The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

I'm supposed to say that if you're following this on Twitter please go to at capital AC Scowcroft or hashtag us nuclear strategy so I mean it's my administrative requirements are finished okay so again and welcome in a democracy of vibrant and informed public debate on the issues of the day is absolutely vital and that's why I'm particularly pleased to be here today to welcome you to this discussion of the logic of American nuclear strategy as many of you are aware a draft of the Nuclear Posture review was leaked in early January and between the leak and the NPR's formal rollout on February 2nd instead of a debate we retreated to a series of fantastical criticisms leveled against the document which alleged that first it called for building more usable nuclear weapons which is a term you will not find in the NPR actually quite the opposite it called for using nuclear weapons to retaliate against cyberattack but you won't find that in the NPR either and indeed the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Paul Selva felt compelled to state in public that that assertion was absolutely false you'll read that the NPR represented a significant departure from traditional us deterrence policy again completely false since it's squarely in the mainstream of more than 50 years of the US policy the list goes on and on and in the attacks on the document degenerated into ad hominem attacks on its supporters and that's why it's an absolute pleasure to introduce to you today a distinguished panel of experts who will discuss the facts and whose discussion will raise and inform the public debate in addition to being distinguished members of the panel I'm glad to say that all of them had good friends of mine of many years standing so our panel today is made up of Admiral Cecil Haney who reminds me he's a DC Public Schools graduate Admiral Haney is an experienced Submariner who after he left he after he left the best job ever commanding officer of the submarine USS Honolulu held a number of major Pentagon posts and also headed several major commands the last one of which before he retired was commander US Strategic Command MS Rebecca Hersman who served several tours in OSD as well most recently as a Deputy Assistant Secretary and who is now director of the project on nuclear issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies dr. Jim Miller the other half of the Miller duo has also served multiple times in the Pentagon most recently as the Undersecretary of defense for policy which is the best job in the US government by the way Jim is now president of adaptive strategies LLC and also a senior fellow at the Kennedy schools Belfer Center at Harvard and dr. Matthew cronic an associate professor at Georgetown University and a senior fellow here at the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center and the author of a newly published book which some of you may have seen as you walked in the logic of American nuclear strategy which is a catchy title for today our moderator today is the noted author in New York Times reporter Tom Schenker and Tom over to you and the panel here I can't imagine a more pressing topic for today nor a you know a panel with greater candle power on the topic for me I'm not a nuclear expert my greatest knowledge came from living in Moscow for five years with the newly deployed Pershing missiles pointed at my family and me none nothing prompts a sharp assessment of American policy and how your tax dollars are being spent then in the target of some of our our own armaments before we start the learning Council wanted me to announce to all those listening virtually and even those on phones here in the room that they're using a mint a meter system it allows audience members to vote on a series of proposed slides to which we can discuss as the topic goes along if you want to log in its w WM NTM enti dot-com and your passcode is nine eight seven five eight six that's nine eight seven five eight six thank you very much I think to start I would love to have the panel members discussed a theme that Frank touched upon it is very kind introduction which is continuity and change regardless of your party affiliation or support the current occupant of the White House the commander in chief describes himself as a change agent he's done a lot of things that are very unusual for the White House occupant but when it comes to nuclear strategy and in particular the Nuclear Posture review do you see it as more continuity or change and what are the essential elements and Rebecca I'll start with you if that's okay and then invite the others to hop in please thanks for having us here for this discussion I mean I will say I think this issue of continuity versus change has become something of a unhelpful and strangely emotional topic so I think it's helpful to think about the Nuclear Posture reviews and I'll say plural both the 2010 NPR and the 2018 in a broader context and part of that is in my view is the 2010 NPR was a slightly left-of-center review I think the 2018 NPR is a slightly right of center and review both are squarely in the mainstream but both were actually sort of moderating as compared to the political context in which they were issued so I think that President Obama's personal views and a lot of the debate that was happening in 29 and 2010 and Beyond and a lot of congressional allies were pulling that to the to the left and the review ended up somewhat to the right of that and more centrist I think a similar thing has happened here I think the current review is more centrist and is more similar but it is somewhat moderated from the rhetoric of the president that's been heard in a number of tweets and not a number of political allies on the hill and elsewhere he was I don't appreciate your view sir well I would say what I appreciate but of the Nuclear Posture review is the context that is laid out in it relative to were the world is today versus where the world was in 2010 and particularly in its specific of what other nuclear nation-states are doing today and then how can we best counter that Thanks I I see this document as primarily one of continuity and one that is deserving of bipartisan support there are elements of it where I am not in full agreement but none of those elements are such that I would say that it's so far off base it should be it should be opposed and that's true at the level of declaratory policy we're in fact the exact same language as in the past in Nuclear Posture you and previous ones is used that the United States would use nuclear weapons only under extreme circumstances in which its vital interests or those of its allies and partners are immediately threatened in a number of areas of policy as well it's true for the programs broadly including the support of the Triad and a forward deployed and deployable theater nuclear capability as well as nuclear command and control and investment in infrastructure and it's true in many other areas well and we can talk about some of the each's and I'm sure we will but I think the big question about this their posture review is does it reflect the views of the president of United States I hope someone we've seen signs talked about who has the bigger nuclear button or fire and fury in response to any any actions in North Korea that would take it out of the mainstream I hope that this view does reflect the views of the President or if it doesn't today that it will very soon well I wouldn't be a good newsman if before I turn him out I didn't ask you you said there were a few things with which you do not agree what what might those be sure sure I would I would highlight three questions about first if I cannot phrase a miss questions I'd have about to review first it did not emphasize your shooting stability in US Russia and us-china context that was a priority of the 2010 review and one of the things that that review did it said we understand that we're in a situation of mutual vulnerability or mutual assured destruction relative to Russia what is the perspective of this review on that question I one could make an inference but I think it's so important for Russia and for China that that it should be dealt with in that regard second is that I felt that the description of China was a little bit off base in the sense that yes China is modernizing but it clearly has far more limited goals than Russia and it's not been engaged in saber-rattling so I would have liked to have seen more differentiation between the two I think the u.s. approach diplomatically and in engagements on strategic stability and other topics should be should be differentiated between those two and finally undeclared policy it goes back to something that my that my brother Frank Miller I noted as well margit sold you know I think there was a muddle in the rollout of the declaratory policy with respect to cyber as as Frank noted vice-chairman General Paul selves attempted to put that back in the box I think some more clarity on that question would be important because I take some of the statements that have been made for by current undersecretary John root in public that there's no intent to expand the role of nuclear weapons in u.s. strategy I take them at face value I'd like to see those reiterated and clarified given them just the way in which that the original document was interpreted and for some of that it was the nature of the leaked and inadvertent rollout if you will that left miscommunication to be the first step we'll get to both cyber in the threat environment a moment wind-up match would have comment broadly speaking give a sure grade of the Nuclear Posture review what do you think well overall I think the the Nuclear Posture review is quite good and I agree with my panelists it's mostly continuity and a little bit of change just on the continuity it says the primary roles for US nuclear weapons are to deter nuclear attack to deter major conventional or non nuclear strategic attack