MICHAEL KIRK - … For those of you in Russia,
when United States started to say it was Russia that hacked us, what did you think? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - First of all, I'm a bit skeptical
about that phrasing: “Russia.” Russia is a huge country, and not everyone—
I'm rather sure that was not Russian government, and the attack probably was not ordered by
Russian government itself. As I've been exploring how this system works
for many years, I know that actually it’s much more chaotic than it’s considered to
be. The system wants to be really centralized. President Putin really wants to be in control
and to—there is a Russian phrase, “vertical of power” he wants to achieve. But in reality, that cannot happen. In reality, the system is much more complicated,
because I call it in my book, All the Kremlin’s Men, a “system of collective Putin.” That means that lots of different people:
Russian bureaucrats, Russian civil servants and people working for private companies,
but affiliated with the state or who are working for private companies owned by Putin’s friends
or just loyal oligarchs. They have an ability to anticipate what their
boss wants them to do. They are always guessing, and they are willing
to guess what they are supposed to do, and they're trying to fulfill that desire even
before the order is given. That's how it works. That's not a system of orders; that's a system
of hints. It’s very interesting how they communicate,
even on the highest level, even in the Kremlin. They never say clearly something outrageous
like, “Please murder those people,” or, “Please steal those billions of dollars.” That's impossible. They usually say: “Do what you have to do. You know what you're supposed to do, so please
go ahead.” MICHAEL KIRK - … We're going to talk more
about it as we go through the development of Putin's presidency. The fact that it happened and the fact that
it was blamed on Russia, and the fact that people in the United States are very interested
in who Putin is and what he wants, he is in some ways, you could say, a beneficiary, an
accidental beneficiary of what happened in the United States. Explain to me how he might benefit from this,
whether he ordered it or not. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - I don't know if he can benefit,
but there is one objective in that sense. For many years, Putin was trying to promote
himself as a great world leader. In the beginning of his presidency, he wanted
to be respected, and he had an illusion that he can be treated as an equal partner by his
friends like George W. Bush or Tony Blair. In [a] couple of years of his first presidential
term, he became disillusioned with that. He felt that he’s not going to be treated
as an equal because probably for George W. Bush, Russia was not a great country to consider
its president an equal partner. For him [Bush], Russia was another European
country like Finland, and that was not the role Vladimir Putin was dreaming of. He came a very long way. He was insulted by the treatment he got from
his Western partners. After that, he felt paranoid because he was
absolutely sure that there is a conspiracy against Russia, against him, to depose him
and just to organize a color revolution in Russia. Then he became relaxed. Then there was another wave of paranoia that
after the Ukrainian revolution of 2014, so he’s got a lot of prejudice against certain
Western leaders. He hates being lectured about human rights. He's sure that all the Western leaders are
hypocrites. He felt deeply humiliated in 2015 when after
the Crimea annexation sanctions against Russia, he came to G-20 summit in Brisbane, [Australia],
and he found himself sitting alone at the table during the working lunch. That was a demonstration of the fact that
he’s neglected by all other 19 world leaders. That was a real humiliation for him, and that
was probably the lowest point of his presidencies. He has always wanted to be a great leader. He has always wanted to be a member of the
board of directors of the world. … He has always wanted to be a member of
the global board of directors. After [the] Ukrainian crisis, he felt himself
as an outcast with whom no one wants to talk to about anything apart from Ukraine. [The] Syrian operation was a way out for him. The only meaning of that operation was to
stop talking only about Ukraine, to start discussing global issues. And he was successful. After Syrian operation, he came back on that
international stage; he came back at least [able to] approach that table of the board
of directors. That’s really important for him to be there. That's really important for him to take part
in all the major events. And he's OK with that. He doesn't want to conquer more territories. He doesn't want to have another part of other
country occupied by Russia. He wants to be recognized as the number one
or top five greatest leaders in the world. That's his objective, and that’s what everyone
understands. That's what people in Kremlin, that's what
people—those bureaucrats, those people, IT people from private companies in Russia,
