Once More into the Breach: How Serious Are the Risks of Another US War in the Middle East?

[Music] for h [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] that's [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] good morning everybody and welcome to the KO Institute my name is Justin Logan I'm the director of the defense and foreign policy studies program sorry that's a terrible way to start thank you fine we got it out of the way early I directed foreign policy and defense studies program at Ko um and I'd like to welcome you to our event here um on the prospect for the United States entering another conflict uh to the Middle East um and as I'll set up the discussion here in just a moment uh you know I I see the United States as as really teetering on the brink uh of a conflict in the Middle East um and I think there's a remarkably small amount of attention uh being paid to this problem in town I had our research assistants look at um the top 17 non- foreign policy think tanks in town um and the events that they've hosted since October the 7th um and depending on how you code these events you can count on one hand um the number of events that have looked at the conflict in the Middle East specifically with an eye to the prospect of horizontal escalation to include the prospect of the United States uh entering this conflict and it's expanding the conflict so I think this is a very serious problem and there there's been a dir uh uh of attention paid to it in Washington so this event is a small effort uh to remedy that deficiency um of course this this current uh uh outbreak of violence in the Middle East began on October the 7th um when the Hamas attack crossed border into Israel from Gaza um killed uh I I initially had had 1,400 Israelis but the numbers that I've been seeing recently have gone down to 12200 a lot in enormous amount um um of Israelis um President Biden subsequently sent one and then a second carrier strike group uh to the region one of those is currently in the Eastern Mediterranean the other has come round and is just outside the Persian Gulf um the statement of the US Secretary of Defense is that the purpose of these deployments is to quote deter hostile actions against Israel or any efforts toward widening this war following hamas's attack on Israel uh there are other deployment fighter aircraft a Marine Expeditionary Expeditionary Unit uh and other forces that have been deployed to the region under similar rationals at the same time the Biden Administration has signaled in other ways that it wants to limit uh escalation of the conflict in a variety of forms um it it has tried uh allegedly to limit uh the Israeli campaign in Gaza um and it has uh also signaled that it does not want a second front to open open uh in Northern Israel with the border with Lebanon um Lloyd Austin held a call with his counterpart in Israel uh to emphasize that point over the weekend um in one report alleged that some in the Biden Administration quote are concerned Israel may be trying to provoke hisbah uh and create a pretext for a wider war in Lebanon that could draw the United States and other countries further into the conflict um that was roundly denied uh but published uh in ax nonetheless we haven't even gotten to the other conf the other uh uh region part of the region in which conflict would erupt which are the scattershot deployments of the United States in Syria uh and Iraq there is an ongoing tit fortat conflict happening there already between the US deployments that exist in those countries uh and Regional militias mostly backed by Iran there have at my last count been 56 attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since the 17th of October 59 US troops have been injured in those attacks none have been killed there have been three us responses to those attacks which have killed uh a number of militia members uh uh in those attacks at the same time the administration claims that this back and forth which is happening uh is quote separate and distinct from the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas this sort of Str credulity because During the period from January of 2021 to March of 2023 those same deployments only suffered 83 attacks from Regional militias over a larger than twoyear time period so in less than a month they've suffered 56 attacks whereas in the previous two years uh they had suffered 83 attacks and at the same time in conclusion of this sort of setting up of the problem the Administration has said uh should warcom we are ready for it President Biden says quote American leadership is what holds the world together he says that we are the essential nation and his treasury secretary says the United States can quote certainly afford to fund the Ukraine conflict and the current conflict in the Middle East involving Israel and Hamas at the levels the administration sees is necessary for the time span the administration sees as necessary so it's this context into which uh we wanted to look at uh the prospect uh for the United States uh to enter this conflict and we're going to get at it from a variety of different angles today um I'm going to introduce the uh panelists in the order in which they'll speak and I want to say at the outset this was not intended to be such a khey panel and it was not intended to be a Manel uh we had a a participant uh pull out at the 11th Hour uh and we were very happy to be able to to pull in one of my colleagues to substitute for her so I just wanted to sort of uh put that set on the table at the outset um the first presenter is going to look at the War Powers questions at stake here what authorities is the president claiming to have uh in hand uh to enter a conflict potentially um and what uh H how do those authorities stand up to Legal scrutiny um dealing with those questions is my colleague Jean Healey who's the senior vice president for policy here at Ko his research interests pertain to executive power and the role of the presidency as well as federalism and overcriminalization he's the author of indispensable remedy the broad scope of the Constitution's impeachment power he's been looking at impeachment for reasons that are probably obvious over the past several years um and also the author of my favorite of his works the cult of the presidency America's dangerous Devotion to executive power uh which I think was a uh remains unfortunately uh a useful clarifying work um he obtained a ba from Georgetown University about which we'll hear more later and a JD from youth Chicago Law School uh I also found out despite being a friend and colleague of jeans for 20 years now because we're those kind of guys I just found out today today's his birthday so happy birthday Jean um our second presenter is Dr ner hashimi who's the director of the aled center for Muslim Christian understanding and an associate professor of Middle East and Islamic politics at the Edmund a Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University Dr hash's research interest focus on the global rise of authoritarianism religion and democracy Middle East and Islamic politics and Islam West relations he's the author of the book Islam secularism and liberal democracy toward a democratic toward a democratic theory for Muslim societies and particularly of interest for the discussion today he's the co-editor of a recent book entitled sectarianization mapping the New Politics of the Middle East which was edit co-edited with Danny pastell Dr Hashi obtained his PhD in political science from the University of Toronto and Dr hushi will talk a little bit about the various actors across the region their capabilities their incentives and interests uh and how those May uh contribute to either escalation or non- escalation as it may be and then finally is Jordan Co and my colleague who's a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at Ko um he has been the co-author of the KO institute's arms sales Risk Index since its Inception and his research interests include arm sales alliances and Middle East politics he obtained his PhD in political science from George Mason University across the river in Virginia so with that I'll turn things over to Jean Hey to talk eight or 10 minutes about what the administration is claiming in terms of War Powers uh and your candid thoughts about those claims thanks Justin uh I think that all sets the stage nicely for the question I'm supposed to address uh according to the invite does the president have the legal authority to bring the United States into into the war and the answer to that question is no of course not uh certainly not uh according to the original understanding of the Constitution's War Powers provisions and not even according to the Loosey Goosey living constitutionalism version offered up by the president's lawyers in the office of legal council at least I'd argue not according to a fair reading of that Doctrine um in the next few minutes I'll make that case uh walking us through some of the various legal Provisions at play here uh but then I'll end with the depressing question does the president's lack of legal Authority matter uh will it actually tie his hands uh if he decides to go to go beyond the current uh few driveby retaliatory air strikes in Syria and decides to to wage a wider wider war with Iranian proxies and perhaps Iran itself um and the depressing answer to that depressing question uh probably not uh so happy Birthday everyone U let's start with the original understanding of constitutional War Powers uh our Constitution's framers broadly speaking believe that going to war should be difficult uh that it should get an open public debate in Congress and require consensus across both houses and the executive branch in the original constitutional scheme the president's military powers are mostly defensive it's the the described as the power to repel sudden attacks not to launch them whenever he thinks it might be a good idea um if you're looking for possible uh presidential constitutional sources for presidential unilateral action uh where would they be uh the first sentence of article two gives the president the executive power in the John U Theory uh during the bush years uh a lot of weight was placed on