THE
BOEING 787. SOLD AS A "DREAMLINER". Jim McNerney: A once in a decade if not once
in a generation achievement of human ingenuity. FOR AIRLINES IT'S CHEAP TO FLY. FOR PASSENGERS IT OFFERS UNPARALLELED
COMFORT. "wow" FOR BOEING IT PROMISED WINDFALL PROFITS. PRESIDENT OBAMA: The Dreamliner is the plane
of the future. BUT AL JAZEERA DISCOVERS A DARK SIDE TO THE
DREAMLINER: STAN SORSCHER: unimaginable that we could
be three years late, have a fleet grounding, have fires on the airplane. OUR INVESTIGATION FINDS BOEING ALTERED ITS
OWN QUALITY STANDARDS COLE: They're shortchanging the engineering
process to meet a schedule. WE UNCOVER A WHISTLEBLOWER FIRED AS HE FOUGHT
FOR SAFETY: WOODS: There's no doubt there are bad repairs
going out the door on the 787 aircraft. WE GO BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, ONTO THE FACTORY
FLOOR, TO REVEAL A WORLD BOEING KEEPS SECRET. UC WORKER VIDEO: I wouldn't fly on one of
these planes… Because I see the quality of the fu**ing sh*t
going down around here. TITLE: "BROKEN DREAMS: THE BOEING 787"
JANUARY 16TH, 2013. TAKAMATSU, JAPAN - A BRAND-NEW BOEING 787
DREAMLINER MAKES AN EMERGENCY LANDING. PASSENGERS KNEW THE PLANE WAS IN TROUBLE:
AOYA KAZUNORI/passenger: I looked outside and saw white smoke. That's when I realised the danger. KEN'ICHI KAWAMURA/passenger: The burning plastic
smell got worse. / I thought we were going to crash. TAKEUCHI KOJI/Fireman: On closer inspection,
we observed a blue box that had expanded in size. THE BLUE BOX WAS ONE OF THE DREAMLINER'S TWO
LITHIUM ION BATTERIES –THE MOST POWERFUL - AND RISKY - EVER PERMITTED ON A COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT. Newsreader: It's just the latest in a string
of embarrassments for Boeing's state of the art aircraft. NINE DAYS EARLIER A DREAMLINER BATTERY HAD
CAUGHT FIRE IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. TWO BATTERY FAILURES IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS. NEWS BITE: Japanese carrier All Nippon Airways
and Japan Airlines have grounded their fleets of Boeing 787 Dreamliners. JAPAN AIRLINES AND ANA HAD BEEN THE FIRST
TO FLY THE DREAMLINER - NOW THEY BECAME THE FIRST TO CANCEL ALL FLIGHTS. NEWS BITE: Breaking news. The United States Federal Aviation… WITHIN 24 HOURS, THE U.S. SAFETY REGULATOR,
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, GROUNDED THE 787. NEWS BITE: All 50 of the new Boeing 787 Dreamliners
have now been grounded… THE REST OF THE WORLD FOLLOWED. NO BOEING FLEET HAD EVER BEEN FORCED FROM
SERVICE. BUT ON JANUARY 17, 2013, THE DREAM WAS OVER. I'M WILL JORDAN. FOR A YEAR, MY TEAM AND I HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATING
THE DREAMLINER. IT'S THE BOEING COMPANY'S BIG BET ON THE FUTURE… A PLANE CREATED TO SAVE FUEL, IMPROVE COMFORT,
AND BOOST PROFITS. AND ONE BUILT IN A NEW WAY - DESIGNED AND
MANUFACTURED BY SCORES OF COMPANIES AROUND THE GLOBE. THE COMPANY THAT MAKES THE BATTERY IS GS YUASA,
BASED IN KYOTO. WE WANTED THEM TO TELL US WHAT HAD GONE SO
WRONG. SOUND: Security Guard in Japanese. Will: Al Jazeera. Guard: Al Jazeera. We wonder whether you might be able to do an interview? THEY REFUSED. SPOKESWOMAN: We have a contract with Boeing
so we can't, we can't tell any comments to you. THE BATTERY IS ONLY ONE PART OF THE DREAMLINER'S
COMPLEX ELECTRICAL SYSTEM. THERE'S ALSO A CHARGER, MADE AT A FACTORY
THOUSANDS OF KILOMETRES AWAY. WHAT HAPPENED THERE, SHOWS BOEING LEARNT YEARS
AGO JUST HOW DANGEROUS A LITHIUM ION BATTERY COULD BE. IN TUCSON, ARIZONA, WE TRACKED DOWN MICHAEL
LEON – AN ELECTRICAL TECHNICIAN. MICHAEL LEON / Former Securaplane technician:
I've been working electronics since I was 17 years old, and I joined the paratroopers and I was assigned to an
electronics battalion of the 82nd airborne. LEON: this is the first time I've been here
since, since 2007. It's hard to believe that this is what's left
of a three story engineering structure. ON A NOVEMBER MORNING IN 2006, LEON AND DOZENS
OF OTHER WORKERS CLOCKED IN AT SECURAPLANE - THE COMPANY THAT MAKES THE BATTERY CHARGER. LEON: I started a pot of coffee then I went
into my lab and started working on my battery charging unit. AND THEN IT HAPPENED. LEON: …and there was a very loud explosion
and all of a sudden I was lying on the floor and there it was coming out the side of this battery. It was about that big, and it wasn't like
fire. It looked like a jet afterburner, like jet exhaust. THE PROTOTYPE BATTERY SECURAPLANE WAS USING
