Hill and then you go south that's just called Cemetery Ridge at the south end of it you've got two Rises one called Little Round Top the other called Round Top that is the Union position for July the second the Confederate position essentially parallels it but on a much longer length ok Dan sickles job was to be he commanded the 3rd corps armies at this time were divided into Corps Corps were divided divisions divisions in the gates dan sickles commanded the third court and he was assigned responsibility for the southern part of the field by General George Meade the commander of the arm of atoning now a medium in ight the first of the night before he arrived at Cemetery Hill conducted reconnaissance and was working through his options the basic problem he's facing is his entire army is not up by the time midnight arrives he still has two Corps on the way to the battlefield he thinks about attacking in the morning but he's dissuaded by a reconnaissance and a desire to have everything concentrated to stay on the defensive for the day he's to be very very concerned about a southern flank ok there's a lot of talk about Longstreet has--is proposes the Lee marching around the southern federal flank and of course the flanks on any army are going to be very very sensitive position so sickles is given command of the southern part of the field and he's assigned responsibility for defending Roundtop Little Round Top which is a clear to round tops not have much military value because it's very wooded but Little Round Top has recently been cleared so it's a very open hill and so it's very important that you hold that field so sickles is assigned to command that part of the field and what happens is sickles arrives in his designated position on the southern and a Cemetery Ridge and he finds its very low grounds the lowest part of the ridge between the round tops and Cemetery Hill and when he looks west in the direction which the Confederates are assumed to be coming from he sees a much better higher piece of ground on which there is a peach orchard this is the famous peach Watership position now in the previous battle at Chancellorsville Dan sickles had held a wonderful position for artillery called Hazel Grove he had been ordered off Hazel Grove in the morning of one of the days of the battle seeing the Confederates put artillery up there and his Corps had taken a severe beating so sickles looks out and he wants to occupy that high ground out front and as well as going the battle feels very very valuable particularly the two different battlefields because Terry and myself have been most both the Gettysburg and to Hazel Grove you look from Hazel Grove to the position sickles had to fall back to and then you have that in your mental picture when you stand the peach orchard and you look toward the position that sickles hat was assigned you very much understand sickles thinking why he would want this position this piece of high ground problem is he doesn't have enough force in his command he is the third Corps which consists of two divisions and there's not enough force to occupy the peach orchard and extend the line long enough to cover the two round tops good so he takes it yeah he asked for from it he writes to headquarters asking for permission to do this Meade sends his son who's on his staff out there to tell him no this is not what you hold the position you were given sickles writes back again Henry hunt the Army's chief of artillery comes the sickles position sickles him towards the peach orchard and Hunt agrees from his professional standpoint that it is better ground so sickles says can I have authority to occupy it Hunt says knowing that the army commander that's not the armed commuter once says not on my authority and then shortly after that and this is often overlooked is that to the left of sickles position Buford's cavalry had been there to guard the southern flank but during the day Meade gives us authority to head further south and so sickles sees his cavalry leave he's nervous about this position out in front and he goes and he occupies this piece of Grant but again he doesn't have enough position enough force to hold it and consequently his third Corps is going to take a very very bad beating his mission to peach orchards going to be crushed and it's only by the the very timely arrival of reinforcements that the Federals are able to hold on to Little Round Top sickles is wounded badly his leg necessitates amputation and he is then there's a big hole in the federal line that Winfield Scott Hancock kept the pull forces from other parts of the Union line to plug up to make up for sickles mistake now it's controversial because after sickles gets wounded his first stop after the hospital is to Washington DC to explain what he did get his story in first ok and the story he comes up with is that George Meade was going to retreat on the second day of July and only by occupying this high ground and forcing the Confederates to initiate the battle I put me in a position where he could not retreat the way he wanted to of course this is going to create the caspian sea of ink meet and his partisans are going to argue against this sickles and his partisans are going to argue for it and this is going to be an ongoing argument in history to this day over sickles performance vs. Meade's performance and it comes down to basic questions that we you know we wrestle with when we teach army officers to Staff College the question of and on the ground commanders perception of the situation and how that fits in the overall commander's intent for what he wants done that day and what happens when those two are in conflict how much initiative should the board and commander be allowed to these are the larger questions that are good to wrestle with the subject but they get wrapped up in the