Proceedings Podcast: Remembering the USS Thresher

[Music] thank you good morning everybody I'm Bill Hamlet the editor-in-chief of proceedings at the U.S naval Institute today is Monday April 10th 2023. good to have you on board today is show today's show is brought to you by the members of the naval Institute since 1873 now 150 years the members of the naval Institute have provided the open Forum of proceedings to Foster debate about how to make the Navy the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard better if you enjoy the show ring the bell subscribe recommend us to your friends and become a member of the naval Institute at usni.org forward slash join now let's get to our guests retired Navy Captain Jim Bryant is joining us from California and Stephen Walsh is here with us today from New Hampshire it is a sad Naval anniversary today 60 years ago today the USS Thresher SSN 593 was lost at sea with all hands during his seat trials Deep dive test off the coast of Massachusetts Jim and Steve and three others are the authors of an article in the April proceedings titled was the thresher ready for C Steve Jim thanks for being on the show you're welcome bill great to be here yeah I'm going to start just by uh because both of you and and your co-authors are very connected to this uh so starting with Jim tell our listeners your connection to the thresher and um you know the the efforts that you've made over the years to uh you know to do right by the victims of the thresher loss well my association with a thresher goes back to uh I was chief engineer of let's see Seth Grant which had the basically the same engine room that threshered it was missile submarine but it had the same repulsion plant same layout of the engine room then I went on to serve on three other social class submarines permit a haddock and then commanded guard fish and I always would walking around the engineering spaces look up and say which one of these pipes would have broken and that caused the problem on on thresher back when we thought that it was flooding and then uh I made friends with a with a guy named Bruce rule who was the acoustic expert that analyzed uh the acoustic recordings of thresher's last dive which a lot of the results of the court of inquiry come from and uh he initially decided that he was going to write a tell-all book and release the information that was still technically a secret uh you know back in about 2017 that uh and that that encouraged me to start studying successor gotcha Stephen how about you yeah bill I was born and raised in Portsmouth New Hampshire my father worked at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the first submarine I ever saw affect the first ship I ever saw get launched was thresher um growing up in Portsmouth I subsequently uh after thresher was lost I started having classmates who lost their dads on thresher and then subsequently I started working at uh Portsmouth Naval Shipyard myself as an engineer Naval architect and then later on I transferred down to navc so my personal and professional career path just keeps intertwining with thresher and then later on Bruce rule hooked me up with Jim and uh that's how I basically have gotten as involved in it as I have been uh so early in my career just uh the connection with Bruce rule continues uh I I worked at Oni the Office of Naval intelligence and I did some work with uh the submarine group there and Bruce was he was considered you know he was like the god of Acoustics intelligence uh he was you know there were there were lots of people who were studying to be you know a Acoustics Acoustics intelligence experts both civilians and um uh and and navy um uh sonerman right and and Bruce was like he was The Godfather to all of them so when I started reading the work that you were doing and I saw Bruce's name it was uh you know it was really no surprise that he was uh interconnected intertwined with this story so uh for our listeners who may not know what happened to thresher that day uh Jim just give a you know a quick two minutes on with the submarine yeah well I know it's it's a complicated story so we'll we'll pull it out but but just you know the the the quick you know uh Reader's Digest version of what happened to the submarine that day yes Bill Norman pullerman actually talking on the phone yesterday about about this very complex story I I mentioned earlier I used to look up at the piping uh when I served on those class submarines about work where the water would have come from that's what the board thought happened they thought the submarine had a major flooding in the engine room and that is just not not true there's there's no acoustic data to support that uh the the the basic easy easy one is that pressure loss propulsion the main propulsion we could drive the supplement of the surface what was lost uh and and there's a a myriad of things you can say about about how that was lost but uh and she was very heavy we think about 20 000 pounds heavy from our our studies and she sank and uh to see a pressure crushed her that's the short version got it so not necessarily A a pipe leak or something like that so so she was going down she was doing deep dive tests after coming out of the Yards uh so and the Deep dive test the goal was to get her down to what about 1300 feet yes and uh that's what everybody says I can't say that because the Navy reclassified that depth so the Norman polamar and Dr Friedman say 1300 feet so that's the depth uh got it yes because the only way you can test a submarine when you when you've done whole work is to take it down to its test depth to make sure that the that the uh the Hall of sound so she comes out of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard she was built there uh she had done some seed trials she'd gone back in for some additional work