Oxford Debate: Will Europe Choose the U.S. Over China?

today's motion is europe will choose the us over china and i would now like to ask you um to vote you should see a poll on your screen whether you agree or disagree with the motion and it's important here to note the motion says europe will choose the us over china so if you disagree with the motion it does not mean automatically that europe will choose china it might mean that it would stake out the middle position might mean that it would try to stay neutral any other combination so please be aware of that of course as you're all aware as the competition between the us and china is becoming ever more broad from trade to technology to security the leeway preferred countries and regions such as europe seems to become smaller and smaller european countries and here in switzerland where i'm based we like to point out that doesn't just mean the eu there are a few others here are faced with the reality of pressure from both sides a traditional ally in the west that is retreating uh slowly but steadily from its leadership position and a new economic partner in the east that presents itself increasingly as an ambitious new leader so this is the situation as it presents i'm going to give you a few more seconds to vote so if you haven't voted yet please do so now um we will not share the results of the poll at this point again we will rerun the poll at the very end of this conversation and then we'll actually calculate the difference so with that um we're very excited that we have four fantastic guests here who have agreed to discuss with us the strategic challenges europe faces vis-a-vis the u.s china conflict and it's my pleasure to introduce them to you now and they should appear on your screen arguing for the motion is ivana karaskova who is joining us from prague she is a founder and project leader of map influence and china observers in central and eastern europe um an organization with the beautiful acronym choice um which does a mapping of international projects of china's presence in central and eastern europe and she's also a china research fellow at the association for international affairs a proc based foreign policy think tank joining her arguing for the motion is andrew small who is in berlin who is a senior transatlantic fellow with the asia program at the german marshall fund of the united states as well as a non-resident senior policy fellow at the european council on foreign relations on the other side arguing against emotion is alicia bachuska who is joining us from varsa today she is a china analyst at the asia research center of war studies university in warsaw i think tank affiliated with the polish ministry of defense where she focuses on chinese foreign policy and its implications for poland as well as a member of the aforementioned map influence and choice and finally uh joining alicia on the side of oregon against emotion is plummeting to who is joining us from athens today is the head of the asia unit at the institute of international economic relations greece plummen is also a founding member of the european think tank network on china and he is a member of several committees among them the eu chapter of the council for security cooperation in the asia pacific thank you very very much all for being here i should mention that ivana and plummen who you'll note are arguing on different sides of the conversation they both have recently been announced as inaugural european china policy fellows by the mercator institute for china studies merrick's in berlin congratulations to you both and i hope that today's conversation will not mean that you will never ever speak to each other again so thank you all uh for being here and without further ado i would like to move right into opening statements um as a tradition with the oxford debate the site arguing for the motion gets the first statement so ivana you have four minutes for your opening remarks and the floor is yours good afternoon ladies and gentlemen let me start by asserting that for europe the choice between the us and china is actually no choice at all given limited time i will not focus on the transatlantic ties but primarily on the europe-china relationship frankly china has not offered europe anything that could prompt it to even begin considering the option of strategic realignment to be sure europe people's republic of china had some chances to boo europe into a closer partnership at several levels first beijing could have offered europe a fair and open access to the chinese market second beijing could have offered to continue on the path of gradual socialization into the international order thus achieving sufficient level of normative convergence third beijing could have benefited from having no direct strategic or security clash with europe europe was ready to offer china its expertise cooperation and partnership but beijing largely mishandled the relationship and effectively push europe away it refused to open up its company while benefiting from access to the eu single market specifically it alienated the european business activity in china by introducing the social credit system for companies forcing them to establish ccp cells within their chinese branches not protecting intellectual property rights steering popular nationalism to prevail consumers boycotts and subsidizing chinese national champions that compete with european businesses since the ascent of sikkim king china's domestic and international liberalization processes have stalled and in many cases overturned the idea of normative convergence gave way to normative competition china is increasingly viewed as a challenger to establish international norms from aggressive territorial claims in the south china sea through dubious international loan standards to exporting pollution along the belt and road moreover china has escalated threats towards eu member states and their representatives notable examples include sweden in connection to the abduction of the hong kong kuen ming hai and the czech republic over the visit of senate president vistacio to taiwan not least china attempts to manipulate media narratives in europe conducts hybrid influence operations tries to push its way into the academic discourse at european universities and espionage in new security domains such as cyberspace europe suddenly finds itself in a strategic clash with chinese interests as the case of the 5g networks and huawei demonstrates due to all of this china has been steadily losing its allies inside