personalities which is something that never happens in much of Civil War history now that wasn't a Caspian Sea Vinc but I think that was more than three to five minutes and we will leave the wrestling with this question if there is any 2qa afterward thank you bro thank you our third most important decision at Gettysburg was Stuart's decision to ride east of the Army of the Potomac missing the first day of Gettysburg in effect leaving Lee blind talk about that gentlemen I'm going to defer that question to my cavalry commander next fire before Gettysburg the Army of Northern Virginia holds a series of grand reviews getting ready to go and so Lee can see his troops and one of the one of the outfits of course any witnesses is his cavalry and shortly after this grand view it's marvelous success ladies faint you know men grow weak with admiration the Union cavalry attacks the Confederate cavalry battle at Brandy Station and again we had a marvelous talk about this and again Jenny and Deb brought up the points this afternoon that it's probably a draw actually it's probably a victory for the Confederates because infantry comes up and the key Union cavalry leaves the Union cavalry commander sorta blows it out of proportion you know thumping his chest and saying he whipped the Confederates but what really happens is Jeb Stewart gets pilloried in the Confederate press and that kind of hurts my feelings because I'm after all the dashing Cavalier of the south and everything I touch turns to gold and I've you know completely discombobulated Union cavalry for the entire war and here boy these guys kind of fought me to a draw really took me by surprise which really pained him so to regain his you know and again is there controversy over this of course there is because this is history all these guys are dead and so we just can read reports and read other people's work and try to determine what happens he's supposed to guard the right flank of the army of northern but he can interpret his orders such that he can he feels he can do this by riding around the Union Army again and so he does now he does leave cavalry with the Army of Northern Virginia but how these guys used is not centrally controlled some out in the West some go with you we'll going north but they're not coming back in painting the picture for Robert Lee as he was accustomed to receiving by and large from Jeb Stewart Stewart in an attempt to regain his reputation and again this is in the myths of how this battle was lost in the south he but the fact is he does right away and more importantly loses contact not only with the Union Army but with the Army of Northern Virginia he does not know where they are so he's got to find them to get back and he has some brushes with Union trains where he takes a bunch of wagons and decides to keep those because that's booty and that's a good thing I can come back and show I've got something he brushes into some Union cavalry farther to the north but he's still trying to find the Army of Northern Virginia and and again Steve and I were talking about this the other thing that really have to bear in mind is his soldiers his troopers are tired but they're riding animals who were also tired and they're still on the March so he's wearing out not only his troopers but his animals which is his prime means of mobility the mobility differential over infantry is you get some more faster on a horse but you have to take care of him so the horses are tired his men are tired when he finally gets back to the Army of Northern Virginia evening to the 2nd of July what kind of a force is he give Lee to you that Lee can use it's a tired force they haven't had too many fights but they're exhausted they've not provided any intelligence again and Steve and you've heard it say this battle began with a meeting engagement because we're out there kind of where's the bad guy nope now we found him we can fight and the cavalry was absent the cavalry at the time both north and south they weren't you know like Napoleonic cavalry with light and heavy and you know sustain themselves or a long periods of time and and be the decisive arm that's the infantry and the artillery in the in our Civil War and the cavalry is really a light force that can do screening if you do reconnaissance not much reconnaissance but more preventing other folks from finding your force and so the decision to while widely interpreted broadly interpret his mission from Robert Lee really does take an essential element of what was the combined arms team of cavalry infantry artillery in the Civil War away from Lee and Lee has to fight blind to a certain extent although I'm not really satisfied in my mind why didn't he make use of the cavalry that he had he being Lee but that's probably in a book I haven't read yet okay I think what the the only thing I would add to that is that if you put yourself or try to put yourself in the mind of robert e lee and you set this army in motion and you set this cavalry force on your flank primarily for the purpose of knowing when you where where and when you're going to make contact with the Union Army the entire construct of this movement is intended so that when the cavalry makes contact you have time to concentrate your army because that the whole focus of this Civil War tactic is to get your army concentrated faster than he can and destroy them as quickly as you can in detail if you can and so we talked early about the first day the meeting engagement the first day is the worst possible surprise to your construct that you have created for this and suddenly you know when you're older your forces are scattered all over Pennsylvania and suddenly you have the Union Army where you didn't expect them where you didn't want them and you're not concentrated and that belongs to Jeff Stewart principally but also somewhat to Robert