all of them, they understand that. They're guessing what he wants to do. They know that there is a global competition. There is some kind of war against the leader
and the West. So if they can bring more chaos to the West,
that means they are helping their leader. I think that’s how that would work. Putin himself would never—that would never
come to his mind, to organize hacking against national— MICHAEL KIRK - But he loves the benefit of
the chaos and disruption? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Not disruption. He loves the idea that no one is saint. He loves the idea that everyone is the same. He hates being lectured about human rights. He hates when he’s compared to other guys
and he’s not the best. He loves the idea that democracy does not
exist; that he likes that, that cynical approach. That is actually almost [the] official ideology
of today’s Russia, that every politician is corrupted. Any election is rigged. Any police in any country of the world is
torturing innocent people. There is no such thing as free press anywhere
in the world. We are all the same; we are all dirty bastards. That's the idea he really believes in, and
that's why he appreciates when he’s getting some proof of that. MICHAEL KIRK - OK, let's go back now and create
this man. Tell me what you know about his boyhood and
anything that happened then that helps create the man you are talking about, any really
important or central events, anything about the way that he was raised, his family, anything
in there that strikes you as relevant as a piece of information that will help us understand
him? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - … 1996, that's the most
important year of his biography. When he is described as KGB officer and that
the KGB influenced his—that's not really important. He was not a spy. He was just a simple Soviet bureaucrat working
abroad. He was a part of that KGB culture, but he
was not an intelligence officer. He was low-level bureaucrat. But the most important thing [that] happened
to him happened in ’90s after Soviet Union collapsed. He joined the team of Anatoly Sobchak, who
was one of the most important democratic leaders of the new Russia, probably politician number
two of the country, the mayor of St. Petersburg. Putin became his assistant. Then he became vice mayor of St. Petersburg. Sobchak was really very fair person. He was really democratic. He really believed in democratic values. After being the mayor of St. Petersburg for
the first term, for five years, he had to be re-elected. He ran for the second term. The economic situation in Russia, and in St.
Petersburg especially, was not very prosperous, was awful actually. That city, St. Petersburg, had the reputation
of criminal capital of Russia. The level of corruption was pretty high. The amount of crimes was really high. That was a very hard election campaign between
Sobchak himself and the man who used to be his first deputy, the man who used to be the
closest colleague of Vladimir Putin and the man who all of them considered to be a traitor
because he betrayed his boss and decided to run against him. The campaign was very transparent, very democratic,
and Sobchak participated in the debates. They were live on city television. He lost the debates, and then he lost the
election by a little margin of 1 percent—being acting mayor, and he didn't use his position
to make sure that he wins. MICHAEL KIRK - OK. So he loses. Sobchak loses? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Sobchak lost, and that was
a blow for all the team. That was a tragedy. They all—all of them lost their jobs. When I say all of them, they are the current
government of Russia. All the deputies of Anatoly Sobchak were Vladimir
Putin and his closest people like Alexei Kudrin, Herman Gref, Dmitry Kozak, Vitaly Mutko, all
the ministers and all the key persons in today’s Russia. They lost their jobs; they resigned from the
government. Especially for Putin, that was a lesson to
learn, that democracy is harmful; that you should protect that if you are right. And he considered Sobchak and himself to be
right, to be the good forces, not the evil, because the evil was the other guy, the traitor. He learned that he must not make that mistake
again. He must not participate in any debates, and
he never did. He must not let the free press cover the political
process out of control. He must not have such an open and free and
fair election because that's dangerous. Probably that local election of 1996 is the
key turning point for his mentality. MICHAEL KIRK - … To what do we attribute
his rise inside the Yeltsin government near the end of the ’90s? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - He has never wanted to become
president. That's important. That was one of the very important reasons
for— MICHAEL KIRK - But that's a big stretch for
this guy. Who is he? He's nobody. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Yeah, but that was a very
important reason for him to be chosen, because he didn't have an ambition. He didn't want to. He started refusing. Yeltsin, President Yeltsin and his family
