The Loss of Force Z - Why send battleships against aircraft?

[Music] hello everybody and welcome to this video which is the fourth of four videos that squarespace kindly agreed to sponsor as i'm sure you're aware by now squarespace is a rather wonderful and simple to use tool that allows you to build a website share your thoughts or pictures with everyone and even dispense knowledge via the means of secondhand books so this time i thought i'll show you how easy it is to share your thoughts with people and this time we're going to use a blog i'm going to call it the mess deck because that seems appropriate that's where sailors used to chat all the time share the latest information as i thought maybe a few paragraphs each month might be a useful place to coordinate all those little bits of information that people ask in videos and perhaps can be difficult to chase down in the comments so you see here's the one of the four basic templates i chose this one we're going to take out the stock image and put up a new one give it an appropriate url 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retold quite a number of times so let's look into those background factors first throughout the late 1920s and much of the 1930s japan had been viewed as the most likely opponent and much of the royal navy's limited resources has gone into building vessels that were useful globally but particularly optimized for a war in the western pacific the carrier ark royal the town class cruisers and a series of large submarines to save but a few estimates were drawn up for a potential war and the overall conclusion was that such a conflict would be largely naval land forces would concentrate on defending the empire not so much on offensive action the raf would likewise provide defensive cover and a screen for capital ships and the royal navy would saute a large force to be based in singapore from which it would seek to engage and destroy the japanese navy as they tried to conduct their offensive operations which would necessarily include some amphibious landings as it turned out the estimates of just how much force the japanese would send against the british holdings would actually prove to be remarkably prescient the size of the japanese invasion of malaya for example was actually pretty close to pre-war predictions but the sudden divergence of focus to europe in the late 1930s and then the outbreak of war itself hindered the latter stages of intelligence work which would in turn leave gaps in the royal navy's knowledge and that in turn wouldn't be helped by the timing of everything the details of the plans for invading malaya the example mentioned previously weren't actually concluded by the japanese themselves until late 1941 which left only a few months for the british to discover what the plans were whilst obviously they were in the middle of some of the worst parts of the european conflict and that in turn meant that whilst they did have a pretty good idea of what was coming when it was coming was almost entirely unknown until it was practically almost too late to do anything about it likewise the use of the imperial japanese navy's carriers as a single combined force wasn't brought in as doctrine within the japanese navy until april 1941 which for similar reasons would have a significant impact on intelligence that led to the forces later allocated to the indian ocean during operation c or the indian ocean raid as it sometimes called in early 1942 and finally of course the war in europe meant that the original planned deployment was impossible some of the ships that would have set sail had war broken out in early 1939 were now sunk and most of the rest were either stuck fighting the germans and the italians or being repaired still going into late 1941 the royal navy assessment of the japanese navy's strength as well as that of the japanese air forces both japanese navy and army representatives thereof were roughly speaking in the ballpark with a few notable differences being that they'd overestimated just how many destroyers and submarines the japanese navy had in total whilst simultaneously underestimating the number of aircraft that the japanese carriers could bring to the table by about 25 percent mostly thanks to some dramatic underestimates of the size of rujo hiru and soriyu the estimates of aircraft carried per tonne of aircraft carrier were actually pretty good they also thought that the megamis and the toenais were armed with six-inch guns but at the same time they also thought the japanese navy was fielding a class of supercruiser with half a dozen 12-inch guns oddly enough the estimates for the air power of the japanese army and japanese navy were actually more accurate than their assessments of german air power at the same time but what was lacking was detail how many of the japanese aircraft were fighters torpedo bombers dive bombers level bombers etc the capability assessments of each individual type were usually fairly good but knowing how far a g3m bomber could fly was a far cry from knowing which squadrons knew how to drop bombs which had been trained in torpedo operations or how the payload of the aircraft might affect its overall range by 1940 the royal navy was mostly thinking in terms of overall trying to match the japanese navy in terms of capital ships they were actually pressing to restart battleship production as whilst numerically the royal navy had superiority well for one thing a number of ships had to be kept at home to deal with european war and for another only the three modernized queen elizabeths hms renown hms hood and the two nelsons were rated as equal or superior to the imperial japanese navy battleline units the revenge class plus malaya barum and repulse were not considered equals on the grounds of low speed low elevation