>> Grant Harris: Well, distinguished guests,
ladies and gentlemen. Good afternoon and welcome
to the Library of Congress. I am Grant Harris. I'm Chief of the
European Division here. I'm very fortunate to be able
to work in this building. You may have seen there
are three buildings here on Capitol Hill. We would like to thank
the Finlandia Foundation. And specifically the Finlandia-- Finlandia Foundation's National
Capital Chapter for working with the Library on this
interesting presentation by James Ford Cooper. We would like to thank all of the Finlandia
Foundation Board Members who made this event possible. Very briefly, let me say that
the Library of Congress is proud of its extensive collections
from or about Finland. We have approximately 100,000
volumes concerning Finland. Among other things, we have
a first-rate collection of monographs that
concern Finnish diplomacy. And we have a few of them on
display in the back there. These are featured there. The Library strives constantly to acquire the best
scholarship from each country. And from Finland,
we receive each year between 400 and 500 volumes. The European Division
is responsible for, for providing reference
assistance, and for developing the
Library's collections. Not only from Finland
and Nordic countries. But relating to all of, almost
all of continental Europe. And we're fortunate to have
Dr. Taru Spiegel whose first language is Finnish,
as our curator for collections from Finland. And from all of the
other Nordic languages. If you have any interest in
using the collections now or in the future,
please contact Taru. She'll make it really
easy for you to use the materials
here in the Library. So we hope you'll come again to explore the Library's
collections and, and, and the, our offerings. And that you have a good
time here this evening. It is now my pleasure to
introduce Turto Turtiainen. Excuse me. Let me say that last name
one more time: Turtiainen. First, first syllable
accent always in Finnish, just know that. [Laughter] He is President
of the Finlandia Foundation, National Capital Chapter. He hails from Varkaus
in Eastern Finland. He was a naval officer in the
Finnish Navy while studying at the University of Helsinki. And he received a Ph.D.
in political science. Dr. Turtiainen worked
for the World Bank, living among other places,
in Kenya and Nigeria. He focused on agricultural
cooperatives and cooperative finance,
good Finnish concepts. He wrote many studies
for the World Bank. And the Library has
one of his works. I remind you now to please turn
off your cell-- cell phones. [Laughter] Is that me, or is
that somebody in the front row? I remind you now to please
turn off your cell phones and recording devices for
the duration of the program. [Cell phone ringtone] [ Laughter ] Off, yes. Off is
the right, yeah. So after the presentation,
we'll have time for questions and answers. So be aware that this
event is being recorded for a future webcast. So Dr. Turtiainen,
please come up here. [ Applause ] >> Turto Turtiainen:
Good afternoon, all. You are respected participants. And Mr. Harris, thank you very
much for your kind introduction. I'm very pleased to
introduce Mr. Cooper to you, our speaker today. But before that, I would like
to make some acknowledgement. It is extremely hard work to get
an event like this organized. And it requires hard work
from a number of people. From the Capital Chapter
side, our coordinator for this event was
Hannah Vaughner. Very hard work. [ Applause ] She was cooperating very
intensely with Dr. Taru Spiegel, who for her part was
helped by Wanda Cartwright. Is that correct? I think they deserve
also just as much-- . [ Applause ] On the financial side, it
always requires some finances to get an event like
this organized. Finlandia Foundation,
especially the President of Finlandia Foundation, Ossi
Rahkonen very critical position. [ Applause ] Thank you all very much for
this effort you have put in. And Mr. Harris, if
you would kind, be so kind as to pass
our gratitude for using, for allowed to be using this
beautiful room or pavilion as it said, to your
higher management. If there is any higher
management. [ Laughter ] About our speaker today. Many of you are his friends. You know him well. If you do not, or if
you have not met him. You might have been
taking a look at the, those information notices
which we are passing around. Newsletter, Facebook,
and website. And you have got the basic, basics about Mr.
Cooper's background. He has a long history or career at the U.S., U.S.
Foreign Service. Especially interesting for us is that he has been
in Finland twice. First as a Political
Counselor and then later on another, another
period there. When he was there as the
Deputy Chief of Mission. As you know Deputy Chief of
Mission is really the head of the, head of the Embassy. If we ignore the
political appointments. [ Laughter ] But besides that, some of you might have also read
this book he has written. [Inaudible] his wonderful
[inaudible]. I have actually gone through
it during the past few days. And it really is, is
wonderful, wonderful book. And good reading. But I have something more
personal to share with you also. I have discussed with some
of his old colleagues. And they told that when
he was in Helsinki, especially in the last position
as the Deputy Chief of Mission. He was the very best
Deputy Chief of Mission they had
ever worked with. And that's something
I think -- . [ Applause ] One of his, one of
his principles, working principles
voiced that he wanted to have a very good [inaudible]
with the Embassy staff. That's important. For today's session, it's even
more important, the other aspect of his approach to, to
the world was he wanted to have very close contact
with all the decision-makers. Important decision-makers or
opinion leaders in, in Finland. In order to have a good idea and
good opinions or clear opinions. About what those people
like President Kekkonen or President Koivisto thought
about the big neighbor. Our big neighbor who
was the other side. That means Soviet Union was on
the other side of the Cold War. So that was something
very special, special and that I think is very
closely related to today. So with these few words,
please help me to welcome to the podium the current
Lecturer of the Year of the Finlandia Foundation,
Mr. James Ford Cooper. [ Applause ] [ Foreign Language ] >> James Ford Cooper: I
wanted to use up a few of my last remaining
Finnish vocabulary so I thought I'd get
that out of the way. It's, it's a great
pleasure really to be here. Thank you for those,
those kind words and, and whoever your sources
were, about my performance as Deputy Chief of Mission. It's, it's to here, we're
here to talk about a, a subject very dear to my
heart: U.S.-- Finnish relations. I came into the Foreign Service, if you can believe it,
1960, December 1960. The last weeks of the
Eisenhower presidency. And yes, I was able and proud
and to stand in the snow and watch the inauguration
of John F. Kennedy as President of the
United States. So that's going back
quite a ways. And my, the first part of my Foreign Service
career was in Latin America. And it was exciting. I met my wife there in 1961. And that's, that's if you can
add, that's 58 years ago or so. And we had, it was
a fascinating place to be in the early sixties. But by the mid-1970s, I was
in Colombia, South America. And no longer happy with U.S.