had a conflict with FSB [Federal Security Service]. They had to appoint a new director of FSB,
a man from the Kremlin administration. Putin after leaving St. Petersburg had a very
low-level position in [the] law department of Kremlin administration, but he happened
to be one of the members of administration with KGB background. So they decided that probably he’s our guy,
and he can be appointed as an ally, boss sort of FSB. And he kept [a] low profile. He wasn't ambitious, and that was the beginning
of his promotion. Many people were trying to participate in
that rivalry, not Putin. After all, he was chosen by Yeltin’s family
and Yeltin’s closest aides to be a potential candidate for role of successor. He refused. There is a legend, but I think it's very close
to truth, that he answered that he would prefer the position of CEO of Gazprom, the national
gas company. But finally he had to accept that offer. He was considered to be a man who shares the
values and the attitude of the team. He was considered to be a liberal reformer. He was considered to be anti-Soviet, anti-KGB. He was considered to be the person who can
be controlled. There was a fight between the old Soviet team
and new reformers, and he became a candidate of reformers. That's the irony of the situation. … MICHAEL KIRK - When he’s appointed by Yeltsin
that New Year’s Eve, that amazing moment, what did Russians know about Vladimir Putin,
their new president? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - By that time, he was already
known. I remember my feelings, and I was amazed. I felt insulted. I was a young journalist, a young political
journalist, and that was one of the first major news I had to cover as a journalist. I thought that I hate the way how they do
that, although most of my colleagues thought that that was OK. Most of my liberal colleagues, most of my
very good, very professional, quality journalists thought that that's a good thing that Yeltsin's
team managed to hold the power. That's the good thing that Yeltsin's team
is prevailing over that old Soviet camp. That's OK that they are installing the newcomer,
and they are trying to make him president overnight using the opportunity of the fact
that everyone’s drunk because the whole country is celebrating the new year. I found that so disrespectful to me and to
the society. I really blame late President Yeltsin and
his team, not for the choice. They couldn’t—probably everyone has got
a right to be wrong. That was a mistake; they know that they were
wrong. They made a mistake choosing Putin. But they could not foresee [that]. But the way, how that was done, that New Year’s
appointment, that was disgusting, I think. That was disgusting political technology,
and I know that they are still proud of that. They think that they’ve created a political
masterpiece. But I think they should be ashamed for that
bold disrespect to Russian society. Everything that followed is a direct consequence
of that bold disrespect of the civil society when they installed Putin as New Year’s
president. MICHAEL KIRK - … Tell me the story of how
you knew, how it was revealed that he was taking over the media, the television. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Right after he was elected
president, he started taking television under his control, but there was no plan. That was not a strategy. It was that I remember, and I know it was
a coincidence. There was no logic in those chaotic decisions. First, yes, he was insulted, and he thought
that NTV was an obstacle for him to be elected as president. NTV was owned by Vladimir Gusinsky, his archrival
who sponsored his opponents, who didn't want him to become president. … There was only one goal: revenge for Gusinsky. That was not even Putin's goal; that was the
goal of the whole reformer team, all of them. Those crystal-clear democrats, they wanted
revenge for the man who was an obstacle for him to prevail. So all those democratic liberal reformers
waged war against Gusinsky. There was a long process, and they took the
company, and actually, they were absolutely sure that they were right in doing that, because
Gusinsky, yes, he used some dirty schemes. He took the money from the Gazprom, from state-owned
gas monopoly, and didn't want to give it back. He didn't want to return his loans because
he thinks he can't afford that. Just no one is—he was really bold. And according to the law, that was possible
to take the TV company from him. So the reformers took the first TV channel
under their control, and they were happy to do that. They thought that they were right, and that
was not against the values. They didn't feel the fact that they are doing
something wrong, no. Simultaneously, there was a slight problem
with the First TV Channel [Channel One], because it started criticizing Putin after the Kursk
submarine sank, and that was a very painful moment for Putin. There was also a tricky situation in the way
how First TV Channel was managed. First TV Channel was owned partially by the