and now she's got to go out and do her uh her test depth dive um she's accompanied by a uh a submarine tender or a you know a surface vessel that's there to um you know support uh the the sea trials uh and and she you know makes a couple of Dives uh and then on this one she goes all the way to 1300 feet and and as you point out um she the the Assumption now or the the conclusion now that you've made is that she had a reactor scram problem and that because of that didn't have the speed and the ability to essentially Drive herself back to the surface right so uh you know let's let's just pull a few more of the details out of that so um what what made you think uh that the uh conclusions early on the 1960s conclusion that she had had some sort of uh uh Plumbing failure if you will or piping failure was was incorrect well there is no acoustic record of it the uh the sky alert the submarine rescue vessel Sky art Skylark had underwater telephone and through that speaker the underwater telephone they they picked up a main ballast tank below air rushing into a ballast tank and they they picked up the whole collapse they heard that if there had been 600 pounds 700 pound of water rushing in through a two to a five inch hole as the board thought so you would have heard that on and and the Celsius recording the sensor the recorded the acoustic uh sounds of treasure on their last dive did not have the resonant lines on it that you would expect from uh major flooding and and Bruce rule had seen this before he's seen this in other stubborn incidents and he did not see that on on thresher so the you mentioned Sosa so the sound surveillance undersea system um and and which was laid down during the Cold War largely to uh to detect Soviet submarines uh in the Atlantic and be able to you know uh find those uh submarines when they came across the GI UK Gap and other places uh Bruce rule as you mentioned was one of those Acoustics intelligence experts who would listen to and be able to you know classify what's that you couldn't listen yeah you're gonna pay for gram you're watching stylus yeah electrical sensitive paper and we're going too too far on the weeds but no it didn't hear anything okay so you're watching those waterfall graphs and and looking at the sound profiles and then classifying submarines or classifying things that are happening on submarines by those sound profiles uh so the talk a little bit about the first the court of inquiry and what was released to the public back in the 1960s and then also what was kept what was Kept Secret for a long time the majority was kept secret until my lawsuit by 2019 lawsuit there was only 19 pages of testimony and there were 1700 pages of testimony and which really tell the story and what was what was released was was fairly heavy heavily redacted so now we have all 1700 pages of testimony that basically tell us that the Navy did not understand the inherent danger of almost doubling the test depth of the submarine they're going from 700 foot boats uh which were built after World War II the thresher using a stronger steel and the and everything from procedures to the quality control to the material they used you know as as Steve has always pointed out to me is that all they did was take a diesel boat system a piping system a pumping system and increase the wall size to make it stronger not even thinking about well maybe it's just going really this deep maybe we ought to look at the whole redesign of the system got it uh Steve uh over to you you mentioned your Naval architect uh so did did you work on submarines uh during your career both at navc and and at Portsmouth and how did how did the thresher what happened on thresher impact your career as a naval architect um I had the uh the pleasure of working with some of the guys that designed thresher at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and um uh they were devastated the shipyard was absolutely devastated not only did the uh they lose the crew uh many of which were fellow co-workers Shipyard Riders but also um a lot of the thresher uh families were um members of the community because uh Porsche medieval Shipyard was the only Home Port thresher ever had in its short existence so there was a very concerted effort to make sure we never replicated some of the things that we learned as a result of the postmortem if you would of the loss of that ship uh so there was a lot of attention you know the sub submarine safety program sub-safe for short came out of that and Portsmouth was very very adamant about following that they never wanted to have something like that happen again but um I used to answer your question I used to be a shipyard writer I would go out to see four or five times a year and uh thresher was pretty much on my mind when uh when I'd be out to see myself so I I would imagine it would be you know you get underway on a submarine you uh you make a dive and you're thinking about uh you know what you saw as a child you said you said that the the children of thresher Shipmates uh were in your in your Elementary School classes right yes very true yep got it so that's yeah the the other thing to on an earlier observation that you made uh that uh asked Jim when I went to Naf C I was working in the Deep submergence office and some of my uh cognizant programmatic cognizant assets would periodically uh survey thresher and getting back to what Jim said about uh the court of inquiry uh stipulating that it probably was flooding in the engine room based on the wreckage I've seen on the bottom from some of my assets there was no sign to me that thresha was equalizing from flooding back there the the pressure all just does not look like there was any Equalization if it was there wasn't much going on in that in that particular compartment so for our our lay audience including me describe