Autumn 1941.
In the first three months of the war, the Germans have advanced 500 miles and inflicted massive casualties
on the Red Army. Both sides prepare to commit
their final reserves to the decisive battle of the campaign,
which will be fought for the Soviet capital. September 1941 - 10 weeks after
the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Now Moscow itself was braced
for the German onslaught. Barricades and anti-tank obstacles
blocked the streets. Windows were taped up to reduce the danger
from flying glass caused by explosions. And at night, the city was immersed
in total darkness. “Lit windows help the enemy”,
warned the posters. Stalingrad, for the moment,
was safe in the Russian heartland. Bandaged soldiers on the city’s streets
were the only visible sign of battles that raged many miles to the west. In the workshops of the Stalingrad
Tractor Factory, tank production was round the clock. The enormous losses suffered by the Red
Army that summer had to be made good. That summer hundreds of tanks
had been abandoned because their crews couldn’t fix
simple mechanical failures. Now tank crews began
their training inside the factories. They were taught every
mechanical detail of their new tank, and how to fix them if they broke down. One of the commanders of these
newly-formed tank brigades was the 40 year old
Colonel Mikhail Katukov. Katukov began the war
as the commander of the 20th Tank Division. But its obsolete tanks
had proved cannon fodder for the Germans in the summer of 1941. Katukov and the remnants of his division
had been lucky to escape encirclement. In late September, his brigade’s new
T-34 tanks were loaded onto trains. Mikhail Katukov and the 4th Tank Brigade
were going to Moscow. Moscow had already
had its first taste of war. The first German air raid came
exactly one month after the war began, on 22nd July, 1941. German pilots were told, “You’ve bombed
England. This will be much easier. If the Russians even have antiaircraft
guns, there won’t be many of them. They don’t have searchlights,
balloons or night-fighters.” But these illusions were soon shattered. The skies over Moscow were defended by thousands of antiaircraft guns
of all calibres. Soviet night-fighters attacked German
bombers caught in the searchlights. Barrage balloons rose to 2500 metres,
and in pairs as high as 4500 metres — much higher than over London. The risk of flying into their steel
cables forced German bombers to fly at much higher altitudes,
from where they were much less accurate. But inevitably, some bombers got through. The Belorussky Rail Terminal,
the telephone exchange, and army supply depots were all hit. The Kremlin itself was hit by 6 incendiaries
and one 250kg high-explosive bomb. It pierced the roof
of the Grand Kremlin Palace and the ceiling of the Georgiyevsky Hall.
But it failed to explode. On the night of 12th August, a 1,000 kg
bomb landed in Nikitskiye Vorota Square, making a crater 12 metres deep,
and 32 metres across. But German bomber crews were made
to pay a heavy price for these successes. A total of 134 air raids
were made on Moscow. More than 1,500 bombs
and 45,000 incendiaries were dropped on the city during the war. The biggest raid was on 29th October, 1941. More than 300 bombers took part.
Bombs hit the Bolshoi Theatre, the Moscow State University, and the
Central Committee of the Communist Party. 47 German planes
were brought down that day. Hitler’s invasion plan called
for the capture of Moscow in the first three to four
months of the war. But fighting around Smolensk and Kiev
had held the Germans up for 2 months. The assault on Moscow was not ready
to begin until 30th September. The Soviet High Command, the Stavka, expected the Germans to attack
along the highway from Smolensk to Vyazma. The Red Army units
under General Rokossovsky began to dig in along this route. But the Germans were planning a surprise. General Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Group
had been secretly redeployed from the Leningrad front to join
the attack on Moscow. To conceal this manoeuvre, the Panzer Group left its headquarters
radio operator near Leningrad. Each radio operator working in Morse code has a distinct style of transmitting
based on their rhythm — just as each pianist has
their own unique style of playing. Experts can pick out
individual radio operators just by listening in
to their transmissions. When the Soviets intercepted
radio messages near Leningrad, which they knew came from
the radio operator of 4th Panzer Group, they assumed Hoepner’s forces
were still in the area. But all they were listening to…
was one lone radio operator. Commander of 4th Panzer Group, Erich