state and partially by Boris Berezovsky, but Boris Berezovsky was a minor shareholder,
the biggest share belonged to the government, to the state. But still, Berezovsky was kind of in charge
of the company, and he was managing the company. The reformists, that democratic team, felt
that that wasn't fair. The minor shareholder cannot run the whole
company. They should reappoint the management, so it
would be much more fair. There was not a plan to take the media under
control. No, just those and those. MICHAEL KIRK - But, of course, that is the
media. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Yes, but— So step by step. They found that it’s better, it's much more
comfortable when no one is an obstacle. How they perceive that: "We have to make very
important, unpopular, probably painful reforms. We have to save the country. We have to save the economy. We need very crucial reforms, so we need mobilization. We have to get the most notorious TV companies
under our control, just not to hurt the reforms." That became a temptation. When you know that after you shut down the
TV channel, your life becomes so much more comfortable, you know that the next time you
should do the same. That's the appetite that comes when you're
eating. MICHAEL KIRK - In the book, you talk about
the meeting of George W. Bush and Putin in 2000. You say that Putin studied, went to school
on who Bush was and what Bush liked and what Bush wanted—the evangelical new president. … I'm leading up to the story of the cross
that they talk about. Tell me that story. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - As Vladimir Putin considered
himself to be pro-Western politician, he wanted to make friends with Western leaders. His first friend he wanted to recruit, he
wanted to appeal to, was Tony Blair. Tony Blair was considered to be his role model. [He] wanted to look like Tony Blair. They are approximately the same age, lawyers,
so he wanted to mimic Tony Blair. The next, his client, the next object of his
romance was George W. Bush, and he was trying to know his character. He was exploring; he was reading the dossiers. Not him alone, [but also] the team of those
people with KGB background and cynical political technologists from Kremlin, they decided that
to impress George W. Bush, Putin had to look like a believer, he should prove that he truly
believes in God and he can be trusted. That's why they didn’t make up a story,
but they were looking for a story in Putin's biography, and they were exaggerating it. They chose an anecdote that should be told
by Putin to George W. Bush during the first meeting. There was a story of the wooden cross that
when Putin's dacha, when Putin's cottage, was burned and everything was destroyed, only
the wooden cross remained as it was before. MICHAEL KIRK - A true story? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - No one knows. I think that's not important if that miracle
of wooden cross has ever happened or not. That was the first story Putin told Bush,
and Bush was impressed, and Bush’s reaction was that he said during the press conference
that “I looked into his eyes, and I saw his soul.” So that wasn't-- MICHAEL KIRK - Maybe he did, you know? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - That was a success. That was a clear success. But that was—you know, but that was an illusion. Putin thought that making friends with George
W. Bush, he would reach his goal. He would get that respect and that feeling
of national pride and another approach to Russia. MICHAEL KIRK - Did it work? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - He didn't get that. His idea was rather ambitious, and I must
say that the plan was very good. The plan was to integrate Russia into the
global political system. The plan was to destroy the gap that existed
during the Cold War and after the Cold War. The fact is that after the Soviet Union collapsed,
Russia was forgotten. That's rather primitive to compare one country
to another, but I must apologize for that comparison. But after the end of World War II, the global
effort was taken to reintegrate Germany, to help its economy to be restored and to make
Germany the part of the new Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, nothing
like that happened. Russia was forgotten. There was total understanding that the dragon
is dead and let’s forget about that. He's not a threat anymore. That was really important if Russia had to
restore its statehood, to restore its prosperity, to restore its economy. It should have been reintegrated; it should
become part of the global political economic system. MICHAEL KIRK - Let me say this. It doesn't really happen that way, does it? … MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Bush accepts Eastern European
countries including Baltic Republics to NATO. At the same time, Putin asks Bush and Lord
George Robertson, ex-secretary general of NATO, to invite Russia to NATO. That's probably the most bold idea that any
Russian leader could have. [At] that time, Putin was the most pro-Western
