Phil Lind Initiative: Francis Fukuyama on The Unravelling of the Liberal Order

good evening and welcome to the Phil Lindh initiative series the unraveling of the liberal order I would ask you to please turn off or silence your cellphone's at this time and also remind you that recording devices are prohibited my name is Katherine Harrison I'm the senior associate dean faculty and equity in the Faculty of Arts here at UBC and I am delighted to see such a big crowd here in this wonderful old auditorium tonight before we begin we are pleased to respect the traditions of the coast salish First Nations and in particular I wish to acknowledge that we are meeting tonight on the traditional ancestral and unseeded lands of the Musqueam people who have called this area home for many thousands of years and continued to do so today I'd like to welcome Phil Lynn one of Canada's most respected media industry leaders whose strategic advice and generous support have been vital to many UBC endeavors in recognition that there were too few academic opportunities in Canada to learn about the politics of a country with which we share a very long border and very close social and economic relationships Phil establish the Phil Lynn initiative the speaker series the series that brings us here this evening our moderator for this evening is award-winning journalist Donna Friesen who is the anchor and executive editor of global national the flagship national newscasts of global news during her more than 30 years as a journalist Donna has been everywhere from small-town Canada to the frontlines of history most recently she anchored global news coverage of America votes 2016 from Washington DC which was a very interesting night prior to joining global national Donna was a foreign senior foreign correspondent for NBC News based in London during her 11 years there she travelled extensively across Europe and the Middle East covering the wars in Afghanistan in Iraq spending months in Israel and Gaza during the conflict there following the disappearance and subsequent murder of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan and covering events in Russia including terrorist attacks in Moscow and bezel on her work appeared on NBC Nightly News Today and MSNBC and she won an Emmy Award for her election night coverage when Barack Obama was first elected to the presidency it is a great pleasure to welcome our special guest for tonight dr. Francis Fukuyama one of the world's most prominent scholars of the liberal order dr. Fukuyama is currently the Olivier nominee no Malini senior fellow at the Freeman spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and the Mosbacher director of the Institute Center on democracy development and the rule of law he received his BA in classics from Cornell University where he studied political philosophy and went on to complete his PhD at Harvard University in political science he was previously a member of the RAND Corporation a global policy think-tank and twice a member of the public policy planning staff with the u.s. Department of State from 1996 to 2000 he was Omer L and Nancy Hearst professor of public policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University dr. Fukuyama has written widely on questions concerning democratization and international political economy many of you will know his very popular 1992 book the end of history and the last man which in many ways began the conversation about the longevity of global liberalism his most recent book published in 2014 is titled political order and political decay from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy as you may have seen on your way in staff from the UBC bookstore are in the lobby selling copies of dr. fukuyama's books and they will be there after this evenings talk as well dr. Pookie Yama's visiting UBC as part of the Phil Lynde initiative as I mentioned it is a dialogue series created in 2015 from a major donor to UBC from Phil in and it is now hosted by the new UBC School of Public Policy and Global Affairs the series addresses the most urgent issues of our time and invites prominent American scholars writers and intellectuals to UBC to share their research and insights with students faculty alumni and the broader community the aim is to provoke a national conversation around issues that not only affect American society but also Canadian society and the world dr. Fukuyama and and the other speakers in the series will all be leading a lecture for a class with 30 students in the Lynn seminar which is being Co taught by Robert mugga the Lind visiting fellow Taylor Owen an assistant professor in the School of Public Policy and global affairs and also the UBC Graduate School of Journalism and Justin Alger our postdoctoral Teaching Fellow we look forward to dr. Fukuyama's talk and to his interview with donna freezin after which we will open it up to questions from the audience last point this evening is being webcast live and the link is being shared at the school of global at the School of Public Policy and global affairs twitter account if you wish to share it with family and friends as well please feel free to tweet your insights from the talk tonight using the hashtag Lynde 18 a video recording of this evening will also be made available on the Philly Phil Lindh initiative website of the School of Public Policy and global affairs so I am now pleased to pass the podium over to Donna freezer Friesen and ask you to join me in welcoming Donna freezin and this evening speaker dr. Francis Fukuyama [Applause] [Music] [Applause] thank you so much miss Harrison it's just an honor to be part of this enlightening lecture series it feels to me like it's a relief that 2017 is behind us because it was such a year of disruption and upheaval and yet as we look ahead to the next 11 months of 2018 there is still very much a sense that we're not on firm ground you know from Donald Trump and Kim jong-un trading insults and making claims about who has the biggest nuclear button on their desk to do brexit to trade deals that are collapsing to China's record-breaking growth to Russia moving to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East the future of the world as we know it feels very uncertain and once we used to value durability now it seems that we have to value flexibility and I'm I'm not sure that's necessarily a bad thing as a journalist and the executive editor of a nightly newscast I spend my whole day flitting from one news story to the next and right now the news cycle is so fast there's very little time to contemplate the sense of the moment that we are in or to dissect what's happened and and try to take it in and understand what it might mean for us as a society and where we're going as a society and I think if I feel that way on a daily basis imagine what our viewers are feeling and consumers of news these days I also think journalists and the Free Press are a pillar of democracy a vital part of a liberal democratic society and we are under attack like never before the attack of course led by the President of the United States and if I was to stand on a stage and say that two years ago people would think I was crazy without an informed citizenry which is what you know I like to think we try to do in the news business it's difficult of course for citizens to make informed choices at the ballot box so the timing is perfect for this series of talks it is a real luxury as I say for me to be here among smart people to listen to big thinkers that speakers in this series are amazing and I want to thank Phil Lind and everyone that's school of public policy and global affairs for organizing this I want to say as well we want to engage all of you not just have you listen passively but ask questions so after we hear a doctor Fukuyama's lecture I'll spend a few minutes asking him some questions some of my own self-interested questions about the media as well and then I want to give the floor over to you there will be some roving microphones in the audience so please formulate your questions get ready for some great dialogue and if we can keep the questions as short as possible that means we'll get as many in as we can so let's get to the main event please welcome dr. Francis Fukuyama [Applause] extremely kind introduction and I'm really delighted to be here in Canada you know it said that Canadians are just like Americans except much nicer and I think that that's actually in my personal experience true but given the political winds in the United States it also is a relief to land in a Canadian city where it seems to me the Society has remained much more normal than back in my own country so thank you for inviting me to UBC and for being able to participate in this series so my topic tonight is the rise of populist nationalism and the challenges that exist okay I better stay behind the microphone the topic is the rise of populist nationalism and the challenges to the global liberal international order now edie loose from the FT as I take it was here previously and spoke on this topic I'm not going to spend a lot of time defining terms but I should go over this briefly the liberal international order as we've come to understand it really has two components the first is economic it has to do with a structure of