TO TEST ITS CHARGER HAD EXPLODED. KIRK WINES / Former Securaplane technician:
I heard a very loud series of metallic rattling bangs. A kind of shhhhhh. And just this jet of steam. LEON: The fire was literally rolling up the
walls around me and, and on the ceiling, I could just see it eating up all around me… WINES: I know if that had happened on board
an aircraft, there, there would be no chance of survival. IT WAS THE BIGGEST CHEMICAL FIRE IN TUCSON'S
HISTORY. A TEN THOUSAND SQUARE FOOT, THREE-STOREY STRUCTURE,
BURNT TO THE GROUND. RICHARD LUKSO / Securaplane founder: …after
my building burned down, after that they realized very emphatically the danger of this chemistry. RICHARD LUKSO KNOWS WELL THE CHEMISTRY OF
THE DREAMLINER BATTERY. BOEING CHOSE THE MOST POWERFUL THERE IS… BUT ALSO THE MOST VOLATILE. LUKSO:
they went to lithium cobalt which is way up here as far as danger. LUKSO STEPPED DOWN AS SECURAPLANE PRESIDENT
JUST BEFORE THE FIRE. HE STARTED A NEW COMPANY TO MAKE LITHIUM ION
BATTERIES FOR BUSINESS JETS. LUKSO WAS A TRUE BELIEVER IN THE TECHNOLOGY. THEN HE BEGAN TESTING. BULLET TEST VIDEO: Two, 3.3 amp hour series
battery pack bullet test. LUKSO WENT BEYOND EVEN THE LATEST INDUSTRY
GUIDELINES - GOING SO FAR AS TO FIRE BULLETS INTO BATTERIES, TO SEE IF THEY COULD BE MADE SAFE FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS. (BATTERY WALK/TALK) LUKSO: Yeah. You could run the test that you feel that
you need to meet the requirements to be safe, but you also need to have a conscience
that's going to tell you I want to do the extreme." IN THE END, TESTING WITH A CONSCIENCE, LUKSO
COULDN'T MAKE THE BATTERIES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS. HIS NEW COMPANY FAILED. LUKSO: …we became proficient in destroying
batteries. And, and the more we learned about it, the
worst it got. I mean, oh, my God, we kept digging and digging. We were saying I wonder what the rest of the
guys are doing. Well, I guess we knew. BY REST OF THE GUYS HE MEANS BOEING. AND THEY WERE TESTING TO A WEAKER STANDARD… ONE WRITTEN BY THE FAA SPECIFICALLY FOR THE
DREAMLINER. IT'S THE FAA'S JOB TO REGULATE AIR SAFETY. BUT WHEN IT COMES TO BUILDING AIRPLANES, THE
FAA DELEGATES OVERSIGHT ALMOST COMPLETELY TO THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS. WHEN IT COMES TO THE BATTERY AND BEYOND, BOEING
LARGELY POLICES ITSELF. THE BATTERIES PASSED BOEING'S TESTS. IN LINE WITH THE FAA RULES, BOEING SAID THE
787 BATTERIES WOULD VIRTUALLY NEVER CATCH FIRE ON BOARD AN AIRCRAFT. THEN, THEY FAILED TWICE IN JUST NINE DAYS. BOEING HAS NOT UNCOVERED THE ROOT CAUSE OF
THE FAILURES. IT FOUND A WORK AROUND: A STRONG STEEL CASE,
MORE INSULATION, AND AN EXHAUST FOR NOXIOUS FUMES. SINNETT: …any fire will be impossible because
there's not enough oxygen to support combustion. BUT SEVERAL LEADING SCIENTISTS HAVE THEIR
DOUBTS. DONALD SADOWAY / MIT: I don't think it's a
sufficient fix / Even inside that steel box with all of its fortifications, all of the elements are still
there for fire. DESPITE NOT KNOWING THE ROOT CAUSE, AMERICA'S
SAFETY REGULATOR, THE FAA, WAS SATISFIED. AND IN APRIL 2013, THE DREAMLINER WAS BACK. BUT THIS STORY GOES FAR BEYOND A BURNING BATTERY. IT BEGINS AT BOEING ITSELF. "This is it. The first American commercial jet capable
of economical transatlantic service. The Boeing 707 jet clipper. SINCE ITS CREATION IN SEATTLE NEARLY A CENTURY
AGO, BOEING HAD DEVELOPED A REPUTATION AS A WORLD-CLASS ENGINEERING COMPANY. BUT IN 1997 BOEING CHANGED. IT MERGED WITH COMPETITOR, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS. TWO COMPANIES WITH TWO VERY DIFFERENT BUSINESS
MODELS. STAN SORSCHER / Former Boeing engineer: the
merger was all about transforming our successful culture and business model into the same business model that McDonnell
Douglas had used unsuccessfully. ABW-002 / 1:05
ABOULAFIA: you basically shortchange engineering, you stop doing aggressive new product developments;
you run the business for cash. THE NEW BOEING MOVED ITS HEADQUARTERS FROM
SEATTLE, THE ONLY HOME THE COMPANY HAD EVER KNOWN, TO CHICAGO. IT BEGAN SLASHING INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH,
IN ORDER TO CUT COSTS AND MAXIMISE WALL STREET RETURNS. CYNTHIA COLE / Former Boeing engineer: I felt
it was wrong, I felt it was going to take the company in the wrong direction and I thought that quality would
suffer and the integrity of the product would suffer. KEVIN SANDERS / Former Boeing manager: I feel