of the main guns and lack of modern systems although repulse actually ticked most of those boxes she was mostly included in this latter category on the grounds that her combination of weak armor and the difference in capability between her and renown meant that she could take on a congo at least it was felt but nothing particularly more formidable the new king george v were of course rated against anything existing in the japanese navy battle line but they weren't available in 1940 and there was still the matter of the actually existing but somewhat underestimated yamatos and the non-existent but considered 12-inch gun supercruisers but even if the royal navy got its way it would mean that there weren't any additional capital ships available until at least mid to late 1942 as 1940 turned into 1941 a two-year gap in the ability to read japanese codes came to an end and between this and radio direction finding measures a fairly accurate picture of what the japanese navy was actually doing began to form even if there was precious little anyone could actually do about it sharing resources with the united states meant that the pool of cracked ciphers grew and also meant that radio direction finding efforts could be coordinated with u.s stations in the philippines this was supplemented by the british submarines of regulus and perseus which managed to directly observe imperial japanese navy fleet exercises and provided valuable photos of brand new imperial japanese ships although with most royal navy submarines leaving the area in 1940 by mid-1941 this data was a little somewhat less use than it had been the previous year as the unseen countdown clock to war entered its final stages the japanese seizure of formerly french indochina and the occupation of the airfields therein was recognized as a major indicator of a threat with british officers observing the great difficulty in attacking malaya has been to provide shore-based air cover now the japanese have the means of providing it from indochina and it is hard to believe they will not take advantage an ominous move will therefore be the preparation of southern indochina air bases for full operation including stocking with fuel and bombs etc aircraft can be flown in but ground support takes time once established such forces could support a seaborne invasion sailing from hainan or formosa and not touching indochina another observation was the air position is a vital singuanon for japan preparation and stocking of indochina air bases is a critical intelligence indicator the arrival of the type zero naval fighter will be a definite indicator that malaya is the target in light of this planning began in summer 1941 on just what the royal navy could send to the far east if and when the japanese went to war this anticipated that the united states and the british empire would be drawn in and the initial draft plan went as follows phase one to immediately redeploy force h which at this point consisted of the battle cruiser hms renowned plus the carrier hms arc royal the cruiser hms sheffield and eighth destroyer flotilla this would act defensively until phase two with the united states navy's atlantic fleet taking over some responsibility for operations in the atlantic this would free up the battleships nelson and rodney plus three of the r-class 10 cruisers 32 destroyers and 10 submarines these would then link up with force h existing royal navy units that had already been in the far east area and royal australian navy units to form a powerful but still largely defensive battle fleet but there would be a number of problems as the year progressed into autumn and then the first stages of winter some of which will cover again as the timeline goes on nelson of course was damaged by an italian torpedo bomber other losses in the mediterranean meant that force h was needed in position at gibraltar now more than ever arc royal herself was sunk in november rodney needed her guns refitted asap and the availability of u.s capital ships in the atlantic was becoming somewhat more remote as the us navy was increasingly unwilling to stem the flow of ships allocated to their own pacific fleet additionally recognizing how vulnerable convoy routes were and looking at german operations in world war one and thus far in world war ii the royal navy thought that the japanese navy would commit cruisers to raiding the indian ocean whilst the us navy more correctly assessed that the japanese would keep their cruisers back for fleet and amphibious operations these differences in opinion made joint plan of action somewhat difficult to agree although a proposal to replace force h with the two north carolina-class battleships thus allowing force h plus one of the king george v to deploy to the indian ocean seemed to offer some hope when it was proposed in the early autumn at this stage the possibility of getting a modern carrier over to the eastern fleet seemed potentially on the cards bearing mind at the time of proposal arc royal had yet to be sunk and it was thought this ship plus maybe hms furious might if they couldn't be sent across at least hold the fort whilst the new indomitable in theory ready in november might be sent along illustrious was still under repair victorious was needed to head off any crisis marine efforts that went by the home fleet and formidable wouldn't be ready until 1942. it was initially hoped that force h with the king george the fifth class in company could still be supplemented by the nelsons and the rs but there were strong debates over the viability of the rs or avengers as anything but anti-raider escorts but with the aforementioned issues putting the nelsons out of action eventually it would transpire that whatever value the is represented it was something which would end up being held as better than