[MUSIC PLAYING] MALIK GHACHEM: Good
afternoon, everyone. Welcome and thank
you for joining us for this online
discussion of Haiti at a critical moment
in its history. My name is Malik Ghachem and
I teach on the history faculty at MIT. We are delighted to
have as our guests today, four extraordinary
experts on Haitian affairs. I want to first say a
brief word of thanks to Michelle English at MIT
Center for International Studies for organizing this
event, making it possible. Then I want to say
just a little bit about the background to
the current political and constitutional crisis in
Haiti as a way of laying the ground for our discussion. In a sense, the central
question of this discussion is how far back to date the
origins of the current crisis. 2018 seems to have been
a turning point of sorts, at least in terms of the
scope of popular protest in Haiti, which
expanded dramatically in response to reports of
a government corruption scandal involving the
embezzlement of funds from the Venezuelan oil aid
program known as Petrocaribe, as well as chronic
fuel shortages linked to the termination
of that same program. Since 2018, Haiti
has seen a surge in kidnappings carried out
by armed gangs, some linked to the government, who
continue to operate with relative impunity
into the present. The first half of 2021 has
brought massive protests against the de
facto administration and its insistence
that it has the right to remain in office
one year longer than most observers believe
the 1987 constitution allows, a deeply unpopular claim
in Haiti that the United States, the OAS, and
the United Nations have all nonetheless endorsed. The terms of most members
of parliament have expired, the country's
judiciary is on strike, and the de facto president has
resorted to rule by decree. In short, Haiti's in the
midst of a full-fledged constitutional crisis and
in the midst of this crisis, the current
government is pushing ahead with very
controversial plans for a nationwide referendum
on constitutional reform set for June and national
elections later this year under the authority
of a contested, provisional electoral council,
which is the body that administers elections in Haiti. Our purpose in
the Starr Forum is to bring to bear the
views of four leading experts on two issues. The first, what
has been the role of the international
community and Haiti's extended political crises
since the end of the Duvalier era in 1986 and the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution? And the second issue is
what steps, if any, can the international community take
to help end the current crisis and help create a political
climate in which the needs of the vast majority of Haitians
are served by their government? Our speakers, in the
order that they will speak and they will each talk for
about five or six minutes, then will have a
conversation among the group before opening it
up to questions from the audience, our speakers
in the order they will speak our Robert Fatton, who
is the Giulia Cooper professor of Government
and Foreign Affairs at UVA. His books include Haiti's
Predatory Republic, which came out in 2007, the Roots
of Haitian Despotism, which appeared in I think the
first number was 2003, the Roots of Haitian
Despotism 2007, and then just
published last month a new book called The
Guise of Exceptionalism: Unmasking the
National Narratives of Haiti and the United States. Sabine Manigat, a former
professor and researcher at the Falcudad Latinoamericano
de Ciencias Sociales FLACSO in Mexico City. She's also taught at the
University de'Etat d'Haiti at Quisqueya University. She's published a number
of important articles on the Haitian political
crisis, some of which are noted on your screen there. George Fauriol is
a senior associate at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies and a fellow at the
Caribbean Policy Consortium. He's also former vise president
of the National Endowment for Democracy, published widely
on Caribbean affairs and US foreign policy in such journals
as Foreign Affairs and others. He has a recent commentary
on the Haitian crisis on the website Global Americans. Lastly, Amy Wilentz who teaches
at the University of California Irvine. She is a-- excuse me,
Wilentz, I believe, is the correct pronunciation. Apologies Amy. She is a writer and literary
journalist and author of two well-known
books on Haiti, the Rainy Season, Haiti Since
Duvalier, which came out in 1990, and farewell Fred
Voodoo: a letter from Haiti, which came out in 2013. Thank you all to these four
wonderful writers and scholars. We will begin with remarks
from Robert Fatton of UVA. ROBERT FATTON: Well
thank you, Malik. And thank you for inviting
me to this Zoom session. This is a pleasure
to join all of us. We're going to talk
about the Constitution and its relationship to
the crisis at the moment. Well president Jovenel Moise,
as well as many other Haitian leaders, have contended that
the Constitution of 1987 has caused political instability
and compromised the country's development. All of complained
that the president is a prisoner of a dysfunctional
parliament, triggering deadlocks and permanent crisis. In this perspective,
the solution is to amend or craft
a new constitution. It seems to me, however, that
the Constitution has never been the cause of Haiti's
recurring systemic breakdowns. In fact, government
officials, opposition groups, and major foreign
powers have consistently violated the Constitution. It is hard to understand
why a new constitution would escape this fate. This is not to say that
the Constitution is ideal. For instance, it has
burdened the country with a complicated
and very costly system of multiple elections
scheduled at different times. Elaborated in the aftermath
of Duvalier's dictatorship, it was explicitly
designed to weaken the presidency and
empower Parliament in order to prevent the
personal rule of a new despot. In reality, however,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Renee Preval, Michel
Martelly, and Jovenel Moise have, at times, ruled by decree
and without a parliament. They have abused their
executive authority and undermined
constitutional order. What I'm suggesting,
therefore, is that while the
Constitution is imperfect, it is not the cause
of Haiti's crisis. The crisis is rooted
on the one hand in the country's massive
social inequalities and it's inherited
authoritarian traditions, and on the other hand
on the neoliberal economic policies
adopted by Haitian rulers and their supporters in
the international financial institutions. For the past 40 years,
these institutions, with the assistance of NGOs
and for-profit contractors, of privatized developmental
projects and in the process, eviscerated the
Haitian state, which has no capacity to provide
basic services to its citizens. Foreign interventionism has not
been limited to the economy. It has taken the form of coups,
sanctions, embargoes as well as outright military
occupation and heavy handed humanitarianism. It has also orchestrated
the funding of elections and their final outcomes. And not surprisingly,
Haiti's leaders have come to appeal
to, and rely on, major international powers for
their continued hold on office. In some instances,
these powers determine their ultimate political fate. Changing the Constitution will
not erase these realities. What Haiti lacks is
a constitutionalism based on the balance of power,
compelling key political actors into accepting an
institutionalized set of practices, which
would have habituate them into acknowledging limits
to both electoral defeat and victory. Can a new Constitution engender
that kind of constitutionalism? I seriously doubt it. Elections in Haiti have always
been highly problematic before, during, and after
they take place. In the aftermath, losing parties
have challenged the fairness of their defeat while
the victors have always asserted the absolute
legitimacy of their triumph. These electoral
disputes have undermined governmental authority,
invited foreign interference in social conflicts,
and increased the role of militarized gangs. Moreover, political
parties in Haiti are organized around
a coterie of big men who join and abandon
new alliances in a never ending, opportunistic [FRENCH]. They're constant
moves are motivated by the acute competition
for [INAUDIBLE] gains and the spoils of public office. This is what I have
called [FRENCH]---- [INAUDIBLE] politics,
which is a politics based on the capture of the state
for the illicit enrichment of those who run it. The question then is
what is to be done? In my opinion, neither
holding a referendum on June 27 for a
new Constitution, nor having general elections
later on this year, will bring a resolution
to the current crisis. A new Constitution cannot on its
own transform political actors into democratic saints. In conditions of extreme
social polarization, it can only offer the fragility
of written rules which are unlikely to withstand
the ferocious zero-sum game of Haitian politics. The Haitian proverb
expresses well this reality. [FRENCH] In other words,
consitution are made up of paper, bayonet of steel. Moreover, a legitimate
crafting and adoption of a new constitution
requires not only respecting the rule
of law, but also the forging of a huge
political majority, transcending ideological
