The Battle of Kursk was one of the greatest battles in the Second World War, and it was the first time that the Red Army was able to stop the Wehrmacht during a summer offensive. Since the Soviets knew that the Germans would attack, they had heavily fortified the Kursk salient. Additionally they had reformed the tactics and organization as well. So let's take a deeper dive here. Originally, the Red Army is similar to the Wehrmacht had paid limited attention on defensive operations. "The 1936 Field Regulation [Временный Полевой устав РККА (ПУ-36). - SUNchaster] demonstrated the Red Army's attitude toward defense. Devoting only about twenty [27, - SUNchaster] pages of a 300-page [216, - S.] document to defense, the Soviets described it as a temporary phenomenon [...]." In the summer 1941 and also in summer 1942 this led to various problems. Mainly the Germans breaking through their defenses that were not deep enough, besides formations often being overstretched as well. Another aspect was the lacking material, which results in a lack of firepower. To illustrate this, let's look at the main differences between 1941 rifle division and a 1943 rifle division. Now the basic organization was similar: both divisions had three rifle regiments and one artillery regiment. Order 1943 had an additional anti-tank battalion, wheres the only one sapper battalion instead of two in 1941. Additionally a signal company was added in 1943, whereas both had a recon and supply company. Yet what is even more interesting is the change in the man to material ratio. A 1941 division had almost 11,000 men, whereas the 1943 had 9,380 men. Yet the number of field guns increased from 36 to 44 field guns. Additionally the number of mortars was doubled from 78 to 160 mortars. Yet the strongest increase was in anti-tank guns from 18 to 48 anti-tank guns. So while the total number of men decreased by about 14%, the number of field guns increased by 22, mortars increase by 105% and anti-tank guns by 167%. Now before we go deeper here, if you want to learn more about Soviet tank doctrine during the Battle of Kursk - check out this video on my second channel with Dr. Roman Töppel, who is the foremost German expert on the Battle of Kursk. Now the Soviet defense was deeply layered and consists of several defensive belts. "The Soviet General Staff Study" map has a total of nine different defensive belts and lines. There was the main defense belt, the second defense belt, the army rear defense lines, the front first line (note that the front here refers to the solid formation front, which was about an equivalent to an Army Group), front second line, the front third line, the cut-off lines, the Steppe military district line, and the state defense line. Dr. Roman Töppel notes about the first two belts: "The second Soviet army defense belt ran parallel behind the main defense line; the distance between the two lines was 10-15 kilometers on average and 20-25 kilometers in some areas. On the main axes, where the German attack was expected, the second defense belt was almost as strongly fortified as the main line of defense. It was not as heavily mined, though, and more thinly manned." Now it becomes even more interesting because each of those lines was quite deep as well and lay at the several trenches, strong points and various other defensive formations. So let's get a bit deeper here, namely to rifle corps level. You can see the general outline: the rifle corps covered both the first and second defense belt. The first one had a depth of about 6-8 km. followed by an area that was less fortified had a depth of 5-7 km, and the second defense belt had a depth of about 3-5 km. Usually rifle corps had three rifle divisions with two were assigned to the first belt and one to the second belt. The total width common was about fifteen to thirty kilometers. The first belt was itself layered in the main position, the intermediate and reserve position. Now for those of you, who watched my organization videos, you'll likely know that most military formations are composed of units that are basically a smaller copy of the superior units. So usually a division contains about three rifle regiments, whereas each rifle regiment contains three rifle battalions, which itself consists of three rifle companies, and exactly that way the defense is structured here as well. We have three divisions: two at the first belt, and one at the second belt. Then we look at the offense area of one division. Two regiments cover the first and second position, whereas the third regiment is in the reserve position. Similarly, two rifle battalions of a regiment sit at the front, whereas the third one sits further behind. So the basic pattern is rather simple. Now in the area between the first and the second defensive belt that could be a rifle division tank reserve, since only some divisions had one. Yet for the rifle corps each one had a tank reserve, an anti-tank reserve, and the mobile obstacle detachment. "Mobile obstacle detachments [POZ - podvízhnye otriády zagrazhdéniya; ПОЗ - подви́жные отря́ды загражде́ния] were created beforehand to construct mine and explosive obstacles during the course of operation." For a rifle corps a mobile obstacle detachment consists of a separate company with about 500 to 700 anti-tank mines. And finally there was also an army artillery subgroup. Now since this is getting a bit cluttered here, let's just look at a setup of one of the two divisions in the first defensive belt. You can see the general outline of the trench lines: parallel to the front line, but also diagonal. Mines were mostly located before the first trench line. Yet also in front of the divisional artillery group. As you can see most of this looks familiar: here the areas of the three rifle regiments, and here the respective areas of the rifle battalions. One of the most important elements here are the anti-tank strong points, or short ATSP [PTOP - protivotánkovye opórnye púnkty; ПТОП - противота́нковые опо́рные пу́нкты]. "[...] They were constructed so as to provide an all-round defense and special attention was focused on the cooperation of all firing means within the anti-tank strongpoints (guns, anti-tank rifles, and mortars), their cooperation with artillery and mortar fire being conducted from indirect firing positions." Such an anti-tank strongpoint