When Pilots BREAK the rules | Royal Air Maroc Express 439

this video is done in cooperation with skillshare to claim your special deal use the link in the video description below an atr 72600 from royal air morocco express is on final approaching to al josema airport in morocco the crew is flying something called non-precision approach and the weather is quite misty as they get down to their minimum descent altitude their minima the captain doesn't see anything but still decides to continue the descent below the minimum now what's about to happen is one of the most serious incidents and indeed accidents that i have ever read about it's as close to a complete horlos that you could ever call this is a story about royal air morocc express flight 439 stay tuned flight 439 was the third flight of the day for the crew the crew was based in casablanca on the atr 72 and the roster for the day on the 9th of july 2018 was to do what we call a v-leg flight this means that the crew starts at their home base which is casablanca in this case then they were supposed to fly to al hotheima from algothema they're flying on to tanger make a quick turnaround in sanjer fly back to alhothema and then back home to their home base in casablanca again these flights are all relatively short flights and they're all domestically inside of morocco royal armor rock express is a wholly owned subsidiary to the flag carrier of morocco royal air morocc and the aircraft that is being flown is like i mentioned before an atr 72 72600 is one of the older 600s in the fleet and it's a high winged turboprop aircraft the fact that it's high winged is likely going to have a very high significance in this story now in the cockpit on this day is a very experienced senior training captain for royal air morocc he is 61 years old has 13 487 hours in total but only 193 hours on the atr 72 and that's because he has done the most of his experience on the 737 ng where he was flying for the flag carrier royale morocco earlier as a line training captain together with him in the cockpit is a much more junior first officer he's 25 years old he has 1063 hours in total and 815 of those hours is flown on the atr 72 so he's basically done his whole career on this aircraft where he started about a year earlier there's also a cadet sitting on the jump seat the reason that the cadet is there is just to observe the operation because the cadet is part of the recruitment program for royal airman rock express so the cadet is not qualified on the atr 72 when this happens on the planning stage the pilots are looking at the weather and they realize that at least in one of their destination aloe sema the weather is a bit marginal it's overcast clouds with a cloud layer of about 600 feet and there is also a very high air humidity you can see that on the weather report because the temperature was 23 degrees and the dew point which is the temperature when clouds start to form was also 23 degrees so this is indicative of some quite tricky conditions at now al-assam as an airport is also a little bit tricky it's surrounded on both the south and east and west side by terrain which means that there's only an instrument arrival available from the north towards the south runway one seven and because the terrain is fairly high on the sides the minima for the non-precision approach is also set quite high and that's because you need to be able to attain certain terrain clearance margins when you do the missed approach so even though the approach itself is flown completely over water the minima is still quite high in order for them in case of missed approach to be able to get up above the terrain as quickly as possible with all of this in mind the line training captain sets out the plan for the day and he says that i am going to be pilot flying for the first leg that way i can show you how to fly this non-precision approach into halo stima and then for the second third and fourth flight the first officer is going to be pilot flying and the captain is going to be pilot monitoring instead all said and done the aircraft's taxis out as normal in casablanca it takes off and it climbs up to their cruising altitude of level 160 which is about 16 000 feet because remember these are all domestic flights inside of morocco and they're quite short all of them during their relatively short cruise phase on their way up towards alhasema the crew receives a system warning for the egpws system that's the enhanced ground proximity warning system and the warning basically says terrain fault okay that's an indication that the system has gone into a slightly degraded mode and the crew discusses this among themselves and realizes that it's probably because of a temporary lack of satellites gps satellites and that can happen from time to time right if there's not enough satellites to give a good enough position for the aircraft to satisfy the egpws system well then it's going to give this warning for as long as you know there is a lack of satellites and six minutes later this warning disappears which indicates that the system is now fully functional again the crew doesn't discuss this much more they continue uh towards allosema they initiated their descent remember the captain is pilot flying for this one and they decide that they're going to fly a r nav approach right this is an approach that is a non-precision approach based on gps coordinates on the way into algothema the minimum for this particular approach is 1030 feet that's the lowest that you're allowed to fly without having a proper visual picture of the runway that you're about to fly into right so as you reach 1030 feet you need to see the runway that you're about to land on in order to continue to approach this is an issue because the cloud base is reported to be only 800 feet the cloud base is the lower part of the cloud okay so if you have a mda a minimum which is a 1030 feet and a cloud base that is 800 feet it means that you're likely inside of cloud as you reach a minima and you won't be able to see the runway as needed all said and done the crew elects to continue to start the approach anyway they fly the approach reasonably stabilized but when they get down to their mda their minima they don't see anything the captain cannot see the runway in front of him now the correct thing to do in this case is to initiate a go around okay because you don't legally have what it takes in order to continue the approach but here is where things are starting to really become shady because the captain now decides to continue the descent without visual references below the mda he initiates the descent in a vertical speed mode means he's telling the aircraft to continue to descend at a set rate of 1000 feet per minute now