Lee in not using the brigades that were left to do any of that so it is a surprise that he runs into infantry versus infantry and so it is a very powerful difficulty for lead not good only he immediately reacts and does what Lee does and that first day attack you know I've got something I got part of them go after it and then concentrate the army while you're doing it but the bottom line is Lee that's not what we wanted to do we wanted to find them bison trade his army and then defeat them okay the second most critical decision at Gettysburg was Lee's decision to order Pickett's Charge and for our commentary on that for professor actually dr. Deb Shepherd Deb hi everyone good to see you speaking of the model sorry Mike death good to see you here I was privileged to be a part of staff ride Gettysburg in 2007 and we were additionally privileged to have a historian who has studied Gettysburg extensively join us that historian was Carroll Reardon and I want to begin our discussion of Pickett's charge with a few words from her book entitled Pickett's charge in history and memory so all this is quoted a few days after he survived Pickett's Charge private William H Jones of the 19th Virginia summed up his entire experience in the awful battle at Gettysburg with the very succinct comment it was the most awful battle that I have ever been in nearly a century later chronicler George Stewart began his story of the day's events with a far more effusive statement if we grant as many would be ready to do that the Civil War furnishes the great dramatic episode of the history of the United States and the Gettysburg provides the climax of the war then the climax of the climax the central moment of American history must be Pickett's charge in quote a question for us then is this what critical decision or decisions led to this central moment late on July 2nd both Meade and Lee had tough decisions ahead of them Meade called his officers together for a council of war and mostly what he wanted to know from them is what do you want to do his idea was to retreat and regroup at pipeline Creek where he originally wanted to fight but he didn't know what his officers thought and at the end of the meeting they decided they were going to stay and they were going to fight Gibbon was there and meat actually told him he thought Lee would attack the center where Gibbon would be the next day Lee's decision was much more difficult and he did not consult his officers he had options he could disengage and in the battle he could wait for me to make a move he could implement Longstreet's idea of flanking Meade's left he rejected all these options because none would lead to the victory he sought the victory he came to Pennsylvania for it in the first place disengaging would put him in worse position and condition than before the campaign waiting on Meade meant going on the defensive and Lee believed he needed offense to win this long streets idea even if successful and that's debated would place him between Meade's army and Washington but it would not necessarily result in an end to the battle let alone a victory Lee decided to attack both ends of Meade's army with long streets and kind of sideling toward the center simultaneously at daybreak Longstreet would renew assault on the Union left with a slide to the center and you'll would resume his attack on Culp's Hill Lee visited Longstreet's headquarters at 4:30 in the morning and found that Longstreet had done nothing to prepare for the orders he'd been given Pickett whom he should have called up hours ago was still miles away Longstreet was convinced Lee's plan would lead to disaster and still hope to convince him to flank Meade Ewell was ready so was the 12th Union Corps and it opened an artillery barrage on Ewell at 4:30 when Lee heard the artillery he knew that he probably needed a new plan he ordered Longstreet to bring up Pickett's 3 fresh divisions he only had three of his five but they were all fresh and they'd have had five brigades each Virginians and they would attack the Union Center Hill's Corps would bolster Longstreet's numbers with six extra brigades Longstreet claimed it would take at least 30,000 for the attack to succeed he would have around 11,000 law and McLaws who were really too ragged and tired from earlier fighting to join in they would anchor the Confederate right where they already were and pinned down Union defenders on Little Round Top all five brigades Anderson's division would provide support roads as three brigades just to the left would join in when road saw fit Lee also planned for artillery from the high ground on the peach orchard that we've already talked about to blast and demoralize Union artillery and soldiers then Pickett would spearhead the assault Lee I think expected that he could succeed he had abundant confidence in his men as we've already noted in addition Wright's brigade of 1,500 Georgians had briefly crested that Center the day before with only one Brigade today Lee would send nine with the rest of the army and support and we'll see what happens after that Thank You Deb and our group of experts decided that the most important decision made at Gettysburg was Meade's decision not pursued Lee we're going to call on dr. Terry beckon ball to comment on that Terry thank you bill mm-hmm everybody hear me after after I kind of started to look at this again I realize I probably shouldn't have phrased it meet decision not to pursue Lee after Gettysburg I probably should have phrase it Meade's decision not to pursue Lee vigorously after Gettysburg he did pursue Lee the question is how vigorously did he pursue him and there's several different questions here like the first question is after Pickett's Charge failed and if you've seen the movie Jay's burg when they start yelling Fredericksburg Fredericksburg why didn't