international economic relations that that encouraged the free flow of goods people services investment across international borders the political dimension are structures security structures like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the bilateral US Japan u.s. South Korea security agreements that have created the political foundation for the stability that allows the economic part of the order to flourish now if you take a an academic trade theory course you will learn that a system of free trade of this free movement of economic goods and services benefits everybody that participates in it this in fact was the reality in the past couple of generations between 1970 the global financial crisis in 2008 the output of the world economy increased by a factor of four so there is a tremendous amount of new wealth being created this was a period in which there are no wars among any of the great powers in the world and it was also a period of a massive expansion in the number of democracies in 1970 there were approximately 35 electoral democracies in the world by the mid-2000s that number had grown to about a hundred fifteen it depends on how you define a democracy but about 115 to 120 so two-thirds of the countries in the world were democratic and that was a remarkable achievement however in the past few years we have seen a reversal of many of these trends in terms of democracies my colleague at Stanford Larry diamond has written extensively about what he calls the Democratic recession the number of democracies plateaued in the mid 2000s and has gone down and a number of authoritarian countries Russia and China in project in particular have gotten very self confident and assertive pushing back against this order promoting their own form of government but in a way the more troubling development has been within the bosom of existing democracies themselves countries that we thought were reliably democratic have seen these populist up surges that have threatened some of the institutional foundations of democracy so you can name a number of countries where this has happened Hungary for example was one of the first countries to come out of communism everybody was proud of the fact that it joined the European Union and NATO one of the first formers communist countries to do so people thought it was a quote/unquote consolidated democracy and yet since 2010 under Viktor Orban the Prime Minister and his Fidesz party it has been busy dismantling democratic institutions there have been attacks on the media he was one of the first leaders to engage in that sort of thing cracking down on civil society reducing the ability of people to contest politics in a free and fair manner if you've been following politics in Poland over the past couple of years a similar pattern has emerged we all you know rejoiced when the wall came down lek fluency and solidarity shifted Poland out of communism and yet the law and justice party there has spent the past year trying to essentially undermine the independence of the Polish judiciary by putting its own party militants in place of all of the existing judges in that system turkey under president air Dewan has engaged in a similar exercise all of these have a common characteristic in which an elected politician uses his democratic legitimacy to undermine the other pillars of democracy democracy needs a state it needs a clean uncorrupt state and it needs a rule of law that restrains leaders and what's been happening is the Democratic part of the liberal democracy the third leg has been weakening the first two legs this is the phenomena populism that now has spread to the heartland of democracy itself you had the vote in Britain in 2016 to leave the European Union the brexit vote in which integration with Europe was was rejected by a very substantial number of British voters and then of course the really big earthquake the election of Donald Trump in that same year so it's one thing I mean democracy has always been challenged by authoritarian countries that was the situation throughout the Cold War and in a way the rise of China you know it's a long-term challenge but that's that's nothing new I think what is new is this this challenge to the foundations the institutional found of democracy from within the oldest and most established democracies through this wave of populism now I need to define populism because this is not something that even political scientists particularly agree on and I think that there are basically three characteristics that have been associated with regimes that are called populist alright so the first one has to do with economic policy that populist like to do things that are popular they like things like price subsidies subsidizing gasoline or providing free health care clinics or other kinds of you know access to consumer goods that are good for people that are popular and that's why they're populist but they're not sustainable the classic case of this was Venezuela under ego Chavez who did all of the things mentioned subsidized gasoline you know provided I clinics and a lot of other social services that Venezuelans desperately needed but it was all depend high oil prices the moment prices collapsed in 2014 so did that regime and the result is the Venezuela we see today which is a total collapsing nightmare all right so that's definition one the second definition is that when populist talk about the people they don't necessarily mean all the people in the society they usually have a certain subset of that population in mind that is usually based on a racial or ethnic or religious or some other kind of categories so to illustrate Viktor Orban the aforementioned Viktor Orban in Hungary gave a speech last year actually in which he said well Hungarian national identity is based on Hungarian ethnicity well that's one way of understanding national identity it's problematic though because not everybody that lives in Hungary not everybody who is a citizen of Hungary is ethnically Hungarian furthermore there are many ethnic Hungarians who live outside of Hungary and Romania in Slovenia in other parts of Eastern Europe so what is their status are they part of hungry or are they citizens of the countries in which they are currently residing this is very problematic in a liberal democracy for precisely the same reason that Adolf Hitler was very problematic for Europe during the 1930s when he tried to define German national identity in very similar ethnic terms all right now the third definition I think is critical in terms of institutions which is that populist leaders usually are very personal istic they want to have a personal relationship with the people they they want an unmediated relationship and that's bad for democracy for the for the following reasons democracies are not just about popular popularity and popular elections they are based on institutions checks and balances that actually constrain the ability of any one actor particularly the executive the person at the head of the government to exercise untrammeled power but the populist leader says you elected me I represent you I represent the popular will these other institutions courts legislatures the independent media they are all trying to undermine me and by doing that they are undermining your ability to get what you want you elected me to do these things and they are stopping me and therefore they are the enemies and therefore populism in this sense this personalism is very bad for the very foundations for the rule of law and for a government that is impartial not corrupt not subject to the personal whims of the person at the top of that particular hierarchy so that's the general characterization of populism and from those definitions you'll see that not all of the things that are labeled populism actually fit all three of those categories so for example Hugo Chavez had these populist economic policies but he was not particularly exclusive in terms of who he considered a Venezuelan on the other and these new populist regimes that are very anti EU and anti-immigrant and the parties like the National Front in France or the freedom party in Denmark are of that sort that they are back to a certain ethnic definition of who the true people are and for that reason are very anti-immigrant and and actually that explains why they're opposed to the European Union because they blame the European Union for letting in all of these foreigners one of the most common cries of populist parties is we need to take back our country the country has been stolen from us by all of these foreigners that are pouring in we no longer control our own destiny and we the people need to take back that kind of control I would note that my president Donald Trump mr. Donald Trump actually fits all three of those definitions of populism I'm saying this I I hope I'm saying this as an academic not in a partisan way but in an analytical way you'll have to bear with me but it does seem to me that in advocating a pretty crude form of protectionism during his campaign he fit the first category meaning things that feel good in in the short run you know keeping out Chinese goods or Mexican auto parts or whatnot but are very bad in the long run he fit the second definition so when he talks about the American people I don't think he's actually