to assure allies these are roles of US nuclear weapons that have been pretty consistent I think for for many years also it says that we need a flexible and tailored Nuclear Posture I also think that's continuity with the previous administration you know the United States doesn't have the luxury of having a single nuclear adversary we face Russia China North Korea's potential adversaries so we need to have a tailored strategy and posture for each and so that's another area of continuity the area of difference I think is we'll probably get to next you know these new or supplemental low yield capabilities there's been a lot of discussion on and so I know we'll talk more about that I just wanted to comment on strategic stability because the new document does mention strategic stability not as many times as the 2010 NPR my own view is that strategic stability seems to suggest that the u.s. nuclear weapons are also part of the problem whereas I don't really see it that way I think if we kind of elevate strategic deterrence as the foremost objective if we can deter Russia China North Korea from using nuclear weapons engaging in nuclear coercion then we'll have achieved our objective but we do have to understand who we're planning against the current threat environment has been mentioned several times but clearly our relationship with Russia is very different from the last neutral posture review China a whole new set of actors in the world so I'd love to hear the panelists about what is different today as far as our adversaries and potential adversaries and whether you think the NPR addresses it adequately no okay I get to go first the suggest all things reverse well I think the biggest difference from the 2010 NPR is that the threat environment has deteriorated over the past eight years you know in the 2010 NPR and the Obama administration talked about the threat of nuclear conflict with Russia as being quote remote today unfortunately I think that's no longer the case the Russians have really emphasized nuclear weapons in their strategy and military military strategy talking about these de-escalatory nuclear strikes making investments and their nuclear capabilities so I think there is a plausible pathway to nuclear conflict between the United States and NATO and Russia really for the first time since since the Cold War the North Korea nuclear threat of course is growing expanding their nuclear and missile capabilities so I think it makes sense that there's a little bit of change with this NPR because it's responding to the real world threat environment which has which has gotten were more threatening please well I think everyone up here would agree that the world's more dangerous now than it was in 2010 in terms of the balance of attention to threats it does seem like the review is very Russia oriented and that a lot of the recommendations are kind of oriented around that I'd like to see more discussion would have liked to see a bit more in the review but really hope to hear it in the continued conversations with the administration about North Korea I think that presents a number of fairly unique challenges for which we need to kind of combine our nuclear policy with a range of counter proliferation and other strategies and I'd like to see that spelled out in greater detail I believe the Nuclear Posture review as good balance relative talks about tailored and tailored in itself per country gives that emphasis that it's different yeah I wouldn't expect it to go through a lot of detail with regard to that because a lot of that I would expect to be classified information and are held in classified documents which we can change of course just you being the journalist so when you look at eight years ago I mean that's a appreciable amount of time and quite frankly when you look at for a Nuclear Posture review and the Russia clearly has a significant quantity Russia is also invested in their nuclear capability and they have been rather mouthy about their capability and where they're going so as a result I wasn't surprised to see most of the Nuclear Posture we be focused on that appropriately in that regard when you look at each of those three nations that were mentioned China Russia North Korea each of them have made significant strides in advances in in their capability obviously we get a lot of news on North Korea because of more recent events but in their normal mode of operation even though they have less quantities it's interesting in the modernization and approaches of a China moving toward a triad for example that we should not lose sight of going forward a lot has changed in that momentum over these last eight years time I agree with everything that the other panelists have said I just encapsulated the security environment is quite different today than it was eight years ago for the 2010 Nuclear Posture review Russia has leaned into nuclear weapons both in their production and employment and as part of their strategy including through saber-rattling and and that has implications for both our deterrence of Russia and our assurance of our of our NATO allies north korea has advanced its nuclear program and missile program substantially since 2010 of course that has implications for both deterrence and reassurance China has grown its nuclear arsenal substantially I think that it has more limited strategic games and it's not engaged with respect to nuclear weapons than Russia and it's not had been engaged in nuclear saber-rattling so I do think it deserves to be treated differently but it also raises fundamentally the issue of strategic stability with respect to US and China as China's arsenal has grown an important change that that we don't have to debate on this panel but Iran has receded as a threat at least for a period of time and part of our Nuclear Posture including our non-proliferation objectives should be to sustain that sustained a non nuclear Iran for the indefinite future including after the end of the jcpoa and if not this administration then the next administration will need to think about also how its nuclear policies play into that role as well yes sir one last piece that would like to add is treaties when you really think about it 2010 you know we're right on the heels of the New START treaty but since then what has occurred you know INF violations for example the skies these types of things also add to the changes that I think that if the posture of you has to address the phrase declaratory policies come up several times and there are a whole range of tools available to a government to signal its intentions publicly and privately I certainly don't want this panel to get into partisan politics but I think we do to talk about the president's communication style when it comes to these issues the national security strategy was rolled out very hard on Russia but the president in his public presentation did not talk about Russia for which some criticized him same in the Nuclear Posture review so to help me understand if you're in Moscow if you're in the Kremlin you read a document but you hear the president are you getting conflicting signals and what does that mean well I think we're sort of waiting to see but I think it is an extremely important question because we often say these are the president's weapons and they're used as reserve to his authority and so I think while the carefully crafted declaratory policies of the Nuclear Posture review are critically important and send an important signal if they're not mirrored by leadership across the government and most importantly the president their meaning and value will be severely undermined so I hope we don't see that discontinuity I don't know that we've seen it yet and my fingers are crossed anyone else what touch that one I would also say in addition to that one indicator of the president commander-in-chief's resolve will be the budget and it seems to me the budget that has been at least proposed and we read about does have some emphasis on modernization of the nuclear force as as well as it follows in sync with the Nuclear Posture review I would just add on that in addition to my role here I'm a political science professor at Georgetown and this is a classic question that international relations scholars have wrestled with how do you make threats and promises credible in international politics because statements can just be cheap talk do you really mean it or not and I are scholars going all the way back to Thomas Schelling who won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on nuclear strategy argued that one of the ways you make your commitments credible is by with a costly signal you know if you're doing something that actually costs economic cost or political cost or something else so I think by making these new investments in these new low yield capabilities specifically designed to deter the Russian nuclear threat is a pretty credible signal of American priorities well you're either prescient or you read over my shoulder to the notes because the low-yield nuclear weapon is the next topic I want to discuss you know I was around in the day of the neutron bomb which was of course highly controversial the Kremlin called it the perfect capitalist weapon because it killed people but left the building standing and so I'm just curious whether you think advocating a low-yield nuclear weapon erases a bright and shining threshold which has helped keep the nuclear peace for all of these decades is it a good idea or is it dangerous Jim please sure Tom I'll jump in I think it's a good idea and and I take it in the context that the Nuclear Posture review text and other statements sense and put it and that is that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons in general and the purpose of this modification to allow a low-yield d5 warhead is to enhance deterrence of nuclear use by others right so it's not to lower the threshold of us first nuclear use it's to enhance deterrence of nuclear use by others in a situation in particular