The General Dynamics F111 was not just
any other aircraft of the Cold War. It was born as part of the Tactical Fighter
Experimental program ordered by Robert McNamara himself to create a plane that could fit roles
requested by both the Navy and the Air Force. The F111 had a troublesome beginning
in the 60s. And at the heart of it was an old grudge between the military branches. Like many of its colleagues of the epoch,
the F111 had unique innovations and cons that left the two branches divided. Although
the Navy despised it, the USAF loved it. Conceived as a fighter, bomber, and interceptor, the F111 pioneered the concept
of using variable-sweep wings, terrain-following radar, and afterburning
turbofan engines that were unique for its time. It successfully served during the
critical years of the Vietnam War, Operation El Dorado Canyon in the 80s, and
Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War. Called the Aardvark, or
earth pig, for its long nose, the last F111s were retired from the USAF
in 1996 and in 2010 by the Australia Air Force after a 40-year long career that
spanned various combat configurations. McNamara's Plane In May 1960, An American CIA U2 spy
plane conducting a reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union to
gather intel on the latest Russian activity was shot down at over 60.000
feet by an S75 surface-to-air missile. The U.S. was surprised by how the Soviet air
defenses took down the aircraft at such a distance. The new missiles could easily
reach American high-altitude bombers. The USAF decided it was time for
a small, long-range supersonic fighter to fly close to the ground to
avoid being detected by enemy radars. The Strategic Air Command agreed that a new
low-level penetration fighter was required. Simultaneously, the Navy was also on the hunt
for a long-range carrier-based interceptor armed with heavy air-to-air missiles to eliminate anti-ship missiles launched from
Soviet fighters and bombers. While both branches were on the
lookout for their new designs, President Kennedy's Defense
Secretary, Robert McNamara, envisioned that one aircraft could fulfill both
the U.S. Air Force and the Navy requirements. That way, millions of dollars could be saved
by focusing only on one multipurpose airplane. Both branches disliked the idea,
but they were forced to cooperate. The result was the Tactical Fighter
Experimental or TFX program. McNamara chose General Dynamics for developing the aircraft
and appointed the USAF as the program manager. However, to make things even, the Secretary
himself based the design on common ground. Both branches agreed that the aircraft would
need to carry heavy armament and fuel loads, feature high supersonic speed, twin engines,
two seats, and variable-geometry wings. Nevertheless, differences quickly
distanced the Navy from the project. While they wanted a high-altitude interceptor with
side-by-side seating for both men to share the radar display, the USAF preferred a tandem-seat
configuration for low-level penetration ops. To make matters worse, McNamara's Plane,
as the Navy began to call it, was to be primarily based on the USAF's configuration,
with a modified version for the Navy's needs. The sailors felt humiliated and would never
pardon receiving a second-place preference. The F111 The prototype was dubbed F111 with variants
A and B for each branch. It was powered by Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-1 turbofan engines
with innovative afterburner technology. At the Navy's request, it had a side-by-side
configuration seating in an escape capsule. In case of an emergency, the
pod worked like a space capsule. A rocket would boost the pod away from the
aircraft and float to the ground on a parachute. The fuselage was designed with the capacity to
accommodate the fuel necessary for long-range missions of up to 3,000 miles and a
bomb load capacity of 30,000 pounds. To reach the desired speeds, General
Electric and Grumman engineers that later joined the project adopted the swing wings or
variable geometry configuration for the F111. This new technology allowed the wings
to swing out at the time of takeoff to increase lift and then tuck inward
during mid-flight to attain higher speeds. Another feature of the F111
was a terrain-following radar system connected to the autopilot that
mapped the surface to avoid a collision, automatically adjusting the flight path. The radar satisfied the USAF, which
allowed the aircraft to fly as close as possible to the ground to avoid being
detected by enemy radar equipment. It also became advantageous when flying at night
or in bad weather with minimum visibility. The F111 could also carry a removable
20 mm M61 cannon with a 2,000 ammo tank, two M117 bombs, or a tactical
nuclear weapon at the bomb bay. Additionally, the aircraft was equipped with four
underwing pylons with a capacity of 5,000 pounds. Either missiles or fuel
drop tanks could be fitted. The F111A, the USAFs version, performed
exceptionally well during testing. It was able to fly at Mach 2.5 speeds at
high altitude and 1.3 at low altitude. Nevertheless, things went
sideways with the Navy's F111B. The Navy Backs Out The F111B was mediocre at best. It did
not fit the role the Navy intended to have since the very beginning.