thinking about the whole population of the United States he's been relatively careful to not say things that are too overtly racist although he's had a hard time restraining himself in you know in recent weeks and he certainly you know likes picking on Barack Obama for maybe not being a real American and black athletes and black celebrities and the like and it certainly encouraged a lot of his supporters who are overtly racist or xenophobic you know it's given them a lot of self-confidence and then finally he fits that third definition of a of a charismatic personalistic leader when he was nominated and accepted the nomination of the Republican Party in July of 2016 he had this remarkable he had this remarkable phrase in his acceptance speech he said I alone understand you the American people and your problems and I alone can fix them he also then proceeded to in this anti institutionalist manner attacked the entire American intelligence community he called the mainstream media enemies of the American people you really have to go back to Joseph Stalin or you know a leader of that ilk you know to find that kind of rhetoric being used he's attacked Congress in fact his own party he's attacked the courts he's attacked basically any institution that has stood between him you know getting done what he wants to get done and so I think he qualifies as a populist according to the definitions that I I laid out I would say in in office at the economic front he's actually behaved much more like a conventional conservative Republican than like an economic populist but we can you know maybe we can bring up why that happened a bit later on all right so that I think is kind of the lay of the land there's many other populist parties waiting in the wings if you follow Eastern Europe you have a lot of mini Trump's coming up in Serbia in the Czech Republic in other places and then almost every major European country has a populist party like the National Front in in France which although they were defeated last year electorally still represent a very big and important part of the population and so that threat is really not gone all right so then the question is why now why in the mid middle of the second decade of the 21st century do we get this upsurge and I think here again there are three reasons everything's gonna come in threes this evening the first is is naturally economic and this has actually been discussed I think quite extensively in the you know in in the popular press so that trade theory course that I described to you will tell you that everybody benefits from participating in a system of free trade that same theory will tell you that not every individual in every country benefits and in particular low-skilled workers in rich countries are likely to lose their jobs and employment to similarly skilled workers in poor countries or paid lower wages and in fact that is what's been going on through a couple of generations now of deindustrialization as manufacturing has either been automated or has moved to Asia or to Bangladesh or to you know other countries that can do the same work for a much for a much lower price which is meant that in particularly in the populist nationalist countries in Northern Europe the social base of populism is not a mass of poor people that's the situation in Latin America it's really a declining middle class it's people who thought that they were the center I mean that they were the the breadwinners and and the and the mainstay of their national economies who are now finding that they're being sucked into a kind of underclass and it actually has a social dimension so in the United States it turns out that in rural communities there's been this massive opioid epidemic 2016 60,000 people more than sixty thousand Americans died of drug overdoses as a result of this crisis that's more than the number of Americans that were killed that year in traffic accidents and it was largely ignored I think by the mainstream press until until the election when like in the New Hampshire primary it became clear that this was a single thing that was preoccupying you know the largely white and heavily rural voter in New Hampshire and so economic decline corresponds to a broader social decline now the second driver of populism I think is political the big rap against democracies is that they talk too much you know you have Parliament's or Congress's that yak in the act and they can't get anything done you have interest groups you have to make compromises and as a result nothing happens this is actually a situation in my last book I described as Vito cracy meaning rule by Vito which I think is been particularly a disease in the United States where our system of checks and balances has actually prevented Congress from doing things that it ought to be doing like passing an annual budget and we just this last weekend went through another government shutdown because Congress couldn't agree I mean actually the only reason the government still open is they kick the can down the road by like a month they didn't solve the problem they they actually just kicked the can down the down the road and this is not the way a responsible serious political system operates I think Japan Italy India there's a number of other democracies that have had similar problems in acting decisively and that creates a demand for a strongman so obey in Japan Modi in India and I think Donald Trump in the United States are all they're saying look you know the old system is broken it's captured it won't make the right decisions I'm the one that's going to break through all this nonsense and and really get things done I'm a businessman successful I got a track record and I will do it all right so that's the political part the the third one is cultural and actually I think this is the one that that is the least appreciated and in a way the most important economic decline oftentimes manifests itself as cultural decline and his cultural resentment we all all of us human beings have an inner sense of dignity and we get tremendously angry if we feel that that dignity that is the basis of our self-esteem is not being adequately recognized by other people and that's the passion that drives a lot of people into politics and what has been going on in a lot of working-class communities in the United States is that many people just think they're invisible you know they think that they are invisible to the coastal the bicoastal elites you know the journalists and the politicians and the lobbyists and the other powerful people that are in New York Los Angeles Chicago and the like but out in red state America they've got problems but nobody really cares nobody makes Hollywood movies about them nobody celebrates their particular struggles and so forth there's a nice book about this by Arlie Hochschild called strangers in their own land she interviewed a lot of Tea Party supporters in rural Louisiana and she has a central metaphor that everybody is waiting on line in a long line there's a there's a door at the end of the line that's called the American dream and so they're waiting patiently raising families going to work every day working hard and all of a sudden they see other people cutting in line in front of them they may be you know african-americans or women or members of the LGBT community or Syrian refugees but all of these people are getting ahead of them because the government is giving them special preferences and this you know is a reflection of the fact that they are being ignored and kind of despised by the coastal elites and this explains some really interesting things about American politics right now so as you're well aware Donald Trump is said oh I mean virtually every day he says something just completely unprecedented for an American president you know unpresidential you know undignified and so forth in any other politician this would have ended their career right away it doesn't end his career why well because I think in the ears of a lot of his supporters what he's doing is he's being honest he's actually practicing something that's key to identity politics which is the ethics of authenticity so people will say yeah well maybe he shouldn't have said that or maybe that's really kind of prejudiced but at least he's saying what he means every other politician out there is modulating what they say to make sure that it's politically correct that they're not offending everybody and we're just sick and tired of this kind of elite caving in to you know to political correctness and I think Trump you know want to I mean he is a genius and certain in certain respects I mean in this respect he kind of understood that this is something that would that would resonate with people and he has exploited it to the hilt and you know one of the consequences of that is that identity politics by the way short advertisement I'm actually going to publish a book on this subject in September so look for it in your local bookstore but I think that identity politics which was actually born on the left you know it was originally about blacks and women and the LGBT community and the disabled and indigenous peoples has now migrated unfortunately to the right where you have the rise of increasingly open expressions of white nationalism and you know just frankly