where Russia has gone forward with the development and production and deployment of multiple tactical nuclear weapons where we have much a smaller posture if you will deployed in Europe only with air delivered weapons and having a second weapon that could be used in reply to any Russian attack and that doesn't have to fight through Russian air defenses to reach its target it does make sense it this what to me it it you know in a sense I think why didn't we think of this in the 2010 review I wouldn't I wouldn't have thought it was inconsistent maybe others would have I would not have thought it was inconsistent with the 2010 review and because we have this w76 warhead associated with with the d5 missile under under life extension program today these modifications should be should be able to be done quickly should be very low cost no nuclear testing will be required no new nuclear missions are involved no new nuclear weapons and to me it's a very sensible move low cost filling a potential gap in both nuclear deterrence and nuclear assurance with respect to our NATO allies in particular do any other panelists disagree so it may be up to me to throw a little bit of cold water right or I can channel the public that any small weapon that makes it easier to go nuclear is a bad weapon so well I think any weapon that makes it easy to go to wage a nuclear war certainly would be a bad one I don't think that's the case here I understand the theoretical argument that's put forward in the NPR and I'm not a party to the kind of breathless counter arguments that have come forward about it being destabilizing or having problems of discrimination or all of those things I'm not really worried about the theoretical case for me the concern is is really fundamentally is the juice worth the squeeze in other words politically in this context where I think the far higher priority is the overall modernization of our nuclear forces and the delicate consensus that holds that together I'm looking to see ok what's the necessity of these weapons how serious is the problem why can't it be met by an existing capability in the Arsenal and are they worth the amount of controversy that they are generating for me that's the question and so far I'm not completely convinced but I don't think it's because they're fundamentally destabilizing they're clearly a second strike weapon there are other the UK for example has Trident d5 missiles with with yield capabilities we understand that was debated in the war on the rocks so I don't find that convincing but whether it's really worth it I think conventional our conventional force posture in Europe for example is far more important in deterring Russian opportunism than these two new weapons capabilities thank you Jim you can tell if I could just jump back in to make two quick points first if you think about you know the nuclear threshold is just pushing down to a level where it's close to conventional weapons the answer is no the largest conventional weapon in the u.s. arsenal is a massive ordnance penetrator that public numbers are are about thirty thousand pounds that's that's an incredible amount of explosive translate that's about around about 15 tons we're talking about with the low yield SLBM weapon we're talking about something that is in the range of Braun numbers 500 times more explosive than that it's it's not going to blur that threshold it's it's orders of magnitude higher and it's in its explosive capability and second and to build on Rebecca's point not just the Brits but the United States already has low yield weapons and without knowing exactly what yield they'll take the SLBM weapon to my strong expectation is that the b61 weapon has substantially lower yield options than this does it's it's not it's not new territory it's provided another option that would not involve having to deal with Russian air defenses and that is highly incredibly survivable to the to a future president so Rebecca are you convinced now no I mean I look I don't disagree with Jim at all I think though that there is a critical political call and it's just a question of whether or not the value proposition is there and that's where I'm struggling and remember by next year we may have a Congress that looks you know somewhat different than the current one and sustaining the overall bipartisan consensus for nuclear modernization will remain critically important in a different difficult political environment and then we're gonna ask the question what's worth compromising that I'll get you in a moment but I know Matt wants to jump in here on this topic and well Rebecca raised the number of good questions including why can't we deter Russia with our existing capabilities impressive conventional forces impressive nuclear force that's a question that many people are raising and what I would say is it doesn't really matter what we think is impressive it matters what Putin thinks is impressive and I think there's quite a bit of evidence right now that Putin believes that he can use nuclear weapons and get away with it so I think that suggests that our current strategy and posture isn't enough for potentially isn't enough to deter Russia and given that deterring Russia from using nuclear weapons is such an important objective of US nuclear strategy I think that's a strong case for doing something different to convince Putin that in fact he can't get away with this and well I'd love to hear your perspective as the one person on the stage who's actually been in command of the president's weapons had this been in your arsenal how would would you felt better what situations would you use it help us understand the utility or disutility of this weapon from the commander's perspective well I think most of the comments have been made that I would agree fundamentally with and that is the business of having options options that are credible in the adversaries mindset so this capability is described as a near-term peace and consequently since we're doing the modifications in Sochi with d5 it's not like it's a new weapon per se that combination as a warfighter gives you more credible options you can provide the president which ultimately means in this art of deterrence you want to provide the president with maximum decision space and the ability to have more options helps in that calculus right I didn't want to move to the cyber question perhaps someone you know not in long Fame but because the articles were out there the debate is out there with the Atlantic Council forum for education helped me understand help my readers understand help the public understand what the document did say about cyber and what it did not because there is a perception out there that the Nuclear Posture review advocates nuclear weapons as a potential response to catastrophic cyberattack true or not well where was the confusion let me jump in as I'm looking for the I thought I'd printed out the relevant page of the Nuclear Posture review but as I'm as I'm looking for that for that page with text that refers to attacks on critical infrastructure and nuclear command and control let me take a half a step back and highlight the debate there's there's there are many people who believe that today Russia and potentially China had the capacity to conduct cyber attacks on US civilian critical infrastructure that could be catastrophic not just significant or serious but catastrophic some have used the term existential if one has that view then it's the next step is what would a president do in response or what options would a president want available in response to that and so one can understand how in addition to cyber responses or diplomatic and economic sanctions that the use of military force would come on the table and that and that potentially why some have argued that the use of nuclear weapons should come on the table my view is that there is a very serious cyber threat to us critical infrastructure is going to grow over time but that nuclear threats are are are the least useful at least credible of any potential threat of response and that they're not necessary and it doesn't help bolster deterrence it undermines deterrence because it's not a credible threat so I when I read the document I didn't read that that cyber was indicated in the sense that in other words it could be conventional or special forces and conventional attacks on critical infrastructure that could hobble the United States may be cyber would be thrown in but in that instance if the United States were taken down as it would be the case with a biological attack you would expect that in the face of mass casualties and that would far exceed 9/11 and mass economic impact that would far exceed the cost of the wars we've experienced that the these weapons would be on the table I I don't see that happening through cyberspace alone and I didn't see the document making that claim and as as Frank Miller noted the Vice Chairman went out actually just before the Nuclear Posture was really formally released based on the leaked document said absolutely not that's not what it's about and I I think that's a fairly authoritative statement I think could be helpful if the administration reinforced Paul selva statement and that's why I asked the question for this panel and you Rebecca you have some comments well I would just say I think this is an area where the debates become a bit muddled and run a bit out of control and so what the administration says now to help sort of bound that will be really helpful I think it's true that for the most part the policy is very similar actually to the prior policy we've never had a sole purpose doctrine I think I might have expected to see a few more adjectives helping to clarify this is a matter of magnitude not type catastrophic existential to kind of emphasize the level of event that's imagined in terms of a non-nuclear attack but I will say that I think there was a little bit of overkill in this topic in the review the word count on the number of times it