Politics by Aristotle (FULL Audio Book) book 2

book two sections one through two four of politics by Aristotle this is a librivox recording all librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librivox.org read by Lucie Burgoyne politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book 2 sections 1 through 2 for our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life we must therefore examiner not only this but other constitutions both such as actually exist in well governed States and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem that what is good and useful may be brought to light and let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a statistical display at any cost we only undertake this inquiry because all the Constitution's with which we are acquainted are faulty we will begin with the natural beginning of the subject three alternatives are conceivable the members of a state must either have won all things or - nothing in common all three some things in common and some not that they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible for the Constitution is a community and must at any rate I have a common place one city will be in one place and the citizens are those who share in that one city but should a well-ordered state have all things as far as may be in common or some only and not others for the citizens might conceive of we have wives and children and property in common as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato which is better our present condition or the proposed new order of society - there are many difficulties in the community of women and the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is not established by his arguments further as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state the scheme taken literally is impracticable and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds that the greater the unity of the state the better it is not obvious that the state may at length attains such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state since the nature of a state is to be a priority and intending to greater unity from being a state it becomes a family and from being a family an individual for the family most said to be more than the state and the individual than the phone light so that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could for it would be the destruction of the state again a state is not made up only of so many men but of different kinds of men the similars do not constitute a state it is not like a military alliance the usefulness of the letter depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality the mutual protection is the end aimed at just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less in like manner a state differs from a notion when the notion has not its population organ in villages that lives an Akkadian sort of life but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ in kind where for the principle of compensation as I have already remarked in the ethics is the salvation of States even among Freeman and equals this is a principle which must be maintained that they cannot earn rule together but must change at the end of the year of some other period of time or in some order of succession the result is said upon this plane they are all governed just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters and since it is better that this should be so in politics as well it is clear that while there should be continuance at the same persons in power where this is possible yet where this is not possible by reason of natural equality of the citizens and at the same time it is just that and should share in the government whether to govern their good thing or about an approximation to this is that equal should in turn retire from office and should apart from official position be treated alike thus the one-party rule and the others are ruled in turn as if they were no longer the same persons in life manner when they hold office there is a variety in the offices held hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons of whom and that what he said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them again in another point of view this extreme unification the state is clearly not good for a family is more self surprising than an individual and the city than a family and the city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-supporting its then self sufficiency is to be desired the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater three than even supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of unity this unity is by no means proved to follow from the fact of all men saying mine and not mine at the same instant of time which according to Socrates is the sign of perfect unity in a state for the word all is ambiguous if the meaning be that every individual says mine and not mine at the same time then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his wife and so of his property and all of that falls to his lot this however is not the way in which people would speak who had had their wives and children in common they would say all but not each in life manner their property would be described as belonging to them not severely but collectively there is an obvious fallacy in the term all like some other words both odd-even it is ambiguous and even in abstract argument becomes a source of logical puzzles that all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each the so may be a fine thing but it is impractical or if the words are taken in the other sense such a unity in no way conduces to harmony and there is another objection to the proposal for that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it even one thinks chiefly of his own hardly at all of the common interest and only when he is himself concerned as an individual for besides other considerations everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody and will therefore being neglected by all alike further upon the principle everyone will use the word the mowing of one who is prospering or the reverse however small a fraction he may himself be at the home number the same boy will be so-and-so son the son of each of the thousand or whatever they the number of the citizens and even about this he will not be positive for it is impossible to know who changed to have a child or whether if one came into existence it has survived but which is better for each to say mine in this way making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens or to use the word mine in the ordinary and more restricted sense the usually the same person is called by one man his own son whom another calls his own brother or cousin or kinsman blunt relation or connection by marriage either of himself or of some relation of his and yet another he clansmen or tribesman and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion nor is there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing one another the children are born like their parents and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another geographers declare such to be the fact they say that in part of a bolivia where the women are common nevertheless the children who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness and some women like the females of other animals for example mares and cows have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents as was the case with the Casali and mare called honest for other evils against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard will be assaults and homicides voluntary as well as involuntary quarrels and slanders or which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations but not equally unholy when there is no relationship moreover they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is unknown and when they have occurred the customary expirations of them cannot be made again how strange it is that Socrates after having made the children common should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only but should permit love and / milites between father and son or between brother and brother then which nothing can be more unseen since even without them love of this sort is improper how strange to to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference this community of wives and children seemed better suited to the husbandman then to the guardians for if they have wives and children in common they will be bound to one another by weaker ties as a subject class should be and they will remain obedient and not rebel in a word the result of such a law would be just the opposite of which good laws ought to have and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat itself the friendship we believe to be the greatest food of States and the preservative of them against revolutions neither is there anything which Socrates so greatly lords as the unity of the state which he and all the will declare to be created by friendship but the unity which he commends