Because the engine uses these traditional
materials, and to ensure its metrics aren't vastly inferior to those of the Boeing 737's B-series
engine, the C-series engine has been extended by 1.5 meters and significantly increased in
diameter, weighing in at 3935 kilograms - nearly 1.2 tons heavier than its B-series counterpart.
Yet, its thrust remains the smallest of the A-B-C series, at just over twelve or thirteen tons. It
consumes significantly more fuel and has a range of only 4000-5500 kilometers, a notable shortfall
compared to the Boeing's 6000-7000 kilometers. There's speculation that China may utilize its
domestically produced CJ-1000A aeroengine in the future. However, the technical challenges of
developing an aeroengine are extraordinarily complex. Even if China successfully produces
the CJ-1000A, it will likely only match the LEAP-1C engine's capabilities and will fall
short in comparison to the B-series engine. This is because the durability and fatigue
resistance of the composite fan blades used in the B-series engine, developed by GE, surpass
any metal and cannot be created overnight. It involves 10 to 15 years, substantial
investment, and a meticulous process from design to material selection, from testing to
certification. Each step demands time and money. Designing composite fan blades requires starting
with small-scale testing to assess basic material properties such as strength, crack resistance,
and fatigue cycles. Then comes the sub-component level testing, looking at how to drill holes
in the material, or attach metals, and protect against sunlight and UV damage. Subsequently,
component-level testing commences, manufacturing blades and conducting various shake, vibration,
throw, and even bird strike simulations. Each stage demands considerable testing
and evaluation, all of which are expensive. For example, fan blade detachment testing
alone can cost up to $15 million per blade, not to mention the inevitable
destruction of engines during tests. Therefore, the development of GE's
fan composites is the accumulation of generations of knowledge and experience,
and it cannot be simply bought with money. Nor is it that Chinese entities can fully
understand everything just by stealing this data and successfully develop products as
efficient as those of General Electric. Even for artificial intelligence, fully
understanding and mastering all the knowledge from GE Aviation isn't necessarily achievable,
not only due to the complexity of the technologies involved, but also because of the amount of
practical experience and accumulated expertise required. This brings out China's position in the
global aviation industry. In the C919 project, China's primary role is in assembly, but
it falls short in fundamental research and development. This situation is common in other
high-tech Chinese companies, such as Huawei, which excel in technical application
but lack genuine fundamental innovation. In fact, China still heavily relies on
imports in many key areas. For example, some crucial components of high-end security
doors need to be imported from Germany. If even for manufacturing something as basic as
security doors, China needs to depend on imports, then in more complex, technology-intensive
sectors like the aviation industry, China's dependency on foreign technologies
and resources becomes even more evident. Insiders have been outspoken about this… The realm of fundamental technologies - from
industrial to scientific - still appears to be a domain where China lags behind. Whether it
be the core design software underpinning these technologies or the process of manufacture itself,
China often leans on foreign software and methods. High-end machinery, such as advanced machine
tools and robotics, are typically imported, with domestic alternatives being far and few
between. Even in the basic sectors of industry, China struggles to independently produce materials
capable of withstanding extreme conditions. Whether it be high temperatures, low temperatures,
high pressure, corrosive acid-alkali environments, or even abrasive wear, the Chinese industry has
yet to master the production of such materials. China's aviation dreams face more than mere
technical challenges. They are deeply entangled in a thorny labyrinth of international
politics and economic complexities. China's ambitious aspiration to make the
C919 competitive with Airbus and Boeing in the domestic market, and to seize a quarter of the
global narrow-body jet market, seems increasingly elusive in the face of stark realities.
Firstly, the C919 is simply not competitive with Boeing and Airbus offerings in terms of
fuel efficiency or maintenance assurances. Spending $100 million on a C919 compared to
$110 million on an A320neo does not provide a compelling value proposition, particularly
when the former entails higher operating costs. Secondly, the aviation industry's international
standards set a stringent safety and certification bar for new aircraft. For the C919 to be sold
globally, it must receive certification from the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or
the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which presents a formidable challenge.
In the domestic market, the C919 cannot compete head-on with Western aircraft. However,
China may implement large-scale subsidies to promote the C919, aiming to displace Boeing or
Airbus' share in the home market. This strategy may seem effective but carries risks. Should
geopolitical conflicts with the West arise, they could immediately cease supplying parts for
the C919, bringing production to a grinding halt. Despite a potential strategy of large-scale
subsidies, the C919's prospects on the global market are not promising. While it has secured
orders worth $94 billion for 1035 units, all of these come from domestic companies, which
undoubtedly hampers its international outreach. Finally, COMAC's production capacity is
under scrutiny. The company has stated its intention to achieve an annual production
volume of 150 units by 2029, with the goal of capturing one-third of the Chinese large aircraft
market by 2035. However, this ambitious plan is overshadowed by the firm's current challenges and
the industry's skepticism about its abilities. However, according to COMAC's 2017-2036 Civil
Aircraft Market Forecast Annual Report, by 2035, the demand for single-aisle jetliners in China
will reach 5,539 units. To capture a third of this market, 1,846 units would be needed, making
this goal seemingly impossible to reach. Even if the company maintains its projected annual
production rate of 150 units from 2029 to 2035, this would only amount to 900 units. To produce
another 900 units in the six years before 2029 seems virtually unachievable. Dave Calhoun, the
CEO of Boeing, emphasized in early June this year that COMAC must increase its C919 output to make
any significant inroads in the Chinese market. While this may be the case, the likelihood
of geopolitical conflict between China and Western countries is increasing, which makes
the mass production of the C919 problematic. This leads to the question of whether Western
countries should continue supplying the parts needed for the C919 project. In the short
term, these transactions may not cause direct harm. However, in the long term, they could
potentially nurture a powerful competitor. That said, the timing might not be right for
the West to take action, as larger geopolitical power plays await. Russia's military actions
in Ukraine are currently at a standstill, and China may potentially step in as a
military aid provider. Although Xi Jinping has not yet indicated a willingness to provide
assistance, if China begins supplying military equipment to Russia, the West could have more
justification to cut off the C919's supply chain. In the field of aviation technology, China's
catch-up game will not be achieved overnight. The seven to eight decades of technical
accumulation and experience in the engine manufacturing sector in Western countries
cannot be replicated in a short time. For China to reach the same level of
technical prowess, it might require a long time and massive investments, and
the desired outcome may still be elusive. Some experts believe that for China to keep pace
with the advancements in aviation technology, it may need to seek new cooperative
relationships in a more open environment, perhaps even after the fall of the CCP.
Regardless, the toppling of the Communist regime is fraught with uncertainties and challenges,
but it may well be the only path for China.