nothing by late september the plans briefly thus showed for revenge class and repulse in the indian ocean by december with the latter to be relieved by renown and a king george v class in early 1942 along with a carrier and 17 cruisers 4 heavy and 13 light to this end repulse arrived in the indian ocean at the end of september followed by revenge at the start of october the abc2 conference in the same month confirmed with the americans already taking up some responsibility for the atlantic that the other three revenges would be in the indian ocean in november but the force h would still be needed in place at gibraltar this in turn led to a re-adoption of the original two-phase plan but now with more emphasis on offense the phase one deployment could be made more powerful and could be made earlier with phase two now aiming at completion in january 1942 this latter phase would send the two nelsons out once refit and repairs were complete to back up the revenges repulse and whichever king george v class that might be sent earlier whether a carrier went in phase one or phase two would depend on the availability of the carriers until a carrier was available a mixture of royal air force bases in malaya and u.s army air force bases in the philippines would have to suffice for air cover however at this stage the u.s rejected the details of the abc2 plan and so things would have to be revised still again still keeping an offensive strategy in mind but now also taking account of mounting war losses and an understanding that cooperation rather than integration with the american forces in the western pacific was going to be the order of the day as part of the new offensive strategy it was proposed to move the navy's primary deployment port from salon now sri lanka to singapore transitioning the force from primarily an indian ocean defensive formation to a western pacific attacking one but the aforementioned issues with the nelsons were now better understood and neither ship would be able to reach the far east before summer 1942 which meant that the strongest fleet that could be in place by the end of 1941 would be a king george v repulse and the four avengers the argument by october was split three ways admiral pound wanted all forces to gather in salon admiral phillips wanted them all at singapore and churchill split the difference wanting any force at singapore to be as fast as possible and thus able to respond rapidly to any incursion at this point it's key to note that carriers were planned as part of the second wave of reinforcements that would take royal navy forces in the area from a formation to a fleet with the aforementioned cover from malay and the philippines taking the place of them for the moment by november the chosen king george v class battleship hms prince of wales was already on its way via south africa as part of a small formation labeled force g too much publicity indomitable had at this point been earmarked for force h due to join in late november as her workup completed it was acknowledged that in an emergency she might be able to make a run for the suez canal and thus join the eastern fleet but this was not advised as whilst the ship may be operational at that point her air group almost certainly wouldn't be familiar completely with operations from the ship and bearing in mind the loss of arc royal it would leave the western mediterranean without much air cover at this stage there was still no significant imperial japanese navy or army aerial presence in range of singapore anyway and nor indeed for some distance further north which made the need for a carrier seem somewhat less urgent on december the 7th that's local time the royal navy listed its primary forces in the eastern theater as prince of wales and repulse which was ordered to meet the battleship at singapore the four are class which would remain in the indian ocean and the small carrier hermes a single carrier likely indomitable was listed as part of the reinforcements potentially able to go in early 1942 but this listing was somewhat misleading as only revenge was actually in place of her class royal sovereign would only reach the area by the end of december and families and resolutions still each had a convoy to escort and wouldn't actually be in the area until january the purpose of the now re-christened force zed being prince of wales and repulse was now primarily deterrence failing that they were to hold the line until reinforcements could arrive against the possibility of japanese aircraft attacking the force whilst at sea there was the recent experience of the mediterranean which suggested that even an assault of 62 mixed torpedo level and dive bombers could be dealt with by good anti-aircraft gunfire as this was what the halberd convoy had faced on the afternoon of the 26th of september 1941 and that force had also included 68 fighters as air cover and it was not anticipated that any japanese attack would be able to send a long fighter cover to help out a 28 strong torpedo attack by italian sm-79s had been seen off when they'd come in as a single unit and given that the italian bomber was actually faster than either the g3m or the g4m and had a roughly comparable operational range as far as intel went this seemed to bode well for any particular threats from that direction one major item that was overlooked in this assessment though was that the balance of forces that had opposed the italian raiders three battleships a fleet carrier with two squadrons of fighters three cruisers two anti-aircraft cruisers and eighteen destroyers plus almost three full squadrons of fighters based on malta four zed by contrast had two capital ships and four destroyers indeed as it turned out the japanese bombing and torpedo attacks would actually be mostly uncoordinated which was a step