and class interests. Such a task seems to be
well beyond Jovenel Moise's increasingly
debilitated statecraft. Moreover, conducting election
in the current climate of generalized insecurity,
popular protests, and logistical
unpreparedness will only exacerbate the existing crisis. In my view, it is
astonishing that the international
community is still calling for an electoral
process in these conditions, and when major sectors
of Haitian civil society oppose it. It is as if past
experiences do not matter. What is needed now is
a historic compromise leading to the creation of a
government of national unity composed of individuals without
immediate political ambitions. This government would serve
for a negotiated period of time and would be charged
with establishing an environment conducive to
fair and legitimate elections. These elections might, in turn,
lead to the potential revision or amendment of the Constitution
according to existing constitutional norms. To achieve this objective, there
must be a simultaneous process whereby on the one
hand, President Moise and his administration
relinquish power, and on the other hand,
the political parties of the opposition stop their
protest and civil disobedience. While such a
compromise is unlikely, it is possible because without
it, the country faces a descent into chaos and the specter
of another foreign occupation the result of which would
be a repeat of past failures and the total surrender
of Haiti's sovereignty. Thank you. MALIK GHACHEM: Thank
you very much, Robert. Our next speaker
is Sabine Manigat. Sabine, welcome, and thank you. SABINE MANIGAT: Well thank you
very much for the invitation and I will start
straightforward. First, acknowledging that
the situation in Haiti is object, of course,
of growing concern in several parts of
the world, but mainly in the United States. It's not necessary to insist
on the historical economic and political reasons for this. The outbreak of a new climax
since the summer of 1918 has put forward
the many failures of a regime set in place
and openly supported by external institution. Mainly the UN, OASU, [? ASAY ?]
but also other countries. Many facts could
illustrate this. Electoral results at all
stages of the 1920 elections to the creation of the US
ambassador in Martelly's nationality among others. But most important
is the new situation created since July 1918. First, the crisis has turned
increasingly political, despite the reality
of an economic crisis and its many dramatic fall
outs for the population living conditions. Second, after a
nine month period of upheaval from the
gas crisis of July 18, to the [INAUDIBLE] movement
on February March 2019, the dynamics of
the confrontation has opposed systematically. A series of mainly Pacific
citizen demonstration, like sit-ins, marches-- among them that of October
and November 1918-- to the growing
brutality of the police, we lead today by a
network of criminal gangs. This approach of
the Haitian crisis is to suggest that first, not
only the core of the crisis is domestic, but that its main
protagonists are also domestic. And two, that the
crisis encompasses every aspect of the Haitian
society and therefore, falls short of understanding
if restricted to a juridic, and more globally, a crisis
with international over-spills to quote Sir Ronald
Sanders from the CARICOM. What we have is a
radical questioning, the result of the exhaustion
of an entire system. The leitmotif of all the
demonstrations since 1918 have been changed the system. The attitudes of parties
and personalities over wide political range,
new ex-parliamentarians eager to distance themselves
from a regime which some of them were part of. And a number of
citizen organizations that have taken some leadership. Today, what we
witnessed is a revival of a strong social movement with
deep roots in Haitian history, although regularly
battered by repression from an exclusive
and elitist state. On the other hand, Haiti's
fate and vicissitudes have long been subject to
international pressures, intimidation, and in
many cases, domination. And although, clearly, the
main and most influence is the United States, it is
not the only player in this. The involvement of the OAS,
of many Latin American states, of the CARICOM, or
the European Union, respond to strategic, economic,
or geopolitical interests that the US's policy in
Haiti does not comprehend. Generally speaking, a weak
Haitian state traditionally, submitted to
external powers, has been questioned by many social
movements that have reached today's citizen lead maturity. The new step forward
has been that both the international
dismantlement of the Haitian state since 1991, but
particularly since 2004, and the pugnacity of a renewed
and mature social movement have led to watch Juan
Gabriel Valdez, former special
representative and head of the UN mission
in Haiti, describes as a Haitian state that has
practically disappeared. Its institution, always
weak in the past, have collapsed before
the autocratic character of an Executive branch that has
not hesitate to systematically violate the Constitution. However, this is only
one side of the issue. A broader view
suggests that there is much at stake in
the Haitian case. Of course, migration
issues, economic interests have been put forward. But as Valdez puts it, the
well-known Haitian fatigue is apparent in the
international community, but in Haiti, there's
also enormous fatigue with international intervention. What can the international
community do to help? [? Remald ?] and Valdez, in
the dialogue issue that we have read, has taken a stance. Clearly, the balance of
power can solve the issue, but the price of an
authoritarian or unilateral intervention would be constant
and renewed instability, which has not been the history
of Haiti all along, but the consequence of the
crisis of a dictatorship facing growing social demands. Thank you. MALIK GHACHEM:
Thank you very much. Thank you very much Sabine. Our next speaker
is George Fauriol. George, please. GEORGE FAURIOL:
Thank you, Malik. I'm delighted to join this
panel discussion about Haiti. Last week, I guess I was
putting some notes together and I was pessimistic
that developments were not only at an impasse,
but likely to seriously get more complicated. Today, I guess I'm cautiously
pessimistic in the sense that I think there is
potentially a way forward, but remains very uncertain
as to what that path really is, is what we already
have heard from the two previous speakers. Let me limit my three
remarks to primarily the international community's
role in all of this. First, the [INAUDIBLE]
government's determination to
pursue the road towards a constitutional
referendum in late June is narrowing by the day. Logistical political
issues, clearly, is increasingly making this a
figment of their imagination. A signal development,
I think in this regard, as yesterday's statement by
the acting Assistant Secretary for Western
Hemisphere Julie Chung that the United States, in
effect, will not support. And that, in practice, means not
only politically but financial, will not support the government
the Haitian government's push for a referendum. Whether that actually sinks
in among Haitian leadership remains to be seen,
but I think that's an important clarification. So it's also, in some
ways, hopefully will help clarify the statements
on this issue, both the national elections
and the referendum, made by other international
actors, most notably the Organization of
American States, which for the past almost six
months now since last December in particular, has voiced
confusing, and somewhat evasive support for the
national elections, and to some confusing
degree also, the referendum. And in the last several
weeks has actually now found itself internally with
further internal disputes raised by, particularly,
several CARICOM countries in the wake of a resolution
of the permanent council of the OAS regarding trying
to provide some support and assistance in support of the
Haitian people and the crisis. The point of dispute
ultimately became, and has become, a
public issue, which is whether what the OAS is
ultimately talking about is support with elections, or
support for the referendum, or both. The fact that even this
discussion is emerging publicly is really not a
good indication of the international community's
role in this particular crisis and reminds, I
think, everyone those that follow Haiti fairly
closely of the checkered record of the international
community in Haiti. Second, voices in
the US Congress are becoming louder,
expressing both their concern that the Biden
administration has not been perceived as
engaged enough, although the statement from
Secretary Chung, in some ways, points now in a more positive
constructive direction. Also that the situation
in Haiti is deteriorating. There have been
several statements from members of Congress on this
issue for the last two or three months. There is an editorial that
appeared earlier this week from Congresswoman
Wilson of Florida and colleagues
that, in some ways, summarizes the concerns and
rings the alarm bell, if you will, from Capitol Hill. Also, the announcement of the
formation of a congressional, at least on the House
side, Haiti caucus also points to a more energetic
engagement on the part at least of the United States. It's probably ultimately bad