this Clause P numbers and emanations from which uh gave the P president the power to launch Wars uh but the framers rejected a a monarchical model of the executive power the executive power in in our constitution is principally the power to execute the law to Faithfully execute the laws that and decisions that congress makes um article two section two of course makes the president the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States but as Hamilton explained in Federalist 69 that Clause merely makes the president the quote first general and Admiral of us Armed Forces and while generals and Admirals have an important role they generally don't get to decide whether when and with whom we go to war uh virtually every military power you can find in the constitution is in article one which lists the powers that belong to Congress it's left to Congress to raise and support armies to make rules for their use to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union and to declare war and that power to declare war was understood broadly as a real limit on presidential freedom of action uh that's reflected in the drafting history of the provision the Madison's notes from the convention describe it as leaving to the executive the power to repel sudden attacks uh to repel and not com to commence War it's reflected in the ratifying debates Pennsylvania's James Wilson uh explained to the Pennsy ratifying convention that this system will not hurry us into war because it would not be in the power of a single man to embroil the country in such distress since the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large and it's also reflected in the War Powers practice of The Early Republic in how presidents understood their own War making Authority during the first four presidential administrations the US was on the receiving end of multiple acts of War uh from Indian tribes from IL legal capture of uh neutral shipping uh by England of France the impressment and kidnapping of thousands of sailors uh by England and during this period uh presidents Washington Adams Jefferson and M Madison believed that the constitution restrained them from going beyond the line of defense defense in response to these acts of War uh as Washington put it in 1793 the Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken till after they shall have deliberated upon the subject and authorized such a measure so in the current conflict conflict is there anything the president can point to to credibly argue that Congress has deliberated on and authorized a wider war with Hezbollah Andor Iran again no uh over the last few decades uh every time we've wanted to do something new and stupid in the Middle East uh the usual candidates for statutory Authority have been the 200 2001 and 2002 authorizations for the use of military force or aums the 2002 aumf is the authorization that Congress passed in October of that year to give George W bush authority to go after Saddam Hussein uh its operative Clause empowers the president to to quote defend the National Security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq uh unless he's going to do a magic find and replace to switch all the cues to ends uh that aumf doesn't authorize a new war against a different much bigger country uh two decades later the 2001 aumf of course is the joint resolution that Congress passed three days after 911 to Target the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks and anyone who harbored or aided them uh al- Qaeda and the Taliban basically it's often been described as a blank a blank check because four presidents in a row have stretched it to underwrite a generational war against all matter of uh jihadist groups that uh you know didn't exist uh at at the time of 911 uh and that have loose connections at best to the authorization original purpose even so it won't it won't stress stretch far enough uh to cover this case uh and for what it's worth the Administration has already disclaimed the 2001 aumf as a possible source of Authority for a wider War uh in a press briefing last month the pentagon's press secretary said that Hamas and Hezbollah are not included under the 2001 aumf because they're not successor organizations to al- Qaeda uh what does Joe Biden think of of all of this uh well he was elected in 1973 um and after a man spends uh fivefold decades in politics it's a a fair question whether he really has any genuine opinions left at all um but for what it's worth during his 36 years in the US Senate Biden amassed a a fairly decent War Powers record uh periodically standing up for the principle that it's Congress and not the president that gets to decide whether and when we go to war uh he spoke up for that principle during George HW Bush's 1989 uh Panama invasion in the runup to the Gulf War in 1991 and even when it was uh when it involved the president of his own party uh when Bill Clinton uh threatened to invade Haiti in 1994 Biden warned him that he didn't have that Authority without Congress and Biden held to that view as recently as the 2008 election cycle uh there's this candidate executive power survey uh started that year by the reporter Charlie Savage then with the Boston Globe and in it uh Biden was asked specifically about the president's authority to bomb Iran without Congressional authorization his answer was short sharp and unequivocal quote the Constitution is clear except in response to an attack or the imminent threat of attack only Congress May authorize War and the use of force on the campaign Trail around the same time uh then Senator Biden even promised uh that quote if George W bush takes this nation to war in Iran without Congressional approval I will make it my business to impeach him um hard to do from the Senate uh but uh but uh you know I appreciate the sentiment um yeah of course since the 2008 cycle uh some things have changed Joe Biden has had 11 years in the executive branch uh eight as vice president and going on three now as president so of course this isn't what he says now uh he has grown in office and his view of the presidential War Powers has grown along with him um Charlie Savage kept doing those candidate executive power surveys through the next five election Cycles after 2008 and Joe Biden kept revising his answer uh the latest round uh which was published in September about three weeks before the Hamas attacks uh Savage asked uh now President Biden again about whether the president has unilateral authority to go to war with Iran uh Biden now says the Constitution vests congress with the the power to declare war uh a a power that includes the requirement to authorize uses of force that would result in prolonged and substantial military engagements as is well established and as the J department of justice has articulated across several administrations the Constitution vests the president as commander-in Chief and chief executive with the power to direct direct limited US military operations abroad with without prior Congressional approval when those operations serve important us interests and are of a limited nature scope and duration Biden's new constitutional theory is also as he alludes to the official executive branch Theory courtesy of the Department of Justice's office of legal council uh olc has been called the president's Law Firm uh the sort of OJ's dream team for defending uh unilateral Presidential Power and they've evolved uh a two-part test for unilateral military action by the president uh one do the military operations contemplated by the president serve sufficiently important national interests to let him get away with unilateral action and two are those operations limited enough in nature scope and duration such that they don't rise to the level of a war in the Constitutional sense and there a number of problems with this test uh starting with you can't find it anywhere in the actual Constitution um and for another the the first prong does the contemplated intervention serve sufficiently important national interests isn't even a legal question I mean if you genuinely wanted to know whether bombing a particular country was in uh the best interest of the United States uh you know and you earnestly set out to get the best answer to that question uh of all the people you might consult would the president's in-house Council be very high on that list even so uh olc's view which is Biden's current view isn't quite the dark Brandon theory of presidential War Powers it's not John U it's not Limitless again for what it's worth there are acknowledg limits to what the even under this Theory to what the president can do without Congress in olc Doctrine there's such a thing as war in the Constitutional sense that needs to be authorized by Congress if the president goes too far he can encroach uh in theory on congress's power to de declare war by creating conditions in which the decision is basically taken and effectively taken out of their hands um and in the second prong of that two-part test olc says you're supposed to consider the nature scope and duration of the military intervention uh in assessing whether that prong is satisfied uh you're supposed to consider the risk of escalation uh whether US forces are expected to suffer or inflict uh substantial casualties uh whether the engagement is expected to be uh prolonged and substantial well I I'm going to leave it to my co-panelists to lay out the specific details here but I think it's fair to say that all of those risks are very much present in the current conflict uh I keep saying for what it's worth but what's it worth uh all these same escalatory risks were also present in January 2020 when President Trump ordered a drone strike on senior Iranian governmental figures including uh General kasim solomane um and olc wrote a memo uh rationalizing that decision most of it is blacked out and redacted um but the the serious risk of a wider war from assassinating a senior governmental figure in a country of a country we not at we weren't at war with um still in olc's judgment was not enough to rise to the level of war in a constitutional sense uh so in the current conflict if uh President Biden feels that his hand is forced or decides that a wider war is in in