refers to deterring non nuclear attack I kind of stopped counting at around 40 and I just think that was too much I think it was over emphasized and that has contributed to this impression so I think they're going to need to do a lot of talking to kind of pull this one back into the box the takeaway is it needed a better editor something you Excel no no I would just add this if I could no this the term in the NPR non-nuclear strategic attack is is a new term but I think the idea is pretty consistent with decades of US policy you know during the Cold War essentially our policy was to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear strategic attack and that's essentially what a Soviet invasion of Western Europe would have been doing non-nuclear but but strategic in nature at the end of the Cold War we kept the option of using nuclear weapons on the table to deter chemical and biological attack so again non nuclear but strategic potentially in their effects and so that's what I see the new NPR is saying is that we need to use nuclear weapons to deter catastrophic attacks even if they're not with nuclear weapons and so the technology changes but I think the principle is the same and just just one other point there's no you know guarantee that that will be the automatic response is just leaving it on the table and so to the critics I think I could turn it around and say you know what's the benefit of assuring Russia or assuring China you know don't worry you can get away with a non-nuclear strategic attack and not have to worry about our nuclear weapons I don't really see a benefit of that so I think leaving it on the table has a has a logic to it the power of uncertainty but Matt you're reading between the lines also so the problem is the opposing argument is reading between the lines as well which means there's too much space between the lines so I think that's the issue if I could if I could pile in on this I think from an insurance perspective so much for the short debate on cyber no I think from a deterrence perspective matt has a very good point if you extend the umbrella and at least have some ambiguity about that you could argue it'll it'll complicate the calculations of future Russian or Chinese leaders for example the the downside of it is if it worries our allies and if it reduces our ability to have assurance of them and to have an effective extended deterrence if they begin to lose confidence that we are responsible stewards of the nuclear weapons that are intended to protect you know them through our nuclear umbrella then it then it's a serious issue and to me that's where that's what the issue is in this instance and that where the filling in the space between the lines that Rebecca about would be helpful in order to assure our allies and to give them confidence that were responsible stewards the United States is responsible steward of its about nuclear brother right thanks one thing I learned covering the Pentagon for many years often talking to many people in this room is that any strategy requires a budget and you can read a budget document as a strategy document so let's talk about money for a moment CBO says we're looking at a 1.2 trillion dollar investment over 30 years so putting aside the should we is that a number that we can as a nation accommodate yes yeah I can jump in I guess I mean yeah so it's a big number but if you break it down it comes to depending on how you count five to seven percent of the US defense budget so if you believe as the past several secretaries of defense have said that nuclear deterrence is the foremost mission of the US Department of Defense then from my point of view five to seven percent of the defense budget for the most important mission is a reasonable number so affordability is a function of cost and will right so as long as the will is there I think that the money can be there but it is important to remember that number you're using is for the overall modernization program for which there is a pretty fragile consensus that needs to be sustained not just for a year not just for two years not for just the Trump administration but for decades and as we do that I think we need to be careful how much we know where we select to inject controversy and so we try to keep that consensus together well and you say well I mean it's the will of the political leadership and to argue for it and to rally the population they often move at the same rate given the destructive capability of a nuclear weapon even what we call non strategic nuclear weapons which in my mind if it went off it would still be having a strategic effect I think it's very important that we meter that when we at the amount of cost and when you look at what was built by our predecessors that we have sustained and lasts well beyond their intended lifespan I would predict that this amount of money is significantly reasonable for the insurance policy we need but not just now but well into the future so as mentioned these weapons in terms of being built etc in that amount of money is well over a presidential period of time but the real key is the longer journey I don't see in my lifetime nuclear weapons going away or mr. Putin seeing I'm just getting rid of mine today he's quite frankly had just the opposite litany today but as we look at going forward given just the investments these other countries have made I think we would be a disservice and quite frankly would detract from deterrence if we didn't make these investments today which quite frankly when you look at 5% or more of our defense budget you know I think due to its relative importance quite frankly yeah I would say why are we arguing over that time I completely agree they on the one hand we shouldn't pursue and can't afford low pick gold-plated nuclear weapons if you will we're going forward to with a replacement program for the current ssbns the Colombia replacement that is a smaller force and I would prefer and the choices were made by secretary gates and President Obama to to use relatively near-term technology associated with that and to drive down cost the cost of the b21 which will be dual capable have been driven down and hopefully that will you know those those lower costs will be sustained at that level so it doesn't mean that nuclear weapons and delivery systems get a free ride and shouldn't be examined it doesn't mean that there's no nuclear weapon that you know that should never be pursued but on the other hand just just to put two conclusion what my colleagues have said it's absolutely implausible and inappropriate for for someone to say sorry we ran out of money we didn't have the resources available at 5% of 5 to 7 percent of the defense budget to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies I think the modernization argument is you made it is far more compelling sometimes than the numbers argument I know this is something that you approach in your book I mean there's been a trend for years now under past couple presidents to push the number of deployed warheads down tell me if I'm wrong I'm sitting here with a sense that that trend is about to be reversed or easily could be reversed there's a debate about growing the force and for decades it's been you know countervalue counter force overkill etc do we have the right numbers right now do we need more or can we afford to go lower both to save money and for stability I know this is one of the central arguments in your book so I I will give you the power of the chair to go first okay great well first thing I'd say I think is that my book operates at a kind of a deeper level than or a different level anyway than this discussion you know that the NPR discussion is what should our nuclear strategy and posture look like over the the next four eight years the book I'm really looking at a kind of a 70 year trend and what I see is the biggest puzzle really in u.s. national security strategy which is that we have these theories that say a minimum deterrent or a secure second strike capability is enough you know once we can absorb an attack and hit back with a devastating counter-attack then deterrence will hold but then you look at the evidence in the United States has never been content with that kind of posture if that were enough we could have their submarines and a couple of hundred nuclear weapons but that's not what we have we have different delivery systems thousands of nuclear warheads counterforce targeting and capabilities missile defenses and so I try to explain that puzzle and that this is something that scholars have looked at in the past and they've noticed this difference and they said well the explanation is simple the policymakers are wrong our theories are right these people in Washington don't get it and so my book takes a different approach and tries to explain why the United States would want a posture like this and essentially what I argue is that this kind of posture can limit damage to the United States and its allies in the event of the nuclear conflict and this enhances us resolve and contributes to deterrence and extended deterrence because another thing that's unique about the United States is we don't just deter attacks against ourselves we extend deterrence to the entire free world so essentially we're signing up to play games of nuclear chicken potentially every day on behalf of Estonia against Russia on behalf of South Korea against North Korea on behalf of Japan against China so if you're going to be playing those games of chicken potentially every day you want to drive a Hummer not a Prius okay another panelist on the robust versus overkill versus efficiency Admiral well I would just say in the numbers piece you know we look a lot at strategic nuclear weapons New START treaty in terms of driving us down I think we've gotten insurance from Russia and the United States that will meet those goals going forward but what's not covered by treaties is non strategic nuclear weapons and quite frankly there's a lot of fuzz in the in the