The Myth of the 20th Maine at Gettysburg

[Music] the American Battlefield trust credits the 20th Mane at little round top with saving Major General George Gordon Mead's Army of the Potomac winning the Battle of Gettysburg and setting the south on a long irreversible path to defeat that's some huge accolades for the action of one unit during a single battle and it isn't even true we can never discount the heroic actions of Colonel Chamberlain as men he indisputably blunted the effects of the Relentless attacks of the 15th and 47th Alabama and for at least the time being saved the union left but to say they were responsible for winning the Battle of Gettysburg not only discounts the heroic actions of many other units but as also historically inaccurate and here's why the 20th Maine volunteer infantry was a three-year regiment that fought with the army of the Potomac it served between Autumn 1862 and spring of 1865 fighting its Shepherdstown Ford Fredericksburg Gettysburg the Overland campaign people's Farm Hatcher's run and Five Forks altogether 1621 men served in the Regiment of whom 293 died the regiment was created in the summer of 1862 put together from volunteers recruited across several counties in Central and Southern Maine the unit was just another generic infantry unit with no flashy moniker no folk tales behind the history and no heroic figures within their ranks they were as Blue Collar as they come the unit did have some history before the famous day in July the regiment lost four men killed and 32 wounded charging deadly Marie's Heights late in the day on the 13th and spent next day and two nights lying in the open in front of the Confederate positions after the battle serving as a rear guard the 20th Mane was one of the last regiments back across the Rappahannock looking for Redemption the unit headed north towards infamy perhaps the most famous legend for the 20th Maine prior to the battle a test to the leadership ability of their Commander Colonel Richard Chamberlain the regiment initially fielded a total complement of 1621 men but by the time of the Battle of Gettysburg the stress of campaigning had reduced the regiment's ranks to some 266 soldiers and the 20th was considered a weak Link in Vincent's Brigade Fortune however was to smile on Chamberlain's regiment in the form of unexpected reinforcements on May 23 1863 120 three-year enlistees from the second main infantry were marched under guard into the regimental area of the 20th Maine the second main men were in a state of mutiny and refused to fight anger because the bulk of the regiment had been discharged and sent home and the regiment had been disbanded the mutineries claimed they had only Enlisted the fight under the second main flag and if their flag went home so should they Chamberlain out orders to shoot the mutineers if they refused Duty fortunately for the men of the second main Chamberlain was born and grew up in Brewer the twin city of Bangor across the panoscopic river where the second main regiment was recruited Chamberlain wisely distributed the second main volunteers evenly to fill out the 20th Maine's ranks an integrated experienced soldiers among the untested 20th Maine on little round top the 120 experienced combat veterans from the second Main bought the 20s ranks up to 386 infantry and helped hold Chamberlain's wobbling line together the 386 men of the 20th Maine were placed at the union far left by Colonel strong Vinson between 4 and 4 30 pm and given the order to hold their position at all costs this position was a large diabase spur of big round top with an oval Crest that forms a short ridge line with a summit of 63 feet the site approximately two miles south of Gettysburg was a with a rugged steep slope Rising 150 feet above nearby Plum run to the West with strewn with large Boulders scattered throughout the terrain at the time of the battle the Western Slope was generally free of vegetation while the summit and Eastern portion and Southern slopes were slightly wooded Robert E Lee's flank attack plan in the southern part of Gettysburg Battlefield called for the division of Lieutenant General James longstreet's Corps to attack obliquely from the southwest along Emmitsburg Road and roll up the Federal line Long Street who had advocated maneuvering completely around the union left before attacking did not believe in the attack but followed his orders to the letter despite repeated objections from his subordinates his men retired when they reached the jumping off point for the attack having had to march sometimes counter March for several hours they were surprised to find federals in front of them at the beginning of the assault where none had been reported Major General Dan sickles had moved his third core about three quarters a mile in advance of the Union line to take up a position in a wheat field a peach orchard and around a tumbled mass of huge Boulders known as Devil's Den Hood's division at the right end of longstreet's Corps began the attack around 4 pm Brigadier General Evander law whose Brigade formed the far right of woods division disobeyed orders and attacks straight ahead instead of on the oblique to avoid being inflated by fire from The Devil's Den While most of Law's men engage federals around Devil's Den he sent two regiments under Colonel William Oates looping right to chase some members of the second U.S Sharpshooters off Roundtop Oates succeeded though not without sustaining casualties from the Sharpshooters accurate fire maneuvering around Boulders and through thick underbrush his men finally reached the summit and Oates could see the entire Federal line he could also see about a half mile away the summit of little Roundtop which was about a hundred feet lower than where he stood unlike the heavily wooded big round top much of the trees on little round top had been cut down months earlier he could plainly see that only a handful of men from the union signal Corps were on the hill receiving orders to take little round top oats had his tired men