Power Shift - John Garnaut in Conversation with Hugh White

it's a great privilege and a great privilege here to be invited up I think one of the very most terrific things about Hugh is his willingness to debate know well I think he's really exactly as president said he has authored I would go further than you know one of the decade paper the most influential internet international relations strategic field anything in Australia going work right back to that early period the 60s I would say it had a huge influence around the world and the degree of public support amongst public intellectuals in particular who receives across Australia is matched only by the private animosity who generates in the corridors of camera and elsewhere including Washington and that's one of the fascinating things there's two levels of debate about China one takes place in the corridors the secret corridors one takes place out there and I think you know what I've tried to sort of try and draw some of these conversations together in my work and this would be an opportunity to to do that a little bit better than I have to date now one of the reviews that you didn't read out then was the actual actually the first one I think it's um one of the most startling reviews I've ever read of an academic piece of work I'm going to read it and you can tell me if you can guess the author professor hue whiteness is September 11 2010 professor here white of the australian national university has done something remarkable he has written a single stupidest strategic document ever prepared in australian history by someone who once held a position of some responsibility to our system what's astonishing document and honor codes and you know who I'm talking gradients stuck in the great hasn't mr. Beach you know he's kept on and that's of motorists in the intervening five years but so one thing he cannot accuse you of not doing is starting a conversation he wrote this essay at a time when and he's absolutely right he identified the big quiz question that no boy alright that's just me that nobody was directly addressing how would China change the regional order as it grows and its ambitions grow what would this more crowded strategic space look like now I sometimes think that she probably doesn't give enough credit to some thinking that you know has been going on in the corridors for some time but it was never brought to the surface except you know for a micro moment in Kevin Rudd's white paper of 2009 and then perhaps another micro moment when China announced its ad I said in the East China Sea shortly after the arrival of the Abbott government in between we had an astonishing development where I think the public silence grew particularly on the killer and barber below the water below the surface level Australia was moving into full hedge mode is all about we're worried about China how do we deal with it how do we hedge our bets how to respond security security riots but on the surface it was the same old opportunity and planned Gaussian sort of popular Pollyanna as far as the eye can see I would say Hugh that that conversation has finally started to come together and dealing in the last few weeks no excuse my rusty joints and there's been some really important debates and I'm but people exist and entering the debate publicly in the last two months and from different points of view but I really do applaud them for engaging with you in public even if they don't name him by name but they all are talking about it Michel Thorley here at the Israeli national university back in July Dennis Richardson secular defense a little bit earlier about South China Sea Kevin Andrews to my world surprised had a very eloquent and interesting speech at shangri-la in Singapore and most recently and I think most impressively with Peter Varghese last week in his speech to the lower Institute all of them in their very different ways from their very angles and different strengths starting to address publicly the very big dilemmas that you raises in his in his essay and develops in his subsequent book and he is essays in in my papers the Fairfax recipe in particular in the end of 85 years I you know have got some questions for you I also encourage you to to think of what you want to feel that either of us throughout the night I'm not going to see to you an occupy the floor the whole time but perhaps I can begin cue by asking you to answer Brendan's question what did you get wrong well first of all thank you all very much for coming Thank You Brendan and and Andrea for organizing this and particularly thank you that John for taking part of this conversation I can't resist the temptation to return you're very kind perform by saying that quality of John's journalism on China in particular has been one of the bright spots the very bright spots in what is in some sometimes a rather gloomy picture of our Australian public debate about these issues so look let me the heart of the courtly essay was a series of six propositions the first was that China's power really was growing and that it constituted the biggest most fundamental shift in the distribution of wealth and power in many decades arguably in centuries perhaps actually in human history and certainly the biggest shift in the distribution of wealth and power since Australia was settled by Europeans the second proposition was that as China's power grew is view of its own role in the international system was going to change or government should say revert that China as its power grew was going to seek a different role in Asia it was not going to accept you as primacy it was going to seek a new model of red power relations and the phrase that she being had not been used but now yours the time which would be a radical challenge to the order in Asia we should prevail particularly since the end of the Vietnam War because that order have been characterized not just by us primacy but by us primacy which is uncontested by any major power the third proposition was the United States would as it can if it continued on the trends that have clearly established would resist China's attempt to change the regional order would seek as with all the elements of American power as the phrase Barack Obama has used since I published the essay to preserve u.s. primacy as a foundation to the Asian order and the fourth point was that the clash between China's growing power and ambition and America's determination to preserve the status quo would lead to escalating strategic rivalry between the US and China and that that would have huge significance for Australia because their whole vision about national future was that we would continue to grow rich on China's wealth and stay safe thanks to American power and that models work very well for us for the last few decades all of us have so me I would love it to last forever but that the further strategic rivalry between the US and China escalated the war the starker the choices that countries like Australia and Australia in particular would face as it found itself increasingly compelled to make choices between those and the risk that we would be forced to make a really ultimate ultimate choice not just a small tactical choice but a really grand strategic choice Woodrow as the risk of an absolutely fundamental rupture between the US and China a conflict arrived and not ever regarded