would be like that of lovers in the symposium who as eros defined says desire to grow together in the excess of their affection and from being two to become one in which case one or both would certainly perish whereas in a state having women and children common love will be watery and the father will certainly not say my son or the son my father as a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is impeccable in the mixture so in this sort of community the idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son or the son about the father or brothers about one another of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection that a thing is your own and then it is your only one neither can exist in such a state as this again the transferor children as soon as they are born from the rank of a husbandman or of artisans to that of guardians and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank will be very difficult to arrange the givers all transferor's cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring and to whom and the previously mentioned evils such as assaults unlawful love's homicides will happen more often among those who are transferred to the lower classes or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians for they will no longer call the members of the class they have left brothers and children and fathers and mothers and will not therefore be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consecutive touching the community of wives and children let this they our conclusion end of book 2 sections 1 through 2 for you book two sections five through six of politics by Aristotle this is a librivox recording all librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librivox.org politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book 2 sections 5 through 6 section 5 next let us consider what should be our Arrangements about property should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not this question may be discussed separately from the enactments about women and children even supposing that the women and children belong to individuals according to the customs which is at present Universal may there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common three cases are possible one the soil may be appropriated but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock and this is the practice of some nations or to the soil may be common and may be cultivated in common but the produce divided among individuals for their private use this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians or three the soil and the produce may be alike common when the husbandmen are not the owners the case will be different and easier to deal with but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble if they do not share equally enjoyments and toils those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much but indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common but especially in their having common property the partnerships of fellow travelers are an example to the point for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which turns up so with servants we are most able to take offence at those whom we most frequently come into contact in daily life these are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property the present arrangement if improved as it might be by good customs and laws would be far better and would have the advantages of both systems properties should be in a certain sense common but as a general rule private for when everyone has a distinct interest men will not complain of one another and they will make more progress because everyone will be attending to his own business and yet by reason of goodness and in respective use friends as the proverb says we'll have all things in common even now there are traces of such a principle showing that it is not impracticable but in well-ordered states exist already to a certain extent and may be carried further for although every man has his own property some things he will place at the disposal of his friends while of others he shares the use with them the lace of demony ins for example use one another slaves and horses and dogs as if they were their own and when they lack provisions on a journey they appropriate what they will find in the fields throughout the country it is clearly better that properties should be private but the use of it common and the special business of the legislature is to create and mend this benevolent disposition again how immeasurably greater is the pleasure when a man feels a thing to be his own for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain although selfishness is rightly censured this however is not the mere love of self but the love of self in excess like the misers love of money for all or almost all men love money and other such objects in a measure and further there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions which can only be rendered when a man has private property these advantages are lost by excessive unification of the state the exhibition of two virtues besides is visibly annihilated in such a state first temperance towards women for it is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance sake secondly liberality in the matter of property no.1 when men have all things in common will any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal action for liberality consist in the use which is made of property such legislation may have a spacious appearance of benevolence men readily listen to it and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend especially when someone is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states suits about contracts convictions for perjury flatteries of rich men and the like which are said to arise out of the possession of private property these evils however are due to a very different cause the wickedness of human nature indeed we see that there is much more quarreling among those who have all things in common though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property again we ought to reckon not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved but also the advantages which they will lose the life which they are to lead appears to be quite impracticable the error of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts unity there should be both of the family and of the state but in some respects only for there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state or at which without actually ceasing to exist it will become an inferior state like the Harmony passing into unison or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot the state as I was saying is a plurality which should be United and made into a community by education and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous should expect to him his citizens by regulations of this sort and not by philosophy or by customs and laws like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respect in common meals whereby the legislature has made property common let us remember that we should not disregard the experience of Ages in the multitude of years these things if they were good would certainly not have been unknown for almost everything has been found out although sometimes they are not put together in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have great light would be thrown on the subject if we could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction for the legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing its constituents into associations for common meals and into frat trees and tribes but all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the Guardians a prohibition which the less of demony UNS try to enforce already but indeed Socrates has not said nor is it easy to decide why didn't suck immunity will be the general form of the state the citizens who are not guardians are the majority and about them nothing has been determined are the husbandmen to to have their property in common or is each individual to have his own and are the wives and children to be individual or common if like the Guardians they are to have all things in common what do they differ from them or what will they gain by submitting to their government or upon what principle would they submit unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the cretins who give their slaves the same institutions as their own but forbid them gymnastic exercises in the possession of arms if on the other hand the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property what would be the form of the community must it not contain two states in one each hostile to the other he makes the guardians into a me rock you pie and Garrison while the husbandmen and artisans and the wrists are the real citizens but if so the suits and quarrels and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in other states will exist equally among them he says indeed that having so good in education the