they attack right then well people told me to attack Winfield Scott Hancock second Corps commander tells me go this is the time to go Alfred Pleasonton specifically told me this is your chance to be immortalized like the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo the problem was Mead was not the Duke of Wellington now that's also being somewhat harsh on meat although I think it is fair Mead did have some disadvantages me didn't have the prussian army nearby like Wellington had at Waterloo meat had used most of the fifth and part of the 6th Corps to patch holes on July 2nd so really he doesn't have a big reserve it will be mostly six four and of course you're not talking about that's uncle uncle John Ethan's uncle John Sedgwick was the six corps commander we're not talking about Lightning Jones here and furthermore Mead is a cautious man by nature he'd only been put in command on the 28th of June why risk it why blow it and that may be part of meets problem instead of we can possibly end the war and bag them here Meade says why blow it however despite all that I think you can make a decent case that Meade was justified not counter-attacking the immediate aftermath of Pickett's Charge both his army had taken a beating just like the Confederates he did have more troops available but again they were very disorganized so even if you accepted that that would have been easier would have been it would not have been easy it's understandable the better question now is that when when Lee does start retreating on the afternoon July 4th why doesn't meat pursue very vigorously well certainly Lee's vulnerable at this juncture hmm the army Northern Virginia had lost over 20,000 men killed wounded or missing close to one-third of its overall strength Lee had a 17 mile long wagon train full of wounded and supplies they had to traverse back through Cashtown Fairfield Monterey to get to the eastern side of the Cumberland Valley of South Mountain and then travel 50-plus miles down to the Potomac River and with that kind of a baggage train Lee is not moving at lightning speed furthermore Meade does not begin as his pursuit at least in earnest until July 5th yes he does send cavalry after after after Lee but instead of going after trying to cut inside at Fairfield which is to the south west of Gettysburg me decides to go south to Frederick and then try and get over over to the Williamsport Maryland where the Potomac River is generally afforded now me did send cavalry and me did a gret the cavalry did act aggressively for cavalry under the Brigadier General John Buford the 1st Cavalry Division went south to Westminster and then the Williamsport where on July 6 to destroyed bridges over the Potomac River which is going to cause problem for Lee later brainer General Judson Kilpatrick the 3rd Cavalry Division who his men called kill cavalry because he was so careless of his own men's lives he followed the Confederates and attacked wagon trains bearing wounds flies through Fairfield Brigadier General David McMurtrie Gregg of the third or the second Cavalry Division follow the Confederates through Cashtown pass which is today modern-day u.s. 30 going towards about roughly modern-day u.s. 30 going towards Chambersburg now hmm even though we certainly criticized Jeb Stewart the Confederate cavalry commander for his absence Stewart does deserve credit here because he does a phenomenal job of trying to shield Stewart and John M Bowden do a phenomenal job of shielding Lee's army from the federal cavalry yes there are some sharp engagements and yes the Confederate cavalry is exhausted but Stewart and Lea managed to combine to let the army of Virginia get back to Williamsport Maryland by late afternoon of July 5th deleted ahead of Lee's long wagon train is in waves port Maryland by July 11th the bulk of the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia is safely dug in behind strong fortifications around the fort at Williamsport Maryland now this is going to make it very difficult these fortifications there's debate as to how strong the fortifications were for the most part the fortifications appear to have been very strong had the Federals attacked these fortifications that would have that would have been very problematic for me to make a breakthrough so the cavalry pursuit was fairly vigorous why wasn't the infantry follow up nearly as vigorous well first off Meade holds a council of war than I have July 4th and note holding councils of war is usually an excuse for a commander to not attack and vote among leading officers is 5 to 3 to sit tight and see what the Confederates are going to do for 24 hours it also doesn't help that it begins to rain really hard back home where I grew up about half an hour from gates where we call those gully washers I don't know if they use that term out here in Kansas but you know you get a good gully washer and remember most of these roads are mud and it's going to be very difficult to move with any kind of speed so you have both sides dealing with mud plus even though the army the Potomac was victorious they had lost over 23,000 casualties as well so they had taken a beating another problem the Federals have is that the shuffling on the second mead has to put all those units back with their coherent with their organic elements so it's going to take some time and I think finally one of the things you have to remember is that Mead has only been in cotton in command for six days at this point six days so why squander this victory well that is dr. refuse mentioned there's a lot of debate about this in one of the books out front Alan well Zoe's book the gays Berglas invasion to say that gueules Oh is Harshal Mead is probably being an understatement okay he's very very harsh on meat he said it would have been difficult but great generals like the Duke of