if you go in and have a look at the descent rate that you get from the approach plate you can see that at around 120 knots that they're flying they should be around 650 700 feet per minute so this means that the captain is now descending quicker than the actual approach path is about a minute later the egpws the ground proximity warning system issues a hard warning it says terrain ahead pull up terrain ahead pull up this is extremely serious warning because this is the aircraft telling you that you are in a position where you're likely going to suffer a sea fit accident a controlled flight into terrain accident the only acceptable way to react to that warning is to do what we call a terrain escape maneuver okay that is a maneuver where you just add full trust you pitch up and you make sure that you maintain your current configuration and this is basically just escaping trying to get away from the terrain as quickly as possible because that warning indicates that you don't really know where you are something has gone wrong in your navigation and you've ended up in a place where you are close to terrain where you shouldn't be so this is the training we all receive you know all pilots that are flying aircraft that are equipped with gpws system are trained to do this exact maneuver if they get this warning but that's not what happens instead the captain action continues to descend disregarding this warning he gets as low as 45 feet over the sea then he levels the aircraft off he climbs up to a maximum altitude of 108 feet that's about 33 meters over the sea and continues flying at that altitude until he sees the runway and goes into land this is an outrageous disregard for established procedures and minimums and you would ask yourself what is the first officer doing in the middle of all this well turns out not much right there's not much calls coming from the first officer and this it seems like the captain is basically flying this aircraft by himself and he's getting very minimum support or suggestions from the first officer now what he should have said was he should have initiated you know do the terrain escape maneuver or at least the go around something like that because it's a flagrant disregard of procedures but this does not happen the aircraft lands from this approach the taxi into the terminal and just to give you an idea here it's if you find yourself in a situation where you've had a hard gpws warning well then after you've initiated and done the terrain escape maneuver and then gone in and landed of that you are actually required to stop the aircraft pull the cockpit voice recorder circuit breaker to make sure that everything that led up to that incident is being saved and then you call your company and most likely you're going to be stood down you're not going to be able to continue to fly after an incident like that right because there needs to be an investigation this doesn't happen instead the crew makes their turn around in halo thema they fly a very short flight over towards tangier and then after they've landed in tangier sitting on the apron there then they start discussing what to do next time that they're coming into a lot okay and what's about to happen now guys is many magnitudes worse than the first approach believe it or not so when they're sitting on the apron now in tangier the first officer is going to be pilot flying for this leg and they decide to do a combined departure and approach briefing now this is fairly common if you're doing really short flights there's not enough time in flight to do a proper approach briefing so what you do then is that you go through and discuss the approach briefing on the ground and then you just do the small applicable parts like making sure that the fmc is properly set up the computer and that the minimums are set when you're in flight and then you just recap what you talked about on the ground so this is perfectly a normal now the captain says that on the next approach that we do into aldothema we're not going to do the rnav approach that we did last time instead we're going to do a vor approach okay this is still a non-precision approach but this time it's flown not with references to gps points but with references to a ground-based vor nav aid the benefit of doing that is that the minimum is a little bit lower so the mda on the vr approach is 760 feet instead of 1030 feet and the thought here obviously is that they noticed already that the weather wasn't great at that of them and they want to get as low down towards the airport as possible in order to see the runway this makes perfect sense but in this part of the briefing the captain is also saying to the first officer that if you get down to 760 feet and we don't see anything then i want you to continue to descend to 400 feet instead we'll level off and then we'll continue to fly at 400 feet until we reach the missed approach point which is at two nautical miles prior to the vor if we haven't seen anything there well then we will execute the missed approach once again this is a flagrant disregard for the rules right the mda is there for reasons there to safeguard the flight in case of a missed approach so why is the captain so keen on going lower well we'll never really know that for sure but the likelihood is that the captain knows that the approach is flown over water so he doesn't see the danger in going below the mda the minima because there's only water there anyway and he's also done exactly that on the previous approach and managed to land of it okay it's a little bit of get there itis you know when a flight crew is so focused on getting the aircraft to land at their destination that they're doing things that they shouldn't be doing okay all said and done the first officer agrees that okay that we can do this right which is a complete no-no by the way but also here he comes with his own little suggestion and he says that since they got that warning the gpws warning on the previous approach maybe we should turn off the gpws on this approach because that warning was a bit untimely obviously that warning was untimely because they shouldn't have been where they were right they were 1.7 kilometers away from the runway at 45 feet so this suggestion indicates a fundamental lack of understanding for what the system is doing but there is also a possibility that he might have thought that the warnings were incorrect because of the earlier issues that they had with the egpws system on their flight over towards al-huthim on their first flight we will never really know that in any case the captain takes up the minimum equipment list which is a manual that we have where if we have a broken system onboard the aircraft we can verify in this manual whether or not