The Falklands War – The Land Battle Part 1 – The Landings

[Music] from north to south the Atlantic Ocean spans the 8,000 miles separating the United Kingdom from the group of islands known as the Falklands [Music] to the east the fortunes lie the uninhabited islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich group which together with the Fulton's themselves make up the British Falkland Island dependencies the main islands little more than two-thirds of the size of Wales lying 480 miles northeast of Cape Horn this is Port Stanley the principal town indeed the only town in the Falkland Islands on the 2nd of April 1982 a large and well-equipped Argentine invasion force landed here and besieged the governor mr. Rex hunt in this is official residence government house the governor had less than 24 hours warning of the invasion and 68 Royal Marines constituted the only Defence Force at his disposal after several hours of determined resistance when it became clear that the invaders becoming ashore in overwhelming numbers the governor surrendered broadcasting his decision to the 1800 Fulton islands inhabitants over the islands radio dear friends I'm afraid I'm not being given the time to say farewell to you all as I would have wished by speaking to each of you personally but the new Argentine governor has kindly given me permission to send you this last message of good wishes and thanks for all your support in the two years I had served here I shall never forget you and hope that we shall meet again someday in particular - and I would like to say farewell to all the government house staff whom we were not able to see today goodbye and God bless you all [Applause] at home the Argentine government had overnight won the rapturous support of the Argentine people for it had given them the Malvinas as they call voters and it had done so in a bold show of military might Britain they were convinced was no longer interested in the Thorntons and would accept a fete accompli with little more than a token protest in London word of the British government's response was eagerly awaited and it came when the Commons met in emergency session the next day British sovereign Tennessee has been invaded by a foreign power for several days of rising tensions in our region Argentina that country's armed forces attacked the Falkland Islands yesterday and established military control of the islands the government has now decided that the large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete the sailing of the task force stimulated a great release of national pride and determination an act of aggression had been committed on British territory and Argentina must be persuaded by force if necessary to withdraw there was little thought of war at this stage no idea in the minds of the public of what the task force might have to do it was enough that the Falklands were eight thousand miles away it seemed only prudent to shorten that distance without delay [Music] meanwhile intensive efforts to obtain an Argentine withdrawal by diplomatic means were being pursued with the utmost urgency Sir Anthony Parsons our ambassador to the United Nations put our case in the strongest possible terms and pressed for the acceptance by the Security Council of Resolution 502 that an act of aggression had taken place could not be denied and it was this use of force by Argentina which when it came to the boat much to Argentine surprise and dismay caused many of her friends on the Security Council to vote against her accordingly Resolution 502 was passed now as news of the task force and Resolution 502 tempered celebrations in Buenos Aires diplomatic pressure was applied to the Galtieri government Leopoldo Galtieri had come to power just five months before the invasion as commander-in-chief of the army he headed the three-man military hunter grappling with an inflation rate of a hundred and fifty percent and with serious internal unrest and bitterness in the wake of a ruthless anti-terrorist campaign which had itself divided and terrorized the population gaudí area saw in the long-standing dispute with Britain of the sovereignty of the Malvinas a way of uniting the people and securing his own power base and he was almost certainly committed to the invasion either willfully or by the pressure of events from the moment the Argentine flag was raised on the island of South Georgia some 700 miles to the east of the Falklands where on the 19th of March a party of Argentine scrap metal merchants was landed without authorization to dismantle the abandoned whaling station at Leith the following day the ice patrol ship HMS endurance sailed from Port Stanley with a party of Royal Marines to investigate she arrived off grid thickened on the 24th in time to observe the landing of over a hundred Argentine Marines at Leith on the 26th by now intelligence reports showed the Argentine fleet to be converging on the Falkland Islands invasions sudden they became a real possibility in response the British government ordered three nuclear-powered fleet submarines into the South Atlantic on Monday the 29th of March despite maintaining an average of 23 knots on her long passage south the first of these formidable vessels did not arrive in the area of Fulton's until eight days after the invasion on that fateful day of Friday the second of April when general Galtieri was able to announce his seizure of the Malvinas to the delight of the Argentine people Quay nazar is unrestrained rejoicing replaced the fierce anti-government ranting of only a few days before it was not until 6 p.m. on that same Friday that the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and the defense secretary John not held a press conference to confirm what the world now knew and to give the first government reaction to it and so a military option in a time when you have distances of this kind is extremely difficult