leader of Russia. And he got very unclear answer. Yes and no and no and yes and please and fill
the application form and stand in the line; please wait; we've got a certain procedure. And that means no. He didn't get a direct answer. … I really think that that was a missed opportunity,
because after that, Putin became much more isolated. He became insulted, and he stopped trying
to be loved by them. He thought that they are not going to love
him; they are not going to treat him as an equal partner; they're not going to treat
him as a friend. He needs to find other ways. And even more after the first Ukrainian revolution
of 2004, he found that they are not his friends, but they might be his enemies. They might participate in a conspiracy against
him, and probably they were willing to make revolution, a color revolution in Russia. That was the beginning of his paranoia. MICHAEL KIRK - It really seems to come to
full flower—I'm jumping ahead a little bit here, but let's do that, to the Arab Spring
in 2011. He watches what happens [to Egypt’s Hosni]
Mubarak; he watches what happens all the way up to [Libya’s Muammar al-]Qaddafi. And you talk about feeding your paranoia. That’s complete—that's déjà vu. What happened in 2004, and then the same thing
happened in 2011 during the Arab Spring, he really felt that that's a part of global conspiracy. That was the reason for him to come back. He was prime minister. Medvedev was Russian president that time,
and Dmitry Medvedev was planning to run again. He wanted to be re-elected for the second
presidential term. That would mean that he would have become
the real president. He would have started the real reforms. He would get rid of Putin as his mentor and
as his boss. MICHAEL KIRK - He could have fired Putin any
time he wanted to. Putin was the— MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Officially, yeah. MICHAEL KIRK - But why didn't he? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - You know, a lot of decisions
are taken irrationally. They had very, very irrational, friendly,
respectful relationships. Putin was his only source of his popularity. He was the man who made his political career. Medvedev did not win the election because
he was popular, no. He was elected by one single voter, and that
was Putin. You cannot fire the only voter who voted for
you. You can, but if you do that, you are evil;
just you betray your best friend. You betray your godfather. You betray the only man who did everything
to you. That’s bad. MICHAEL KIRK - And this also informs— MIKHAIL ZYGAR - If you are a good person,
and Medvedev thinks that he’s a good person, he could not do that. That's unfair; that's treachery. MICHAEL KIRK - The Americans respond to Medvedev
by saying: “This is a chance for reset. We've gotten Putin out of the way.” … MIKHAIL ZYGAR - I'm not sure that really happened. MICHAEL KIRK - I want to hear this, yeah. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Probably that was— MICHAEL KIRK - That may be what they're thinking? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Probably there was a discussion
what to do with Medvedev and how Americans should treat him. It looked like from Moscow that Medvedev is
not really respected by Americans, although he wanted to be respected, and he wanted—his
attitude to Barack Obama was something like Putin’s initial attitude to Tony Blair. Medvedev adored Obama. He wanted to become a Russian Obama. He was just—he was mad about him. He was in love with him, and he really wanted
to make friends, to be partners. He could not fire Putin, yes. He could not get rid of his father. That’s difficult. You cannot do that overnight. But he really hoped for better understanding. The reset button initiated by Obama, Hillary
Clinton, Joe Biden, and Medvedev was his sincere desire. But I don't know why and I don't know how—I
describe it in my book—but … nothing happened actually. Nothing happened. There was very symbolic official visit of
Dmitry Medvedev to Washington to see when they visited, I don't remember, Burger King. And Barack Obama met a GI who just returned
from Afghanistan and started talking to him, forgetting about Medvedev. Medvedev was just standing behind and waiting
for that conversation to be over, waiting and waiting. He was lost. He was just standing alone in a line, waiting
for his burger. MICHAEL KIRK - And that meant something to
Russians, to see that? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - That meant only to Medvedev
and to his—to the team, the team who was not really friendly. Parts of the team were supportive, but some
of them were old Putin's guard, and they did what they could to hurt Medvedev. When they saw that he is trying to make friends
with Obama and Obama is ignoring him, and he’s chatting with the soldier, forgetting
about the president who is standing behind him waiting for his turn, that was not—that
didn't look like a real support. There was a lot of speculations in Russia
whether Medvedev finds some guts, finds strength to—not to fire Putin, but to insist. Actually, he could run for the second term. That was legally, officially, morally—he