news for the US government that had more or less
assumed that they had gotten a pass during
the Trump administration and somehow hoped that this
would ultimately play itself out positively under
the new administration. I don't think that's
going to happen. Finally, a third point. All of these developments may
not be happening fast enough. What worries me the most
is I really don't quite see the emerging consensus
that's required politically in Haiti to ultimately bring the
pieces together toward a more constructive outcome. There's been for over a
year now some discussions, including an active
civil society engagement, not to be underestimated. Some models involving the change
of a consensus prime minister might be one option. Notions of an interim government
gets a little more complicated, as well as some discussions. In fact, Robert
Fatton just mentioned that in passing notions of a bit
of a national unity government, presumably without,
obviously, Moise being there. All this to me leads me to
the final conclusion, which is, unfortunately,
rather pessimistic, which is I don't quite see
how all of these pieces are going to come together
over the next several months, and, therefore,
underscores, I think, an emerging consensus, which
not only is the referendum, in fact, a complete
waste of energy, and a distraction,
and ultimately a misleading exercise,
but even the notion of holding national elections
sometime in this calendar year is itself going to be a
remarkably difficult exercise to be charitable if it's to
be successful in transitioning to the next government
after President Moise. I think I'll stop
there with my comments. Thank you very much. MALIK GHACHEM: Thank
you very much, George. And our last speaker
is Amy Wilentz. Amy. AMY WILENTZ: Thanks so
much for having me here. I'm just going to go through the
whole situation from, I guess, a very personal point of view. So when the 1987 Constitution
was written and became law, it was hailed as a
formative document that would bring Haiti
from dictatorship into the beautiful light
of electoral representative democracy. Haitian constitutions from
their origins in 1801 one with the [? Toussaintic ?]
constitutions have been political
documents more suggestive of the aims and
ideology of the world's first black-controlled
country than they have been pure legal documents. As one scholar wrote they are
about the imagined communities outlined for what the
country should look like with many of the legal
underpinnings, of course, but not necessarily a
step by step blueprint. Thus I think it's just a
little bit, if you will, white, and Western,
and arrogant to assert that we can look
to the Constitution to help us solve
Haiti's current impasse. The organic and enfolding nature
of Haitian political crises is the result of various
hemispheric and national systems and attitudes. How do you apply the
Haitian Constitution of 1987 to the grotesque criminality
rampant in the streets of Port Au Prince today? How do you apply it to the
hunger, and destitution, and inequality we see
throughout the country? It is almost as
absurd as applying Toussaint's Constitution of
1801 to the current crisis. I'd like to say thanks to the
State Department's Julie Chung for cutting through this
constitutional discussion with a sharp speech yesterday,
even though she was singing a different tune not long ago. And her insistence that
speedy elections in Haiti are somehow going
to be more honest than an interim government is. Well, let's say it's interesting
coming from the US government. She says [FRENCH]. With many hands,
the work is light. But I say, [FRENCH]. After the [INAUDIBLE]
festivities, the drums are heavy. The name of the new US policy
among Haitians is [FRENCH].. That's the Julie Chung
analysis and that means directly to elections. It's unclear how this might
work because Haitians-- they are the voters
after all-- would have to be convinced to believe
in whatever elections are held, which will be quite a task if
these elections are perceived to be run by Moise's
regime, and as usual, by the OAS, the UN, and the US. As electoral authenticators,
these entities are no longer trusted. That's because the
perception is that the international
community has never been truly interested in the
economic, political, and human welfare of the Haitian people. Even after the fall of
the Duvalier dynasty, we know in part from their
behavior toward president Aristide that their
interest in democracy flagged easily when faced with
the democracy of the Haitian people wanted. When the highly questionable
low turnout Michel Martelly balloting was held
in 2011, the OAS certified it in order to put
his more palatable, to them, government in place after the
difficult Aristide, Preval years. As earthquake monies
in the millions began pouring in
from the outside, the international community
and members of the core group, as it is known, wanted to
ensure that the people they've known and trusted
for decades in Haiti, the same ones who pushed
for Aristide's ouster, would receive and
direct those millions. Much of the money disappeared. The people who wield power
now on the ground in Haiti, who tolerate, and even oversee,
and arm the street kidnapping gangs are some of these
same Haitian counselors who have been advising the
US embassy and the core group to be careful about
ditching Moise. These are not model citizens. But the United States, leader
of the international community in Haiti, remains the
most important actor on the Haitian front as my
co-panelists have pointed out. Moise and his
opposition both like to pretend that Haiti can
act entirely on its own. But sovereignty is not really
sovereignty in the global world and in Haiti,
things don't change without US greenlighting,
for obvious reasons, of aid and other support
from the northern superpower. Even recently, we've seen
that the Moise forces, faced with a new US administration,
were perfectly able to find kidnapped
people and take them back from the kidnappers. The Moise government also
suddenly met with various gangs to arrange a sort of
cease fire in the streets. The government can
convene the gangs. Moise's people seem to know
just where the kidnappers were. They simply hadn't
rescued victims or arrested perpetrators
up until now when they've suddenly
realized that they do need US backing in
order to stay in power and that the US is no
longer run by Trump. A sudden spate of arrests
of other gang leaders has now followed. Still, the wrong advisors, the
good old advisors, are in place and Haiti still suffers
under a core group that is entirely wrong headed and
complicit in the [FRENCH] of Haitian democracy. There are reasons for this. Let me present it. Here are the core group members. I hadn't really
thought about them much until I was thinking
about writing this talk. The US is at the
top of the list. A white country whose
slave plantation economy was profoundly threatened by
Haiti's revolution and that has been obsessed
with controlling Haiti for two centuries. The US also occupied
Haiti from 1915 to 1934, you will remember, and
with its harsh racist rule, paved the way for the political
turmoil that led to Duvalier. Now that Biden's
in the White House, it is a tiny bit possible the
US won't be so destructive. Au revoir. France, white country number
two, or perhaps number one, the French were the
slaveholders of Haiti in 1825. France exacted
reparations from Haiti for the perceived theft
by the victorious Haitians of Haiti's own lands and the
bodies of its own people. These large payments
were still going out up until the days of
the Second World War. They undermined the
young republic's growth and brought Haiti to
its knees economically. There's a reason to look
at who these people are. There's a historical depth
to the problem in Haiti. Spain, wife country
number three, that settled and held
slaves on Sant-Domingue, the island Haiti now shares
with the Dominican Republic. Germany, white
country number four, that vied for control of Haiti
during the imperial years and the descendants
of whose settlers they are part of the economic elite. Canada, white
country number five, although with a less
torrid history in Haiti than the others, and a
Haitian origin population of more than 100,000. Brazil, a country that offered
36,000 soldiers to the UN's occupation force in Haiti over
the years with mixed results and that has taken in many
Haitian immigrants post earthquake. The Dominican Republic,
Haiti's neighbor on the island, with a record of massacre
and legalized racism against its Haitian workers
and their descendants. The OAS, an
organization composed of countries still influenced
by the colonial former slave-holding white nations. The EU, a union of
white countries, and the UN, which oversaw
a harsh, militaristic peacekeeping force of
occupation in Haiti for 13 years until 2017 and still has
a formal presence there. Whose side, then, is
the core group on? The answer is simple and
unsurprising, their own. They are still operating with
an antiquated and neoliberal, unsuitable, anti-socialist,
Cold War-style, Trumpian political and economic
agenda rather than thinking in new ways about
Haitian democracy and what the
Haitian people need. They still hope for
sweatshops and free zones under the [? appalation ?]