down from the italian efforts as the regia aeronautical pilots had learned through hard experience that coordination was necessary to break through british defenses at least when they were present in strength ironically the us and the uk had independently arrived at the same conclusion at this point a need for defensive strategy until mid-spring 1942 by which point reinforcement programs would allow both forces to go on the offensive but of course the japanese would also get a vote and they would launch their assault on december the 7th 1941 at pearl harbor which of course was december the 8th over in the western pacific on the other side of the international date line a divide that in the context of what was to come can sometimes prove a bit confusing the arrival of prince of wales in theater had as mentioned before bin specifically publicized as a means of deterrence although in the end this did nothing other than allow the japanese to change their balance of forces to account for the ship's presence although given that their planners had already accounted for a potential six battleships two carriers and 16 cruisers being present in the indian ocean and decided that this was a manageable force with the forces that they were committing to the operation it probably didn't make all that much difference by early december the evidence for its significant japanese military build-up was growing and concerns over a number of imperial japanese submarines who were tracked moving south meant that the admiralty was soon suggesting to admiral phillips who'd arrived on the second to take command of four said when it arrived in singapore to possibly consider relocating the force either to darwin in australia or possibly even move back to ceylon japanese air power in range of singapore was assessed to be of low strength but this assessment was rising rapidly from an estimated 300 or so aircraft in indochina of which 180 were deployed in the south and 90 or so of these were estimated to be bombers of some type on december the 2nd to 450 total in on the 4th and 500 total on the 6th which was actually pretty close to the 564 total combined japanese army and japanese navy aircraft that the japanese record state were deployed at the start of hostilities by the eighth the day that four said sailed the estimate was that there were at least 100 bombers most of them capable of carrying torpedoes that might be deployable against force said but it seems that this particular information didn't actually reach admiral phillips who seems to have sailed under the assumption made been an assessment a couple of days earlier that japanese strike aircraft could only reach 300 miles from their bases although he also thought that they were on airfields 150 miles further south than they actually were which split the overall difference between the estimated and actual range which was about 600 miles neatly in two there was also an impression aboard prince of wales that any attacks would likely be from aircraft carrying high explosive bombs intended for ground attack and indeed that would actually have been the case 24 hours earlier but unknown to anybody the leading elements of the elite canoe air group specially trained in torpedo strikes had completed their relocation to airfields near saigon on december the 7th local time along with the less specialized but still well-trained genzan air group when war came on december the 8th again local time which was the same as december the 7th over in hawaii the threat picture for four said had radically shifted from anything it had been up until that point whilst in the end it didn't actually end up mattering the assessment of the surface threat was equally both accurate and inaccurate at the same time intel suggested that there were 10 battleships four carriers four heavy and four light cruisers plus 40 destroyers and 15 subs that were staying in japan as a core fleet with eight heavy and 12 light cruisers plus four aircraft carriers 52 destroyers and 18 submarines potentially being placed under the command of admiral condo for operations in the southwestern pacific added together this was a remarkably accurate assessment of the operational japanese combat strength but what it didn't show was that at the time the assessment was made the first of december the majority of the imperial japanese carrier force and a strong escort force were by then on route for pearl harbor and the southern attack force whilst it had indeed been formed consisted only of two battle cruisers a light carrier and a number of cruisers once again they correctly identified the seventh cruiser squadron made up of the megamies as heading for malaya but on the flip side they were also convinced that the megami still had their six-inch guns an assumption that would last until post-midway photo assessments revealed twin gun turrets on these ships you might well ask what exactly phillips thought he could do against the estimated forces ranged against him but you have to remember that along with his two ships and their escorts he was likely counting on elements of the u.s asiatic fleet and the dutch navy to join with him and form a much larger and much more capable force should the situation go south indeed two days before sailing on the 6th of december phillips had met up with general macarthur and admiral hart the us ground and naval commanders in the region he'd asked for a combined eight destroyers from the u.s navy to join with his own forces as per pre-existing agreements in the event of war which looked to be imminent the outcome of this meeting was that four of the destroyers that he'd asked for were dispatched as what was thought to be an imperial japanese invasion convoy had been spotted but as it turned out those four destroyers would arrive just too late they