a conflict as inevitable or even very very likely but it's a clear risk and the risk clearly grows as a rivalry escalates and the sixth point was that Australia therefore faced a huge set of see challenges to really the first was what we could do with others of course to try and avert the trajectory of escalating rivalry which I saw being said in training and the second was what could we do to prepare ourselves for the possibility that we would fail to avert it and therefore find ourselves faced with a catastrophic choice and living in a region which would be very different from the one we've known and loved very different from the one upon which we base our entire international posture one in which the US and China might be in conflict with one another or bitter bitter strategic rivals one in which the United States might in fact it withdrawn from Asia in order to avoid debt and that these set of policy challenges seem to me to be ones which Australian governments across the political spectrum had failed to effectively address now I owe you an ounce of your question because allow me to cite not much I mean naturally I'm a examines one's conscience have I have I retrospectively adjusted the arguments I made in the essay to suit what's actually happened will you be the judge I don't think so it's not Pacific it's not there was a terribly difficult argument to mount I would look to make video obvious but I did get some things those writers I'm on it I underestimated how fast China's economy with dryer even I've at that time from I think you regret it for a while but I think I put the diner which China's economy every tax America I'm the biggest in the world of 2030 well if you believe the latest PwC estimates of PPP measure of GDP very sick of these statistics but by 2030 China's economy in pay pay pay terms is already 30% bigger than America's so if I just the chance economy other types Americas it keeps on growing significantly faster dimer probably very probably and therefore applies the quite decisive margin of economic white the second thing I think I underestimated was health fast China's growing maritime capability would limit us military options and how quickly a miracle responds and recognize that and the third thing I underestimated was how slow the United States would be to nonetheless recognize the significance of China's challenge like it's the biggest surprise I've had is how hard it's been to convince Americans that China is really serious about challenging us primacy and therefore to start the debate about how the amount of station responded so I think who is more or less saying that his biggest mistake as he didn't go far enough so let me play devil's advocate for a little moment so I think there are a couple of really important implicit assumptions in powershift five years ago and I don't think they have panned out exactly as assumed and essentially I think it is related to whether or not concepts like the Chinese have been examined too close enough closely enough you know what is the Chinese what do you mean there's a lot of them and you know any different you know what with very different interests often and you also I think perhaps strip away a little bit too much of the key the owners of the Chinese Communist Party and how it exercises power at one stage you say that it's still venomous but it's thrown away all the older they thought all the old communist ideology I'd like to know exactly what that is because I reckon the more things change for more things sometimes say the same on that's one question flowing from that I think is is it some basic philosophies of how Beijing exercises power you know at the core of this essay is a an assumption that that the problem in coming to a grand bargain a concert of power would be on the American side I think it's more complicated than that you know I would have to go as far as to question when is it in Chinese Communist Party history where they've shown a willingness to do to make an enduring pact concert of powers grand bargain really on any level you know rather than a an agreement to reflect the relative bargaining power hours or particular parties at a particular point in time as almost any Buddhist foreign business person in China will attest and so why do we think that the way that the Chinese Commerce party exercises power in China where it is explicitly above any law that's explicitly above really any values because it hasn't ever really defined consistently over time what it stands for apart from its own hold on power and loyalty to the system why would it impose a greater respect or a different or respect a different set of norms and values including the idea of striking an enduring bargain when it left its shores query number one - I think the the weakness in this argument I think it's gone become greater overtime is what about you know all the two billion or so people in between so what about how Vietnam sees the world what about how Japanese people see the world what about India with its sooner than we thought going to overtake China with its 1 million plus population and to a lesser extent other countries in the region and I think that's there's a there's is a bit of an assumption in this book and is in this essay that these guys would naturally gravitate to where they broke their bread is buttered you know that would gravitate to China as if it's almost an otherwise neutral choice or one power country a country B the blue team in the red type it red the red team let's go with the red team now because they're paying the bills it hasn't panned out that way I would say that if you look around the region other maritime powers which we're really talking about what just States in every single case except for you could probably argue over South Korea at the moment in every other case the strategic game has gone the other way and so for all of America's strategic arrogance at which there is plenty of all the fact that nobody ever likes you know America has an idea unless they kind of need them and for you know I think it's been astonishing how quickly all these states have have flocked the Americans to our security embrace and whereas it's depicted in this essay and I think that some of you is further writings as a case of America pushing prodding provoking forcing States to come into its Poorman you know often it's been the other way around and for example just three weeks ago Admiral Scott Swift is the new Pacifica McCullough fleet commander who prides himself on controlling the waters between meta gas in San Diego I you know do you want to have greater facilities in fremantle and Darwin and he said well to be honest we really can't be bothered it's kind of really costly to set up these things and when you've got every port in the region begging to have our ships to to look after them for free why would we go and pay a billion dollars to to deepen ports in Fremantle winners so far away from the action so there is a huge new demand for an American strategic presence in the region and that follows I think from another questionable assumption at the start here and that is here we talked about she talks about that's there's a spot here we talk about the Beijing would find that the more harshly excited dominated Asia the more opposition it would face from these powers it is therefore much more likely that China