America's interests uh it's it's a a pretty safe bet that the president's Law Firm will almost certainly give its blessing to whatever he wants to do earlier I quoted uh penylan James Wilson uh who said that the system devised by the the framers will not hurry us into war it will not be in the power of a single man to involve Us in such distress that was the way it was supposed to work uh it's not the way that it works now in what happens next we uh For Better or For Worse are going to have to depend heavily on one man's prudence and self-restraint a very sobering note on which to close the that part of the that part of the discussion Professor hashimi talk to us a little bit about uh who's who over there thank you um thanks for the invitation just a shout out to um the KO Institute for hiring two I think of the most um astute and aidite analysts of the Middle East broader Arabic Islamic world must of akol and Jonathan Hoffman um um I Rely a lot on their analysis for my own understanding of the region so I wanted to give them some public recognition so the question um uh that brings us together is how serious are the risks of another us war in the Middle East and my argument is that I think there are short-term risks that we have to think about there's longer term risks of an expanded war in the Middle East that flow from the Israel Gaza War I think the longer term risks that I want to focus much of my remarks on is the much greater risk because it's going to add another layer of instability onto an already unstable Middle East increasing the prospects of volatility chaos disorder down the road that will inevitably drag the us into the region repeating and expanding what we've seen over the last month but at a much higher level uh that's where I think the real danger is so in terms of the short-term risks they've already been sort of hinted at um a little bit let me just say a few words on the short-term risks uh of a us um expanded War um involvement in the Middle East that flows from events on October the 7th so since the beginning of the war in Gaza there has been daily skirmishes on the Israel Lebanon border um has has fired anti-tank missiles at Israeli outposts along the border Israel has conducted air strikes on Hezbollah positions um um in Lebanon 10 Israeli soldiers and civilians have been killed and more than 60 Hezbollah operatives and several Lebanese civilians have been killed roughly over the last month Israel has evacuated tens of thousands of people from the border area um um warning of a potential Hezbollah sort of military strike on Israeli territory behind the scenes we have reports now that the us um and the White House has asked Secretary of Defense Austin to express uh his concern to the Israeli military leaders about an escalating Israeli military action in Lebanon the United States is trying its best to contain the expansion of the war into Lebanon so I think there are sort of risks of the Lebanon Israeli sort of um U border expanding into a broader War but I think at the same time it's important to appreciate there are deep constraints that Hezbollah uh is operating within and we sort of saw a sort of a a sign of this when nosta gave his speech about a month ago and the constraints basically are the following at the end of the day you know Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization it has to operate within Lebanon Lebanon is a deeply fragile and broken country its economy is in tatters 80% of the population lives in poverty it has a broken political system in 2006 uh hea started a war with Israel it didn't end very well for Lebanon and Hezbollah took the blame other Lebanese factions said look what the hell did you do do to us and and and and and hezb took a b took a big uh beating up from other Lebanese political forces and it's very conscious of that fact so I think those are the big constraints that are going to restrain heah from getting involved but of course we don't know if there is a mass expulsion of Palestinians into Egypt that's going to increase the political temperature it's going to increase the prospects of leban of of Hezbollah firing more rockets and things can spin out of control so I think those are the that's how I view in a nutshell you know what's happening in Lebanon with respect to Hezbollah I have to say more with respect to us Iran tensions and attacks on American you know assets and troops in uh Syria and Iraq um it was mentioned that you know since this crisis broke out there have been an increase um attempts by Iran to attack American assets uh military basic Etc in Iraq and also in Syria the United States has retaliated several times um according to axio 56 us Personnel have been um injured combin of traumatic brain and minor injuries uh have been reported but it's also been reported that they've all returned to work so we're going to we've seen that type of back and forth it's probably going to continue at this level uh the Biden Administration has taken the rare step of sending a message to the senior Iranian leadership not to Target American troops I don't think the Iranians are going to listen but at the same time I don't think Iran wants to get involved in a broader Regional War um for reasons of its own National Security calculations and I think broadly speaking Iran is benefiting um quite a bit by now without getting involved militarily in a direct way by this changing landscape that we're seeing in the Middle East how is Iran benefiting um um by this changing political landscape well the global Focus now is no longer on Iran its internal repression its nuclear program it's regional destabilization the focus now by the world is on on Israel and Gaza and on the human suffering there that plays to Iran's benefit Iran doesn't want the spotlight on its human rights record it wants the spotlight on re other Regional countries who are engag in Gross human rights violations secondly Iran um since the Arab Spring has had a problem with the Arab Street the Arab street is Iran's basic constituency after Iran strongly backed the Bashar Al Assad sort of repression campaign against the protesters Iran's stock in the region among the Sunni population dropped significantly now that's all changed Iran is projecting itself as the one country that cares about the Palestinians that cares about the suffering of What's Happen in Gaza while all of the regional countries were just about to jump into bed with Netanyahu and so Iran likes to draw that distinction between itself and what the other Regional countries were doing it gains that way by trying to extend its soft power into the Arab world and of course the Gaza crisis also allows Iran to break out of its isolation uh diplomatically it's not a coincidence that um there was a recent Summit in Riyad where the president of Iran Ibrahim RI was invited I doubt if that would have happened at this time had this crisis not happened it allow s Iran to be part of these Regional discussions and situate itself as a major actor in the region um so those are the way that's the way that Iran sort of benefits and so I think broadly speaking the short-term risks of a major war that will draw the United States into the region are quite limited but that could change if there's an escalation in what we're seeing in Gaza and I think the operation in Gaza is still in its early phases we don't know how this is going to play out I'm really concerned about the longer term problems and I want to inject something here a point of view that is rarely heard in Washington DC but I think it's foundational to the topic that brings us together these are the dark days of Middle East history replete with torture States corrupt ruling Elites repressed civil societies and deten detention centers that are overflowing with political detainees authoritarian regimes are ascendant everywhere while Democratic opposition groups and social protest protest movements are severely repressed um across the region when judged by the key indicators of democratic development civil and political rights press Freedom censorship women's representation the status of minorities State sanctioned executions the countries of the Middle East in North Africa have the lowest scores in the world adding to this Grim picture is the expansion of mass poverty and economic destitution for hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims data on global inequality reveals that the Middle East despite its abundance of wealth has some of the highest wealth in equality scores in the world the world inequality lab co-directed by Thomas piy reports that the Middle East is the world's most unequal region where the top 10% captures 61% of the national income this mass popularization of the region is a key reason why this the future of this region is deeply in doubt in terms of the prospects for stability the Middle East of North Africa also has the highest un youth unemployment rate in the world and it's held that position for the last 25 years over 30% of young people in the region are unemployed opinion polls consistently reveal that the vast majority of young people in the Middle East of North Africa want to immigrate somewhere this region has one of the highest population growths in the world uh in 1950 the Middle East in North Africa had a population of about 100 million in the year 2000 it had a population of 380 million and 200 in the year 2050 it will have a projected population of 722 million people this is a perfect storm for a coming societal explosion that will affect not just the region but the entire world the picture becomes even glimmer if you look at sort of the the organizations that monitor Global Peace and security the Middle East of North Africa uh region remained uh the world's least peaceful region and this was according to the 2021 um Global Peace Index many of the most unstable countries in the world are located here and the Middle East has held that distinction since 2008 um if you look at other monitoring groups that monitor sort of global conflicts in the world such as the international crisis group instability in the Middle East and North Africa always ranks at the top so this is a region where the uh political stability of the region is very much