The Genius Supply System of Rome’s Army | Logistics

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“The main principal point in war is  to secure plenty of provisions and to   destroy the enemy by famine” - Vegetius This quote from Vegetius refers to the   importance that the Romans placed on military  logistics, in that it was literally the driving   force of victory. For it is the best possible  outcome if a hostile enemy can be neutralised   simply by disrupting their supplies without  losing man power in a full-on engagement.  The term logistics is defined as the strategy  of transport, delivery, storage and the overall   organisation of the military supply system.  And the Romans perfected it so well,   that it became one of the key reasons they  were able to secure one of the greatest   Empires the world has ever known. By the end  of this video, you will know exactly how…  All military campaigns start as an order from  above; that is - from the senate or the emperor of   Rome. As the highest ruling authority, they first  carefully consider and debate all motives and   available resources before launching a campaign.  Whatever the reason for war, several preparations   are made months before the armies are even  mobilised. This involves careful calculations of   the supplies needed for an army throughout a full  campaign and how they would reach them... Let’s   assume that a moderate army of 4 legions has to  travel from the lower danube to the upper rhine.   Marching at an impressive 150km (93 miles) a  week, it would still take 2.5 months to cover   the 1600 km (1000 mile) distance. Throughout this  period, the army would need all sorts of supplies,   which we will go over in a bit. Each  legion consisted of about 5000 legionaries,   and would require a total of 600 draft  animals to carry its 65 artillery pieces,   together with all their food, supplies, and tools.  So, an army of 4 legions would have about 20,000   legionaries, and be accompanied by about the  same amount in auxiliaries and mercenaries,   and about double that amount of non-combatants.  This would amount to 80,000 people, 10,000 draft   animals and 260 artillery pieces; quite literally  the population of an entire ancient city. Keep in   mind, this is nowhere near the size of Trajan’s 12  legion army that he assembled for the Dacian wars…   Our estimate of camp followers is fairly accurate  for the time, because many seeked to make a profit   from war through looting and trading. Their  numbers would vary depending on how rich the   enemies of Rome were thought to be, and Livy  describes an interesting campaign of Liguria,   where there were almost no camp followers because  the region was poor and offered little plunder…  As you can tell, even a moderate 4 legion  army would heavily diminish the supplies   of any province it crossed. So the senate,  after carefully considering all the numbers,   would issue edicts to many provinces and  nearby allies to acquire the supplies,   so as to distribute the heavy load among everyone,  and to make sure they had plenty of time to do it.   To ensure that each was up for the task, these  edicts would take into account the specific   demography and tax revenues of each province, as  well as their natural productions. For example,   Provinces like Hispania, Sicily, and Sardinia  were known to supply Republican armies with   woollen tunics and togas, which was vital for the  army to stay warm. While the Anatolian plains were   known for their excessive grain production, and  were likely ordered to produce it for campaigns. Depending on the season, different supplies  were ordered to the provinces, but the most   essential ones were wheat, vinegar, wine and salt.  These were the goods the armies would always try   to carry in large amounts. Wheat was used to make  bread, which would make up ⅔ of a soldier's diet,   and account for 60-90% of their energy  requirement, as each soldier needed at least 3000   calories a day. Wine was the staple drink of every  soldier, but not in the form we take it today.   It was largely mixed with water, and even  seawater for flavour, and also had the effect   of disinfecting the drinking water. Lastly, salt  and vinegar were used as preservatives for food,   ensuring that it doesn't go bad too quickly… For  a more interesting diet, individual soldiers would   purchase various food from either camp followers  or local merchants… An army would also need   fodder for its horses and pack animals. This was  available in 3 forms: Hard fodder, like barley or   oats (2.5 kg a day for ancient horses, supported  by egyptian papyrus), dry fodder, being hay or   straw (7 kg a day, could be replaced by pasture),  and pasture - grass and crops growing in fields.   The latter was often provided by the land, but  the other 2 had to be collected just in case. If any provinces did not comply with the edicts,  proper officers were appointed to compel them to   do it, sometimes by force… If a province is unable  to produce the supplies, they must either trade or   buy them in full quantity and quality. Independent  contractors and corporations were also included   in the logistics. These middlemen would bid  to supply the armies of Rome with clothing,   weapons and transportation… all for a profit.  During the early campaigns into Germania,   Augustus met with the council of chieftains  from Gaul several times to discuss the logistics   and make proper arrangements for the incoming  campaigns. Such arrangements were very welcomed,   as they allowed the state to share the  burden of a campaign with local authorities.   These were in turn spared from forceful  requisitions and harsh policies… In no case should a campaign be  delayed by a single province,   and the punishments for such delays in the  logistical network were severe. But it also   presented a good opportunity for Provinces and  allies to prove their worth to the ruling party,   which would often see them rewarded for  their enthusiastic loyalty and support.   