will see its interests better served by aiming lower and you talk about being unlikely that China would try to impose its will by force or political repression now we can argue about degrees well I don't think that's the case I think the reason that so many of these states are talking about in the middle are flocking towards each other and towards American security of embrace is because they've seen that China's not longer just wooing them but there's been a threat explicitly or implicitly of coercive force so that's essentially my critique of our vs a five years ago and you know I think empirically the model the other model works in the abstract empirically I think that strategic which has become much more crowded congested and complicated as time goes on greater relevant are really really very very good very very good set of points so let me send a pull back across the net please to you are nature three points the first one's actually complicated point the first point resident who are the Chinese and what do they want well the first point you know it I know that much much much less well than this guy does who really knows China very well and I don't know China really at all but my argument that the basis of my argument about which as you rightly say rule in the heart of my logic of that there's China's power grows it will seek a bigger role in Asia is is not based on anything that's distinctively Chinese or even anything that's distinctively communist it's that I'm just working on the hypothesis that the Chinese are normal but they want to do with their power what every other country has done with its powers its power is growing that China is the six six lakh Britain sought as its power grew what Japan sought is its power through what America sought is its power through what a rush of saw that its power growth etc or for that matter Athens and Sparta and the Romans and so on now it's very interesting question on that philosophical question why do states and their peoples yearn for power like that but it does appear to be a very consistent feature of the international system that countries see their place in this system see their place in the order is terribly important to their prosperity their security and their identity in their sense of themselves and that they will strive if that if they feel they have the capacity they will strive for leadership within it so my weapon my working hypothesis might prove to be wrong but I wouldn't I bought this as the child will do what everybody else has done but it is worth adding a kind of an element today because that's just it the arguments and basic isn't based anything specific to the Chinese but it does seem to me that there are some things about China which make me even more confident of that judgment than I would otherwise be generically and that is it it seems to me that Chinese of our time think of a Chinese of my generation so I'm with what in 1953 if I was Chinese I would remember the bright family just to leave you know I probably might remember losing family members family how they look very vivid memory of the Cultural Revolution I would either have been out there feeding peas somewhere in the boonies or I'd have been running around the city's putting dancin to catch on people or maybe worse what education would have been disrupted but I would have joined the workforce as I did here in Canberra in China somewhere in 1980 and within my professional lifetime I would have seen the whole deal unfold in front of me so what does a Chinese like that how does they see their present situation I see it it seems to me through the lens of a very strong sense of China's remarkable history we all know that's a very strong sense perhaps exaggerated but not entirely of grievance at what was done to China as they would say and partly done by people I guess in the 200 years since the opium wars a very strong sense of what China has achieved in their professional lifetimes she must miss the crowd how proud that you be that what didn't you and a cautious but very deep confidence in where they're going that seems to me to be a very potent brew of attitudes which turbocharges I suspect turbocharges what you might call the normal generalized point I'll make about so whatever what Chinese thing but I'll put it this way it would be a very heroic assumption to assume the opposite to assume that China has its power brew to overtake the United States to become the biggest economy in the world would be prepared to accept American primacy as a foundation for the Asian order the way Japan did Japan is in fact I think the only historical example of a country not seeking a role in the international system commensurate with its with economic weight and Japan - that under very specific circumstances I think it'd be a very dangerous assumption to assume if it works that way as for the CCP of course very you know to say it you mean you know a lot more about Jonathan I understood a lot more about the government's body than I did when I found your writings and then we're really extremely fascinating but I wouldn't my point about the CCP is well partly that it seems to me what the CCP is really committed to is preserving its own position that's why cause French the Leninist institution more than anything else so I think anything is available for compromise on that on that basis so I take your point whether it whether art that means at all elements of all of the other elements of communist ideology have been thrown aside yet or resist susceptible or being thrown aside as the slate continues down the path is enormously punishment maybe the other elements were never that important well let that one be it that might be it but I but I would just make this point it doesn't seem to me that there's any that that this is going to sound a little bit strange or my flippant but I think I meant it quite seriously I don't think the future the Communist Party is terribly important to the future of China as a strategic actor in the Asian strategic order I think at China which was no longer ruled by the Communist Party was ruled by somebody else would still be lucky to behave in largely the same way it's not that I think the Communists are going to permit maybe the Communist Party will survive maybe it'll go but I think the idea that we have a that China is challenging the strategic order in Asia because of a feature of communist ideology rather than what you might very broadly call nationalist sentiment is just understanding what drives these these things your third point is really important one is would it we've got any reason to believe the child they had a deal that was done with the United States part of my argument is that the way out of the dilemma that I've described is that the US and China should reach an agreement to share power in Asia and quite a lot of a bit of ESA and quite a lot of the book I subsequently published tries to flesh out how how on earth that would work and it's a really critical question could you trust China to stick by that kind of deal and the answer is not course you could China would only stick by that bill if it was very clear that but violating that deal would meet a devastating section but the shape of an Indian national order is in the end defined by the circumstances and members of that order are prepared to go to war to preserve it and so