in doubt and I'm not really getting to the Israel Gaza component of this um at this moment I'll say something about that in a few seconds so this is the broad social economic reality that shapes the Middle East in North Africa today and that very few people in Washington DC and in other Western capitals want to Grapple with um so the Middle East in a nutshell is facing a series of overlapping and mutually reinforcing crisis that will eventually contribute to some sort of deep political instability that will lead to um collapsing States many of them us allies that will force the United States to respond so there's a human rights crisis that the region has seen the worst in its modern history there's an economic crisis there's a youth unemployment crisis there's a refug Refuge crisis there's a collapsing and fragile state crisis there's a crisis of good governance there's a crisis of political legitimacy and on top of everything else there's now a new crisis that's going to sink this region deeper to the bottom and I'm referring to the climate change crisis the climate change crisis disproportionately affects the Middle East as opposed to other parts of the world adding to the Region's instability so in many Western capitals when we gather together to talk about the problems of instability and War we rarely deal with these underlying socioeconomic political environmental factors that I think are really at the basis of the instability of this particular region the quality of lives of the average citizen are getting worse and the prospects look incredibly uh Bleak in in the coming months and years um recent events that we saw prior to the October 7th crisis the floods in Libya the earthquake in Morocco remind us of the deep fragility of Life facing millions of poor people throughout the region who are often forgotten when we gather together to talk about this particular region the focus up until now as all of you know um from a US foreign policy perspective with respect to the Middle East was the wonderful things that could happen if only we could get uh the Saudi regime and the Israelis to normalize relations there was a broad bipartisan consensus in this city that a new Mega deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel could transform the region and this would be um a major Leap Forward in terms of promoting Global Peace and security and of course all of this is predicated of this on this longstanding myth that shapes foreign policy thinking in this city the myth of authoritarian stability the idea that somehow these authoritarian regimes are going to Pro preserve social order preserve stability protect American interests when in my view it's the exact opposite it's the policies of these authoritarian regimes that are producing the instability the mass popularization the grievance the rise of author the rise of radical extremists Etc um and just take a look just to cite one example among many take a look at the authoritarian stability thesis and apply it to what's happening in Sudan today and get back to me on how well that's working out a final word on Israel Palestine so we in the United States in the west we can't solve all of the problems that I've just referred to in terms of the Middle East many of these problems are rooted in age old questions as to what constitutes good human political economic development but what we can do and I think what we must do going forward is to tackle one important cause of the instability in the Middle East that continually draws the United States militarily into this region and that is the Israel Palestine conflict the United States has enormous leverage over the key players that it could theoretically use to advance a just and Lasting settlement of the Israel Palestine conflict The Contours of what a just and Lasting settlement of the Israel Palestine conflict could look like enjoys broad International and Regional support and they've been enshrined in international law documents and many un resolutions I'd be happy to go through it go through them if you want you should be familiar with them already I think if the United States were to take this on it would obviously not solve all of the problems in the Middle East but I think solving the Israel Palestine conflict as we're seeing today could remove one important layer of the instability that this region is facing it would uh prevent I think the United States from continually deploying assets to the region always being on this war footing and I think it would sort of at least push things in a very substantive uh way in the right direction the last point I want to make about um you know what's going on in Israel and Gaza today and it hasn't really received much attention is that this particular conflict the violence the you know the atrocities what's happening in Gaza um the rise of Hamas is actually um a perfect storm a perfect situation for recruiting more people in the direction of radicalism and militancy in the case of Hamas if you know anything about the organization they get recruits from going to families who've lost loved ones and saying look this is join our side we're going to get you justice and we're going to get you retribution if you if you sort of sign up to our political project so that's that's one reality that's going to happen even if Hamas is completely eliminated it's not going to go away some iteration of Hamas or some variance of that is going to manifest itself in the coming uh months and years regionally also there's the problem of al-Qaeda and Isis who are going to exploit this moment to gain new recruits drawing upon the mass misery poverty lack of hope that people have and then pointing to Israel and Gaza and say look what the West is doing to us once again look at the double standards look at the hypocrisy look at the value that the United States place on an Israel life and look at the value that the United States doesn't place on Palestinian lives don't buy into the values the world view the the the alleged commitment to Human Rights and democracy that the West claims it stands for look at what it's actually doing come over to our radical project and let us build a new world and the last point that I'll make if you know anything about radical extremism in the Middle East and the philosophical origins of it all of the leading theoreticians of radical extremism in the context of political Islam pointed to the question of the Israel Palestine conflict as justification for their radicalism bin Laden said he got the idea for 911 from watching Israel's Siege and bombardment of Beirut in 1982 um say kutub comes to the United States right after the creation of the state of Israel and is shocked why everyone is supporting and celebrating the creation of the state of Israel where from his perspective the state of Israel translated into the expulsion of three4 of a million Palestinians and he didn't understand why the United States doesn't get that and that contributed to his radicalization so there's a lot to say about how these particular events that we're watching right now are going to produce much more instability much more extremism much more recruits in the direction of al-Qaeda that will then manifest themselves in some sort of violent attack bombing assassination that will then implode the region and draw the United States in exactly as we saw after September the 11th thank you Professor hashimi we've had Jordan we've had this ju position of of course it would be against the law but probably doesn't matter we might be all right in the short term but in the long term there are these huge structural forces uh that are going to portend uh uh big important problems so see if you can do this great ju to position of on the one hand on the other hand with respect to the United States yeah and so I think one thing I've learned about the Middle East since I really started studying it in high school then through college Master's PhD and working at Ko is quite literally I'm really bad at predicting what the us is going to do in the Middle East because it feels oftentimes completely irrational so with that said I I'm not going to tell you what the likelihood of horizontal escalation dragging the us into uh the a broader Middle East war is I just I don't know but what I am going to do is kind of do some just generalized like military analysis and bean counting to kind of describe the costs of Us action if us chooses to get involved for whatever reason ultimately and again I bad at predicting this so so take it for what it's worth but I I see two real Avenues where escalation could drive us direct action in this conflict the First Avenue is Hezbollah and uh if Hezbollah expands the war and I really do thinks that is possible I think the Israeli government at least thinks it's possible because the axos report Justin talked about when he started did show that and it did say that the Biden Administration fears that Israel is trying to get hezb to attack to drag the US in a war and I and the second I think is Iran but I'll get to Iran after I talk about Hezbollah so often times when you hear especially kind of Israelis talk about Hezbollah they referenced 2006 and that yeah 2006 was costly but Israel beat Hezbollah pretty good they they destroyed Lebanon pretty good the problem with that argument is that the Hezbollah of 20 6 is not the Hezbollah of 2023 the heesa of 2023 has somewhere around 100,000 Fighters ready to fight they have somewhere around 150,000 Rockets uh thousands of which are Precision guided they have anti-ship missiles including the Russian yant missile which is one of the best anti- ship missiles kind of in production it can travel about 186 miles and it can carry 4 140 lb explosive and armor piercing Warheads so any naval battle like happened in 2006 hezb is a lot better prepared for I I would also point out that hezb is better prepared to attack Israel and while the iron doome has come a long way uh Hezbollah has short range Rockets right again they have 150,000 Rockets the short range Rockets can occupy the Iron Dome and the Iron Dome may be able to take them out but but that's really what it's geared for Hezbollah also has kind of more medium- range rockets and Israel has the has