numbers relative to how many does Russia have for example and you look at a spread of the open literature's is somewhere between a thousand to six hundred six thousand that's a lot of a lot of weapons when you think about it so when we look at well will the will this movement them forward this Nuclear Posture review etc put a lid on the number of nuclear weapons I didn't see anything in that that document that that said we were going to grow quite frankly if anything in the contrary the other piece which I think we haven't mentioned here is in order to maintain sustain and modernize you've got to have an industrial base to support it and that's another area that has not gotten a full-fledged support throughout the years and we're you know more in an extremist condition now fixing that so that we can move forward so I don't see us growing in nuclear weapons if anything quite the contrary going forward the real key is is the deterrence value of what we have and what we do need the modernize well I would just say I mean I think it's important to give the the drafters of the review credit in my mind there is no indication of expanding the Arsenal in the review despite the fact that there were certain sort of presidential messages that might have suggested otherwise so I don't I don't see any evidence of that in fact that everything in the review suggests they're gonna remain compliant with our treaty obligations and stay within the confines of New START as long as Russia does likewise so I don't think it says I'm going to grow the Arsenal and it doesn't say I'm going to unilaterally shrink it it doesn't rule out continued negotiations to reduce numbers so in that sense I think it does sit squarely in the middle but this does go back to our earlier debate over presidential comments versus official documents of that set government but that's where the review did not those presidential comments came earlier review did not lay any signal that it would grow and it hasn't sent anything in the budget thus far that would suggest and expand it arsenal so we don't have any real indication that something is going to come of that comment but it's true that that comment said a lot of concern and anxiety in the broader nuclear policy community about what was coming and that would have been explosive I think to first I agree with my colleagues points on what the Nuclear Posture view has to say and what it doesn't say and then return to the question of nuclear superiority if you would like to do that please I think you need to think about two very different sets of cases one is the situation that the United States had had at the end of World War two where we use nuclear weapons on August 6 on August 9 to 1945 to effectively end the war having even a small number of nuclear weapons when the other side does not is it is is very worthwhile it's a great strategic advantage we want to sustain that including with respect to North Korea today right we want to and the purpose of our missile defenses is to negate any nuclear weapons that they may have but we still want to push them back and deny them the ability and and in any sense that they have the world's permission if you want to go forward with the nuclear missile program so that's that makes a lot of sense the questions that you should ask about nuclear superiority and in the context of US Russia or US China in other words of great powers with nuclear weapons is one is it achievable - if it's achievable is it sustainable and three what is the cost of attempting to pursue it not in dollars but in risk primarily and my view is that with respect to US Russia us-china it's not achievable if by a combination of offense and missile defenses we had it for a moment which I don't expect the incentives of Russia and China to overcome that would be extraordinary and they have resources to provide for that and that therefore the effect of attempting to pursue nuclear superiority relative to Russia or China as opposed to parity and as opposed to deterring their nuclear postures would be would be to increase the risk of inadvertent war and how would you counter the argument that a robust and you know even its modernization only not in numbers but a growing modernized US force is an engine of proliferation around the world so go ahead well so you have to write not politically so in the book that the first half of the book looks at the benefits of a robust nuclear force and I agree with much of what dr. Miller said but I would just add I think often people kind of conceptualize nuclear superiority as either kind of a perfect you know superiority or you don't have it so it's the United States first Japan in 1945 versus any other nuclear-armed state and one of the conceptual moves I make in the book is to point out there are shades of gray and I think that those matter as dr. Miller pointed out were more vulnerable to China than we are to North Korea we're also more vulnerable to Russia than we are to China and even when it comes to to great power competition you know if these kind of traditional mutually assured destruction theories were correct if it came to a conflict with China or Russia we'd say okay now it's time to sit back and accept our mutually assured destruction but that's never been US policy you know the goal is to deter war if at all possible but god forbid if the war will use whatever capabilities we have offensive and defensive to try to limit damage to ourselves and to our allies and that contributes to deterrence so that's kind of the first half of the book the second half does look at the cost and many people have argued well by the maintaining a robust nuclear posture in the United States is going to upset strategic stability with other countries it's going to lead to arms races it's going to cause proliferation it's going to be too expensive and so I go through and show that there are some costs there but they're they're often exaggerated and in some cases even non-existent so again the kind of conclusion of the book is that it does make sense for the United States especially if it wants to continue to extend deterrence to the entire free world to maintain this robust posture there are benefits and the cost are not as great as many many argue anyone else on the proliferation question well I would just take the opportunity actually on proliferation because I think this is an important issue that's been reduced to a kind of a strange zero-sum game based on you know the size of the arsenal if we're going down it's argued that's either good or bad for a proliferation or not in terms of arms control that is really unhelpful the overall direction of arms control is only one factor when we think about US leadership in non-proliferation so I think one thing that actually concerns me about the Nuclear Posture review is that it seems to perpetuate a little bit of a zero-sum game and it does pay some words to non-proliferation nuclear security but I don't think that sort of lip service at the end of the document is enough I think there's a lot of room for the United States to lead on non-proliferation to lead on nuclear security and to do so in a way that is entirely complementary and reinforcing of our deterrence objectives and I think we we need to step away from this notion that there's a trade space here I don't think that's the case in fact supporting the NPT non-proliferation nuclear security preventing the transfer of materials from any country to any other to support any of the development of a nuclear weapon that is squarely in our interest and our allies and partners expect us to do that that includes our deterrence allies and partners those that live under our umbrella those issues are very important to them and they expect us to lead in both areas and not choose one over the other Jim I would just say you know in order to meet our non-proliferation goals if you don't have a credible deterrence capability you will upset that applecart and that's why my opinion having a modernized capable but credible in the eyes of have a series as well as the assurance piece that we provide as was mentioned earlier here without that then we could expect more proliferation so I see this thrust of having a credible capability front and center in our non-proliferation effort Tom let me say first I very much agree with Rebecca about the critical importance of non-proliferation and fissile material control and the other steps that I think the Obama administration did a terrific job on at the same time acknowledge that the 2010 Nuclear Posture review was an outlier in addressing them and it was an interagency review in a sense in more than any other that's occurred before or after and it was specifically an instrument of implementing the president's Prague vision to include something he did not emphasize much at Prague which was modernization of our arsenal but so was a I think that you know need to judge this administration by its actions and I would like to see more on non-proliferation and following up on some of the initiatives on physical material globally on arms controlled to me the most important value for strategic arms control has been the verification regime the data exchange and verification regime not the numbers at the same time I think the credibility of the United States in advancing its non-proliferation objectives globally is enhanced by by showing that it's taking steps to follow article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty so to seek reductions over time I think there's room to do so I would particularly emphasize tactical nuclear weapons as Admiral Haney suggested earlier and one of the interesting points you know to come conversational sense is that when the Obama administration asked the Russians okay um we we want to talk about tactical nuclear weapons we're open to talking about them as an entity by themselves or to roll them together with strategic for conversation the answer that we got was in yet and it was what you guys don't have you