We have an account of 2 allies even competing in  acquiring the needed supplies before a campaign,   all to be in a good standing with the ruling  authority: In the 2nd century BC, both Carthage   and Numidia constantly competed by sending large  shipments of grain, elephants and troops to the   distant wars of the Republic. In this case,  both Numidians and Carthaginians hoped to win   over Rome to rule in their favour, as they were  both embroiled in several territorial disputes   in which Rome had to act as an arbitrator... Once the supplies were collected and ready,   it was essential for them to be stored  within the walls of large cities within   each province, especially if they were border  provinces. This was done for 3 reasons:  Firstly, it was for provincial administrators  to more easily present the supplies to passing   legions in whole. Secondly, if the enemy were  to launch preemptive raids on border provinces,   they would find that all the cattle, grain, and  other provisions of the countryside were gone,   and both their damage dealt and loot collected  would not be as significant. The 3rd reason is   if the enemy decides to siege any cities,  they would find them very well provisioned,   and will not be able to capture them  before the main Roman army arrives… If any province needed transportation for their  supplies, the proper means were considered.  In the ancient world, ships were the  fastest and cheapest form of transportation,   with each Mediterranean ship having the capacity  of transporting 150 tons at a speed of 2-5 knots,   depending on the wind. So considering a  single legion and its servants needed 5600   kg of grain per day, a single cargo could have  provided for several weeks. It is unknown how   such shipments were organised, but it was likely  done through private ship owners and merchants,   who were contracted by the Roman state to  deliver supplies to certain garrisons and depots.   Payments and tax breaks were probable rewards for  such journeys. The state also made sure to keep a   careful inventory of the ships at hand, and even  recorded the exact state of each ship they had and   if any were in need of repairs... Ships  however, were limited by the season. So   it was common to campaign during favourable winds  and have the army follow a main river. This way,   supplies could easily catch up to the fast moving  army and resupply them. Trajan’s column shows such   a strategy being used, with depictions of ships  carrying barrels, tents, troops and even horses… But armies on march would usually be  separated for strategic advantages,   so land supply also had to be maintained as  an alternative. This is where the Roman road   network came in, which was specifically created  for the purpose of moving troops and supplies as   quickly as possible. If not for proper roads, a  marching army would only leave behind an uneven   trail of mud and rocks that would slow  down the movement of carts and baggage.   So the roads provided the Romans with  speed; Supplies were collected faster,   distributed faster, and the army arrived faster,  which was an advantage over many of its enemies… But no supply line can work efficiently  without proper communication channels.   For this, the Romans had the "cursus publicus", a  state mandated courier and transportation network   made up of stopping stations. These would  provide official messengers and contractors   with fresh equipment and horses to ensure  they can carry on without having to stop.   This allowed the constant flow  of information between the army,   the rear and the home front by having a reserve  of fresh mounts and riders every set distance.   A campaigning army was always in need of supplies  and it was the responsibility of the higher   civilian echelons to address the needs of the  army as efficiently as possible. This was done   by a constant correspondence between the army  general’s staff and the civilian authorities.   Many of these letters contained dispatches about  the state of the campaign, the recent activities   of the army, the future plans, the supply needs  for short and long term and any further orders. Now let’s take a look within the army itself.  Regardless of the stage of the campaign, the Roman   armies always had to be either on the move, or  very soon to be on the move and there were several   good reasons for this. The simplest one was  that it always kept the men busy with something;   they were always packing, scouting or digging, and  it did not give them time to be idle. Because when   an army WAS idle, it was very prone to becoming  soft from indiscipline, getting caught off guard   by the enemy, or having growing thoughts of mutiny  and desertion… The second reason to keep an army   on the move is because most locations could not  sustain it for long. This brings us to two more   vital supplies for an army: Wood, for keeping  warm, cooking, and building forts, and water,   for drinking and washing. These were daily needs  of such magnitude that it was rarely even possible   to move them to an army. So all marching camps  had to be made in close proximity to water and   forests… But the sheer amount of people and  animals in 1 place will quickly reduce an   area of these resources. Josephus gives us a  good idea of what a Roman army was capable of,   and writes that during the siege of Jerusalem,  trees within an 18 km radius were cut down by   the legions to build platforms, towers, and siege  engines... The Romans would then feed their pack   animals with the natural pasture around them, and  would try to reserve their supplies of dry fodder   for emergencies. It wouldn’t take long for the  army's animals to strip the land of any grass,   and thus further necessitate the constant movement  of the army. As for the water source, our 80,000   people and 10,000 pack animals would need to  drink about 320,000 (85,000gallons) litres a day,   and that's not even considering  their need for cooking and washing.   