Hoepner was an old-fashioned general, known as ‘the Old Cavalryman’. Nevertheless he’d been one
of the first generals to understand and embrace the principles
of armoured warfare. Three German panzer groups
now targeted Moscow, led by Hoepner, Guderian and Hoth, who was replaced
in October by General Reinhardt. The German plan was to force
a final decisive battle for Moscow, in which they would encircle and annihilate
the remnants of the Red Army. The operation was codenamed “Typhoon”. The offensive began near Bryansk. Red Army troops were ready
to defend the town itself, which lay at the centre
of the local road network. But on 30th September 1941, Guderian’s
panzers attacked much further south. Heinz Guderian had a reputation
as the “Father” of German blitzkrieg, based on his early writings on the theory
of offensive, mechanized warfare. He was also a bold
and energetic field commander, who often quarrelled
with his superior officers. In three days,
Guderian’s tanks had encircled the bulk of the enemy forces opposing him. In two more days his troops had reached
Orel, and were advancing on Tula. In a desperate attempt
to halt Guderian’s advance, the Soviet High Command took
a bold decision: to reinforce Orel by air. Giant Tupolev TB-3s and Lisunov
Li-2s landed at the deserted airfield. The Germans, recovering from their surprise,
opened a withering fire on the second wave. Nevertheless, 6,000 men plus equipment
and ammunition was landed. The troops immediately went
into action against the advancing Germans. Soon, T-34s from Colonel Katukov’s
4thTank Brigade also began to arrive, after their 500 mile train
journey from Stalingrad. Tank brigades replaced
the Soviet mechanized corps that had been destroyed that summer. A mechanized corps
had contained 36,000 men, 1,000 tanks plus guns and other vehicles.
It was a huge and unwieldy formation. The new, more mobile tank brigades
had just 3,000 soldiers and 91 tanks. Katukov now had a chance
to test the tank ambush tactics that so far he’d only been able
to practice on the training ground. First the tanks had to be concealed,
using buildings, bushes or uneven ground. Several alternative positions
were needed for each tank. Dummy positions were also built
to confuse the enemy. A T-34’s gun could destroy any German tank
from a range of 1 kilometer. But the key to success was patience,
and discipline. Katukov told his men:
“The crew in ambush may open fire only at point blank range
when a hit is guaranteed. This means a range of 200 to 300 metres.” When taking on a German panzer column, Soviet gunners would target
the lead tank first, and then the rear tank.
With the road blocked in both directions, the rest of the column
became sitting ducks. One member of Katukov’s brigade was
the Soviet tank ace Dmitriy Lavrinenko. In 28 engagements
he destroyed 52 German tanks, believed to be the most by
any Soviet tank commander in the whole war. The tank ambushes proved
to be highly effective. Orel fell to the Germans, but Katukov’s
tanks bought time to reinforce Tula. As Red Army paratroopers
reinforced the southern flank, the Germans launched
their main thrust in the centre. German Army Group Centre rapidly
outmanoeuvred and defeated the Soviet Reserve and Western Fronts, securing the highway
from Smolensk to Vyazma. Operation Typhoon was in full swing.
The fate of Russia hung in the balance. The Germans had broken through
on the road to Moscow. On 4th October 1941, General Konev
told the Soviet High Command that his forces were about to be cut off.
But he received no order to retreat. The Stavka seemed unable to accept that another major disaster
was unfolding in front of them. Hitler, meanwhile,
was convinced of final victory. He addressed the crowds
at the Sportpalast in Berlin: “Huge events are now
unfolding on the Eastern front. We have launched a large-scale operation that will lead to the final
elimination of the enemy in the East.” Once again, the Stavka’s
order to retreat came too late. More than half a million Red Army soldiers had become encircled
around Vyazma and Bryansk. The divisions and regiments that did escape
the encirclement began a headlong retreat. With bitter humour, they referred
to this manoeuvre as the “scarper-march”. It was becoming all too familiar to the Red
Army soldiers who’d survived the summer. Enemy air superiority
had a particular impact on Soviet morale. The 43rd Army reported:
“German bombers attack without mercy. They make raids in groups
of 20 to 25 aircraft. Survivors are left senseless.” One aircraft was especially
feared by the soldiers. The Junkers JU 87 Stuka
dive-bomber was the airborne artillery of the German blitzkrieg machine.