I think it's not possible even if you have the most brilliant intelligence system in the world to read the minds of the other side all I can tell you is that the beginning of this week there was a naval exercise going on in this area we had no clear evidence at all that it was going to be directed against the Falkland Islands and at that time the Foreign Secretary was contemplating moves in the United Nations and among our friends so that it would have been wrong to dispatch a large task force before we were absolutely certain which we became last night that an invasion was imminent as these words were being spoken the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sir Henry leach had the mobilisation of the largest naval task force this country had assembled since the Second World War well in hand he was determined to sail the first group on it's 8,000 mile voyage south by the following Monday to delay might have enabled a more ordered loading of the ships but of greater importance was the need to give the public at home and the rest of the world the clearest possible evidence of the British government's resolve nothing could have done this more effectively than the sight of men and ships sailing for the South Atlantic just three days after the first Argentine troops landed at Port Stanley it was to the first seed Lords immediate subordinate commander-in-chief Fleet Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse that overall command of the task force film and it was from his headquarters at Northwood that he appointed Rear Admiral sandy Woodward then commanding the 1st flotilla of destroyers and frigates exercising in mid-atlantic as commander of the naval carrier Task Group one of the admiral Woodward's earliest and most demanding duties in his new role was that of facing the awkward questions of the press and TV journalists accompanying the task force no one for years has been put in a position like this you've got a vast force a lot of power how do you feel about exercising it and dinner how much power wealth I felt very exactly if I've got a lot of firepower yes I mean I don't I now know what to talk about yes but a lot of fat and if one is given the authority to use it and I'll use it to the best advantage I can with the training I've had and with the assistance and skills I've got available to me as the leading elements of the Task Force sailed south they still represented in the eyes of many a means of strengthening Britain's diplomatic hand rather than a force destined to fight it out with the Argentine invaders if it came to a fight however he was clear from the outset that the decisive battle would have to be fought on land not at sea a vital force therefore where the men were third commando brigade who comprised the landing force under Brigadier Julia Thompson the brigade was organized with three commanders which are the equivalent of non mechanised infantry battalions gonna support was the to nine commando light regiment armed with 105 like guns and then there was a sapper squadron and a logistic regiment which is unique actually in that all the logistic units of the brigade were under one command in the logistic regiment the training of the brigade was unusual in two aspects one that the mountain Arctic warfare training is unusual we've meant that a lot of men were used to working in wet and cold conditions and were equipped for just that and many had spent up to nine or ten winters in Norway and the other side that was slightly unusual was them phoebius training where particularly the staffs and the leaders in the brigade had quite a lot of experience and amphibious operations which turned out to be quite useful of course because training a man to jump in and out of a landing craft or a helicopter is relatively easy what takes the time is training the staffs and the leaders to put together their own figures package so that it's right on the day getting shipping together was more of a problem than getting the chaps back because nobody seemed to believe how much shipping one needed and it's not so much the shipping for the men it's the shipping for the combat supplies without which there's no point in shipping a lot of men down to fight unless we've got bullets to shoot and beans to eat and the brigade was expanding because we had three para added to us who were the spearhead battalion and we're very glad to see them we knew quite a lot of them good to have that law with us it's also very good to have tea bats really air defence battery join us and to troops of the Braves and rawls with their scorpions and scimitars but this meant you need more ships to move them early on the idea had been to put at least one commander in Hermes but when people thought about the problem in greater depth they realized that Herman's main task was going to be providing the main bulk of the air support for the task force and therefore he couldn't clutter her decks up fill her holes and compartment up with marines of course the main priority was to get going get south as fast as possible to show the resolve of the country now this meant that a lot of stuff was just tipped in as fast as it could be there is no slur on the people who did the tipping because my goodness me did they work hard it did mean some a Lascelles arrived south with 18 inches over there loading marks with horrific sort of mixes of ammunition like fuel and ammunition and so forth all on the same hold and so a certain amount of sorting out head to be done when we got down to ascension and that time we had there was very useful for their purpose Brigadier Thompson as command a third commando brigade was one of three Task Group commanders the other two being Commodore Michael Clapp Commodore amphibious warfare and Admiral Woodward the carrier Task Group commander Admiral Fieldhouse as commander-in-chief fleet exercised overall command of the operations