if you want to put some boundaries around China's power you you're gonna have to impose those boundaries on the basis of your clear willingness clear to them that you're willing to go to war against them with all the customers that that entails they're prevented to prevent them kicking over it so isn't it no no cut no part of my model of a consider all Asia which is what I propose that it should be preserved by sort of kumbaya you know let's all hold hands and be nice to one another just like the concert of Europe which was held together by the shore knowledge and if any country tried to establish primacy of over the whole of Europe here in the 19th century it would face the other four powers united against it that's what made the concert of tea and if you want us if you want to see any such agreement in Asia it's not just at the fourth house because I think they are we'd have to agree on the basis of that but I'd also have to agree on the enforcement of it with that foundation so I completely agree none of this should be based on the idea of of trust it's not trust it's tougher than that but as you say there are a lot of other powers and the question is don't how other countries in Asia see China's power is a really critical one I think though that this is I think this is simpler than it sometimes seems every power in Asia wants to avoid living under China's shadow and everybody in Asia knows that strong US role in Asia is a best way of avoiding living under China's show so everybody wants the United States to continue to play a strong role in Asia on the other hand everybody in Asia values their relationship with China enormous Lee and everyone fears the consequences for the overpaid us-china relationship and nobody wants to be forced to make a choice between the US and China so everybody wants the United States to stay engaged in Asia but everybody wants the United States to stay engaged in Asia on a basis which does not drive escalating rivalry between the US and China and so while they want the United States to play a strong role in Asia I think they're much less fussed about with the United States role is privacy where the United States continues to dominate we all want the United States to stay in Asia to balance China we're much less sure we want the United States to stay in Asia to dominate China if that's going to drive escalating fatigue rivalry between the US and China 95 percent of what we want can be satisfied by a strong US balancing presence the problem is that's not what America wants America's strategic objective in Asia today is to preserve us primacy why do you say that because that's what they say look at the word leadership you watch what's the way the word leadership is used for example in President Obama's speech in Brisbane during the g20 the most starkly Andy Chinese speech given by any American president since Nixon went to China in 1973 like I can't recall the count but the number of times the word American or leadership is used is striking and I think yes it's it's that disconnect between America's objectives and the objective everybody else Nations I say I'm agree we do think that that they do want America to stay engaged but I don't want America to stay engaged to do exactly what America wants to do and the test for this becomes how much substance is there to the alignment that we see between the US and other regional countries you're absolutely right the other regional countries have been happy to reach out to the United States and say come and help us but what does it really mean which of those countries are really willing to sacrifice their relationship with China in order to support the United States in Asia let's take an example of random let's take us plan the the pattern of Australian policy since the pivot was announced for sample is that we talk big and do very little the the the the neatest recent demonstration of this was the moment at which the poor US official was unwise enough to suggest that the one vomit were going to be transiting through Darwin and Tony Abbott even by his standards was remarkably agile to get in front of a microphone repeatedly and say that's not going to happen Australia's alliance with America is not directed against anyone he explicitly repudiated the explicit statement by the US official that that the US force deployments to Darwin were part of a u.s. posture against Britain aimed at China's position in the South China Sea that is because in the end of Australia is not actually prepared to see itself being signed up in an anti China coalition with the United States it doesn't actually appear to go that way that's why Barrack Obama makes a big speech in in Brisbane on the Saturday and Tony Abbott stands up and welcome and she's your ping to our Parliament on the Monday of the recipient yeah so these are empirical questions about what America means by leadership that the Ridgid doesn't want yeah and I would argue that actively it that America's not to not hasn't shown itself willing to push really hard on what most of the region doesn't want most of the time yeah and on that question of that particular weekend and I do remember how could I forget the headline and Abbott clueless on US and China swinging hopelessly between the two poles of China in the u.s. yeah I don't see it that way at all I think that the alignment between the Abbott government and Washington on the underlying strategic play in this region not anywhere else it's almost perfect and they disagree they do things differently Australia's small we we actually talk pretty small most of the time and so we want to say we love you see champion when you come to Australia can you sign my trade agreement but underlying they feel I think actually that if anything Australia has been impatient to have more US military balancing in the region and less so I disagree just on here on the imperative if you're right and it is an empirical question on it's an empirical question on which inevitably our data is a little too perfect but I I think I would Beverly you know legitimate question which one just has to stand back to say I'm interesting to see but I would just nudge back a half a step by saying aye I see plenty of evidence that the Abbott government and for that matter the Gillard government before them is too unless for the us in Asia then the US would like that there is suspicion in Washington that Australia talks a good line but is not in the end willing to stand by the United States in resisting China's challenge to us primacy and when for example you see an Australian Defence Minister saying words of one syllable with me event of the us-china conflict over Taiwan Australia is not part of it then if you're an American you think really what's this alliance been all about all these decades no one has had the experience of being subjected to reach Armitage in full flight lightly forgets it and I do treasure the recollection of sharing a platform like is with rich Armitage in which rich leant across and kind of grabbed hold of me and here's about three and a half people stuck into one suit and the said your line of thought that if a small democracy offshore Ranger is subject to Chinese aggression any other small democracies offshore Asia ought to be there to help button and I think that is remains a strong view so I think it's your view right it's a question