had that right. He didn't have to resign saying, “I want
to support Vladimir Putin.” No, that was his decision. MICHAEL KIRK - Why did it happen? What happened? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - That happened because he was
asked by Putin, because Putin persuaded him that there is a war; that Arab Spring is a
part of global conspiracy; that Russia is potentially under attack; that Americans are
not partners and not friends, and they want to start a Russian Spring. They want to start a color revolution in Russia,
and Medvedev is not able to save the country. Putin is the one and only to save the country. Medvedev could not say no. … There was a real conflict between him
and Putin when Medvedev first supported sanctions against Iran and then he supported operation
against Libya. That was like the first time ever Russia really
absolutely supported the international operation initiated by the United States. MICHAEL KIRK - And how did Putin feel about
that? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - …They quarreled publicly. Putin blamed the United States for crusade,
and Medvedev responded the next day publicly that—I don't know, he didn't—[although]
they did not name each other, that was clear that they are blaming each other for doing
something inappropriate. Medvedev said that Putin didn't have a right
to say that because the president of the country is in charge of the foreign policy and the
prime minister should care about economic situation. That was the moment when, really, there was
a rift. There was the possibility of a real conflict
between them. As an outcome, Medvedev could decide to run
for the second term. Probably a lot depended on Obama administration. If they supported Medvedev, if they provided
Medvedev with proof that there is a partnership, and America wants that liberal reformer as
a president— MICHAEL KIRK - Would that have helped with
the Russian people? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - But we don’t know. We don’t know. Sorry? MICHAEL KIRK - Would that have helped? I mean, yes, maybe—what if America did support
Medvedev? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - That was important for Medvedev’s
psychology. MICHAEL KIRK - Only for him, though? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - We know that was his decision,
and we don’t know what were his motivations. He believed Putin that he must resign, and
he did that. As we all remember, Vladimir Putin was not
popular at that time. After Medvedev announced that he’s not going
to run again and Putin comes back, the wave of protest rallies start in Russia. Since the December 2011 and all the winter,
until summer 2012, there were huge protests, rallies against Putin. MICHAEL KIRK - Why? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Because people didn't want
to go back. MICHAEL KIRK - Who led the protests? Tell me about— MIKHAIL ZYGAR - They were rather spontaneous. There was an obvious leader whose name was
Alexei Navalny, and he was the hero of that protest. They started after their parliamentary elections. But that was much more a pretext. The real reason obviously was the [prospect]
of Putin coming back. He was considered by many people to be an
old leader, to be something from the past. He was considered to be the symbol of the
old regime. MICHAEL KIRK - Does he fear the protests? … MIKHAIL ZYGAR - I'd rather be careful with
the word “fear.” As for now, I don't think that now he’s
afraid of any protests. MICHAEL KIRK - Even then in ’11? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Now he’s rather self-confident,
but at that time, 2011, 2012, that was a real shock. They did not expect—no one expected that
protest activity. No one expected Russian civil society to stand
up. That was a shock for all of us. I was running the only independent news tv
channel in Russia. That was the only media to cover all those
events live. We were like the symbol of the free press
and just the one and only mouthpiece of democratic values. And we did not expect [it]. For us, that was a surprise that suddenly—and
that was a period of high enthusiasm. People thought that Russia is progressive
country, that we are prevailing, that we are changing for better; that Putin's decade is
over, and we are in the beginning of the new decade that is going to be much, much more
progressive; that is going to be much more democratic; that the new reforms, the fight
against corruption, the fight against bureaucracy, the change. That was the period when Barack Obama was
still the most popular rock star of the world. And yes, we can do that, too, Russian people
were thinking. MICHAEL KIRK - When Hillary Clinton makes
the announcement about the unfairness of the election, does that have any effect at all
on all of you? I know that Putin eventually, or even at the
time— MIKHAIL ZYGAR - That didn't help. MICHAEL KIRK - —really hates it, focuses