that that legacy and that history and that competence has been hijacked by a bunch of corporate thugs. BY 2003, IT WAS TIME TO LAUNCH A NEW PLANE. BUT BOEING'S NEW BOARD WAS RELUCTANT TO INVEST
THE BILLIONS NEEDED. DOMINIC GATES / Seattle Times: The board made
it clear that they wanted this plane made for less money. They wanted it made for $5 billion and they wanted
partners to come in and pay the rest. ABW-002/ 9:35
Richard Aboulafia: It's expensive. So how do you make that happen? Well, you promise them that you can do it
for less / and then worry about the consequences
later. BOEING CAME UP WITH A PLAN TO SAVE ITSELF
MONEY. IT WOULD PUSH THE COSTS ONTO ITS MAJOR SUPPLIERS. BOEING WOULD CALL THEM PARTNERS – AND THEY
WOULD DESIGN AND PAY FOR THE PARTS THEY BUILT. BOEING'S JOB WOULD BE TO ASSEMBLE THE PLANE. GATES: It was almost as if at times you thought
Boeing executives believed, well, maybe they could sit in Chicago and have / other companies / do things, and
they would just rake in the money somehow by putting it all together and putting a Boeing sticker on it at the
end. RIGHT ON SCHEDULE, BOEING ROLLED OUT THE DREAMLINER
ON SUNDAY JULY THE 8TH 2007, 7-8-7. Tom Brokaw: Airlines with us today have made
a big commitment to Boeing and to this airplane. So far they have ordered 677 of them. ABOULAFIA: I think in a lot of ways, July
8, 2007 was one of the more magical moments I've seen in the industry… Brokaw: Watching us live around the world,
broadcasting I'm told in 45 countries in 9 languages for the premier of this very exciting Boeing 787 Dreamliner. GATES: We were all inside the factory with
artificial lighting, big stage, Tom Brokaw, huge screens… Then they opened the doors of this giant assembly bay… ABOULAFIA: And in rolls this beautiful, beautiful
aircraft. GATES: And there it is, sitting in the sun
and we all stream outside and we all touch it and none of us noticed. Smile! ABOULAFIA: And I'm reassured by the executives
involved that it's going to fly within two months. One, two, three. JON OSTROWER / Wall Street Journal
What I realized walking around it is that you could look up in the wheel well and you
could see daylight. GATES: We learned that the whole thing was
a sham. MIKE BAIR / 787 Program Manager: Beautiful
isn't it? Absolutely beautiful… GATES: They rolled out this fake airplane. OSTROWER: I realized the doors were made of
plywood. GATES: This plane that we were admiring was
completely a shell inside JAMES MCNERNEY / BOEING CEO: None of this
would be possible, of course, without exceptional leadership. ABOULAFIA: There's only two conclusions you
can draw: You have executives there who are either lying, in which case they are completely clueless because
they are going to get caught in two months, or you have a complete disconnect between the people who are working
on the plane, the engineers, and the executives who are saying this. MCNERNEY: And so to each and every member
of the 787 global team, I say, 'Thank you, congratulations, and keep up the great work.' SANDERS: More than any other single event
it was the big lie, and it was a statement that the Boeing Company is now all about the big lie. THE DAY AFTER THE ROLLOUT, WALL STREET PUSHED
BOEING STOCK TO A TEN YEAR HIGH. BUT IT WAS ALL ABOUT TO UNRAVEL, AS REVEALED
IN BOEING'S INVESTOR CALLS. Hello and welcome to our quarterly update
on the 787 program. SEPTEMBER 2007: BOEING ANNOUNCES ITS FIRST
DELAY. MIKE BAIR: It's not a failure in how the airplane
goes together. It's just a really complicated puzzle." OCTOBER 2007: THE THREE-MONTH DELAY BECOMES
SIX MONTHS. JIM MCNERNEY: We wish we didn't have to do
this. New kinds of innovation present challenges
and we're doing our best to meet them. OCTOBER 2009: SIX MONTHS BECOMES TWO YEARS
OF DELAYS. JIM MCNERNEY: We know that we can and must
do better. And I'm confident that despite our setbacks
we will get the 787 through the flight test program and into
the hands of our customers. GATES: It just kept getting worse and worse
and it seemed unbelievable. You have to understand, this was unprecedented. There had never been a Boeing delay in a Boeing
program. ABOULAFIA: The sequence of events looked an
awful lot like a catastrophe rather than just a manageable series of delays. THE DREAMLINER BUSINESS STRATEGY WAS BACKFIRING. DESIGNED TO SAVE SO MUCH MONEY, IT WAS COSTING
BOEING BILLIONS. GATES: The outsourcing plan failed very badly. / All these different suppliers who were going
to / build these major sections couldn't actually do it. TO FIX THE DREAMLINER, BOEING DISPATCHED HUNDREDS