europe big businesses which wanted to make money off the chinese market became increasingly fed up with the rising restrictions and uneven playing field proponents of multilateralism and also some intellectuals disillusioned with the ways how democracies in the west work find it ever more difficult to advocate for closer ties with enacters which builds concentration camps for ethnic minorities in xinjiang and has covered up yet again an outbreak of a new epidemic for europe there is really no choice while the us can be sometimes deeply annoying especially in the context of the trump presidency it remains an essential ally to europe due to its clear convergence of security strategic economic and normative interests with china there is hardly a reason to seek such an alignment thank you very much ivana for that opening statement and thank you especially for doing it with a little bit of time to spare that's what we like let's just move it straight over to the opening argument for the team opposing the motion where alicia bachuska will deliver the opening statement also with four minutes time alicia please the floor is yours thank you very much i would like to start by stating that we believe that the internal logic of this statement is inherently misleading first of all it suggests that a clear-cut choice is necessary for the eu to maintain its global position its competitiveness its international appeal secondly the statement is based on a worldview that does not take into account the agency and subjectivity of smaller states it basically portrays the future of international cooperation as an outcome of a battle between the two and only superpowers which obviously creates this dichotomous view where no other actors are actually allowed to influence the global balance of power it also frames the eu as a passive actor whose political will and ambitions are reduced to this seemingly simple choice between two partners with contradictory global interests at the same time we do agree that xi jinping's china does pose a very serious threat to the rules-based international order but we do not agree that the eu must pick sites between the prc and the u.s the us is not a unitary actor in a sense that its current foreign policy does not represent the multitude of domestic voices on both china and other international affairs and while bipartisan consensus on china does seem to exist in the us the views on how to counter this new challenge are very diverse so from this perspective we believe that the eu must create its own policy its own global agenda which in the end might actually have a lot in common with the u.s one especially when it comes to shared concerns about china's increasingly aggressive international behavior its trade policies as well as human rights violations nevertheless we believe that this debate should not be about picking sides and naming and shaming but about designing and implementing specific policy tools aimed at securing the shirt european market and its overall competitiveness the same goes for the european security and both in conventional terms and in terms of emerging hybrid threats and for many countries in the eu maintaining the u.s security umbrella is very important especially here in central and eastern europe but striving for strategic autonomy does not mean rejecting the us-led security system however given the unpredictability of the current u.s administration the eu should firstly and most importantly focus on its own biggest strengths to counter its weaknesses not by picking sides but by tackling head-on the most pressing issues that endanger its global position and actually many of these problems stem from china's behavior and in this way the eu's room for maneuver to cooperate with the us on china-related issues is indeed large but this type of cooperation should be carried forward using both the language and the methods in line with the eu's core values and interests maintaining the ability to independently set priorities while not subsuming to others no matter whether it's china or the us should remain one of the eu's priorities in the end i believe that picking sites might lead us to a self-fulfilling prophecy of this inevitable clash between the two superpowers and this scenario is definitely something that you would like to avoid thank you thank you very much alicia and also i want to commend you for sticking to the time and so eloquently uh arguing without even using the four full minutes let's move it back to the team arguing for the motion andrew small in berlin with his rebuttal for which he also has four minutes and replays good evening from berlin ladies and gentlemen um i will make the uh the case then for why the choice in the motion is a real one um if we were in even semi-normal times i would begin by still running the straightforward case for the transatlantic alliance and its centrality why at critical moments our common values have pulled us together the central role that the u.s plays in europe's defense today which i still think we need to remember when we're thinking about these questions and i would also note that for the greatest europeanists from jean mon eon atlanticism and pro-europeanism were deeply intertwined and because they understood how the us from the marshall plan to the unification of germany has been a necessary force for european unity even at times when we europeans ourselves have doubts and differences i would note that even today despite the president these commitments to europe run strong in the u.s system um as we saw from the overwhelming vote in the senate um for nato just the other year and i would lay out the figures for the transatlantic economy which we also so often take for granted not just the more superficial trading relationship that we have with china but the deeper ties of investment and innovation uh the complementary flows of research of high-tech components and finance that mean that for all the talks of uh us pivot to asia it's europe that has still attracted nearly 60 of all u.s global investment and all u.s international r d spending but we're not in normal times at the moment trust in the transatlantic relationship here in europe is low largely because of this president and what he represents some of the differences at the moment seem to loom larger the choice as our opponents have argued seems like a one that we want to avoid any case at the moment for the kind of essential economic security and values based importance of the alliance is greeted with more skepticism than