turned up at singapore on the ninth then turned around immediately and headed back north east ending up meeting up with what was left of four said zone destroyers in the afternoon of the 10th what was agreed at that meeting was that an initial defensive strategy where the british formation reinforced by the u.s destroyers would guard the malay barrier an attempt to stop any japanese move on the dutch east indies would be made with the expectation that revenge and royal sovereign would arrive to help by the end of december but no royal navy carrier was expected before spring a combined cruiser force would be located in borneo to assist with these efforts as would the us navy's submarine force based in cavite in the philippines efforts were to be made to upgrade manila in the hopes that by april the royal navy would be able to stage its reinforced formation from singapore to the philippines to combine with the asiatic fleet and any reinforcements that they in turn might have received at this point however exactly how this was to be done in the face of the speculated japanese force composition is not recorded nor was any specific strategy at dealing with japanese air power beyond moving aircraft into position on malayan and other airfields close to known japanese held air bases there was also nothing mentioned as to where the asiatic fleet should fall back to should the first japanese blow fall on the philippines and render their bases untenable what is critical to note here is that on the sixth phillips was seeking additional ships for an offensive move which suggests that the eventual sailing on the eighth which is sometimes characterized as an immediate knee-jerk reaction to outcoming events was actually something that had been calculated for far longer indeed the fact that the japanese invasion convoy was at sea and this was already known was something that was fairly widespread amongst allied high command by the time of the conference taken on balance the total force is expected to be under allied command at the end of december seem somewhat reasonable to this allotted task it would be three battleships a battle cruiser four heavy and five light cruisers 23 destroyers and 40 submarines mixed between the british australian dutch and american navies not including any further forces that might be in the indian ocean or still at home in australian ports whilst the u.s pacific fleet existed to preoccupy the majority of the japanese navy it seemed a reasonable amount of shipping for their task but there were some flaws even in this assessment of what might be in a few weeks most of the japanese cruiser and destroyer forces for example were made up of ships that were well over the treaty limits whereas much of the allied forces equivalent ships in the area were either old somewhat undersized or both only prince of wales and the tambour class subs in the philippines could claim a definitive advantage over their imperial japanese navy counterparts and of course in the latter case although they didn't know it yet the use of the mark 14 torpedo meant that the us subs such as they were were effectively a non-entity for the opening months of the campaign and thus we come to the day of the forces sailing that night technically the seventh local time at 2300 signal intercepts determined that hostilities were about to commence at 0 100 news arrived of japanese landings in malaya this was followed by a raid on singapore by japanese bombers and the news then just kept piling in malaya was also under attack by japanese aircraft as well as landings and airstrikes being reported in the philippines and then came the news that most of the us pacific fleet's fighting power lay on the seabed at pearl harbor almost every single factor that phillips had counted on as a certainty for facing the japanese was stripped away over the course of the day including critically raf air cover from malaya and u.s air cover from the philippines both of which were now either destroyed or otherwise heavily engaged right from the start one element of these attacks even went into compounding the assessment of japanese air power as only a handful of bombers had shown up over singapore with fairly small bombs given that the pearl harbor attacks had been occurring at almost the same time this seemed to reinforce the idea of a limited combat ranges for torpedo-loaded japanese navy aircraft for surely the reasoning went if they could stage any large number of torpedo bombers any significant distance then the japanese would surely have sent them to singapore with that raid in actual fact the raid had been considerably stronger but most of the aircraft had gotten lost thanks to cloud winds and rain and of course as mentioned earlier the japanese torpedo trained air group had barely cooled their engines from their transit flight at this point nonetheless phillips set sail in the late afternoon working under three assumptions firstly that he had the element of surprise secondly that the bad weather would provide concealment and cover from enemy recon assets thus preserving the element of surprise and allowing him to get away once he'd attacked the landings and thirdly as we've already seen he thought that the air threat was limited in both range and to the type of attacks which experience suggested could be relatively easily weathered i.e light bombs dropped from high altitude this would also give a reason as to why he was willing to sail when his battleship's radar air search systems were still acting up in the tropical heat it didn't seem likely he was going to need them his goal was to find the japanese malayan landing force blow through any screen that they might have sink the transports disrupt the landings and then return before any major response could be gathered as it was on the ninth a