OF QUALITY INSPECTORS TO STRUGGLING SUPPLIERS AROUND THE GLOBE INCLUDING TO ITS PARTNER ALENIA - IN SOUTHERN
ITALY. Riccardo Busca / Alenia plant manager: We
are just working through the final part of the process. ALENIA WOULD TAKE ON THE TASK OF CONSTRUCTING
THE BODY OF THE PLANE - NOT WITH ALUMINIUM PANELS… BUT WITH COMPOSITE PLASTIC BARRELS. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE: TO LOSE WEIGHT, SAVING
FUEL AND MAKING THE 787 CHEAPER TO RUN. BUT NO ONE HAD EVER MADE ANYTHING LIKE THIS
BEFORE, NOT BOEING, AND ESPECIALLY NOT ALENIA. Busca: There is nothing comparable with that
on the market. Will: there's nothing built like this. BOEING'S QUALITY INSPECTORS HAVE ONE OVERRIDING
PRIORITY, TO MAKE SURE THE JOB IS DONE CORRECTLY. IN 2009, WHEN INSPECTORS FOUND FLAWS IN PARTS
MADE IN THIS ALENIA PLANT, THEY ORDERED WORK TO STOP. A YEAR LATER, IN ALENIA'S OTHER FACTORY THEY
AGAIN FOUND SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND AGAIN THEY ORDERED WORK TO STOP. BUT THIS TIME, MANAGERS OVERRULED THE QUALITY
INSPECTORS. THIS INTERNAL BOEING DOCUMENT, FROM 2010,
REVEALS EXECUTIVES ORDERED ALENIA TO "CONTINUE WITH FABRICATION… WITHOUT DELAY." DONATO AMOROSO / ALENIA COO: We followed at
the time the procedure to stop but with the help of a Boeing specialist at the time and while we were in the disapproved
condition they took responsibility for approving the quality and we will continue to work in engineering at
the time the product. IN THIS SEPARATE MEMO, OBTAINED BY AL JAZEERA,
BOEING STATES THAT "SCHEDULE MAY REQUIRE DEVIATIONS TO THE PREFERRED QUALITY PROCESS". WE RECEIVED THE MEMOS FROM AN ENGINEER WHO,
LIKE MANY WE SPOKE WITH, WAS AFRAID TO APPEAR ON CAMERA. SO HE ANSWERED MY QUESTIONS BY EMAIL. SOURCE: They changed basic engineering principles
to meet schedule… We all protested. …Would you fly on a plane that you knew
was built with major flaws? THE QUALITY ENGINEER TOLD US DEVIATING FROM
THE PROCESS COMPROMISED SAFETY. ALENIA AND BOEING SAID IT DID NOT. CYNTHIA COLE: 6,7,8,9,10… SO I BROUGHT THE MEMO TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT
OF BOEING'S ENGINEERS UNION. Cynthia Cole: So My name is Cynthia Cole,
C-y-n-t-h-i-a. Last name is C-o-l-e. CYNTHIA COLE SPENT 32 YEARS AT THE COMPANY
BUT NEVER ON THE DREAMLINER PROGRAMME, SO SHE HAD NEVER SEEN THIS MEMO BEFORE. COLE: The program schedule may require deviation
to the preferred process. See? That one sentence right there, that one fragment of the sentence / You know,
you don't change your quality process for schedule. You make quality happen in the schedule. // They're shortchanging the engineering process
to meet a schedule and they're not even allowing quality control to do their job and
their telling them this is how it's going to be. // I don't see how these people who write these things and agree
to these things, you know, and the signatures down here, how they sleep at night. I just don't get it. How can you do that? // As an engineer I find that reprehensible. Male Voice: How does it make you feel as a
flyer? Oh, yeah. I'm not flying on a 787. That just makes, you know… Because I've been kind of avoiding flying
on a 787 and seeing this, I would definitely avoid
flying on a 787. TEASE: IN PART TWO – INSIDE A BOEING 787
PLANT, WORKERS REVEAL THEY FEAR TO FLY THE PLANE THEY BUILD. IF THE DREAMLINER REPRESENTS BOEING'S FUTURE,
THEN I'VE COME TO THE PLACE WHERE THAT FUTURE WILL BE BUILT. IN THIS ASSEMBLY PLANT IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH
CAROLINA. I'VE BEEN CALLED TO A MEETING WITH A MAN WHO
WORKS INSIDE THE PLANT. HE'S TAKING A HUGE RISK EVEN TALKING TO ME. SOURCE: It's been eating me alive to know
what I know, and have no avenue, no venue to say anything. AT HIS REQUEST, WE USED A DIFFERENT VOICE. SOURCE: 300 souls on the plane / their lives
/ it's bigger than me. WE HAD SEEN REPORTS OF BAD WORKMANSHIP IN
THE PLANT. BUT THE MAN CLAIMED THE PROBLEMS GO FAR DEEPER. SOURCE: With all the problems reported on
the 787 / there's 90 percent that's getting swept away…hushed up. / It's an iceberg. SOURCE: The people that actually work on it
are the biggest problem. // there is / an uneducated, under-skilled and uncaring staff that are building these
planes and I'm not the only one that feels that way. AND HE WAS PREPARED TO PROVE IT, WEARING A
CAMERA INSIDE THE PLANT TO RECORD WHAT SOME WORKERS SAID ABOUT THE DREAMLINER. UC PLANT WORKER 1: … They hire these people
off the street dude. Working, fucking flipping burgers for a living