Americans don't have anything going on in this arena why should renegotiate the this administration's action on the nuclear sea launch cruise missile may begin to give a little bit of negotiating room for the tactical nuclear weapons going forward right thanks before I move to audience Q&A I wanted to touch base with our virtual audience I know that the other slide is which country poses the greatest threat to the u.s. can we bring that one up and see how our remote viewers are dealing with that great while he's doing that here we go the answer is okay well now we can focus our thinking it's a great pleasure to invite Frank to join us for the Q&A wait for a microphone I'll call on you if you could please identify who you are your organization and remember there a lot of people want to ask questions so we would love a question from you but not a speech just one moment please great yes you in the third row sir hi sorry this is my name is asif I'm a research assistant at the Wilson Center I had a question about the non-nuclear strategic event and Russia so Russia is a penchant for being aggressive when it's doing a big global events such as the 1980 Olympics the euros in 2008 when it beat the Netherlands Sochi Olympics and Crimea so the World Cup in 2018 is a big event for Russia the whole world we're watching and this election year for Vladimir Putin so my question is in terms of this this big event going on what could precipitate a response from us that could possibly involve nuclear weapons and Russia doing something naughty like in Ukraine or someplace that's that's my question it's kind of implicit in in some of our conversation before about the de-escalatory nuclear strikes but one of the scenarios I worry most about and I should say that you know all these scenarios are low probability but that's kind of the job of national security strategy to identify these low probability events and take steps to make them even lower probability but one of the scenarios I were most about is what if Russia reruns its playbook from Ukraine against one of the Baltic States it's a NATO allies so the United States would be compelled I think to come to those countries defense and given Russia's escalate to de-escalate strategy for flowing forces forward and they use nuclear weapon on US forces US ships at sea or aircraft or forces on the ground then how do we respond it's a very difficult dilemma that's the point of the strategy to try to spriting us into backing down and so right now we could try to respond with strategic nuclear weapons misses strategic missiles or strategic aircraft based in the United States but I think that risks escalation to strategic nuclear exchange we could try to respond with our tactical air in Europe but they'd have a difficult time penetrating Russian air defenses and so I think what we need are exactly these capabilities called for in the NP R which is low yield capabilities that can penetrate Russian air defenses that can be brought close to the theater and so you know that's really the scenario I worry most about and that's why I think these low yield capabilities make sense not not to fight this conflict but for Putin to look down the game tree and see that we have a response and to deter him from going down this path in the first place Thanks yes in the back here hey Justin double-damn reporter with inside defense and I have a command control question that's probably best suited for the Admiral of D or the whole panel discuss it and so one of the things the administration is considering as part of the implementation of the review is putting these low wield weapons under the command and control of combatant commands rather than in Stratcom and so I was just wondering you know what what are the advantages of doing something like that what are the drawbacks and what were reviews on that on that issue one I'm not sure I know what you just described as a reality I think everything I have sent so far is the use of a nuclear weapon authority goes up to the commander-in-chief period so I won't hypothesize I would just say that you know when we work on decisions as military leaders it's jus Command commander I was a combatant commander I'm not just talking to myself we're always talking to the other combatant command nothing in the NPR would suggest any modification of the notion that the president is the release authority period full stop with what's interesting in the NPR is that it does call out improve their nuclear command and control as a key issue and it also calls out a study by the chairman as to how do we govern our nuclear command and control system but what you say is a complete fantasy it's just not it's a miss reading thank you yes please hi John little first of all congratulations the panel it's terrific discussion of the subject two questions one related to what what what was just said release Authority and so forth there was a lot of discussion and some perhaps in the 2010 review about no prompt to use I think you said move toward no properties I didn't see that here it seems to have dropped out of this Nuclear Posture review and the focus seems to be on increasing command and control just to make it safer and so forth but not necessarily to give us a no prompt to use option so I appreciate the panel's comments on on that and the other the other is about a pre-emptive attack against North Korea of course for many years our strategic plans always had a pre-emptive option in them and Fred Kemp even wrote a wonderful thing about Kennedy approved such a thing in 1961 if Khrushchev took certain actions in the Berlin crisis and so forth but once the Russians developed a sure destruction capability an assassin he never wanted it to be mutual it just came out about that way you know that preemption really didn't play a very big role but North Korea is a different situation and in fact I think it's the biggest news in my mind strategic situation that we face right now because for the foreseeable future we would in principle have a pre-emptive option if we got the intelligence soon enough and if we could respond soon enough and a bunch of other questions and so forth so the do you think nothing was said about that because it's too sensitive or do you disagree that it's something that ought to be thought about we think about our nuclear capability in addition of course deterring North Korea and defending directly and the kind of things you mentioned great question that could be an entire panel who who wants to take that one first I'll go I'll take first weigh in at both questions if I can't Jen both good questions and thank you the 2010 Nuclear Posture review did say that the administration worked to reduce the role or the extent to which we leaned on launch under attack for ICBMs there were some subtle steps taken in that regard and I think but the reality is that still part of our is still a part of our posture now I'll just say what I would like to see going forward is over time a shift to a small ICBM that has a mobile option and a continued shift away from launch under attack as long as our SSBNs are secure at sea and have a high capability there's not much incentive for a commander-in-chief to lean too hard in that direction to launch under attack for ICBMs but I think we should continue to reduce that role by how we structure the forces and ensuring resilience of good command and control and so on on preemption at the fundamental issue with respect to North Korea is that the the idea of a splendid strike that limited strike that would negate its nuclear missile programs is in my view of fantasy not that you were having that fantasy and it's it's it's not feasible so you would be looking at comprehensive sustained strikes you're looking at a major war on the Korean Peninsula and one has to ask whether that's that approach which would be my judgment as more likely than anything to provoke a North Korean nuclear use is an appropriate choice I certainly don't don't see it as such anyone else could jump in well I'll just quote my colleague dr. Jim Miller on the North Korea preemption point which is that even if we don't want to take pre-emptive action and I agree I think that wouldn't be a good course because we couldn't succeed we'd open ourselves up to costly retaliation but even if we don't want to do that there's the possibility that North Korea goes first the enemy gets about and so if North Korea uses a nuclear weapon or two I think the United States would want the ability to make sure that it can't use a third or a fourth and so I think that means it still is an important priority for the United States to be able to track and target North Korea nuclear missiles to limit damage to ourselves in the event that God forbid North Korea starts a war agree yes in the back thank you all the panelists Phenix wang with hong kong phoenix TV just want to talk a little bit about china because you know general heighten of Stratcom about two weeks ago he mentioned about china has the most active and diverse nuclear capabilities right now in the world so what's your thought about his comments about about Chinese capability right now because you because we don't know that neither the quantity nor the capability that China has right now can compete with the US and also with Russia and also your assessment about Chinese nuclear forces thank you I think general Hayden was correct right now China is putting in the field two different types of land mobile ICBMs it's got four new strategic missile submarines in the water it's got a new strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile it's got a series of air launch programs underway and a wide range of medium-range and an immediate range nuclear capabilities deployed that as you well know China has created artificial islands in the South China Sea it broke its pledge not to militarized in those islands are militarized and so I think what the Chinese government is trying to do is establish a regional hegemony in the area backed up a