work their way down to the valley between the two hills where they were joined by a regiment of their fellow Alabama's and two from Texas the newcomers had fought their way through the Fringe of Devil's Den where heavily fighting continued the five regiments began ascending little Roundtop with fourth Texas on the left and then fifth Texas fourth Alabama 47th Alabama and on the right flank the 15th Alabama two-thirds of the way to the summit they were met with volleys of rifle and cannon fire the 20th May was now fully engaged Vincent's men took up a position downslope on the far side of the crest along a ledge from left to right the regiments were the 20th Maine 83rd Pennsylvania 44th New York and 16th Michigan they were supported on their right by 10 parrot rifles from first lieutenant Charles haslett's battery the federals got into position just 15 minutes before the Alabama and Texas troops arrived the Confederates rocked by the initial volley responded with their own fire a bullet struck Colonel Vincent fatally reportedly his last words were don't give an inch the 140th New York regiment from Brigadier General Stephen weeds Brigade arrived sent by Warren to reinforce the union position its Commander Colonel Patrick O'Rourke was killed almost instantly soon weeds other three regiments the 146 New York 91st and 155th Pennsylvania joined the Defenders on little round top weed himself standing near one of hazlett's gun was killed by a shot to the Head reportedly from a Confederate sharpshooter in Devil's Den below Lieutenant Haslet too fell dead also reportedly for the victim of a Devil's Den Sharpshooter the federals had rapidly deployed some 3 000 infantry and hazlets Gunners to oppose five southern regiments that had totaled around 2 400 when the day began the two sides kept up a galling fire and made repeated charges and counter charges perhaps the most critical point of the Union line was extreme left held by the less than 360 men of the 20th of Maine under Colonel Joshua Chamberlain a former Minister and Professor if they gave way the federals would be outflanked opposing them were nearly 650 Confederates of the 47th and 15th Alabama when his men ran low on ammunition Chamberlain ordered a bayonet charge whether he conceived the idea himself where it came from first lieutenant Holloman s welcher the charge successfully broke up a flanking attempt by the 15th Alabama and drove them back whereupon Company B of the 20th Maine and members of the second U.S Sharpshooters concealed behind a stone wall opened fire finishing the alabamians attack for the day fighting on the far side of the line had been equally intense the Texans had nearly broken through the 16th Michigan but the timely arrival of the 140th New York saved the Union right on the hill around 6 30 PM Oates ordered all regiments to withdraw the 15th Alabama had lost nearly half of its 520 men the Texans lost all officers except for Majors J.C Rogers officer casualties were heavy on both sides and included Colonel oates's brother lieutenant John Oates killed while attacking the 20th Mane the fight for little round top was over but farther north along the Emmitsburg Road brutal battles were being fought in the wheat field in Peach Orchard thinking logically from the point of view of the Confederates the attack seemed Reckless almost suicidal exhausted soldiers attacking a fixed position uphill with little cover was a recipe for disaster but thanks to a book labeled as historical fix by the way these events have taken on a life of their own again in no way do I wish to Discount the heroic efforts of the 20th Maine and the other Defenders of little Roundtop but at some point the facts must take hold Fact one the Texans and alabamians attacking the federal positions were exhausted they had marched all day fought a Devil's Den and attacked uphill at least four times in the hot sun it is necessary to ask what oats was going to do with little Roundtop had he managed to capture it there were no other troops prepared to reinforce him as the rest of the first Corps was engaged in brutal fighting and Major General George Pickett's division longstreet's lone remaining Force had not yet arrived on the battlefield additionally the entire Union six Corps had reached the battlefield directly to the east of little round top in the mid-afternoon and certainly could have been utilized to retake little Roundtop if not necessary as could have elements of Brigadier General James Barnes Division and Brigadier General Roman Ayers division of the Union fifth Corps in later years Oates described his efforts to capture both the of the round tops as an objective that should have been pursued owed States within half an hour I could convert big round top into a Gibraltar that I could hold against 10 times the number of men that I had in analyzing oats claim author Henry fans writes the battle was raging below the division was attacking not defending his regiments were needed on the firing line not in a defensive position on Roundtop that had no value in the situation at hand Franz rape further States Roundtop had little or no value as an artillery position and attacked that afternoon additionally it remains a mystery where oats would have found any stray batteries to fortify big round top for none were in the vicinity even if a battery had been located fawns continues one can easily assume that the fight for that day would have been over before any guns could have been drag to the top of the hill if oatsun managed the Herculean task of placing a battery on big round top fronds concludes they still could not have been used unless trees were filled to clear a field of fire one can then wonder what targets would have been fired at that could not have been assailed equally effectively from guns in other positions Sac II units were stacked up Northeast of Chamberlain's position and there is some evidence that there was reunions dispatched to help the 20th Maine and that Chamberlain was aware of this again without discounting what