racist and xenophobic kinds of speech being you know uttered in public in a way that was really not possible just you know a year or two ago so that's the the cultural dimension the cultural dimension of this so then the question is what's the future of all of this and what is to be done about it and then I want to say a little bit about Canada because I'm actually kind of interested that you actually are not one of the countries that's been at the forefront of this populist nationalism so the the future well as Yogi Berra said it's very hard to predict the future make predictions especially about the future and I think that this is particularly true at the moment so we are definitely in a democratic recession whether this is going to deepen into a full-scale depression and lead to the kind of conflict that you saw in the 1930s which is the last time we had populist nationalism as a really big force in the world that is very hard to say my inclination is to think that that is not going to happen for a number of reasons one of them being that democratic institutions both in democratic countries and internationally are just stronger than they were in the 1930s in the United States we have this system of checks and balances designed precisely to protect the country against a charismatic leader like Donald Trump I mean that's you know the founding fathers had this worry about what they call Cesar ISM that you know Julius Caesar undermined the Roman Republic because he accumulated too much personal power and so they created this system to prevent that from happening in the future and I must say that by and large those those safeguards have held in the newer democracies like Poland and Hungary they've not worked so well but in the United States the courts the ending of the media is stronger than ever in the United States the courts have continued to contest a lot of administration decisions the intelligence community bureaucracies all of them are actually continuing to function in spite of everything that could change if you know depending on how the midterm elections go and then the re-election of the possible reelection of Trump in 2020 but you know I would say so far so far so good internationally I think it's actually quite striking how almost nothing has changed you know America pulled out of the TPP almost as the first thing that trump administration did and yet the people the architects of the TPP - America are still meeting the organization you know still is moving ahead NATO is still in place in fact it's making plans you know it's it's arming itself against Russia everybody is now aware of Russian interference in the American and the German the French elections and so that reaction is happening despite the inclinations of the current administration in Washington so in that sense I think I'm you know I'm modestly I'm modestly confident that things will stay on keel but a lot will depend really on how politics in the United States develops there's a lot of wild cards in this so the one area in which presidents are not constrained as foreign policy deliberately so and I think for good reasons and that is an area where you know that degree of discretion can really land not just the United States but its friends and allies into a lot of hot water I don't have to spin out scenarios related to Korea and other hotspots around the world but you know I think you understand the dangers that are involved and so that's another uncertainty that we have in thinking about about the future the final thing I just want to say a little bit about Canada since I'm here in Canada it's a remarkable country a little bit like Australia and New Zealand and you know other Commonwealth countries in the sense that you have experienced unprecedented ly high rates of immigration Canada is a more multicultural society in many ways than in the United States and yet you do not have the equivalent of brexit or the Trump phenomenon and so forth and I would say that that's you know a real credit to the strength of Canadian democracy and it's a it's an interesting discussion as to why part of that I think has to do with economic as Canada has been riding a long commodity boom and so I think that the kind of you know I mean deindustrialization has obviously hit you know important parts of Canada but it's been buffered a little bit by the fact that there's you know been a lot of there's been a strong engine of growth and in that sense the the growth and the identity and everything else you know are all interconnected the other thing is in terms of national identity I think Canada's has been sufficiently flexible and liberal that it is able to accommodate one of newcomers who can feel that they're Canadian and yet retain in their personal lives a sense of where they came from and you know other communities to which they belong I will close on the following observation every liberal democracy if it wants to survive as a liberal democracy it's easy as it survived as an illiberal democracy that's Hungary Poland Turkey you know there's a lot of illiberal democracies if you want to survive as a liberal democracy I think that it is centrally important to have an integrative sense of national identity that is itself liberal meaning there's a set of principles that you agree to you as part of the social contract for being a citizen of the country of which you are a member it requires loyalty to that set of principles but they are fundamentally liberal principles meaning it doesn't depend on where you were born your race your identity your your your particular you know race or gender or whatever anyone can be part of that community that's a task that not every modern democracy has lived up to and so I think that's what lies ahead for a lot of our fellow democracies around the world so thank you very much for your attention I look forward to our discussion [Music] [Applause] thank you so much I think we're just gonna make sure our microphones are working yes that's what seems like it's on boom thank you so much that was fascinating I I want to start with call him the elephant in the room I don't want to talk only about Donald Trump but it's hard not to start there because it seems to me the overarching theme for at least 2018 and forgive me for looking in the shorter term but that's kind of the news business I don't I'm not in the academic world and I think what we try to do is explain and make sense of the moment that we are in and everything now seems to me as I said earlier that we need to be flexible rather than solid we need to learn how to adapt rather than be fixed what do you think or who do you think is the biggest threat right now to two liberal world order so I thought what goes on in the United States is quite important because it was American power and the American example that created that created this liberal international order there's plenty of other players in that but but the United States was quite central and if the United States steps back from that leadership role either in terms of its active mentoring of these organizations or its fails to set an appropriate example then that's going to be bad for the order in general I think it's a kind of tribute to the sort of momentum of that order that despite the fact that the US has been stepping back that you know it's kept going but that's not going to last forever and so that's you know I would put that kind of at the top of the priorities the United States has to come back to that leadership role and say yes we are a democracy we believe that these values are good you know for the world as a whole we believe that the international institutions are good I would not over personalize it and you know one individual because you know that individual wouldn't have gotten elected if a lot of Americans didn't also want to step back from you know heavy involvement in the world but I would observe that you know Americans actually are most voters in most countries actually don't have very strong opinions about foreign policy and they can be persuaded to return to a you know that kind of the role under the right kind of leadership so I would say that that's a big issue I think internationally you know Russia has been in the news quite a lot for its very creative use of social media you know in and in other forms of power that we didn't really anticipate but in the end I think that China is a bigger challenge not I wouldn't say a threat but it's a challenge just because they've got a balanced economy technologically you know very at the cutting edge of many things and they're they're just big and they've got lots of resources and so accommodating them within the existing order I think is going to be you know it's gonna be a challenge do you think that you know president Trump through the campaign and now we constantly hear the refrain America first America first and everything he does is it possible that in the four years if he last four years in office he will really make America more prosperous and really bring low-skill low-wage workers up in in prosperity and and and reduce the wage gap that exists in the United States or is that total pie in the sky well I think a couple of different things are happening so right now the American economy is going gangbusters we've got a four point one