from his Northwood headquarters advised by three service deputies Vice Admiral David Halifax Major General Jeremy Moore and Air Marshal Sir John Curtis while the staff at Northwood grappled with the complexities of an out-of-area operation greater than anything undertaken since suez brigadier thompson and his staff joined the assault ship HMS fearless by helicopter on the 6th of April as the task force made best speed towards Ascension Island for the men of 3 Commando Brigade an unexpected taste of luxury for their voyage south in their troopship the liner Canberra Admiral Fieldhouse taking a last opportunity to confer with his Task Group commanders called a council of war and ascension which took place on board HMS Hermes on the 17th of April at that castle war I was told the two para had been stood by to join us down in Ascension this was good news as far as I was concerned I knew H Jones he'd been the BM of a reg aide under his command which I had served in Northern Ireland and there were some good chaps in that battalion that I knew so this was great news to have them coming to join us the same time I was asked by general more what force did we require to carry out the aim in the Falkland Islands suppose we had to land and invade the islands and carry out a down campaign and I said perhaps while the flippantly it wouldn't be a bad idea to have about equal numbers which meant about 10,000 men which meant another Brigade rarely and I was then asked did I think that my brigade headquarters could handle the command of say seven or eight battalions to which my answer was no I reckon that five was as much as we could hack on our own so that of course I believe you've led to the decision to bring down another brigade headquarters after the council of war the rest of the ships who had sailed either at the same time as us or indeed after us the faster ones arrived at ascension and it was particularly good to see the very large white shape of camera steaming in bearing with her 42 commando 40 commando and three para and I visited her as soon as I could get away and it was tremendous to see the heart in which the troops were in particular huge space in which to train and keep fit in this very large ship and this was an enormous bonus as far as I was concerned because I knew well from my experience what a problem it is keeping men fit in a ship for long periods and here's a ship where if you ran around the promenade there once they're portable month so you do marches in equipment not shooting anything like now the mood in the brigade was one of intense exhilaration particularly among the younger chaps who thought well this is what we're being paid for and this is what it's all about I think among the older members it was perhaps a little more somber when we realized or began to realize what the odds were particularly the odds on the air side and also a number of us who had been down in that part of the world on particularly people like myself captain A&E Higginson who'd actually played rugger against these guys and said they're all alike ass sometimes yeah like we realized that perhaps they weren't going to track the towel in all that easily because after all they were there not very far away from their own country they had a superiority said why should they talk Italian so I personally and some of my senior people believed that they would fight right from the very beginning in the days that followed the meeting a dissension between Admiral field house and his hospital commanders it became clear to all concerned that with Argentine airlifting men and supplies in Port Stanley around-the-clock even a much strengthened 3 Commando Brigade could not be expected on its own to defeat our well equipped and well dug in occupied already of at least twice its number even if as was known many of its men were conscripts with a minimum of training Admiral Fieldhouse decided therefore to amend the mission given to Commodore clapping Brigadier Thompson from that of repossession of the fortin's to planning for a landing with the view to repossessing the Falklands in order to accomplish this task these were the land forces which had now been committed to land and establish a beachhead on the Falkland Islands third commando brigade under Brigadier Thompson comprising headquarters 3 Commando Brigade 44 2 and 4 5 commandos Royal Marines two troops the Blues and Royals 2 9 commander regiment Royal Artillery one battery of rapier missile launchers two troops of blowpipe missiles five nine independent command a squadron Royal Engineers 2nd and 3rd battalions the parachute regiment 3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron and the commando logistic regiment South Georgia the island occupied by Argentine forces on the pretext of protecting a party of illegally landed scrap metal merchants although strategically unimportant was now significant as evidence of the resolve of Her Majesty's Government to retake South Georgia a separate task group was dispatched commanded by Captain Brian Young of HMS Antrim and comprising D squadron SAS and M company for two commando M Company had with them sections of the reconnaissance troop mortars and SBS the Task Group arrived in the area of South Georgia on the 21st of April with HMS Antrim was the RFA tide spring and the ice patrol ship HMS endurance the details of this operation are not our concern here suffice to say an Argentine submarine the Santa Fe was put out of action and the surrender taken on the 25th of April of a force of 137 men captain Alfredo estis signed the surrender document there were no British casualties on the 12th of April with the nuclear-powered submarine HMS Spartan on station off Port Stanley her majesty's government declared a 200-mile maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands by the time South Georgia was retaken on the 25th Admiral Woodward's carrier battle