it would usually be many of us agree with our opponents uh we share a view that we want to europe that is more autonomous and capable as indeed do many on the us side too we've long wanted to see a europe that's less dependent i think the same thing that's true of jean-monet is true of many u.s atlantic assists the best of whom also want to see a strong autonomous europe as an asset in our common cause but that's not the only reason that we're not in normal times as my partner has laid out in china we face a shared challenge with profound implications with the future of our economies our technological edge our values and as we've seen even more through the pandemic the security of our everyday lives too and to deal with that challenge the case that our opponents have laid out a more strategically autonomous europe europe charting its own path is not enough if it's essentially europe alone what our opponents argue for is only a starting point it's a necessary but insufficient condition and i will go further if we had a full federal united states of europe combined european armed forces a unified approach to all strategic economic matters it wouldn't be enough either and we know this because the united states itself has just conducted that experiment over the last few years it's been wielding virtually every instrument of u.s power and taking china on but it did so alone and it wasn't enough it didn't change china's economic behavior it didn't change how china is externalizing the most problematic elements of its domestic model through the belton road it didn't bring that even a pause in the worst of china's behavior in xinjiang or hong kong and now there's a growing recognition on the u.s side that if we're going to deal with these issues it has to be through a coalition with other allies and given the central role that economics and technology play in this challenge europe will be one of the critical us partners together we europe the united states japan and some others do still have the collective capacity to shape global rules consistent with our values to exert pressure on china in critical areas from trade human rights to offer alternatives to chinese financing and to strengthen each other's economic security and technological capabilities i support most of what our opponents have argued for but none of us stops us figuring out complementary approaches on the many areas and in which we still agree the coalitions and coalition partners are annoying everyone has somewhat different goals and somewhat different ways of getting there but at certain times they're essential and the partnership between the united states and europe and taking on the trainer challenge is essential this is one of those times i commend the motion thank you very very much andrew and for our final opening remarks uh let's turn it over to plum and ton chef in athens for his rebuttal arguing against the motion plummet you have four minutes on the clock and the floor is yours thank you very much first of all i'd like to congratulate our opponents dear colleagues and friends for a comprehensive overview in fact what ivana said about china as a threat uh was a was a very good overview and i couldn't have said it better myself and then i want to congratulate andrew for his very british understatement when he says that the transatlantic um uh trust is is very low in fact i would say the trusted transatlantic bond i'm afraid is falling apart we have to admit that the relations between um europe and america are not what they used to be i mean um i'm afraid that we're turning into frenemies with president trump calling the eu a foe and then french president macron speaking of a brain-dead nato i mean something's wrong with the transatlantic relations right now we have to admit that as sad as it is i mean speaking about shared values yes but then you can also see a lot of divergences emerging i'm afraid that the gap between uh europe and america is opening it's it's been opening even before trump came to power while we do share a lot of concerns relating to china that's true and we have to sit down and talk about we should go about china at the same time we do have a lot of different views on a number of global issues including china of course we have to admit that the eu and the united states this particular united states with this particular administration certainly differ on a number of global challenges that have to do with traded investment europeans have a lot more nuanced stance on china whereas the americans tend to dismiss china you know as somebody you shouldn't talk to um let me tell you that a recent survey uh published by rhodium group and the bulletin foundation in germany reveals the fact that not all the products produced in china are actually dangerous and not all the chinese investment in europe should be seen as strategically important so one will have to distinguish between what is serious and less serious when it comes to the whole and the pandemic which is the biggest challenge right now we certainly differ a lot we are in two different camps the eu actually supports the wh so as the world's doctor it needs to be revamped surely but the united states dismisses the who altogether and that's not the way to go we do differ on a number of other issues like the climate change china actually supports the paris accord whereas the united states has walked out and and we do not know how we could possibly uh address this challenge without the united states on board and there are very many uh tricky issues like iran or even afghanistan where we might need china's contribution to the peace process so there are very many issues but let me speak about this uh confrontation between uh china and the united states the two emerging polls of the world order uh i think that it's becoming a bit like the facilities trap that uh graeme edison has spoken about we europeans are a bit relaxed about it we've been there we've done that we don't really care whether china and the united states want to be the two bosses of the world in fact the european view is that we don't need yet another bipolar world and yet another cold war what we need uh is stability and this is where the eu can actually play a very constructive role as a third pole in the middle trying to sort of temper the wild instinct of the two giants america and and china and i think it's important uh to have an eu as a mediator and i would say also as as a referee perhaps uh in this very worrying uh standoff i'll stop here thanks very much thank you