percent unemployment rate actually wages even for these middle-class or working-class workers is going up so actually things look pretty good I would say that Trump can claim only a portion of the credit for this because this has been in the making for some time but you know honestly the tax you know the tax reform bill that was just passed has contributed to it you know people are more willing to invest repatriate money and so forth the problem is that in the longer run I don't think that these policies are sustainable certainly if he actually decides to undermine NAFTA or really go after China in a big way that's going to come immediately back to haunt us in terms of retaliation but actually I think you know the United States didn't need a tax cut at this stage in the economic cycle I think it's it's like a sugar high and it's not gonna last like all sugar highs once the crash comes it's going to be much deeper and more serious than it would have been if you know we haven't done this extra kind of stimulus the political calculation however is you know just for the Republicans just let that crash happen after the 2020 presidential election because we don't want to take ownership of it and unfortunately that's the way politics works getting to the issue of China growth in China has hit records I think it was six point nine percent according to the IMF in 2017 projected to be six point six percent in 2018 is it a particular kind of Western arrogance to think that liberal democracy is the best system in which humans can live in prosper well live and prosper includes a lot of things other than economic growth I think that a number of authoritarian modernizing countries have demonstrated that you do not need democracy in order to grow fast so South Korea Taiwan Singapore you know there been lots of countries that didn't have democratic political institutions that sustained really high rates of growth alright so that you know I would readily concede the real question is a couple of things is that growth model sustainable and is that enough you know to actually make people happy with their lives I think you know for a period of time sure because I think the traumas that China went through Great Leap Forward the Cultural Revolution all of these upheavals replacing that with a stable period of prolonged economic growth the rising middle class in comes why shouldn't people be you know content with that the real question is is that growth sustainable I think there are a number of reasons to think that it may not be and then the real test of the system is you know in a downturn like China's not experienced the recession since 1978 supposing you suddenly had 10% unemployment as we did for a while after 2008 you know our people gonna feel as happy about the system then and I think that's a question you know we can't answer at this point Canada's Prime Minister talks a lot these days about what he calls progressive trade about wanting to be a force for good in the world and he says this is a way he puts it he wants to strike a bargain the best of both worlds so access to markets lucrative markets like China but protecting gender rights protecting women's rights environmental and labor laws this is what he actually said in China last year when he was there if we move forward with simple straight classic trade deals that focus on tariffs and barriers then we're going to find ourselves in a world where protectionism and inward thinking is the only option it depends on the specifics of the package that's being offered in principle yes of course and in fact this is a critique of the old trade regime that Danny Roderick the economist at Harvard has argued quite strongly that the you know the the people that negotiated the WTO and NAFTA and so forth the way that they design the institutions biased it towards the interests of large corporations you know all the big powerful multinational players at the expense of things like labor rights and you know protection of indigenous communities and women and you know all of these other things and so it's perfectly legitimate to want to build an alternative order that takes those kinds of issues into account the trouble is that if you do too much of it you're not actually going to have a system of free trade I mean it's you know you're going to create not the old kind of protectionist barriers you're going to create a new one so that's why I say it really depends on the specific you know way that you you try to implement this would i if I were a Canadian Prime Minister what I say this in Beijing absolutely because you know the problem with I think China's approach to a lot of these issues is that they haven't observed the kinds of safeguards that are routine in you know other democratic rich democratic countries and I think as they get richer they're gonna find that these issues are ones that they should care about themselves I want to ask you about income inequality which has grown to unimaginable levels really there was an Oxfam reports that came out this past week that said about 82 percent of the wealth created across the globe went to the top 1% there was a world's billionaires made over four hundred and sixty two billion dollars combined which is enough money according to Oxfam too and extreme poverty around the world seven times over and that a new billionaire added is added to the list nearly every two days it was the Liberal Democratic order that got us here right so how big a threat is this now to our future all right so there are several factual issues I think that need to be put on the table you know a number of people have written about this baquette ewwww and there's also a very good book by Branko Milanovic former World Bank economists that shows I think that if you look at the world as a whole over the past thirty years yes it's true that global inequality by certain measures has increased but it's also the case that global poverty has fallen at a absolutely dramatic rate you know hundreds of millions of people have left poverty and are now you know you can consider the middle class not all of them are in China you know a lot of them are in Bangladesh and India Latin America sub-saharan Africa it's the same is the case for literacy rates - yeah no I mean literacy under five mortality you know there's there's lots of indicators that show that it's not just you know the top one percent that's been benefiting from all the economic growth where we've had the real problem Milanovic shows us particularly is in the middle where the the people that really have not benefited are these working-class and middle-class you know workers in rich countries they're the ones that have lost ground and politically they're you know they're they're very powerful all that being said the concentration of wealth at the top is itself a separate problem even if other people are getting richer because just obviously in a democracy or in any society wealth turns into political power and it biases the political system in favor of the interests of those people so you know the banking Lobby in the United States Congress is still you know despite the financial crisis and their culpability for it you know it's still the most powerful lobby in the United States and you can't actually really reform the system you know given the power of you know that particular group so yes that is absolutely a really big challenge for inequality in that form translates into political inequality and that's a bad thing I wanted to ask you about the media my self-interested question um how concerned are you about this assault on journalism and the Free Press and not only from people like Donald Trump but also the business model is broken so we are all facing declining revenue and the growth of digital journalism and platforms has been great to spread content but the advertising revenue has just tanked so at a time when it feels to me like we need to have even it's more important even more important than ever to inform the public about politics and everything else in the world it's getting it harder and harder to do that well you know I live in Silicon Valley you know amidst all these big Internet platforms that have been getting rich that's why housing prices are completely unaffordable in Palo Alto where I live and all that money is being sucked out of the rest of the economy and certainly out of the rest of the media ecology you know as a result of this yeah I mean it's actually it's stunning the turnaround in attitudes towards these new media platforms over the past just the past six months because I think ten years ago everybody had this very favorable view of Google of Facebook you know Apple Amazon and all these democratizing force that's what we thought people thought that it would and there's there's a logic to it and in fact it was democratizing in certain respects because information is power and if you increase access to information you you give people more power but you know the truth of the matter is that all those editors and gateways and gatekeepers and so forth that we're going to be destroyed and disrupted by this this technology revolution actually we're doing something useful you know by not allowing everything to be published you know they were ensuring that there was a certain quality at least a factual