we're allowed to fly with it or if we need engineering to fix it now this this mel it's not supposed to be used for deciding which systems that we can turn off it's supposed to be there in case something breaks and we want to know whether or not it's safe to fly with that system not functioning anyway the captain decides by reading the mel that it is perfectly legal to fly without it so we can turn it off so already here you can kind of see how the uh the kind of you know holes in the swiss cheese model is starting to line up right they're already briefing about how to disregard established rules and turning off systems that are there to save them to help them the kind of final warning systems that are there to avoid disasters now before we continue and explain what happens on this second approach into allosema there are a couple of things that we need to discuss first of all a stabilized approach okay now i have mentioned the importance of stabilized approaches in previous videos okay many other accidents have happened because the pilots have not been stabilized now what we're trying to achieve with the stabilized approach is to give the pilots time to concentrate on the landing ahead okay we don't want the aircraft to be in a position where a lot of maneuvering is needed because it's much less likely that if we have to do a lot of maneuvering or a lot of configuration for example that will be able to get the aircraft safely down okay so what the industry has said is that in most cases you need to be stabilized either by a thousand feet if you're inside cloud or 500 feet if you're nitrogen visual and by stabilizer we mean that you need to be on the right altitude at the right position you need to have the correct speed you need the aircraft to be configured the way it should be configured with gear down and the final flaps out okay the trust needs to be set at a final approach value which is appropriate but only minor changes to be done on all of these things if that's the case well then you're stabilized and you can continue to approach for a safe landing if you reach a thousand feet in imc in the cloud and you are lacking one of these well then it's much safer to go around give yourself some more time do a second approach stabilize yourself earlier and then come down and land as always when we're flying it's all about safety it's all about giving ourselves the margins needed to land the aircraft in a proper and safe way now the second thing that i want to point out is how the crews are taught to fly a non-precision approach according to their flight crew training manual so basically what they're supposed to do and at what distance in order to be able to achieve a stabilized approach and in the flight crew training manual for royal amarok express it says that prior to the final approach fix that's the distance when they're supposed to initiate their final descend down towards the runway four miles prior to that they need to call for flaps 15. follow quickly with gear down flaps 30. now the aircraft is basically completely configured for landing just prior to descent they're supposed to set the missed approach altitude in their autopilot selector as they fly over the faf they're supposed to initially initiate the descent rate the slightly higher the sentry than what's indicated on the approach plate that's because of the inertia of the aircraft get a little bit high but pretty soon after that they're supposed to level the aircraft out on a descent rate that's indicated from the plate okay the pilot monitoring is supposed to give distances versus altitudes to give an indication to the powerfly whether they're high or low and the speed should be pretty much constant at this point they should also complete the landing checklist so that when they pass a thousand feet above the landing air drone they're completely stabilized with all of the approach checklist and the landing checklist complete and they can now just focus to continue down to their mda to decide either to continue in case they are visual or if they don't see it runway execute a go around now this way of flying a non-position approach is called well it has many many names but one of them is kanpa constant angle non-precision approach it's also called a cda constant descent approach and many others but the point here is that we fly these approaches just like we fly in ils with a constant descent down and then if we don't see anything we go around now back in the old days we used to do something called dive and drive basically which is where you fly over particular distances from the runway and once you pass that you can descend down to for example your mda and then you can level off and you can fly on the mda with all of the gear and the flaps and everything hanging out and level flight until you reach from this approach point right this is how people use the flight approaches back in the day but it has been very clearly established that it's much safer to fly it the kampa way the cda way now the only issue with flying it that way is that because you are constantly descending and not maintaining your altitude there is a chance that you might shoot through your mda and that's not allowed right you cannot descend below your mda and the way that we have you know fixed this is that we've added either 30 40 or 50 feet depending on which aircraft you're flying and which company you're working for to the minimum so if we have an mda of 760 feet like in this case well in that case we've set the minima to 800 feet that gives us the margin so when we get down to 800 feet if we don't see anything we'll press toga and we'll go around and the aircraft will just descend slightly never reaching the mda of 760 feet and we've flown the the approach as safely and as accurately as possible so i just wanted to give you that as a slight background and after this short break i will tell you what happened on this absolutely mind-boggling third approach i also want to take a few seconds here to say a special thank you to the sponsor of this episode which is skillshare now i know that you are watching this because you are a curious person a lifelong learner someone who constantly wants to improve and understand the world around you better and in that case skillshare is definitely something that you should be checking out okay they have thousands of high quality video courses and pretty much anything that you can imagine a course that i'm using myself at the moment is five minutes creativity with jasmine cheyenne where she gives kind of hands-on tips on how to chisel out a few minutes to be creative every single day and it's something that i personally really need but there are also courses in you know storytelling creative photography