Political Philosophy and the Ontological Question

in 1975 and here I come to the point of my obscure remark Richard Kennington who is on the faculty joined this faculty and Richard Buckley was a student of Kenny tents and remained a student of the late Richard Kennington uh somewhere along the line you got a job at Stone Hill University where he eventually as a reward or punishment for his Labour's B was made chair but then went on the greater things 1997 he came to Catholic University and was here for a happy decade earning the rank of full professor in 2004 most of us he is the author of many articles three very fine books um although I only speak on on a hunch about the third having not read it yet his first freedom and the end of reason on the moral foundations of cons critical philosophy appeared in 1989 from the University of Chicago Press and really breaks ground and his argument about the importance of Rousseau for the foundation as a foundation for cons critical philosophy in nineteen and 2002 we published being after Rousseau philosophy and culture in question again from the University of Chicago Press and there you find fine studies of Rousseau con shelling and Heidegger which prepares for a book which is just appeared I hope to have my own copy to show you but he brought his here this Heidegger Strauss and the premises of philosophy on the original forgetting it's just appeared from the University of Chicago Press so those books three edited books many articles further ado please welcome back well it's always a great pleasure to be here at this wonderful institution and to see a number of familiar people and to come to a place where it is very much like that returning home and a place where I can address issues and questions and and and be sure if a very thoughtful and interesting response mmm so thank you very much for that introduction John yeah well the presentation I have is a rather basic presentation I mean in the sense that being rather introductory to themes of this third book what place does thinking about politics have in high Daguerre's philosophy if that place cannot be called political philosophy what might it be called instead what are the implications for political philosophy of high Daguerre's thought a doubt could be raised about whether a positive relation exists between high Daguerre's ontological inquiry and political philosophy certainly Heidegger does not use the term political philosophy for any aspect of his thinking which is focused on renewing the question what is being as forgotten in its true character since the beginning of Western philosophy Heidegger's use of the term politics and its cognates is often disparaging Heidegger clearly has only contempt for the academic discipline of the study of politics politique which he claims lacks a primordial existential approach to the interpretation of design surely he is on safe ground in regarding contemporary social sciences philosophically insufficient but one might think that the analysis of designs mode of existing as Kerr points toward a central place for political thought and action for in this analysis design human existence roughly confronting the temporal horizon of its existence as limited by death understands itself in terms of its possibilities which in its authentic stance it regards is radically unlike mere entities that are present at hand design has the state of being of an entity for which its being is an issue the analysis seems to entail a certain privileges of deliberation and action over the attitude of contemplation the account of being in the world gives priority to the engagement with pragmatist and over things as objects of beholding and perception things present at hand but the analysis of design Heidegger underlines is not undertaken for the sake of anthropological investigation as it he says uncovers time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being how'd it go states that care as a primordial structural totality lies before every fact achill attitude and situation of design and I'm quoting this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the practical attitude over the theoretical when we ascertain something present at hand by merely beholding it this activity has the character of care just as much as does a political action or taking a rest and enjoying oneself theory and practice are possibilities of being for any entity whose being must be defined as care notably though Heidegger places the terms theory and practice in quotation marks indicating that he puts in question the traditional distinction one might recall in this context is interpretation of phronesis in book six of Aristotle's Nicomachean Nick and McCann ethics Heidegger regards Aristotle's account of the human engagement with the environment and deliberative circumspection as the key to understanding design is disclosing truth in general and thus the key to the understanding of theoria as the most intense form of world engagement strikingly absent from high Daguerre's interpretation are the political aspects of Aristotle's account of furnaces prudence in Heidegger is not as it is an Aristotle directed toward given ends above all the end of the common good the intellectual virtue of practical judgment does not rest on moral virtues such as courage moderation and justice which for Aristotle belong essentially to the political context of the agent who judges prudentially when is tempted to say that Heidegger denies that he places practice above theory or if he does so it is because theory has been transformed and reinterpreted as a mode of being in the world not essentially distinct from a kind of practice and practice itself has been transformed and reinterpreted so as to divested of the political aspects of deliberation and action for the sake of the good of which the highest form is the common good of the community or City in Aristotle with the analysis of design seeming to point away toward everything distinctively political one is inclined to endorse the statement of lay of Strauss that there was no room for political philosophy in high Daguerre's work but the mention of Strauss brings us to a paradox in the generation of students deeply affected by heidegger's teaching in the 1920s were several who under his influence moved toward practical philosophy and indeed in some cases political philosophy with a strong impulse coming from Heidegger's readings of the Greeks besides Strauss one can mention Hannah Arendt hans-georg gadamer on jonas Gerhardt Krueger Karl livet and Herbert Marcuse a as this list covers several of the best known figures to emerge from hiding our circle of students when might conclude if when were not acquainted with his writings and knew only the writings of these students that Heidegger was not principally concerned with the metaphysical tradition but was a political philosopher or at least a practical philosopher in some recognizable and traditional sense accordingly when might suspect there was something wrong with my initial presentation of Heidegger indeed there is the more accurate presentation will acknowledge that Heidegger thought from its very beginnings had a deep engagement with political questions Alby --it understood from his special standpoint the analysis of a comprehensive crisis of Western civilization all of the students mentioned drew from Heidegger analysis some related understandings of the Western crisis but they all departed significantly from his view of the role of politics in the narrow sense in that crisis and in as possible overcoming and thus in various ways they also departed from his account of the crisis itself we shall see that when strauss writes that high Daguerre's work has no room for political philosophy he does not mean that Heidegger thought has no political dimension or that lacks all relevance for the concerns of political philosophy on the contrary strauss regards Heidegger's thought on the Western crisis as being a first importance for his own renewal of Socratic political philosophy my primary intent and the remainder remainder of the lecture is to throw some light on this complex state of affairs but I must proceed that discussion with some further comments on the relation of the question of being to politics and Heidegger's philosophy that Heidegger ventured some major gestures in the arena of national politics is of course extremely well known all the same it is sometimes denied that his philosophic thought had any relation to his political involvement a position that cannot hold up under even moderate scrutiny of the relevant sources Heidegger is own statements clearly rule