“The main principal point in war is
to secure plenty of provisions and to destroy the enemy by famine” - Vegetius
This quote from Vegetius refers to the importance that the Romans placed on military
logistics, in that it was literally the driving force of victory. For it is the best possible
outcome if a hostile enemy can be neutralised simply by disrupting their supplies without
losing man power in a full-on engagement. The term logistics is defined as the strategy
of transport, delivery, storage and the overall organisation of the military supply system.
And the Romans perfected it so well, that it became one of the key reasons they
were able to secure one of the greatest Empires the world has ever known. By the end
of this video, you will know exactly how… All military campaigns start as an order from
above; that is - from the senate or the emperor of Rome. As the highest ruling authority, they first
carefully consider and debate all motives and available resources before launching a campaign.
Whatever the reason for war, several preparations are made months before the armies are even
mobilised. This involves careful calculations of the supplies needed for an army throughout a full
campaign and how they would reach them... Let’s assume that a moderate army of 4 legions has to
travel from the lower danube to the upper rhine. Marching at an impressive 150km (93 miles) a
week, it would still take 2.5 months to cover the 1600 km (1000 mile) distance. Throughout this
period, the army would need all sorts of supplies, which we will go over in a bit. Each
legion consisted of about 5000 legionaries, and would require a total of 600 draft
animals to carry its 65 artillery pieces, together with all their food, supplies, and tools.
So, an army of 4 legions would have about 20,000 legionaries, and be accompanied by about the
same amount in auxiliaries and mercenaries, and about double that amount of non-combatants.
This would amount to 80,000 people, 10,000 draft animals and 260 artillery pieces; quite literally
the population of an entire ancient city. Keep in mind, this is nowhere near the size of Trajan’s 12
legion army that he assembled for the Dacian wars… Our estimate of camp followers is fairly accurate
for the time, because many seeked to make a profit from war through looting and trading. Their
numbers would vary depending on how rich the enemies of Rome were thought to be, and Livy
describes an interesting campaign of Liguria, where there were almost no camp followers because
the region was poor and offered little plunder… As you can tell, even a moderate 4 legion
army would heavily diminish the supplies of any province it crossed. So the senate,
after carefully considering all the numbers, would issue edicts to many provinces and
nearby allies to acquire the supplies, so as to distribute the heavy load among everyone,
and to make sure they had plenty of time to do it. To ensure that each was up for the task, these
edicts would take into account the specific demography and tax revenues of each province, as
well as their natural productions. For example, Provinces like Hispania, Sicily, and Sardinia
were known to supply Republican armies with woollen tunics and togas, which was vital for the
army to stay warm. While the Anatolian plains were known for their excessive grain production, and
were likely ordered to produce it for campaigns. Depending on the season, different supplies
were ordered to the provinces, but the most essential ones were wheat, vinegar, wine and salt.
These were the goods the armies would always try to carry in large amounts. Wheat was used to make
bread, which would make up ⅔ of a soldier's diet, and account for 60-90% of their energy
requirement, as each soldier needed at least 3000 calories a day. Wine was the staple drink of every
soldier, but not in the form we take it today. It was largely mixed with water, and even
seawater for flavour, and also had the effect of disinfecting the drinking water. Lastly, salt
and vinegar were used as preservatives for food, ensuring that it doesn't go bad too quickly… For
a more interesting diet, individual soldiers would purchase various food from either camp followers
or local merchants… An army would also need fodder for its horses and pack animals. This was
available in 3 forms: Hard fodder, like barley or oats (2.5 kg a day for ancient horses, supported
by egyptian papyrus), dry fodder, being hay or straw (7 kg a day, could be replaced by pasture),
and pasture - grass and crops growing in fields. The latter was often provided by the land, but
the other 2 had to be collected just in case. If any provinces did not comply with the edicts,
proper officers were appointed to compel them to do it, sometimes by force… If a province is unable
to produce the supplies, they must either trade or buy them in full quantity and quality. Independent
contractors and corporations were also included in the logistics. These middlemen would bid
to supply the armies of Rome with clothing, weapons and transportation… all for a profit.