of foreign investment, the small presence of which
over the past half century has left Haitian workers
sick, destitute, uneducated, and hungry for generations
and will continue to do so. Some black lives matter in the
US, but not all black lives. The unfortunate global legacy
of the Haitian Revolution is that it exposed Haiti early
on to various solutions of what I'd call the black power problem
for the ruling Western nations. How to control and delegitimize
black political power? That was the goal
of the white powers and the fight still
persists in, for example, the voter suppression
attempts in the United States. So my advice, and I imagine
that of my cohort here, is this. Let's shut out the
current core group and demand its reconstitution. Let's say goodbye to the
dominance of the white powers. As Sabine and [INAUDIBLE]
have said, change the system. And say hello to at least a
more equitable, thoughtful core advisory group that
won't fall back on the same corrupt Haitian
opportunists, whisperers, and exploiters who
have been counseling the international
community for decades. A new group of outside
and inside advisors who will not be swayed by the
old, shopworn, ineffective solutions, nor unmoved by their
tragic human consequences. Because of time
constraints, I hope to talk later about a possible
new core advisory group. Thank you. MALIK GHACHEM: Thank you
very much, Amy, and everyone. If I could invite
all of the speakers to turn on their
cameras and unmute, we'll join in the
conversation with each other. So as I was listening
to the four of you, I heard, really, four issues
that I think we should maybe explore a bit more. One is the question
of intervention. What intervention
does or doesn't mean in the current context. The second is why there
is so much argument over the Constitution if it's
not the core of the crisis, as Robert and others
were suggesting. The third is the
election gospel. If that's not the foreign policy
of the international community, what should it be? And then, I guess,
the fourth question related to that and
to Amy's presentation, how exactly to
organize the response of the international community? So let's start with the
intervention question because that was a running
theme through a number of your comments and
particularly Sabine's remarks. So here's this statement,
recent statement by Jacky Lumarque, who is
the director of Quisqueya University in Port Au Prince. He's [INAUDIBLE]
quite unequivocally that Haitian says about Haitian
political actors too often turn to Washington for
support, either to stay in power to overthrow
an established power. Robert made the same point. The best support that the
international community can show is to stay out
and affirm its neutrality with respect to the solutions
envisioned by Haitians themselves. Is that-- let me
just ask each of you. Is that how you understand
non-intervention, or what you understand
non-intervention to mean? And is that kind of
non-intervention in Haitian affairs even possible
in the current moment, given that the situation
has been so profoundly shaped, as Amy was saying, by
the international community? If your starting
point is already shaped by the
international community, can you simply say
non-intervention and expect the train to run,
so to speak, in that situation? Anybody want to take that up? Amy? AMY WILENTZ: I think you can
start with the feeling that the United States should
not be the major actor and the international community
[FRENCH] But there has been there have been repeated
problems when this kind of [FRENCH] happens, this
meeting of all the forces in civil society and the
political class of jealousies that are-- people always say from
the outside Haitians can't rule themselves. Of course they can, but so much
has been denied for so long so, much has been interfered
with and twiddled for so long, that you do risk
a big fight among even the best people that we all know
in trying to come forward with a solution. Meanwhile, the best
people that we all know who might have
some infighting, are going to be surrounded
by the remnants of the Moise corruption. I don't know how they're going
to actually physically survive, I don't know how
they're going to meet, and I don't know how they're
going to impose themselves without, at least, the speech
of the international community behind them. MALIK GHACHEM: Sabine? And George? SABINE MANIGAT: Yes, I will
continue on with the same idea that Amy was suggesting, but
maybe not in the same way. When I say not in the same way. As a matter of fact,
it's hard to say that the United States can not
be the main player anymore. It would not be, in the
short term at least, not be very realistic. However, there is a need. There is a need for the
international powers, or international institutions
that intervene in Haiti, maybe to adopt another position,
a more solid position with less intervention
and being more [? attent ?] to what the
Civil society is saying, because the crisis has come
to a point where we're not talking about making up a
new governance in Haiti. We have to think, really,
about a change in system that will have to go through
elections that will have to end in the possibility
for the Haitian citizen to choose its faith by voting. But right now cannot
be considered that way because as Amy was saying, the
system was twisted for so long. Not even the voters are really
confident in a system where their ballot would
be somewhere and then they would tell us this
is the person who won. So maybe we need a
more balanced view of the international
community, as we call it, maybe with other stakeholders
stepping forward, and mainly respecting what the strong
social movement that I think is so, so important
in today's situation, respect to what this
movement is saying. Back off, yes, but we
welcome solidarity. This country is too weak and the
crisis is too deep to say well, we'll get it on by ourselves. And that that would not
be the point either. MALIK GHACHEM: George, do
you want to add something? GEORGE FAURIOL: Let me pick
up on what Sabine just said and address this
issue of intervention. It's a tough question
because in a way, I don't want to suggest that
the international community shouldn't care about
what happens in Haiti, and therefore that
concerns that you may have, the solidarity kind of theme
that you may have with Haiti or groups in Haiti, I think
that needs to be cultivated and has a potentially
positive outcome. The problem with the
international community-- I'll make a very
general statement-- is that in its experience
in Haiti-- particularly but it's [INAUDIBLE]
true elsewhere-- it ultimately thinks
of intervention in a programmatic sense and
ultimately, a very often, the bureaucracies
that are behind it are regulated by a mechanism
where the success is ultimately achieved by as
quickly as possible. So there's, in some
ways, a timeline that is attached to everything
the international community ultimately does, and
particularly in Haiti. And when it comes to
political development issues, that is a particularly
difficult theme, ultimately, to try to have. And therefore, my
sense in this case is-- I'm sympathetic
to the notion that the international
community needs to think through
a little bit what the nature of its commitment
might be to Haiti. The definition of
what that problem is, I think I would agree, needs
to be defined primarily, if not almost exclusively,
by key Haitian actors. That's why, to me, in some
ways the potential outcome of the current crisis is
not so much what ultimately the US, or France, or the
UN, or the OAS ultimately can contribute, but
how they can contribute to the definition of a set of
issues that have been defined and has ultimately
emerged as a consensus among key international
key Haitian actors. That may not be easy to
do and they, therefore, may be a supportive
role very specific that can be played by
some international actors, but not the large bureaucracy
that we all often imagine. MALIK GHACHEM: Thanks George. Robber? ROBERT FATTON: Yes. I wish we could hope
for more solidarity. I must confess
that I'm extremely pessimistic about
fundamental change in the international community
and how they approach Haiti. Whether it be a Republican,
or even a Trump [INAUDIBLE],, or Obama's administration,
the policies have been very much the same. Very much the same
interferences. I think one of the
major problems, and maybe we are reaching
the end of that period, is the economy programs that
were unleashed since the 1980s and that have contributed to
the development of some nations, but really devastated
countries like Haiti. If we change, that
maybe there is hope. In terms of the politics of it,