or making sandwiches at subway… SOURCE: You can't have somebody from McDonald's
do heart surgery. / That's trusting somebody with your life. That's what we're doing here. UC PLANT WORKER 2: The thing about it is,
they don't realize the seriousness of putting something together and putting it together right. Because if this fucker breaks, it can't come
over to the curb, it's gonna come down. SOURCE: I've seen a lot of things that should
not go on at an airplane plant… / people talking about doing drugs, looking for drugs… UC PLANT WORKER 3: It's all coke and, um,
painkillers and, what's the other one… You can get weed here, you can get some really good weed here. SOURCE: Really, like in the plant? WORKER 3: Yeah. SOURCE: Like there's somebody who has it right
now? I could walk up to them and just… WORKER 3: No, I don't know if they have it
right here. You've got to place your order. SOURCE: You gotta place your order. SOURCE: I have never seen anybody or heard
of anybody having to take a random urinalysis. As far as I know random drugs tests just don't happen. UC PLANT WORKER 2: they don't drug test nobody. SOURCE: I know they don't. WORKER 2: There's people that go out there
on lunch and smoke one up. SOURCE: Do they? WORKER 2: Hell yea. SOURCE: You know for a fact. WORKER 2: Hell yeah. WHEN BOEING FIRST ANNOUNCED THE 787, BACK
IN 2003, NOBODY EVER DREAMT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED ANYWHERE BUT WASHINGTON STATE. THE ONE PLACE BOEING HAD ALWAYS MADE ITS COMMERCIAL
AIRCRAFT. BUT NEW BOEING WAS PLAYING BY NEW RULES. SO IT DID SOMETHING IT HAD NEVER DONE BEFORE
- AUCTIONED OFF FINAL ASSEMBLY TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER. DOMINIC GATES: They were going to hold a competition
for it. / A state against state, nationwide competition, where to build this plane. I ran to my editor after I put the phone down,
I think it was 5:00, and I said, "You're not going to believe this. They're not necessarily going to build it
here." WASHINGTON STATE WON, BUT ONLY BY GIVING BOEING
WHAT WAS THEN A RECORD THREE BILLION DOLLARS IN TAX BREAKS. "Power! Union Power! Union Power! Union Power!" FIVE YEARS LATER, BOEING'S MACHINISTS WALKED
OFF THE JOB AFTER CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS STALLED. THE STRIKE COST BOEING BILLIONS AND ADDED
TO THE DREAMLINER'S DELAYS. BOEING STOCK WAS IN A FREEFALL, AMID A GLOBAL
ECONOMIC CRISIS. GATES: … that strike / really enraged the
top executives at Boeing. And so / early in 2009 they made it very clear that they wanted a second assembly line
somewhere else. THAT TURNED OUT TO BE SOUTH CAROLINA. THE STATE OFFERED CHEAP LAND AND LABOR … CLOSE
TO ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN SUPPORT… AND NO UNIONS. GATES: The decision to build the second 787
assembly line in Charleston, South Carolina/ was made because of the strike in 2008. / They wanted to do it there because they
wanted to weaken the union, and they did. SORSCHER: It kind of has a shameless feel
to it, right? It's very manipulative and not very hometown. That's not the way you treat your people in your community,
unless they're not in your community, unless you see them as a source of gains to be extracted. BUT FOR BOEING, LEAVING BEHIND A WORLD-CLASS
UNION WORKFORCE FOR THE GREENER PASTURES OF NON-UNION CHARLESTON WOULD COME AT A PRICE. WORK IN THE PLANT IS SIGNIFICANTLY BEHIND
SCHEDULE AND PLAGUED BY PRODUCTION ERRORS. Repair worker: I seen some crazy stuff, ya
know, putting fasteners and just beatin' the shit out of em to get em to go in the hole. SOURCE: I know of one customer / They'll no
longer accept planes from Charleston due to quality issues. They will only accept final assembly done in Everett,
Washington. SOURCE: Everyday when you go to work, not
only are you doing your job, but you are looking at the previous job to see if someone has messed something else up
on that and chose not to tell anyone. UC PLANT WORKER 4: That machine malfunctioned
in there. Fucked those holes up. And they just went ahead and filled them. And I've gone ahead and told managers about
that and nothing has been done. Nothing. TO BE SURE EVERYTHING IS DONE CORRECTLY AND
THE PLANE IS SAFE, BOEING HAS QUALITY ASSURANCE INSPECTORS PAINSTAKINGLY CHECK EVERY STEP OF THE WORK. BUT IN SOUTH CAROLINA, THIS INSPECTOR SAYS
HE ONLY SIGNS OFF ON FINISHED JOBS. UC PLANT WORKER 5: Here you will do the whole
job and we just final it. You know and I'm supposed to verify that oh, you checked the hole, you did the sealant,