During the early campaigns into Germania, Augustus met with the council of chieftains
from Gaul several times to discuss the logistics and make proper arrangements for the incoming
campaigns. Such arrangements were very welcomed, as they allowed the state to share the
burden of a campaign with local authorities. These were in turn spared from forceful
requisitions and harsh policies… In no case should a campaign be
delayed by a single province, and the punishments for such delays in the
logistical network were severe. But it also presented a good opportunity for Provinces and
allies to prove their worth to the ruling party, which would often see them rewarded for
their enthusiastic loyalty and support. We have an account of 2 allies even competing in
acquiring the needed supplies before a campaign, all to be in a good standing with the ruling
authority: In the 2nd century BC, both Carthage and Numidia constantly competed by sending large
shipments of grain, elephants and troops to the distant wars of the Republic. In this case,
both Numidians and Carthaginians hoped to win over Rome to rule in their favour, as they were
both embroiled in several territorial disputes in which Rome had to act as an arbitrator...
Once the supplies were collected and ready, it was essential for them to be stored
within the walls of large cities within each province, especially if they were border
provinces. This was done for 3 reasons: Firstly, it was for provincial administrators
to more easily present the supplies to passing legions in whole. Secondly, if the enemy were
to launch preemptive raids on border provinces, they would find that all the cattle, grain, and
other provisions of the countryside were gone, and both their damage dealt and loot collected
would not be as significant. The 3rd reason is if the enemy decides to siege any cities,
they would find them very well provisioned, and will not be able to capture them
before the main Roman army arrives… If any province needed transportation for their
supplies, the proper means were considered. In the ancient world, ships were the
fastest and cheapest form of transportation, with each Mediterranean ship having the capacity
of transporting 150 tons at a speed of 2-5 knots, depending on the wind. So considering a
single legion and its servants needed 5600 kg of grain per day, a single cargo could have
provided for several weeks. It is unknown how such shipments were organised, but it was likely
done through private ship owners and merchants, who were contracted by the Roman state to
deliver supplies to certain garrisons and depots. Payments and tax breaks were probable rewards for
such journeys. The state also made sure to keep a careful inventory of the ships at hand, and even
recorded the exact state of each ship they had and if any were in need of repairs... Ships
however, were limited by the season. So it was common to campaign during favourable winds
and have the army follow a main river. This way, supplies could easily catch up to the fast moving
army and resupply them. Trajan’s column shows such a strategy being used, with depictions of ships
carrying barrels, tents, troops and even horses… But armies on march would usually be
separated for strategic advantages, so land supply also had to be maintained as
an alternative. This is where the Roman road network came in, which was specifically created
for the purpose of moving troops and supplies as quickly as possible. If not for proper roads, a
marching army would only leave behind an uneven trail of mud and rocks that would slow
down the movement of carts and baggage. So the roads provided the Romans with
speed; Supplies were collected faster, distributed faster, and the army arrived faster,
which was an advantage over many of its enemies… But no supply line can work efficiently
without proper communication channels. For this, the Romans had the "cursus publicus", a
state mandated courier and transportation network made up of stopping stations. These would
provide official messengers and contractors with fresh equipment and horses to ensure
they can carry on without having to stop. This allowed the constant flow
of information between the army, the rear and the home front by having a reserve
of fresh mounts and riders every set distance. A campaigning army was always in need of supplies
and it was the responsibility of the higher civilian echelons to address the needs of the
army as efficiently as possible. This was done by a constant correspondence between the army
general’s staff and the civilian authorities. Many of these letters contained dispatches about
the state of the campaign, the recent activities of the army, the future plans, the supply needs
for short and long term and any further orders. Now let’s take a look within the army itself.