citizens will not need many laws for example laws about the city or about the markets but then he can finds his education to the Guardians again he makes the husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute but in that case they are likely to be more unmanageable and conceited than the helots or Panisse de or slaves in general and whether community of lives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not and the questions akin to this what will be the education form of government laws of the lower class Socrates has nowhere determined neither is it easy to discover this nor is there character of small importance if the common life of the Guardians is to be maintained again if Socrates makes the women common and retains private property the men will see to the fields but who will see to the house and who will do so if the agricultural class have both their property and their wives in common once more it is absurd to argue from the analogy of the animals that men and women should follow the same pursuits for animals have not to manage a household the government too as constituted by Socrates contains elements of danger for he makes the same persons always ruled and if this is often a case of disturbance among the meaner sort how much more among high-spirited warriors but that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is evident for the gold which the God mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one at another time to another but always to the same as he says God mingles gold and Sun and silver and others from their very birth but brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and and then again he deprives the Guardians even of happiness and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy but the whole cannot be happy unless most or all or some of its parts enjoy happiness in this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers which may exist only in the whole but in neither of the parts not so happiness and if the Guardians are not happy who are surely not the artisans or the common people the Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties and others quite as great section 6 the same or nearly the same objections apply to Plato's later work the laws and therefore we had better examine briefly the Constitution which is therein described in the Republic Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only such as the community of women and children the community of property and the Constitution of the state the population is divided into two classes one of husbandmen and the other of warriors from this ladder is taken a third class of councilors and rulers of the state but Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the government and whether they too are to carry arms and share in military service or not he certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the Guardians and to fight by their side the remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject and with discussions about the education of the Guardians in the laws there is hardly anything but laws but much is said about the Constitution this which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form for with the exception of the community of women and property he supposes everything to be the same in both states there is to be the same education the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations and there are to be common meals in bow the only difference is that in the laws the common meals are extended to women and the Warriors number 5,000 but in the Republic only 1000 the discourses of Socrates are never commonplace they always exhibit Grace and originality and thought but perfection and everything can hardly be expected we must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens just now mentioned will require a territory as large as Babylon or some other huge site if so many persons are to be supported in idleness together with their women and attendants who will be a multitude many times as great in framing an ideal we may assume what we wish but should avoid impossibilities it is said that the legislature ought to have his eyes directed to two points the people in the country but neighboring countries also must not be forgotten by him firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life for a state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbors and not merely useful at home even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best either for individuals or States still a cities should be formidable to enemies whether invading or retreating there is another point should not the amount of property be defined in some way which differs from this by being clearer for Socrates says that a man should have so much property as will enable him to live temperately which is only a way of saying to live well this is too general a conception further a man may live temperately and yet miserably a better definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally if the two are parted liberally will combine with luxury temperance will be associated with toil for liberality and temperance are the only eligible qualities which have to do with the use of property a man cannot use property with - or courage but temperately and liberally he may and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property there is an inconsistency - in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens the population is to remain unlimited and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful however many are born to others because he finds this to be the case in existing states but greater care will be required than now for among ourselves whatever may be the number of citizens the property is always distributed among them and therefore no one is in want but if the property were incapable of division as in the laws the supernumeraries whether few or many would get nothing one would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children and of the sterility and married persons the neglect of this subject which in existing States is so common is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime fight in the Corinthian who is one of the most ardent legislators thought that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same although originally all the Lots may have been of different sizes but in the laws the opposite principle is maintained what in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained Hereafter there is another omission in the laws Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects he only says that they should be related as the warp and the wolf which are made out of different walls he allows that a man's whole property may be increased fivefold but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent again will the good management of a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads for he assigns to each individual to Stead's in separate places and it is difficult to live in two houses the whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy but something in a mean between them which is usually called a polity and is composed of the heavy armed soldiers now if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of states he was very likely right but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state for many would prefer the lace of demonium or possibly some other more aristocratic government some indeed say that the best Constitution is a combination of all existing forms and they praise the lace of demonium because it is made up of oligarchy monarchy and democracy the king forming the monarchy and the Council of Elders the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented by the efforts for the efforts are selected from the people others however declare that F or allottee to be a tyranny and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life in the laws it is maintained that the best Constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny which are either not constitutions at all or are the worst of all but they are nearer the truth who combined many forms for the Constitution is better which is made up of more numerous elements the Constitution proposed in the laws has no element of monarchy at all it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy leaning rather to oligarchy this is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates for although the appointment of them by law from among those who have been already selected combines both elements the way in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties while the rest may do as they like and the endeavor to have the greater number of the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes both these are oligarchical features the oligarchical principle prevails also in the choice of the counsel for all are compelled to choose but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class and of an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three classes