out this assessment I will of course not attempt to deal with the vast literature on this subject I shall deal with the subject briefly but I hope not to superficially and will claimed that for philosophical reasons Heidegger turned to the theme of the fate of Europe and there with the West as dependent on the fate of Germany and in this way his philosophic thought in teaching and publications made an explicit turn toward political questions not just coincidentally he at the same time became practically engaged with the National Socialist Movement there was a long preparation for this step in heidecker's history has been expertly shown by Professor Holger borovsky before the First World War before Heidegger broke with the Catholic Church and before his mature philosophy was formed Heidegger wrote numerous pieces some scholarly and some of a popular character focusing on the problems of modernity in a highly critical spirit what he called the autonomous 'm of modern culture the reliance on feeling and subjectivity and the naturalism of the social sciences were targets of his attack his thinking was deeply informed by Catholic tradition although Protestant theology can't and Nietzsche played roles before the actual break with the church the destruction of the tradition that Heidegger undertook as a mature thinker in the 1920s has some continuities with his beginning however in this later period Heidegger articulated the failures of modernity as rooted in the rationalism of Greek antiquity the entire metaphysical tradition arising from the Greeks Heidegger claimed overlooked the meaning of truth as unconcealed adness emerging in designs designs attitude of care in the authentic mode of care design experiences its thoroughness into the world and confronts the fact of mortality the authentic temporality of living toward death is the presupposition of all understanding of being but the metaphysical tradition concealed this presupposition by its emphasis on being as present at hand or as eternally present Amita bull to designs correct a serving and calculative thinking Western metaphysics and even more its offspring modern science take flight from the anxiety of temporal mortal existence Heidegger used this analysis to attack the foundations of modern mass culture and bushwa Society for such as clearly his intent in the description of the inane distractions and idle chatter of dustman the day of public life it is not difficult to find in this account possible implications for action against the political cultural status quo although Heidegger at the time did not give any pointers as to where resolute rejection of the present age would lead this explicit and highly public engagement with politics took place in 1933 as he assumed the rectorate of the University of Freiburg it is a mistake to regard this move as mere opportunism a chance for Heidegger as leader of a major university to play on the bigger stage of national politics an indication of high degrees philosophic intent is given in the inaugural address of 1929 what is metaphysics where Heidegger discusses the plight of the modern University as lacking a philosophic account of truth to ground and unified the scattered plurality of disciplines the university must find the deep source of its unity in metaphysical questioning so as to guide the nation in the renewal of philosophic questioning Heidegger offered more clarity about the development of his thinking as leading toward national socialist politics in an essay published after his death titled the rector at 1933-34 effects and thoughts written in 1945 there he relates how he and a small circle discussed the writings of aaron stronger in the early 1930s wherein Heidegger saw that an essential understanding of nietzsche Nietzsche's metaphysics was expressed in whose horizon the present and the future of the West was seen and foreseen with the declaration god is dead nietzsche made manifest a new reality the collapse of Christianity in the supersensible world amid the universal domination by the will to power in the form of planetary planetary technology with deepened awareness of nihilism as the destiny of the West Heidegger saw the urgency of radicalizing the search for the ground of the sciences and the revival of the revival of the University the reflection on the overcoming of the metaphysics the will to power through a conversation with the Western tradition was to be the core of the assertion of the university's leading position Heidegger writes that in this writing of 45 with the Assumption of the rectorate I dared to make the experiment to save purify and secure the positive in the national socialist movement this conviction then and also later with some significant modification was the Germany had to play the leading role in renewing the West for the Germans have a distinctive character among the modern peoples as the most philosophical people related to the ancient Greeks all human greatness and pre-eminently philosophic greatness arises out of rootedness in a particular people the German folk with its traditions of thinking and singing alone can resist the dreary technological frenzy and organized domination of the average man found in America and Russia I'm stating there's position of the 1930s for the sake of philosophy this people must rise up against egalitarianism technological flattening and spiritual triviality of the rising powers of democracy and communism strauss states memorably how Heidegger experienced the technological world society as a nightmare I quote Strauss it means unity of the human race on the lowest level complete emptiness of life self-perpetuating doctrine without rhyme or reason no leisure no elevation no withdrawal nothing but work and recreation no individuals and no peoples but instead lonely crowds one of course detects in this eloquent statement some sympathy on Strauss's part Straus also notes that Heidegger became disillusioned with the Nazis and abandoned all hopes of making the needed transformation through politics strauss writes one is inclined to say that Heidegger learns a lesson of 1933 more thoroughly than any other man but Strauss continues surely he leaves no place whatever for political philosophy the room for political philosophy is occupied by God or the gods as Heidegger's thinking prepares for the return of the gods in the overcoming of nihilism by the absence of political philosophy Strauss does not intend merely the lack of theoretical treatment of politics to grasp a true bearing of Strauss's critique is the major concern of what follows among the leading thinkers of the 20th century seeking to reach new insight concerning the roots the meaning and the fate of Western rationalism Martin Heidegger and Leo Strauss were the two to develop the most searching analyses of the philosophic tradition as originating and radical questioning and undergoing forgetting both rethink the possibility of philosophy through recovering its original starting points as they view the present age as a wholly new crisis in the tradition of inquiry compelling philosophy to reconsider the most elementary premises on which the tradition is based Strauss writes that the crisis of our time may have the accidental advantage of enabling us to understand in an untraditional or fresh manner what was his or - understood only in a traditional or derivative manner in a letter to hans-georg gadamer strauss employs Heidegger's language the characterize the crisis quote it is necessary to reflect on the situation - demands the new hermeneutics ie on our situation this situation will necessarily bring to light a radical crisis an unprecedented crisis and this is what Heidegger means by the world night but long before writing this Strauss claimed in 1930 something similar while referring to the disturbing force of another thinker I quote through Nietzsche tradition has been shaken to its roots it has completely lost its self-evident truth we are left in this world without any authority any direction only now has the question post Bo T on how shall I live or how shall one live again received its full edge we can pose it again these two figures Nietzsche and Heidegger are from Strauss's early years the presiding spirits of late modern thought at once threatening and liberating who exposed the failures of the modern rationalist tradition and point problematically toward a new beginning they are for Strauss not merely destructive forces since they make possible the raising of new questions and giving new life to old questions Strauss writes in 1932 that Nietzsche uncovers the neglect of the Socratic question even as he