on her. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - That never helps. As I think— MICHAEL KIRK - Do you remember it? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Yeah, I remember it. But, you know, as I've already mentioned,
there is a certain degree of paranoia among Russian bureaucrats and among Putin's inner
circle as well. They really think that there is an anti-Russian
conspiracy. They really think that the first Ukrainian
revolution was a part of that conspiracy. So when the protests started, they could not
believe that that's a spontaneous rally. They thought that that was orchestrated campaign
that was organized by Ambassador [Michael] McFaul, by State Department, by some NGOs
[nongovernmental organizations]. After that, they started blaming even those
liberal bureaucrats in [the] Kremlin. After that, they started suspecting that there
were people from Medvedev’s team who were trying to support those protest rallies just
to keep Medvedev in office, just to prevent Putin from running. There was a huge conspiracy theory, and they
were puzzled. Every time they heard something from Washington,
there was like a smoking gun for them. They felt that yes, that’s organized by
Americans. That means that they must protect; they cannot
negotiate to that crowd. It's possible to negotiate with your friends,
it’s possible probably to negotiate with your people, but that's not possible to negotiate
with accomplices of American conspiracy. MICHAEL KIRK - So that's really it for the
relationship with Obama and Hillary Clinton from Putin's point of view? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Yeah. But from the beginning, Putin didn't like
that. He didn't like Obama. … There is a theory in Kremlin that Republicans
are better than Democrats; that the presidents from the Democratic Party are always lecturing
Russian authorities about human rights, and Republicans are much more pragmatic, cynical
or something. That is a stereotype. Putin was annoyed with that, with Obama's
and Hillary Clinton's attitude. Before Obama was elected, in 2007, Putin was
named as the Man of the Year by the Time magazine, so he felt he was the most popular man in
the world. Then Obama came with another ideology, another
message. So there was a kind of rivalry between Putin
and Obama without him knowing about that. Only Putin viewed that he considered Obama
to be his rival. … MICHAEL KIRK - Let’s go to Ukraine in 2015,
in December, in November and December, and Sochi and then Crimea. You are the only people there actually covering
it [Ukraine], I guess? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Yeah, and even more after
the war started, our TV channel was the only TV channel to have correspondents on both
sides. MICHAEL KIRK - … So when events first start
to happen in Kiev and other places in Ukraine, in December, and the protests form, what did
you think was going to happen? What did it feel like was actually going to
be the result? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - There was a feeling that the
new Maidan [had] started. That started in late November, I think. That wasn’t clear if there's going to be
a revolution. That was clear that [Viktor] Yanukovych is
not going to be the president of the country for the next presidential term. It was the problem of when. The next presidential election was in a year,
and he obviously was not going to be re-elected because of the street protests, because he
ruined his popularity, so that was obvious that his days are numbered. That was obvious for everyone. That was obvious for Yanukovych, for those
protest participants, for Kremlin. That's why they started quickly preparing
Plan B. If Yanukovych leaves and the orange team comes
back, and Ukraine joins NATO, what's going to happen next? There is a strong prejudice against NATO. Somehow, the idea of NATO warships in Crimea
is something absolutely unacceptable. The port of Sevastopol is the symbol of [the]
Russian fleet, and [the] Russian Black Sea fleet is still there. For Putin and for his inner circle, that was
the moment when they started thinking that they should keep Crimea, not to let NATO into
Sevastopol. They didn't know when Yanukovych would go,
but the idea was that the only possibility to keep Sevastopol is to use the turmoil. … MICHAEL KIRK - When it finally breaks out
and when it’s pretty clear that something has to happen, in the midst of all of that,
the Sochi Olympics are happening. What do they mean to Putin? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - That's a personal tragedy
for Putin as I've already said. That's important for him to be loved, to be
respected, to be globally recognized. The recognition of Russia as a superpower
is a key thing. That’s the result of those miserable decades,
especially of miserable ’90s, when Russia was suffering from the economic collapse. So [the] Sochi Olympics, for Putin and for
many people in Russia, I would say, should have been a symbol of Russia coming back as
a great country, as a great culture, as a sports nation. The preparation, it was really a big deal. It was a really big thing for Putin. [It] was ridiculous, but I remember that Russian