series of japanese recon aircraft flew near or over the formation consisting of prince of wales repulse and four destroyers then unknown to philips the submarine i-65 spotted them in the early afternoon and followed them for a while reporting their positions this report caused the now empty transports to sail for safety under escort and orders were given to prepare the specially trained bombers for a torpedo attack just in case that failed the battle cruiser's congo and harona along with eight heavy cruisers one light cruiser and 12 destroyers were dispatched although in a number of separate formations and to a number of separate tasks not in a single fleet as the sun was setting imperial japanese navy float planes actually spotted for said they were in turn spotted by the british and with phillips realizing he'd lost the element of surprise the attack on the invasion site was cancelled and the ships turned for home heading on a deceptive course until nightfall and then altering calls to press on towards singapore somewhat short of fuel the destroyer hms tinidos was sent on ahead the japanese strike aircraft all took off aiming for a night attack as there was still some concern that the british might attack the invasion convoy in the darkness this search effort failed and it was largely thanks to the bad weather that phillips had counted on that it did during the night a flare was dropped over the cruiser chakai and its escorts by japanese search aircraft which was itself only some miles away from the british formation and might have presented an interesting nighttime kill but by this point the british ships were aiming for home and all the flare that was spotted reinforced was the point that surprise had been lost given that the allies didn't fully appreciate the capabilities of the long last torpedo at this point it's probably for the best but luckily for the japanese this misidentification didn't lead to a mistaken attack on jakai similar to the one on sheffield that had occurred during the hunt for the bismarck as if it had then phillips would almost certainly have escaped scot-free for there were only enough aerial torpedoes present in indochina on that particular day for a single strike wave there were more torpedoes on the way but they wouldn't have arrived before four said had safely reached singapore as the ninth turned into the tenth however the final nails in four seds coffin were being hammered in one by one just before midnight the rain stopped and the clouds were mostly blown away leaving a much easier job for both japanese recon and strike aircraft in the future and almost the same time a signal was received stating that an enemy landing was taking place at quantum this is the often underappreciated point about which the fate of force said turned there was actually no landing there but that wasn't to be established until it was far too late but for phillips the signal presented him with little choice quantum was halfway between the known japanese landing points and singapore it would cut british defensive efforts in malaya in two if indeed it was taken quantum was also further south of his current position more accurately somewhat to the southwest but in any case it was further away from the known japanese forces and it was 400 miles away from the known japanese air bases a distance which if you'll recall from earlier his intelligence had assured him was 100 miles further than japanese torpedo bombers could ostensibly reach even if in reality was actually 200 miles inside their operational range thus with the cover of night philips could have felt pretty much no other choice than to alter course to intercept and destroy this new force it also neatly explains one of the two reasons why he didn't insist on air cover for the coming day as far as he knew he didn't need it but at the time philips change coursed the japanese had no idea where on earth he'd gone without that signal then even without so much as a kite with some rude messages attached for air cover four zed would likely have made it back to singapore but that was not to be phillips altered course towards kuantan maintaining radio silence to ensure that japanese landing forces would have no inkling of his approach shortly before midnight this new course took him across the path of the submarine early in the morning of the 10th i-58 would launch a torpedo attack all of its torpedoes missed but the sub went undetected and then subsequently surfaced and radioed in its sighting report at 0315 this reached the bomber's headquarters and as the sun rose the bomber forces three whole air groups were in the air chasing recon aircraft dispatched at dawn to track down the newly relocated ships meanwhile off quantum itself the only excitement was a tug with some barges and a lone mysterious aircraft perplexed four said slowed down further to investigate but eventually they were forced to conclude that either no landing had occurred or else the entire force was made up of ninjas with nothing else to do the ships began to head for home again but at no 0952 came the beginning of the end further to the south the detached tinidos was spotted by a reconnaissance aircraft and then attacked by nine bombers these all missed as they were dropping aerial bombs and the ship continued on by 100 the other japanese strike forces were almost at the end of their tether low on fuel and with no luck in sighting the main body of force said but then by some accounts at 10 15 a single recon aircraft came across the formation and reported its position this seems somewhat likely as at 10 20 an aircraft was spotted by phillips ships and at 10 30 having received and processed both that sighting anteneus's own signal forsaid went on to full alert for air attack and began to make course for singapore at 25 knots now