that a little bit more so if there was flooding in the engine room right then you wouldn't when a when a compartment floods on a submarine the air in that compartment starts pressurizing it starts climbing from basically one atmosphere which is what the submarine is is uh pressurized at inside the pressure Hall that that'll start climbing and uh because the outside pressure it's going to want to start try to equalize so there was very um if you look at the pressure Hull of the engine room thresher basically broke apart by compartment when she imploded so there's uh she basically was a five compartment ship and uh she ended up in in that many pieces in large pieces on the bottom the engine room um had a tremendous amount of of distortion to the hull but it was largely intact most of the other uh compartments were pretty pretty well shattered but not the engine room it was clear that it had water tight Integrity quite deep and um uh had the boat been equalizing the deformation of the hull would not have been as extensive as it is on the bottom right now that told me in fact when I first hooked up with Bruce after I retired from navsea in 2017. I mentioned to him that um it didn't look to me like uh the engine room had been equalizing it hadn't the internal pressure had not been equalizing to the external pressure and uh he jumped on that immediately interesting um so Jim you've talked a little bit about the your lawsuit and also the Freedom of Information Act and over the last few years we've published a number of things in proceedings as some of that information has been forthcoming from the Navy they've Declassified some in response to that foia and and the lawsuit uh so describe if if you would some of the things that came out as they came out and then how that changed the conclusions about what caused the loss of the thresher well the Navy has finally released about 4 000 Pages they've released uh uh most of the 255 exhibits that support the testimony and the conclusions in the court of inquiry uh but um they've they've in some cases they've had heavily redacted that information and it's hard to tell and in some areas they've released the same information because the the redaction team uh is not talking to each other whatever which is good for us because we need more more information um but my intention was in my lawsuit first thing in the lawsuit you know we submitted a couple of very simple freedom information act requests back in 2017. and they were things that we knew were unclassified like the the the the the the uh the sea trial schedule it says in what has been released if this was an unclassified document and they very cleverly they've got very good bureaucrats there that know how to keep things hidden things get passed around and became very difficult and it looks like the only way that I was going to get information out of the Navy was to file a lawsuit and that has told us and listening to the testimony there's a commander woolston who made a testimony he was the the desk Officer Steve yes down a few ships the bureau ships was the now the current now ships he was the project officer for the thresher class and he was actually an enlisted guy on the Indianapolis when it sank and survived but but he um so he had a history of you know living through surviving ships and he was very very brutally honest about the design it was diesel boat designs and that testimony was was very valuable in fact Steve is copied that and passed that to a number of people uh one of the things that I found interesting when I read your article is that the uh the procedures for a reactor um shutdown at depth for the thresher were you know essentially that you um there was not enough residual uh steam power to drive the submarine to the surface right and then in later in later boats they changed the procedure because uh if there's a if there was a shutdown you needed to eat at least have the residual uh steam power to keep this keep the submarine moving and you wanted to propel it with the planes uh up to a less depth so you you came out of that danger zone describe that a little bit and you know uh Jim you've got you've got guards you've got your guard face uh guard fish hat on well actually it's the uh yeah like those are the submarines today those are class submarine take serum he called ourselves 594 tough because the Admirals called us that because it's a very hard submarine to maintain back in the in the 70s and 80s but you said uh all those those submarines were sister ships of uh of Russia and guard fish guard fish you commanded so yeah I'm guessing that I'm guessing that you know the procedures that you use to to run those subsequent ships uh were different because of maybe what was learned from thresher correct yeah the procedure was changed when a reactor shuts down in a submarine it does not stop producing heat because even though the fission process that produced a major amount of heat the the uh the the fission products decaying of all this radioactivity creates heat and also you've got the heat built up in the steam generators and the reactor coolant system and Admiral rickover himself he was the director of Naval nuclear propulsion and we've got his testimony uh it said that he believes he said that they could have saved the ship if they had not secured steam to the engine room and used that remaining latent heat he calls it to drive the main engine to get the submarine up high enough because they were they were trying to blow the main ballast tanks to go up but the submarine was probably going down and they needed something to counter counter that going down the momentum of going down yeah yeah there was some reactor safety issue I'm guessing I don't know we've not found that yet why why they would secure steam to the engine room after after a scram but that was the