By attacking targets in a steep dive, it was able to deliver its bombs
with pinpoint accuracy. The aircraft would then circle
and attack other targets with light bombs and machine guns. These sustained attacks sowed chaos and destruction ahead
of advancing ground troops. The bulk of German
Army Group Centre was needed to encircle the Soviet armies
of Generals Konev and Budyonny. But several divisions, led by SS Panzer
Division Das Reich, began moving east. These troops had been given
the honour of being the first to enter the Russian capital. The Germans were just 205km from Moscow,
and the road ahead was almost clear. The Red Army rushed a battalion
of paratroopers to the area. Armed only with machine guns,
rifles and Molotov cocktails, they fought ferociously to hold
the bridge over the Ugra River. By the end of the day, from 430 men,
just 29 were left. By the time a tank brigade
arrived to help them, the signpost read 180 kilometres to Moscow.
The Germans had advanced just 25km. Despite such fierce resistance,
the Red Army faced a catastrophe. It had suffered huge losses
over the course of the summer. The enemy was
at the doorstep of the capital. Reinforcements were on
their way from the east, but Stalin desperately needed more time. In this, the darkest hour,
he sent for General Zhukov. After arriving at General Headquarters in
Moscow and quickly appraising the situation, Zhukov drew a simple, stark conclusion: “The defensive front in the west
has been destroyed. A huge gap has appeared in our front line,
and there is nothing to fill it as there are no reserves.
The roads leading to Moscow are open.” Hitler’s confidence seemed well placed. But there was a small window of time
for General Zhukov. Soviet troops encircled near Vyazma
were fighting on, meaning for a short time, only a few German divisions
could be spared for the advance on Moscow. Zhukov’s immediate task
was to halt this German advance, and restore Moscow’s defences
before the full weight of German Army Group Centre fell upon them. The Mozhaysk defensive line,
120 km from Moscow, was the last obstacle between
the Germans and the capital. In early October everyone not fighting
who could lift a shovel was helping to build the Mozhaysk line. Zhukov planned to fill it with troops. But the only spare ones he could
find were officer cadets from Moscow’s military schools. It was a sign of how desperate
the situation had become. The Mozhaysk line was more than 200km long.
It could not all be held by teenage cadets. Seven rifle divisions
were being formed near Moscow, but realistically these raw recruits could
only fend off the Germans for a few hours. The Stavka had to take one of the war’s
many hard decisions. In besieged Leningrad, there were
already serious food shortages. The Stavka had gathered reserves
to launch a counter-attack that would lift the siege
and end the city’s suffering. But just hours after the disaster
at Vyazma, this operation was cancelled. The reserves were
ordered to reboard the trains. They were now bound for Moscow,
and the Mozhaysk line. The elite SS Das Reich division was
spearheading the German advance on Moscow. Its troops were well trained, experienced,
and had the best equipment. Near the battlefield of Borodino, where
the Russians had fought Napoleon in 1812, they met the Soviet 32nd Division. These were fresh troops, hurriedly
redeployed from the Far East. Their headquarters
had been symbolically sited where General Kutuzov’s headquarters
had stood in 1812. The first German tanks appeared
on the Moscow – Minsk highway. Near the village of Yelnia, the road descended into a deep
hollow as it crossed the river. Soviet pillboxes housing antitank guns overlooked the crossing
from the opposite bank. When the German tanks reached the bottom,
the Soviet guns opened fire. There was no space for the tanks
to turn around or get off the road. The German panzers
were knocked out one by one. The SS troops included
fascist volunteers from France. Field Marshal von Kluge
addressed them before the battle, reminding them how under Napoleon, Germans and French had fought side-by-side
against the Russians on this very field. The next day the French legion
plunged into battle. But in the face of Soviet
armoured counter-attacks, it suffered devastating losses. The unit
had to be withdrawn from the front line. Zhukov’s orders were clear:
“Hold fast at the Mozhaysk line.” Every day they held out allowed more time
for reinforcements to reach Moscow. The German advance was now measured
in hundreds of metres, not miles. The Das Reich division
suffered massive casualties that included most of its officers. The Germans tried to blast
the defenders out of their positions. Ivan Makukha, a cadet from the Podolsk
Artillery School, recalled the experience: “Direct hits on our pillbox caused
blast waves that knocked us off our feet, and left us bleeding
from our eyes and ears.” The reinforced Germans renewed the assault. Kaluga fell on 13th October,
Borovsk three days later. The 32nd Division was forced to retreat
from Borodino. In ferocious fighting, the enemy’s advance was halted once more