you have a major contradiction. And this is the reality,
that Haitian politicians, Haitian leaders, have
always consistently said that they don't want
foreign interference, but at the same time,
they are calling for it. And this is a contradiction
that has not been resolved. You also have the
problem that what we might call the opposition
is deeply divided. There is a civil
society, which is different from the
traditional opposition, but in terms of the
organization of the opposition, they always manage,
in one way or another, to co-opt some key sectors
of that civil society and undermine the autonomy
of those movements. So there are many
problems confronting the internal resolution
of the crisis and the international
community, I don't think we are going to
see fundamental changes there. One should remember,
for instance, that a few weeks ago, President
Biden put a picture of himself and he said to Haitians,
essentially, don't come here. It was in Creole. That was a statement that
was completely Trumpian, so I don't I don't see
fundamental changes. What I would hope, the
best that I can hope, is that the international
community doesn't do harm, but that is a
complicated thing because of the programs of the
international financial institutions, the opportunism
of many Haitian [INAUDIBLE] and in the government. So my pessimism is very
profound, unfortunately. MALIK GHACHEM: All
right, well maybe-- let's continue on
this theme and talk about the fourth
issue I mentioned, which is Amy's suggestion
for reformulating how the international community
is organized vis a vis Haiti. And I want to ask you all
two dimensions of this. One is a US specific one. Is about USAID, which
is on the ground, and is not going
away from Haiti, and is a key part of US
foreign policy in the country. So do you have any
thoughts about what USAID [INAUDIBLE] relationship
to this crisis should be and then secondly, if it's
not the core group, what should replace the core group? So in other words,
can we just flesh out a bit more what Amy
was talking about when she reimagines a new kind
of international community? What would that
look like exactly and who are we talking about? Sabine and then Amy. SABINE MANIGAT: Well actually
I'm sure one comment back, I want to react shortly
to what Robert said. Actually, the problem when
we think about solidarity or another stance of the
international community, it means that we're
not thinking primarily about the United States. We're not talking about
the American policy has changed or hasn't changed,
is Trump different from Biden? I was rather thinking
in the audacity that Amy put forward when she
was reshaping the core group. I was thinking of a much
broader participation, a world participation, or at least
hemispheric participation. Solidarity encompasses
many kinds of contribution to alleviate some
of Haiti's problem, but certainly not
reshape, or even rethink, or reorganize
Haiti's situation, even with compassion. Even with goodwill. What Robert said in
his first intervention remains, to me, fundamental. Only the Haitian actors
can actually solve this and the extent to which
the international community is convened to do will
depend on the capacity and the proposition that
the Haitian actors have. Will they succeed? Well, there's no
guarantee for anybody on any social movement in any
country that this will succeed. We've seen many failures
lately around the world. MALIK GHACHEM: Amy. Thank you, Sabine. AMY WILENTZ: Yeah so
I was thinking more, of course, I've
watched USAID for many, many, years, which was the
first part of your question, Malik, and I've been
confounded by them for so long. I talked in my little
opening remarks about the Haitians
who have been advising the international community. And I think they've been
so destructive and so-- not all obviously--
but so me, me, me. I want this. I want to get this program. I want in on the
ground floor of this. And that's something that has
happened at USAID for so long. They need different
Haitian interlocutors. But I would like to propose,
as a beginning for this, a new core advisory group
that would be advising the US, the OAS, and
the UN, basically, and would include
them to a degree. And this is how I
would constitute it. And I'm just going to tell
you my weird pipe dream, and of course, Haitians would
have totally different opinions about this. But I would, from the US on
the new core advisory group, I'd include a member of the
Congressional Black Caucus and someone
delegated by Samantha Powers, the new head of the
Biden administration's USAID. Those would be two members
of the new group as well as a young, outspoken black
American or Haitian thinker, someone like Ta-Nehisi
Coates or Valena [? Elisa ?] [? Shalia. ?] I'd include a Cuban
health official and/or a representative from
Venezuela, someone who's not part of the long,
[? etiliated, ?] outmoded US OAS mindset in Haiti. From France and Canada, I'd
want a human rights official and an economic advisor. I'd want a respected
constitutional lawyer from a core nation. Five further Haitian or
Haitian-American members, a business person,
and a professional from the diaspora, a Haitian
educator, a leader of one of Haiti's women's
groups, and a rotating member from the Haitian
political class just to say goodbye, again, to the
dominance of white powers and the thinking, the old
thinking of this core group and the United States. And what Robert,
Robert, was talking about how it doesn't matter
who's in power in the US. They still are
thinking the same way. But I think if they had
an advisory group that didn't think the
way they thought, they might actually be
conscious of some things that they haven't been
conscious of, at least. MALIK GHACHEM: That's a
striking proposal Amy. Thank you very much for
sharing that thought. I hope somebody is listening. We're going to have to turn at
some point soon to questions from the audience. So I want to just move
on to another issue before we do that, though, which
is elections, and particularly the election gospel that
the United States preaches in Haiti. I mean not just in Haiti,
but certainly in Haiti. And those of us
who heard, or read, the Julie Chung statement from
Haitian Flag Day yesterday, you can't help but be struck by
the paradigm, the world view, just unable to perceive
options outside of the fundamental recourse to
elections as the basic solution to the crisis. She did say it's not
a panacea, but it is the first and fundamental
step for US policy. So maybe some of you could
just respond directly to that and what,
if that's not right, what exactly is wrong with it? And what is your position
on elections in Haiti? Who would like to? George, do you want to? GEORGE FAURIOL: Let
me start with that. I would give Julie some
credit for at least making the statement. The problem, I think in part,
is that she's working from, in some ways, a rather deep
deficit and credibility in that sense that
for what three or four months, the new administration
here in Washington was rather evasive,
to be charitable, about Haiti, about
the elections, about the referendum. And in some ways, ultimately
at the end of the story, at least today, the
issue became a referendum versus national elections and
ultimately, in a very practical sense, I think
they want to ditch the whole notion of referendum
and put all the efforts now in elections. Having said that, I
have some difficulty, I must admit, trying
to visualize how, under present
circumstances, both the politics of the country. Secondly, the
electoral logistics that ultimately are either
incomplete or nonexistent in some cases, starting
with voter ID card issue. And thirdly a security, or
insecurity, how, somehow, there is a conception in her mind,
or the administration's mind, of how elections can actually
be held in a credible manner in Haiti during calendar 2021. That's also overlooking
the fact that to have Democratic elections,
you need participation, need candidates,
you need debates. How this is going to happen
under present circumstances, let alone a worldwide
pandemic, I'm not quite sure that this has been thought
through terribly carefully. So to me, I'm happy that
the statement has been made. I'm not convinced, however,
that it's been thought through very carefully as to so
what now is basically the question I would ask,
Elections, how does that work? And we're not quite sure
that the administration has a clear answer
to that question. I would add, very
quickly however, that part of that
answer has to come from Haitian actors themselves. Unless there is quickly
a response from the Moise government or other