procedure I think at the at the start you mentioned that the the sub was uh was Heavy which I'm guessing it had to it had to be heavy to get down to that depth right no Steve go ahead talk about buoyancy no what what uh like you alluded to uh earlier Bill the power plant and the hydrodynamic hull form of thrusher she could have driven herself down even if she was positively buoyant in fact we call that a controlled Deep dive uh basically what we want to see submarines do as a result of thresher is to actually be a little bit on the positive buoyance buoyancy side and hold themselves down with their planes with a with a moderate amount of speed um and uh that that puts uh Fail-Safe if they lose propulsion when they're deep like apparently thresher did um it's going to want to float to the surface instead of sink to the bottom like thresher was got it okay that makes sense uh for the non non-naval architect non-engineers in the group here including me um uh there was a another complicating issue uh that had to do with the you know some vortices that froze up in the main ballast blow system can you talk about that a little bit Steve yeah the the uh basically the simplest way of looking at the conical strainers in the orifice plates that were in the inlet side of the um air pressure the high pressure air reducers um were more or less considered to be Shipyard maintenance gear um the shipyard didn't put them there they came from the manufacturer with the recommendation to install them and they were manufactured by the uh the equipment manufacturer and the reason beam was the the the manufacturer was getting a tremendous number of of uh these reducers coming back to them for refurbishment and a lot of it was because the shipyards not just Portsmouth but all of them apparently we're using uh contaminated air it had a lot of particulate matter in it and basically it was that those particulates Move Along at high pressure uh we're scoring the seats they would basically sandblasting the seats so these these reducers would start leaking by to try to mitigate that the manufacturer provided orifice plates with a conical strainer that sat on the Upstream side of these reducers to try to filter out the particulate matter which was the purpose of the conical strainers the the uh the problem is is it also the in the incorporation of that would have adversely affected the performance of that the design performance of that system which is why it wasn't meant to go out to sea and unfortunately um when Portsmouth got ready to uh pull those off the boat uh the new Co seeing and this is all based on the testimony that Jim got released uh the new CEO noting that uh he had had a high attrition just in the two and a half months that he'd been on thresher decided he wanted to retain them and had Portsmouth break open those mechanical joints so that his crew could verify that they were still installed and unfortunately the the orifice plate is a flow restrictor and the conical strainer that sat on it was into the direction of the flow and what they found out on portsmouth's sister ship finosa won the court of inquiry mandated a pure side blow is the the blow system didn't perform as expected and when they broke the system open to try to figure out why they realized that the conical strainers on tenosa had collapsed into the hole in the orifice plate and then it proceeded to ice over with all the moisture in the in the air that was moving at high you know was expanding at high speed from the air flasks and it it plugged it plugged the airflow on tenosa over solid by testimony they knew that this that installation was retained excuse me retained on Thruster and they figured that the same thing must have happened to her based on Bruce Rule's Solstice analysis of hearing partial blows but they didn't last very long that was a great explanation I I commend you for that because boy there's a lot to unpack there but if if I could just to to um restate it a little bit so submarine is down deep 1300 feet she was heavier than she should have been uh she's got a reactor scram of some sort of reactive problem they they scram the reactor and they they stop the um Steam from going through the turbines so this the ship basically comes to a a standstill uh and and then as they're trying to blow the main ballast tanks because of these strainers freezing up the the attempts to blow the main ballast tanks are in insufficient incomplete and so the submarine's heavy it can't blow enough ballast and she sinks did I get that just about right that's exactly right that must have been uh just a absolutely terrifying uh set of events to realize what kind of what was happening or to have some realization of what was happening on board this submarine uh Jim I want to ask a question about subsafe because after thresher you know one of the good things that often happens from a disaster is if it's a an organization that can learn from mistakes is you learn and you put in place um you know new procedures that that prevent that disaster from happening again and you continue to serve for another what 20 25 years in the submarine Force so how did subsafe prevent another thresher how did your procedures on the you know guard fish and other boats uh change and then you know just tell us a little bit about uh what subsafe has done for the you know the submarine Force since thresher let's go back also to to the uh the command officer decision to leave those trainers in uh you know before subsafe you know there was no backup to the Nuka repulsion system it's it's a submarine got deep and heavy and lost propulsion there was no backup to that because that blow system uh was considered only to the surface the submarine from a very shallow depth it was not designed or tested to be blown continuously deep to safe so one of the things the first