denounces Socrates and Heidegger reveals the neglect of ontology the question of being as concealed by centuries of metaphysical tradition by showing modern philosophy to be a destructive process process they provide not new certainties but allow one to escape the power of the certainties of the present age strauss writes but to me modern philosophy appears to have come to its end to lead to the point at which Socrates begins Nietzsche and Heidegger make one aware of the un-- radicality of modern philosophy which consists in its belief that it can presuppose the fundamental questions is already answered and that it can therefore progress but even as Nietzsche and Heidegger call into question the dogma of modernity is progress over antiquity these philosophers the young Strauss remarks remain entangled in the project of modern philosophy to overcome Christianity whereby they still think within a framework defined by Christianity in which religion and philosophy are fused to that extent they remain under the Spill of a certain conception of progress that underlies all of modern philosophy and the historicist thinking at the core of what Strauss in 1932 calls the second cave or the cave beneath the original cave in later writing Strauss argues that Heidegger continues in a deeper and subtler form after the famous turn in his thinking to weave together philosophy and revelation such that the place of political philosophy is occupied by God or the gods in claiming that there is no room for political philosophy in HIDA guesswork Strauss means the time to guard neglects I quote the tension between philosophy and the polis the highest theme of political philosophy if Nietzsche and Heidegger were the deepest and most radical critics of modernity in the first decades of the century they were not the only developments in the German situation to assault the prestige of modern science and modern philosophy the catastrophe of the first world war set in motion a whirlwind of challenges to the doctrines of Enlightenment liberalism in Max Weber one saw modern science at the highest level unable to justify the choice of itself as a way of life or to offer any wisdom Edmund Husserl phenomenology exposed the inadequate starting points of all modern philosophic and scientific explanation and Cole Tory returned to the things themselves by careful description of the pre scientific understanding of the world strauss claimed that Viserys analysis of the origins of modern science in the transformation of geometry underlying Galileo's physics was of unsurpassed significance whistle proposed a new form of rigorous science but the prevailing mood was to turn away from all science to other grounds of authority either Revelation as in the new thinking in theology of Carl Bart and Franz residence by were the absolute obligation to the state Carl Schmitt Strauss studied briefly in the early 1920s under hacerlo and Heidegger and reflected on all the tendencies of his time but as supporter of the Zionist cause is chief concern was the paradoxical effort of the Jewish enlightenment and Zionism diffused orthodoxy and nationalism or excuse me I mean rationalism his early studies of Spinoza and the German Enlightenment were in accord with the new thinking the new thinking's criticism of rationalism although Strauss maintained great sympathy for the dialectical spirit of Lessing the alleged defeat of the god of Revelation by modern rationalism was effected through a mere construction of nature supported only by an act of will it showed itself to be a form of faith no less than the faith that sought to defeat and the triumph of Reason over prejudice was a hollow victory later Strauss modified this critique of the modern foundations without abandoning its core he did however move away from his defense of Orthodoxy after writing his 1928 book on Spinoza in the autograph autobiographical preface of 1965 Strauss states that he saw the danger in a critique of rationalism that could justify any orthodoxy and that it would be unwise to say farewell to reason this was also of course the period of the rise of Nazism in a change of orientation strauss began to question the premise that a return to pre-modern philosophy is impossible and to consider whether I quote the self-destruction of Reason was the inevitable outcome of modern rationalism as distinguished from its Prima from pre-modern rationalism at this time he began to recover pre-modern accounts of the relation between philosophy and revelation in the great figures of the medieval Islamic in great figures of medieval and Islamic and Jewish philosophy a relation in which philosophy is not entangled into battle against universal prejudice and seeks only instead to liberated philosophical individuals from the power of opinion he realized he was recovering the Socratic and platonic understanding of I quote the strictly esoteric character of the theoretical analysis of life but as he recovered the lost pre-modern justifications of philosophy he saw more clearly the deficiencies not only of modern philosophy but of Nietzsche and Heidegger Strauss his own radical reflection on the tradition had the effect of diminishing the apparent threat radicality of the two thinkers who above all others had led the revolt against rationalism the account just given is a prelude to considering the question what role does Heidegger have in the return to pre-modern philosophy one must immediately insert that Heidegger's importance is philosophic not merely critical and destructive that is not only a symptom of the political intellectual Cataclysm it is well known that Strauss held that the only great thinker of our time is Heidegger web team this begs the question of whether Heidegger was a philosopher but Strauss also asserts I quote Heidegger was the first great German philosopher who was a Catholic by origin and training he adds as a philosopher Heidegger was not a Christian writing in his later years about what Heidegger called the destruction of the tradition Strauss says that no one has questioned the premise of philosophy as radically as Heidegger and that he intended to uproot Greek philosophy especially Aristotle but this presupposed laying bare its roots the laying bare of it as it was in itself and not as it had come to appear in the light of the tradition and of modern philosophy by uprooting and not simply rejecting the tradition of philosophy Heidegger made it possible for the first time after many centuries when hesitates to say how many to see the roots of the tradition as they are and thus perhaps to know what so many merely believe that those roots are the only natural and healthy roots that's the end of a long quotation Heidegger provided a fundamental stimulus to rethinking the origins in the meaning of the entire philosophic tradition yet this is not the view of Heidegger that Strauss puts forward prominently and several of his public statements on this thinker Strauss is better known as the leading critic or critic of Heidegger's radical historicism and for reasons that obviously include Heidegger's endorsement of Nazism some of Strauss as presentations of heidegger's thought warned the reader about the dangers of high Daguerre's relativism as the ultimate consequence of a process of decline and modern philosophy toward nihilism but the statement just quoted on Heidegger stay Stroup seoane which occurs in a public address of Strauss as last year's shows that the emphasis on relativism is rather misleading insofar as Heidegger sought to uncover the roots of the tradition as they are according to Strauss and to distinguish them from traditional interpretations he could not be a relativist of any simple or familiar sort who denies the possibility of transcending to receive thinking of one's own time on the contrary Heidegger intended to uncover a beginning which had been almost immediately forgotten after its discovery in antiquity one which in heidegger's view Plato and Aristotle failed to sustain what is more Heidegger supposed that the recovery of this beginning was crucial to overcoming contemporary nihilism in general it might be said that students of Strauss was considerable support from some of Strauss is prominent presentations that tend to think of Heidegger only as the most extreme symptom of the crisis of Western philosophy rather than as a profound analysis of the crisis and now as analysts of the crisis whose analysis is in certain ways continued by Strauss also it can easily be supposed then when Strauss and his friend Jakob Klein heard Heidegger lecture on Aristotle in the early 1920s they saw him in the following way Heidegger