very much plummen and thank you everybody for your fantastic opening statements i think we are already seeing the breadth um of the challenge um and the different arguments it's now time for some discussion and q a for which i invite all the panelists to turn back on their cameras and audio so we can ask you questions please if you're joining us on this call and if you have a question submit it by using the q a function that's located on the bottom of your screen you can again also upload other people's questions so we get a little bit of a feeling of what you would like us to address i will start us off with trying to challenge some of the points that our panelists have made and ivana i would like to start with you because you said and your argument really centered on this idea that china has not offered europe anything and you made a very convincing list of things where europe as it were maybe has been a bit disappointed and were the hopes towards china both in terms of political liberalization as well as market access as well as you know china's role in international relations and global governance have been in a way disappointed but and i think this may be something that your opponents would like to point out many europeans now feel eerily similar about the us so while it's certainly true as andrew has pointed out that there is a history of transatlantic relationship at least in the last few years one could ask you the question well what exactly is the us offering what's the case for the us versus china aren't they just both uh big superpowers that you you cannot necessarily put trust into it's a very fair point but um i think it's one which which is trying to mislead the whole discussion to another another completely other avenue so to tackle um your question well um i think that for for europeans we do did really offer china a lot we acted on a good faith thinking that what china will do and what it signaled that it will do would be actually being a part of international system being a responsible stakeholder if i would like to use the the words of the deputy secretary of state uh robert zelik and we acted on that we let china into international organizations we negotiated about what it is that that would make their life easier about market economy status and so on so i think that europeans really offered a lot and they uh were all the time ushered to another to deceit and saying that yes china will somehow develop china will do this and that but the deadlines were all all the time postponing and running away and nothing really changed what changed with thinking king was even more aggressive behavior in international organizations in international waters in uh claiming more territorial starting new territorial disputes claiming the territory which allegedly belonged to china through ancient times um so i think that we can't really say that we were naive we acted on a good faith um but china didn't deliver it didn't uh act upon its promises and it even slapped europe to the face um not doing not offering basically anything promising to open the uh the market promising to um fade to cancelling the restrictions on uh transfer of technology this is still in place in china and it has been promised a number of times but not we haven't seen any uh change and i think that is running away and as for the u.s i think it's a completely different uh different uh question and completely different area you said what is it that the usa is offering while the universe is offering rdi the us is offering still participation in international organizations it still carries the most of the burden in nato the member states most of them didn't upgrade their their defense budgets on the european side as they promised they would do so i think that they're putting china and the us in the same basket is is inherently wrong um it's not the same situation so and the u.s is not threatening uh europe these are words they're ours of course but they're of course deeds and on chinese side there are deeds on the u.s side there are just threatening words okay let's i actually want to want to pick it up right there um plummen you mentioned which i thought was an interesting point you mentioned who which of course is an incredibly important relevant international organization in these times of pandemic and you said and you were right of course that the eu supports the who but the us does not and has in effect said so publicly and again that is true but then on the chinese side is it really much different of course china has not you know pulled out of the wh or threatened to do so but it's also not exactly been you know in the judgment of many supportive so are we not as ivana has argued in his place where at the very least both these sides when it comes to global organizations aren't really playing along should we as europeans trust that china would support an organization like the whl which you seem to suggest thank you nico that's an excellent point in fact what i'm saying is that we cannot trust china on the who because uh the way it is right now the who is actually china driven china-led and we're not happy with that which is why i said the who needs to be fundamentally revamped and there are initiatives you know taken by european governments how we could have a better more efficient and more independent who let me remind you of the fact that when was it last april was it on the 4th of may the eu had this fundraising event it actually came up with 7.4 billion euros for vaccine development and take a wild guess the united states ran away it didn't even turn up at the event and the the chinese ambassador to the eu came up with a bland statement not committing a single euro all right so this is exactly why the eu wants a wh oh but a different who and it cannot really trust uh the united states nor china in terms of addressing effectively addressing what is a global challenge the kobe 19 pandemic thank you so much i i want to turn it to andrew because you said something that i thought was very interesting so your argument andrew was essentially that europe alone is not enough and the u.s alone is not enough in any other country or region you know when dealing with china it's not enough china is a giant and so you would have to form a coalition to effectively counter it and you know as you mentioned as you said to influence china um in a certain way and it seems to me that this is precisely the the calculation that maybe the the quote-unquote west has made in the last 20 or so years that we believed