Philosophy15 Episode 53: The Problem of the Criterion

welcome to philosophy 15 I'm Robert Elise I'm Scott Aiken these are 15-minute conversations unscripted between two philosophers about whatever's on our mind actually on today God has been thinking very hard for a very long time about what in epistemology is called the problem of the criterion the problem of the criterion so probably criterion can be stated roughly as follows how do we sort true propositions or true impressions from false impressions without already presuming that we've done that so one answer to the question how can we sort them is that we've got a criterion we've got that they pass a sniff test or they they look right to us and then the thought is okay well whatever that property is of the those impressions or those propositions or so on there's a property that tells us that that's a truth and indicating property how how do we know that that's a pretty true thing to indicating property and the thought is well that we know that there are truths that that property indicates but we would have done as a consequence had to have already had the truths in hand in order to tell that that was a truth indicating property so we've got how do I sort truths from falses I've got a good criterion how do you know it's a good criterion because it sorts truths from falsus right and so we're kind of caught on what sex does America's and the ancients called the DLA lohse the wheel that you're kind of caught in this little circle a little loop of questions and maybe one way to even kind of it kind of put it is to kind of make it analogous to a number of these sort of chicken-and-egg kinds of problems it looks like you need one to have the other and you need the other to have the one there's a kind of a puzzle of what's sometimes called epistemic priority I need to have the truth to know that I've got a good criterion I've got to have a good criterion to know that these are truths so that's the problem the criterion in a nutshell it's pretty easy it's again one of these sort of nice philosophical problems it's kind of easy to kind of get get your head around but the easiness to get your head around of the problem it belies the difficulty of solving the problem understanding it is one challenge fixing it is another one and and so the problem the criterion has been one of these long-standing problems in epistemology that make it very difficult to be able to explain what knowledge is so when one thought is that well that it works with any kind of concept right when thought would just be like well it looks like that's with truth but it works with knowledge maybe it even works with other kinds of concepts I mean it's maybe one way to even think of how the paradox of analysis works which is I've got a definition of justice for example I've got instances of justice but how do I know that these instances are good well because I've got a good concept well how do you need a good concept because that sorts the right instances so the problem the criterion is a sort of an initial instance of a number of sort of many central puzzles as to how to figure out what many of our sort of central and second kinds of concepts are really important concept and it looks like it's one that sort of once you see the structure of the problem it looks like it kind of bleeds out onto a lot of other things so it's not just an epistemology problem it's not just a sort of a problem that's sort of relegated to the old skeptical challenges it's one that sort of is at the kind of the heart of the enterprise of philosophy at least by my estimate epistemological problems are kind of problems that are part of our math our philosophical methods parts of how we think that we know or that we are at the very least in a good position to be able to stand our philosophical positions rights but it is it does enter the vernacular of philosophy as a skeptical challenge in epistemology it is primarily a skeptical trope and most of the ways that folks respond to it is that there's a kind of Michael mitigating or human humidify humility of fiying humidify right humbling theory thank you humbling a kind of consequence that's supposed to be on the other side of it that it looks like the that you you dial down the confidence that you've got and your answers in light of the how you've how you answered that question and you know I mean once you've kind of got that puzzle the way that the problem the criterion works in mind or the and then it's sort of various cousins in philosophical method with the paradox of analysis there's a kind of a nice way of than being able to see how certain kinds of philosophical methods work right so empiricism for example it's a sort of a nice really great observation by Roderick Chisholm that empiricism is a kind of answer to the problem of the criterion that you just say look we're going to start with a criterion sensation sensation is going to be a source of truth sensation is going to be a source of things that you're that you that you start with and that then you run everything in terms of I've got a criteria and everything that is I'm that's going to be acceptable has to live up to this criterion there are other philosophical methods that start with the other ones like there's just gonna be a set of truths or a set of things that are a set of instances and all we've got our instances and we build our we build our concepts out of these sort of higgledy-piggledy instances so common sense theories of knowledge common sense theories of any of these sorts of cases nominal isms for example all start as effectively particular particularist features of the world it's like look we've just got what do these things got in common the fact that they've got a name so you just start out with instances and notice by the way how nominalism not only starts out with instances but then in some ways is a way of even asking whether or not we even get things wrong right I mean the crucial thing with a problem a criterion is that we get things wrong right it's possible that we could have a false impression or a false name in right one thing about certain kinds of strategies is to just say there's no such thing as a false naming right the things are what we call them right so that's one kind of strategy with the problem the criterion is to just deny one of the background assumptions which is know sometimes you know there are no definitions are up to us and so whenever we say something is you know whenever we say that something is justice and we agree about that then that's it right then we're not we're not wrong about that so the sorting the sorting is something that we do does the problem of the criterion though differ in its implications or what makes it problematic does it does it differ depending on what the criterion that is problematic as a criterion of so I can see that it's a skeptical challenge when you're looking for a criterion of justified belief true belief truth you know entitlement whatever epistemic concept I can see how you get a skeptical result in those cases but I'm just wondering if in these other kinds of non epistemic non epistemology let's see if the problem of what we're calling these are sort of other phases of the problem of the criteria and Arendt's you know don't don't don't amount to sort of a skeptical