things they did it immediately installed on all submarines was develop a 4500 emergency blow system because what you had on thresher was uh was a a normal blow and they were using the legacy of the three thousand pound air system that had been used on all previous submarines including World War II but they needed more they needed higher air pressure so they had to have these reducers bad design bad thinking not thinking about safety so and then in these reducers were were dying on them they were failing and then you lose your whole air system so the community and officer had had that problem during a fast cruise where he lost a couple of these reducers and so he really wanted to make sure so you can't really criticize him for for doing that um but wait we basically went back and did the right thing we redesigned looked at all the systems and redesigned them we had problems with it with the control services jamming in in died positions or service positions which means either you broach the surface or you exceeded test steps and so we we just basically redesigned these whole systems throughout all the things we learned about diesel boats diesel boats went very slow they didn't go deep thresher went to test depth 40 times during her her year of operation and that is way way way more than diesel boats do diesel boats only go down uh you know World War II you know to avoid depth charts but so the systems were all changed and then everything inside these critical boundaries of these systems had to have certain quality control on the way they were manufactured the material that was used to manufacture them the way they were installed you had to have extra paperwork to cover when the testimony on the The Naked Court of inquiry interviewed many people to try to figure out if the the auxiliary sea water system in the engine room had been hydrostatically tested pressure tested it was a it was a real mess they kind of figured out that yeah it really did it wasn't the paperwork and the certification and people's name signature on it to really prove that that it was where now when you close up a system like that and test it you know everybody how it was done and who did it so that's a yeah and we've only lost one other submarine we lost the Scorpion in May of 68. scorpion was not fully sub safe she was limited in depth she can own she has a 700 foot boat she can only go to about 300 I forget with the 300 or 350. but we lost her and that was a highly likely was it was a battery problem so it wasn't really a hydrogen leaking from the battery and exploding so it wasn't a subsafe issue is that good enough bill yeah that's that's great uh great comment uh I want to ask a question about uh leadership but we're running uh short on time so this might be we got time for one or two more questions but uh you know crisis leadership you talked a little bit about you know decision that the CEO made uh and and not criticizing him for making that decision in the shipyard before the submarine went out to see um but in the you know in the immediate aftermath of losing the submarine uh and realizing what what had happened and the loss of lives on board and then the court of inquiry and the uh you know the follow-up decisions made um any insights on crisis leadership or on leadership through what what was a catastrophe well if people have looked at that the people in the in the bridge of the Skylark claim it was the commanding officer killing them very calmly what was going on we didn't get a lot of information and and the the commanding officer the Skyler got in and during the last phases were where they were trying to report he kept saying are you in control are you in control are you in control and blocked out a lot of a lot of communications but uh uh in that kind of situation where the the crew first thing the chameleon the chameleon officer and the executive officer had only been on board three or three months they had never been to see on a fast deep diving submarine uh you know and nowadays you know Canadian Officers Training the course they go to see on on the submarine and go and do that they've been on Escape class uh uh in Nautilus and they just didn't have that that kind of experience so it's hard to say what was really happening in the control room but they were you know they were sure sure trying but uh one of the things was they felt that the crew was so good and it really was a great crew and it but there was so little people with experience on board how many people we figured out Steve's the expert on the Steve please give me a short rundown on the qualification of the officers uh thresher went to see she had 13 assigned officers built 12 of them went to see one was ashore on an emergency medical family situation uh of those 12 officers that were lost on thresher only four of them had been on a thresher-class submarine before um and they were all on thresher they were leftovers during the PSA the ward room was very heavily poached by bupers because they needed experienced people to man other other submarines that were in the construction phase so of the uh if you subtract the four that had thresher class experience from 12 you got eight five of those eight were on their first submarine Tour Ever they were fresh from school wow um the other three um none of them had thresher class experience in fact none of them even had skipjack class experience which would have been the next similar class um the CEO did have a telebi experience he had been the engine on television 597. but talibi was a submarine that could only dive half his half as deep roughly and go roughly half as fast so the handling characteristics of that boat uh from a ship handling perspective and from a damage control perspective as far as time compression due to flooding would have been totally different so basically the