or even how to use your own home simulator to improve and prepare before you start your private pilot license something that i've been doing together with my oldest son lucas and he really really enjoys using skillshare is really affordable it's less than ten dollars per month but the one thousand first of you who uses this link in the description below will get a whopping 30 off the annual fee of skillshare premium so you can support me by supporting them go down click the link and let me know what your favorite course is i'd love to hear let's continue with the accident flights the royal amarok express flight 439 and what happened so the aircraft has now left tangier and it's at its cruising altitude of flat level one trees here about thirteen thousand feet proceeding up for second approach into al josema the crew has already pre-briefed that they will continue to descend below their minimum descent altitude if they don't see what they're required to see at their minimum okay now as they get their initial descent clearance to 6 000 feet the captain continues to brief the first officer about what to do in case of a missed approach and he also adds kind of an omnious comment to the briefing where he says don't worry i will be monitoring the speed and the water now why would he say that he was going to be monitoring the water well that will become very obvious very soon so the aircraft starts descending as it descends past 4500 feet the captain reaches over and disconnects the egp egpws the ground proximity warning systems like they had briefed on the ground in tangier they continue to descend down to three thousand feet they get into contact with al josema tower and the aloha tower gives them the latest weather the weather is runway 1-7 in use winds are calm visibility is 4 000 meters in mist cloud base is overcast 600 feet temperature is 23 and the dew point is 23 the qnh the air pressure is 1016. now this is really important information because it tells you a couple of things first of all the visibility is only 4 000 meters the required to do the approach is 3200 meters so visibility is starting to be quite bad and that's over the runway this approach is being flown over the sea and since the temperature and dew point of 23 it's very possible that the visibility over the sea is even worse okay something called sea fog can very quickly form during these conditions especially when the wind is calm the other thing obviously is that the cloud base is 600 feet which is well below their minima however this crew doesn't seem to be too bothered about that because they've already decided that they are going to disregard their minima and fly lower anyway as the aircraft continues to sand past 3000 feet and then to 2100 feet the captain starts to tell the first officer to slow down it's obvious here that he realizes that the aircraft is a little bit hot and high a little bit high on profile a little bit high on speed so he asks the speed to reduce from 220 knots back to 170 knots as the aircraft levels off at 2100 feet it does so just prior to reaching the final approach fix the aircraft goes into altered hold which means it goes into level flight and it still has a quite high speed at this point this is significant because if the aircraft pauses to final approach fix in altitude hall it means that it's going to become very quickly high on profile the captain acknowledges that and tells the first officer to reset the mcp altitude first officer reaches over and it's at 400 feet just like they had been discussing on the ground earlier on but remember according to the correct profile that we talked about before he should have been setting 3000 feet which was the missed approach altitude and the reason that that's important is because in case you need to do a go around the aircraft needs to be set up to be able to capture the missed approach altitude so you don't fly through that but they set 400 feet they initiated the descent at 1800 feet they select flaps 15 and as they pass about 1500 feet they select gear down now at this point the captain is obviously very concerned about their altitude because he tells the first officer to continue go go to the limit and the first officer responds to that by increasing the vertical speed to 1800 feet per minute if you look at the kind of vertical speed that they should be keeping at this point in the approach they should be back at their approach speed plus maybe 20 knots maximum and that would give them the center speed of about 650 to 700 feet per minute they've now selected 1800 feet per minute which means that not only are they going to get onto the profile they're going to go below the profile very very quickly and that is exactly what happens when they pass the landing gate at 1 000 feet remember that's when they should be completely stabilized with all of their checklists completed they are far from stabilized they don't have their landing flaps they're only at flap 15 at the moment they're about 240 feet below their profile and the speed is way too high they have a speed of about 150 knots at that point it should be at maximum about 125 knots so the right thing to do at this point is to execute the go around right the aircraft is not stabilized they are running behind the aircraft they should just go around and slow things down but this is not what happens at around 800 feet they select flaps 30 which is the landing flap and they complete the landing checklist very soon after that the aircraft is still at 1800 feet per minute vertical speed so it goes into altitude star which is the equivalent of altitude acquire in the boeing where the aircraft tries to pitch up in order to capture its selected altitude of 400 feet so the aircraft starts pitching up and when the first officer recognizes this he resets the altitude once again first down a little bit and then up to 9400 feet which doesn't make any kind of sense but if you think of the kind of workload that he would be under during this approach where nothing is done the way it's supposed to be done it kind of makes sense it just sets something higher when they reach 400 feet remember that when they're supposed to be maintaining 400 feet until distance two which is the missed approach point the captain still doesn't see anything on the runway and he says keep going keep going to 300. first officer once again input vertical speed 1800 feet per minute this is at 400 feet at 310 feet the first officer is starting to indicate that he's not feeling very happy about this the aircraft continues to descend with a very high descent rate and at about 135 feet he actually reduces the descent rate 1400 feet per minute and he also says this this this is not normal and then in his mother tongue