persuaded them of the inadequacies of traditional accounts of the Greek roots but his new readings while brilliant were misguided and thus forced them to develop counter readings that uncovered the true roots Strauss's account of their early response to Heidegger shows that this view is not accurate I quote Klein was more attracted by the Aristotle brought to life and brought to light and life by Heidegger than by Heidegger his own philosophy unquote the distinction in this sentence means that Heidegger's account of Aristotle contains something true and of enduring worth apart from whatever had to be rejected and heidegger's philosophy of exists existence Strauss writes elsewhere that Heidegger revealed the founders of modern philosophy had refuted only the Aristotelian zuv their time without understanding Aristotle himself and they thinker I quote cannot have been refuted if he has not been understood as Klein saw perhaps him more quickly than Strauss Heidegger was showing that ancient philosophy is not doctrinaire but attentive to a Perea and is particularly in particularly engaged in a dialectical reflection on the relationship between a Dedic openness to the world and genetic causal explanation strauss asserts that heidegger's destruction of the tradition led to the insight that Locke our eldest a CID mode Aaron must be renewed the point cannot be that heidegger's reading of the Greeks were brilliant and provocative but all the same simply wrong one can approach the real point by noting another formulation of Strauss Heidegger by quoting had opened the possibility of a genuine return to classical philosophy with full clarity about the infinite difficulties which it entails yet he had to open this possibility without intending it since he sought to go beyond or beneath the classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle the point of this remark seems to be this Heidegger had valid not just brilliant and interesting insights about Greek philosophy but those insights could be employed to recover and defend Plato and Aristotle contrary to Heidegger's intention those valid insights relate to the infinite difficulties of the return to classical philosophy and that and the fact that those difficulties paradoxically promote a return to classical philosophy by opening up an unfamiliar opening up unfamiliar conceptions of Plato and Aristotle as philosophers attentive to a Perea who in the post Nietzschean era can ground a living way of philosophizing Ross writes that Heidegger went further than Husserl in his turn to the natural understanding of the world the natural by quote browse the natural world the world we live in and act is not the object or product of the theoretical attitude as in Tesoro it is a world not of mere objects of which we detachedly look but if things were affairs which we handle now to expand his thought a bit I think Strauss means the human relation to the world in which objects or beings are accessible to the human is not itself another object the human as questioning as open to the whole is the presupposition of all accounts of being but the being of the questioner has been neglected in the metaphysical tradition I'm not going to go into the question of whether these are accurate II characterizations of Pesaro and Heidegger in the 1922 lectures on Aristotle's metaphysics which Strauss heard Heidegger presented the beginning of inquiry in seeing as a way of actively engaging the world in circumspection wimzik and treats the theoretical life as the most intense form of practice by his own account strauss found this to be a fresh and provocative way of starting in Aristotle and it no doubt contributed to Strauss's later account of political philosophy as the starting point for all philosophy yet one must also note that for Strauss in the 1920s it was not Heidegger but Nietzsche who focused on what became for Strauss the primary theme a political philosophy the tension between philosophy in the city the fact that philosophy and the state are incompatible since the natural subject of philosophy is the cosmos not history but with this account one has not yet reached the heart of the matter Strauss is mature reflection on the basic philosophic questions as a radicality comparable to heidegger's and he was to the end of his life engaged with Heidegger as the one contemporary thinker with whom his thought was any central dialogue yet to see this and grasped its meaning one has to get past the first appearance that Strauss's writing offers the reader namely that the true issue between Strauss and Heidegger is the problem of relativism which Strauss would address by the assertion of absolute norms the genuine issue for Strauss I argue is whether Heidegger remain faithful to his own reopening of the question of being and thus the implications of the crisis of philosophy and whether Socratic skepticism provides Ostrowski are use the more rigorous and consistent response to the crisis Strauss formed his account of Socratic skepticism in relationship to the modern crisis inclusive of heidegger's role in the crisis in this regard Strauss is account a political philosophy is novel and not simply a revival of ancient sources of Socratic thought the true bearing of Strauss is Socrates 'm is obscured by some common misconceptions as well as by some subtler ones commonly a political project is described as browse along the lines of the revival of natural law or natural right with a central concern for the defense of Western liberal democracy one leaves out a view here implausible accounts of Strauss is having nefarious political intentions but Strauss in a public lecture once declared that through Heidegger I quote all rational liberal philosophic positions have lost their significance and power when they deplore this but I for one cannot bring myself to cling to philosophic positions which have been shown to be inadequate Strauss does not intend to reverse the contemporary crisis of liberalism through a philosophic defense of the liberal foundations even as he argues that liberalism has undeniable strengths compared to the contemporary political alternatives most students of Strauss grasp that at the highest level political philosophy for Strauss is not a practical Enterprise of founding regimes or even of putting forward principles that enable such founding although it can and should have beneficial consequences for political life rather it is an inquiry into political matters that leads to the philosophical and specifically to a way of philosophizing in which the political matters reveal something fundamental about the nature of the whole political philosophy is the political introduction to philosophy Straus renews the Socratic thought that philosophy is first possible through reflection on the problems of political life a less common error is to claim as one prominent writer on Straus has done that Strauss turned away from the question of being to the primacy of the political and that Strauss held it was I'm quoting this source Heidegger's concerned for being rather than beings that led to his indifference to tyranny however Strauss makes clear that Socrates M as he understands it is centrally concerned with questions about being in the whole I'll quote him now three different places contrary to appearances Socrates turned to the study of the human things was based not upon disregard of the divine or natural things but upon a new approach to the understanding of all things in its original form political philosophy broadly understood is the core of philosophy or rather the first philosophy and third quote we have learned from Socrates that the political things or the human things are the key to the understanding of all things at the same time Strauss characterizes the questioning about all things or the whole as a pyretic he writes that the foundation of classical political philosophy is I quote the understanding of the human situation which includes the quest for cosmology rather than a solution to the cosmological problem another quotation socrates was so far from being committed to a specific cosmology that his knowledge was knowledge of ignorance socrates then viewed man in the light of the mysterious character of the whole a one could say that through interpreting socrates and many other figures in the tradition Strauss sought to show that the metaphysical questions come to light in an operatic formulation only through the ascent from the political I quote him to articulate the situation of man means to articulate man's openness to the whole that ascent begins with the experience of political life as seen from the perspective