erroneously that you know if we were united we could influence china and it wouldn't we just have to accept that whatever coalition we form whatever basis we have influencing china might just not be possible uh thank you and i i think one of the the questions in the q a race raised this issue as well and and they're important questions and so a couple of responses to that uh first of all we have not been united in any meaningful way in our approach to china um in in recent decades we have pursued parallel approaches we're certainly still pursuing um very parallel approaches at the moment uh china is is aware of this um it's one of china's primary objectives to ensure that there is not a coalition a counter-balancing coalition of various forms that develops against it and this is what we've seen with wangi's visit to europe with the big push that's taking place at the moment there are real fears at the moment on the chinese side that there is going to be a common front that develops against um against china because their behavior in particularly in the last year but over a longer period of time has started to bring that about we're seeing that from australia from japan from india from the us from canada go down a very long list of countries there is a huge level of collective disquiet with china at the moment and there are real prospects for stitching some kind of uh coalition together particularly as we may see coming after after the next uh us elections and what's possible in in those circumstances that group of of actors and the us and and in europe uh even among those wield a significant level of power um economic standard setting technological and if we are able to um put on a more effective common front than we have ever really attempted to do seriously with with china before and what does that mean it doesn't just mean trying to change china's behavior though i think even the prospect of this has started to elicit some changes in chinese behavior it's partly out of fears of this coalition that we've started to see um on china's part for instance the climate promises that xi jinping made at the un general assembly the other week because they're so anxious at the moment that precisely this sort of coalition is going to deform that's good we want to see these sorts of changes in chinese behavior as a result of this we want to see china changing its economic practices as a result of this we want to see reforms in china we don't want a confrontational relationship with china on all fronts that's part of the value and of even the prospect of a coalition like this coming together and but if it doesn't work in changing china's behavior that's okay that's not the pure uh goal of building a coalition like this the other goal is similarly that we're able to strengthen and make resilient the ties among each other and which do come under uh threat if we're not able to maintain a common front for instance we will not be able to as europe and the united states continue to have the flows of technology and finance and things if we have divergent approaches to china we're starting to see those pressures building it will have an effect on the transatlantic economic relationship as well because the us can't pursue one set of policies that says china can't get access to technologies that it then acquires from europe instead we need to figure out common approaches to these things otherwise we will start to damage relations with each other there's a very popular question from the q a that a lot of people have uploaded and i would actually like to put it to you first alexia and then see whether the other panelists um want to offer diverging opinions so the question is how you actually understand the word choose in the context of the motion will europe choose the us over china and i wanted to ask you because you made an interesting point in your um initial statement we said we as europe we may well end up with china policy or policies plural that look very very similar to the ones the u.s has so in effect we may end up choosing the same policies than the u.s but you seem to suggest that this is not the same thing than actually choosing the us so can you address that difference what is the what would the action of choosing the u.s actually look like um and and what makes you oppose it if we will end up with the same policy anyway it seems like that's a i don't see what the difference would be yeah thank you very much well um i have a feeling that um this very question about what choice in this context mean um is basically what i was trying to describe in my opening statement and first of all i feel that there is a very big difference between um setting the rules and following the rules of others and as ivana has mentioned before europe is very well aware at this point that china has not reacted to this favorable policies that the eu has been trying to to implement and forge ties between china and europe in the last couple of decades and in this sense choosing the us would somehow mean assuming this very defeatist approach it would basically be about saying that there is only one big player here in this big global room and we have to somehow subsume our agency and our interest and our multitude of domestic voices to it is one player and obviously you could say that the eu as as such cannot form a comprehensive foreign policy because it's just too messy it's made up of too many actors too many conflicting interests but well you can say it's a mess i can say this is the essence of democratic debate and this kind of strategic changes they don't happen overnight these are not you know overnight oaths it's not that you put this idea into this intellectual fridge and you take it out after an hour or two or a day or two and then you can have it ready to implement i feel it's more about being able to forge and and um develop this debate that will at certain point reach the tipping point and i feel that we are here at this moment that europe is not naive anymore um all the actors are somehow reaching this um realization that china is more of a of a rival than the partner and the international environment is enabling um the eu to create a more coherent long-term strategic perspective which will be also about choosing certain convergent points with the us and then developing them together but not subsuming and you know uh being dominated by the u.s uh debate on the topic and adopting it without little internal discussion so i want to thank you very much ality i want to put this to ivana and andrew