you put in the fastener. I never saw all that. But I'm supposed to final it and say that it's good. That's one of the problems I have. SOURCE: you think Everett's better? UC PLANT WORKER 2: I think Everett will do
what's right, to make the plane right because of the union, they have to. / Here everybody is being pushed to meet this
fucking schedule regardless of quality. Will: which do you think is the priority then,
schedule or quality? SOURCE: Schedule. IF IT'S A CONSTANT BATTLE BETWEEN QUALITY
AND SCHEDULE, WE FOUND ONE CASUALTY - 100'S OF KILOMETERS FROM SOUTH CAROLINA -- IN MISSISSIPPI. JOHN WOODS / Former Boeing engineer: My name
is John Woods, I'm an aerospace engineer. I worked for General Electric, Lockheed, Boeing. JOHN WOODS SPENT A CAREER IN THE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED
FIELD OF AEROSPACE COMPOSITES. BOEING HIRED WOODS KNOWING HE HAD QUALIFIED
PSCHIATRIC CONDITIONS - ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER, OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE DISORDER, AND MILD DEPRESSION. HIS JOB WAS TO WRITE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO
REPAIR PARTS DAMAGED DURING THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS. WOODS: It's my job to make sure that that
aircraft is safe. WOODS SAYS WHEN HE TRIED TO ENFORCE QUALITY
STANDARDS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA PLANT HE WAS BERATED BY HIS BOSSES. WOODS: In a couple of meetings, there were
several, a group of managers screaming at me to dumb down my work instruction. // saying, you have to remove requirements
from your work instructions. It's going to take too much time. WOODS SAYS HE WITNESSED DAMAGED PARTS BEING
IGNORED, PAPERED OVER AND HIDDEN FROM VIEW. WOODS: There's no doubt there are bad repairs
going out the door on the 787 aircraft.// I am worried that sooner or later, there's going to be a structural
failure on the fuselage. WOODS APPEALED TO BOEING'S HUMAN RESOURCES
DEPARTMENT CLAIMING HE WAS BEING HARASSED FOR DOING HIS JOB. INSTEAD OF COMING TO HIS DEFENSE, BOEING MANAGERS
PUT WOODS UNDER REVIEW. WEEKS LATER, THEY FIRED HIM. WOODS: I'll never forget this. The day before I was terminated, I was telling
my brother how proud I was to be working at Boeing. It's true. WOODS: So instead of saying thanks for doing
a good job, because I thought I was doing what I was supposed to be doing. / I had to leave in shame really. I was embarrassed for my own family. HE STILL HAD NOT LOST FAITH IN THE SYSTEM. HE TURNED TO THE FAA - FILING A WHISTLEBLOWER
COMPLAINT. THE DOCUMENT ALLEGED SEVEN SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA PLANT. MARY SCHIAVO / Former Inspector General, USDOT:
So I've gotten to the page where they reached their conclusions and their discussion and what they found is,
of all the allegations, all but one of them they could not substantiate and the one that they could substantiate,
they asked Boeing to fix it. Boeing said, "Okay, we fixed it." And then they closed the investigation. That's pretty much how they all go. I've seen this so many times. Woods in coffee shop: "thank you"
SCHIAVO: I always tell people, when they call me, they call me up with information and they
say, "Well, I have all this information about this dangerous situation. Should I blow the whistle?" I said, "Well, you know, not unless you have a private trust fund or another job
to go to because you'll have a problem earning a living." WOODS: I had to maximize all my credit cards
to survive, to support the family. There was a lot less money for the kids, for college and everything else. / It shouldn't be this hard to do the right
thing. WHEN WE LOOKED AT WOODS' FAA COMPLAINT, WE
NOTICED A FAMILIAR NAME -- ALI BAHRAMI. HE WAS THE FAA'S MAN IN CHARGE OF THE DREAMLINER. IN 2011, THREE YEARS BEHIND SCHEDULE, BOEING
CELEBRATED FINAL APPROVAL FOR THE 787 TO FLY. AND IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED THE ORDER. Fancher at Certification Party: "Thanks also
in recognition for Ali Bahrami, manager of the FAA's transport airplane directive. Ali …"
IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED OFF ON THE DREAMLINER BATTERIES. AND AFTER TWO FAILED AND THE FAA GROUNDED
THE DREAMLINER … IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED IT BACK INTO THE AIR. SHORTLY AFTER THAT HE RETIRED FROM THE FAA. TWO WEEKS LATER BAHRAMI WAS HIRED AS VICE-PRESIDENT
OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, WHICH LOBBIES ON BEHALF OF BOEING. ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS HE DID WAS TO APPEAR
BEFORE CONGRESS TO CALL FOR GREATER SELF-REGULATION FOR COMPANIES LIKE BOEING. Ali Bahrami / Congressional hearing: ‘We
urge the FAA to allow greater use of delegation, not only to take full advantage of industry expertise, but to increase
the collaboration that improves aviation safety." MR. BAHRAMI DECLINED OUR INTERVIEW REQUEST. SCHIAVO: One day you're regulating the airline
and the next day you're working for it. //
You can't possibly be tough on the industry that you're regulating because you'll never
get that plum job after you leave. The regulators at the FAA will rarely cross
Boeing. They simply won't. IT'S THE WASHINGTON INFLUENCE GAME - AND BOEING
IS A MASTER. LAST YEAR, THE COMPANY HAD OVER 100 REGISTERED
LOBBYISTS, 78 OF THEM WERE FORMER GOVERNMENT WORKERS. THREE WERE FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. BOEING CHIEF EXECUTIVE JIM MCNERNEY IS CHAIRMAN
OF PRESIDENT OBAMA'S EXPORT COUNCIL. THE PRESIDENT'S FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF CAME
FROM BOEING'S BOARD, AS DID HIS SECOND COMMERCE SECRETARY. AS SECRETARY OF STATE, HILLARY CLINTON HELPED
BROKER A 3.7 BILLION DOLLAR SALE OF BOEING PLANES TO A RUSSIAN AIRLINE. EVEN PRESIDENT OBAMA BOASTS THAT HE WORKS
FOR BOEING. OBAMA AT BOEING EVENT: "So I tease 'J' ever
time I see him. I say, "I deserve a gold watch because I'm
selling your stuff all the time." "J" IS JIM MCNERNEY. IT'S CLEAR WHAT BOEING GETS FROM THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT. WHAT'S NOT SO CLEAR IS WHAT IT GIVES BACK. SCOTT KLINGER / Think tank analyst: Boeing
paid no taxes in 2013, no federal income taxes. / That's not a unique year. Over the last 12 years, they claimed over
$1.6 billion in federal tax refunds even though they reported $43 billion in U.S. profits. 43 BILLION DOLLARS IN PROFIT. BUT NONE OF THAT COMES FROM THE DREAMLINER,
WHICH HAS COST BILLIONS AND IS YEARS AWAY FROM MAKING MONEY. ALL OF BOEING'S COMMERCIAL PROFIT COMES FROM
OLDER AIRCRAFT – THOSE CREATED PRIOR TO THE DREAMLINER, PRIOR TO JIM MCNERNEY, AND PRIOR TO THE MERGER. IT HAS BEEN THE TOP EXECUTIVES AND LARGEST
STOCK HOLDERS WHO HAVE BENEFITTED MOST. KLINGER: Boeing's CEO, Jim McNerney, made
$27.5 million in 2012. That was enough to pay the salaries of the president of the United States, the vice president,
the 15 cabinet secretaries, the nine Supreme Court justices, the seven joint chiefs of staff, and all 100
U.S. senators. MCNERNEY IS SET TO RETIRE WITH A PENSION OF
CLOSE TO 250 THOUSAND DOLLARS A MONTH. JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS 2013, BOEING DEMANDED
PENSION CUTS FROM ITS UNION MACHINISTS. SHANNON RYKER / Boeing machinist: For Jim
McNerney to be earning a pension at approximately a quarter of a million dollars per month and think that it's
okay for him to take my $2200 a month pension is outrageous. It's absolutely outrageous. BACK IN SOUTH CAROLINA, OUR UNAUTHORIZED TOUR
WITH BOEING'S NEW WORKFORCE IS COMING TO A CLOSE. THERE'S ONLY ONE QUESTION LEFT TO ASK. SOURCE: Would you fly on one? WORKER: um… no. SOURCE: You won't fly on one? WORKER: Noooooo
SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these planes? WORKER: I've thought about it? I thought about it… no not really
SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these mother f**kers? WORKER: Probably not. SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these? WORKER: Yeah it's sketchy. SOURCE: Sketchy? Yeah I probably would, but I kind of have
a death wish too. (laugh)
OUR SOURCE ASKED FIFTEEN OF HIS CO-WORKERS IF THEY'D FLY ON THE DREAMLINER. TEN SAID NO. UC WORKER 2: I wouldn't fly on one of these
planes (shaking his head). SOURCE: You wouldn't? Why wouldn't you? WORKER 2: Huh? SOURCE: Why wouldn't ya? WORKER 2: Because I see the quality of the
fucking shit going down around here. "Hi Mr. Loftis, Will Jordan"
"I'm sorry, Will?" "Will Jordan"
WORKERS WHO FEAR TO FLY THE PLANE THEY BUILD… QUALITY PROCESS APPARENTLY LOOSENED TO SPEED
UP SCHEDULE… WORKERS FIRED AFTER MAKING SAFETY ALLEGATIONS… WE NEEDED ANSWERS FROM BOEING. Larry Loftis: Right now we're at a very exciting
point in time, we have brought our production rate up to 10 airplanes a month, faster than any airplane
in aviation history and to the highest level of any wide-body airplane in aviation history. Will Jordan: There's a couple of documents
I want to show you here. I SHOWED HIM THE DOCUMENTS SUGGESTING BOEING