of statesman and citizens in order to recover the surface of the political phenomena that had been overlaid by the philosophic and scientific traditions this recalls for Searle suspension of theoretical constructions and his dismantling of sedimentation of original insights in order to show the genesis of science out of the pre scientific understanding classical political philosophy is founded by Socrates did not have to undertake the dismantling of a prior tradition and could investigate the pre philosophic understanding without the aid of historical studies Strauss underlines that our need for historical studies for uncovering what the classical philosophers could grasp directly from the political phenomena is a disadvantage we suffer and not a mark of superiority but it must be noted about Strauss's phenomenology if one can speak this way that it recovers the surface of political life as the home of problems not of absolute principles or solutions and Socratic it is dialectical exposing the fissures and perplexities of the pre philosophic understanding Strauss place the problems intentions inherent and political life under the heading of the theological political problem it is a mistake to identify this solely with the dispute between philosophic reason and piety or revelation political life is itself characterized by unending debate concerning notions of justice the law and the good Strauss says the meaning of the common good is essentially controversial the enduring tensions of political life include the tension between divinely sanctioned law and the statesman's need for autonomous flexibility they also are revealed in poetic accounts of the tension between law or justice and eros are the good strauss rights the ambiguity of the political goal is due to its comprehensive character reflection on the ultimate goals the political art gives rise to controversies that do not occur about the ultimate goals of other arts the political political life as a kind of whole discloses the structure of the cosmos of problems considered by philosophy crucial to that structure for Strauss is a certain duality in the meaning of the gods as the ground of the authority of the law and is pointing beyond the law the common notion that the just human being needs a higher reward for sacrifices made for the law sake discloses that duality Strauss sums up the problem by noting the city is both closed to the whole and open to the whole the paradoxical character of political life wherein political things and quitting are the link between what is highest and what is lowest entails of political things and their corollaries are he says the form in which the highest principles first comes in sight it is this paradoxical character of political things that discloses they are eight acquitting a class by themselves that there is no essential difference that excuse me that there is an essential difference between political things and things which are not political thus Socrates turned to investigating the political things was the same as his turn to a day where the forms of things as revealed in speeches his account of noetic heterogeneity was above all focused on the peculiar difference of the human as political animal but the examination of this peculiar class of things shows that I'm quoting the ultimate aim of political life cannot be realized by Pope by political life but only by a life devoted to contemplation or philosophy yet the philosophy is essentially a quest because it is not ever able ever to become wisdom the superiority of the philosophic life rests on a claim to be wisdom not on that but on its awareness of the fundamental problems Strauss says Socrates viewed man in the light of the unchangeable ideas that is the fundamental and permanent problems the philosophers mark of distinction is knowledge of ignorance or knowledge of the fundamental problems in this light one must view Strauss's inquiry about natural right he writes that natural right is an inevitable problem when to which political life in all its forms necessarily points his lectures on natural right in history are an inquiry that seeks he says to restore knowledge of the problem of natural right I know that I am only lightly touching upon an immensely important issue Strauss's account of classical philosophy has centrally engaged with the fundamental paradox of political life enables philosophy to justify itself as a way of life against its accusers and detractors the ground of the philosophic life is the enduring evidence of permanent problems which which evidence the philosopher can no more dismiss than he can reject his concern with truth and is not in my understanding of Strauss the refutation of the possibility of a mysterious infinite God Strauss writes the very uncertainty of all solutions the very ignorant regarding the most important things makes quest for knowledge the most important thing and therefore makes a life devoted to it the right way of life philosophy cannot possibly lead up to the insight that another way of life apart from the philosophic one is the right one now let us turn to the question of Heidegger's relation to this account of political philosophy and revisit Strauss's statement that certainly no one questioned the premise of philosophy as radically as Heidegger heidegger's questioning of the premise is not the same as rejecting it from a non philosophic standpoint as I have noted Strauss identifies the fundamental premise of all rationalism as the axiom that nothing comes into being out of nothing or through nothing and accordingly the fundamental principle of philosophy is then the principle of causality or intelligible necessity in heidegger's view Greek philosophy never adequately examined this principle committing a certain circle of thinking and supposing that the fundamental disclose of disobeying or the whole which makes possible access to beings and principles could be grounded in the highest beings or principles Strauss and correspondence would call live it proposes that the causal problem exposed by Heidegger is the same as the unsolved human problem granting to the Scottish thinker a depth that Heidegger certainly never accorded to any soul from the British Isles Strauss also claims in a public lecture that in all important respects Heidegger does not make things obscure than they are and that Heidegger is sensible his word in arguing that man participates in the inexplicable 'ti of zine being however strauss also makes clear that he does not follow Heidegger in his response to this insight and suggest that Sucre philosophy perhaps especially in the design of phonic form contains a response or at least the basis for a response superior to Heidegger's in a very compressed fashion he he Strauss opposes the socratic he opposes the Socratic response to the responses of content Heidegger who are akin in treating some version of freedom a practical reason is the source of grounding for human thought Strauss his position rests on a vastly different view than theirs of Socrates thus he departs from Socrates anisha's account of Socrates and the birth of tragedy as the optimistic rationalist whose supposed that quoting Nietzsche or rather quoting Strauss Anita thinking can not only fully understand being but can even correct it life can be guided by science the same issues arise if in a more understated way in the book natural right in history where Heidegger is not named but his thought is discussed under the rubric radical historicism strauss writes there that in historicist thought there is an absolute moment in which the insoluble character of the fundamental riddles has become fully manifest it seems at first as those Strauss thinks that this claim of insolubility must be refuted by showing I quote the possibility of theoretical metaphysics end of philosophic ethics our natural right on whose denial of historicism stands or falls but instead Strauss proceeds to say in the next paragraph I quote one might realize the insoluble character of the fundamental riddles and still continue to see in the understanding of these riddles the task of philosophy one would thus merely replace a non historicist and dogmatic philosophy with a non historicist and skeptical philosophy end of quote historicism goes beyond skepticism in claiming that the effort of philosophy to replace opinions about the whole with knowledge about the whole rests on premises that are merely historical relative the non-historical in non-relative knowledge put forth by Strauss is not a knowledge of absolute standards of right such as many readers hope to find in his book but something more