on which the data is mixed but I think the evidence is at least partially my way sure let me know who else you need to do thank yes I check the one question and then I'm gonna open it up there for if that's okay and let me make it more moderate sermon and there the question of whether you know China's prepared us to go to war which isn't really addressed today because this is about cooperation and you know I think you present you know if the Taiwanese people of their own volition decide they want to join the mainland on such a basis why should the US object you know I think that's a bit of a the Gough Whitlam East Timor kind of formula because in Taiwan that's not the way it's going you know Taiwan is not volunteering to sign up to the mainland political program we can yeah I think you clearly going that work here but the question therefore is China's preparedness I think in your terms to go to war to get what at once I think see something quite different I see the the greatest kind of spending on fancy shiny hardware military hardware that the world's with this region seen whatever really and you know the capacity to inflict you know terrible damage to no question but and again this comes back to the political structures since the Korean War the Chinese military has never really fought a real war and in fact I don't think that there's anybody in China to really think so you know in a serious position who really thinks that the military is therefore an externally defensive purpose they just don't believe that anybody's gonna invade China and you know that might have been a fear before that nuclear weapons but it's not today and I've heard senior generals say that and so the question is are they really developing a military to project serious force in a way that could push back the United States in a sustained complex theater and look I actually don't think so for one fundamental reason the way this system operates when it's allowed to you know different if it's a moment of civil war and it was different in the Korean War but in the 67 years since its operated incredibly siloed lines because that's the way the Leninist system is designed there's very little horizontal trust in the system and close to the top that very little trust between commanders and deputies and if you think about just the examples the last 18 months we've seen the new Generalissimo arrests the top two previous generals shoots a hole and course all and so that's the amount of trust that there is in the system you know you die I live is the Chinese you know literally nisa war they're not talking about international relations they're talking about the cockpit and in that system where there is not very much trust at all except for that which is built up over huge amounts of time and these are family alliances these affection alliances sometimes inherited two generations down the line you know unless you have that kind of established camaraderie it doesn't exist across across silos across factional lines so which Chinese commander is going to trust a submarine what are they called drivers yeah with with a lot with a live nuclear weapon which is you know pretty much I I don't know much about this stuff I really don't but yeah the definition of a second strike capability yeah I don't think it's really likely to happen which Chinese president commander Central Military Commission Chairman is going to actually trust his a chief of staff to to organize coordinated military commands in cooking which can unify the 1,400 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan the separate military commands regional commands on the East Coast there plus the East China Sea Navy plus the Air Force you know we haven't actually seen that happen which is I think a prerequisite for a sustained invasion of even what's defined as the fundamental military targets I want so I question I think the military is hugely about theater it's about convincing you know and it does go back to this sons of staff which they still kind of parrot is if it's relevant today and it might be it's about the theater of convincing others that you're serious and you learn to kind of crazy Hawk say these crazy things but you don't really mean it you hope that they back down you hope to win the war without firing a shot I think there's nothing that C champion would not do to avoid a war or for war with United States it's a really important flinch and first point is to absolutely agree you'll rather you know acknowledge the very significant point you're making about how unknown is China's military capability and military culture even and I don't for a moment disagree with the points you make about how complex those questions and how and how uncertain they are I just make the point exactly quite common in strategic affairs very common not to have a very clear sense of how good your adversary is you know it's a slightly theatrical example that think of Hitler facing the Russians for the Japanese facing the Americans not realizing just how formidable these countries are now you're absolutely right the Chinese have got no experience of fighting serious Wars for a very long time it is worth bearing in mind that the sort of war we'd be talking about between the US and China the American the Americans about our experience of it either it's 70 years this month since there was a major power maritime war no nobody knows what maritime war would look like nobody supported there's a whole new generation to generations of weapons have emerged and nobody really knows what works and what doesn't now of course I have very high regard for the US military and so on but I don't think they're infallible and I have I think a healthy level of skepticism about new and emerging militaries but you can just as a Prudential judgment I think would be unwise to presume that the Chinese can't make 50% of what they got going work and 50% would be enough and that brings this kind of an operational point here which is really critical that China is in a very real sense I'm in Veda ball to have the Chinese roughly right to think that and it's certainly unavailable by the United States you know I say it's not a continental and certainly not on the scale or quite I mean they prove that in Iraq so I think that that is absolutely right but what China needs to do militarily in order to achieve its strategic objective is to undermine that is strategic objective undermining US leadership and promoting its own is to undermine the military foundation of US strategic leadership in Asia and the military foundation of your strategic leadership in Asia has been forever its capacity to project power by see now the two Chuck the Chinese have not and will not anytime that need bother us acquire the capacity to project power by sea themselves against the country's powerful as the United States the United States is very easily capable of fighting and sinking Chinese ships therefore the Chinese aircraft carrier is just a career opportunity for an ambitious young u.s. submarine commander or Japanese or whatever but the converse is also true china has acquired over the last 20 years the capacity to raise the customers to the united states of projecting power by sea against china to the point where that option has now more or less I think as a practical point of policy disappeared there's a solution to that