arabic he also says uh i'm taking it manual he disconnects the autopilot and at 80 feet over the sea the first officer now starts to pitch up he still hasn't set go around but he's just gone manual started pitch up and as soon as he's doing this the captain reaches in and pushes forward so now you have two pilots that are struggling with the controls one is pulling back to climb the other one is pushing forward the captain turns out to be a little bit stronger than the first officer the aircraft continues to descend at 35 feet the first officer adds gore on trust but it's too late the aircraft continues to descend with about -3 degrees of attitude it impacts the water with 3.2 gs at about 1.4 nautical miles short of the runway the aircraft bounces off the water it's then descending into the water again this time with a 3.9 g impact and just to get you a little bit of a feeling of how of strong of an impact that is if we do a landing and we impact with more than 2.1 gs we need to call engineering to do a hard landing inspection so these are very very strong impacts with the sea after the second impact amazingly the aircraft starts climbing away that's because the captain has now released controls probably from the shock of the impact the first officer is still pulling back on the controls and remember how in the beginning of the video i said that it was going to be important the fact that the atr 72 has a high wing structure well it is likely that if this would have been a low wing aircraft well then as the aircraft impacted the water the engines would have also touched and it would have caught the aircraft to cartwheel over and this would have been a completely different story but because the aircraft now impacted the water with only its body and its landing gear it could continue to climb away which is what happened but the captain still shows sign of being very confused at this point we know this because in a normal go around with the atr 72 once the goron is called for you're supposed to go from your landing flap to flap 30 to flaps 15 and then as you get positive rate you can select the gear up but what the captain actually does is as the aircraft starts climbing he reaches over and he goes from flaps 30 all the way to flaps up the aircraft is climbing very steeply now and has a very low speed and this could have actually caused the aircraft to stall completely but because it takes about 14 seconds for the flaps to be retracted from flap 30 to flaps up the first officer is actually pitching forward as this is happening so the aircraft is continuing to accelerate and it doesn't go into stall right there's not even any mentioning in the funnel report about any stick shaker being activated and uh i know this because it was highlighted by a different channel which i wanted to check out fly with magnar uh he is an atr captain that did a video on this incident as well and if you want even more technical descriptions of this incident then i suggest you you check it out out here anyway as the aircraft is now climbing away they call air traffic control and tells them that they have done a go-around and that they are diverting towards nador air traffic control comes back reads it back and then asks them what the reason for the go-around is this is something that they very often do the captain goes onto the radio and says well we've had a bird strike bird strike anyway they continue to fly to nador they do a normal descent approach and landing in the door and when they get out and have a look at the aircraft after landing they realize that there is substantial damage to the aircraft there is a big gaping hole in the part of the underbelly where the landing gear is situated and the landing gear both the main gear and the nose gear have recorded well above structural limit loads so this means that not only does the body need to be repaired but also the landing gear needs to be completely replaced but the main thing here and the amazing thing is that none of the 52 passengers nor the cabin crew or the pilot are injured right no one is injured in this incredible event and this ladies and gentlemen this is as close to a complete whole loss as you can possibly get without actually having a whole loss it is incredible that everyone survived this event now in the report which the captain had to write after this he initially insisted that it was a bird strike that caused the incident but given the amount of damage to the aircraft he would have had to impact the dragon from lord of the rings in order for that to happen so he subsequently changed the report to tell the authorities that he's actually impacted the sea as part of the approach because of that this is now a huge investigation and the investigation came to some quite obvious conclusions this accident was caused by non-compliance with operational procedures specifically the disregard of the mda their minimum they're continuing a completely unstabilized approach they're voluntarily shut down of the ground proximity warning system and the lack of effective crm on the flight deck this is an extremely strongly worded final report as it should be the recommendations that the final report came out with was for royal amarok to implement better crm training that would emphasize the importance of speaking up when something is wrong and for correct decision making to happen on the flight deck they also needed to check and verify and train the crew's understanding of how to fly a constant descent angle approach the importance of adhering to minimas and to stabilized approaches but all in all this is a complete rebuke of how this crew manages to fly this approach and how they completely disregarded very well established safety norms and procedures now the obvious question that i'm going to get is what happened to the pilots did they get to keep their jobs were they fired were there any criminal investigations attached to this and the honest answer to that is i don't know that's not the way that these funder boats are built they're not built to kind of give out you know blame or tell airlines what to do with the pilots they're only constructed to share knowledge with the rest of the flying population out there to avoid things like this from ever happening again when it comes to what happened to the pilots that is an internal procedure that goes on inside of the airlines and i have no idea what happened to these guys now if you want to ask me questions so you want to come with suggestions about other incidents and accidents that i should be covering then send it in either by the metro aviation app or via my discord server or you can send it in to news mentorpilot.com have an absolutely fantastic day and i'll see you next time bye [Music] you