David sling which is an Israeli production and it mainly is designed to kind of fight these in intercept medium- range Rockets but what hezb didn't have at least to the degree they do now in 2006 are cruise missiles longrange cruise missiles uh Israel does not have the air defense capabilities to deal with the bombardment of these Precision guided cruise missiles and while doesn't have a limitless amount they they do have enough to cause damage uh for example they have an m600 missile that can travel 155 miles it can carry a half ton Warhead and it's ACC it's pretty pretty accurate about about kind of I think the number I have here is uh a dozen yards off its Target accuracy so it's pretty accurate uh ultimately what all this means is that any Ty if hezb expands in Israel they can basically hit any Target throughout the country and they will do damage in 2006 it took 150,000 artillery rounds for Israel to defeat Hezbollah uh Hezbollah is much stronger now it's going to take more than that and this is where us entry becomes important uh if the US decides to enter I think the first thing it's going to do is try to provide Israel with artillery to fight against Hezbollah as well as some sorts of missile defense system so uh 155 mm shells if you've heard about those they're they're really kind of a thing in Ukraine the US doesn't have a lot of them the US produces about 24,000 a month uh for context Ukraine is firing 6,000 of these a day uh Israel is going to need them in any conflict with Hezbollah and I think the us is going to try to provide what it can but it really does mean the US like right away is removing a key aspect of its artillery just to help Israel uh they're also going to Israel will need air to surfice missiles especially if hezbo launches a multif front attack right from Lebanon and from Syria and again the US just doesn't have a ton of these and they're wanted by us clients so the first thing that I'm really trying to point out here is that if hezb joins Israel's going to need things that are wanted by Taiwan that are wanted by Ukraine so it is going to force weapons calculations on behalf of the United States and that means places like the indopacific are probably going to take the loss here right they're not going to get weapons they're asking for uh beyond that any direct US military action Beyond just weapons transfers is very dangerous hezb can likely hit targets anywhere across the Levant and potentially throughout the Middle East I did some research in the Levant right now uh the US has over 6,000 troops uh and it has over 45,000 in the Middle East property but let's just focus on the 6000 hezb can hit those troops very likely from anywhere right so right away there is a military cost for the US entering which is the US troops that are already there at risk now obviously military entry means even more US troops and so all of the sudden you're talking about multi- thousand US troops are at risk just from Hezbollah right just from hez entering this war and the US using that as uh reason to enter um I'd also point out that if Hezbollah enters while the war in Gaza is happening so this is more in the short term where where I agree with Professor hashimi that I think it's probably unlikely but if it does happen right if Israel is still fighting in the tunnels that they probably don't have the total number of troops to fight a two to three front war that hzb joins which means any us entry likely could require US troops fighting along kind of the the Israeli borders and again there's just a risk there the US is entry into this war risks US troops and while it seems easy to just say oh well it's HZ BL their terrorist organization in many ways their Arsenal Rivals that of many modern militaries so it's not nothing uh and with that said compared to Iran hea's risks to the United States are pretty modest um I this has been something that's bugged me since I was in high school where everybody just says oh well the us can go in bomb on in and out and that totally ignores how Iran has built its military right so so the weapons it purchases for its military are there primarily to defend Iran uh that they are primarily defensive they are primarily designed around preventing access into the country uh for example they have the bavar 373 which is a longrange air defense system that many military Scholars think is actually stronger and better than the Russian s300 in the US Patriot system it can detect up to 300 targets at one time uh with a range of 180 miles they also have short- range weapons like the cad uh they have anti-aircraft missiles that are kind of more medium range like the scod 2C which has actually in the past hit us uh us targets what these weapons really get at Beyond just broadly they have ballistic missiles they have in the thousands of ballistic missiles including medium range uh per the Congressional research service Iran is the most capable unmanned aerial vehicle kind of Department in the entire Middle East uh just doing some other research by the pure numbers Iran has the 15 largest amount of Manpower in in the world and the that can fight in the 13th largest fit for service population in the world they have the 13th most armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery in the world they have the ninth most towed artillery in the world and the E eighth most mobile rocket projectors in the world what I am trying to get at here is Iran is really good at preventing access into Iran uh Iran's kind of anti-a area denial capabilities by many kind of military analysts mean that they could ostensibly put an umbrella that is untargetable from the Persian to the Gulf of Oman that means any us entry that requires direct action against Iran is going to cost a lot of US troops uh estimates as in 2019 suggested us ground entry into Iran would take about 1.6 million troops uh US troops which is an enormous number but I don't think the US again I'm not great at predicting this I don't think the US is irrational enough to try a ground invasion of around at least initially think it would essensially start by kind of using air Naval to attack it but again that's going to cost a lot of us weapon systems a lot of us aircrafts us ships and US service members uh beyond that right if the us is going to war against ran because of this that means Israel is also under threat from Iran uh the Federation of American scientists reported in 2012 that in this situation right where Iran attacks Israel which escalates drags us in a war in the first 3 months of a conflict alone it would cost the global economy $2 trillion uh Iran's military is even better now than it was then so if anything that estimate is probably on the low side it would cost Israel a lot of money uh 2012 business data Israel report which is a consulting firm suggested it could cost in the first month of the war cost Israel's economy $42 billion in the long run uh it's pretty significant and again I I point to what I pointed to when I was talking about Hezbollah the US has a lot of troops in the region Iran can definitely hit US troops we're seeing that now if the conflict escalates we'll probably see it more and finally if the US enters to fight Iran it's very unclear to me what a win looks like and this is my problem with kind of Israeli policy so far uh and especially threats of us entry I see very little definitional answer to what the strategy is what the goal is Right eliminating Hezbollah Iran and Hamas is not a strategy any more than me Learning to Fly tomorrow is a strategy uh frankly it is just not possible based on the equipment and Military that are available so the question that the US has to ask itself and again I I just unfortunately am not seeing this is what is helping Israel win this look like uh right now I think the costs are just going to be really high and any win is going to have massive losses attached to it so I guess my kind of end point here is I really do urge the US to consider what the costs of aiding Israel in a direct conflict either against Hezbollah or Iran looks like because there are going to be costs in weapons transfers to the indopacific there are going to be costs to US troops there's going to be cost to the global economy and I think really us goal right now alongside Israel should be to deter any of this from happening uh so with that great no thank you Jordan I wanted to um usurp the moderator's privilege before we go to the to the meet space audience here to the virtual audience um you can ask questions online on Twitter and YouTube and Facebook using the hashtag k FP um but I wanted to youur at the risk of getting a little bit further a field Jordan you you led me down this path so I'm going to to ask Professor hash me to weigh in on it a little bit right we've heard a lot about the the kind of amorphous or or underspecified let's say um Israeli objectives in Gaza right it's it's it's to prevent another October 7th which is sort of scrutable and I can get my hands around that it's to eliminate Hamas to the eliminate the Hamas leadership and and so you've heard different characterizations from different individuals Etc but it's clear that um there's going to be some sort of political Dumont of this campaign something is going to emerge politically in Gaza um after this campaign and and some of us in the department have been kind of concerned um that war and terrible suffering tends not to empower the most liberal actors in a society modest claims department um do you have a read of the political Evolution and again this is asking you to predict I apologize for doing so but do you have a read of the political Evolution you think is more or less likely uh as this campaign if and when it concludes you mean in in Gaza yes in terms of what Israel is planning politically afterwards in terms of what is likely to emerge afterwards um well I think there's a tension now between what the United States is stated it wants and what Israel has stated it wants the United States has said there has to be some sort of Palestinian um um leadership and govern governance structure over the Gaza Strip that is linked to um what we see in the West Bank and that sounds very nice and I think the United States would very much like