policies under President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger
vis a vis Latin America and our support for
right-wing dictatorships. And, and authoritarian
governments. And I was very much in accord with U.S. policies
in, in Europe. And so I asked the State
Department personnel system is I couldn't be transferred to
an embassy in, in Europe. And by golly, they came through. And I received word in 1975,
early, that we were going to be, that I was going to be appointed
as U.S. Political Counselor at the Embassy in Helsinki. But first, ten months of
Finnish language training. And my wife also was
given an opportunity to take the Finnish
language training. So we had a full year
at least to prepare for assignment to, to Finland. And then from, from let's say
from the language training and the area studies
with, with Bob Rhinehart. And Nordic area studies
which were invaluable. Bob and I fought a little battle
here three years ago to try to keep the area studies alive. But not, we were not
successful, unfortunately. Don't understand it. In any case, from 1975
with the language training and already the, the, the
officials from the Embassy of Finland in Washington
very astutely keeping track of young officers
heading off to Finland. Making sure that they
were hearing already in Washington the
Finnish point of view. And so, and doing
independent reading. And so from 1975 to 1978,
1988 I was dealing almost all of my career with Finland. Because I had the assignment as
Political Counselor '76 to '79. And then I went on
and did other things. And then sent back in 1984 -'86
as the Deputy Chief of Mission. Following which I was
immediately assigned to the State Department
as Director of the Office of Northern European Affairs. So two more years of dealing
with Nordic countries. And importantly with Finland. So you can say that from
1975 through, through 1988, I was dealing almost,
most of the time, a good part of that time with, with Finnish affairs
and Nordic affairs. And during this long period,
I developed a professional and sometimes personal
relationship with top-ranking Finns in
the Finnish government. Presidential advisors,
Foreign Ministry officials, Finnish Security and
Defense Ministry experts. General Ari Puheloinen, for
example, was a contact of ours. Political party leaders of all, of all political
parties including, including the Communist
Party, labor leaders. And leading Finnish
academics and, and others. And Magda and our children, one
of whom is here with us tonight. Developed a, a deep affection
for Finland and for Finns. And I believe I was able to
gain some important insights into Finnish history,
culture, and domestic and foreign policy and politics. And it was also during,
towards the end of this period of concentration. That I decided that
when I retired, I wanted to write a book about
U.S.-- Finnish relations. Now our target subject
today is U.S.-- Finnish relations
during the Cold War. There are many people,
how were two countries with totally different
perspectives and circumstances heading
into the long Cold War able to develop a basically positive and constructive
relationship with each other? The United States
entered the Cold War as by far the most powerful
country in the world. Both economically
and militarily. And as the effective leader of what would become
the NATO alliance. And deeply concerned already about Soviet domination
of Eastern Europe. And concerned about Soviet goals and ambitions towards
a Western Europe. Prostrated by the
destruction of World War II. So the U.S. had a unique
perspective on, on the, on the world as the
Cold War began. Finland's perspective, as
it entered the Cold War, could hardly have
been more different. Beginning with the fact
that Finland had been forced into a harsh peace
after its wars with the neighboring
Soviet Union. Wars in which Finland was able
to maintain its independence, but it had to, had
to cede ten percent of its territory to
the Soviet Union. The very country, the
very country at the heart of our Cold War concerns. And a country with which Finland
shared an 800-mile border. Now many, many in this
room obviously know a lot about Finland. But I want to review with
you the different elements of the Finnish context
and history. The parts that I
believe was important. And this is the point. The part that was important for
U.S. diplomats and policymakers to know about Finland. Which would help us understand
Finland's Cold War outlook. And how it was importantly
influenced by her long and often arduous history. Moreover, to step back and,
and look at, at these factors and historical periods this
evening serves as a useful and inspiring reminder
to all of us. What this exceptional country
and people have endured and overcome during
their long history. Few countries have
had as, as interesting and as turbulent a
history as has Finland. And few if any countries
have their histories and their geographical,
geopolitical realities had such a direct and lasting impact
on their national character and outlook as is
the case of Finland. And here's a heads-up. Just as I want to put U.S.-- Finnish relations in
historical context. I also realize that we cannot
end our discussion this evening with the end of the Cold War. There have been too many
important developments since the end, since 1990. Right down to the present,
which I think we need to, to refer to and think about. So a key element to
start at the beginning. A key element in
understanding Finland is to internalize Finland's
extreme northern position. And I want to give you
two quick perspectives. And that's, that's
not happening. Come on. Yeah, there it is, okay. Alright this is starting
at the beginning, okay? [Laughter] Starting at the
beginning, giving you a break. Twelve thousand years ago
just a reminder that all of Finland was covered by
a massive glacier ice pack that gradually receded
as the Ice Age ended. Gouging out the ravines
and the thousands of lakes surrounded by forests. Which characterized
ancient and even a part, a good part of even
current-day Finland. The glacier pack history
reminds us of how far, how far north Finland is. What am I touching wrong here? There we go. And now, and so does this, this interesting map
which I came across. It shows Finland
in juxtaposition to the Eurasian continent. But Finland just related how
far Finland was in and is from, from Central and Western Europe. And, and it, it for
thousands of years, it must have been
an isolating factor. And then think of that early
group of migrants to Finland, bringing with them the
[inaudible] predecessor language of today's Finnish language. Which is we know is closely
related only to Estonian and to the Karelian
languages that was spoken on the Russian side of the
Finnish-- Russian border. Now the Finnish language of
course is totally unrelated to any Indo-European languages. Including the Slavic languages
spoken on Finland's east and the Nordic languages
spoken to Finland's west. And I, I'm suggesting that
Finland's geographical location, its relative isolation. And then this language
which was totally different, totally different grammatic, grammatical structure
and vocabulary. I think these have
been factors helping to isolate Finland
from mainland Europe. And also in maintaining a
cohesion among the Finns. And to a certain degree,
protecting Finland from unwanted outside
influences over, over hundreds if not thousands of years. When nations began forming in
the, in the early Middle Ages, around 1150, Finland
came under the domination of neighboring Sweden. And for some 650 years,
Finland was controlled by Sweden and indeed became
considered as a, as the comprising the eastern
half of the Swedish realm. Swedes and Swedish Finns
dominated the economic, cultural, and governmental
and social heights in Finland throughout
that long period. Even though Finnish was the
mother tongue of well over 80% of the Finnish part of Sweden. This centuries-long period left
strong social, organizational, and cultural legacies that are
recognized by sociologists. As having endured
to the present time. The next extremely
important historical period which had an enormous
impact on Finland. Including on its outlook
during the Cold War was when Czarist Russia took
Finland away from Sweden in the early 19th century
during Europe's Napoleonic Wars. Finland had of course had been
fought over countless times. Between Sweden and Russia with the Finns fighting
alongside the Swedes against the Russian incursions. However, this time,
Sweden was forced to cede Finland to Russia. Czar Alexander I in March 1809, Czar Alexander I summoned
the Finnish Estates or "diet parliament,"
if you will. To gather formally
in the small city of [inaudible], east
of Helsinki. And propose that
Finland become a quote, "Grand Duchy of Russia." Alexander I understood it
would be a great mistake to try to Russify the newly-acquired