group was just four days steaming from the exclusion zone while Brigadier Thompson and 3 Commando Brigade remained on board their ships off Ascension awaiting the arrival from the UK of to Peron in the ferry Norland with the addition of 2 and 3 para 3 commando brigade was a formidable fighting force when clearly once a beachhead had been established more troops would be needed to recapture the problems if the Argentine's decided to fight it accordingly mo d army alerted its out-of-area force the 5th Infantry Brigade with orders to prepare to sail for the South Atlantic although it could not then be known whether it would have a fighting or a post operational role when Fire Brigade joined 3 Commando Brigade in the beachhead the land forces then at approximately divisional strength would be commanded by general mer whose role meanwhile remained at Northwood providing military advice to Admiral Fieldhouse while we were traveling south to ascension and indeed while we were dissension the landing force element was making its plans for what it wanted to do when we got down there ie where we would like to land in order to get our souls to stand there and a number of consideration had to be brought to bear at that stage and the planning for that was done in this cabin here which is my my day cabin and I planned in here with my R group when we got to the stage where we thought we knew what we wanted to do we had to then make certain that it was what the Navy could actually do this is new point on a joint operation in going ahead on your own ignoring the other half that's got to get to their protector while you're there and support you are there now this was quite easy because all I had to do in order to consult the Navy was go and see the corner amphibious warfare I called on Mike Clapp who was in a cabin next all mine and I just used to go through the door and see him whenever I needed to consult with him Mike you remember as an essential animal field has told us to bring us three options yes which we did and as I remember the options were covalent air bearing cap Herrmann Terrace orbital yes Sam : yes and then I rather wanted to have a for thoughts and into the Berkeley science yes and I can't remember now what it was that you wouldn't unhappy about about what I I was any unhappy in extent I think that you and South attorney had reported in the sailing days that he'd met a fairly heavy swell in there which would have made ship shore movement difficult particularly with the mixer flights while Admiral Woodward's carrier battle group continued south and Commodore Clapp regalia Thompson and their staffs studied the options for an amphibious landing there was increasing acceptance in Britain and around the world that the task force would probably have to fight to remove Argentine troops from the Falklands on the diplomatic front with the powerful support of United Nations Resolution 502 Britain retained the initiative throughout April but in spite of an energetic spate of shuttle diplomacy by the United States Secretary of State general Alexander Haig the negotiated withdrawal by Argentina seemed increasingly remote on the 29th of april admiral Woodward's battle group assembled just outside their maritime exclusion zone received a signal from Northwood in all respects prepare for war by midnight 29th of April the sea and air battle had begun on Saturday the 30th of April the 200-mile maritime exclusion zone around the bottoms was declared a total exclusion zone and a single bulky bomber of 101 squadron Strike Command took off from Ascension Island its target the runway had stem the airport by the time it had dropped its bombs early on Sunday morning the ships of the carrier battle group were well inside the total exclusion zone and a force of 12 sea Harriers from Hermes flew off to attack key enemy targets radar installation and runway and Stanley and the enemy base when it came the predicted enemy air attack in retaliation did little damage with the loss of two mirar spiders and the Canberra bomber on the Argentine victims versatility on the second of May the Argentine heavy cruiser General Belgrano was being shadowed in the vicinity of the total exclusion zone by the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror the cruisers presence posed a clear and unacceptable threat to the task force and the submarine was ordered to attack the sinking of the General Belgrano stunned the Argentine Navy which subsequently took no major part in the campaign the Argentine reaction came just two days later an attack by super 8 andar strike aircraft equipped with air launched Exocet missiles their intended target was one of the carriers in fact they found the destroyer hms sheffield in their path on picket duty southeast of the Fortnum's 20 miles ahead of the battle sheffield was hit amidships on fire and crippled she was abandoned later when undertow she sank the loss of sheffield to a single exit missile had a profound effect on subsequent naval tactics obliging Admiral Woodward to keep his battle group well to the east beyond the range of air launched exercise and therefore beyond the range of the Argentine Air Force altogether thus the vital air battle which it had been planned would be fought and won before any landing was undertaken never took place and air superiority an important assumption in the planning of Commodore clapping Brigadier Thompson was not achieved on the 5th of May the day after the loss of Sheffield Admiral Woodward signaled northward to the effect that the task force could only remain operational for another month the determining factor being aircraft serviceability in the grueling conditions of the South Atlantic in winter the amphibious task group was at last ordered to sail from ascension on the 9th of May final confirmation of the mission was received by the Task Group commanders on the 12th tool and with the view