fundamental he quote I quote in grasping these fundamental problems as problems the human mind liberates itself from its historical limitations no more is needed to legitimize philosophy in its original Socratic sense philosophy is knowledge that one does not know that is to say it is knowledge of what one does not know or awareness of the fundamental problems and therewith of the fundamental alternatives regarding their solution that are coeval with human thought in spite of the in spite of the his insight into the insolubility of fundamental riddles Heidegger remains a dogmatist of sort in his reading of history as culminating in an absolute moment of definitive insight in this regard he completes the eschatological tradition of German philosophy whose historicism must be distinguished from conventional cultural relativism the German tradition of Hegel Marx and Nietzsche arose out of the modern conception of philosophy as assuming the largest responsibilities for human welfare the relief of man's estate in which philosophy is synthesized in a new way with religion Strauss claims that Heidegger's thought seeks to prepare the arrival of a new world religion that unites the deepest elements of East and West and Strauss reads both Nietzsche and Heidegger is holding that the Philosopher's of the future is distinct from the classical philosopher we'll be concerned with the holy whereas Strauss acknowledges that Heidegger has a deep sense of the requirements of his project it is in Strauss's vo a task for which philosophy is not suited philosophy cannot make itself wholly at home in the political world dwelling in harmony with God's traditions and folk ways of people's yet the heart of Heidegger inquiry is along increate a human dwelling in which the highest thinking is at home precisely in this way so Strauss regard Weald leaves philosophy cannot render the realm of history whole and meaningful Strauss notes that for the classical authors history is a sequence of their afters of contingencies Heidegger's misjudging of the significance and potential of National Socialism was directly related to his hope of redeeming Europe and in the West through his philosophy Strauss false Heidegger not for his insight into fundamental aporia but for his stance toward that a pariah in which he failed to see its moral and political implications instead of harboring skepticism about the possibilities of action Heidegger saw it is super ethic ethical confirmation of action from being as historical in knowledge of the permanent limitations of politics and philosophy Straus eases the Strauss sees the source of a trans historical reflection on human duality philosophy has access to a thinking that unlike Heidegger's reflection on being is not an erogenous a gift of being this is not to say that Strauss has no concern with history he writes the distinction between philosophic and historical cannot be avoided but distinction is not total separation Strauss is Socrates 'm exists in a new kind of cave when based on historical thinking in which all traditions are eroding Strauss like philosophers before him must devise rhetorical strategies appropriate for leading the potential philosophers from their particular cave the highest subject of philosophy is the philosophical life itself which is always a particular effort in particular circumstances to attain an end that is radically universal to be at home not in the city but in the whole but philosophy itself as awareness of the fundamental human problem is not a destiny or a fate sent by history for Strauss philosophers have a permanent natural fate as X Isles operating in the midst of the political realm that provides them with their questions and problems a faith that can be experienced only by individuals and not by epics or cultures first I'll note that there is a significant difference between Heidegger and Strauss in this regard and I mean I think one could say that in the early 1930s Strauss was highly critical of you know the Western democracies and as well as of the Vermont Republic and of the tradition of Enlightenment liberalism in Germany the in other words the tradition of enlightened liberalism generally and I don't want to venture biographical hypotheses but the fact is that he fled Germany he took up residence first in France and didn't Britain and appreciated greatly the political tradition of Britain and the tradition of freedom the tradition of gentleman ship the a persistence of you know high regard for the classics and and the influence of that training in the classics upon leading figures in English society and as influencing concretely you know the actions of Britain with respect to Nazi Germany right I mean he has a glowing praise and letters about a certain well you know new insight he has about you know the the excellence of things English even going so far as to praise English food which may be it well that's perhaps a bit but but that's certainly a sign of a sign of an appreciation of a tradition of politics that was still influenced by classical sources and I believe it's correct that he extended that appreciation to the United States and you know and and did speak Harley you know of the American Founding Fathers and for similar reasons so I one cannot identify the the extreme anti modernism of strepa Heidegger and Heidegger's view that both the the Western democracies and Soviet Communism are the great opponents that must be you know faced by you know the rising up of German depth right so let's draw certainly departed from that view and so I mean a more nuanced and complicated presentation would then but and I do this to certain extent in the book which shows that that Strauss in certain respects had a high regard for aspects of the modern tradition and yes and me Strauss did have considerable regard for Whitehead and Baird son as well as so saralyn high together means only briefly mentioned I'm not aware of any actual discussions perhaps others know where he may have committed more on we gasp all right and and please go back to which definitely what you want me to define yeah now I have to go back to the point and I may have seemed as I was abandoning it that Strauss does regard the situation of philosophy in the 20th century as one that is critical I mean although he may have regard for some other contemporary thinkers he did not think that you know at the deepest level the question of the possibility of philosophy was addressed by you know Whitehead or other figures you mentioned and and so that there is a you know a genuine crisis that he thinks in as you know with important qualifications has been exposed by Heidegger now the qualifications are very significant before in the end strauss has you know a different understanding of what the fundamental problem is addressed by philosophy it has for him a transhistorical character or a natural character that is not present in high Daguerre's account all right but all the same strauss regards this recovery of implement you know an authentic original understanding of nature in Greek philosophy as requiring us to go beyond the tradition of modern philosophy it's simply not carried forward in his view by any of the modern figures it's it's it's stronger than that I mean he finds them even within the modern thinkers of natural right hobbes through Montesquieu of more questionably or so there is a persistence of an understanding of a you know fundamental problem I'm calling it the duality of the human that you know the human is a being that has necessarily a necessary political character or orientation at the same time also necessarily you know of course with very great differences in awareness of this and transcending of that right in other words the natural situation of the human is still reflected in modern philosophy up to a point but without an adequate philosophical account of it without an adequate understanding of what this the issue in how it arises originally okay so there is continuity all right in his view and you know the the liberal tradition is insufficient and it has shaky as it's certainly a shaky questionable character but it retains a certain link with classical thought which you know prevented it from moving into radical historicist thinking at least it did at that time well a more limited one than Heidegger gives the philosophy clearly and Heidegger is proposing clearly some drastic appearance of a new beginning a new age that will be issued in or at least prepared by philosophic reflection right you know an epoch of new thinking and Strauss doesn't attempt something as ambitious as that as I understand him rather he's you know