of course America can regain the sea control required to sail the carriers and the Marines up close to China's coast and that is we're running a strike campaign against a target set of no pick a number maybe 500 separate targets in China stretch of the campaign stretching over safety months that would make the first week of operate first month of Operation Desert Storm look like a picnic in other words a full-scale war with China massively escalator which means is not really a strategic option for the United States at all and even if the Chinese system turns out to be really fun and a whole lot of stuff doesn't work the chances of sinking and carriers still pretty good and that's and of course the real question is what effect does that have an American decision making now I completely agree China absolutely does not want the war with the United States and they only are interested in doing all of this stuff because they can in the best sense of tradition believe they can win the war without fighting as America China believes it can achieve its objectives of displacing you not aside from the leadership of a show without fighting cause it thinks the Americans are gonna back off and America thinks it can achieve its objectives to sustaining its leadership in Asia just in the front of the face of Charlie Jones because I think China's going to back off now that's okay as long as one or other of them is right the risky they'll maybe the both right but the really risky thing is that birth then out to be wrong and this is the point at which our present situation is a little bit like not important July 1940 what went wrong in July 1914 is that the Austrians thought the Russians were back down the Russians thought the Austrians are back down the Germans thought the Russians were back down the Russians or the Germans at that game everybody thought everyone else would back down so they didn't have to so if you're choosing thinking you think America is going to back off so you can have a huge win without suffering humiliation and the Americans I fear I think that the Chinese will back off so they can suffer they can have a huge win and the risk is that they're both wrong and they both find themselves facing exactly the choice that people faced in the last week July 1914 which is that they either do go ahead into a conflict well they have to suffer a really heroic humiliation so if the United States does decide to do a freedom of navigation transit over fiery cross reef and the Chinese do put himself through a p8 and the United States do then send in a destroyer and the destroyer is sunk on the go to New Zealand oh yeah what well this but this is the point I mean this is of course because very important it's just it's a balance to track the balance between something which like one predicts I don't predict this pathetic building there's a possibility this is a possibility we have to do it and it's possibly that Barack Obama has to deal with and so does Xi Jinping and so I think it is although I agree the military is probably much less there's much less to the pla than meets the eye there's still enough to make this a very dangerous situation sure Thank You Hugh he's certainly clarified you know we need to think about in very important ways what we care about what we're prepared to fight about I would love to get some questions maybe four we've got time for a few I think I think look I think if the pointer is very important one and that is the underlying well the question is how do we vector and have the US and Chinese decision-makers factor the risk of escalation across the nuclear child into their calculations in these sorts of situations and it's a very difficult question to answer because we nuclear weapons are still only 70 years old they've only been used twice and that most of the data we have about the way in which nuclear weapons affect the relationship all the data we have about the way in which nuclear weapons have picked a relationship with that great powers come from one particular example one case study that is the duration between the superpowers during the Cold War and that taught us lots but it was a very different kind of confrontation between very different kinds of powers and very different strategic including geographical circumstances so the real larger question is nobody on either side really knows what broad nuclear weapons play nobody knows where the threshold is and therefore one hopes both sides are very careful about how they conduct themselves however I do think there is a risk of misunderstanding on both sides there continues to be a view I think in the United States I have no idea where that the so to speak a serious nuclear strategist the professional nuclear strategists in the heart of the Pentagon think this but there is a very widely held view in US strategic analytic circles that the United States continues to have clear escalation dominance over China in nuclear weapons which i think is a simple mistake I think China has lots of attractive options to deprive the United States of escalation dominance I don't think the Chinese have escalating governance either I think neither side have it but if the another States believes they have it they will take they will take bigger risks then then I think they should so it should factor into the calculations on both sides it should of course impose a high degree of caution and rationality and probably 95 times out of a hundred of will that one wants to be really careful of that of that 5% possibility that makes me that makes me very cautious I think Katie good question I didn't I didn't actually argue that we could be an intermediary between the US and China that is to get between them and kind of do the Chi Henry Kissinger shuttle diplomacy thing I mean there are circumstances on which that can happen but I don't see any future I don't see any situation which Australia can play that intermediary role and in the end actually the US and China can and do talk to one another themselves quite effectively but at least they talk but I so my proposition was a different one it's not that we should be an intermediary it's that we have an immense interest in how their relationship develops and we should as a country be bold in asserting what we think they should each be doing now seem to be the most natural way of us doing that is to talk to Washington we are for all the US ally and all of that but I don't think we don't think we should abstain from talking to Beijing as well and so my argument is that Australia should be going to Washington and going to Beijing and saying to Washington we think you should be willing to share some power with China we think you should accept that China are gonna play a bigger role in the region but you should also be prepared to continue to play a big roll yourself you shouldn't walk away and we should be going to Beijing and saying you should be accepting that the United States will continue to play a significant role in Asia you shouldn't be aiming to push push America completely out now you might say who's going to listen to Australia well a good point but actually Barack Obama chose to come here to deliver the big pivot speech and he chose to come here to deliver by thine away spent most powerful speech on China since the pivot speech your honor channel soccer Australia's actually in Washington's