to repossessing the Falklands and as far as I the landing force command was concerned to achieve that mission I had three possible tactical options and they were to land at cob a volunteer Bay or kappa mentor salvador or san carlos now you'll notice that there's all on the northern half of East Falkland and the reason that was that I did not want to land anywhere that would bring me up to Stanley from the southeast or the South because that seemed to me to be the obvious way to come and furthermore to come into the defensive position on the strongest side so all the time I was looking to come in from the north or northwest understanding the first two options volunteer Bay and the entrance to San Salvador became less and less attractive to me I wanted somewhere where I could hide from exit for a start although they didn't have many exercise I wasn't prepared to actually buy one of them San Carlos stood out as far as I was concerned very early on as being my ideal it gave me protection from exercise he gave me some protection by conventional air attack and he gave me sheltered waters so about three weeks before the chosen date of landing we put in the SBS to explore the beaches and check that they would be suitable and to look at the hinterland for the landing force commander one of the peculiarities of the SBS beach reconnaissance role is the conflict between avoiding compromise and gaining as much information as possible and by that I mean if the enemy know that there are people looking at his beaches he's got a finite number of places in which to look so the patrols have to be extremely careful it may well be that the patrols can carry out half their job and get away with it and come back with information when if they try to do the whole thing they may cause a compromise which would have all sorts of unfortunate results and in the san carlos sport san carlos area in particular the Brigadier was very clear that we were not to be compromised had we been compromised that our position is being compromised by swimmers being seen in the water making too long a radio transmission from the hillside and had the Argentinians as a result moved a battalion into the area the result would have been a disaster and that is the nature of the compromise at SBS patrols always have to make in the beach intelligence role but in any situation like this there are obviously three very distinct types of operations which are carried out by Special Forces in support of the main landing forces the first one being the gathering of strategic intelligence the second one being operations carried out prior to the landings which are designed to both deceive and also cause attrition to the enemy forces and finally there are the direct land operations in supporting the landings themselves and also in operations which may take place subsequent to those landings in the first type of operation the strategic gathering of intelligence the SAS were deployed into six different locations which were rarely chosen all from that because it must be realized that prior to the landings there was absolutely the named knowledge and a real knowledge of where the enemy dispositions were and therefore six positions were picked off a map faith in East and West Falklands and the SS were landed there a repaired of three Knights by helicopter starting on the night of the 30th of April the 1st of may the first SAS and SBS reconnaissance patrols began to provide valuable intelligence data on the location and strength of Argentine forces on East Falkland early in May they reported the area around San Carlos water to be entirely free of troops on the 8th of May it was decided to go firm on San Carlos as the site for the landing the penalty 50 miles of rough boggy and in hospitable country that lay between San Carlos and the principal objective Port Stanley this however was beyond the scope of the immediate landing plan first revealed to his commanding officers by brigadier Thompson at a briefing on board HMS fearless on the 13th of May and what I wanted to achieve was by first light be on the high ground in reverse state positions ready to fly in the rapers and the guns in order to beat off air attacks and any ground counter-attacks as soon as possible now to achieve that I had a three-phase landing plan in phase 1 by landing craft at night I was going to land two para closely for it almost simultaneously with 40 commando at San Carlos settlement to Paris mission was to get up on to the high ground Sussex mountain as quickly as possible to block off any possible approach from the strategic reserve which we thought was in the Darwin area coming onto the beachhead 40 commando vertical settlement and then get up onto the high ground at the back of the settlement and then in phase 2 which I planned should be again in darkness by landing craft simultaneously 45 commando would seize the Ajax Bay complex and then get up onto the high ground to the west side while 3 para landed at Port San Carlos or rather to the west of Port st. Carlos cleared the settlement and then got up again onto the high ground overlooking a settlement and my reserve for those two phases was to be 42 commando afloat in Canberra phase 3 was the first time that we started using helicopters and wouldn't start until first light and then using helicopters and landing craft I would land the batteries of the commando Richmond and the Ricker bare tree still keeping 42 commando afloat as my reserve on the 19th of May Commodore clap received the signal from C&C fleet authorizing him to undertake the landing at dawn on the 21st by now the total hairier strength available to the task force had risen to 35 thanks to the arrival of the container ship Atlantic compared bringing an additional 12 aircraft a further four our AFG our three areas were flown from Britain via essential although they were to play a vital part in the rest of