reporting and things of that sort and I think that the business models of all of these platforms has blown that apart because the coin of the realm is virality is how many clicks you get and that is dependent not on high quality content it's dependent on sensationalism and you know confirmation bias I mean all of these things have been operating in that fashion I actually think we've started a couple of projects on this topic at my Center at Stanford because we're kind of right in the middle of it and I think one of the big problems is that Facebook especially but also Google and Twitter have in effect become media companies but they absolutely do not accept the responsibility that a traditional media company took on to be a responsible custodian of information they take content from from existing companies that's right and simply you know pass it on and their business model actually encourages you know the wrong kind of information and accelerates you know the movement of it and so you know there's a couple of approaches to this I mean one is the one that's been taken by the Germans which is to try to regulate it you know 50 million euro fine for fake news you know a so-called Facebook law that kind of thing just it wouldn't happen in the United States because of our First Amendment and you know other things and so therefore I mean I I think that you know as a result of political pressure there just needs to be a way a change in the way these platforms think about themselves they are media companies and they have to take responsibility as media companies so that being hauled before Congress and having to answer questions about it well so that cycle is beginning the trouble is that the administration is is it's sort of of two minds you know it wants to censor all the negative anti Trump news but it doesn't want to censor the stuff that's positive right it doesn't want to censor all the right-wing fake news and so they're not going to be a very reliable partner in this so the question is in our toxic polarized political environment can you get enough consensus you know to put certain limits on the kinds of things that these platforms can do now there's already some consensus on things like child pornography and cyberbullying and you know things of that sort there may be consensus on foreign governments you know being able to buy advertising because I think you know generally speaking that would receive support but going anywhere beyond that I think is going to be pretty difficult because it's gonna hurt one party more than the other and given the polarization that means it's no-go um I'm curious about leadership in these uncertain times we got the news today that Oprah is not going to run for president she says it's not in her DNA to do that so we won't have another billionaire TV star on the ticket but you know America of course does have a reality TV billionaire in office right now what do you think is there room anymore for a serious thoughtful candidates who understand policy who aren't celebrities and stars or a week and we wrecked the system we just do we just expect that now from our political leaders you know it it's not clear to me that that's going to be the pattern in the future I mean obviously a celebrity just has the name recognition you know to get on the ballot but I think you can also I mean it's hard to say this after the 2016 election but you can also underestimate the intelligence of voters and it could be that after having experienced one celebrity president people will say okay enough is enough you know I mean we actually didn't really want a reality TV show hosts you know to be our leader and maybe that's not the best kind of leader to pick in the future so you know we'll just have to we'll have to wait and see okay I was hoping you'd say something else give me something outside like it'll never happen again well you know actually quite honestly I think Barack Obama set a bad precedent because it had been the case that almost no American presidential candidates came out of the Senate or having Congress in general because Americans thought that a president should have executive experience so most candidates were governors of states before they thought of running for the and certainly nobody as a first term senator thought that they were qualified to be a president and quite honestly Obama's lack of executive experience I think actually hurt him in a lot of areas but that didn't stop you know in in the primaries a whole bunch of first-term senators like Ted Cruz you know from running so maybe maybe it takes a few election cycles you know I guess you know my image of democratic politics is it's a it's a stupid donkey and you got to hit the donkey on the head with a two-by-four several times before it gets the message yeah I better get up and you know and do something I want to ask you one more question before we go to the audience about how you see artificial intelligence and where it's going there have been a lot of people who say it's it's frightening and we can't control it and we don't even know what it's capable of MIT Technology Review wrote a piece called the dark secret at the heart of AI and they it said that no one really knows how the most advanced algorithms even bother me no one really knows how the most advanced algorithms do what they do and that could be a problem mm-hmm so I think that there's a certain set of fears you know about autonomous robots taking over and killing people and you know getting out of escaping the control of the people that created them which is way overblown the real threat to AI and is automation and the elimination of low skill and even medium skill and you know kind of going up the skill ladder it's the elimination of large categories of work that's the real threat and that's a real one so in Palo Alto where I live we see self-driving cars you know wandering around the neighborhood all the time there's like three million truck drivers and another three million taxi and limo drivers in the United States and then a big train of people that depend on their incomes and you could imagine that most of those jobs will be gone in another 10 or 15 years as as self-driving cars come on the market and it's not clear you know what somebody like a 55 year old you know taxi driver what that person does to retrain you know to get the skills that would be necessary to you know fit into the kind of digital economy that's evolving so that I think is the real threat of all of this stuff and unfortunately I've not seen either on the left or the right any politician articulate a realistic program to deal with that you know that problem you can you can redistribute income and you know raise social protections only to a certain degree before they become unaffordable you can retrain people which is the big you know panacea from a lot of economists but I think there are limits to how much of that is feasible politically possible and also you know I mean just in terms of people's underlying cognitive skills not everybody is capable of being a genetic engineer or you know whatever well and I would say that the technology is moving ahead so fast that it's not even really possible for us to anticipate where it's gonna go no that's right very hard to harness all right that's it for me I want to open the the floor to all of you and I know there lots of students here in the crowd which is terrific and you've had the pleasure and the honor of having dr. Fukuyama in your class this afternoon if you have anyone has any questions we have some roving microphones can you just put where the microphones are sorry you're at both at the back do you want to move forward there's some young people here there's a young man right there and right next to with the glasses up here in the yep Thanks thank you very much so your last point was about artificial intelligence and just in terms of the structural forces that are going to affect the economy I think another elephant in the room is the effects of global climate change in subsequent decades upon economic growth your thesis outlined how no eco eco economics it affects culture and all these different aspects so I was just wondering what you what you thought about climate change is ramifications for democracy in the future well I think it's bad I mean actually it may not that be that bad for Canada you know as the as the growing zone for a lot of crops moves north you're not actually going to do that badly but in general for the world as a whole you know the adjustment costs are going to be a tremendous it's already you know the source of a lot of political upheaval in in many parts of the world and it's it's a devilishly or it's kind of one of these wicked problems because you know the the worst effects are put off in the future but the costs of mitigating climate change are all born in the present and moreover the harms that are done are not necessarily done to your own society they're done you know the places like Bangladesh you know that you don't care that much about and therefore you're not going to accept you know a big hit economically in the short run in order to make you know people in Bangladesh in 20 years better off so I think that's why it's been extremely hard to get international international action on this we had a