usually had 4-6 anti-tank guns with an additional 6-9 anti-tank rifles, 2-3 heavy machineguns, and 3-4 light machineguns. Hence It could both engage panzers and also fend off their supporting infantry. It would also be supported by the regimental artillery groups. In some cases, like for the 6th Guard Army, tanks could be also part of the anti-tank strongpoints, with around of 10-50 vehicles. Now in our case the anti-tank strongpoints would be located here. Now in the upper area you can see concentration of 3 such strong points. This was called an anti-tank region. These were formed in vulnerable locations or if it was geographically feasible. Anti-tank regions in general consists of two to four anti-tank strong points. In our case we have an additional one located in front of the third rifle regiment. Now the rifle regiments had mobile obstacle detachments secured with mines available that were located in the rear. The regiments also had an anti-tank reserve, which consists of two to three anti-tank guns and an anti-tank rifle platoon and an automatic weapons platoon. For the division the anti-tank reserve was larger and could be moved in to prepare positions. In our case there were three positions indicated on the map: one covering the northern rifle regiment, one the southern rifle regiment, and one supporting the center. As mentioned before, some divisions were assigned tank reserve. This would be located here, which would be a tank regiment with about 39 tanks, if it was a regular set up for 1943. Note that the majority of the tank reserves were located in the second defensive belt. And, of course, there were also regimental and divisional artillery groups. As you can see, the Soviet defense was an elaborate system that provided defense in depth. There are many more points to make, yet i will just add a few here. First off, the Soviets were quite aware and concerned about the German panzers, especially the Panzerkapfwagen VI Tiger, of which one was captured near Leningrad in 1942 [18.01.1943, - SUNchaster]. As such: "Special attention was focused on studying the tactical-technical data on T-VI tanks [Panzer VI Tiger], their vulnerabilities, and the methods for fighting them. Special exercises were conducted on repelling tank and submachine-gunner assaults with artillery." One way to achieve this was by visual instructions. "Target plates were distributed, which highlighted the vulnerable areas of the German tanks, and the crews of Soviet anti-tank guns and anti-tank riflemen were urged to target the vision slits of the tanks or the commander's cupola." Next, one of the key elements of the defensive setup, which are only mentioned on the side were mines. So let's look what "The Soviet General Staff Study" has to say on that. "The number of mines laid by armies along main axes ensured a mining density of up to 1,500 antitank mines and 1700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of defence frontage, which made it possible for mines to cover all primary dangerous tank axes." Minefields were especially effective if they were in range of anti-tank defenses. Since after the Germans detected a minefield, they would usually try to bypass it. And as such provide better firing conditions for the Soviet guns. If a minefield was located in a zone of effective artillery fire - an immobilized pazners could be finished off, since the Germans often tried to recover the damaged tanks. Roman Töppel adds an interesting point about anti-tank mines: "[...] Soviet engineers, who often dug out German anti-tank mines and used these to construct new minefields. This might in fact be one of the reasons why German reports time and again noted that the troops had driven into their own minefields because these had been unmarked and uncharted." And he also makes it very clear that mines were not ****** weapon. "However, the backbone of the Soviet defence were not the trenches, minefields or tanks but artillery. This arm service was the pride of the Red Army; and, the Soviet forces had technically excellent guns - and many of them, too." But for those who wanna go no artillery only, "The Soviet General Staff [Study]" wants to have word of you: The artillery`s fight against the attacking enemy could be successful only if it occurred in cooperation with other combat arms and with engineer fortifications and obstacles, rather than in isolation." Now looking at the extensive defensive preparations, you probably wonder "Why the Germans attacked anyway?". Especially: "Considering that Model and Hitler were worried when aerial photographs showed that the Soviet defenses had reached a depth of 20 kilometers by the end of April 1943 [...]." Now by July they had reached a depth of 110 kilometers. In this case the German military intelligence had utterly failed. This becomes even more apparent if we consider the following: "When the 6th Panzer Division and the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion made a successful thrust from Mélikhovo [Ме́лихово] via Shákhovo [Ша́хово] to Kazáchye [Каза́чье], he [General Breith - III Panzer Korps] believed that his Corps had broken through the last Soviet defensive belt. Even after the war he was convinced that the III Panzer Corps had actually achieved the operational breakthrough on 11 of July, which would have offered the possibility to "operate in open space" (im freien Raum). In truth, the corps had only penetrated the second Soviet army defence line." Of course, this also means that the German Panzer forces managed to break through those defenses that they were briefed for. Similarly, it also acknowledged the Soviet achievements in fortifying and defending the Kursk salient. "The war diary of the III Panzer Corps noted: "On the whole corps front the enemy offers fierce resistance in deeply echeloned positions, reinforced with wide minefields and fortified in exemplary fashion."" If you like well-sourced content like this - consider supporting me on PayPal, Patreon or SubscribeStar. Thank you here to Peter from Tank Archives, TacError and especially Roman Töppel for helping me out at various points at this video. Note that none of them saw the final script, so any errors are my own. Special thanks to Mike and Check for sending me books that help with this video. Sources are linked in description. Thank you for watching and see you next time.