regional nuclear by a regional clear hegemony I think that's what general Titan was talking about and I think the Nuclear Posture you took that into account as it was being prepared anyone else Carter William I would just add the non-transparent behavior of China and particularly in the nuclear arsenal arena is probably also the context by which general Hayden was speaking from in addition to what Frank Miller mentioned I'm just adding I think again as Frank said that the qualitative changes in their their posture is large but also the way it appears to be integrated in a comprehensive way in terms of space cyber sub conventional behavior and so it's a very integrated approach so I think when you think of it as an adversary it's very difficult to kind of break it out and say oh here's the Chinese nuclear problem and here's the everything else China problem you have to look at it as a whole and as a whole it's pretty intimidating I'll be the optimist here maybe I agree with everything my colleague said but I think looking at the three nuclear adversaries that the United States faces Russia China North Korea I think the nuclear aspect of the threat in terms of kind of plausible scenarios toward near-term nuclear use are more severe with Russia and with North Korea than with China so the the China problem is real but you know fortunately China has had a more relaxed nuclear posture and strategy I think in unlike North Korea and and Russia it's not engaging in this kind of nuclear saber-rattling threats of early nuclear use so that's that's good news thank you yes totally right there good afternoon chess Jones American University I've got a question for the panel regarding the Trump NPR do you believe the administration's stance on long range standoff weapons namely cruise missiles are driven by perceptions of threat or something else entirely such as you know bureaucratic politics Organa organizational interests or mainly even near Trump's rhetoric I don't know what what their decision-making is driven by but I think their actions to go forward the long-range standoff weapon and to begin plans to initially a study then plan to go forward with nuclear sea launch cruise missile which I would propose be only on undersea vehicles in other words submarines not on surface ships I think their actions are consistent with the threat environment that we face today and what we project going forward including significantly improved air defenses for our potential adversaries that mean that you need a highly capable and more stealthy cruise missile to be able to penetrate yeah I would just agree with that I think it's critical to have some standoff capability in the force and especially as part of the air leg which is why I think the you know the L RSO capability is so important that's built into the core modernization program we haven't really discussed that but as part of the core motivation program its received some controversy but the advancing ATO ad capabilities I mean I think it's critically important to retain it and I would just add that the question made it seem like this was a trump administration policy just point out that this was something that was put in place as part of the Obama administration modernization plan that's now being continued the air side there's not they're not the naval confirmed right right so continuity and not not change yes sir here thank you Rick Steinhauser retired government central intelligence music retired so I have a question about false positives and indications and warning okay we're talking about us but a couple remember a couple months ago Hawaii was all astir because they thought they were under attack which was incorrect it took 38 minutes to correct that so do we know and probably not in an unclassified forum but how sensitive are the triggers in the opponent countries to mistake oh gee the US is really coming at us with something so hypothetically let's say North Korea thinks that's happened in Hawaii that oh we're actually gonna do something you know with one Newt just a bloody nose okay that's what Trump is set but we're really not will they wait 38 minutes to find that it's a false alarm maybe eight minutes and then launch and there goes Honolulu and Pearl Harbor up and for smoke so what would the pup may be in being on posture but what might be an American response to their first strike when it was a false positive because false positive has already occurred we know that in Hawaii I'm sorry to scare everybody but that's that's a data point as well I do worry about the prospects for inadvertent nuclear conflict the idea of it happening out of a sort of a day to day posture with respect to into these countries is highly improbable and so if in the scenario that you described if it's if it's if it's not in the context of a major conflict not just crisis but a major conflict then I think that for example Kim jong-un today would say well I can either wait and see what happened and figure out how to respond or I can take that precipitate action I can and that would guarantee the end of my regime and I think in that situation you he would be wise to hold off and to be and to be deterred by the ultimate prospect the what worries what worries me is that oh is that we know from credible reports that that at least during the Cold War that the Russians had a so-called dead hand system and I worry about any any any approaches that that would lean back in that direction and and head towards automated responses and based on warning or based on limited conflict that is very worrisome and I and I sincerely hope they don't they or any other code that direction again sure first of all 38 minutes was what was the time that elapsed between Hawaiian local authorities were able to correct the situation they themselves created this wasn't created by the United States military so that's a false number second of all for for literally decades we and and the Russians have had two different kinds of early warning systems which are referred to in the jargon is dual phenomenology space-based satellites that that detect the launch of a system as well as ground-based radars that tracked missiles once they're in the air and that dual phenomenology gives leaders on both sides a very accurate picture as to what's going on in the world so well there's always room for mistake I think I think that base is covered China is is is is building up a dual phenomenology system does not yet exist and the North Koreans have none so so I think North Korea would react to what happened or in your case what didn't happen I was just gonna say I think that there might be ways I think we've been so fixated for so long on denuclearization of North Korea that we might need to kind of take some of that energy and think about how to have a more stable deterrence relationship there and thinking of some different ways to improve crisis communication might be one of them so there might be some things you can actually do we've done that in the past there's probably ways to help stabilize and build some you know loads of communication to help us manage a crisis and prevent miscalculation but if we don't even open that door I don't know how we're going to have that improved communication so the scenario you lay out is kind of a version of the old use them or lose them problem you know the idea that an adversary may fear that it's going to be subjected to a devastating u.s. nuclear first-strike and so rather than to write that out it decides to act first and I have a chapter on strategic stability in the book where I talk about the use of or losing problem and I'm not convinced that that's as big a problem as many people think I think in part for the logic that dr. Miller laid out I mean essentially the argument is an adversary so worried about a US nuclear or about a war with the United States that they intentionally start a war with the United States and you know in most cases it seems like the better response is to wait and maybe avoid the conflict altogether especially if you're Kim jong-un and your regime is potentially at risk yes no yes in front thank you yes ma'am sorry thank you what do you knock sir thank you my name is not Edith Fernandez Georgetown University and you already talked about the possibilities of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure but there is a question that is not clear for me is if the cyber attack goes against the systems that activates nuclear weapons so I don't know if according to an ampere there if there is a possibility for a tailor or response nuclear response go first unless I happen to co-chair a defense Science Board report on cyber deterrence that came out since we since we're showing for our publications read the New York Times that came out one of the recommendations was to devote substantial attention to ensuring the cyber integrity of our nuclear command control system and there is work that should be done given the advancement of potential cyber threats and the department has begun to take the Department of Defense has begun to take some of those steps and to pay much closer attention I see it as first and foremost an area of of self-help and it's in and it's important to pay attention not just to nuclear command and control but to other systems as well because in the event of an attack on the United States whether a cyber attack or otherwise particularly not a nuclear attack one wouldn't want to go in to see the president say I have good news our nuclear forces can be used I have bad news our non-nuclear forces cannot be used and so protecting a subset of particular our long-range strike capabilities such as the new b21 and the bombs that will go with it such as our SS ends our attack submarines and the non-nuclear tea lamp are are very important as well the department has begun to work harder on those and it'll be a long-term campaign and it's one that it's one that it's important for not just our deterrence but our but the strategic stability of the balance a