The aircraft was too big and too heavy to be an effective fighter. It was a
flying tank that Navy pilots did not like. Veteran pilot George Marrett, who had more than 180 combat missions
in Vietnam aboard A1 Skyraiders, was one of the test pilots that felt the F111B was
too clunky and ineffective for the Navy's needs. In his book Testing Death, Marrett
wrote that the F111B was (QUOTE): "grossly underpowered, and had poor
cockpit visibility for a fighter… I wouldn't want to maneuver one against a
fighter, but purely as an interceptor, it would have done well against
bombers and cruise missiles." Secretary McNamara resigned in February 1968,
at the height of the Vietnam War, when the North Vietnamese launched the Tet Offensive that
surprised the American forces in the country. The Navy saw this as an opportunity
to get rid of the McNamara plane. They did so in a March hearing before
the Senate Armed Services Committee. According to author Robert Bernier, who
thoroughly studied the F111Bs development, Vice Admiral Tom Connolly replied to a
Committee member at the hearing (QUOTE): "Senator, there isn't enough power in all
Christendom to make that airplane what we want." With that response, Congress declined to
approve further funds for the aircraft, which had escalated from 3 million to 8 million
per plane. The Navy F111 was later canceled. USAF Deployments Although useless for the Navy, the F111 went
on to have a successful career with the USAF. During the Linebacker raids of 1972, the
USAFs F111s showed the effectiveness of their low altitude capabilities and the terrain-radar
use at night. Like a relentless night predator, the aircraft destroyed NVA airfields and
air defense batteries with relative ease. F-111s were also tasked with sinking
the Cambodian Khmer Rouge in 1975 when it captured the container ship S.S. Mayaguez. In the more than 3,800 combat missions
that the F111s ran in Vietnam, only six were lost, making it one
the lowest loss rates of the war. The Air Force F-111s saw combat
once again in 1986 when President Raegan decided it was time to retaliate
against Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi after he ordered his agents to kill two
U.S. servicemen in a Berlin nightclub. Reagan ordered an attack on Qaddafi's
private compound near Tripoli. It was one of the first attempts of taking
down a head of state by a ferocious air attack. The mission was designated
Operation El Dorado Canyon. A squad of 18 F111s with heavy ordnance
was dispatched to Tripoli to reduce the compound to ashes. Aided by four EF111s
modified and equipped with electronic warfare assets to disrupt enemy radars, the
aircraft made their way to the objective. Although the facility was heavily bombed, the Libyan dictator managed to escape
with his family at the last minute. Years later, the F111s saw action once again
in Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War. During the critical days of January 1991,
F111s took the most out of their low altitude capabilities to hunt down Iraqi SAM sites to
clear the way for other American aircraft. When Package Q was launched
to bomb the city of Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein was stationed with the
Republican Guard, electronic warfare F111s became a vital part of the massive coalition
airstrike, jamming enemy air defense systems. Overall, 80 F111s with various combat
configurations were deployed in the Gulf War, flying over 5,000 missions. The Australian Pig The USAF has sold the F-111C exclusively
to Australian air forces since 1973. To the Aussies, the F111 became known as
"the Pig" for the aircraft's long snout and its terrain-following activity. The F111C had longer wings and a
strengthened undercarriage. It became the most powerful aircraft
of all of Southeast Asia. In March 2006, four Australian F111s were
ordered to sink the North Korean freighter, Pong Su, which had been smuggling
heroin into Australia since 2003. Using two 2000-lb GBU-10 LGBs, the F111s sent
the Asian vessel to the bottom of the sea, displaying their influential
role as anti-shipping strikers. The Australian F111s were
finally retired in 2010 Partly. Aftermath Although the U.S. Navy never flew the F-111, the
Air Force made good use of it during its entire career, often modifying it for various combat
roles. The USAF took more than 500 to serve in fighter, bomber, interceptor, and electronic
warfare tasks. It excelled in most of them. Like most airplanes of its time, the F111 had
some innovative features that took their time to be perfected and used for combat, such as
the radar systems, the unique wing design, and the turbofan engines. But in
the end, every one of them paid off. From Vietnam to Australia and the Middle
East, McNamara's plane and its multiple and versatile configurations, different versions
went on to serve for more than 30 years. To this date, it remains a controversial topic
when joint-use aircraft or multipurpose planes are designed, as more often
than not, they tend to fail. The F111 was not one of them. In the end, Navy
officers agreed that it was not a bad aircraft. It simply was not enough for the
combat role they desired to have.