HAD CHANGED QUALITY PROCEDURES AND OVERRULED INSPECTORS TO SPEED UP PRODUCTION. MR LOFTIS WAS NOT MANAGER OF THE 787 PROGRAMME
IN 2010, WHEN THE MEMOS WERE WRITTEN. Larry Loftis: OK I am not familiar with this
document. Will Jordan: Former Boeing engineers have
told us that these represent Boeing essentially putting schedule ahead of quality. Short-changing the engineering process to
meet a schedule. Is that something you recognize? Larry Loftis: The number one focus that we
have at Boeing is ensuring the continued safe airworthiness of an airplane, the integrity of the airplane and
the quality of the airplane going out. Will Jordan: We've also heard directly from
workers inside your South Carolina plant. They paint a grim picture really of things there. They say the workforce isn't up to the job. Larry Loftis: I'm extremely confident in the
quality of the workforce in Boeing South Carolina. Will Jordan: The Boeing workers at South Carolina
don't share that confidence. Here's what some of them said. …
Paul Lewis: Guys, Guys, Guys. I'm gonna just call a halt here for a second. Can you turn the camera off for a secon? Cameraman: Why would we need to turn the camera
off? What's the problem? AND THEN, BOEING'S COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR
STOPPED THE INTERVIEW. Paul Lewis: So who are these employees that
you're speaking to in South Carolina that are making these points? Will Jordan: I can't, Obviously I can't tell
you who these employees are, but they are Boeing workers who assemble the planes that you build. Paul Lewis: Well I'm not sure it's appropriate
here and now. Will Jordan: Well I'm assuming the buck stops
with the Boeing Commercial Airplanes management and so the most senior managers are the ones to answer this. We're here with the head of the 787 programme. / And we have these things that you need to hear and you need
to provide a response to. Paul Lewis: We have not had a chance to review
this or craft a proper response. Paul Lewis: Larry, Larry, can you step out
for a second? Larry: OK but, as I do. I have the highest degree of confidence in
the production system we have, with the employees we have at the Boeing company and
our supply chain. Thanks. BOEING ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS IN WRITING,
DENYING IT COMPROMISES SAFETY OR QUALITY. IT SAID OUR INTERVIEW WAS HOSTILE, UNPROFESSIONAL
AND IN THE WORST TRADITIONS OF TABLOID-STYLE TELEVISION NEWS. THE COMPANY SAID IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT ITS
BATTERY FIX PREVENTS FAILURES. BOEING SAYS IT USES ONE, COMMON, FAA-APPROVED
QUALITY SYSTEM FOR THE 787 IN EVERETT AND CHARLESTON. BOEING NOTED ITS MEMO STATED IT DID NOT SIGNIFY
AUTHORISATION TO SHIP PARTS THAT DON'T MEET QUALITY REQUIREMENTS. BOEING SAID IT DRUG TESTS IN LINE WITH COMPANY
POLICY AND APPLICABLE LAW. THE COMPANY DENIES ANY CUSTOMER HAS SAID THEY
WILL ONLY TAKE PLANES FROM EVERETT. AS FOR JOHN WOODS, BOEING SAYS HIS SAFETY
CLAIMS HAVE "NO MERIT". TORONTO. MAY 18, 2014. AIR CANADA CELEBRATES THE DELIVERY OF ITS
FIRST 787. THIS IS THE MODERN MARKETING REALITY OF THE
DREAMLINER. AIR CANADA EXEC: Today represents a huge milestone
for Air Canada. We've been waiting a long time for this airplane. It's going to allow us to grow in unprecedented
ways. PASSENGER: Because when you were eating before
where did you put your iPad? FLIGHT ATTENDANT: Well I think our passengers
are going to be very receptive of some of the new amenities. PASSENGER: I just wanna see how for it goes
back. PASSENGER: The windows are huge. FLIGHT ATTENDANT: We are just excited because
we really genuinely love this aircraft. REPORTER: Is there anything else you wanna
add? AIR CANADA PILOT: Uh, no we're very, very
happy. REPORTER: From a seating point of view how
is it different? REPORTER: Are there more restrooms? BUT IS THERE ANOTHER REALITY? ONE REVEALED BY A BURNING BATTERY. BY THE WORDS OF THE WORKERS WHO BUILD THE
PLANES. UC WORKER: We're not building them to fly,
We're building them to sell. You know what I'm saying? BY BOEING'S APPARENT CHANGES TO ITS OWN QUALITY
PROTOCOL. BOEING SAYS THE 787 HAS NO MORE PROBLEMS THAN
PREVIOUS MODELS. THE FAA SAYS THERE'S NEVER BEEN A SAFER TIME
TO FLY. THE DREAMLINER IS THE FASTEST-SELLING PLANE
IN THE WORLD. ONE DAY WE MAY ALL FIND OURSELVES ON BOARD. WHEN WE DO, WE WILL TRUST BOEING HAS PUT QUALITY
FIRST; WE WILL TRUST THE REGULATORS HAVE BEEN RIGOROUS;
ULTIMATELY, WE WILL TRUST THE PLANE IS SAFE.
