Time to take a look at probably the most controversial
Panzer of World War 2: the Panzerkampfwagen V Panther. Now, when it comes to the Panther, you usually
get very emotionally charged opinions. And even among experts, there is quite some
disagreement going on. For instance, David Willey the Curator at
the Tank Museum at Bovington notes in his Tank Chat from 2016:
“[…] probably the best German tank of World War two […]”
Similarly, Ralf Raths the director of the Deutsche Panzermuseum Munster notes:
"The Panther is generally regarded as one of the best designed and best balanced tank
designs of the 2nd World War [...]." Whereas Nicholas “the Chieftain” Moran
comes to a very ambivalent conclusion, he notes in his inside the Hatch episode:
“[…] the second thought is I am very impressed by the tank itself as a tank. It has so much potential and it’s just such
a capable tank. The last thought is I am really NOT impressed
by this tank. It seems to have so many flaws in its design
[…]” Markus Pöhlmann one of the leading experts
on the Panzerwaffe brings up a similar issue: “The hyperbolic assessment of the Panther
frequently found in the popular technical literature usually overlooks the fact that
the vehicle was extremely powerful when measured by individual parameters, but practically
did not fulfil its military purpose in 1943 in any way.” Which of course raises the question: was the
Panther the best Panzer of the Panzerwaffe or just a fat high-maintenance cat like Garfield? Let’s start early on, now the original development
for a successor to the Panzer IV started already before the war at this point it should have
been a 20-ton tank, yet, what set off the development of the Panther we know now, where
the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks that the Germans encountered after they invaded the Soviet
in Summer 1941, which created some serious [Panzer III vs. T-34 video] trouble for the
Panzerwaffe. One of the various attempts to deal with the
problem was to creation of a tank commission that was sent to the Eastern Front to gather
information firsthand: “In his closing remarks to the Panzerkommission
on 21 November [1941], Guderian pointed out that the following priority applied to the
new tank designs: 1. heavier armament
2. higher tactical maneuverability
3. improved armor protection
Guderian emphasized that at the beginning of the next offensive it will be necessary
for every Panzer-Abteilung to possess several guns in their tanks or several anti-tank guns
capable of penetrating the heavy Russian tanks. The troops would thereby regain a feeling
of weapons superiority over the enemy.” So, these were the requirements for the Panzerkampfwagen
V Panther and in that regard the Panther was quite different to the Panzerkampfwagen VI
Tiger, which was designed as a breakthrough tank that possessed strong armor protection
also to the sides and even rear. Since I am not a particular fan of development
history, let’s skip ahead a bit and look at the first Panthers that were operational. Now, there are many different variations of
the proverb “no plan survives contact with the enemy” in case of the Panther, one could
argue that there were problems even before the first contact with the enemy. Since, two of them were lost while unloading
from trains before Operation Zitadelle the German attack against the Kursk Salient in
Summer 1943. The Panther’s critics usually refer to this
incident and the battle quite extensively. How appropriate this is, is a matter of debate,
since the Panther was pushed from the drawing board into production in record time:
"When one considers today that the period from the first concept to the first test vehicle
was less than a year, this achievement by the German army and armaments agencies and
industry is unique in history.” Additionally, it was also rushed into combat,
as such neither the tanks nor their crews were particularly ready, as pointed out by
Dr. Roman Töppel: “It soon became obvious that the deployment
of the 51st and 52nd Panzer Battalion had been precipitous – not only were its crews
insufficiently trained, the vehicles themselves had apparently not been tested properly. The Panther had various technical defects
which would sometimes bring the crews to the verge of despair.” Some of the problems with the Panther could
be ironed out, yet, some not, but first let’s discuss shortly if the Panther was a Heavy
or Medium tank, because this is a common point of contention as well. For the Soviets after their trials with the
Panther captured at Kursk, the conclusion was obvious, they noted the following:
“The Panther tank, widely used by the German army since summer of 1943, is a new type of
heavy tank, vastly different from other heavy tanks in tactical purpose.“ The best summary on the discussion I found
so far is from Dr. Roman Töppel, who addresses both technical and tactical situation while