Most water sources would not last near  a Roman army for a couple of days.   Vegetius mentions that even the air around an  army would become noticeably contaminated.. Now that we established that armies  always liked to be in motion,   we could guess that the next immediate step  would be to strengthen the supply lines from   the source to the constantly moving army. These  would have to be guarded by cities and forts,   which always needed to be further strengthened  with strong garrisons to hold these key positions,   because if they were to fall, so would the line of  supplies, and then the whole army. For this role,   a good general of a Roman army would leave  soldiers who are least fit for service to   garrison them, and would provide them with all  needed equipment and artillery for their defence.   This could include soldiers who are either  wounded, less experienced, or most rebellious   and troublesome. This last class of soldiers is  particularly important to leave behind on watch   duty, so that they can’t corrupt the minds of the  army with thoughts of mutiny or insubordination.   A smart general would even make their new  position of watch duty sound like a promotion,   which would make them feel more valued and  important. No matter how frustrated a soldier is,   it is hard to stay that way when his superior  officers tell him that they would trust no one   more with the highly important task of guarding  the rear and managing the flow of supplies to   the army. This new feeling of purpose tends  to neutralise them as a threat of mutiny… Once an army was within enemy territory, it  could, to a degree, defer the problem of sourcing   supplies onto the enemy. But unlike for fodder,  water, and firewood, foraging for food was not   done as often in large campaigns. On Trajan’s  column, legionaries are shown collecting grain   in open fields, but it was likely the exception  rather than the norm. Grain that was supplied   was already harvested and processed, and saved  a lot of time to prepare. Also, if the point   of the campaign was to acquire more territory  after punishing the enemy, then preserving their   agriculture would create a smoother transition  under Roman rule. Most importantly, Rome wouldn’t   need to supply them with money and food to prevent  starvation or revolts until their next harvest… To do this, the Romans instilled heavy discipline  and organisation to make sure everyone acted to   the state’s benefit. Roman armies also tried to  be as self-reliant as possible to account for   logistical disruptions or unexpected campaigns.  Archaeology has reported dozens of clerical and   specialised positions in the legions. They had  doctors, vets, hunters, shepherds, boatmen,   mule drivers and many more… Every legionary was  a small cog in the grand logistical machine of   the Roman army, and they made sure to provide the  most for the army's needs. As such, a Roman army   could service and take care of their own clothes,  armour, animals, equipment, weapons, and artillery   pieces. A Roman helmet found in Valkenburg, was  passed down to five different soldiers through   the years. The same was true with armour and other  equipment, which were often recycled or repaired   to be issued by new recruits. A Roman army could  also create its own projectiles, siege engines,   and pretty much any form of construction… Even the  army’s non-combatants and animals were broken down   into many subunits, each given their own standard  to stay close to, so they don't get disordered or   scare the soldiers with their panic during a  sudden engagement. They would march with the   main baggage between the best infantry behind them  and the cavalry in front. This would not be the   case for the camp followers and sutlers following  the legions, as it would have been near impossible   to coordinate such an overwhelming number of  civilians during march. Within the army, even the distribution  of food had a system of its own.   Some positions and ranks in the legion received  different proportions and quality of rations,   depending on their level of prestige or  punishment. For example, Roman citizen legionaries   were known to receive more rations than the  non-citizen auxiliaries, while legionaries   who were punished were known to have received  not only less rations, but also cheaper food,   like barley instead of wheat. However, such food  distributions had to be done very carefully to not   raise tension between the men, and in difficult  times, like during sieges or dwindling supplies,   this system was abandoned, and every man received  the same rations regardless of rank or punishment.  This whole system, starting  from the provincial edicts all   the way to the distribution of food among  soldiers, was very advanced for its time   and was a big reason why Roman  armies rarely lost external battles   and if they did, they were quickly able  to raise new armies and strike back... That's all for this breakdown of Roman logistics.  Feel free to watch other related videos we made! I   would like to give a shout out to our Patreon  supporters who helped us make this video.   Consider joining them if you wish to forever  engrave your name in our future videos!
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Channel: Victrix Historia
Views: 631,159
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Keywords: Logistics, Supply network, administration, emperor, Roman history, Documentary, Training and recruitment, Roman legionary, Roman legions, History, Europe, Medieval history, peasants, infantry, Senate, Emperor, Caesar, julius Caesar, Augustus, Cleopatra, Cavalry, Food and water, nutrition, Fodder
Id: 6i29Vx14vBI
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Length: 15min 23sec (923 seconds)
Published: Fri Aug 19 2022
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