and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory on the first and second then from the person so chosen he says that there ought to be an equal number of each class selected the supreme on Durance will be given to the better sort of people who have the larger incomes because many of the lower classes not being compelled will not vote these considerations and others which will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar qualities tend to show that states like Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy there is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of the body who are themselves elected for if but a few small number choose to combine the elections will always go as they desire such as the Constitution which is described in the laws end of book two sections five and six put to section seven through eight of politics by Aristotle this is a librivox recording all librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librivox.org politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book two section seven through eight section seven other constitutions have been proposed some by private persons others by philosophers and statesmen which all come near to established or existing ones than either of Plato's no one else has introduced such novelties as the community of women and children or public tables for women other legislators begin with what is necessary in the opinion of some the regulation of property is the chief point of all that being the question upon which all revolutions turn this danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions he thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty not so easily when a state was already established and that the shortest way of compasses the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions and for the poor not to give but to receive them Plato in the laws was of the opinion that to a certain extent accumulation should be allowed forbidding as I have already observed any citizens who possess more than five times the minimum qualification but those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to forget that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the number of children for if the children are too many for the property the law must be broken and besides the violation of the law it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions that the equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood even by some of the old legislators laws were made by salon and others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased and there are other laws in the states which forbid the sale of property among the locals for example there is a law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakeably that some misfortune has befallen him again there have been laws which enjoined the preservation of the original Lots such a law existed in the island of Lucas and the abrogation of it made the Constitution too democratic for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualifications again where there is equality of property the amount may be either too large or too small and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury clearly then the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties but at moderation in their amount further if he prescribed this moderate amount equally to all he will be no nearer the mark for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized and this is impossible unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws but failures will probably reply that this is precisely what he means and that in his opinion there ought to be in States not only equal property but equal education still he should tell precisely what he means and that in his opinion there ought to be in having one and the same for all if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice or ambition or both moreover civil troubles arise not only out of the inequality of property but out of the inequality of Honor though in opposite ways for the common people quarrel about the inequality of property the higher class is about the equality of Honor as the poet says the bad and good alike in honor share there are crimes of which the motive is wont and for these failures expects to find a cure in the equalization of property which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman because he is hungry or cold but wound is not the sole incentive to crime men also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desire they wish to cure some desire going beyond the necessities of life which prey upon them nay this is not the only reason they may desire securities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain and therefore they commit crimes now what is the cure of these three disorders of the first moderate possessions and occupation of the second habits of temperance as to the third if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy for all other pleasures we are dependent on others the fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold and hence great is the honor bestowed not on him who kills a thief but on him who kills a tyrant thus we see that the institutions of alias avail only against petty crimes there is another objection to them they are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state but the legislators should consider also its relation to neighboring nations and to all who are outside of it the government must be organized with a view to military strength and of this he has said not a word and so with respect to property there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state but also to meet dangers coming from without the property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbors may be tempted by it while the owners are unable to repel the invaders nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war against states of equal power and of the same character Phaleas has not laid down any rule but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage the best limit will probably be that a more powerful neighbor must be two inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less there is a story that you beuliss when her daddy's was going to be siege at our newest told him to consider how long the operation would take and then reckon upon the cost which would be incurred in the time for he said I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Eternia sat once these words of uvulas made an impression on auto fur daddies as he'd assisted from the siege the equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens from quarreling not that the gain in this direction is very great for the nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more than an equal share of honors and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution and the avarice of mankind is insatiable at one time two opals was paid enough but now when the sum has become customary men always want more and more without end for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied and most men live only for the gratification of it the beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to Train the nobler sort of nature's not to desire more and to prevent the lower from getting more that is to say they must be kept down but not ill treated besides the equalization proposed by Phaleas is imperfect for he only equalizes land whereas a man may be rich also in slaves and cattle and money and in the abundance of what are called his movables now either all these things must be equalized or some limit must be imposed on them or they must be let alone it would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city only if as he supposes all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a supplementary part of the body of citizens but if there is a law that artisans are to be public slaves it should only apply to those engaged in public works as at epidamnus or at athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced from these observations anyone may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas section 8 HIPAA damnest the son of Yura Thawne a native of Miletus this name who invented the art of planning cities and who also laid out the Piraeus a strange man whose fondness for distinction led him into a general eccentricity of life which made something Kim affected for he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments but these were worn on a cheap but warm garment both in winter and summer he besides aspiring to be adept in the knowledge of nature was the first person not a statesman who made inquiries about the best form of government the city of hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided into three parts one of artisans one of husbandmen and a third of armed defenders of the state he also divided the land into three parts one sacred one public the third private the first was set apart to maintain the customary worship of the gods the second was to support the Warriors the third was the property of the husbandmen