many have asked why at this point phillips didn't ask for air cover for indeed this was available but in addition to believing that he was out of strike range of torpedo bombers which were as far as he was concerned the only serious aerial threat the previous day he'd received a signal stating in unequivocal terms that there was no fighter cover available on the 10th this was in fact an incredibly poorly worded signal that had been meant to inform phillips of the fall of the northern malayan airfields and that thus no fighter cover was available for his supposed assault on the landing forces in that operational area but it had been so condensed as to seem an absolute statement covering the entire operational theater and so in the middle of preparing your ships for an air attack and with denidos having already broadcast to anyone in range that japanese aircraft were around why ask for what you'd already been told was not going to be available and if any aircraft were at hand somehow then surely tunidas signal which singapore should also have picked up would have brought them out anyway by 1100 most of the japanese navy's attack aircraft with their fuel now well below 50 percent were mostly trying to work out if they'd have enough to make it home or if they'd have to divert to the airfields that reportedly had been captured the previous day but then another aircraft sent an updated location report this one at 1105. already converging on the general area and with minimal endurance left in their tanks the scattered japanese aircraft would dive into attack the moment they spotted their targets one formation after another with one of these formations having already expended their payload onto nidos the next which was armed with small 550 pound bombs headed for a pulse dropping their payloads at 11 13. a single bomb hit the battle cruiser amidships but burst on hitting but a single inch of deck armor relatively high in the ship and although some casualties were caused it did nothing to impede the ship's ability to sail or to fight in exchange of the eight bombers involved five were hit by anti-aircraft fire two of which were badly damaged both of these attacks also seemed to confirm previous assessments aircraft with light bombs could reach this far but not anything carrying any heavy ordnance but this notion was to be disabused at 11 32 when another 16 aircraft appeared nine of which made for prince of wales an ordinary seaman serving aboard her reported i could see a formation of about 10 planes skimming low on the water towards us i awaited with excitement the massacre of this echelon monster that would frighten the life out of lesser mortals but no not us let them get nearer catch them on the up sweep a deafening crescendo of noise erupted into the heavens eight 5.25 inches fired simultaneously i watched the shells burst but not a plane was hit to me they seemed well off target the planes came on remorselessly as all the pom-poms machine guns and the bofors gun opened up all hell seemed to be let loose at once but nothing seemed to stop them the battleship turned to evade one aircraft broke off its attack run to go after repulse the other eight headed in and made their drops one torpedo exploded the moment it hit the water but the other seven came straight on the remaining seven aircraft of the overall formation joined by the one that had broken off its attack made eight drops on repulse with 15 torpedoes in the water one bomber went down into the sea on fire and three more took heavy damage repulse for all of her age twisted and turned like a snake in the grass and evaded all the incoming weapons prince of wales did almost as well six torpedoes went wide but one lone torpedo impacted right aft just where the outermost port side propeller shaft left the hull the shock wave of the explosion rippled up the ship knocking out power generators bending the prop shaft and shearing its supporting structure the massive weight and size of the quad 14 inch half turret formed a fulcrum about which the stern whipped and various seams and bulkheads opened up both port side engines briefly stopped and the ship's speed in turn also began to drop bad as it was the situation may just about have been salvageable indeed unknown to the british the situation was almost identical to one that the italian battleship vittorio veneto had faced just prior to the battle of cape matapan but whereas in that situation the italians had time to sort things out in this one the ship was facing further attack unaware of the catastrophic nature of the damage the outer shaft it along with the inner shaft was restarted this led to the freewheeling tube that was the outer shaft ripping open bulkheads and glands all the way back to the machinery spaces and 2400 tons of water began rushing up the damaged path bypassing any and all anti-torpedo defenses and permanently crippling much of the ship's motive and electrical power with speed limited to 16 knots and near 12 degree list into the bargain and the ship was now far more vulnerable to attack not helped by the fact that the list meant that the starboard 5.25 inch battery could no longer depress the guns far enough to engage further torpedo bombers and the aft turrets on either side had no power in any case immediately leaving the ship with only the forward two port side turrets in any way usable against torpedo bombers whilst the starboard turrets could be used against high-level bombers but the turrets themselves and the light anti-aircraft weapons were now all the more clumsy as they were operating under manual only operation not just for loading but also for traverse and elevation about 1143 another wave of japanese aircraft came in seven torpedoes and six bombs were sent against repulse who neatly evaded all of them before attempting