at the Protva and Nara rivers. A staff officer of the German
52nd Panzer Corps reported: “The recent fighting
to take Russian positions was the fiercest of the entire campaign. Our tank losses have risen dramatically
since the start of this operation”. For the Germans, the honour of being
the first troops into Moscow had turned into a nightmare
of blood and smoke. All possible measures were being
taken for the defence of Moscow. All the major roads into Moscow were mined,
including those leading to Kiev, Old Kiev, Mozhaysk, Zvenigorod,
Leningrad and Dmitrov. The bridges were also mined. Obstacles
were placed across the rail tracks. In total, more than 150 minefields
surrounded the city. Meanwhile Soviet troops encircled near
Vyazma and Bryansk continued to resist, much to the surprise
and frustration of the German planners. 24 German divisions earmarked
for the attack on Moscow had to be held back to fight
the encircled Red Army units. Von Funck, commander
of the 7th Panzer Division, reported that, “Combat following
the encirclement of the Russians was some of the heaviest
the division ever experienced. Some of our panzergrenadier platoons
were wiped out to a man.” It took a full week for the Germans
to crush resistance inside the pocket. Of 580,000 men encircled
near Vyazma and Bryansk, 130,000 were killed or missing in action,
and 370,000 were taken prisoner. Only 85,000 men broke out
of the encirclement. Front commander Yeryomenko was seriously
wounded and evacuated by air. Major General Petrov,
Commander of the 50th Army, and Major General Rakutin, Commander
of the 24th Army, were amongst the dead. Among those captured
were Lieutenant General Yershakov, who died in a German prisoner of war camp; Major General Vishnevskiy,
liberated by the Red Army in 1945; and the wounded Commander of the 19th Army,
Lieutenant General Lukin. Lukin survived the German camps
and was liberated in 1945. When Stalin heard the news, he said: “Tell Lukin my words
of gratitude for Moscow.” Stalin wrote on Lukin’s file,
“Loyal man. To be restored in rank.” He was not always so generous
to those who’d surrendered to the Germans. It was mid-October.
As the bulk of Army Group Centre completed the destruction
of the encircled Soviet Armies, the autumn rains began to fall.
The roads soon turned to rivers of mud. The German troops complained
that it was impossible to conduct offensive operations
in these conditions. But muddy roads were
a handicap to both sides. Colonel Katukov recalled: “Even T-34s could foul their tracks
and become stranded in the mud. Staff cars had to be towed
by tanks or carried on trucks, otherwise they would never get though.” Many German officers later
blamed their failure to take Moscow entirely on the weather. But in private, many admitted
that the German High Command had badly underestimated
Soviet determination, and the scale of their reserves. For now, the German offensive
was literally bogged down. In Moscow, news of the German advance
threatened to cause panic on the streets. On 15th October, the Central Committee
of the Communist Party was evacuated, as well as most of the ministries
and foreign embassies. The next day, many shops
and factories stayed closed. Workers were left on the streets with
nothing to do. Rumours began to spread. On the orders of Commissar Lazar
Kaganovich, the metro stopped running. It was rigged with explosives
so that it could be blown up if the Germans entered the city. Trams stayed in their depots. The roads leading east, to safety,
were blocked with cars. The Luftwaffe stepped up its air raids. The streets were awash
with rumours of spies and saboteurs. The situation demanded urgent measures. Aleksandr Shcherbakov, First Secretary of
the Moscow City Committee, went on the air. He assured citizens that Moscow
would not be abandoned. The NKVD secret police would patrol
the streets and restore order. Check points were set up everywhere. People trying to leave the city
with valuables were closely scrutinised. Looters and scaremongers were sentenced
by military tribunals, and shot by firing squad. And posters went up across the city announcing a concert
by the film star Liubov Orlova. The posters had their desired effect. If Russia’s biggest celebrity was in town,
the situation couldn’t be that bad. In fact at the beginning of November,
the Moscow front was relatively stable. But there was no room for complacency. The cry was “Not a step back!”,
and it was rigorously enforced. On 4th November, an order was read out to
the officers of the 133rd Rifle Division. Its commander Gerasimov
and Commissar Shabalov were to be executed by firing squad for
disobeying orders to hold the town of Ruza. They had retreated without authorisation. Stalin knew his own movements
would be crucial. He choose to remain in Moscow, and inspect the parade held every year
to mark the anniversary of the Revolution. All preparations for the parade
were made in complete secrecy. Even the units taking part
weren’t told in advance, and at the last moment, the start time
was brought forward by two hours. At ten past 8 on the morning