key actors in Haiti, this is going to drag on and not
get any better any time soon. MALIK GHACHEM:
Thanks a lot George. I don't know if anyone else
wants to opine on the election issue or not? Sabine, it looks like maybe,
Robert briefly, and then maybe at that point, we'll
turn to some audience Q&A. Go ahead Sabine
and then Robert. SABINE MANIGAT: Very,
very quickly, I second what George just said about
the technical conditions. I just would like to
underline that in Haiti we have a problem that
goes beyond that. To put it shortly, the
meaning of the vote is problematic in
a system that has been confiscated from the
start, or at least after 1990. And not only confiscated,
but twisted to the point that elections appear
as an imposition to the majority of the voters. And I'll stay here just to
add to the technical things that the political aspect of
holding elections in Haiti today. ROBERT FATTON: Yes. Just to say that elections
are a good thing but not under any conditions. And clearly, the
conditions are not inviting for any type
of legitimate elections. And the problem is that
we have the same problem the last election, and
the election was forced. Most Haitians didn't
want the damn election. And the problem is that when
you have such bad elections, it gives a very bad name
to the democratic process and the elections themselves. So people don't vote. People look at the
electoral process and they say "What
the heck is going on? It doesn't change anything. We don't want those people. We are not going to vote." 15% of the population
supposedly voted in very bizarre conditions. And this time is going to
be as bad, if not worse. So to have elections
in a moment like that is to invite to the exacerbation
of the current crisis. The government has no
longer any real legitimacy. Part of the opposition
has no legitimacy. This is why I was
suggesting that we need some kind of
transition whereby some of the civil society
organizations, people who are not immediately concerned
about getting into office, set up the conditions
that are more or less legitimate for
some sort of fair election. That's my view on that. MALIK GHACHEM: Yeah. So that's linked to,
Robert, that's linked to one of the comments
from the audience here. Maybe I can put this
question before the group and see who wants to respond. This is from Vicky [? Asevera ?]
who asks have any of us, have any of the
experts on the group here, ever done an assessment of
the opposition, quote unquote? Or all the political
parties forcing an articulation of actual
substantive platforms? And she goes on to say
the US should support democratic practice
and not elections, which are one small facet of
how people organize themselves to govern their
collective public goods. What is the state
of the opposition? Who are the who are the
alternative political parties that I think she's suggesting? What would be in a position to
support democratic practices as opposed to their own
particular interests? Maybe the issue is what
are some of the groups? Maybe you could tell us,
Sabine, a been a bit more about the social movement. I mean who are
some of the groups that you think the international
community should partner with? Should express solidarity with? What is their-- what
role would these groups have in the transition to a
new and different government? SABINE MANIGAT: To
put it very short, we have had a strong
social network in Haiti, not only since
1986 but long before. The question has
always been how do they organize besides local
democratic practices that are being invoked right now? It's interesting. Presently, the civil society,
the so-called civil society, the society many of its
sectors and it's more organized sections is working on
a national international proposition to the
nation and to be able to declare it and
oppose it to foreign or to authoritarian
interventions. But the problem is we
never had a governance system with institution backed
by political institutions and political parties genuinely
representing the population. It's always been a superposition
of personalities, or groups, or so-called parties,
but were never rooted in the social movement that is
presently expressing itself. So the political parties are
working with civil society, but civil society
today is not reflected by the political parties. It's not going to be
easy for representation like democracy calls for. The parties have to
reorganize, and maybe there should be new institutions
shape from civil society, but it's going to
take some time. This is why they're
calling for a transition, a genuine transition,
not just a transition to postpone elections. Just to make them
genuinely possible. MALIK GHACHEM: Amy and George? AMY WILENTZ: I just want to
say briefly that the minute that the international
community expresses solidarity with a faction, or a person,
or a party in civil society, or a group that's
doing something, first that group will
become suspect to a degree. And second of all,
everybody might flock to that group
thinking that, therefore, funding and support is coming. So it's a very hard place for
the international community right now, and I think
that's why they're so reluctant to see an
interim civil society unity government because they
don't know what it will be. They don't know
how to support it. And it might blow
up in their face. Always they're worried about
Haiti blowing up in their face. MALIK GHACHEM: Yeah, George? GEORGE FAURIOL:
Conceptually, my sense is that civil society, which I
think has, actually, in Haiti, demonstrated a fair amount
of organization and strength. We saw that in the 2017, 2018,
2019, massive demonstrations and particularly in
connection with Petrocaribe. Corruption in general
basically almost shut down the country in some ways. The problem with
civil society is that they're different
than political parties. You need to translate political
action into political action and political groups. And Haiti's political
party community, certainly over time, certainly
since the end of the Duvalier era, are-- some of it originally
had a philosophical and to some degree
ideological base. Now we find it,
in some ways, it's a collection, like
many other countries, of personalistic
vehicles that obviously have no real grasp in terms
of the electorate beyond just their own personality. And I think that's
the challenge here, and that is that
translating what clearly is active interest within
civil society groups, to ultimately address
the political crisis, but then translate that into
political movements, let alone political parties. That's the challenge. That's why I'm a little-- it's not that I'm uncomfortable,
I am a little unclear as to how you ultimately end
up with a near-term solution with a government of national
unity made up of exactly what? If it's just civil
society, to me, that misses the
element of governance. Civil society is,
in fact, what it is, but it's missing the actual
instruments, if you will, of political action that
ultimately make a difference. MALIK GHACHEM:
Thank you very much. Let's turn to another
question from the audience. This one from Michelle
[? Degraff, ?] who is an MIT colleague of
mine and expert on linguistics. And Michelle is asking is
there a linguistic dimension to the mishandling of the
international community's policy towards Haiti? He asked, in particular, how
can the international community support Haitians when it
does not even speak, or even care to speak, the language
of the sovereign people that is Creole? Except for insulting
Haitians like Biden, President Biden recently did. So he says, I
think we need first to break down these fundamental
linguistic and cultural barriers between local
and international elites and Haiti's sovereign people. That's a necessary initial step. And we have a follow up comment
on that from another audience member. Any thoughts about this? Is there a cultural
linguistic dimension to the situation here? Amy? AMY WILENTZ: Don't we all agree? Isn't-- I'm only raising my
hand because no one else is. But of course, years before,
everybody should speak Creole. The USAID people
should speak Creole. People can't know
Haiti profoundly unless they speak Creole. I don't even speak
very good Creole, but it makes a huge difference. And if you don't, you're
locked into speaking to people who speak French and English. That's a certain
part of the society. And I get the
feeling very strongly that the Americans
really like to speak to people who speak
English, and that's who's advising them
and encouraging them in certain directions. I think it's a
really huge problem. I think Michelle is
right about that. But how are you going
to get them to all be speaking it suddenly? How is that going to