challenge right yeah right so one might so in moral and political philosophy just imagine somebody endorsing a kind of reflective equilibrium sort of styling right yeah okay so all right we've got certain kinds of cases of real injustice if you don't think that you know slavery torture go down the list of all of the right the easy cases if you don't think these are obvious and easy cases of injustice there's a whole other discussion that has to be had that's not maybe not even a moral discussion that's a you know maybe we need to you're not one of us speaking our language and it could be all kinds of thing that you're that that you know I could just tell you what these words mean or or what torture is and if you don't see it you don't see it then we have to have a different kind of conversation so somebody could say well you know so we've got these obvious cases that the acceptance of which as obvious is your sort of entry pass into the moral discussion in the first place so if you're part of the moral discussion we've got these cases then like well how do we know that those are hard cases well we need the theory to answer the question of how we know we don't need the theory to know though we need the theory to know to to explain listen yeah make it explicit yeah so I'm wondering if so there's there's a version of what looks like a problem of the criterion there which is okay you got there obvious cases you've got a theoretical apparatus now that helps you identify those obvious cases as obvious cases of justice or injustice and with that theoretical apparatus you're then able to go and identify other things like you know taxation as unjust or no probably and now you can then go and learn new things about what's just and unjust with the apparatus I just went so it does have a chicken-egg sort of bootstrap II feel to it reflective equilibrium does but just wondering it doesn't look like you've got the same skeptical upshot right if the criterion that is referenced in the name problem of the criterion is in itself a core epistemic cons yeah and this is and one of the nice things about reflective equilibrium kind of challenges or strategies with the problem criterion is that they do a good job of explaining and sort of keeping track of why these concepts or normative right because if someone said something like well look I just don't see instances of slavery as unjust right you're like now it looks like we've just sort of emptied the concept of whatever normative concepts were like like it looks like the whole reason why we cared about that was to be able to handle the easy cases and then be able to write and if you're if you're gonna deny the easy cases then we're then we're kind of off the map as to the normativity of the concept right and so the really nice thing about about these reflective equilibrium strategies is that they're supposed to sort of you take a bunch of easy cases and say like look you know if I can if we can trace out how this how a theory how your theory makes it so that you can't handle easy cases or maybe even deny them that looks like it's a reductio of your of your view so there's a kind of a baseline and the nice thing again about the about these strategies is that they help capture the normativity of the concept is it but but now the question here is but is that ass kept is that an anteye skeptical strategy or is it like a mitigated skeptical strategy and one answer is well one cancer could be well look D do we have something if if we had somebody who said I don't see torture as unjust or I don't see slavery as unjust right and the that is within our conceptual frame like we we've seen a politic whenever Aristotle gives the apology for slavery it's not we're like he's just talking Don says I just don't understand what he's saying would presumably we would have to be able to say things back to him it's just that it looks like we've moved to a place where these are easy cases and that's a kind of an intellectual achievement on our on our part I mean at the very least you like to pat ourselves on the back for it is thinking of such but presumably in those cases we still have arguments right it's just that we just we don't have we don't just keep going right so whenever John Rawls says like if nothing's wrong if slavery is not wrong nothing's wrong or something along those lines I'm like well that's that's kind of where we're at right that's the kind of the political not metaphysical sort of strategy but it looks to me that like if it's gonna have the real anti skeptical answer then we can't just be like stomping our feet whenever Aristotle says gives us the defense of slavery that we just say no it's just now is just wrong we don't have anything say back to him so it's a kind of a Mott like is it anti skepticism or is it like a kind of a modest I kind of a modest like well you know I don't have anything to say to that like you're just not one of us I mean what's what like what exactly is the force of it right I mean there's the hey you're not just you're just not one of us isn't doing justifying work that's just like hey that's just how we talk over here right and so the the you we hanker for something more than that sort of R or D response yeah you know you're not from around but what yeah what is the upshot I mean so you know there is I think unavoidably in the kind of case that you're asking some philosophical maneuver that's required that looks like it's therapy right now whether that's whether you can take that first you dip your toe into that pool and then pull it back out and say it's not all for zippy that's that yeah right right and it's like and it's maybe even this sort of contextual point where it's like look we're not we're talking about this Prez okay so over here do we have to talk about like whether or not slavery it's like we're talking about whether or not you know a certain kind of taxation is is is unjust we have to talk about slavery too all right right so there might be a kind of a pragmatic element to that where it's like calm down over there falada like philosophy 101 boy or something and maybe there's a that all reflective equilibrium strategies actually rest on the presumption the practical presumption is that there is maybe for wordy style reasons maybe for other kinds of maybe it's to be explained in other kinds of ways there will be among anybody who sees the question you know what's justice or what's truth or anybody who can formulate these problems of the criteria right yeah there will be as a necessary precondition for either formulating the problem some common ground of what are sometimes called insufficiently theorized agreements that's right yeah that's and that's the basis from which the argument can begin and that's kind of how is that like kind of one of these from background requirements for philosophy that like we seem to need to share enough of a culture for us to be able to recognize each other's arguments how do you stop this crazy thing okay this is philosophy 15 folks I'll figure out how to turn the alarm clock off in a second we'll see you next time

Channel: Philosophy15

Views: 581

Rating: 5 out of 5

Keywords: Skepticism, Problem of the Criterion, Reflective Equilibrium, Metaphilosophy

Id: ovOS5s_isSQ

Length: 15min 13sec (913 seconds)

Published: Thu Jul 25 2019