these brave warriors did on that late afternoon it is obvious that their effort was not the singular action that won the battle for the union the following evidence is a little more controversial but is rooted in fact we know that the six Corps had arrived and was tired but ready for action the divisions were commanded by General Horatio G Wright Brigadier General Albion B Hal and Major General John Newton the sixth and March upwards of 37 miles in about 17 hours to reach Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 2nd 1863. the first division deployed and saw action at little Roundtop in the wheat field despite being the largest Corps in the Union Army at the time the rest of six core was mostly held and reserved to the east of Gettysburg however all this was happening far away from the action and Colonel Chamberlain would have no idea that these troops were available right probably not he was involved in the fight for his life low on ammunition and running out of options right so why did he make this statement as after Action Report Colonel rice informed me of the fall of Colonel Vincent which had devolved the command of the Brigade on him and that Colonel Fisher had come up with a brigade to our support these troops were masked in our rear it was the understanding as Colonel rice informed me that Colonel Fisher's Brigade was to advance and seize the western slope of Roundtop where the enemy had shortly before been driven but after considerable delay this intention for some reason was not carried into execution we were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed to strengthen himself in that position he would have a great advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight or before so it appears Chamberlain did know there were troops being held in reserve he knew that they were supposed to be sent forward to fill in the gaps did he call for them to come up did they could they at the very best provide them with desperately needed ammunition or was he talking about the two Pennsylvania units the 155th and the 91st and the 146th New York that had already been used to fill the gaps in the center and right if this was the case why would the right be reinforced over the more important left or was it referring to the arrival of the six Corps Civil War historians know the timing of battles and other events is suspect at best soldiers in generals could not glance at their cell phones to see what the correct time was most times were estimates at best post-battle assessments and after action reports were often written days after the battle well after the fog of War had worn off and personal recall takes over such as the case in this engagement I have read several different accounts both Rebel and Union and the times are certainly not precise and vary greatly some list the rebel attack is starting at four so some listed as 430. some show the arrival of the 20th of Maine as five and some listed as early as three the same with the arrival of the six core some references show the arrival as early as 3 P.M While others have them in place around five in fact the entire July 2nd timeline of the sixth Corps is foggy as indicated by Major General Cedric's after Action Report the sixth Corps were dispersed along the ridge Cedric writes Wheaton's and eustis's brigades of the third division temporarily commanded by Brigadier General Wheaton and Bartlett's Brigade of Rights division went into action about 5 PM on the left Center between divisions of the fifth Corps and assisting and repulsing the assault of the enemy Russells and tolbert's brigades of Rights division were held in reserve that night Niels Brigade of house division was sent to the right of the line reporting to Major General Slocum and Grant's Brigade of the same division was posted on the extreme left of the general line sheller's Brigade of Wheaton's division was held in reserve near the left Center Colonel rice filling in for the mortally wounded strong Vincent would indicate in his after Action Report having with the aid of this officer properly disposed of three regiments of this Force I ordered Colonel Chamberlain of the 20th Maine to advance and take position of the mountain this order was promptly and goutly executed by this Brave and accomplished Officer Colonel Fisher at once ordered two regiments of his command to support Colonel Chamberlain and the hill remained permanently in our possession Colonel Garrard commander of the 146th New York would write the other regiments the 146 New York volunteers and the 91st in 151st Pennsylvania volunteers were led to the right and front some distance and formed in a line in a narrow Valley to support a portion of third Corps and Watson's battery then severely pressed by the enemy before becoming engaged however orders were received for these regiments to return it double quick to Round Top Ridge and secure and hold deposition The 91st was posted on the left of the battery connecting with the 140th the 146 and 155th were posted on the right extending from the battery on the summit along the crest of the ridge to the gorge on the right there is other correspondence from commanders in the sixth Corps complaining and chomping at the bit to get into action so is this definitive proof that Colonel Chamberlain was a fraud certainly not and I certainly hope no one feels that way but it does call into question the contention that the 20th main was the Bastion of the Union left had oats and his men broken through they certainly would have met with the remaining units of the sixth Corps the exhausted alabamians and Texans would have been fodder for the waiting Boys in blue the actions of those that fought on that Hill that day had a huge impact on the outcome of the battle but I do feel calling it The Action that won the war is at best inaccurate it's your history learn it know it love it [Music]

Channel: MaddHattals Civil War History

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Length: 19min 57sec (1197 seconds)

Published: Tue May 30 2023