happen in the next before elections are imposed? I don't know. How are they going to
find out that patients don't want that election? They have to listen to
what people like Sabine are telling them. They have to have reasonable,
intelligent, sensitive interlocutors on
the ground in Haiti who care about the country. That is the essential
thing that the Americans, and the rest of the
international community, need to develop. MALIK GHACHEM:
Any other thoughts of Sabine on this issue? Please. SABINE MANIGAT: Very
quickly, I totally agree with what Amy said. But I wanted to
point out, though, that many institutions, some
development institutions, some administrative institutions
in the United States, and in several mission
churches have adopted, more or less, systematic
practices of, I mean habit, of learning
Creole before coming to Haiti or when they come to Haiti. It is it does not have a
lot to do with the empathy that we're talking about. Because I suppose that Michelle
is referring, [CREOLE],, is referring to the
quality of communication that it entails when you speak
the language of the person you're pretending to communicate
with or to work with. And it's not
necessarily the purpose of these initiatives
of learning Creole before you go into Haiti. But it is a fact that we
should take into account. Robert, sorry. ROBERT FATTON: I
agree to some extent. In other words,
knowledge of the language allows you to
communicate much better. On the other hand, if you look
at the situation in Haiti, all Haitians speak Creole. And to put it crudely, that has
not stopped people at the top from screwing the
Haitian people. So language is one thing,
but the material differences, the inequalities-- and clearly language is
a very important thing to say about it because while
the top was and still speaks Creole, speaks English, it
speaks Spanish, speaks French and have used those languages
to build the networks that are facilitating its power. But internally,
Creole has not really facilitated any type of
fundamental transformation of the Haitian social system. If you look at
Duvalier, Duvalier was a brilliant in how he how to
communicate with the peasants, but it was a very vicious
type of use of the language. So language is
important, but it has to be also analyzed in terms
of the potential differences between those who run the show
and those who are literally being run by the show. MALIK GHACHEM: Thank you all. Let's get a couple more
questions into the mix. I'll put two on the table
and you can take or leave as you like. So one question is
about economic pressure. Please describe the kind
of economic pressure the US uses to shape
Haitian politics. There was a reference
in Julie Chung's speech yesterday to use of the
Magnitsky Act, which is a statute that permits
the application of sanctions against people involved
in human rights abuses. So what do you guys think about
that as a tool of US policy here? And another question is about
the Haitian American diaspora. Maybe we should say the
Haitian North American diaspora, or the Haitian
diaspora more broadly. What can the Haitian diaspora
do to bring attention to these issues
and place pressure on the Biden administration
to stop supporting Moise? Any comments on either
of these two questions? George? GEORGE FAURIOL: I'll start
with the economic pressures and sanctions question. As a general policy
issue, I'm somewhat skeptical of the
utility of sanctions, particularly in the
cases of countries that ultimately it's
not going to change the behavior of the leadership
if that's the intent. It may address, to some degree,
of populations aspect to which it draws the attention
to the activities of certain individuals,
and it, to some degree that may be satisfactory
for us policymakers, it also underscores the concern
regarding that behavior. I think in the
case of Haiti, I'm not quite sure that's much of
a particularly effective policy instrument that's going to
change very much on the ground in the near future. I'm also not quite
sure, however, that the United
States only doesn't need to be a bit
more creative when it comes to not so much economic
sanctions or economic pressure, but I'm really trying to
determine in some ways a better model than
simply saying well, we don't like this
particular exercise, so we will not support it. We will not fund it. But we like this one
and we'll fund that. It becomes a bit more
formulaic and simplistic. And particularly in the
context of elections, it can be ultimately
very counterproductive. The United States, the
international community in general, has spent
enormous amounts of funding, directly, and
through contractors, and NGOs, in revising,
recreating, reinventing the Haitian electoral machinery. And as of today, you probably
need an entirely new effort to reconstruct it. I think part of the issue
there is simply an inability to translate what are
probably valuable efforts into ultimately
institutionalizing actual Haitian institutions,
Haitian capabilities, to actually maintain and
ultimately run the process rather than simply
depending every election cycle on international
assistance. MALIK GHACHEM:
Any other comments on either of those issues? Robert and Amy? ROBERT FATTON: Sanctions
are instruments that do not necessarily work. We can remember, for
instance, during the Cedras administration, the
de facto government, that there were massive
sanctions imposed to the Haitian elite
and on the government. But the government
was not going to move, and it started moving only when
Carter and Powell and Sam Nunn went to Haiti and told the
Cedras regime the planes are in the air. Get out of here. That's why they moved. They were always able to
maneuver around the sanctions. And when you have
sanctions, there is a crisis which
is even more acute. In crisis, not everyone suffers. There are people who use the
crisis for their own benefit, especially those who
are in the state, because they have the levers
to manipulate those sanctions. So while sanctions
may be an instrument, I'm not sure that
at the moment, given that the vast
majority of Haitians are really suffering
already, that it would have a positive effect. In terms of the
diaspora, I was talking to some people of
the diaspora and they said what we should do? Because the diaspora is
remittances represent actually the most important
amount of money that Haiti receives
from the external arena, something like over $3 billion. That the diaspora
should stop and say we should stop giving that
money and the government would respond. Now there's a problem
with that, obviously, because a lot of the money that
the diaspora sends to Haitians is very much linked to the very
survival of very poor people. So it's a very
complicated business and it's not an easy equation,
as it were, to resolve. MALIK GHACHEM: Amy
and then Sabine. AMY WILENTZ: Another of
my loopy, crazy ideas is that the governments of
the US, Canada, and France, perhaps some other
countries, should give tax deductions, charitable tax
deductions, to the Haitian diaspora for time spent-- so no actual money exchanges-- for time spent in Haiti
working and training Haitians in whatever is their expertise. Because now they go out of
the goodness of their heart when they go to do
that kind of work and it doesn't
happen that often. But I think with a
little incentive, it might happen more. And it just struck me
oh, that might be good. Of course, hard to do,
hard to convince people. MALIK GHACHEM: Sabine? SABINE MANIGAT: Yes, I wanted
to say something very short about the sanctions. Like Robert put it, the
sanctions do not always work. But not only that,
usually the sanctions fall on the most vulnerable
part of the population. We've seen that in
1991, from 1991 to 1993, and in my view, this
what has been a step downwards with the earthquake. But since the sanctions that
were imposed in 1991, from 1991 to 1993 or 1994, the country
has never really recovered from the sanctions. It's not easy to target the
persons or the groups who are going to be the
object of the sanctions. But, of course, there's always
the issue of taking our visas, and calling to justice, or
putting them wanted by the DA. The problem may be not so
much to sanction a country, but to combinate
non-intervention with some technical assistance. That could take the
form that Amy was saying or maybe some other, as long
as respect for the choices and the possibilities
of the population is being put forward. This is what I would tell you. MALIK GHACHEM: No, that makes
complete sense, I think, as far as regards
country sanctions, that's certainly true. I think the Magnitsky Act
sanctions are targeted to particular individuals