Finland. Rather, the idea was to try to loosen the centuries-long
Swedish influence over Finland. Under the agreement, the
Czar consequently granted, granted wide autonomy
to Finland. It would have its
own parliament. It would select and
manage its own government. Pass its own laws,
including tax laws. Finland could raise
its own military. Russian citizens had
no rights in Finland. Now the Czar did keep the
authority to appoint a Russian as the Governor General
of Finland. Resident in Helsinki. But the Governor General would
report directly to the Czar in the latter's capacity as
the Grand Duke of Finland. He would not be responsible
to any Russian bureaucracies. Importantly the Czar himself
affirmed in his closing speech in [inaudible] at
that conference. That the Finns had been
quote, "Elevated to membership in the family of nations." Unquote. So these
constructive policies permitted and encouraged intense
resurgence of Finnish nationalism
and awareness. Which manifested itself in the
flowering of the Finnish culture and language during
the Grand Duchy period. Three examples, three
quick examples in the arts. Akseli Gallen Kallela,
a famous Finnish artist. This is a self-portrait. But he also frequently
resorted to themes from the [foreign
language] in his paintings. Here you have Finland's first
playwright and novelist to write in the Finnish language. Aleksi Kivi, who wrote
"Seitsaman Veljesta." And then later in the century, of course the extraordinarily
famous then and famous now Jean Sibelius
whose works had many references to Finnish nationalism. Just think of his, of
his tone poem, Finlandia. The use of the Finnish language
was vastly widened during the Grand Duchy period. And in 1863, the Finnish
language was finally accorded equal status with
the Swedish language. The first high school in the Finnish language was not
established until about 1844. Not a single, in other words,
not a single high school in the Finnish language
throughout the entire 650-year Swedish period. One of the leading
proponents and promoters of the expanded use of
the Finnish language was and culture was Johan
Vilhelm Snellman. His famous aphorism was
"Swedes we are no longer. Russians we cannot become. We must be Finns." And language started
becoming an important issue. There was resentment among some
Swedish Finns over the loss of the unique status of
the Swedish language. And many Finns of Finnish-speaking
backgrounds expressed resentment against the untoward
influence wielded by the Finns of Swedish-speaking backgrounds. Nevertheless, many Finns, including Swedish Finns
identified with the concept of emphasizing Finnishness. Many Swedish Finns changed their
Swedish names to Finnish names. Reversing the process
of a previous era when some Finnish-speaking
Finns changed their names to Swedish names in order to fit
in better with the, the policy, the, the power structure
of the time. But there's no denying
that the language issue for decades was important
in Finland and divisive. Fortunately, only remnants of these feelings can
occasionally be noted in today's Finland. Now, all of these
positives associated with being a Grand Duchy were
swept away with the accession to the throne of Czar
Nicholas II in 1898. Ignoring the benevolent
and successful practices of Alexander I and his
immediate three successors, Czar Nicholas ordered
a brutal program of Russification of Finland. He appointed a Russian army
general, Nikolai Bobrikov, as the Governor General
of Finland. With orders to carry out a
strict Russification program. Here we have General Bobrikov. Actions included the decisions of the Finnish Parliament
could be overruled by Russian authorities. The small Finnish
army was abolished. Young Finns became
subject to conscription into the Russian army. All official government
business must be conducted in the Russian language. The Finns were outraged! In a matter of weeks, a
petition to the Czar was signed by over half a million
Finns, more than half of the adult Finnish
population of the time. Czar Nicholas refused even
to receive the delegation that brought him that petition. Finnish unrest was
dramatized by the assassination of Governor General
Bobrikov in Helsinki in 1904. The assassin was a young
Swedish-speaking Finnish nationalist Eugen Schauman. Who then turned his weapon on
himself and killed himself. He left behind a letter
saying his act was in response to Bobrikov's brutal
Russification campaign in Finland. Eugen Schauman became an
enduring national hero to all Finns of both Swedish
and Finnish backgrounds. But it was not just the
Russification program of Czar Nicholas II
that was the trouble. It was rather a towering
incompetence on his part that had introduced
a 20-year period, 1898 to 1918, of
chaos in Russia. That spilled over into Finland. This became another formative
historical period exerting strong influence on the
Finnish perspectives during the Cold War. You had the loss in
1904, the Russian loss to the Russo-Japanese War. The St. Petersburg
revolutionary uprising in 1905, resulting in the 1905
Bloody Sunday Massacre. You had the overthrow of the
czar finally in May of 1917 within the Revolution
of the Mensheviks. And the provisional governor, government of Alexander
Kerensky. Who in turn was overthrown by
the Bolsheviks of Vladimir Lenin in the October 1917 revolution. And the assassination
of Czar Nicholas II and his whole family. All of these events in Russia
had tremendous consequences for Finland. Creating and exacerbating
serious divisions. There were differences
between Finnish political and language groups. About how to continue resistance
to the Russification program. The language issue itself
became more divisive. The Finnish socialist
movement gained strength. The Finns were able, however,
in 1906 to take advantage of the chaos in St. Petersburg
or Petrograd by then I guess. To approve the new 200-member,
single chamber parliament. Called the [foreign language]. And then in the 1907
parliamentary elections introduced for the first time
in Europe, universal suffrage. Electing several women to the new [foreign
language] in the process. Meanwhile, social
democrats won a majority in the 1916 parliamentary
elections. David pointed out
to me last night, that that was the only
time a single party in Finland ever had an absolute
majority in the Parliament. Back in 1916. And the [inaudible]
government overthrew that, overthrew that election. And the Finnish socialists
divided among themselves between the moderates
and the hardliners. Similar to and influenced by
the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in Russia. And indeed the Finnish
moderates sort of had their links
back to the Mensheviks. And the Finnish socialist
hardliners had their links to the Bolsheviks. In the 1917 parliamentary
elections, the Finnish socialists with their now more radical
social demands lost their majority by a narrow margin. And a non-socialist government,
coalition government, was formed by, by headed
by P.E. Svinhufvud, who drafted the Finnish
Declaration of Independence. And submitted it to
the [foreign language]. It was approved by the [foreign
language] on December 6, 1917. And of course, as we all know,
we celebrated it for a year. It became accepted
as the official date of Finnish independence. Meanwhile, the more radical
Finnish socialists organized militia units called Red Guards. And the Finnish conservative
movement also formed Civil Guards or White Guards units. Finland was increasingly
polarized. On January 3, 1918, the new
Russian leader, Vladimir Lenin, formally recognized
Finnish independence. Although both he
and Stalin expected that Finland would soon
become a part of what was to become the Soviet Union. The hardline Finnish social
revolutionaries rebelled against the conservative
government of Svinhufvud. They declared a general
strike and were supported by the Russian Bolsheviks
now in power in Petrograd. The officials of the Svinhufvud
coalition government had to flee Helsinki
and north to Vaasa where the conservative
forces were gathering. The Finnish socialists
established a government they called quote, "Finnish Socialist
Workers Republic," unquote. And signed an agreement with the
now-Bolshevik Lenin government of Russia on March 1, 1918. The Russian's promised weapons
and supplies to the Red Guards. One example of what
was at stake. The Svinhufvud government
had sent to Parliament a bill to convert tenant
farmers into owners of the land that they worked. The Socialist People's
Commission instead declared that tenant farmers would
become tenants of the state. So the split was final. And the Civil War was on. Kind of interesting slide here. The disposition of, of the
Red and White territories at the outset of
the 1918 Civil War. Of course there were,
there were exceptions and different groups
in different parts. But that reflects
