The Battle of Cannae was a huge fight between Rome and Carthage in 216 BC, in southeast Italy. Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, cleverly trapped and wiped out a much larger Roman army led by two commanders, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. The battle of Cannae is famous for being a high point in military strategy and one of Rome's worst losses. Before Cannae, Rome had suffered but recovered from defeats at Trebia and Lake Trasimene. They met Hannibal at Cannae with a huge army of about 86,000 soldiers. The Romans packed their troops tightly, making it easier for Hannibal to trap and kill most of them. The number of Roman soldiers who died was so high that it's compared to some of the bloodiest days in modern warfare. Only around 15,000 Romans managed to escape. After this loss, many Italians stopped supporting Rome and joined Carthage. Rome itself went into panic mode. They did all kinds of emergency things like checking holy books and even burying people alive as sacrifices. They made new armies by recruiting very young men, criminals, and even slaves. Despite this huge setback and another big loss later that year, Rome didn't give up. They kept fighting Hannibal for 14 more years until they finally won at another battle called Zama. Today, the Battle of Cannae is often cited as a textbook example of how to completely defeat an enemy. Not long after the Second Punic War started, Hannibal got into Italy by crossing the Pyrenees and Alps in the summer and fall of 218 BC. He quickly beat the Romans in two major battles at Trebia and Lake Trasimene. Because of these defeats, the Romans put Quintus Fabius Maximus in charge as a dictator. Fabius tried to wear Hannibal down by cutting off his supplies and avoiding big fights. But the Romans didn't like this slow approach. They wanted to end the war quickly, worried that if Hannibal kept causing trouble, Rome's allies might switch sides. So, when Fabius's term ended, the Senate didn't keep him in charge. Instead, they gave command to new leaders, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus. In 216 BC, two other commanders, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus were put in charge of a huge new army. According to the historian Polybius, the Roman Senate decided to do something they'd never done before. They raised eight legions, which was twice as many as usual. Each legion had 5,000 soldiers and 300 cavalry, along with allied troops. While there's no exact number for how big the Roman army was, everyone agrees it was a lot bigger than Hannibal's army everyone agrees it was a lot bigger than Hannibal's army. Normally, each of the two Roman leaders would get two legions to lead, but this time was different. Because the situation was so serious, the Senate sent all eight legions to fight, not just four. And since all the legions were together in one big army the two leaders had to take turns being in charge each day, as Roman law required. Many people blame Varro for the defeat at Cannae because he was the one leading on that day. But it's possible he was just an easy target for blame. Unlike Paullus, Varro didn't have powerful family members to defend his reputation. Paullus, on the other hand, was the grandfather of a very important person, Scipio Aemilianus. Scipio was a friend of the historian Polybius, who is one of our main sources for this story. So, Varro might have been unfairly blamed for the loss. In the spring of 216 BC, Hannibal moved first by taking over a large supply depot at Cannae, in southern Italy. This blocked the Romans from their much-needed supplies and made them nervous. The Roman leaders, Varro and Paullus, decided to march their armies south to face him. After two days of marching, they found Hannibal camped near a river called Aufidus and set up their own camp about 5 miles away. Varro, who was in charge on the first day, was eager to defeat Hannibal. When some of Hannibal's troops ambushed the Romans, Varro pushed them back and kept moving towards Cannae. This small win made the Roman army more confident, maybe too confident. Paullus, however, was more careful. He didn't think it was a good idea to fight Hannibal on an open field, especially since Hannibal had better cavalry. But they didn't pull back and instead set up
two camps on either side of the river. Both armies stayed put for two days. On the second day, knowing that Varro would be in charge the next day. Hannibal came out of his camp to offer battle, but Paullus declined. Hannibal then sent his cavalry to mess with the Romans trying to get water, making life even harder for them. On the morning of the battle, one of Hannibal's officers, Gisgo, commented on how huge the Roman army was. Hannibal replied with a joke that lightened the mood among his troops. "There is one thing, Gisgo, yet more astonishing which you take no notice of'' 'In all those great numbers before us, there is not one man called Gisgo." Hannibal Barca The number of soldiers in ancient battles like Cannae is often not very reliable especially for the Carthaginian side. Hannibal's army was made up of fighters from many different places and might have had around 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers. This included various types of infantry like Libyans, Gaetulians, Gauls, and different Spanish tribes. Hannibal also had a diverse group of cavalry, which included Numidians, Iberians, Gauls, and