of 7th November, every radio station in the Soviet Union
broadcast Stalin’s speech from Red Square. It was a supreme act of state theatre. No other parades were held in Moscow
until the end of the war. To hold one in 1941,
the hour of greatest danger, showed the world Stalin
and the Soviet Union’s determination to fight to the bitter end. The troops seen here
parading through Red Square would go straight on to the front line. There they would take part
in some of the bloodiest and most decisive
fighting of the entire war. Muscovites had been fully mobilised
for the defence of their city. They built fortifications and made weapons. The Dynamo and Kalinin
factories produced mortars. Automobile factories now
made submachine guns. By 5th November, Muscovites’ had made
donations to the Defence Fund worth more than 80 million roubles.
They had given 8 kilos of gold, 377 kilos of silver
and 1.4 kilos of platinum. But now, with the ground frozen hard, German Army Group Centre
received orders to renew its offensive. Moscow was not just
the spiritual heart of Russia. It was also the transport hub
for the entire Soviet Union. All the major road
and rail networks converged here. If Moscow fell, the Soviet Union
would be almost defenceless. By the time Army Group Centre
renewed its assault, the city’s defences
had been considerably strengthened. Reinforcements continued to arrive
from the Far East. Katukov’s Tank Brigade was one of the units
sent to guard the approaches to Moscow. Like an increasing
number of Red Army officers, Katukov could now consider
himself a combat veteran. Understanding the role of air reconnaissance
in German success, Katukov wrote: “Tank tracks and footsteps in deep
snow can clearly be seen from the air. This isn’t taken
into consideration by our soldiers, who walk around their positions
creating a network of paths that can be seen from above.” Katukov recommended changes to standing
orders to reduce visibility from the air. The Red Army was slowly learning its craft. Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Army resumed its advance through
the city of Tula towards Kolomna. 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups
had been redeployed to the north. Their objectives were the crossings
over the Ivankovo Reservoir, with the aim of encircling Moscow
from the north. The simultaneous assault of two panzer
groups caused Soviet defences to buckle. But the line did not break. The Red Army retreated
and dug in again around the town of Klin. Katukov recalled:
“We retreated with heavy hearts: every single kilometre yielded to the enemy
brought the fighting closer to Moscow. We passed road signs reading “60 km
to Moscow”, then “55”, then “53”. South of Moscow, Guderian bypassed Tula, but ran into determined resistance from
General Belov’s dismounted cavalry units. By 30th November, German observers
could see the spires of the Kremlin. Motorcyclists from Hoepner’s
Fourth Panzer Group reached Khimki, a Moscow suburb less
than 15 miles from the Kremlin. According to one account,
the intruders were all killed. In another, they were forced
to beat a hurried retreat. It would prove to be the high-water
mark of the German invasion. In his memoirs Guderian wrote:
“The offensive on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts
of our valiant troops had been in vain. As a result, the army’s strength
and morale was greatly undermined.” Just as German reserves
were stretched to the limit, the Stavka was gathering fresh divisions
to unleash a devastating counter-attack. One army prepared to hit Reinhardt’s panzer
group from the flank near Solnechnogorsk. Another was aimed at the flank of
Guderian’s panzer army near Stalinogorsk. Another army would roll back the Germans
from immediate vicinity of Moscow. On 29th November
Zhukov phoned Stalin to request that he give the order
to begin the counteroffensive. Stalin issued the order that evening. As German soldiers struggled to cope
with plummeting temperatures — as low as minus 30 degrees
centigrade by night — they could at least take comfort
in the latest intelligence reports. “The enemy’s combat capababilities
in this area,” they claimed, “are not sufficient to conduct
any large scale counter-offensive”. But sunrise on 5th December
brought a terrible shock. Fresh Soviet tank brigades
and infantry divisions launched a full-scale assault
along the whole front. They tore across the frozen landscape,
forcing the Wehrmacht into retreat, and fighting fierce battles
against a desperate rear-guard. Hundreds of German vehicles,
having run out of fuel or anti-freeze, lay abandoned at the road side. Many German soldiers now
thought of nothing but survival. General Schaal recalled, “More and more
soldiers abandoned their weapons, but could be seen leading livestock, or perhaps dragging a sleigh loaded
with sacks of potatoes. Soldiers killed in air attacks
were left unburied.” In the south,
Guderian was also in full retreat: “With a heavy heart,” he wrote,
“on 6th December I ordered our troops to cease all attacks,
and begin a retreat to our original lines.” The pursuers had become the pursued. The call “Not a step back!”