quick point attacking nuclear command and control is an extremely dangerous proposition we often talk about decapitating strikes that's very dangerous it's it's worse than then a pre-emptive attack on the forces it's the same as that actually so I think that's my first point my second point would be in addition to reading the New York Times and maths book Jim and two co-authors have an article out on managing the strategic competition with Russia which is also very much worth reading great yes the gentleman I didn't call on her who thought I did my name is Arthur Katz I guess my connection is an old tome that I wrote about life they have the nuclear war but the issue I want to discuss is Lee or asked you to discuss is the the possibility that when you use these lower-level nuclear weapons you're going to ground burst them and when you ground burst them you're gonna push this radioactive fallout and the radioactive imagery of radioactive fallout of Europe and the United States is likely to at least create a political question about how you control the public response rather than the strategic governmental response to that kind of environmental situation ok look again the first principle is all of this is to prevent Russia from going first or any other country okay it is not to use nuclear weapons it is to use them to deter not to employ them in combat second of all you can assert that they're all going to be ground burst they may be ground burst they may be reversed I mean no we're not going to talk about that but but all of this jumps of this this conversation jumps to the second stage which is what happens when the u.s. uses a low-yield nuclear weapon that sort of skips the most important point which is the existence of those weapons will be designed to prevent the Russians from miscalculating and from using nuclear weapons first in the theater I see I've just add just add one point to Frank Miller's comments and that is that in the awfully event that the United States president felt that it was necessary to use a nuclear weapon and reply to a nuclear attack by another by another state by a Russia or North Korea I would prefer based on the law of armed conflict based on basic basic human decency and as well as on credibility that the president have a low-yield option available that that minimizes that collateral damage not not to not to trivialize it any sense not to not to lower the threshold or make it easier but if if a reply is going to be taken it ought to be as as close as we can make it to meeting our obligations to to minimizing civilian collateral damage on the public response I don't know if the Russians are thinking about that consequence of their strategy maybe they should be thinking about it more because I think you're right that that's potentially a downside cost I can say the United States takes into account public opinion quite a bit in European public opinion and I'm told that during the NPR there was a lot of consultation with our European allies and I suspect that part of the reason these new low yield capabilities are going to be on US ships was in part to minimize the potential reaction in Europe because other options could have placed low yield capabilities on the ground in Europe which obviously would have would have led to more I think controversy in Europe since these are us capabilities on us platforms I think that that minimizes that controversy yes sir I almost hesitate to ask a question toward the enuine everybody's mind so more or less jaded at this point anyway I was reflecting on the on the question of the the classic defense planning question how much is enough and there have been comments on the panel that bear on that during the during this discussion but I was wondering how that might relate to any thoughts any reflections you might have on stability and it's linked to deterrence and I guess also bringing into the picture of the the START treaty and what happens in several years and does the treaty give up any benchmarks for planning and in other words in the nuclear realm how much is enough or if that treaty is allowed to just end what are the benchmarks for how much is enough in the nuclear realm and then therefore how important is it it is a treaty like that how important is that to keep fort for stability reasons or for planning reasons if nothing else and you know the United States has for decades done so-called counter force nuclear targeting for legal and moral reasons but also for strategic reasons you know so these kind of simple academic theories assume we just aim at cities and try to slaughter a lot of people that may be China's approach that's not the u.s. approach in target only legitimate military capabilities essentially try to target the adversaries nuclear forces so in the conclusion of the book I kind of you know count up order just open source what are the plausible nuclear related targets in Russia China North Korea and also there's kind of a rule of thumb outside analysts use that u.s. planners might want to use two warheads for every target because what if the missile misses what if the warhead doesn't detonate what if it detonates but doesn't destroy so just my open source what are the targets x two gets gets me to about two thousand or so which is pretty close to what the US deployed arsenal is now now so i think that's that would be my answer to how much is enough what are the counter force targets you need to hit what kind of redundancy do you need to make sure that you can kill those targets and that roughly gets you at your number I'll be even more specific based on the guidance provided by the George W Bush administration and by the guidance provided by the Obama administration New START levels provide more than enough capability for United States to meet its its objectives from a military perspective well just to go further I think again you're asking it's a question of relative not absolute numbers right so I think the fact that both the United States and Russia have met the central limits of the treaty and that that does create certain bounds in which we can kind of manage that how much is enough question for me that argues in favor of trying to sustain a new start and try to work on behalf of its extension even while recognizing we're in a difficult environment and there are other serious treaty issues that we have to deal with such as INF but I think that it does impose some relative balance could I ask Tom is there anybody on the panel who thinks that a five-year extension of the New START treaty is called for or as alibis provisions is not in the US interest I think would be in the US interest I I worry about what the Russians are gonna do is this is essentially the only big legacy arms control treaty that they still seem to be abiding by and so what they continue to do that in the future or not so I do think we need to think about ourselves what happens if Russia pulls out and how do we respond I think that how much is enough question the way you asked it in the way we answered it was all associated with strategic nuclear weapons and you know as commander your Strategic Command I testified on to Congress that I was fine with the New START treaty numbers as a commander I think you know as we look going forward here not proponent of growing Arsenal's of non strategic nuclear weapons but it's very important as we look at what's after New START is can we somehow put a lid it's verifiable and has all those kinds of attributes with non strategic nuclear weapons whether or not you think the doomsday clock is ticking down are certainly is on this discussion today before I move to the last question I wanted to thank all the panelists most sincerely for your time sharing your wisdom sincere thanks to the Atlantic Council for hosting this event and to all of you for attending and who has a doozy for the last question yes the farthest arm all the way in the back corner please hello my name is Elise Theatre Aspen an independent consultant this is about the w76 mod 2 now we have a designation for the low-yield us will be in Moorhead I am trying to aggregate what the added value is to extended deterrence because if since it's a mod it's a little more advanced than an alt it's not a new warhead we're not really talking about significant added capabilities what if you could just sum up because obviously we're at the end here in a sentence or two no serious new capabilities no serious new missions what really is the concrete added value that will yield us will be a Moorhead gives us thank you sure ok fine so let's start the beginning in the face of our existing capabilities our triad and our weapons in Europe over the past 10 to 15 years the Russian military has evolved a doctrine that features the use of nuclear weapons to defeat NATO forces in a regional conflict like an invasion of the Baltics it has kept older weapons in that category that it pledged to get rid of and has deployed new weapons and it has exercised that doctrine with those weapons in the field that means that the Russian military leadership believes perceives for whatever reasons that there is something in our capacity and our current deterrent capability that does not present an adequate counter to the strategy and weapons they've got the NP are looking at all of this decided that a low-yield response which would not be a battlefield weapon which could escalate the conflict to the Russian homeland and which could not be stopped by Russian air defenses provided that adequate capability albeit in very small numbers that's the rationale you may not accept that rationale but that is the rationale on which the NPR recommendations were based Frank you had the opening word you have to find final word thank you all for joining us this afternoon and again thanks to the Atlantic Council [Applause]

Channel: AtlanticCouncil

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Keywords: atlantic council

Id: PWEzbjmcF8o

Length: 87min 7sec (5227 seconds)

Published: Mon Feb 26 2018