on the other side so you guys argue that we need to form a coalition with the us um we need to speak you know with what one voice we need to develop a joint position and anitia and this is an interesting argument i think argues that this would essentially mean giving up to a certain extent you know our debate and and and the way of developing the argument and really the essence in way of democracy so is joining a coalition with the us against china worth giving up our own foreign policy independence to a certain extent or is it a false choice i think i will i may start and then leave it to andrew to elaborate i think it is essentially a false choice because we are you know forgetting the third partner in this debate and that's china it's not only about eu us relationship or it's not primarily about eu u.s relationship it's primarily about what china is doing and if you put it in a way that we are choosing between china which is not offering anything and the u.s which is actually offering anything then i think that it's this the whole whole equation is is uh really really wrong china doesn't give us chance it doesn't offer anything so why should the europe partner with with china i also do not agree with um the understanding of subsuming um our policies european policies to eu sorry to u.s interests we are parts of nato for example do you feel that europe somehow subsumed its interests because we partnered with us on security front i might leave it to to andrew but i really think that this dichotomy is inherently wrong all right andrew let's hear from you would we need as europe as european countries we need to give up part of our independence to join this coalition with the u.s that you've advocated for and if so is it worth it i think we would agree with um uh 70 of of of what alicia was was saying in in her argument we don't think that the argument should be that uh europe should subsume its foreign policy to the united states or just follow an approach to china um that is deferential entirely to u.s preferences absolutely not we we think that the priority um should be to put in the hard work to come up with a common ground as we've done on on many other uh issues in in the past uh before and the most effective policy the most effective u.s policy as well is going to be one that takes its allies interests into account i think there is increasing recognition on the u.s side that that is going to be essential for them to be able to run a more successful china policy than they have over the last few years and that europe is going to be central to that and we need to take advantage of that we need to be in a position to help set the agenda we should be in a position to shape us policy in these areas as well in a way that's more conducive to our interests but to do that does mean making a choice it means not separating ourselves from this it means taking the step making the decisions that say that this is going to be one of the central priorities in in our policy it means at the most most banal level prioritizing the u.s security alliance over say on sales or dual use weapon sales to china there are real choices we've made them before we have chosen the us when it came to this when the ons embargo issue came up um in in the past that is a real and material choice we should continue to prioritize our economic relationships our technology relationships how we coordinate multilateral institutions and everything with other market economies and democracies including very centrally at the united states as well these are real choices and they're not choices that need given the power and capacity that we bring to bear on this as europe to mean that we have to uh act purely out of deference this has been a helpful few years in forcing us as europeans uh to sharpen up our positions in in this regard we will come with more bring more to the table than than we would have done um uh several years back in this regard i think we can be more self-confident about this role than thinking in any coalition um with the united states and others on this issue that we would have to approach in a way that subordinated um european views priorities agenda and anything else can i begin very quickly just very briefly please yes um so uh first of all i would like to respond to ivana um when i was talking about subsuming our interest to the interest of the us i was talking about very specific issues when it comes to the defense um cooperation as i said in my initial statement i feel that these things are not self-exclusive europe can develop its own strategic autonomy or strategic flexibility call it as you like it does not mean that we have to resign in any way from cooperation with the us in terms of of defense and security especially here in central and eastern europe but then again we don't know who's going to win the new um presidential elections in the us in in in november and let's imagine that donald trump wins he will continue his policies he will feel even even stronger and more confident about about his um direction and his dynamics when it comes to shaping this these uh policies do you want to actually sign up europe as a whole you as a whole to um a policy that basically is not only about containing china but it's also about climate denied climate change denialism about lack of respect for minorities for women for many actually social groups that are um not very visible um and they are not very powerful both in the united states and in many many places in europe is this the kind of cooperation we want is this the way we want to legitimize certain policies of donald trump by basically choosing the us um over china that's an open question let me uh let let's maybe table this question which is an interesting one um because i do want to bring up one other question from the audience and we only have a few minutes left in this part and so this question goes to the topic of technology which um some of you have already mentioned in your opening statements and rebuttals um of course we are seeing right now a much more critical stance towards chinese technology exemplified you know in the 5g and huawei issues but it is worth remembering as the person asking this question does here reminding us that there's also is and perhaps should be some skepticism on this issue you know from europe towards the us when we think back of the snowden affair so plummen you had argued that you know at the end the transatlantic bond is becoming weaker and weaker when it comes to the issue of technology when it comes