he also divided laws into three classes and no more for he maintained that there are three subjects of law suits insult injury and homicide he likewise instituted a single final Court of Appeal to which all cases seeming to have been improperly decided might be referred this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose he was further of opinion that the decisions of the court ought not to be given by the use of a voting pebble but that everyone should have a tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal but if he partly acquitted and partly condemned he was to distinguish accordingly to the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be guilty of perjury whichever way they voted he also enacted that those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be honored and he provided that the children of citizens who died in battle should be maintained at the public expense as if such an enactment had never been heard off before yet it actually exists at Athens and in other places as to the magistrate's he would have them all elected by the people that is by the three classes are mentioned and those who were elected were to watch over the interest of the public of strangers and of orphans these are the most striking points in the constitution of hippodamus there is not much else the first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the threefold division of the citizens the artisans and the husbandmen and the Warriors all have a share in the government but the husbandmen have no arms and the artisans neither arms nor land and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class that they should share in all the offices is an impossibility for generals and guardians of the citizens and nearly all the principal magistrates must be taken from the classes of those who carry arms yet if the two other classes have no share in the government how can they be loyal citizens it may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous and if they are why should the other classes share in the government at all or have power to appoint magistrates further what use are farmers to the city artisans there must be four these are wounded in every city and they can live by their craft as elsewhere and the husbandmen too if they really provided the warriors with food might fairly have a share in the government but in the Republic of hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own which they cultivate for their private benefit again as to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen although the legislature intended to make a distinction between them if again there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husband who have land of their own and from the warriors they will make a fourth class which has no place in the state and no sharing anything or if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands and those of the public as well they will have difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain two households and why in this case should there be any division for they might find food than selves and give to the warriors from the same land and the same Lots there is surely a great confusion in all of this neither is the law to be commended which says that the judges when a simple issue is laid before them should distinguish in their judgment now in an arbitration although the arbitrator's are many they confer with one another about the decision and therefore they can distinguish but in courts of law this is impossible and indeed most legislators take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another again will there not be confusion if the judges think that damages should be given but not so much as the suitor demands he asks say for twenty my knee and the judge allows him ten my knee or in general the suitor asked for more and the judge allows less while another judge allows five another for my knee in this way they will go on splitting up the damage and some will grant the whole and others nothing how is this final reckoning to be taken again no one contends that he who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation purchase himself if the indictment has been laid in an unqualified form and this is just for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant knows nothing but that he does not know the twenty my knee he only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty my knee and yet condemns him to honor those who discover anything which is useful to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound that cannot safely begin acted by law for it may encourage informers and perhaps even lead to political commotions this question involves another it has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country even if another law be better now if changes are inexpedient we can hardly assent to the proposal of hippodamus for under pretence of doing a public service a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the Constitution but since we have touched upon this subject perhaps we have better go a little into detail for as I was saying there is a difference of a and it may sometimes seem desirable to make changes such changes in the other arts and scientists have certainly been beneficial medicine for example in gymnastic and every other art and craft have departed from the traditional usage and if politics be an art change must be necessary in this as in any other art that improvement has occurred is shown by the fact that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous for the ancient Aline's went about armed and bought their brides for each other the remains of ancient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd for example in kyoumi there is a law about murder to the effect that if the accuser produced a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen the accused shall be held guilty again men and general desire the good but not merely what their fathers had but the primeval inhabitants whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors are some destruction may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary or even foolish people among ourselves such is certainly the tradition concerning the Earthborn men and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions even when laws have been written down they ought not always to remain unaltered as in other sciences so in politics it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing for enactments must be universal but actions are concerned with particulars hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed but when we look at the matter from another point of view great caution would seem to be required for the habit of lightly changing the laws isn't evil and when the advantage is small some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left the citizen will not gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience the analogy of the Arts is false a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art for the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit which can only be given by time so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law even if we admit that the laws are to be changed are they all to be changed and in every state and are they to be changed by anybody who likes or only by certain persons these are very important questions and therefore we have better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion end of book 2 section 7 through 8 book 2 sections 9 and 10 of politics by Aristotle this is a librivox recording all librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librivox.org recording by Jennifer politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book 2 sections 9 and 10 section 9 in the governments of Lhasa demon and creat and indeed in all governments two points have to be considered first whether any particular law is good or bad when compared with the perfect state secondly whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens that in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to provide further daily wants is generally acknowledged but there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained the Thessaly in Penna state have often risen against their masters and the heel it's in like manner against the last Damian's for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait nothing however of this kind has yet happened to the cretians the reason probably is that the neighboring cities even when at war with one another never form an alliance with rebellious serfs rebellions not being for their interest since they themselves have a dependent population whereas all the neighbors of the last Damian's whether are jives Messenians or Arcadians were their enemies in Thessaly again the original revolt of the slaves occurred because the thessalians were still at work with the neighbouring Atkins / havens and McNees ins besides if there were no other difficulty the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome affair for if not kept in hand they are insolent and think they're as good as their masters and if harshly treated they hate and conspire against them now it is clear that when these are the Brazil the citizens of a state have not found out the secret of managing their subject population again the license of the masa demian women defeats the intention of the Spartan Constitution and is adverse to the happiness of the state for a husband and wife being each a part of every family the state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women and therefore in those states in which the condition of the women is that half the city may be regarded as having no law and this is what has actually happened at Sparta the legislature wanted to make the whole state hearty and temperate and he has carried out his intention in this pace of men but he has neglected the women who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury the consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly valued especially if the citizen fall under the Dominion of their wives after the manner of most warlike races except the Celts and a few others who have who openly approve of male loves the old mythology would seem to have been right in uniting areas in Aphrodite for all warlike races are prone to love either of men or of women this was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness many things were managed by their women but what difference does it make whether women rule or the rulers are ruled by women the result is the same even in regard to courage which is of no use in daily life and is needed only on war the influence of the last Dameon women has been most mischievous the evil showed itself in the Theban invasion when unlike the women of other cities they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy this license of the last Dameon women existed from the earliest times and was only what might be expected for during the Wars of the last Damien's first against the archives and afterwards against the Arcadians and masini ins the men were long away from home and on the return of peace they gave themselves in to the legislators hand already prepared by the discipline of a soldier's life in which there are many elements of virtue to receive his enactment but when like her jizz as tradition says wanted to bring the women under his laws they resisted and he gave up the attempt these then are the causes of what then happened and this defect in the Constitution is clearly to be attributed to them we are not however considering what is or is not to be excused but what is right or wrong and the disorder of the women as I have already said not only gives an air of in decorum to the Constitution considered in itself but tends in a measure to foster avarice the mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of property while some of the Spartan citizen have quite small properties others have very large ones hence the land has passed into the hands of a few and this is due also to faulty laws for although the legislature rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance he allows anybody who likes to give or bequeath it yet both practices lead to the same result and nearly two fifths of the whole country are held by women this is owing to the number of Eris's and to the large dowries which are customary it would surely have been better to have given no dowry x' at all or if any but small and or moderate ones as the law now stands a man may bestow his heiress on anyone whom he pleases and if he died intestate the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir hence although the country is able to maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites the whole number of Spartan citizens fell below 1000 the result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property for the city sank under a single defeat the want of men was their ruin there is a tradition that in the days of their ancient kings they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to strangers and therefore in spite of their long wars no lack of population was experienced by them indeed at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens whether this statement is true or not it would certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property again the law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse to the correction of this inequality for the legislator wanting to have as many Spartans as he could encourage the citizens to have large families and there is a law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service and he who has four from all the burdens of the state yet it is obvious that if there were many children the land being distributed as it is many of them must necessarily fall into poverty the last mode Danian Constitution is defective in another point I mean the F royalty this Magister C has Authority in the highest matters but the efforts are chosen from the whole people and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men who being badly off are open to bribes there have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former times and quite recently in the matter of the undry ins certain of the efforts who were bribed did their best to ruin the state and so great and tyrannical is their power that even the Kings have been compelled to court them so that in this way as well together with the royal office the whole Constitution has deteriorated and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy the effort II certainly does keep the state together for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office and the result whether due to the legislator or to chance has been advantageous for if a constitution is to be permanent all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained this is the case it's part of where the Kings desire its permanence because they have due honor in their own persons the nobles because they are represented in the Council of Elders for the office of Elder as a reward of virtue and the people because all are eligible to the ephoralty the election of efforts out of the whole people is perfectly right but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion which is too childish again they have the decision of great causes although they are quite ordinary men and therefore they should not determine with them merely on their own judgment but according to written rules and to the laws their way of life to is not in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution they have a deal too much licensed whereas in the case of the other citizens the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures again the council of elders is not free from defects it may be said that the elders are good men and well-trained and manly virtue and that therefore there is an advantage to the state in having them but that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a disputable thing for the mind grows old as well as the body and when men have been educated in such manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them there is real danger many of the elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs and therefore they ought not to be irresponsible yet at Sparta they are so but it may be replied all magistracies are accountable to the efforts yes but this prerogative is too great for them and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other manner further the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish and it is improper that the person to be elected to canvass for the office the worthy is should be appointed whether he chooses or not and here the legislature clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other parts of his Constitution he would have his citizens ambitious and he has reckoned upon this ability in the election of the elders for no one would ask to be elected if he were not yet ambition and avarice almost more than any other passions are the motives of crime whether Kings are or are not an advantage to States I will consider at another time they should at any rate be chosen not as they are now but with regard to their personal life and conduct the legislator himself obviously did not suppose that you could make them really good men at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue for this reason the Spartans used to join enemies with them in the same embassy and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state neither did the first introducer of the common meals called Phoenicia regulate them while the entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost as in Crete but among the last Monday means everyone is expected to contribute and some of them are too poor to afford the expense thus the intention of the legislature is frustrated the common meals were meant to be a popular institution but the existing manner of it regulating them is the reverse of popular for the very poor can scarcely take part in them and according to ancient custom