discussion of this in our class discussion this afternoon I actually think that this is one of these problems that fan sans regime type so it's not that democracies have a particular problem dealing with it everybody's going to have a big problem dealing with it because it requires adjustments that are hard for any political system to make I think that you know the only real hope is you know further technological innovation of a sort that will you know come up with ways of mitigating you know carbon emission I mean in fact you got to do more than mitigate it you've actually got to remove carbon from the atmosphere in the long run if you're gonna successfully deal with the problem in a long-term basis and an area that just requires huge you know investments in the in the near term and even if that happens it's not clear it's going to solve the problem so unfortunately not every problem that humanity faces is you know is actually politically a soluble one another question that's uh let's do some gender balance here where's a si we're sorry where are the microphones if you see oh there's a woman over there with your head way up it's like the highest hand yes hi dr. Fukuyama thank you for your talk my question is one of your main theses is that identity politics have replaced class politics and are one of the key factors in destabilizing democracy my question is destabilizing for home and is it fair to frame a history of so many people especially in America still struggling to overcome their race gender sexual and class oppressions for the liberation of all peoples in this manner as a threat thank you so I would never argue that identity politics per se is destabilizing or threatening democracy I mean it comes directly out of democracy because all of the groups all of the identity groups were groups that had suffered marginalization disrespect and the like and it's perfectly natural that they would like you know to be included have access you know to institutions and you know all sorts of things so that part of it is is is not in question the issue is is more of a complicated practical one the way that many identity groups have spoken about themselves have actually restored these birth characteristics as you know the definition of identity this is particularly true in something like the concept of lived experience where only somebody that has lived a particular kind of experience as let's say a black person or an African American or a gay or lesbian those are the only people that can actually really appreciate and really you know resonate with with those particular types of oppression now that's true that's a true fact that is very hard to empathize across these kinds of identity barriers but if you try to harden those you know those those those divisions it makes it harder to you know create coalition's and it makes it harder to empathize with other people that's you know that that suffer from other kinds of debilities the area in which this has affected democratic politics is in the politics of the left the left when it was based on class rather than identity was a big coalition of which the working class their trade unions and the like with a single biggest component what's happened in the United States in many European countries is that that old working class you know that were white and part of the dominant culture have increasingly gotten alienated from the left because of the rise of this you know particular form of identity politics and they're the ones that are now voting for these new you know kind of anti-immigrant sort of nationalist populist kinds of parties so in my country I mean this is the big dilemma right now that's facing a Democratic Party you know do you continue to align with your activist groups that won you the last couple of elections and you just right off that old white working-class or do you actually try to recreate you know that old coalition that was broader and that actually won you know elections for the Democratic Party for about 70 years and you know my personal opinion is that you really have to go for the latter strategy which means coming up with ways of framing the same question about inclusion in equality but framing it you know less and the kinds of identity language that we've come to you know this becomes sort of second nature to us and you know framing it more in terms of national identity and more you know integrative forms of identity Bernie Sanders was better at building a coalition than Hillary I think I think that's that's true but even he you know was forced I mean he was sucked into that kind of politics because just that's just the nature of the Democratic Party right now in the u.s. does that does that answer your question are you good yeah okay good right here there's a in the white to pink shirt there with glasses yeah I think I thought it was quite insightful when you talked about the in the US the cultural alienation the sense of cultural early alienation from the elites that's kind of contributed to this populist nationalism and that it seems to me that because of the way that sort of the Trump voters identify with Trump as a spokesman a cultural spokesman for them that media criticism of Trump you know even legitimate criticism is is is felt as to contribute to that sense of cultural alienation and feed this populist nationalism and so so criticism of Trump becomes sort of fraught I'm wondering if you agree with that analysis and if so you know how should the media and other you know other sort of people treat that topic no I think that's absolutely right that and this is part of the problem though the fake news problem that you know in a sense an assertion of a particular fact or a point of view these days is not taken as an input into a deliberative democratic reason process it's really seen as an expression of identity you know that Who I am is reflected in what I think about immigrants are about crime or about a lot of these other issues and therefore I'm not all that interested in actually kind of excavating what the real the reality of this particular situation and by the way I mean this is kind of related to the earlier question about identity politics there is a version of this that exists on the left as well which is unwilling to question an identity assertion if it is authentically stated by somebody that comes from an identity group you know that the people sympathize with and so there's versions of this on both the the left and the right and again I think that this is one of the reasons why this becomes dangerous for democratic politics because in the end if everybody's opinion about things you know decisions that have to be made in common are simply fixed by who you are you're not persuadable by facts by discussion by interaction with other fellow citizens then I don't think you're going to have a very successful democracy right so I think this is kind of the you know the challenge that the that is in front of us right now it's nice to follow up on follow up is how should people in the media sort of operate in this sort of climate well I don't think that you can answer a lot of these criticisms by simply backing off doing what the media is supposed to be doing you know by reporting information as honestly and you know thoroughly and carefully as possible I think the media's primary job is actually to keep doing its traditional job living up to journalistic standards and so forth I think that you know the fight is actually not going to be carried on by the media itself because they're now seen as a you know by on the right as a partisan of one particular viewpoint I think they fight you know probably has to be borne by other you know other parts of the population you know using other sorts of tools I'm not sure the media itself will ever put itself in a position where you can persuade you know one of these identity voters to you know accept what they're saying just you know just because they've they've changed their presentation a little bit so I have a kind of an answer to that too which is I think the ice it's it's the media's role to do all those things you said to cover to maintain journalistic standards and we shouldn't change that now given the moment we're in but I think there's an obligation for all of you especially young people to to raise the level of public discourse to listen to other voices so that you become the generation that we in the media go to for voices and we hear you and you spread that reasoned debate and you listen to other people you try to as dr. Fukuyama said excavate to the kind of essence of things and if we if all of you collectively do that then it raises the game everywhere so right next question sure over here in the that you got a microphone right there yeah very much a faculty member in Peugeot science a political economist I'm struck with the three causal explanations you had of the erosion of democracy in fact that maybe the first one is driving the other two that is it's the economic erosion of when key class is leading to partisanship and due to inequality and then you have politically roshan and inefficiency and the identity results as well from that when we look at the u.s. there's two factors one is just bad policy in congress in response to trade instead of sharing the benefits they have