Libyans. In addition to this, he had a smaller group of slingers and javelin throwers. Despite coming from different places, what united this army was their loyalty to Hannibal. Roman soldiers had standard equipment like heavy javelins and thrusting spears as well as bronze helmets, shields, and body armor. On the other hand, Hannibal's army had a mix of gear. Spanish warriors used falcatas and straight swords, along with large oval shields and unique helmets. Most Gallic soldiers likely only had big shields and long swords for protection. The Numidian horsemen were lightly equipped, while heavier Iberian cavalry had more robust weapons and shields. Skirmishers, who were light infantry, used slings or javelins. Hannibal and some Roman officers might have worn bronze armor and carried a special kind of sword called a falcata. In ancient battles, it was common to put infantry in the middle and cavalry on the sides. The Romans did this too, but they made their infantry formation deeper rather than wider hoping to quickly break through Hannibal's center. Even though the Romans had more troops their deep formation made their front line about the same size as Hannibal's smaller army. Hannibal knew the Romans' style of fighting and used it to his advantage by positioning his troops strategically. Hannibal was very thoughtful about where he placed his different units. For example, he used Spanish slingers to throw projectiles at the Romans from behind his own lines. He put his experienced fighters from Spain and Gaul in the center of his line and African troops on the sides to attack the Roman flanks later. His brother Hasdrubal led the cavalry on one side of the army, next to a river making it harder for the Romans to surround them. Hannibal's plan was for his cavalry to beat the Roman cavalry and then attack the Roman infantry from behind. The Romans were in a tough spot: stuck between a hill and a river, with only one good way to retreat. Hannibal also made sure the Romans would be facing the sun and the wind which would make it harder for them to see and fight. Light infantry from both armies had brief, inconclusive encounters before retreating through their respective heavy infantry lines. As both sides moved toward each other, Hannibal strategically adjusted his frontline, broadening its center. He led the Hispanic and Celtic troops forward while keeping the African soldiers as reserves on the flanks. This formed a crescent shape aimed at disrupting the Romans' forward push. Though some historians debate its intentionality, the majority believe this was a calculated move by Hannibal. The battle kicked off with intense cavalry combat at the flanks. Polybius detailed how many Hispanic and Celtic riders had to dismount to fight due to space constraints, describing the violence as exceptionally brutal. Carthaginian right flank - The Numidians harass the Roman cavalry The Carthaginian cavalry gained the upper hand and, instead of chasing fleeing Romans, they focused on the remaining Roman cavalry. As the infantry from both sides advanced they had to contend with gusts of wind that blew dust into their eyes, impairing their vision. Additionally, factors like fatigue and thirst, exacerbated by Hannibal's prior attack on the Roman camp played into the psychological toll of the battle. When the situation was ripe, Hannibal commanded his African troops to pivot inward effectively surrounding the Roman infantry in a pincer maneuver. The Carthaginians closed in from all sides, halting the Roman advance and trapping them. Polybius recounted how the Romans were systematically slaughtered their outer ranks continually falling as survivors were forced into an ever-shrinking space. The Romans experienced devastating losses, with some even resorting to suffocating themselves in self-dug pits Almost 600 Romans per minute were killed until darkness fell. Only about 14,000 Romans, including Scipio Africanus, managed to escape. Polybius states that out of the Roman and allied foot soldiers, 70,000 died 10,000 were taken captive, and around 3,000 managed to survive. After the defeat at the battle, Rome was thrown into unprecedented chaos and despair. The loss was so devastating that even the Roman Senate was at a loss for words. This wasn't just another defeat; Rome had lost two of its key armies along with their leading consuls. Cities and regions like Apulia, Samnium, and most of Italy had fallen to Hannibal. For a short time, Rome was in a state of utter confusion. With their best troops gone and the remaining leadership discredited, the whole city was mourning. Additionally, the defeat had international repercussions. Cities in Sicily rebelled against Roman rule, and Philip V of Macedonia declared his support for Hannibal leading to a new war against Rome. After the battle, Hannibal had to make a choice: to attack Rome immediately or not. His cavalry commander, Maharbal, advised attacking, but Hannibal hesitated. Instead, he tried to negotiate peace with Rome. Historians argue that Hannibal might have had good reasons to hesitate. His army was also worn out, and attacking Rome directly would have been risky. For the rest of the war in Italy, the Romans changed their strategy. They didn't gather big armies to face Hannibal directly but focused on smaller, persistent engagements. This slowly drained Hannibal's forces ultimately forcing him to retreat and leading to his defeat in Africa, which ended the war.