the campaign providing both air defence and close air support it was during that most hazardous of phases the landing and securing of the beachhead that their contribution was to prove crucial the greatest threat to the success of the landings being that posed by the Argentine Air Force in order to reduce that threat Special Forces attacked an airstrip on pebble island a few days before the landings destroying a number of Pokhara ground attack aircraft based there only a short flying time from the San Carlos beaches following pebble island and shortly before the main landings took place another operation of this nature was carried out by a former portrayal of SAS who positioned at that time in the Mount Kent area they were able to observe over a period of time the whereabouts which continually changed incidentally of the helicopter force which was used to provide mobility for the main strategic reserve for the Argentine forces in the whole of the Falkland Islands by identifying exactly where the Argentine's were hiding these helicopters at night they were able to call in an airstrike about two days before the main landings and totally destroyed the ability of the Argentine's to move their strategic reserve around the islands by helicopter as the amphibious possible entered Vulcan a cover of darkness on the night of the 20th of May the cloud which have been solid all day it cleared greatly increasing the vulnerability of men and ships to air attack HR was sent 403 30 hours on the 21st of May because no decisive air battle at we fought the best they could expect was local air parity over san carlos in the proceeding as a series of diversionary actions was planted including a naval bombardment to the south of stanley and a raid by special forces a few hours for HR on d-day a very successful raid was carried out by an SS squadron landing by seeking x' at night north of darwin and then they went in an assault at Darwin the aim of as far as I was concerned of that raid was to keep this strategic reserve which we thought was in the Darwin era busy and their eyes off of what we were doing the public Northland in San Carlos water for a period of six or seven hours they were able to delude the Argentine forces into thinking that least force of a battalion in strength of British troops had landed in the area of Darwin goo screen and they did this by a use of massive use of their own squadron fire including mortars rocket launchers etc it was a highly successful raid India afterwards we discovered from intelligence of the Argentine's thought they'd been attacked by a battalion and then the SS cause rounded it off as they were drawing from it in daylight they were attacked by aircraft and they shot one of them down with a stinger so they had every reason to feel very a piece of themselves at the end of that crucial to the security of the landing operation was the control of the high ground commanding the entrance to San Carlos water known as Fanning head several days earlier when they were withdrawn SBS patrols had reported fanning head like everywhere else adjacent to the landing area to be free of Argentine forces by the night of the landing this was no longer the case we had an indication that there was an Argentinean force a subscription probably a company - on one of the major hill features and probably on the fanny HED feature our problem was we only had a few hours in which to find these enemy in an area not much smaller than about half of Dawa we were fortunate in that we had just got from warminster a thermal imager camera angle a team of experts we could teach us how to use it and this I think was the first ever use of thermal energy or ti in war the special camera was mounted in a helicopter which proceeded to sweep the ground from a height of about a thousand feet in darkness only hours before the landing was due to take place [Music] when analyzed on board Antrim the recording revealed the exact locations of the Argentine troops they were indeed on Fanning head overlooking the route into San Carlos water shortly to be taken by the landing craft an immediate SBS attack was launched the force that was going up onto fanny HED was carrying with it a small handheld TI device which enabled them to pinpoint exactly the men on the ground when the firefight started and by using naval gunfire support we had our own spotter from one for a battery with us we were able to bring down very accurate fire from entering from her two guns out in the bay literally as the men in the landing force were getting into their landing craft and saving into san carlos water the firefight was going on we knew that we would be the first treatment sure and my section were told that we would be the point section therefore I would be the first section commander sure we managed to cram ourselves into the landing craft they were quite full the way we went once we were upon the Elias ooze it was a sense of relief mixed with anticipation relief or getting off the boat but the anticipation where you you're not quite sure whether you that you're going to go into and as we're in there and we're sort of bobbing around in the water you can see tracer arcing through long funnin head where there was a battle going course on the tune of Argentinians and ship-to-shore fire was going on which which heightened it but this time you look around you young lads and you can see that they're keen for it and there's a lot of humour flying around this you get the odd joke that we're in a rubbish skip and rubbish skips them don't float too well and things like this then we steamed off towards the shore and you can see in the outline a silhouette of the islands coming closer and you're wondering what its gonna be like it's the first time that you're actually going into something and as the the colonel briefed us before we actually embarked on this venture it'd be something like