the basic reality. There were some 70,000
Russian troops in Finland at the start of the war. But most were pulled back by the
Russian government to Karelia. In the north, White
Guards disarmed and disbanded numerous
Russian troops. The Red Guards were untrained and without experienced
leadership. At the officer and
non-commissioned officer level. In contrast, many of the
White Guards had prior military experience. Moreover, they had the most
experienced and brilliant leader of them all, General,
soon to become Marshal, Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. Born in Finland of a distinguished
Baltic-Swedish family. Mannerheim, who did
not speak Finnish, attended the Czar's Military
School in St. Petersburg. Later becoming the
prestigious, the commander of the prestigious
Czar's own regiment. During World War I,
he was a Major General in the Czarist Army, fighting against Germans on
the Eastern front. At the outbreak of the Bolshevik
revolution, Mannerheim had to flee from Russia to Finland. Narrowly escaping
execution by his own troops. Mannerheim was given overall
command of the White forces. Which also benefited from
significant German material, military material support. Young Finns who had
secretly been sent to Germany during World
War I for training. And some of whom actually
fought alongside the Germans, returned to Finland in the
Civil War and were turned into the elite Jager battalion. On March 3, 1918, the Soviets and the Germans signed a treaty
ending Russian participation in World War I on terms
very favorable to Germany. General Mannerheim had stated
he did not want the assistance of any foreign troops in
the Finnish Civil War. However, in April the
Germans landed a full division in southern Finland and rapidly
defeated the Finnish Red forces. And then went on to capture
the capital city of Helsinki. Meanwhile the White
forces of Mannerheim, took what was a major
socialist stronghold, the city of [inaudible]
also in April. And by early May, the
Civil War was over. Brother against brother,
veli veljea vastaan. This was a brutal five months
short but brutal Civil War with heavy casualties. Some 33,000 Finns
lost their lives, one out of every 100
Finns at the time. Even worse, even
worse, only one-quarter of the deaths occurred
during actual combat. Although it is distasteful, I
believe we have to recognize in this presentation with
at least this one photo of the numerous war
crimes and atrocities that occurred on both sides. Ten thousand of the
33,000 deaths were by summary military executions
like the one we see here. Of these executions, some
80% were by the White Guards. And some 20% by the Red Guards. And also, even though the Civil
War lasted only five months. Many thousand more Finns
died of disease or starvation in prison of war camps. Mostly in the White POW camps. Many of these deaths
could have been prevented. The war left a bitter legacy
that divided Finns for decades, although the 1939
Soviet invasion of Finland helped
draw the two sides of the Civil War closer together
against the common enemy. But memories are long. These times are still
not forgotten. Here we have a, we
see General Marshal, Marshal Mannerheim bringing,
leading the White Forces after the Civil War is over. Leading them into Helsinki. I believe that's [inaudible]. It seems probable that had the
Red Guards won the Civil War. Finland would have
been joined again to the now-communist
Soviet Union. As had been anticipated
by both Lenin and Stalin. Instead, Finland was very
much within the German sphere of influence following the war. The Soviets had been pressuring
Finland to move the Finnish-- Soviet border on the
Karelian Isthmus westward. Offering Finland some
significant land concessions further north along the 880-mile
Finnish-- Soviet border. But Karelia had a central place
in Finnish history and folklore as the origin, the mystic,
mythic origin and actual origin of Finnish history and of the, of the Finnish National Epic
poem, the [foreign language] which had been compiled from,
from by [foreign language]. It was politically impossible for the Finnish political
leaders. To agree to moving the border
even though Mannerheim warned them that the border
was not defensible. Suddenly, on August 29, 1939, the situation changed
drastically. Germany and the Soviet
Union signed in Moscow the infamous Molotov-- von Ribbentrop-negotiated
Non-Aggression Pact. Here we see, we see
Molotov on the right, von Ribbentrop on the left. And Joseph Stalin in the center. This pact gave Hitler a free
hand to invade Western Europe. The two sides agreed to
divide Poland between them. And unbeknownst to Finland was
a secret provision giving the Soviet Union carte blanche to do
whatever it wanted in the Baltic and Finland areas without
interference from Germany. This led immediately to renewed
Soviet pressure on Finland to cede Karelian territories. Joseph Stalin said,
"The Finnish-- Soviet border is too
close to Leningrad. We cannot move Leningrad,
so we're going to have to move the Finnish--
Soviet border." And the Soviet Union attacked. Here was the Soviet Union
Red Army plan of attack. You'll notice the
arrows penetrating into Finland from
all directions. Well as we know, none of
these arrows went anywhere. Except modestly but importantly
on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet Army invaded
on November 30, 1939. At the first Karelian town
reached by the Red Army, [foreign language], the Soviets
established the so-called Finnish Democratic Republic. They recognized it as the
official government of Finland. Placing at its head the
Finnish communist Arto Kosonen, who had fled to the Soviet Union
following the Finnish Civil War. This was a pretty
clear signal perhaps of what plans the Soviets
had in mind for Finland. The Finns, desperate, pleaded
for international support against the Soviet onslaught. The British and French consulted
with each other about some kind of joint intervention
at some point. But nothing ever materialized. The Finns were on their own
against the Soviet Union and the mighty Red Army. A powerful lesson, you
think, to be learned? To be kept in mind
during the Cold War? To the admiration of the world,
Finland fought courageously, inflicting unbelievably
high casualties on the Soviet Red Army. Soviet leaders and generals
thought that Helsinki, well would be taken in
maybe 10 or 12 days. Instead, the war
dragged on for months. The spirit of the Finnish
resistance can be summarized in a few scenes from
the Winter War. And I just simply could
not resist including, including a few. Here you have the
Finnish ski troops with their iconic white
coverings over their uniforms. Here you have a Finnish ski
troop column overran a Red Army tank column, a frequent
occurrence during the three-month war. Here you have Finnish Winter
War machine gun in placements. Set up alongside of strategic
places facing fields, open fields covered with
snow and frozen lakes. And the recently purged
Red Army Officer Corps and experienced officers
marched their soldiers in their, in their brown great coats
across the open fields. And open and frozen lakes with
some tank support, it is true. Considerable tank support. But the Finnish machine
guns mowed them down. Yes, Helsinki was bombed
during the Winter War. And here finally, Red Army dead
in their brown great coats. One Finnish general
said, "Poor Finland. We are a small country. Where are we going
to bury them all?" [Laughter] The world
looked on in admiration as Finland held off the
far-superior Soviet forces. But no help came. Finland had to sue for
peace in March 1940. The Finnish people
were devastated because Finland seemed to
have won all of the battled. But Mannerheim and
his staff knew that the Russian attacks now. With new generals,
better tactics, more weapons and more men. Could not be stopped by a militarily depleted Finnish
forces with tremendous loss of, of equipment as a
result of the Winter War. The Soviet Union,
meanwhile, was getting anxious that the war was dragging on
longer than they expected. And so while insisting on their
territorial demands which they in fact increased their demands. They forgot about the puppet
government in [inaudible]. And negotiated directly with
the duly constituted government of Finland. [Inaudible] to, to consider
the casualties suffered by both sides in the,
in the November 1939-- March 1940 Winter War. Dead or missing in action,
Finland about 26,000. The Soviet Union from
between 126,000 to 168,000. Wounded: Finland, around 44,000. The Soviet Union:
around 167,000. The, the losses of the Finns,
the dead and wounded were by no means insignificant,
given their small population. It was a serious sacrifice. But the casualty rate
was four or five to one. Which is virtually unheard
of in modern warfare. And I want to recognize now,
as and many others have. That had it not been for