to package that as sort of a form of Palestinian self-rule but of course if you know anything about what's happening in the West Bank under the 87y old uh leadership and dictatorship of Mahmud abas that's not a step forward for the Palestinians it's just extending in other words a dictatorship from the West Bank into the Gaza Strip um which is something that I think the United States would be very comfortable with but that's even a bridge too far it seems for Netanyahu I think there's another Dynamic here that Netanyahu knows that his political future is over because he was Mr Security on October the 7th and um I think the only way he can survive politically is to drag this war out as long as possible um what's going to happen afterwards we don't know there's a scenario where there's there's actually a a notorious Palestinian I'm not sure what the best word is I would call him just sort of a Palestinian sort of um Security man who actually is from the Gaza Strip was very much connected to the um Palestine Authority but now works very closely with the government of the United Arab Emirates his name is Muhammad dlan he happens to come from Southern Gaza he's very much I think someone who they would like to see come back to Gaza and Rule Gaza you know in close coordination with with Israel so I suspect that might be one particular scenario that we're going to see but at the end of the day you know whatever these you know plans are um the bottom line remains and this is something that I think most people who are honest and objective instinctively know but not many people at least in Washington want to publicly state that there can be no security longterm for the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people their security is deeply linked to the Palestinians having some stake in a stable future which allows them self-determination either uh in a separate state or in some sort of unified state where there will be equal citizens barring that sort of you know ignoring that part of the equation is simply to perpetuate I think the Israel Palestine conflict in very destructive ways that ends up killing a lot of innocent Israelis and Palestinians at the end of the day yeah the idea of bracketing the question away I mean we're sort of living with exactly the wages of that Jean I wanted to talk to you you talked a little bit about getting away from legal Concepts and getting into uh sufficiently important national interests campaigns that are limited enough in scope and duration um these are witchy political science Concepts security studies Concepts not these uh discret legal Concepts and I wanted to ask you about um uh the Biden administration's uh War Powers reports that they've uh sent to Congress they've been uh good uh uh uh uh they' filled out their TPS reports on time that's always good to see um but they've Justified the strikes that they've used in Syria to retaliate for these militia attacks um the first one uh was justified that they were trying to quote establish deterrence with these militias which again are witchy political science Concepts not really legal or much less constitutional uh Concepts and the second uh War Powers report that they sent to Congress was to reaffirm deterrence so having in the first strikes established deterrence they then reaffirmed that deterrence with the second strike um are these new Concepts to be introduced for the authorization uh of the application of American military power overseas or is that have I just not been paying close attention I I look at that as less of a legal concept and more as a rationalization uh I mean clearly deterrence was not established as the pace of the taxes continues to go up um but you know there were these drive by air strikes uh on Iranian proxies you know in Syria we've seen recently several times uh even before uh October 7th uh in the Biden Administration they're all uh you know they're Justified under the you know the legal Authority they they cite in the the War Powers notifications is uh you know generally article two uh executive power and commanderin-chief um the more interesting legal question is what's the authorization for the continuing presence in in Syria uh the initial authorization was uh statuto or the justification was statutory under the 2001 aumf as part of the anti-isis campaign that in itself was a heck of a stretch uh given that Isis didn't exist uh you know uh in 2001 and uh could not really be described as a successor organization to al- Qaeda and in fact was uh various times openly at war with with al- Qaeda um so but you know leaving aside the the fuzzy uh and tendentious initial justification for that deployment um there doesn't seem to be any uh legal statutory domestic War Powers justification for that deployment at all now um and you have a situation where we're forward deployed in bad neighborhoods and we get shot at and then the legal justification to shoot back is defensive article two uh you know it prior to October 7th it would have been a good idea to wind down our presence over there um now it seems uh you know absolutely imperative yeah no that's quite right I'm normally like my children uh en raptured by these devices so I'm going to do my best not to do that and to go to the audience here in the flesh uh first let me ask um wait for the microphone we have microphones on either side um uh please identify yourself in any affiliation you may have and please ask your question in the form of a question if you will um there's a gentleman right there that I see under the lights with glasses on and it looks like a gray sport coat yeah U my name is Roger coach Eddie and um I am a retired business executive my question has to do with a foundational presumption on the part of the American public that um any War activity invading Libya Afghanistan Serbia Vietnam Korea Panama you name it involves overseas commitments um but they can't hit back we could do whatever we want to hoim in he can't do anything to us in the worst case we just pull out we could do whatever we want to you name it and they can't do anything to us in the worst case you pull out no one has addressed the question of whether or not any of what you've been discussing about the Middle East exposes the United States or continental United States or the the you know the Republic to any vulnerability because if it does not then okay we made a mistake we'll pull out and we've done that with Afghanistan we've done that with Vietnam we know how to do that so is there an exposure of of risk to the United States itself thank you can I channel that question two different ways to two different panelists one um Jean there's been a Le the introduction of a new legal concept that it means something when they can hit back that the definition of a war uh is bounded by whether or not they can hit back so I wanted you to touch on that and Professor Hashim there was a question that I think is related to this that I had been thinking about as a non Regional expert um but there is kind of a question about um you know the US standing in the region is not in a great position if I can make another modest claim um there's a lot of frustration to put it mildly um with the US position as it stands today Joe Biden not a very popular guy um in the region is there any risk of a resurgent anti-us terrorism threat uh looming here so maybe Professor Hashi if you want to take it first yeah I mean I think there is I think the difference um in terms of US foreign policy let's say in Vietnam and the geographic distance from our adversaries I think that whole calculation and assumption um completely changed after September 11th when we saw that these extremist um elements and you know terrorists using you know the realities of globalization can actually hit us on our own short we also saw this again on 911 uh sorry on with the rise of Isis where you know radicalized sort of young people many of them you know not necessarily directly directed by ISIS but can be radicalized online because of children media will then take it upon themselves to hit American targets now that doesn't fundamentally I think jeopardize the Safety and Security and stability of the United States but it does have huge psychological effects on the American population in terms of how they View safety and so I think with this particular crisis and with the perception of the United States being very one-sided in terms of how it deals with human suffering in the case of Israel Palestine that's going to increase the sentiment and the ability of these radical extremist elements to you know just put something online and and and someone might see it and then take it upon themselves to do what they uh what we've seen happening not too long ago in terms of sort of attacks in major American cities so I think that's really the the one you know um you know differentiating factor that I think we have to be aware of yeah Jean can you is it a war if they can't hit back uh yeah it's funny that uh that not being able to hit back actually became part of uh War Powers uh legal Doctrine uh during the Obama Administration uh in Libya um you know I it's pretty rough on the office of legal council uh in my remarks but in the case of Libya in 2011 they for you know the rare occasion when they weren't willing to just uh bless and rationalize anything the the president wanted to do of course they uh they wrote a memo justifying the initial uh bombing of Libya uh under that two-part test I talked about but when they ran up against the war War Powers Resolution time limits UH 60 to 90 days um and it turned out that our NATO allies really didn't have the capability to keep uh uh bombing um President Obama looked for a justification uh for bypassing the time limits of the War Powers Resolution and in this case uh olc was not willing to to give it to him so he went Forum Shopping to the state Department's legal adviser Harold Co who wrote an opinion that said that uh you know I'm paraphrasing uh here but the essence of which was it you're not engaged in hostilities within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution if you're bombing a country but they can't hit you back uh which is really extraordinary uh uh you know just as