in the government, so that would be a somewhat
different approach. George, briefly, you want
to add a footnote to that? GEORGE FAURIOL:
Actually just to comment on the diaspora issue,
which was the second part of your question. I tend to think that the
Haitian-North American diaspora in the United States and
Canada is increasingly organized and motivated. Ironically in the last
two or three months, the Moise government
was trying to reach out to them in connection
with the referendum, trying to somehow
demonstrate to them and convince that community
that the new constitution would be good for them. I think to some
degree, highlights the potentially influential
role that the diaspora can have on shaping particularly
United States policy. And in some ways,
it's the degree to which the members of
Congress listen and hear from their constituents,
which is only going to make a real
difference, potentially in terms of how activated and
how engaged members of Congress are on the Haiti issue. MALIK GHACHEM: Interesting. There's a suggestion from the
audience, one of the audience members, Maricena,
that the diaspora needs to have dual citizenship
in Haiti and the United States. Presumably that would
entail voting rights in both countries. Let's see. We've got, well-- Robert, we've got a
rebuttal from Michelle. But I'll let you
guys argue over-- for Michelle Degraff, I'll
let you guys carry forward that dialogue, perhaps offline. There is a comment about
local elections from [? Don ?] [? Jean. ?] In this
talk of elections, we often forget the local
elections and governance. How can we think about
reinforcing political stability through local elections
instead of waiting every four years for the presidential one? Sabine, any thoughts about the
local electoral scene in Haiti? SABINE MANIGAT: Well actually,
the local electoral scene has been one of
the biggest issues that the social [INAUDIBLE]
is putting forward, thinking about participation
in political participation. But of course, it's
always also been seen as the main danger
for the central power for the central government. And to what extent also
from external institutions, I don't know, but certainly
from the central government. The fact that the grass root
participative traditions that we have could foster
strong local governments that would control and would
shape better the central power, and maybe provide for
more stable institutions, political institutions
for instance, that will generally come
from the local governments and shape a new political scene. I think it has always been
seen as a bit dangerous and this is why it has
never been organized by any governments, be it
more progressive or more authoritarian. It's a big issue. MALIK GHACHEM:
Any other thoughts on this question
of local elections? Otherwise, I have one
maybe wrap up question that I'll give everyone a chance
to share some final thoughts. OK, here's my here's
my wrap up question. And you can use this opportunity
to say anything you feel still needs to be said. The question comes
from Ryan [? Ely ?] who asks what does the future
hold if elections are not held this year? And I'll add, given some
of George's comments, if there is no
constitutional referendum and if there are no
elections held this year, how does the country escape
from the current crisis if that turns out
to be the case? AMY WILENTZ: Isn't
this, if I may? Isn't this what we've been
talking about the whole time? MALIK GHACHEM: In a way. AMY WILENTZ: Or has
it escaped from it? I think one of the things that
was contained in Julie Chung's talk when she mentioned
the Magnitsky Act was a threat against precisely
Moise and the people around him of the US bringing
down that act on them. So I think that
there is an attempt to convince this
government to go, perhaps. And then what we do if
there aren't elections is just what Sabine has been
talking about this whole time. It's the organization of
civil society in an attempt to come together to
make something work that can go to elections, but not
to just rush off [FRENCH].. Not to just go headlong
into that scene again. MALIK GHACHEM:
Sabine and George. SABINE MANIGAT: Maybe should
I take from what Amy just said and just add that for somehow,
as the situation is today, there's no perspective of
anything consistent coming out of so-called referendum of
[INAUDIBLE] if ever there will take place. So we're talking about
a transition anyway. What we don't know, what
is difficult to foresee because the Haitian actors
have to be the one to decide-- and if they fail,
well they will fail-- is what kind of
transition we will get. Of course, the supporters
of the present regime can choose to back off
and that would precipitate some kind of outcome,
which would not necessarily be orderly. But there is
sufficient, I think, there's sufficient conscious of
a more mature social movement today. It is sufficient
conscience that we have to get out of this
without going to chaos, It's a choice, in any
case, more than an option. It's a choice to set,
to stay, to stand by the proposition of
an orderly transition of the civil society. MALIK GHACHEM: George. GEORGE FAURIOL: Let me pick up
on Sabine's last thought, which is the issue, the notion
of orderly transition. I'm willing to still think
that the objective of having a national election is
an important objective, around which there needs
to be some emerging consensus among key
Haitian political actors. To me, the key issue is
dropping the referendum. As long as that
issue is on the table or floating around in the
background, in effect, the question is
not only we don't know what we're going to
look at what this is going to look like on
June the 27th, we don't even know what the rest of
the year is going to look like. And the timing is getting
shorter and shorter to try to address that. And my sense, therefore, that
the real issue is not so much simply having national elections
in the hope that miracles will come out of that, but rather
that the process by which one drives toward
that actually does engage an emerging civil society
consensus, some acceptance, clearly, political acceptance
on the part of the Moise government that
the game is over. And, therefore what he
has supposedly promised, which is that he's
out by next February the 7th actually does occur. But also between
now and then, it was actually a more
constructive, evolving, emerging process that is only
not just to have elections, but actually to have a
richer process that comes out of that electoral
process, some time hopefully by the end of
the year, early next year. MALIK GHACHEM: Thank you. Robert, you will
have the last word. ROBERT FATTON: OK. Well if history is a guide,
we have a few possibilities. One is that Moise manages
to finish his term. And then you have a
crisis at the very end because we need a transition
to something, an election, but that's a possibility. Or he finish like Martelly. Very debilitated
years to exit and then you have very
non-productive answer. In other words, you put
another politician out there for two months and
you have an election, which would lead to the
same type of crisis. The other possibilities
are one that is even worse, which would be a descent into
chaos and foreign intervention. And then you have
the possibility that people are afraid
of that very possibility, and that they manage to
force the powers that be into accepting the transition. And the transition would
have to be negotiated between the government,
the political parties, and the civil society. That's a possibility. But if you are going to form
the government of national unity with the same characters,
you fall into the same trap. So you would need, for a
while, a government of people who are not interested
in the immediate conquest of political power. I think there are enough
Haitians capable of doing that if they are given a chance,
but there is no guarantee at all that this will happen. So we are in uncertain terms
but with particular scenarios that look very
similar to the past because we had similar crisis. MALIK GHACHEM: And
that will indeed have to be the last word. I want to thank Sabine Manigat,
George Fauriol, Amy Wilentz, and Robert Fatton for bringing
their expertise to bear on a difficult set of issues. Thank you so much
for joining us. Thank you to our audience
for listening in. This session has been recorded. It will be posted to
the MIT CIS YouTube site where it can be accessed there. Please share with
people who you think would be interested
in the discussion. Thank you again for joining
us, and once again, thank you to our participants for being
part of this conversation. Appreciate it very much. [MUSIC PLAYING]