attempting to make accessible to those who you know are able and willing to pursue the matter to recover philosophy in modern circumstances now he believes that it may have some you know beneficial you know consequences for an a limited basis for those who you know learn from him the importance of well the importance of this problem of nature and the character of the political I mean in other words he's he's not altogether closing off some helpful practical effects it's a precarious matter because the dualities he is exposing or the problem of nature he's exposing is revealing the the inherent incompleteness of politics and the tension between you know the human need for something transcending political life and the human attachment to the cave or the laws of the city but so there's a certain precarious character to the well let's call it the pedagogical and effort of Strauss but most fundamentally it is meant to awaken an understanding a philosophy which he thinks is you know genuinely going to occur only among a relatively small number of human beings yes yeah I think implicit in your question is the the difference are far more evident differences I mean the Strauss is I mean Heidegger at least in being in time gives an account of the human as above all oriented toward the you know the the fact of death this shapes the entirety of designs being in the world it overshadows human being together in a political or social way and human and human being together is viewed in the light of well to simplify a flight from death right and which by the way is of course only a very provisional way of putting stroke the Haida guests thought because those terms of the account of being changed as a thought develops but nevertheless the the the beginning point for Heidegger is it's not as it is for Strauss a reflection of law on the core of human political life the the natural human reverence or respect for something that limits human freedom right I mean that all human beings have a certain inkling a certain intimation that human freedom cannot be that human freedom is a problem and cannot be unlimited right that's kind of natural awareness that Strauss says can be characterized in human and in heidegger's case the only thing parallel to that would be mortality or a sense of human finitude in the face of death now again drastically simplifying but the way to put a certain kinship is this that for both of the thinkers in order to understand how there is a question about the whole or how there's a question about being one has to go back to a human starting point that I mean heidegger's calling it human being in the world that the questioning was in the engagement with the world of you might say the limited horizon Strauss would characterize it as political of man as a finite being is the fundamental root or source of awareness of the existence of a problem of the whole that the me to articulate you know what being is what the problem of it is and hiding here on Christmas droughts proceeded in quite different ways with the actual articulation you know requires that in the first place we met you might say methodologically set aside you know claims that nature being is in some sense immediately available to the human or known right we're in our min and in fact in a radical way to oppose a kind of suspending of the entire tradition on this matter and now in order to go back to the very sources of the questions which have been they claim you know ignored or overlaid by a tradition following four traditions plural I may not be coming up with the best weird language right now but I am I mean this is an extremely large problem which I can only indicate now with a few formula I think what he can say that I mean I mean he picked up you know this the concern of destruction or another term Heidegger used for joined us when referring to the neglect of you know the ontological question and Strauss presley says in when writing io the use of the term neglect he resigned us to high Daguerre's account in being in time I mean that's only of course a pointer to a very large set of concerns but I would say yes that you then was directed back towards thinking about that issue just what is the thinker what is the starting point of the thinker and then big well then however in a fashion which brought him into conflict with Heidegger's thinking on the same subject now something like that seems to be the case if I understand Strauss I mean although I don't want to overstate it but that you know the questions about being nature in the hole arise in an act whereby the human is attempting to move beyond the cave beyond the political and in the rock they arise through that right there is not a movement you know immediately or fully outside of the cave where one B holds what is right so it is this so to speak transcending of the political that's crucial its which may be it may have a kind of parallel in Heidegger now I mean Strauss is rather you know direct and saying that he regards the knowledge of the first causes the ultimate grounds is inaccessible mysterious uses the language of the mysterious hole frequently and and I I think that he's quite open to the possibility of you know a revealed God although I think he also thinks philosophy is possible on in on another basis I mean it is not dissing it's not the argument from revelation but you know I disagree with certain readings of Strauss's claiming that his heart of his thought is some claim to refute you know the possibility of a mysterious God that possibility I think in fact is fundamental to his conception of the dialectical character of human thought you know it I mean it it's at the heart of the the fundamental problem fundamental problems or the a Perea concerning being I think that would be fair to say I take though a Strauss to mean that that philosophy can justify itself only in terms of reason right that you know it's examination of its own possibility and its own necessity you know it's true justification it can be carried forward only by reason at the same time one has to say that reason may be fundamentally limited in its grasp of the whole of things but there is no other way for philosophy to justify itself and that it does have a justification that is coherent alright yeah I don't see that though is resting upon something you know refutation 'el or eristic you know I I mean it's understanding of Socrates is that Socrates is not an aristocrat incur who makes the fundamental premise of his thought some refutation or defeat of a and uh you know any position I mean of course he has dialectical arguments and so forth but which involves a disclosure of failures of arguments but that the the the Socratic philosophizing doesn't rest upon the establishment of some fundamental certainty you know you know it through a reputational move yes no I mean that is that is a rather common interpretation that and Strauss uses a language once or twice that rather suggests this I think he's he's writing at a dialectical way to put forward a position which you then consider and and have to move beyond I mean I don't believe it is his view in the end that he regards the choice of philosophy as an act simply of blind blindly for you know a mere commitment you know of an existential sort right rather than you know through you know rational reflection we become aware of problems that won't go away I mean you know that are inherent we can see as inherent in the the structure of human thinking and living and that awareness is of course rational and then provides the basis on which we say that philosophizing is both possible and necessary no yes I guess the only thing I was hesitating about is the way you put you know just being content with a position of not knowing because because there's something positive namely a knowledge right I mean of you know impressing and important problems essential to being human that persist that reason grasps and therefore that reason can't ignore now he he makes a concession at one point maybe it shouldn't be called a concession and stating that just a knowledge meant that what we grasped in our Western tradition concerning thinking and knowledge may be inherently limited and he said perhaps we do have something to learn from the Eastern traditions however it's not a path that Strauss took and in fact he didn't think it was reasonable to do so unless of course one had some capacity to investigate another but the such traditions but yeah the point is though not that that Strauss then is some historical relativist but rather that rational insight is genuine concerning you know certain problems inherent in human