Gallipoli where you're told what's gonna happen and it probably won't happen that way we could hear the shells from the frigates pounded into their their features all around the beachhead which is quite reassuring that also a bit frightening me do you think what was happening my next task was to look over the bow and as we approached the beach and see if I could see our member of the SBS team flashing some signals to let me know whether or not the London was to be opposed to the beach was mined unfortunately we didn't see any signals from me as BS and therefore we didn't know what an act of fact was going to happen about 50 meters out from the shore and when everybody is expecting the front to go down and you're expecting to go storming off and grab yourself a piece of the Falklands and claim it and put it in your pockets for boat for dear old England and things and the ramps don't go down and you suddenly find that you're stuck on a sandbank despite encounters with minor obstacles like sand banks all four units had no difficulty securing their objectives in the North three para the high ground above port San Carlos in the east 40 commando the high ground of the Verde Mountains above San Carlos settlement in the West four five commando the hills above Ajax Bay and in the South two para the Sussex Mountains blocking any advance by the enemy garrison at Goose Green the dawn of d-day break reasonably to my satisfaction we were late in a number of areas but nothing too critical the seven escorts I had were deployed outside San Carlos three were on gun lines in support of the land forces and they were essential until the 105's were in place and zeroed in and I hope to provide defense-in-depth fare as well although I realized that modern ships radars and things didn't work too well in confined waters I didn't actually expect you to work quite the way it did the air attack sure enough came and so I set it out my life gunshot and I kept fearless at one end and revered at the other with the amphibious video Ella cells in the middle and to give them some protection from that crash and the escorts were arranged outside this worked quite well and I was grateful say ready that the Argentineans were decoyed off onto the surface ships and didn't press him into some Carlos and take out the amphibious ships and so at the end of the day not a single amphibious ship was badly damaged and nothing had stopped the helicopters continued flying the landing craft a continued operating and said the essential task had still gone on and the military were getting established we did suffer a fairly heavy toll ardent who was on the gun line supporting the SAS on their attack on Darwin was sunk because she was isolated and I had not sufficient ships to give a mutual support Antron was damaged brilliant was damaged Argonaut was very badly damaged and was towed into some Carlos where she remained for about ten days preparing herself as an impetus on their defensive control platform I was told that Canberra had been hit I should think about a dozen times various ships were all sunk three or four times over I had no means of knowing who were broadcast from different voice reports going on from where we were in the theater we put any see a few other ships in the Anchorage and we were not in communications with the entire team I wasn't in strict terms in control it was impossible we had made our plan and I had to rely on the various captains to carry it out which they did without any prompting and the initiatives they took were exactly the ones I wanted them to take which was gratifying and continued that way for the rest of the operation d-day went on the hill very well and at the end of it I was very satisfied there were one or two small slips second phase did not go in in darkness but went in in daylight and the reason for that was that to power took much longer to load into their landing craft from Norland than anticipated and this was caused by the master of Norland luring his life beds to half position which slowed up the loading of the battalion at his landing craft and of course the offload was considerably slowed up by air attacks which went on through the day but that didn't prevent the landing craft crews and helicopter crews carrying on so by last light on d-day I was pretty satisfied I had all five of my battalions or commandos ashore all my guns were sure my air defense was ashore and my ammunition was starting to come ashore and I was a good position to beat off attacks from the air and from the ground by nightfall the beachhead was secured the commanders and para battalions on the high ground around San Carlos water consolidated their positions to their relief and surprise there'd been no sign of Argentine counter-attack Brigadier Thompson had every justification for satisfaction but what next how would the successful landing be converted to victory and the recapture of Stanley when would the land forces break out of their beachhead and bring the Argentine forces to battle this was the concern of general Murr who having flown to ascension on the 19th of May was now steaming rapidly south in qe2 with five brigade he was to be virtually incommunicado for the next seven days and therefore unable to influence events responsibilities must continued to rest with brigadiere thompson based on the directive he had received from general Murr on the 12th of May you are to secure a bridgehead on East Falkland into which reinforcements can be landed in which an airstrip can be established and from which operations to repossess the Falkland Islands can be achieved [Music]

Channel: British Army Documentaries

Views: 1,019,388

Rating: 4.7390146 out of 5

Keywords: falklands, the falklands, falklands war, war, british, argentinian

Id: shJLud0yz2k

Length: 46min 28sec (2788 seconds)

Published: Wed Oct 16 2019

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