Regardless of the stage of the campaign, the Roman armies always had to be either on the move, or
very soon to be on the move and there were several good reasons for this. The simplest one was
that it always kept the men busy with something; they were always packing, scouting or digging, and
it did not give them time to be idle. Because when an army WAS idle, it was very prone to becoming
soft from indiscipline, getting caught off guard by the enemy, or having growing thoughts of mutiny
and desertion… The second reason to keep an army on the move is because most locations could not
sustain it for long. This brings us to two more vital supplies for an army: Wood, for keeping
warm, cooking, and building forts, and water, for drinking and washing. These were daily needs
of such magnitude that it was rarely even possible to move them to an army. So all marching camps
had to be made in close proximity to water and forests… But the sheer amount of people and
animals in 1 place will quickly reduce an area of these resources. Josephus gives us a
good idea of what a Roman army was capable of, and writes that during the siege of Jerusalem,
trees within an 18 km radius were cut down by the legions to build platforms, towers, and siege
engines... The Romans would then feed their pack animals with the natural pasture around them, and
would try to reserve their supplies of dry fodder for emergencies. It wouldn’t take long for the
army's animals to strip the land of any grass, and thus further necessitate the constant movement
of the army. As for the water source, our 80,000 people and 10,000 pack animals would need to
drink about 320,000 (85,000gallons) litres a day, and that's not even considering
their need for cooking and washing. Most water sources would not last near
a Roman army for a couple of days. Vegetius mentions that even the air around an
army would become noticeably contaminated.. Now that we established that armies
always liked to be in motion, we could guess that the next immediate step
would be to strengthen the supply lines from the source to the constantly moving army. These
would have to be guarded by cities and forts, which always needed to be further strengthened
with strong garrisons to hold these key positions, because if they were to fall, so would the line of
supplies, and then the whole army. For this role, a good general of a Roman army would leave
soldiers who are least fit for service to garrison them, and would provide them with all
needed equipment and artillery for their defence. This could include soldiers who are either
wounded, less experienced, or most rebellious and troublesome. This last class of soldiers is
particularly important to leave behind on watch duty, so that they can’t corrupt the minds of the
army with thoughts of mutiny or insubordination. A smart general would even make their new
position of watch duty sound like a promotion, which would make them feel more valued and
important. No matter how frustrated a soldier is, it is hard to stay that way when his superior
officers tell him that they would trust no one more with the highly important task of guarding
the rear and managing the flow of supplies to the army. This new feeling of purpose tends
to neutralise them as a threat of mutiny… Once an army was within enemy territory, it
could, to a degree, defer the problem of sourcing supplies onto the enemy. But unlike for fodder,
water, and firewood, foraging for food was not done as often in large campaigns. On Trajan’s
column, legionaries are shown collecting grain in open fields, but it was likely the exception
rather than the norm. Grain that was supplied was already harvested and processed, and saved
a lot of time to prepare. Also, if the point of the campaign was to acquire more territory
after punishing the enemy, then preserving their agriculture would create a smoother transition
under Roman rule. Most importantly, Rome wouldn’t need to supply them with money and food to prevent
starvation or revolts until their next harvest… To do this, the Romans instilled heavy discipline
and organisation to make sure everyone acted to the state’s benefit. Roman armies also tried to
be as self-reliant as possible to account for logistical disruptions or unexpected campaigns.
Archaeology has reported dozens of clerical and specialised positions in the legions. They had
doctors, vets, hunters, shepherds, boatmen, mule drivers and many more… Every legionary was
a small cog in the grand logistical machine of the Roman army, and they made sure to provide the
most for the army's needs. As such, a Roman army could service and take care of their own clothes,
armour, animals, equipment, weapons, and artillery pieces. A Roman helmet found in Valkenburg, was
passed down to five different soldiers through the years. The same was true with armour and other
equipment, which were often recycled or repaired to be issued by new recruits. A Roman army could
also create its own projectiles, siege engines, and pretty much any form of construction… Even the
army’s non-combatants and animals were broken down into many subunits, each given their own standard
to stay close to, so they don't get disordered or scare the soldiers with their panic during a
sudden engagement. They would march with the main baggage between the best infantry behind them
and the cavalry in front. This would not be the case for the camp followers and sutlers following
the legions, as it would have been near impossible to coordinate such an overwhelming number of
civilians during march. Within the army, even the distribution
of food had a system of its own. Some positions and ranks in the legion received
different proportions and quality of rations, depending on their level of prestige or
punishment. For example, Roman citizen legionaries were known to receive more rations than the
non-citizen auxiliaries, while legionaries who were punished were known to have received
not only less rations, but also cheaper food, like barley instead of wheat. However, such food
distributions had to be done very carefully to not raise tension between the men, and in difficult
times, like during sieges or dwindling supplies, this system was abandoned, and every man received
the same rations regardless of rank or punishment. This whole system, starting
from the provincial edicts all the way to the distribution of food among
soldiers, was very advanced for its time and was a big reason why Roman
armies rarely lost external battles and if they did, they were quickly able
to raise new armies and strike back... That's all for this breakdown of Roman logistics.
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