view I think was transacted quite important in this I wouldn't exaggerate us our weight in Beijing but the other point I'd make is we don't have to do this alone because the little sketch like gave me an answer to John's point a very important point before about how the rest of the region Ceaser's does seem to me to have pretty universal application nobody wants to live under China's shadow everyone wants the United States to stay engaged but nobody wants escalating u.s. robbery I don't think we have to do this alone I think we can go to Korea Indonesia Singapore India for that matter Japan's a bit different we can all stop sending this message and so I'm not it's not an intermediary role but it is up this is what I think to both of them and we're a commercial be pretty loud about it couldn't agree more that's where the game's up and all the regional yeah diplomacy yeah if we've got some more questions up the back I can I reckon nobody knows the answer to that and I think over here they're kind of you know if they have a war room they're asking exactly those questions and in Washington as well okay what is the actual strategic benefit of these is it just a sinkable aircraft carrier that doesn't move or doesn't change the ground now it doesn't change the facts on the ground in material way is allowing enabling force projection I think the single most difficult thing is it's really confusing you know the fact you have to ask that question is okay you know we believe in freedom of navigation okay now but in the past we've been actually implicitly as a means of courtesy flying doing detours around this island and this one do we change our you know which of these forty islands you know ten of which are new how do we you know so I think there's some very very detailed and complicated and confusing cartography going on and trying to work out the answer to that question so at the very least it's confused the whole strategic creature yeah I think I think that's right I mean it but that there might be unsinkable aircraft carried but they're not on destroyable ones as bases they're a variable use in anything of an intense war I mean they're just a target waiting to be excised I actually think by finally the biggest significance of those bases is there's the challenge they pose to America's capacity to stop provinces and I think America has walked into that trap I don't myself meet their very significant challenge to freedom of navigation in any practical sense I think there's some legal questions there which are quite intriguing but I think in terms of is China gonna use him to stop shipping you know shipments of iron ore from the Pilbara to oh hang on the grant in China it doesn't sound right to me but I do think by doing something which America obviously doesn't like by tempting America to stand up and say we want you to stop this and then America failing to find anything effectively to do to stop them reinforces what seems to me to be the principle Chinese message which is a mere if not the power that it used to be and I think it's a failure of US statecraft to stumble into back which I think it what happened like that's a fair assessment in could you sorry Europe it's not dominated by Germany of runs but its sharing by different countries and same like Asia if it's only two giants probably it's too much tension so I think it may be better if you invite more other countries to sharing and it's released a lot of more tensions and stress but I think people from Beijing and also from Washington's they know that but the question is how so probably like the the policy from China that talking about you can reload it maybe that's a way to Cherie but that's not not really about sharing it's actually a done another way of dominance so it's an from other way not inviting more people to sharing the game but actually excluding United States so what do you think about this look there was a time when the economic diplomacy was quite effective and but that was a time when China didn't seem to be demanding very much the game has changed and look I think anything is possible but coupled with the the militarized performances that we've seen in the last couple of years I think it's yeah I'd be surprised if they get the serious diplomatic leverage through these projects for whole host of reasons including the fact that there's not actually a great history of successful offshore Chinese developments really in any sphere so I don't see that why this would be any different particularly if it's being imposed strictly on Chinese terms but early days I think which is close watching yeah should we give a ride of a play up here I could evening hi he hi gran Rob Lee with the US Embassy appreciate your thoughts and comments if you allow me just to speak briefly because I think you made some claims about US policy that frankly is just an accurate so I feel it's my duty to actually set the record straight in terms of US policy objectives and that US ultimately it's about dominance in the region and frankly I know you've had conversations with the US officials as well and that's not really an accurate reflection of what our goals are and I would also encourage people to if you didn't read the Obama speech in Brisbane to read it for yourself because I also disagree with his characterization of it being the most anti Chinese speech made by any US leader let me ask you which one was the most anti just tacky no but I think the Obama speech in Brisbane actually lays out again reiterates what US goals are and I think I would summarize as you know a lot of the discussion tonight is sort of a summary of the discussion I've seen over the past few years serving as a diplomat here and the question seems to be who what should rule the asia-pacific I think our point is really not who should rule but what the rules ought to be to make sure that the prosperity and peace we've seen in déja Pacific will continue and if not President Obama say in the State of the Union address we should make those rules that's a quote we should make those rules well on the TPP the that there is a discussion about setting those standards that should govern the trade of the region so that's spoken in that context and also within the US domestic debate but I think there's also a visit that you know we know one brought up this evening of President Xi heading to the US and that will also be an important opportunity so there are a lot of discussions between US China about managing this relationship which is vital to the United States it's vital to us economically its loyal to us strategically so I think that point is also often lost in the debate that the US has enormous interest at stake making sure that we get the relationship right and I think the Chinese also recognize that as well so I think the the picture isn't quite as grim as this you know battle between US and China over supremacy but that really it's a matter of getting the rules right because it's an outcome that will affect the entire region and I believe that the framework that's been established over the past 50 years has worked rather well for the entire region China included and that there are ways to fine tune those rules to make sure Beijing's concerns are addressed but what we don't want to see is the use of coercive power to to make gains to to be able to dominate the region so that