a legal justification but also uh you know from uh an internationalist you you know putative humanitarian president that uh you if you can drop bombs on a country but uh they don't have a good chance of of uh returning in in in kind by conventional means uh that it's not really a war it's really only a war if an actual American might get killed um and also but as your as your question uh you know suggested uh you know conventional means are not the only way that uh targeted states can can uh can reply uh you know certainly you know in a wider conflict with Iran uh I think we would have to take very seriously the uh the possibility of unconventional responses yeah all right in honor of my kids let me go to Minecraft or whatever this is here um Dan asks a question um I appreciated Professor hash's remarks about constraints on his Bala due to the political Dynamics in Lebanon he asks do similar or different constraints exist on Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria in your opinion how much control does Iran exercise over its so-called proxies in Iraq and Syria so the kind of principal agent uh question there about uh who has his finger on the trigger um well Iran has a lot of influence over those proxies because it funds them it finances them I think Iran wants to utilize them as a form of Leverage over the United States um as it feels it's comes under pressure by the US and its allies in the region so I think those are primarily the constraints it's really it's less about what those actors on the ground are doing how many resources they have to recruit to pay their militias it it's really what decisions are made by their primary by by their primary Patron in tan in terms of how much it wants to um use those proxies to um to hit out American targets and we've seen this fluctuate because if you recall just before October the 7th there were reports courts that is Iran wanted to make this deal for the prisoners that it held in exchange for the money it had instructed its proxies and there were reports widely in the mainstream press that the amount of attacks on American troops and bases in the region has had decreased significantly um because Iran wanted to create an environment where it could strike a deal with the United States to get that money um so I think that's how it basically works so a considerable amount of Leverage considerable amount of Leverage yeah okay good let's see if we have another person we have someone uh right down here in the front row if you want to yeah show me right there yeah I'm Ken mord unaffiliated uh there two recent uh developments that I'd be interested in what the significance is of one is the Saudi Iran Repro and the other is uh three of our Earth while allies Saudi Arabia UAE and Egypt uh joining the bricks group um I I'll answer those very quickly um I think there's been a lot of exaggeration about a Saudi Iranian rosma when the news first broke it it was being portrayed in some quarters as if Iran had and Saudi Arabia had struck up some sort of new alliance and you know the United States and Saudi Arabia had turned its back on its previous allies I think there's just a realization that um there needed to be a det taunt between these two Regional Powers you have to understand uh Irani and Saudi relations in the context of the up and down roller coaster relationship that they've had since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 it's always fluctuated it's gone up it's gone down now it's gone down because I think there's a realization that there's no benefit to keeping the tensions going so I think it's very fragile the underlying strategic View and um prospects for the the future of the region are still fundamentally different when looked at from the perspective of tan and Riyad so the the the differences are still there I think this Rosman is very superficial it can easily Come Undone I think the is the interesting thing is now because of the crisis in Gaza that has elevated this topic um and it's going to create conditions for Iran and Saudi Arabia to at least nominally come together and issue statements like we saw in Riad over the weekend but the underlying reality and tensions um that separate these two countries still remain there and easily we can get back into a period where these two countries are back in uh conflict with one another I suspect I'm I'm going to guess here but if Trump comes into you know office once again in this country we can see a repeat in the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran if Trump sort of starts to back those same political forces directed by Jared Kushner with the Saudi Crown Prince I think the Iran Saudi relationship there can take a nose dive very quickly reproducing what we saw during the Trump years um well we need another conference for that one but very quickly bricks I think is exaggerated you know I don't think mean yeah I mean so they played a role because I mean they played a role largely because they were the only Power that had relations with both sides right the United States doesn't talk to one of the sides so we were excluded from that perspective so I think China wants to insert itself I think politically they want to stick it to the United States look we've brought these two adversaries together you're trying to isolate Iran we're bringing Iran out of the political isolation it's a small sort of but I I I I wouldn't exaggerate China's role in the region China is not going to get involved like the United States is it's going to try and sort of view you know manage things from a distance but China is benefiting politically in huge ways now because of this crisis because right now for young Arabs and Muslims they're watching what's happening in Gaza and they're saying this is the West this is the United States this is Israel China's not killing us China is not brutalizing us maybe the Chinese worldview you know that we're hearing might be a better alternative so China is going to manipulate this and milk it for all it's worth um but I don't see you know China going beyond what it's doing already to intervene in the region militarily at least not at this stage one thing I just added that pretty quickly about the exaggeration is Saudi Arabia's military is like close to 100% dependent on us weapons and Us action so no matter what China says Saudi Arabia is not going to want to give that up so I think the their involvement is somewhat limited based on as Professor Ashi said they only country that has relations with although the Saudis will milk it and say look give us what we want you know Joe Biden or we're going to China and that scares people in Washington DC but I don't think it's going to happen for the read the arm sales 22 arm sales Risk Index for more on that so exactly I wanted to go back here to the computer um Dr George Simpson asks and I guess this is mostly for Professor ay um if Israel so again we've heard varying statements about objectives we don't want it to go we don't want the PA to come in it can't be Hamas or something it looks like Hamas etc etc so so if if the longer term bigger Israel vision for Gaza were to come to fruition um with neither hisbah nor Iran making a much more concerted effort to prevent this from happening what would that mean for Iran standing in both the Arab and Muslim worlds that is to say you said you know in the short term there are reasons to be maybe not optimistic but less pessimistic but then do those reasons for Less pessimism drop off if the Israelis reveal a much bigger vision for I think that benefits Iran ideologically because Iran is going to say look there's another Palestinian population that has been ethnically cleansed depopulated oppressed uh the West has stood not only is the West not stood aside Iran will say the West has openly backed this new displacement of Palestinians and all of these Palestinian deaths you know um that we're seeing they're happening as a direct result because of us and Western arm sales their American weapons that are killing these Palestinians Iran is going to milk that scenario whatever Israel has planned you know um even in its most expansive way if Israel tries to completely occupy and control the Gaza Strip either directly or indirectly Iran is going to milk that ideologically I don't think Iran is going to I mean he really doesn't have any military options to try and insert weapons there but it's going to sort of Step Up the propaganda effort to expose its Regional allies who St who sit on the sidelines and going to remind everyone look we're supporting the Palestinians we're very we care about the Palestinians where our Arab allies you know look what they were doing just before October the 7th they were all trying to jump into bed with Netanyahu so I think that's how Iran is going to play this um uh going forward it's going to try and um make those arguments but also appeal to the Arab Street which is its primary constituency by saying look we are the country that is standing up for the oppressed masses in the Muslim World which of course is a complete sham because it's completely selective look at what Iran has said about the Wagers not only has it nod said anything it's openly supported China's policy on the wi so it's very self- selective here but at least in the context of the Arab world it's going to make these types of arguments but you think even in that scenario it's more of a public diplomacy preing type of thing there's there is not an enormous amount of pressure on them to do something military I think the rich could I mean what can they do they can perhaps spend more money um any Palestinians living in the region perhaps can get training in Iran and backing I mean can they can do those types of things but Iran really does doesn't have a military option unless it wants to risk a major war with Israel and United States or his B I mean I I view those two things as the same if Hezbollah tries to attack Israel in in any capacity it's going to only do so if it gets the green light from Iran right and I think Iran uses Hezbollah is sort of a key asset in its National Security Doctrine if ever there's a moment of Crisis where Israel or the United States try to bomb Iran that would be a red line