to the issue of where do we get our 5g equipment or where do we you know like where do we put our trust in our data you know are the us and china effectively the same should we not trust either of them or is there you know an argument to be made for one of the two sides to be met with more european trust and cooperation well let me tell you that right now there are several agents i hope you can hear me because i was offline for a couple of minutes yes i apologize for that right very good well right now there are the shall i say 5g giants huawei zte nokia and erickson right and there are some american companies of course but these are the big players right so i can think of no compelling reason why we should be discussing this issue i think we can very well invest in european companies and in fact this is happening right now as we speak okay um excellent uh let's maybe quickly hear from the other side ivana and andrew on the technology issue how would you see that would you and how would you argue which i assume that you would that europe should forge a closer collaboration on technologies with the us than it should with china i just want one one sentence on alicia's uh arguments well i don't get to how how the minorities and women got it to the discussion well we are debating whether do you whether the europe should should align with china or with the us and of course on both sides we can find something we really do not as europeans feel comfortable with but the motion is about something else and still we are not talking about assuming somehow our illnesses to either side um as for the fight issues um well politics is dirty politics is never never a nice thing and foreign policy is dirty as well um so here it essentially boils to the question of who do you trust most do you trust united states despite the snowden scandal despite the the spying on on let's say angela merkel and so on or whether do you trust an autocratic regime which is spying regularly on its own citizens and would like to spy on everyone else would you who would you like to give the access to your private data if you can't protect them uh in in in any way would you would you give it to a democracy which is an ally though it might you you might have some reservations regarding uh the way it functions functions or would you give it to an autocratic state which is run by a chinese communist party so i think that it very essentially boils to the trust issue here all right thank you very much um we have come unfortunately already to the end of the discussion and q a part so let's move straight into closing arguments which are two minutes each the order again is the same as at the beginning which means we'll hand it right back to ivana and then followed by alicia andrew and finally barman so ivana you have two more minutes to summarize the position and argue why people should vote um in favor of the motion today thank you well i argued that for europe there is really no choice while it is essentially a good idea for europe to build its strategic capabilities and capacities as our opponents were mentioning a couple of times for now it's certainly not in a position to carve out a middle way europe has not been a relevant actor in security even in its immediate neighborhood as the case of ukraine showed as the case of syria and libya demonstrated the view of europe as a third actor carving out a metal position between the us and china i think it's it's an illusion europe cannot pull its act together right now it potentially can but it doesn't do that and with the united kingdom leaving european union europe's ability to exercise its strategic muscles further diminishes well i can imagine a situation where europe would be forced to grow its strategic muscles quickly and that would be when the u.s abandons europe but it's a hypothetical scenario right now it's unlikely to happen the united states didn't do it even during the trump presidency to be sure it scored europe it threatened europe on tax imports but whoever wins in the upcoming upcoming presidential elections know that europe has to be a part of the u.s policy in china we all want to see strong autonomous europe but it will not be enough to deal with the china challenge we need to combine forces of europe and us if we want to achieve at least something europeans know that u.s can be sometimes deeply annoying however it remains an essential ally to europe due to clear convergence of the interest security interests strategic economic and normative interests i repeat again europe has been in a position to offer europe carrots but it didn't do that instead it slept europe to face couple of times and i don't see a reason for europe to seek alignment with china for europe there's only one chance and that's to choose the united states as we argued for thank you very much uh let's turn it right over to alitya for her closing statements arguing against emotion thank you i would like to um finish by saying that we believe that donald's donald trump's policies and his disregard for values advocated by the eu have theoretically created the perfect environment for a hypothetical china ear approachment yet this reproachment clearly never happened quite the opposite the eu has become increasingly aware of china being more of a rival than a partner and that's precisely the proof why the eu doesn't have to choose if the eu was to be convinced to pick sites it would have already done so by now the eu has its own identity and know its comparative advantage although it might not yet be able to use them to its best we believe that the us under donald trump's rule has not made this task any easier the eu is also aware of its economic leverage over china and it might actually end up using it however the precise form of this kind of response will have to crystallize in the years to come and the diversification of economic partners localization of supply chains more focus on cooperation with the indo-pacific partners are just a few options of how to go forward and last but not least i would like to quote the words of the french minister of state for european affairs clement who recently said that europeans know that they must once again speak the language of power but without losing sight of the grammar of cooperation and that's precisely what we mean by strategic flexibility thank you thank you very much um andrew the floor is yours for your closing statement arguing in favor of the motion uh thanks very much um so i think it was a danish finance minister uh who said there