Wellington asked difficult thing from their troops but gueules Oh argues that possibly Mead was a secret McClellan ight a Democrat who was not in favor of persecuting the war - its vigorous and that he wanted possibly a negotiated settlement that's that's an awful lot to lay on Meads on Meads legacy if I was in the jury after reading that book I'd say there's enough evidence to indict I don't think there's enough to convict Stephen Sears book Gettysburg 2004 is nowhere near as harsh he says that meat could have been more aggressive but it probably wouldn't have mattered he also points out that Meade's officer corps much like Lee's had also been destroyed the two best core commanders Hancock had been wounded and John Reynolds on the first court been killed so me is little Mena slow reluctant to attempt a vigorous pursuit an attack with untried and untested corps commanders Edwin Kyneton the classic the Gettysburg Campaign which I still believe is the best operational history of the campaign written in 1968 says that Meade was entirely reactive Lincoln had told me to cover Washington Baltimore he criticized Meade for making too cautious assumptions for what for one for one example me did not think of sending cavalry units to seize the pass around Fairfield Monterey to the southwest of gas berg he had assumed that Lee had strongly fortified these things because Lee is brilliant never makes a mistake well guess what Lee didn't have him fortified of course as an armchair general I can say that and so can Coddington but I think the thing you have to understand is that civil war armies are incredibly resilient I there's only a couple times in the entire war where our Civil War army is destroyed in the field grant destroyed three of them he destroyed one when he captured Fort Donelson he destroyed one at Vicksburg and of course he destroys Lee's army when he captured it at the very end of the war otherwise it rarely happens in an open battle I guess the closest thing is maybe you could argue that that John Bell hoods army is destroyed by General George Thomas at the Battle of Nashville right at the end of the war but other than that Civil War armies are really really difficult to to destroy and I think you could argue that lead even though he performed poorly in the gay spur campaign up to Pickett's charge he executed a very superb Lee rearguard action and defense so I'm sure I'm over my time so I will stop okay thank you Carrie we are going to open it up to your questions and answers now we're going to take about 15 minutes worth please only one question make it very brief indirect and if you want a specific member of our group to respond please direct it to that person keep your hands up and our students will come along and find you when as to the mead doing an immediate attack on LY after Pickett's Charge I think by adding and subtracting at 23,000 casualties out of 73,000 armed force that left 50,000 Confederates in the trees with Mead still having the cross that's a mile open ground into fortified positions in the treeline why wouldn't that be considered Meads version of Pickett's charge if he actually undertook it it's on now okay yeah mainly the answer I would give you is because he didn't do it it's easy to criticize someone for something they didn't do and you know I tend to agree with you it would have been I think problematic lead was already organizing a defense when when Pickett's charge is streaming back the remnants but realistically I think that I mean my personal opinion is I don't know that even if he does aggressively go after he just civil war armies are very very difficult to destroy he may have maybe caught a core maybe done some damage to a division or two I don't think he would have annihilated Lee's army I mean remember when grant captures lead Appomattox Lee is down to less than what 20,000 26 now 26,000 27,000 men that's considerably less than what Lee has a gas berg and the Army's Potomac is actually much smaller than what grant has at Appomattox as well so I think it's a reasonable expectation to not expect him to do that okay Lexi yeah I was I'm interested in another decision that was made in regard to this battle and that is the decision of by Lincoln to replace hooker with Meade three days before a significant battle does that is that do you think how do you think that might have affected the battle if Lincoln had not decide to do that go ahead either the question about replacing fighting Joe hooker with George Gordon Meade on June 28th we discussed this in our earlier today about the circumstances Joe hooker had a very very bad relationship with Henry Halleck who was the general in chief of all the Union armies it's traced back to the time when they're both in California Halleck was a very successful banker pal political leader and hooker was a man down on his luck who borrowed money and didn't pay it back that's part of the story when hooker takes command the Army Potomac in January 63 Lincoln knows that he doesn't have a good relationship with Henry Halleck but hookers really the only real person Lincoln can see 2.2 command so the service that he gives hooker work around Authority you can communicate directly with me after Chancellorsville hookers command hook her stock takes a bit of a hit and on the movement north as Lee's army moves north hooker proposes marching south on the philosophy that if I go south toward Richmond Davis will call back robert e lee lincoln thinks that's a bad idea and he begins to lose faith and hooker and then hooker starts feuding with Halleck and Halleck starts intervening and hooker complains and Lincoln says ok let's make it clear you will take order some Halleck and you Alec will give you orders and you are to obey them which had very happy for Halleck because he's looking for at some point a reason to get rid of