the extraordinary heroism, determination, sacrifices, and prowess of the
Finnish armed forces, Finland's fighting forces, and their home front support
during the Winter War. And the later Continuation War, the Red Army surely would have
moved, moved to occupy Finland. If not in 1940, then in
1944 or 1948 or even later. It seems certain that the Soviet
and Red Army leadership decided or concluded that any attempt to subjugate Finland would
have met endless fighting and resistance. A proud and definitive
chapter in Finnish history, the likes of which
few, few countries, if any other countries
can point to. After the Winter War, as
determined in the summer of 1940, the Red Army
divided Poland with Germany. They invaded Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia and forcibly incorporated
them into the Soviet Union. They stepped up their
propaganda attacks on Finland. The Finns began digging
new defensive lines and feared the worst. However, that July of 1940, Germany sent a secret
military mission to Helsinki. And let it be known
that Hitler was planning to invade the Soviet
Union the next spring. Were the Finns interested? [Laughter] Well, the Finns
adopted one of the oldest and unwritten rules in
international warfare, international affairs
and in warfare. My enemy's enemy is my friend. And here was Finland's
enemy's enemy. Adolf Hitler on the left
chatting with Marshal Mannerheim in the center and President
Risto Ryti on the right. However, Finland did
stipulate to Germany that they would not be allies
with Germany in this war against the Soviet Union. But rather a co-belligerent. That is to say fighting the same
enemy but for their own goals. In this case to regain
their lost territory. They assisted the German
forces, some 250,000. The Finns helped them transit
Finland to get up to Lapland. Some 250,000, where they
would attack the Soviet forces protecting Murmansk. But Finland would not
assist Germany in the siege of Leningrad which could
easily could have done. It was almost hard not to do. And nor would Finland
move to cut the Murmansk-- Moscow railway line
which was possible. Which the Allies
were using of course to resupply Soviet
Union during the war. So when Hitler's forces
invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Finland waited three days and then executed its
own planned attack. Finnish forces took back their
lost territory and then took over much of Soviet Karelia. And then established defensive
lines to see what was going to happen in the greater war. Finland called its
renewed fighting with the Soviet Union
the Continuation War. Continuation of the Winter War. Here we see Finland
occupied Soviet Karelia, that large pinkish area in the center was part
of the Soviet Union. It was Karelia, Soviet
part of Karelia. The Finns occupied
that entire area. And then as I say, sort of
established defensive lines and waited to see
what would happen. It is quite possible,
let's, let's be realistic. Quite possible that
had Hitler won the war, there would have been
a greater Finland. Including the Soviet Karelia. However, after Stalingrad,
when it became clear to the Finns and to many others. That the Soviet Union
and the Allies were going to defeat Germany. Finland began secret
negotiations with the Soviet Union
to get out of the war. Meanwhile, it was talk,
talk, fight, fight. Then in June 1944, the Red Army
launched a massive military and artillery attack on
the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns were overwhelmed
and sought the assistance from the Germans to
halt the offensive. The Germans initially
refused to provide the Finns with the heavy equipment
and air support they needed to stop the attack. Because they had become aware that the Finns were secretly
negotiating with the, with the Soviet Union
for a separate peace. It was only when
President Risto Ryti of Finland gave his
personal assurances. That he would not approve
a separate peace agreement under his presidency, did the
Germans relent and provide to Finland the necessary
equipment. To blunt the attack and
avoid being overwhelmed. As soon as the attack
was stopped, President Ryti resigned
the presidency. The Parliament named
Marshal Mannerheim president. And he promptly signed
an armistice agreement in September, ending the
conflict with the Soviet Union. A cynical maneuver? Ryti's commitment
had been personal. And thus not binding
on his successor. But that was what Finland
had to do to survive as an independent country. The fighting with the
Soviet Union was over. But under the terms of the
agreement, the Finns had to drive the German
forces out of Lapland. A very annoyed German
forces, I might add. Drive them out of
Lapland which they did. The war was over, but prospects
for Finland were bleak. The Soviets demanded further
territorial concessions from the Finns. Remember earlier
they had offered to give some additional
territories all up north along the Finnish-- Russian border to some
territorial concessions to Finland. Instead, they took a big
chunk from [inaudible] and then a big chunk
from [inaudible] which was Finland's
outlet to the Arctic Sea. Very important demands. They also took some
islands, Finnish islands from the Gulf of Finland. And then very importantly,
way there at the bottom left, the, you see Porkkala. The Soviets, that's a
peninsula near Helsinki. The Soviet Union grabbed up
that peninsula as a, as a, as a Soviet naval base. And demanded a 50-year
lease on that base, only miles from Helsinki. And then one of the bleakest and most feared events
in Finland's history. September 22, 1944, the Allied
Control Commission arrives in Helsinki, remains
from 1944 to 1947. Emblematic of Finland's
precarious position. The Allied Control Commission
consisted of 200 Soviet and 15 British members. And was headed by the Soviet
Colonel General Andrei Zhdanov. A well-known Communist
Party ideologue from, ideologue from Leningrad. With always a special, almost
perverse interest in Finland. The ACC as it was called
set up its headquarters in the Hotel [inaudible]
in downtown Helsinki. Zhdanov totally dominated
the ACC and deeply meddled in Finnish political affairs. He brokered the creation of a Communist front electoral
movement called the SKDL. The Finnish People's
Democratic League. Which had a good and
strong electoral result in 1944 parliamentary
elections in Finland. Zhdanov saw these results
as very promising and stated that after the election. That he saw Finland as quote,
"Being firmly on the road of democratic development. Alongside Hungary and Romania." Hardly countries I think Finland
would like to be paired with. And then you had the Paris
Peace Treaty of 1947. It included very harsh
terms for Finland. The United States
could not participate in the Paris Peace Treaty
negotiations about Finland. Why? Because we were
the only Allied country that never declared
war on Finland. The middle of World War II, we did not consider
Finland an enemy. It was just a country doing
what it had to do to try to preserve its independence. That we had not been at
war with Finland explains in part why the U.S.
was not included also in the Allied Control
Commission in Helsinki. The Paris Peace Treaty terms
essentially reinforced-- I jumped ahead here. Anyway, reinforced the
territorial transfers to the Soviet Union that
we've always talked about. It formalized the
mandatory 50-year lease on the Peninsula Porkkala. And demanded war,
war crime trials against Finnish conservative and social democratic
party political leaders. It placed strict and permanent
limitations on the size of Finland's military
forces and types of weaponry that would be permitted. Even in future years. And demanded heavy war
reparation from Finland. I've seen estimates
ranging from $300 million to $600 US-million dollars. And this is where I meant
to get now, to this flag. So here we were. The cold, hard facts that
Finland and its leaders had to take, had to face
and take into account. The, as the World War II
ended and the Cold War began. Finland had been abandoned
to its fate in 1939 by the Western countries. It faced brutally
harsh terms imposed by the 1944 armistice
agreement with the Soviet Union. And by the 1947 Peace Treaty. Moreover, in 1948, the
Soviet Union imposed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance on Finland. Which in effect said
that if the Soviet, Soviet Union should unilaterally
decide that Finland might be under some kind of
possible threat. From a third country, then
the Soviet Union would come to Finland's assistance whether
or not Finland wanted it to. [Laughter] So that's
what the Finns, that's what Finland
faced from the east. But it must also be noted
that signals from the west, that Finland could not
rely on Western support against the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. In a memorandum of
a NATO meeting. In July of 1947, the U.S.