became the battle cry “Forward!” There was to be no mercy for the invader. Meanwhile, Field Marshal von Bock was echoing Soviet orders of just
a few weeks before: “A commander may only order a withdrawal with the permission of his army commander. A division will not retreat
without my personal authorisation.” To add to the suffering,
the troops were experiencing the coldest Russian winter in 140 years. A German doctor’s diary recorded:
“A Russian can live in this wilderness. He can make a stove out
of a pair of empty jerry cans. Our men only know how to warm themselves
by burning precious petrol.” The Wehrmacht faced the same fate
as Napoleon’s army – total ruin. They had been forced back more than
100 kilometres from the gates of Moscow. It was the first large-scale repulse
of German forces in World War Two. Footage of thousands of German prisoners
and their wrecked vehicles was seen around the world. Hitler blamed defeat on a failure
of ‘will’ amongst his top generals. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was sacked
as Commander-in-Chief of the German army. His successor.. was Adolf Hitler. Von Bock was replaced
as commander of Army Group Centre by Field Marshal Gunter von Kluge. Guderian clashed with the High Command once
more, and was relieved of command. For ordering a retreat, Hoepner was sacked
and stripped of his decorations. In 1944 he was hanged
for plotting against Hitler. However, Hitler’s demands
that the army ‘stand fast’ and offer ‘fanatical resistance’
had effect. The front line was eventually stabilised, as the Germans dug in
and fought the Red Army to a standstill. Meanwhile, the Soviet Supreme
Command launched an offensive along the entire front – from besieged Leningrad in the north
to the Black Sea in the south. Outside Moscow, the Red Army
tried to break through to Vyazma and cut off Army Group Centre’s
main supply route. Stalin hoped for a grand encirclement. The German High Command fed in fresh
divisions from Western Europe. As they reinforced the front line, the lead elements of the Soviet
encirclement themselves became cut off. Two Soviet armies,
General Belov’s cavalry corps and thousand of paratroopers
were trapped around Vyzama. Their attempts to fight
their way out ended in failure. As 33rd Army was surrounded and crushed, its commander General Yefremov committed
suicide rather than be taken prisoner. Maslennikov’s 39th Army and the paratroopers
dispersed to fight on as guerrillas. Only part of Belov’s cavalry corps
managed to escape, galloping through the forests
to rejoin the Soviet front line. The Red Army still had much to learn. Zhukov told his officers:
“If you want to keep your commands, I insist that you stop ordering
criminal frontal attacks on well-defended enemy positions. You should attack along ravines, through forests or where there is some
cover from enemy fire.” By April 1942,
the disruption to Soviet industry meant the Red Army was running out
of tanks and ammunition. Its losses, exacerbated by its own
tactical blunders, had been enormous. As the spring thaw began, the Soviet
counteroffensive was called off. Germany had entered a war of attrition
against the Soviet Union — its spirits raised by the successful
defence of the capital. In the battle for Moscow
and in the Soviet counteroffensive, the Germans suffered 400,000 casualties. They had lost 1,300 tanks.
2,500 guns. By comparison, in the conquest of Poland
they had suffered just 44,000 casualties, and in the defeat of France, 154,000. At the Nuremberg Trials,
Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of the German High Command,
was asked when he knew that the invasion
of the Soviet Union had failed. He replied with one word: “Moscow”.