to get closer to the stricken flagship to try and help during this period repulse made its own signal at 11 58 reporting the air attack and half an hour later a squadron of buffaloes was on its way but too little too late at 12 18 another 26 aircraft arrived these carried slightly newer aerial torpedoes that hit a little bit harder and they were amongst the best trained in the imperial japanese navy when it came to torpedo attack six aircraft vectored on the limping prince of wales scoring three hits on the starboard side where the anti-aircraft guns could do virtually nothing to stop them one hit right forward another right aft even further back than where the first hit had been which had crippled the ship this one bent the outer starboard propeller shaft like a pretzel laying it over the inboard starboard propeller shaft which saw the ship begin to coast to an almost complete halt moving at about six knots on the strength of the inboard port side propeller and that only had one last boiler room which was frantically but futilely trying to push the ship forward a little faster one final torpedo struck the ship adjacent to b turret the super-firing twin but it was the only one to hit the ship's torpedo defenses which to some small comfort to the designers managed to resist the hit completely counter flooding efforts from the first hit meant that the bow and stern hits from the second assault actually did even more damage than you'd expect even for impacts on unprotected portions of the ship as the air gaps in the hull were now full of water which transmitted the shock wave of the impacts quite well but by this point prince of wales was carrying more water inside her than the entire displacement of most pre-dreadnought battleships and so her fate was only a matter of time at 12 23 11 of the remaining japanese aircraft went after a pulse in a pincer movement of eight and three aircraft respectively the eight launched first and repulse once again evaded them all but this turn took her unavoidably into the path of the other three one of whom managed to score a hit this didn't actually seem to faze her all that much the torpedo having struck in the midst of whatever torpedo defenses she had and which appeared to be doing their job quite well but now the remaining aircraft swooped in and three or four more torpedoes struck home from both sides indicative of a second pincer attack this catastrophic damage happening all at once was too much and repulse rolled over and sank in just under 10 minutes having evaded almost two dozen torpedoes before receiving her fatal blows a final bombing attack at 1241 scored a single hit on prince of wales but accomplished little other than adding to the casualties the ship was already in the midst of capsizing deport which is indicative of just how much damage and flooding that first hit had caused considering that she had three holes in her starboard side but was going over in the opposite direction hms express one of the escorting destroyers came alongside to take off what crew she could and at 1318 the battleship went over completely almost actually taking express with her and then she sank just as the first buffaloes arrived overhead in exchange for the loss of four aircraft three shot down in the attack and one more crashed on landing plus over a dozen badly shot up and the expenditure of 49 torpedoes and dozens of bombs the japanese had sunk the only two allied fast capital ships in the entire indo-pacific region a total of 840 officers and men went down with the ships 513 in repulsor's rapid demise and 327 from prince of wales bereft of fast heavy ships to anchor itself on the gathered allied forces would gradually be picked off piecemeal in the forthcoming months the now critically under strength abda command then a good portion of the remaining royal navy units in the indian ocean in operation c indeed allied fast capital ships would not appear in the pacific campaign again in any role apart from latterly as carrier escorts until admiral lee's dramatic intervention in the guadalcanal campaign but that was almost a year away but far from being a vainglorious suicide charge ostensibly made in the face of modern realities an examination of the evidence rather appears to indicate the loss of forced was more down to two far more mundane and unfortunately far more common factors mostly but not entirely accurate intelligence where the fewer missions turned out to be the critical factors and simple bad luck if that first torpedo had hit a couple of hundred feet forward and the two ships had thus been able to keep up their anti-aircraft fire and evasive actions at top speed would the subsequent attacks have been enough to stop them possibly not the japanese navy certainly wouldn't have been able to come back for another go any time soon given that they would have had to restock on aerial torpedoes which they didn't have in the theater would the two damage capital ships have affected the fall of singapore or the subsequent indian ocean raid if they'd been able to be repaired in time possibly so but in the event these things would not come to pass and regardless of the exact reasons the simple fact remains that repulse and prince of wales were sunk on december the 10th 1941 and with them went most of the hope of stopping japanese expansion east of india that's it for this video thanks for watching if you have a comment or suggestion for a ship to review let us know in the comments below don't forget to comment on the pinned post for dry dock questions

Channel: Drachinifel

Views: 532,782

Keywords: wows, world of warships, WW2, IJN, Royal Navy, Force Z, HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Repulse, Singapore, Pearl Harbour

Id: g7dqxBdYBZI

Length: 51min 2sec (3062 seconds)

Published: Wed Mar 23 2022