training infrastructure for the thresher class at the time was extremely limited no Shore based trainers um the classroom was strictly book learning and one of the Courts of inquiry findings was some of the documentation that thresher had to train on was substandard it wasn't well written and there's reason for that too but basically the in today's parlance the crew was not as enabled to be successful on the sea trials as they could have been or probably should have been for that deep dive which by the way that was their first deep dive after uh shock trials so the they had tried to do a deep dive after shark trials and they had uh they determined they had a leak and the boat had a limitation and depth going into the shipyard so that was the first time they were trying to get down to 1300 feet after the shark prowls uh I want to step back a little bit and and just ask your thoughts on um leadership not on the boat itself but Navy leadership in the wake of the of the disaster how did the Navy do the CNO at the time or Admiral rickover as you mentioned was uh chief of Naval reactors what was how did they manage the situation well we initiated this new casual procedure um which actually you know leaving steam after in an engine room after a scram was actually in place one another submarine it was it was on the George Washington the first missile submarine the ballistic missile submarine so uh neighbor reactors I think took a look at at casualty control in the engineering plant to make sure that every that every injuring off for the watch the officer in charge of the propulsion plant uh was prepared to handle that that kind of casually before he'd be qualified and that requires a lot of leadership coordinating everything that goes on during the uh during a reactor scam and Recovery is is very um is is very uh important make sure you have the right leadership and give directions and I think all of our training of leaders improved and uh to make sure that we had the exercises and did the training and we had the we had the shore base diving trainers that could actually simulate you know surfacing um changing depth having a having a flooding casualty and people were watched during that interesting yeah yeah well as you as you point out you know because of subsafe the Navy's lost uh one submarine since thresher that was scorpion in 68 and it was for for a different reason a battery casualty battery problem hydrogen buildup Etc um and and has had an amazing safety record in the submarine Force since then as uh my Aviator friends would say my you know natops is Written in Blood that's Naval Aviation uh training and operating procedures and um at you know sub safe also you know clearly is Written in Blood so uh uh this is a um an anniversary that is a hard one to observe 60 years to today since uh thresher went down but uh sounds like the Navy uh did some you know very uh not just adequate but admirable course correction and and uh you know initiated of programs that called subsafe that is uh you know kept kept our uh our submarine Sailors safe since then I want to commend the two of you and your and your co-authors for writing this article but also for having the tenacity to uh to ask the questions you know uncomfortable questions uh of the Navy through the foia requests and then the lawsuit um with the goal in mind that you know uh sunlight can be the best disinfectant and it brings light particularly you know 60 years it's been 60 years so there's probably not a lot about a submarine that was designed you know more than 60 years ago that that still needs to be kept uh you know secret given that what we're what we're operating at Sea today so um just as a wrap up I'll go to Steve and then Jim um you know any parting shots or or saved rounds no um basically um your Jim's observation that the uh the whole uh Navy's approach and I mean from op nav all the way down to the operators including the shipyards that design and build the boats nav C which is what view ships you uh used to be known as view ships the whole uh approach to submarine design uh construction operation maintenance it's all changed as a result of uh the hard Lessons Learned From thresher and it's all changed for the better uh Jim over to you agree we've we've we've changed everything at that because we were we were still honoring the the World War II Heroes and still thinking about that uh rickover did not want uh people like uh Gene flucky middle of Honor winner for being very very brave operating his reactor plants because he broke the rules and he and so we we we learned when we could break the rules and when we can't gotcha no that's an important lesson to learn and I know uh Emma rickover was all about uh not just driving technical Innovation but also the standardization uh to make sure that it was uh you know repeatable uh success was repeatable and uh that we didn't have problems with our nuclear actors at Sea on submarines uh well gentlemen thank you so much uh so Captain Jim Bryant Steve Walsh joining us today they are the authors of the article in the April proceedings it's called was the thresher ready for C it's a great piece uh and we honor the men who died 60 years ago today on the thresher off the coast of Massachusetts uh thanks for being with us today thank you Bill thanks Bill all right well that wraps up another episode of the proceedings podcast brought to you by the naval Institute to become a member go to usni.org forward slash join until next week remember Victory begins at the naval Institute [Music] thank you [Applause] [Music] foreign

Channel: U.S. Naval Institute

Views: 5,274

Keywords: U.S. Naval Institute, USNI, Thresher, Submarines, Silent Service, U.S. Navy, Navy disasters, Military history, 60th Anniversary

Id: ZHpl1dIRg7c

Length: 41min 27sec (2487 seconds)

Published: Mon Apr 10 2023