those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain the rights of citizenship the law about the Spartan Admirals has often been censored and with justice it is a source of dissension for the kings are perpetual generals and this office of Admiral is but the setting up of another King the charge which Plato brings in the laws against the intention of the legislature is likewise justified the whole Constitution has regard to one part of virtue only the virtue of the soldier which gives victory in war so long as they were at war therefore their power was preserved but when they had attained Empire they fell for of the arts of peace they knew nothing and had never engaged in any employment higher than war there is another error equally great into which they have fallen although they truly think that the goods for which men contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them once more of the revenues of the state are ill-managed there is no money in the Treasury although they are obliged to carry on great Wars and they are unwilling to pay taxes the greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans they do not look closely into one another's contributions the result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of benefit for he has made his city poor and his citizens greedy enough respecting the Spartan Constitution of which these are the principle defects end of section 9 book 2 sections 9 and 10 of politics by Aristotle this is a librivox recording all librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librivox.org recording by Jennifer politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book 2 sections 9 and 10 section 10 the Cretan Constitution nearly resembles the Spartan and in some few points is quite as good but for the most part less perfect inform the older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later and the last of domain Ian's is said to be and probably is in a very great measure a copy of the Cretan according to tradition like couragous when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charley's went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete for the two countries are nearly connected the lesions are a colony of last domain Ian's and the colonists when they came to create adopted the Constitution which they found existing among the inhabitants even to this day the Perry assay or subject population of Crete are governed by the original laws which my nose is supposed to have enacted the island seems to be intended by nature for Dominion and Alice and to be well situated it extends right across the sea around which nearly all the helens are settled and while one end is not farther from the Peloponnese the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about try opium and roads hence - acquired the Empire of the sea subduing some of the islands and colonizing others at last he invaded Sicily where he died near camicus the chrétien institutions resemble the last Dominion the helots are the husband men of the one the peri say of the other and both cretans and lacedaemonians have common meals which were anciently called by the last domain Ian's not Phoenicia but Andrea and the cretins have the same word the use of which proves that the common meals originally came from Crete further the two constitutions are similar for the office of the efforts is the same as that of the Cretan Cosme the only difference being that whereas the efforts are 5 the Cosmi are 10 in number the elders too answered to the elders in crete who are termed by the cratons the council the kingly office once existed in Crete but was abolished and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war all classes share in the ecclesia but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi the common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the last demeaning 4 in lasa damia everyone pays so much per head or if he fails the law as I have already explained forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship but in Crete they are of a more popular character there of all the fruits of the earth and cattle raised on public rent lands and of the tribute which is paid by the peri say one portion is assigned to the gods and to the service of the state and another to the common meals so that men women and children are all supported out of a common stock the legislature has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating which he conceives to be a game he likewise encourages the separation of men from women at least they should have too many children and the companionship of men with one another whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time but that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the last domain e'en there can be no doubt on the other hand the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the efforts of which they have all the evils without the good like the efforts they are any chance persons but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage at Sparta everyone is eligible and the body of the people having a share in the highest office want the Constitution to be permanent but in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families and not out of the whole people and the elders out of those who have been cause me the same criticism may be made about the Cretan which has been already made about the Macedonian elders their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment and dispensing with written law is dangerous it is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not discontented at it being excluded from it for there is no profit to be made out of the office as out of the effort II since unlike the efforts the Cosmi being in an island are removed from temptation the remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an extraordinary one suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitutional state for the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues or of private individuals and they are allowed also to resign before their tournament surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man which is a very unsafe rule worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosme a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit to justice this shows that the Cretan government although possessing some of the characteristics of a constitutional state is really a closed oligarchy the nobles have a habit too of setting up a chief they get together a party among the common people and their own friends and then quarrel and fight with one another what is this but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of society a city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her but as I have already said the island of Crete is saved by her situation distance has the same effect as the less de Manian prohibition of strangers and the cretins have no foreign dominions this is the reason why the parry easy are contented in Crete whereas the helots are perpetually revolting but when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island the weakness of the Constitution was revealed enough of the government of Crete end of section 10 end of book two sections nine and ten recording by Jennifer Hilo Hawaii book 2 sections 11 and 12 of politics by Aristotle this is librivox recording all librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librivox.org recording by Jennifer politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book 2 sections 11 and 12 the carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government which differs from that of any other state in several respects though it is in some very like the last damayan indeed all three states the last and Devonian the Cretan and the Carthaginian nearly resemble one another and are very different from any others many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent the superiority of their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people remain loyal to the Constitution the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth speaking of and have never been under the rule of a tyrant among the points in which the Carthaginian Constitution resembles the last damayan are the following the common tables of the clubs answer to the spartan Phoenicia and their magister c of the 104 to the efforts but whereas the effers are any chance persons the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit this is an improvement they have also their kings and their Jerusha or council of elders huuah correspond to the Kings and elders of Sparta their kings unlike the Spartan are not always of the same family nor that an ordinary one but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed by seniority this is far better such officers have great power and therefore if they are persons of little worth do a great deal of harm and they have already done harm at last a demon most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state for which the Carthaginian Constitution would be censured apply