state media were counting the leaders of the countries that were going to come for the
opening ceremony, and they were comparing the numbers to the previous Olympic Games,
claiming that that's unprecedented; 86 presidents and prime ministers are coming to show their
respect to Russia, coming for the opening ceremony of Olympic Games. That's 14 presidents more than attended the
opening ceremony in London or something like that. They really cared a lot. The fact that the Ukrainian revolution spoiled
the show was a tragedy, and Putin was sure that that was not a coincidence; that that
was a real conspiracy to rain on his parade, to spoil his party; that his enemies wanted
to steal his Olympics. It’s funny. It reminds me a lot of the Moscow Olympics
of 1980, and that Olympic Games were spoiled by the invasion of Afghanistan. Right during the Sochi Olympics, Putin—that’s
right at the end of January—it’s right at the anniversary of the withdrawal of Russian
troops from Afghanistan. During [the] Sochi Olympics, right after the
revolution in Kiev, Putin met the group of those war veterans from Afghanistan, and they
were discussing the political situation. They were discussing the defeat of Russian
national hockey team in the match against United States. Putin said that that wasn't fair because the
judge was American, and that's not fair when the judge is American and Russia plays against
United States. But he compared that to the global situation
in the world. It's also very unfair that the judges are
Americans and the Americans are attacking us. He said that he understood what [Leonid] Brezhnev
was thinking when he sent Russian troops to Afghanistan. That was [a] very symbolic meeting, and that
happened two weeks ahead of the Crimea annexation. … MICHAEL KIRK - How do you think Putin was
shaped by what happened there with the United States sanctions, the world stage looking
at him in a post-Sochi moment, for the battle back and forth over should we put lethal defensive
weapons in the hands of the Ukrainians? Suddenly he’s a kind of, at least in America
and maybe lots of other places, a bad guy again. How does that shape him? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - He felt like a bad guy nearly
since the beginning. That was not a surprise for him. He has never felt himself as a—he has never
been treated as a good guy. Everyone feels that he is a good guy. There is no man or woman on this earth who
thinks that he or she is evil. Everyone thinks that I'm good, I'm right,
and Putin is absolutely sure that he is good and he is right and he’s not evil. But he really thinks that his “American
partners,” as he called them, are evil. But he got used to criticism. He has been criticized for violation of human
rights in Chechnya since the beginning of his presidency. He has been criticized for Yukos case at the
end of his first term. Then a lot of problems, a lot of reasons for
criticism. He’s never been treated as a good guy, so
he didn't care much. … Probably according to his assistants,
the turning point was Malaysian Boeing [Malaysia Airlines Flight 17]. When the Malaysian Boeing was shot down flying
over eastern Ukraine, that was the point when he understood that he’s in trouble, that
the situation wouldn’t be solved very quickly. That was the beginning of a real war, probably,
because he understood that it’s not just a little adventure; that’s a serious problem. MICHAEL KIRK - We've talked about him and
his complicated relationship with the United States. Do you think he’s at war with us now? MIKHAIL ZYGAR - I don't think so. I've got déjà vu, and I've [spoken] about
that. He was very tense and he was very paranoid
after the first Ukrainian revolution, after 2004, and he was preparing for an Orange Revolution
in Russia. He was afraid of Bush doctrine. He thought that George W. Bush is planning
to overthrow him. But his paranoia ended with Katrina hurricane
when the Bush approval rating died, and he understood that he overestimated George W.
Bush. He exaggerated the threat of the American
administration. He felt relaxed, and that's why he became
much more relaxed. He decided to resign. He chose Medvedev as his successor. He was very self-confident. He was named as Man of the Year by the Time
magazine. He became international celebrity, and he
became happy with that. Now we have something that's the same. He was very paranoid after the second Ukrainian
revolution. He was thinking that there is a plot against
him; there is a conspiracy to overthrow him. But then Obama administration has gone, and
then he finally felt that Americans are weak and that he’s prevailing and that he’s
popular and he is called the most powerful man in the world, and he sees the New Yorker
magazine with Russian title on it, and he hears that Donald Trump is Putin's puppet,
and he is happy. He knows that Americans are not his friends,
but for the second time, he realized that he overestimated the threat. … The danger is not there. MICHAEL KIRK - Thank you. MIKHAIL ZYGAR - Thank you so much. MICHAEL KIRK - Very good. Thank you.