and British representatives at this meeting recorded that an
understanding had been reached by them. That quote, "It was not
anticipated that in case, in the case of an attack by
the Soviet Union on Finland that action would be
taken to assist Finland." End quote. And that Finland should
not expect any U.S., quote, "guarantees." End quote. And then a 1951 United States
government policy paper stated that, "Taking into
account the fact that the Soviet Union now
possessed atomic weapons, Finland does not constitute
a strategically viable cause for global war." Quote/end quote. So Finland lay outside of
the western defense system. And lay beyond it was not under
the U.S. nuclear umbrella. So this had to be recognized. And even before the end of Finland's participation
in the war. Two major Finnish political
leaders, J.K. Paasikivi and Urho K. Kekkonen publicly
recognized and argued. That if Finland were to
survive and remain independent. It would have to strike
a new relationship with its superpower
Eastern neighbor. Both Paasikivi and Kekkonen
spoke out forcefully on the need for a new national realism. The two leaders stressed that Finland's independence
could be secured only by winning Soviet confidence that Finland could be relied
upon as a good neighbor. Ladies and gentlemen,
let me confirm to you, based on my experience and other
American diplomats in relations with Finlands and the
knowledge of the record of the U.S. Department of State and all other relevant
U.S. agencies and departments in Washington. And most especially the
responsible U.S. Diplomatic Officers at the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki had a full
understanding of all of the factors that we
have just been discussing. And therefore of Finland's
difficult situation. At the beginning of and
during the Cold War. We understood that Finnish
leaders had drawn the only logical conclusion. If Finland were to survive
as an independent state. It would have to
establish a new relationship with the Soviet Union
as described. But we understood that in
return, Finland expected that the Soviets
would not interfere in Finland's domestic
affairs or form of government. Alas, the Soviets did
not always fully live up to their side of the bargain. But fortunately, the two
aforementioned towering post-war presidential leaders
emerged to guide Finland through these difficult
Cold War years: J.K. Paasikivi and
Urho K. Kekkonen. It was a tough sell
for, for many Finns. You do not turn off
your hereditary, your hatred for your
hereditary enemy overnight. And believe that they
are now your friendly, neighborly neighbors. And yet, that was what
any responsible government of Finland would have to do. I would like to add
here a personal anecdote that touches on just this point. In the fall of 1978, I
was invited to the town of Lappeenranta in
Eastern Finland to speak to the local chapter of the
Finnish American Societies. An organization very similar
to your organization here. Which has chapters scattered. And I'm not sure how
strong they are right now, but they've been scattered
into different towns and cities of Finland. And there was one
in Lappeenranta. And they had invited
me to speak. And so it was a good meeting. I spoke about the timely topic
of the 1978 Presidential, coming Presidential elections
in the United States. Between President Gerald Ford, and his challenger
Jimmy Carter of Georgia. Yes, that really happened. [Laughter] And it so happened
that a number of members of the Finnish/American chapter of Lappeenranta were
also members of the local war
veterans organization. And they had, prior to my
arrival, they had invited me on a moose hunt the day
following my presentation. The hunt took place in the
afternoon and was followed by a rustic dinner at
a remote hunting lodge. As the vodka flowed
and the night wore on. It became clear to me that this
moose hunt was a good excuse for these Finnish war
veterans to get together and relive their experiences
fighting the Russians. Whose border after
the imposed loss of Karelia was now right
there next to Lappeenranta. We all know that now because
we see the border town movie. [Laughter] Anyway, the
straightforward patriotism and honesty of these
Finnish war veterans. As well as their warmth,
friendship, and admiration for the United States
was touching, and clean. It almost brought tears to my
eyes to be welcomed as a friend and to share their
good cheer and vodka. The more vodka drunk,
the more the hatred of the eastern neighbor
was exposed to me like a raw, open wound. It was an emotional and
deeply moving experience. And it gave me an insight
into the cruel reality of Finland's Cold War position. The need for the government to
try to soften the hard edges of the hatred and
the bitterness. Bitter wartime experiences. In order to try to
meet the requirements of the new national realism. I could see the conflicting
emotions. And I mean it when I say
I could see good Finns on both sides of that issue. The government doing
what it had to do. And the people and the war
veterans unable really to come to grips with the Soviet
Union as a friendly neighbor. It was a remarkable experience. And I, I have to admit that I
was not the last man standing at the end of that evening. [Laughter] I admit that freely. Finland faced a continuing
problem during the Cold War. And the term I believe
was coined by a political scientist
George Maud. He called it, "The
Finnish dilemma." That is that to the extent that Finland gave continual
assurances to the Soviet Union and seemed to support some
Soviet security interests that were at odds with
western interests. There were elements in the West that questioned Finland's
neutrality and independence. And the quality of their, of their neutrality
and independence. And the ugly term
Finlandization was coined. But the other horn of the
dilemma was that to the extent that Finland reached
out economically. Or politically to the West
and promoted its neutrality. Rumbles would emanate
from the Kremlin. Questioning whether
Finland was truly acting in a good neighborly manner. Whatever the challenges
of dampening down the traditional antipathy of Finns toward Russia
or the Soviet Union. Presidents Paasikivi and
Kekkonen attempted each in his own way to try to strike
the right balance during their respective terms of office. President Urho Paasikivi, the first Cold War Finnish
President, becoming president in 1946, succeeding
Marshal Mannerheim. President from '46 to '56. By the way, his birth name
was Johan Gustaf Hellsten. He was one of those
Swedish families that had changed their names
from Swedish to Finnish. Did you know that? A lot of people did
not know that. President Paasikivi had to deal with several difficult
situations as president. He was president in 1948 when the Czech communists
overthrew the democratic government of Czechoslovakia. There were indications that a similar movement among
Finnish communists might be underway in March
and April of 1948. Paasikivi put military
and police forces on quite public alert. And the crisis passed. And it has never been
confirmed whether or not there was a real threat. But Paasikivi's actions
underscored that regardless of the participation of
the Finnish Communist Party in Finland's Parliamentary
Democracy which the Finnish Communist
Party, by the way, accepted. Much to the chagrin of the, of the Soviet Union
Communist Party. In any case, what are
despite their participation in Finland's Parliamentary
Democracy, they would not be permitted to undermine the
system from within. Paasikivi also insisted
on appointing as prime minister a Social
Democrat: K.A. Fagerholm. Even though Fagerholm was
opposed by the Soviet Union who didn't like the Social
Democrats at the time. In his memoirs which were not
published until years later, Paasikivi noted that
if the President of Finland allowed the
Soviet Union to decide which Finns would be allowed to
serve in the government cabinet. Then Finland truly in
effect would have lost its independence. A final major achievement
by Paasikivi was his ability to negotiate the
early withdrawal of the Soviet military
enclave in Porkkala, only 17 miles west of Helsinki. On which the Soviets, if you
recall, held a 50-year lease. The very existence of a
Soviet base in Porkkala, stood as evidence to many that Finland could not
be considered a truly independent country. Paasikivi was able
to negotiate Soviet, Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala. And its full return to
Finland in January 1956, a huge step in beginning to restore Finland's sense
of full independence. President Paasikivi was succeed
by President Kekkonen in 1956. And until 1982 as you see. President Urho Kekkonen
articulated the same, the same national realism
policies and as he stay in office, the policy
became known as the Paasikivi--
Kekkonen Line. There were major achievements
during the Kekkonen presidency. He was able to strengthen
contacts with the other Nordic countries to partially offset the Soviet
looming presence and pressure. Despite Soviet misgivings, he was able to win
their acquiescence in Finland's becoming in the 1960s an Associate
Member of EFTA. And a, an important
economic grouping of Western European countries. And again, in the 1970s, he was
able to win Soviet acquiescence in Finland's, when,
when the EFTA and the EEC countries joined
together, Finland was able to join on a purely
economic basis without any political
commitments. These were extremely important
measures linking Finland to Western economies. Another major achievement was
Finland's brilliant initiative in the early 1970s in promoting
developing and negotiating and finally hosting in 1975
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
the CSCE Conference. It's a long story. We don't have time
to get much into it, but it created a
forum of 37 countries. All of European countries
plus the United States and Canada signed onto this
agreement which provided a, a, a, a, a way for countries
to engage on economic and even human rights issues. It was, there was a blossoming of so-called Helsinki watch
groupings all throughout Eastern Europe who were taking
their governments to task on human rights issues. Totally unforeseen by the
Soviet Union in its effort to get a ratification of the
existing borders in Europe. Just to jump ahead
here for a moment. In 1985, Finland hosted
a tenth anniversary of the 1975 CSCE Conference. And it was represented
at the, at the, at the Foreign Minister level. I was back, I was at the
Embassy then as U.S., as Deputy Chief of Mission. The U.S. delegation
was headed by Secretary of State George Shultz. And the Soviet Union
delegation was headed by the brand-new Foreign
Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, who had, who Soviet, whom Soviet
General Secretary Gorbachev had just named to replace
the hard, cold liner, the cold hardliner, I guess. [Laughter] That's
English [inaudible]. Andrei Gromyko and this was to
be Shevardnadze's maiden event. And the, back to the '75, I
forgot that Secretary General, General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford were
represented at that meeting. And, and met and talked
at that conference. And then this, the, the
tenth anniversary meeting, you see George Schultz shaking
hands at a bilateral meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze. The two of course also met
at the Finlandia [inaudible] in the Plenary Sessions. But there were two
bilateral meetings. The first one was
at the U.S. Embassy. And I watched them shaking hands
as they went into the meeting. After the meeting, the, the U.S.