hooker as evidenced by fighting Joe hookers plan his basic idea as he is moving north he there's the issue of the Harpers Ferry garrison which is the Harpers Ferry the Potomac River you know the Shenandoah Valley Italy is going north down the Shenandoah Valley toward the Potomac River crossing the Potomac River moving to the Hagerstown and Cumberland Valley west of South Mountain Harpers Ferry is the point is on the Potomac River where you move from Shenandoah Valley to north of Potomac heyget Harpers Ferry had proven a big problem for robert e lee in his last time he crossed the Potomac in September 62 he had to detach forces to try to deal with the garrison that enabled the Federals to catch him with his forces divided and so Lee decided this time I'm not messing around with Harpers Ferry I am just moving north and I'm going to leave them consciously behind me in the Shenandoah Valley hooker thinks this is a good this is a good thing I'll reinforce Harpers Ferry with a Corps they'll move in the Shenandoah Valley and robert e lee is going to have a very strong federal force on a supply line through the Shenandoah Valley but the thing is hooker once control the Harpers Ferry garrison and Harpers Ferry garrison is independent from his command hooker goes personally to Harpers Ferry to coordinate with the commander there while he is there a telegram arrives from Halleck to that commander explicitly saying hooker is not to give orders to you and you are not to obey orders from hooker even the hooker is by rank the senior commander hooker writes back you know give me authority or this is my resignation Alec says great we know it's one choice I want and here is and he takes he accepts hookers resignation in the orders to Meade when me takes command he tells me Harpers Ferry garrison is under your control dead and so what what Meade does is he what he does in Harpers Ferry garrison said keeping the Shen Dao Valley he brings it yeast over to Frederick to guard his rear area and that's why when Lee is falling back that would have been a real problem for Lee's retreat if that Harpers Ferry garrison had been there but because it's not there Lee's able to get back to the strong position at Williamsport but that has all kinds of consequences for the camp for the campaign it would have shaped Lee's decision making Lee's fighting day-to-day a Gettys ergh it would have shaped his retreat so it'd been very very different fighting Joe hooker been in command also different command relationships hookers got a very good army automic is a very very personality divided organization there are commanders who still and the suspicion that they do is quite valid still have a lingering affection and loyalty for George McClellan like an administration hates George McClellan good and hooker figure that out and worked his way to High Command by making clear I am NOT George McClellan when hooker takes command the McClellan Heights do not like him and hooker does not like them when a hookers buddies is dan sickles McClellan night is Meade there is a conflict built into that army that is going to shape what's going to happen at Gettysburg so there are many consequences this command change I think big thing is you take come in on the 28th Meade says right after the battle I have aged more in seven days than I have in the the 48 years before this and so that's got to play a consequence in the retreat but that's not quite Caspian Sea but hopefully okay Quinn I was surprised that among your seven critical decisions you didn't include Longstreet's decision on the morning of the third day not to aggressively implement these orders could you speak to why that was not included well actually that was one of the ones that we'd considered and we came around again we were trying to find consensus of what really affected the totality of the fight this was a decision on the third day and and as we discussed what other options did Lee really have I mean it would have taken an enormous amount of moral courage to disengage Longstreet you know so the legends in the lore that have built up didn't want to attack dragged his feet I don't know I'm not so sure what were his reasons well you know if my boss just told me you're going to take the last fresh troops that we've got and I expect you to win this fight and breakthrough at that little clump of trees over there I might be inclined to take a long time to make sure that everything is set and and George Pickett did graduate last in his class at West Point so I'm going to make darn sure that George really gets what I want him to do because he's the guy's got to coordinate that division so we did consider it but again it was this was really tough and we formed consensus over decisions that were that really affected the totality of this really significant battle ok we're going to take time for one last question right over here ok I I hope this isn't an unfair question but going from the strategic down to the tactical Chancellor Fraser was an officer of the hundred and fortieth Pennsylvania and I believe that he was elevated or he was a colonel at the time were elevated to the regimental commander because all the other officers in the regiment were killed at the in the Battle of Gettysburg and I was just wondering if any of you have any knowledge of you know what it what it was that the hundred and fortieth Pennsylvania what the actions were of a hundred and forty of Pennsylvania or the involvement during the battle I think they might have been involved at the wheat field but I don't know if anybody has any field knowledge of that I don't know sorry sorry I think we struck out you're entitled in in a total of this would be a total of four and a half six hours of programming that that's the only one so much like that you've stumped the chumps yeah let's thank these panelists