similarly also pointing out the German classification of Soviet tanks:
“[…] the Panther eventually reached a combat weight of 45t, which made it a heavy
tank rather than a medium one. It had the same weight as the heavy Soviet
KV-1 tank and the IS-2 introduced in 1944, which in German sources is sometimes called
a super-heavy tank (überschwerer Panzer), even though it was not heavier than the Panther. Tactically the Panther was not a heavy ‘breakthrough
tank’ (Durchbruchspanzer); it was scheduled to be deployed to the ‘medium Panzer companies’
(mittlere Panzerkompanie) and replace the medium Panzer IV tank.” For a further discussion with Dr. Töppel
be sure to check out this video from my second channel. Yet, let’s discuss some of the obvious flaws
of the Panther. The main flaw which according to most authors
was never solved was the very short life-time of the final drive, which is repeatedly noted
at just 150 km. The final drive is that part, which transmits
the rotation power of the engine to the drive wheels, as such it sits between the hull and
the drive wheel. Hence, it is quite hard to spot unless the
kitty is properly disassembled. Yet, there were many other problems, like
the reliability of the engine, fuel pump leaks, etc. most of them could be ironed out over
time. Yet, the final drive was not, as noted by
the French report with the title “Le Panther” from 1947 that did a long-term assessment
after the war. They noted:
"The real weak point of the Panther is the final drive, which is too weakly designed
and only has an average life span of 150 km.“ To put this in perspective, the report gives
the average life-time of the engine at about 1000 km. Yet, there are also German war-time reports
that note that the reliability of the Panther reached almost that of the Panzer IV. I got a look at one such document, it consists
of a preamble followed by report by a Panzer regiment:
The preamble from May 1944 is as follows: "The report confirms the view that the service
life of the Pz.Kpfw. 'Panther' has increased through further improvement
of the aggregates. The average service life of a Panther can
now be assumed to be approximately the same as that of a Panzer IV with approx. 1500 - 2000 km between two major overhauls." Yet, if we read the attached report from April
1944 to the very end, something interesting shows up near the end:
"The high mileage and associated rare breakdowns are usually the merit of good drivers and
commanders." Which raises the question, did the preamble
compare the best performance of a Panther with the average performance of a Panzer IV? And what where the performance values for
a Panzer IV with good drivers and commanders? Additionally, the sample set is very small. Since the report notes that for 3 out of 7
Panthers, the engine-life time was at 1700 to 1800 km, which is far higher than the average
of 1000 km given in the French post-war report. Yet, similarly to the French report, the German
report notes that problems with the Final Drive resulted in a “very large percentage”
(“sehr grosser Prozentsatz”) of breakdowns, although it should be added this was during
spring on the eastern front, as such this was one of the most demanding times, since
a lot of mud is around at that time of the year. As you can see, there is quite a lot of conflicting
information out there and I am not finished yet. One issue with the final drive is that in
late war there was a general problem with all Panzers and their final drives, as pointed
out by Ralf Raths the Director of the Panzermuseum: "The second major problem with this vehicle
was the final drive. [...] The number of these breaks did not decrease,
but increased, which may be connected to a general trend in German tank production, because
there were reports in 45 that this was the case for all tanks. In any case, the Panther was already in 43
[and] 44 very susceptible to this." Related to this general problem might be a
document from August 1944 that informs that the final drives of 4 German armored vehicles
were changed from one transmission ratio to another. As such, I am quite cautious, and the question
here is, were some of the problems with the final drive a result of the general decrease
in German production quality and also crew training in the later stages of the war? Since,
“In the summer of 1944, the Panther was at its peak since it still had excellent crews. Its performance would start to falter later
in the year due to heavy attrition in trained and experienced crews.” The decrease in production quality and crew
training might have countered an overall increase in the Panther’s reliability. Of course, the French report from 1947 indicates
that these problems persisted and ultimately stemmed from a general problem with the Panther
design. Yet, it could also be that the French continued
to use German spare parts from the war that might have been of lower production quality. Furthermore, we don’t know how much know-how