for Hezbollah to launch attacks on Israel as sort of a as a as an attempt to shift the equation and hases is like Iran's offensive military I me in a lot of ways like that that's how they attack great let's go back to the audience I see let me take two because I keep seeing people down in the front because of these darn glasses let's take the gentleman in the front and then there's also someone in a sweater next to the wall there so maybe if you can come down to the front and you can go to the wall no I'm directing traffic here um yeah we'll take the front first and then the wall thank you thank you no you yeah yeah sorry Jeff Steel American Legion question is from Mr hashimi on the um authoritarian stability Theory so if that's not the way forward short or long term and there will be no repeat of George W Bush's idealistic Crusades to democratize the Middle East but democracy must be the way forward if authoritarian stability theory is not how does that happen well I think the the problem here is sort of what our expectations are at the beginning if your sort of suggest gesting we can turn on a light switch or engage in one policy position and everything is going to be wonderful in the Middle East that's not how it's going to work as I said in my comments the fundamental roots of instability are rooted in these deep long-term underlying questions about socio economic and political development and so there's no quick fixes but what is sure and what is guaranteed is that these authoritarian regimes are not the guarantors of stability they're in fact the producers of instability so like any sort of you know project for political development good governance democratization we have to have the political stamina the patience the willingness to invest in these types of things over the long term knowing that along the way there's going to be setbacks there's going to be progress but I think if we invest in these types of policies and planning then over the long term we'll see a better and more stable Middle East if you want to keep you know throwing fuel to the fire here um adding kerosene to the burning sort of catastrophe and thinking you're going to get something good out of it well go ahead you know I I I don't see I don't see that producing anything positive I think these authoritarian regimes I was just making a list you know of sort of the um the layout of the region you know outside of the Gulf area you just see a combination of failed and failing States one after the other Egypt Syria Iraq Tunisia Sudan Yemen Morocco Libya Jordan Algeria Lebanon you know Etc um you know Iran is not has a lot of internal problems itself um so I mean that's the landscape and these authoritarian regimes are not the solution so I think I think what really is needed here from a US foreign policy perspective is the need for a very new robust forward-looking bipartisan Grand strategy for this region um that that we are committed to that we invest in and we hope to get the the the results not in you know the next five to 10 years but in the next 30 to 40 years I think that's the way we have to look at it but I think one of the problems is that our politics in this City revolves around short-term electoral Cycles is deeply influenced by the corrupting influence of private money and private capital and Lobby groups that shape and warp our politic I think US foreign policy is probably one of the most undemocratic aspects of our political system so there are these deep structural problems that prevent us from I think doing what is needed to be done so that's how I see it you know um if if someone think in this room thinks that you know the Abraham accor is is a solution to the problems of the region if we can only get these corrupt Arab dictators to jump into bed with Netanyahu and that's going to bring peace and stability to the region go ahead I think that's a recipe for disaster I I'm out of my uh Lane here my area of expertise but wouldn't there be a case for uh you know after the last 30 years uh trying a period of benign neglect uh as far as the us trying to uh uh improve outcomes in the Middle East um it depends on what that means uh in terms of the details what is uh military withdrawal uh and uh I I don't know I suppose uh uh coming to a more realistic view of uh our capability to forge a lasting peace in Israel and Palestine um the the problem with the the last part of the question is that we're deeply involved in Israel Palestine by virtue of our strong support for Israel and because of that strong support that has gotten stronger since October the 7th there's no incentive for any Israeli political leader to compromise knowing that they'll always have the backing of the United States which then produces the situation where you know Netanyahu can do whatever he wants knowing that there's going to be no consequences from the United States so I think you know if we're going to be giving Israel all of this uh support political moral diplomatic Financial then that should EST establish a set of you know responsibilities and and sort of questions that we have to ask what are we doing with this investment do we want to sort of condition as I think we should you know our support for Israel on Israel making serious moves toward a just resolution of the Israel Palestine conflict so you know I think we can't have it both ways if we're going to continue to support some of our allies by virtue of this form of support well then we have to ask ourselves what's the payoff here what's the calculation um yeah I think you know pulling out some US troops from some parts of the region I'm I think that um is something we should be seriously considering we have to ask ourselves what the consequences are I wouldn't like to see Russia to fill in the void or Iran to fill in the void I don't think those are steps in the right direction I think broad broadly speaking I think US foreign policy properly rethought and re-calibrated can produce better outcomes but that would require I think a serious sort of fundamental paradigm shift um where we sort of reconsider these assumptions that have informed US foreign policy for such a long time that you know our allies in the region are these authoritarian regimes let's just keep backing them and hopefully they all going to they're going to sort of support us in the end in the end we see failed States failing States and no one in in Washington really willing to sort of reconsider that calculation equation and so I think this is one of these moments these crises I do view what's happening in Israel Palestine today is a transformative moment and and perhaps you know think tanks like Po and others can sort of do the long-term deep thinking over how we got to this crisis you know how can we get out of it how do we how can we think new thoughts how can we redirect US foreign policy in more I think productive ways um so I'm not I'm not of the view that we should just unilaterally sort of disengage I think in some areas yes in some areas no but I think it has to be very carefully calculated in terms of what the risks and benefits are but I think one I think one shift that should happen and must happen is this is this sort of you know this deep investment in authoritarian and repressive regimes thinking that these regimes are going to sort of help us in the end they're not they're many ways the root of the problem yeah I think primum nun or Cher is where you know first Do no harm would be made the F the lowest common denominator between the two views don't make things worse which we've been doing far too much of for far too long let's hope that this last question is a sunny optimistic one that can bring this I'm even more I'm standbest and I'm even more depressed than when I WR um I'm going Economist the professor makes an excellent case for the dire economic situation throughout the region should we be thinking about the equivalent of a Marshall plan for the Middle East as a long-term solution to this problem um I I've advocated for that uh a long time ago some American Senior officials have also made that uh argument I think that fundamentally is what's needed but of course it's not just a question of throwing money at the region there has to be the proper accountability for how that money is spent to make sure that you know we're getting an investment we're getting a a reward on our investment but I think something like that yeah is fundamentally what's needed it turned Europe around you know after World War II there was a big fear that you know parts of Europe are going to go communist unless we sort of you know invested in not just the economic future of of of of Europe but also the political future of Europe and I think looking back over you know what happened in Germany what happened in Japan I think those are investments that we can be very proud of because they did produce the types of outcomes that we I think um can be proud of something like that is going to be needed in the Middle East um you know good luck in trying in selling that equation here in Washington DC yeah except I worry that in this metaphor parts of the Middle East are already communist and so we would have to have to yeah to start start a different start over World War II hasn't happened yet so again to bring it back to the most morbid uh uh theme of this this show today I want to thank all of the panelists uh for particip ating in this I think it was really important to get some of these themes out there uh and get them under discussion um I'm very appreciative for their time I'm appreciative for the people who came out in the meat space it's always good to come to events even you people online watching um it's always good to come and mostly because we have sandwiches upstairs which are just terrifically delicious uh I'll invite everyone to join us upstairs and to join me in thanking the panelists for this discussion thank you all very much thank you so much profess thank you thanks appreciate it a lot happy [Music] thanks [Music] hey yo heyo [Music] [Music] Bo [Music] [Music] how [Music] [Music] [Music] a [Music] AC

Channel: The Cato Institute

Views: 460

Keywords:

Id: hrXZ7_hpzZo

Length: 94min 38sec (5678 seconds)

Published: Fri Nov 17 2023