that's something that not only the u.s. is concerned about but really countries throughout the region it's a conversation that needs to be had to make sure what what are the right rules to ensure peace and prosperity which is of interest to everyone in the region Australia you was China and all the citizens in the region as well thank you for articulating that position I think it is important to have that dialogue it is going to be an exceptionally important few days in Washington in the middle of next month we should all be watching that very closely I think we've really only got time for one or maybe two short questions yes please he glad you finally raised the Japan question earlier you made a point that nobody in this region really wants intensified rivalry between China United States I see that what Japan's a begun is doing is what he seems to be exactly trying to trying to make the US even move toward a more hostile direction his policy towards China so what's your Japan yeah so wondering with what your view is about Japan's asia-pacific policy and whether you think Japan's during the region good service or bad service I think things really good question I think I did say at one point that Japan is a different case and it is I think Japan is in a particularly difficult strategic situation and its strategic typically make difficulties for the rest of us Japan more than anybody else feels threatened by China's growing power and I completely understand why and Japan more than anybody else feels dependent on the United States for protection from China but Japan is kind of locked in a kind of Newtonian contradiction there that the stronger China becomes the more they fear China but the stronger China becomes the less confident Japan can be of America's support of Japan in the face of China's pressure and so Japan finds itself in a position where they it wants in order to feel more confident of us support it feels the other way around it feels less and less confident of us support the better the US and China are getting on so it feels it security depends on tension between the US and China but just like the rest of us it can't live with tension between the US and China so there's a kind of a fundamental dilemma it seems to me at the heart of Japanese strategic policy aye-aye-aye I think the only resolution of that I think it's a very tight dilemma and I think you only way out of it is for Japan to cease to rely on the United States as long as Japan relies on United States for its security from China it will be very difficult for the US and China to develop a good strategic relationship because Japan will people on pulling America back from it and I think there isn't I don't think that's the only thing that's driving escalating rivalry between the US and China because I think the u.s. does have a vision of the u.s. trip of the strategic order in Asia which is incompatible with China's and vice-versa but the Japan factor certainly amplifies it and if the US and China started to move more closely together I think Japan would very effectively get in the way so there's a strange a very counterintuitive but I think very hard to escape conclusion is if we wanted you to stay with us China relationship we'd be better off with Japan which is no longer strategic Clyde of United States it's a scary conclusion there's nuclear weapons in circumstances in which US China relationships are stabilized rather than Japan doesn't have any nuclear weapons and circumstances we where us-china relationships are unstable so it's it's a it's a tough call but I it's a proposition I'm prepared to defend now I think we've got time for one last killer question yes I yeah I think look it would obviously be an extraordinarily traumatic thing for Japan to make that kind of transformation but countries do sometimes go through those changes only when their strategic circumstances get very dire but that might might be argued that's exactly what your pen potentially faces that's not this year or next year but if one looks you know 20 years down the track which not very long in this business I think that's I think it's it's it's conceivable that Japan ends up being forced to that kind of choice last killer question does the advent of from Weddington from the research school of computer science a self-serving question does the advent of cyber warfare change the equation do we have the advent that in a on the beach scenario countries will not know they're under attack who's attacking them and in this respect China has a capability perhaps as great of that as you'd the USA will this destabilize the situation very interesting question first point I'm not sure that China has a bigger capability than the USA Americans talk about a lot of f-words China does to them Tommy's book listed that what the United States does to China so I I don't know if and I don't take it for granted there is no pretty active u.s. capability but the broader point is and I'm gonna admit myself a slight skeptic about the business of cyber conflict as a strategic instrument obviously attacking the cyber systems embedded in people's kinetic military systems is a very important adjunct to ordinary old-fashioned a good old-fashioned kinetic war you know you disable my missiles by disabling the computer system to control but that's really just you know how to watch Michael normal kinetic war they're really that their revolutionary possibility is that states can now achieve genuine strategic effects fundamental change for the halyard starts by attacking one another's cyber systems now the argument in favor of that is that our societies are immensely dependent on cyber systems and therefore would be very sensitive to their disruption but that reminds me of the argument that people made in the twenties and thirties about the effective aerial bombing that is that that once the athletes appeared over to natural capitals and dropped tens of tons of high explosive on national capitals the population of those capitals would rise against their governments and demand peace and it wasn't true Germans killed 40,000 British civilians the British killed pick a number 500,000 German civilians and they didn't stop them let alone what we didn't repair didn't stop the fighting and I suspect you know be a real pain in the neck if if you know country X chameleons cyberwarriors close down the ATM so I can't get the money out I'll be bitter flippant but look the thing about societies like ours is a bit to him does it mean sizes I think societies in general the terrifyingly robust they will take an enormous amount of punishment without stopping and so I just I'm not sure that they come pretty sure that states could resist even very serious cyber disruption as a strategic victory had a huge impact you know close down the banksters and close down the American trail system but compared to a full-scale nuclear attack so I don't think it actually changes I'm like beer all day long enough whoopee rope you heard of fist

Channel: ANU TV

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Keywords: ANU, The ANU, Education, Australia, Research, Policy, Academic, University, The Australian National University, Public Policy (Field Of Study), China, Australia - China relations, Australian Foreign Policy

Id: bpKrlgi9A84

Length: 68min 44sec (4124 seconds)

Published: Mon Aug 31 2015