negotiating team, after decades of confronting the
Andrei Gromyko, could scarcely conceal
their general optimism over the meeting. My former U.S. Ambassador
to Finland, the Honorable Rozanne Ridgway,
was on the U.S. delegation at the, at this meeting. And she was there because she
was the Assistant Secretary in charge of European affairs. The first woman ever
to hold that position in the Department of State. And she told me later that
the immediate reaction within our delegation was that
they, that, that with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze at the helm. There seemed to be
real possibilities that real agreements
could be reached. Anyway, the second
slide got me ahead. I want to go back to Urho
Kekkonen because it's, it has to be acknowledged
that critics have argued that President Kekkonen,
over his 26-year presidency. Accumulated far too much power
and authority in the presidency. At the expense of
Parliament and the Cabinet. There was concern that President
Kekkonen was allowing too much influence, political
influence by the Soviets. And by the Soviet Embassy, the feared [foreign
language] Embassy in dealing with Finnish political parties. Also that he encouraged
self-censorship, self-censorship by
the Finnish media. Some felt that President
Kekkonen and his inner circle
played the Moscow card. That is to say implying that
anyone who did not support him as a candidate for
President means that that person was
opposed to good relations with the Soviet Union. Full disclosure:
I, myself made some of these arguments in my book. And there are several examples, other examples we could
discuss if we have more time. One example was, was when
Parliament put forward after the 1958 elections as Prime Minister
the same Fagerholm that Paasikivi had put forward. Had been put forward
to Paasikivi, and that Paasikivi endorsed
despite Soviet opposition. Well, the Soviet Union again
expressed their total opposition to Fagerholm. And they instituted a kind
of deep freeze on Finnish, on relations with Finland. And President Kekkonen,
unlike Paasikivi, did not support Fagerholm
until finally, finally Fagerholm
had to withdraw. In effect, the Soviet Union was
allowed to block the appointment of a high Finnish official. In this case, the
Prime Minister, something Paasikivi
had warned against. But President Kekkonen
remained in office until poor health caused
him to resign in 1982. After Kekkonen's
long stay in office, Parliament passed constitutional
change limiting presidents to two six-year terms. Which brings us to
the next and third and final Cold War President
in Finland, Mauno Koivisto, President from 1982 to 1994. President Koivisto conveyed a, a far more laid-back
presidential approach than did his predecessor. He was known as having express-- used favoring a more
vigorous parliamentary role as indeed came to pass
within two years in Finland. At the same time, President
Koivisto, like his predecessors, recognized the national
realism, and was careful like his predecessors to recognize the Soviet Union's
security interest in Finland. However, Soviet political
influence, and I was there-- I was back there by then--
had notably and quickly, quickly diminished during
the Koivisto period. As did Finnish media
self-censorship. And President Koi-- Koivisto
in no way could be considered to have ever played
the Moscow card against his domestic rivals. Although some of his rivals
tried to use it against him. Also upon the collapse
of the Soviet Union, President Koivisto moved quickly
and unilaterally to remove uni-- renounce all of the
treaty restrictions that had been enforced upon
Finland by the Armistice, the Peace Treaty, and by
the Friendship Treaty. The Cold War was over. Let me underscore that throughout the
45-year Cold War period, my U.S. Embassy colleagues
and I, and there are several
of us here today. Drew tremendous satisfaction
in knowing that the consistent overriding
U.S. national objective with regard to Finland was to
support its Western values. And independence and to promote
respect for Finland's efforts to be recognized as
a neutral country. We knew that our policy
exactly paralleled Finland's own aspirations. But we understood that Finland's
existential relationship with the Soviet Union meant that Finland could not really
acknowledge U.S. support. Much less admit that the only
threat to Finland's independence and system of government at any
time had been the Soviet Union. Also, my wife Magda, who
unfortunately cannot be here with us today because she's
suffering from the effects of bronchitis and was
told she shouldn't fly. At any rate, we are so
privileged to have lived in Finland during six
with our children, during six of those
Cold War years. So many good friendships, a
number of which still survive. Despite the 30 or 40 years that
have passed, that have elapsed. So many fond memories. The whole family, learning
how to cross-country ski in [inaudible], in
northern Finland over New Year's holiday 1977. And then my putting my very
modest cross country skiing skills to use almost
ten years later in the 75-kilometer
1986 Finlandia heathto. Placing 8656 [laughter] in
only ten hours and 30 minutes. [Laughter] But there were
10,000 people that participated. [Laughter] And mostly behind
me were the women. And [inaudible] women. But the Cold War ended in
1990, and there are, and we, but the events keep rolling on. And I, I would have normally
stopped here, but I can't. I can't stop here. We have to talk about the
significant new dimensions to Finland's policies and to
the European security context. And the Transatlantic
context which we have to bring up to date because it is
so immediately relevant. A U.S. Presidential visit last
year to Finland should remind us that there's quite a
history in Helsinki and Finland of, of
high-level visits. And I just jotted down
or noted a few of them. They would take place usually
at the Presidential Palace here at the lower right
on the South Harbor. Here we have President
Koivisto and one of [inaudible] several meetings with General Secretary
Gorbachev in the 1980s. Here you have President Reagan and President Koivisto
meeting in Helsinki in 1975. Here you have, -- . In 1985, sorry. Here we have President Clinton and President Yeltsin
meeting in 1997. And then jumping
pretty far ahead, we have President Sauli Niinisto and President Vladimir Putin
meeting December of 2016. And then of course
President Niinisto in between the two visitors
that he had last May, President Trump and
President Putin. And then Presidents
Trump and Putin went off to a private meeting
where they discussed, well we don't know
what they discussed. [ Laughter ] This slide records that NATO
has expanded to 29 countries with nine new countries
joining NATO since 2000-- since 1999, the year that Vladimir became
the effective leader of the Soviet Union, or
of Russia, of Russia. Russian Federation. Under President Putin, the
Eastern neighbor, once again, has pretentions that
it can intervene in and direct the national security
policies of its neighbors. Meanwhile, Finland has been
reevaluating its security policies big time. In 2002, Finland signed onto
the NATO Ukraine action plan. In February 2005, Finland
joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Enhancing its relations
with NATO. In 2008, Russia intervened
militarily in Georgia, removing two provinces
from that country. In, in 2014, Russia seized
by force the Ukraine area of Crimea, including
Sevastopol and incorporated them into the Soviet Union. And today, even today volunteer
so-called Russian troops still today occupy parts of the
East Ukraine and fight against Ukraine government
forces. Meanwhile, Finland has signed, and the U.S. signed a
Defense Cooperation Pact in October 2016. Was signed by Finland's
then-Minister of Defense, Jussi Niinisto, and U.S.
Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Bob Work. This was during the final
year of the Obama presidency. And then you have in 19--
last year, May of last year. Eleven, eleven months ago
here you have Finland, Sweden, and the United States signing in Washington a Trilateral
Agreement to increase joint
security cooperation. It was signed by the then-U.S.
Defense Minister, James Mattis, and the then-Minister
of Defense, Jussi Niinisto of Finland. And the Swedish Minister of
Defense, Peter Hultqvist. I don't know if he's
still in that position. And then in April of last year, President Sauli Niinisto
announced that Finland will host major
multinational military exercises in Finland in 2021. He said that the
exercises will be similar to those hosted by
Sweden in 2017. In which 19,000 military
personnel from nine countries
participated, seven NATO countries, plus
Sweden and of course Finland. Finland has obviously decided
it will not be left again alone facing the Russian Federation. But suddenly we find
ourselves in a period of considerable uncertainty. As Finland has strengthened its
security ties and cooperation and become an integral partner
of Western Europe and NATO, we have seen some mixed
signals emanating, emanating from Washington about its security
relationship with Europe. President Trump at one
point a year or so ago, was questioning why should
the U.S. remain in NATO? On the other hand,
we had last month a, an apparently good
visit to Washington by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg. Meanwhile, he was honored also,
Stoltenberg, during this trip by very obvious declaration
of, of support for NATO by a bipartisan Congress
when he addressed these, the only member, he
was the only member, he was the only first time
that a, the leader of a, the head of the international
organization has direct-- has addressed a joint
session of Congress. A clear message by the U.S.
Congress on both parties of their support for NATO. Just in case anybody
had any doubts. And also, let's,
let's acknowledge at the current U.S.
Administration, unlike its predecessor
administration, the Obama Administration has
provided lethal defensive arms and weapons to Ukraine. U.S. last year announced
substantial increase military equipment and training
for the Baltic countries. More than 5000 U.S.
troops have participated in recent military
exercises in Baltic countries. In Finland last month, Defense
Force Chief General Jarmo Lindberg in a speech
in Helsinki stated that it was the Russian
invasion and takeover of Crimea that has caused a large
and justifiable increase in the level of military
exercises in, in, of NATO and countries like
Sweden and Finland. And increased defense
preparedness. And he strongly supported
the need for Finland to buy new generation
of fighter aircraft. So Finland has been
hanging tough. But you had elections in Finland
two weeks ago, and there, there it seems that there could
be some significant political shifts that result
from these elections. Which may pre-stage a difficult
government formation period. One notes that there
were significant gains of left-of-center parties. And one notes that the,
the, the Center Party which had been the major party in the recent coalition
lost 18 seats. So Finnish attitudes and
European attitudes as far as defense issues could change. And they could be affected by
attitudes in the United States. So these are uncertain times. Where are matters headed? And all I can say is this
is where I hope they end up. U.S. and Finnish flags
flying side by side, joint defense of Western Europe. And cross, and joint
cross-Atlantic cooperation. That's where it has to end up. I would welcome any
questions or comments. [ Applause ] Yes, sir? >> Thank you, thank you, thank
you very much for this-- . >> James Ford Cooper:
I thank you. >> Excellent summary
of the Finnish history and your deep understanding
of the position of Finland between West and East. >> James Ford Cooper:
Thank you very much. >> So we have five minutes
for, or something like that. >> James Ford Cooper: I
know I went on too long. But I couldn't help it. >> We need to be out of the
building before seven o'clock so-- . >> Actually, they extended the, the door opening
time until 7:30 so. >> Okay. >> James Ford Cooper: Well, I, I slipped the guy a five
dollar bill on the way in. [Laughter] Any, any
comments or questions? We have some distinguished,
[inaudible] we have, another former DCM, another
two-time server in Finland. Except he has the advantage of speaking absolutely
fluent Finnish. And then we have, we have
Dave here who has been, we were colleagues together. And we had also very
knowledgeable about Finland and
Finnish affairs. And as is his wife, by the way. Yes, yes sir? [ Inaudible ] >> Can everybody hear? Oh, thank you. >> Thank you. You have one country was not
mentioned so much, Sweden. >> James Ford Cooper: Yes. >> And in fact Sweden
did support Finland on the voluntary basis
in the Winter War because official
Sweden could not. >> James Ford Cooper: Yes. >> But I think of
the 9000 men who came over to the [inaudible] sector. They were actually in
their other duties. They had been part of
the Swedish military. And one-third of the
Swedish air force at that time was supporting. It could not do it
probably and so I note. And now again, and after these
election probably the military cooperation with Finland and
Sweden is further strengthened. It has been building up over
the last two or three years. >> James Ford Cooper:
Yes, yes I-- yeah. I think I acknowledged that. And no, you're absolutely right. Finland received no official
help during the Winter War, but they did have volunteers,
many from Sweden, and also some from Norway and,
and from Denmark. Including a neighbor of
ours, Dr. Barnard Rasmussen. Who came to Finland
to help on the front and married a Finn
and stayed forever. >> And of course, as
you mentioned earlier, Finnish history, I think both of
our institution and culture has, you know Sweden was an important
country for us in those days. >> James Ford Cooper: Indeed. >> I'm not really a Swede. I'm totally Finn, but I do, I do have to recognize
the Swedish contributions. >> James Ford Cooper:
Yeah, but as I say, sociologists believe that,
that the Finnish structure, they refer to it as the,
as the sort of the, the, the Eastern Nordic
Finnish structure. And then they refer to the, the Danish Norwegian
Swedish structure. But they're very similar. But Finland, yes, direct, a
direct inheritant of that today. Yes? >> Thank you. I'm curious about the
economic position of Finland. I assume that they
probably have some trade with the Soviet Union? And I was wondering how that affected things
politically within the country? >> James Ford Cooper: That, it,
the Finnish, it became clear to the Soviet Union that it
was perhaps a great advantage to have a, a Western-oriented
country with links to the Western economies
as a neighbor. Because they were able
to take advantage of, of, of getting high-tech material
and equipment from Finland. And the Finnish-- Soviet trading
relationship was done almost by barter. And it was like a classic
trading arrangement between an advanced country
and an underdeveloped country. With Finland being the advanced
country providing ice breakers and machinery and woodworking
materials and machines. And the Soviet, and, and, and
paying for, being paid for by, by logs and, and timber
and gasoline and oil. So by, that was an
important relationship. And Finland benefited
from that as well. It was mutually beneficial. I think most people will agree. Yes? Okay, well I can't drag,
I can't [inaudible] you into staying any longer. So thank you so much. It's been a lot of fun for me. [ Applause ]