on operating and maintaining the Panthers was transferred from the Germans to the French. There are of course many good elements in
the French report as well. They noted the excellent gun, strong frontal
armor and excellent optics. I spare you the common number fest on armor,
speed and firepower values here. Not that I don’t like numbers [Best German
General], but I prefer those that are lesser known. Additionally, there is a very interesting
strength brought forward by Ralf Raths: "The suspension and the drive, on the other
hand, were excellent, there's no question about it. The suspension, for example, can absorb uneven
ground up to 50 cm. This is simply absorbed by these torsion bars. This figure was only reached again during
the Cold War. The Leopard 2 manages to beat that figure
later on. In between, it doesn't happen." Now as you can see, if you want to point out
the flaws, there are plenty and if you want to point out the strengths, there are many
as well. As such, the ambivalent assessment by Chieftain
of him being both impressed and not impressed comes to mind. Of course, we should also not discount the
experiences of the Panther crews themselves, something I covered in a previous video already. Now, for this video I have actually 2 endings. The first is my interpretation on what might
have gone wrong with the Panther, whereas the second is a more traditional interpretation. Now, I might be terribly wrong here, so take
this part with a lot of salt, ideally from Jingles Salt Minds Limited. Ready? Good, so after looking at all the assessments
from the French, the Soviets and those of the various experts. One aspect in particularly stuck out, both
the Soviets and Chieftain referred to the Panther more or less as a tank destroyer and
not a universal tank – which is even more interesting since some call the Panther the
first main battle tank. Now, the Soviets noted:
“The Panther tank […] is a new type of heavy tank, vastly different from other heavy
tanks in tactical purpose. The difference is in the use of Panther tanks
as tank destroyers, and not as breakthrough tanks. This is indicated by thick front armour and
a powerful gun, but poor side, rear, and turret armour.” Now, remember the closing remarks of Guderian
to the Panzerkommission in November 1941? He put the armament first, followed by mobility
and at the final spot was for armor protection. Additionally:
“Guderian emphasized that at the beginning of the next offensive it will be necessary
for every Panzer-Abteilung [Tank Battalion] to possess several guns in their tanks or
several anti-tank guns capable of penetrating the heavy Russian tanks. The troops would thereby regain a feeling
of weapons superiority over the enemy.” As such, I have the impression that the designers
and engineers conceptualized a tank that should have been an addition to the Panzer Battalions,
similar to what the Western Allies did in 1944, when they added a few tanks with high
velocity guns – like Sherman Firefly - to their tank units. Hence, it seems the German engineers constructed
a turreted tank destroyer, yet ultimately the German Army used it tactically, as a medium
tank. Thus, I have the impression – yet not supported
by any documents so far – that there was a serious miscommunication or change of mind
and that the Panther was pressed into a role it was not designed for, namely that of a
general-purpose tank. Now, even if this was not the case, my conclusion
about the Panther is that it was the ugly duckling of the Panzerwaffe. Due to its hastened development many practical
issues were not addressed in its initial design by the engineers. Although, on paper it looks like a swan, a
closer examination reveals various flaws. Needless to say, some people will continue
to see the swan that the Panther is on paper, whereas others will always see the flaws. For me, well, the Panther is just a young
swan that never had time to mature and like so many things in life, he is neither perfect
nor imperfect. And we should not forget that the Germans
named it after a cat and cats have the tendency to not conform to your wishes anyway and in
this regard the Panther is an excellent example of a big cat and a quite vicious one as well. This video took a quite a while and got a
lot of help, so thank you to Roman Töppel, Jens Wehner, Chieftain and Ralf Raths for
important input and remarks here, note they did not see the final part of the script,
so all errors are my own. Special thanks to Roland_HUNter for sending
me additional sources and to Michael Mußmann for giving us access to the Panther. And of course, thank you to the Tank Museum
at Bovington and Panzermuseum Munster for inviting me to their respective Tanks driving
around in circles Events in 2019. As always, sources are listed in the description,
thank you for watching and see you next time!