Channel: Mentour Pilot

Views: 396,890

Rating: 4.905952 out of 5

Keywords: Royal Air Maroc Express, Al Hoceima, Royal Air Maroc Express 439, RAM 439, Water landing, ART 72, ATR72-600, air crash investigation 2021, air crash investigation full episodes, Final report, Crash in the sea, unstabilized approach, Fear of flying, Breaking rules, Aviation minima, mentour pilot crash, Mentour Pilot, Seconds from disaster, fear of flying help, nervous flyer, Cover up, Aircraft damage, Boeing 737MAX, Boeing 737, Airbus A350, Boeing 747, Why aircraft crash

Id: ifZyclQ5QCQ

Length: 37min 31sec (2251 seconds)

Published: Fri May 28 2021

Reddit Comments

[u/badreddls]

I really enjoy watching this guy talk about planes, i started binge watching his videos two weeks ago. I was under the impression that aviation safety was taken seriously in morocco (i mean i didnt think there was a plane accident that happened in morocco since that one plane-assisted pilote suicide in agadir in 1992).....

[u/no-void]

Small mistake in the title : this happened in 2018

[u/MeMalankos]

The trainer is training in disregard for flight safety. Only explanation is that the safety culture is rotten. I am not surprised really. I see it every where in Morocco. Trafic, building codes, the beaches, health care etc.

[u/Realistic-Wish-681]

This is probably the reason why civil pilots need to train with the airforce now.

Still remembering the 737 missing a wing that was parked in Oujda or the case of the drunk pilot. But still RAM pilots have a good track record.There is another video on the channel with a positive story.

[u/LouisTheTurd]

I just watched this and the level of irresponsibility and amateurism is so unbelievable. There are some extra info and pictures in the official incident report (French ofc...):

https://www.aviationcivile.gov.ma/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Report-CN-COH.pdf

Happy the catastrophe was avoided and none got injured and I hope the pilots (especially the captain) lost their licenses.

EDIT: Correct report: https://www.aviationcivile.gov.ma/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Rapport-Final\_CN-COH\_09.07.2018.pdf

[u/no-void]

I took the 2nd flight a couple of times before covid, think I might skip flying domesticly from now on tho ...