relationship to being all right at the same time we just acknowledge that we don't have a comprehensive understanding and of the whole or yeah I must admit it sounds fundamental mystery regarding it uh yes I think there's a lot here that's correct I mean the the truth is that that Strauss was quite interested in the later Heidegger and and after the Second World War when the the works of the later Heidegger was starting to appear he acquired them and apparently read all of them and but and I would say he he didn't claim that Heidegger thought including how the later thought was based on the view that philosophy makes the world or makes an epoch it's it's the the the the critical angle on Heidegger is rather that Heidegger is not focusing at least adequately on the tension between philosophy and the requirements of political life that you know so that Heidegger is conceiving of philosophy as not creating but as being open to or articulating a experience of the world that is at the same time you know the world as apparent in you know the well it's put in Strauss's terms the the founding elements of the city that he's not it doesn't articulate at though he is aware of some important tension between philosophy and politics he obscures that that tension now I think though Strauss actually has quite a bit of respect for an aspect of the later Heidegger that you're you're pointing to although there's still a disagreement and that is the reflection and the later Heidegger odd the need for something binding you know I mean it could be relating to your point about something akin to the tradition of natural law the hard to guess reflection that the modern emphasis on values on subjectivity is you know into an impasse and when he has to do a kind of reflection on what truly binds the human in some fashion which he then you know in in his version he articulates in certain conceptions of the appearance of the holy and so forth and Strauss finds it extremely interesting and and up to a certain point I think sympathetic because a you could say Strauss's well what Heidegger is in effect arguing and strauss puts it this way is that without something like a grounding in what is binding or you know rootedness there's no human greatness and then there can't also be any transcending of these these starting points and they're in the binding or the rootedness in philosophic reflection so he has some agreement with Heidegger in the view that the current condition of you know the West is leading toward a situation where human greatness and and thus philosophy itself is in danger imperiled and has some sympathy with Heidegger's view about I don't you have some reflection that can take one beyond that again the critique of it could be think of modern conceptions and in search for something one can call binding but he also disagrees with the way in which Heidegger conceives this this matter and I mean again one can say it's and a way in Heidegger that does is not a truly political understanding and not sufficiently attentive to the problem of the relationship of philosophy to politics so I think it is more complex than perhaps I made the matter seen and I think one can do some justice to the points you're making all right well that's a large undertaking but certainly from Heidegger point of view what Strauss does would appear to be you know too limited and perhaps having a rather just a rather tactical I mean in other words Strauss is claiming that we need in order to recover the beginnings of philosophy to return to certain ancient texts and interpret them in a new fashion and thus the possibility of a new beginning is limited to you know what emerges from certain textual interpretations and we'll you know issue in you know a certain philosophic understanding or certain philosophic freedom on the part of people who get some enlightenment from this but Heidegger's of course is full of the sense of a world crisis you know the planetary destiny you know of nihilism not that hard Strauss it is an unaware of that but Heidegger is saying philosophy must make a beginning that can move us beyond this starting now you know in terms of rethinking of the world a rethinking of human openness beginning a kind of thinking that hasn't previously I've been undertaken you know Heidegger's project I'm now is just speaking superficially about you know how it might appear to Heidegger would perhaps appear limited and academic and and not sufficiently engaged both with a full articulation of the philosophical problem of being or the very the very first question of concerned Heidegger and not and proposing an a true a line of thinking that moves us beyond the impasse of what the Western world in other words Strauss is offering kind of promissory note yes we all find no new beginnings if we read these books carefully I mean no Heidegger would be saying well where is the analysis of being here where is I mean of course I've been given quite a bit of language the effect that that Strauss is concerned with that but Strauss is always concerned you might say with a kind of ambitious I mean less ambitious at least in some sense less ambitious preparation or beginning by turning to these texts right and with the thought that you know something here can take us out of the now the world the night of the world but only you know as as the effect of the understanding by perhaps a relatively small number of human beings who are inspired by these tags I mean you see there's a fundamental difference here in the conception of how philosophy should approach life in the world and no heidegger's has clearly related and it's important ways to that of Hegel in Nietzsche you know even if it isn't you know the same conceptions of of how philosophy is related to practical life or reality but it's nevertheless the case that Heidegger is saying that you know an analysis of being and a closure of disclosure of being and so forth is to be the very focus of half-hour of the a universal transformation of the human situation which Strauss would not not think of proposing through philosophy right I don't think he would I don't of course he it's a very sly person who could have you know a sense of him much larger effect that is turned to the quarrel of the Ancients and moderns involves but you know at least on the surface Strauss just appears to be engaging in something more preliminary now I am arguing it is on the basis of a reflection that relates to many of the issues that Heidegger races well well it's a good question but I I would ask in return isn't there a distinction between how philosophy approaches death and how non philosophy approaches death and has and perhaps in Heidegger Soundview he didn't adequately make that clear in being a time but to live toward death or to affirm mortality one could well ask is that inherently philosophical now on the other side I would say I don't think it's fair to characterize Strauss is just you know distancing himself from these no primary human experiences but rather saying that philosophy finds a philosophy finds a distinctive way to think about them and yes oh I said I have two responses and I gave you one oh I think that's what you're saying right all right I have to think try to think of another now but know that now I have response there to what you just said which is what won't one find that serious philosophic engagement with death in Plato's Phaedo or in Socrates account of the last days of Socrates well yes I well I I find something wrong in your characterization of the of the alternative to taking you know the the problem of living seriously and I would say Socrates clearly shows this in an exemplary way and and that his thinking doesn't consist only in now turning to the next life or thinking that that is the only answer to this question yeah perhaps this is a there's something of a false dichotomy and the the the question I mean in Strauss's account of Socrates the question - the good life the best life is the very heart of things all right and that involves thinking about you know the role of politics and law in human life so it wouldn't be conceivable to think of the philosopher is merely disengaged and Socratic Li well I think it's more complex than that I mean in fact he has certain engagements he was a soldier and took part some part in political life and suffered as a consequence and but then of course he also distinguished the the activity of philosophizing from you know acting politically about it would be wrong to characterize him as having no connection with the city and its concerns

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Published: Mon Oct 15 2012