equally to all the of government which we have mentioned but of the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy the Kings and elders if unanimous may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people but when they are not unanimous the people decide on such matters as well and whatever the Kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them and anyone who likes may oppose it now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete that the magistrates of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted that they should choose the Supreme Council of 100 and should hold office longer than other magistrates for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office these are oligarchical features they're being without salary and not elected by lot and any similar points such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another as at last daemon are characteristic of aristocracy the Carthaginian Constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side for men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit but for their wealth a man they say who is poor cannot rule well he has not pleasure if then elections of magistrates further wealth be characteristic of oligarchy and election for merit of aristocracy there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates and particularly the highest of them their kings and Generals with an eye both to merit and to wealth but we must acknowledge that in us deviating from aristocracy the legislature has committed an error nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class not only win in office but when out of office should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way and to this his attention should be first directed even if you must have regard to wealth in order to securely yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices such as those of kings and Generals should be bought the law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue and the whole state becomes a voracious for whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable the other citizens are sure to follow their example and where virtue has not the first place their aristocracy cannot be firmly established those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best and even if the legislature does not care to protect the good from poverty he should at any rate secure leisure for them when in office it would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold up many offices which is a favorite practice among the Carthaginians for one business is better done by one man the legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker hence where the state is large it is more in accordance with both constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons for as I said this arrangement is fairer to all and any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed we have a proof in military and naval matters the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all the government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to their colonies this is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state accident favors them but the legislators should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents as things are if any misfortune occurred and the bulk of the subjects revolted there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods such is the character of the last Dominion Cretan and Carthaginian constitutions which are justly celebrated end of section 11 book two section 12 of politics by Aristotle this is a librivox recording all librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librivox.org recording by Jennifer politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book 2 section 12 of those who have treated of governments some have never taken any part at all in public affairs but have passed their lives and a private station about most of them what is worth telling has already been told others have been law givers either in their own or in foreign cities whose affairs they have administered and of these some have only made laws others have framed constitutions for example like Hajus and sullen did both of the last of domani in constitution I have already spoken as to sahlan he is thought by some to have been a good legislator who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy emancipated the people established the ancient Athenian democracy and harmonized the different elements of the state according to their view the Council of Areopagus was an oligarchical element the elected magistracy aristocratic 'el and the courts of law democratical the truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of sahlan and were retained by him but that he formed the courts of law out of the citizens thus creating the democracy which is the very reason why he is sometimes blamed for in giving the supreme power to the law courts which are elected by lot he is thought to have destroyed the non democratic element when the law courts grew powerful to please the people who were now playing the tyrant the old Constitution was changed into the existing democracy effets altes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now see all this is true it seems however to be the result of circumstances and not to have been intended by Solon for the people having been instrumental in gaining the Empire of the sea in the persian war began to get a notion of itself and followed worthless demagogues whom the better bet class opposed Saul and himself appears to have given the athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government all the magistrates he appointed from the nobles and the men of wealth that is to say from the Pentecost you may deem me or from the class called Suki ta or from a third class of so called Knights or cavalry the fourth class were laborers who had no share in any magistracy mere legislators were Seleucus who gave laws to the epinephrine locrians and toronto's who legislated for his own city of katana and for the other chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily some people attempt to make out that anima Quartus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation and that he although a Locrian by birth was trained in Crete where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art that Daley's was his companion and they like urges and Seleucus were disciples of Thale ease as charondas was the lucas but their account is quite inconsistent with chronology there was also feeling oust the Corinthian who gave the laws to the Thebans this Filan house was one of the family of the baqia day and a lover of Diocles the olympic victor who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyon had conceived for him and retired to Thebes where the two friends together ended their days the inhabitants still point out their tombs which are in full view of one another but one is visible from the Corinthian territory the other not tradition says the two friends arranged them thus Diocles out of horror of at his misfortunes so that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb Fela vows that it might this is the reason why they settled at Thebes and Sophia vows legislated for the Thebans and besides some other enactments gave them laws about the procreation of children which they call the laws of adoption these laws were peculiar to him and were intended to preserve the number of the Lots in the legislation of charondas there is nothing more remarkable except the suits against false witnesses he is the first who instituted denunciation for perjury his laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern legislators characteristic ofili's is the equalization of property of Plato the community of women children and property the common meals of women and the law about drinking that the sober shall be masters of the feast also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands so that one should be as useful as the other Draco is left laws but he adopted them to a constitution which already existed and there is no peculiarity in them which is worth mentioning except the greatness and severity of the punishments Pittacus ii was only a lawgiver and not the author of a constitution he has a law which is peculiar to him that if a drunken man do something wrong he shall be more heavily punished than if he were sober he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard but only to expediency for drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence Andrew Thomas of rhegium gave laws to the Chell Citians of Thrace some of them relate to homicide and to heiresses but there is nothing remarkable in them and here let us conclude our inquiry into the various constitutions which either actually exist or have been devised by theorists end of book 2 sections 11 and 12 recording by Jennifer Hilo Hawaii and of politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett

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Published: Tue Jan 22 2013