are two kinds of european nations there are small nations and there are countries that have not yet realized they are small nations we have to realize and recognize that in what can be achieved with our china policy too the u.s has started to recognize this it's time for us to do that we're facing profound global power shifts we have to be ambitious as europe as our opponents um have argued and as we fully share um but we also have to be realistic we have to make some choices on who we're going to work with and some really material choices that will be uh consequential for uh european strategy and for the shape of our future partnerships look like and we're going to face these choices even more acutely very soon we're a month away from an election now in which we are at present and fairly likely to see a president elected who will be looking to place allies at the center of u.s china strategy and not just u.s china strategy u.s grand strategy this isn't just about us choosing the united states or about deferring to the u.s agenda it's about the united states choosing us too and it's about doing the hard work of coming up with an agenda that is a genuinely shared one between the united states europe and other democracies so we will argue and we argue that for the sake not just of the continued vitality of our most important security and economic relationship which will be hit if we can't find common cause on china it will be damaged but also in order to deal with our most important shared long-term challenge we should be ready to make the choice that this motion presents our closest ally still our closest ally however as my partner says annoying at times uh over the country that is itself choosing in china to be more and more a competitor and more and more a rival thank you so much andrew and finally for the closing statement arguing against the motion flemington chef in athens thank you nico we would argue that the eu has shown that it can have its own stance even if it's confusing at times in fact the eu must have its own stance both the united states and china want the europeans in their camps and this is where the eu should actually cash in why because the european single market remains very attractive to chinese companies the eu represents a secure destination for their exports and investments china needs allies among western partners western powers committed to free trade and globalization to which china actually owes its spectacular economic development over the past decades and this is particularly true now with the beginnings of this violent decoupling drive launched by the united states the united states in turn needs to tap into washington's traditional alliances if it is to corner china and tease out concessions from what the americans view as their strategic rival and this is why america doesn't have the luxury of seeing its clout peeled off and european countries including eu member states jumping onto beijing's boat for these reasons it would be a big mistake to write off the the european union it's a powerhouse and it will remain so even if in economic and normative terms not not as a military power the united states china eu triangle is based on on competitive relations and even rivalry but this is a global arrangement that will remain in place and each side will need allies depending on on specific issue at stake a final point since i'm based in greece let me allow allow me to um finish with a metaphor from the greek mythology the way both china and america vie you know for europe's attention and loyalty makes me think of the odyssey and queen penelope if you remember on the island of ithaca she was a you know fight by various suitors for the hand hand so that they can marry her penelope was courted but she withstood the pressure and we know the happy end of the story my point is that penelope dash europe needs to do also that she needs to do is remain true to herself she needs to be herself and not what others want her to be thanks very much thank you very much for this beautiful analogy at the very end plum and tonjes and with that um our oxford debate on whether europe should choose or will choose the us over china is coming to an end all that is left to do is to vote and determine the winning team i will now launch the poll again um and you should see it on your screen you can again answer the exact same question europe will choose the us over china do you agree or disagree with this emotion and then the difference between the first and the second vote will determine the winner all right so here we see that there has been a change while the statement agreeing with the motion yes has gone from 62 to 46 um the statement uh disagreeing with the motion has gone up from 22 to 31 so while a majority also at the end still agrees with the motion the team arguing against emotion has made the biggest gain uh with nine percent plus which means that you win congratulations alicia and plummen um also of course congratulations andrew um and ivana majority still agrees with you also very interesting i don't think this has happened before we've actually had an increase in people who say i don't know uh so today's debate has also contributed to people not just changing their minds but even uh not being sure which i think you know in such a complex and multi-layered conversation is probably a good thing again thank you so much to all our contestants today um for your great debate and great arguments this is of course a conversation that will continue um and they will continue to have in different ways thank you everybody at home watching for your participation for all the great questions i'm sorry we did not get to answer all of them but there will be future opportunities and for your votes um it was a great pleasure hosting you all if you are leaving this call afterwards and are so inclined there should be a feedback form popping up in your browser and you can give us some feedback we would appreciate it we're always trying to improve and so with that all that's left to say is again thank you very much for having joined us today and i hope you will join us soon um for our next oxford debate or any other online event

Channel: Asia Society

Views: 4,889

Keywords: current affairs, asia society switzerland, europe, program, european union, european policy, europe-china relations, europe-us relations, oxford debate, webcast, ivana karskov, andrew small, alicja bachulska, plamen tonchev

Id: aqZDPTdNngg

Length: 55min 19sec (3319 seconds)

Published: Thu Oct 15 2020