been reinforcement of winners and so in contrast to canada where you have public schools you have health care and other things that we distribute the other piece is the Dani Rodrik piece or superior or you could bring Palani which is the self acceleration process in globalization which in the way if you believe in a planet is a true lemma between democracy sovereignty and globalization and the only way according Rodrick is essentially to scale down globalization until you do that you do that and we find a way to do it without collapsing the whole system as in the 30s then the first factor will keep growing and you have a bigger Trump how do you react to this how can we address this first the engine is right so I think Dani rodrik's analysis of the trilemma is is correct you cannot maximize you know sovereignty democracy growth simultaneously and I think in principle he's wanting to scale back on the globalization side is is the right answer if you can actually manage this in practice you know and and this is kind of it becomes sort of a slippery slope problem that if you start saying okay well certain kinds of trade barriers on behalf of workers or environment or other kinds of issues are acceptable does this set off kind of a cascade of you know further barriers that basically you know throw out the baby with the bathwater so to speak I think that that's the fear that especially a lot of economists have had that they they understood that global trade free trade was creating these inequalities and discontents but they didn't want to admit that in public because they didn't want to trigger this and and see that as a you know legitimating full scale protectionism so the real question is can you have a moderate form of protectionism that puts a little bit of sand in the gears of globalization slows it down for the sake of these other political and social goods that are being hurt by it and I think you know we got to try some version of this I just don't see how you can stick with the old system where you said okay you know full speed ahead you know everybody else has to adjust to the consequences of these big disruptive changes and you know we're not that's up to individuals but as countries we're not going to worry about I don't think that's a acceptable thing it does bear these big risks of setting off a cascade of you know further restrictions where the pendulum you know so it's swung way over here towards free trade and now it's starting to swing back and it may not just stop at a at a nice point you know somewhere in the middle thank you yeah there's a young man here at the thank you very much doctor for Grandma many people were devastated where when Trump was elected here at UBC for example they had to cancel midterms because the students were grieving too much in Liberal Studies is that fake news it's two stories mapping it there with math midterm was cancelled for that but I was I was thinking about this and maybe it's a good thing that Trump was elected maybe it shows the fact that it shows those underpinning trends that have been happening with the American population and not only and maybe in the midterm elections or in the 2020 elections there will be Trump will be replaced there will be a backlash against Republicans against people identity politics and I guess all that and new politicians maybe Democrats will come into power the question is if they do if Democrats and those sort of politicians do come to power will they address the questions of those you know the red states in America and will they promote legislation that would be to the benefit of the population so loathe as I am to admit it I mean I do think that there were some beneficial aspects to the Trump election that go beyond some of the things you suggested so for one thing I think it's made a lot of Americans much more appreciative of their existing institutions there's nothing like a threat to those institutions to make you realize it's nice to have you know journalists and courts and you know legislators and even the intelligence community the CIA is now very popular the FBI is popular with the American left you know so in that sense there and and and then this mobilization of people you know by Trump I think is a very positive thing people running for office really wanting to get involved in politics I guess my fear is that again it's kind of this pendulum business that Trump has been so abrasive and he's gotten people including me so angry that you know the the Democratic Party is really moving pretty far to the left and a lot of its leading candidates you know I I think are actually putting themselves in a position where it's going to be hard for them to you know to get elected because they are going to lose a lot of those red state you know swing voters that could vote either way and a lot of it is going to be over these identity cultural kinds of issues but that's really as I was saying that's the big fight in the Democratic Party now between someone like Joe Biden who would appeal to those you know those white working-class voters versus a Kamala Harris or Elizabeth Warren you know that would have a narrower but much more passionate support base all right one more question at the front here thank you so much for your talk I'm actually a former student of Professor pay's at Claremont McKenna so I just wanted to pass along hello but one of the things we talked about a lot in his class was the idea of democratization especially in developing countries as having internal players in institutions and governments and in what cases those players kind of affect the way in which a government or a country moves forward - could you describe sort of the role you see as internal players whether they be reformers or radicals or conservatives or liberals not just in the US but maybe in other countries that are dealing with populism how they kind of they play out in the shaping of the institutions of those countries because they're obviously not as strong as we maybe otherwise thought but they're obviously still very important and they have varying levels of popularity or or value to the people in each of those countries so maybe just dive into sort of the rules that those players in those and I don't understand what kind of players are you talking about so you Luda just some of them as being you know journalists or intelligence communities in certain countries but I'm also thinking of you know whether it's opposition parties or it's sort of the players that and the actors that make up not just the ruling party but kind of this system of government well so I think one of the lessons from the last year has been that you've got a system of checks and balances institutional checks and balances but institutions are not like physical barriers to movement it's not like a you know a wall or a steel plate or something that keeps the executive from crossing a certain threshold it's all in the end normative all right and one of the to me worrisome things is the degree to which Republicans who were committed to constitutional checks and balances have been willing to look the other way when Trump crossed certain of these barriers simply because it was in their partisan interest not to get in the way of you know of their president so for example I mean you know about a month or six weeks ago they started this massive campaign on the right to discredit the FBI because President Trump doesn't want this FBI I mean he doesn't want this mueller investigation of him which in my view has no merit whatsoever and if you really believe in something like the rule of law this is just horrifying because a president should not be able to quash an investigation that may you know lead to his family or you know close associates of his but that's exactly what Donald Trump is trying to do and there are many there way too many Republicans that are trying to help him right and so I think what that demonstrates is in the end what institutions are are people who have certain norms about behavior and even when it's not in their partisan interest to do a certain thing they still do it there's a classic case of this in the Tilden Hayes election in 1878 there was a one senator whose vote was critical in determining that election and he actually voted against the interest of his party and it preserved you know the sanctity of the institution of Congress but it ended his political career and that you know but I think political systems kind of depend on on people like that well and the only two people who really are standing up now or John McCain and Jeff Flake I guess who were it was well who's leaving he was leaving and John McCain is sadly on his way out as well thank you so much for this it was such a pleasure and it gives me some solace that there are people out you thinking out there thinking these these big thoughts trying to solve these these problems and in the moment that we're in dr. Fuki I'm gonna thank you so much thank you [Music]

Channel: UBC School of Public Policy and Global Affairs

Views: 3,498

Rating: 4.3513513 out of 5

Keywords: Francis Fukuyama, Global Liberal Order, Democracy, UBC, University of British Columbia, Phil Lind, Phil Lind Initiative, Global Liberalism, Politics

Id: S8YtokWoxwg

Length: 87min 3sec (5223 seconds)

Published: Fri Feb 09 2018