Modalities for Nuclear Disarmament in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Treaty

weapon of mass destruction project the project has been a four-year initiative funded by the EU the objective is to conduct research promote capacity building and facilitate Regional dialogue as related to the Middle East weapon of mass destruction free zone in this context I really believe that the event today is directly advancing all these four objectives when we think about how the Zone can be maternal materialized one of the challenges is obviously the political ones one what many of them which are very important and recovered inverse activities and Publications which you can you can read on our project websites the link of the website will be in the chat I have no doubts that they will we will discuss many uh of those aspects in the discussion today one of the topics that have not been fully discussed and explored sufficiently is how disarmament will take place in the in the region not what is needed to get there which has been covered extensively in our publication as well as others but how to operationalize it what would be considered by Regional States the and the International Community as an acceptable process Which models exist the traditional states can build upon how relevant are they and what pitfalls Regional State should avoid or lesson learned that they should consider it is my pleasure today to introduce the paper authors and Ambassador Hagar and Mr mishobino after both present a paper we will have the opportunity to hear some Reflections about the paper and the topic from my tourist team colleagues Miss gaokaro mukherjanova and Dr Hassan albertin after which we will open the event for Q a from the our audience uh you may use the Q a tab to always hands function to ask a question with that let me introduce our authors in the order they will speak today Mr mishobino was a researcher with unidaire Middle East weapon of mass destruction prison project she has previously worked at kill University and chatnam house to measure the floors and yours and then I will sorry let me first actually introduce also a current ambassador Karen pagad he's a professor of practice at school of global Affairs public policy and the director of the Middle East studies Center at American University in Cairo he has served as a career Egyptian Diplomat for over 25 years so with that Tunisia in Korean the floors is yours thanks hen and hello everyone um I'm really very pleased and honored that so many of you have decided to then attend the launch of our paper and with all the distinguished familiar names in the virtual room I'm really looking forward to the constructive discussions that will surely follow the remarks by us the authors and our to distinguished discussions as well as Ken mentioned I was uh with unidir but recently moved into a new role so I'm participating and speaking today in my personal capacity um and the views expressed are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the UN Secretariat um so that disclaimer out of the way I thought it would be useful to say a little bit about why we wrote this report and why at this stage um what initially prompted Kareem and I to write this report were the discussions within the conference on the establishment of the Middle East weapons as our Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction specifically whether the treaty should include a disarmament obligation in the body of the treaty require MPT accession within a set time frame for signatories or um to have MPT accession and of course disarmament for a state that does possess nuclear weapons be a prerequisite for uh signature of the treaty uh for those of you not familiar with the process although I'm sure if you've found your way to this event that probably is not the case but just to be on the safe side so the conference which was mandated by the UN General Assembly in 2018 um has held three sessions to date at unhq in New York and will continue to be held annually until a treaty of the zone is elaborated uh to date Israel has not participated in in the conference process and out of the P5 who are invited as observers the UF has also not participated so um to go back to the discussions on the conference that prompted this paper um they were really centered on whether and how disarmament could or should be addressed in the treaty but um they have not yet reached a conclusion and the states have not yet discussed how uh they might choose to address disarmament verification um how that would be conducted under whichever pathway they choose for these reasons we felt that it would be useful and timely to write this paper which explores what each pathway for disarmament would look like and what the implications would be for the negotiations and the implementation of the treaty and I really feel that you know our paper does focus on this negotiation aspect which perhaps wasn't really addressed previously um partly because you know there was no official process um additionally um when it comes to establishing the Zone Israel's uh nuclear program and its disarmament accession to the npt are really considered by many as the biggest challenges for the process so we hope that through this paper uh We've started uh to look at at in some detail how a process leading to Israel's nuclear disarmament could look like within the Zone treaty or for the Zone treaty at such a time that Israel decides to do so um let me say a little bit about how the paper is structured so uh it considers two main Pathways for nuclear disarmament for the Zone context either prior to joining the zone or through obligations created by the Zone treaty um under the second pathway it also considers how the treaty could include disarmament obligations so for example would it require npt accession as I mentioned So within a set time frame for signatories or would it include a disarmament obligation written into the treaty uh perhaps even with a verification mechanisms or elimination protocols um the paper also then outlines the advantages and disadvantages of each pathway both from the perspective of how much they would simplify or complicate negotiations and also how they would be implemented in practice um here I'd also like to say we the paper doesn't really go into a lot of technical detail on the process of nuclear disarmament verification but it does um highlight that you know a main question for States at this stage is what role the iaea would have in nuclear disarmament verification and this is a question that is open regardless of the pathway especially given that there has only been one case of a state voluntarily dismantling its nuclear weapons program that of South Africa so the paper does this through a review and Analysis of other relevant instruments such as the MPT and CWC as well as draws on cutting's own experience over the years with the Zone initiative in general and and Conference proceedings uh in specific um and then after we sort of examine the different Pathways the paper then highlights three key considerations for States as they move forward in the negotiation of the Middle East Country the first of these considerations is what level of assurances transparency and information States would want to have about the nuclear disarmament verification process involving any state in the region um again as the conferences it's still at its early stages of discussing this topic um this you know created a main challenge for us when writing this paper because at present states have not fully um communicated their positions on questions such as the level of information or transparency that they would consider sufficient uh regarding the process of ndv uh sorry nuclear verification in the region so how much would they want to know about what was happening with a broad conclusion by the iaea be sufficient all of this is is yet to be discussed um but you know that being said and given the secrecy of Israel's program past non-compliance cases in the region concerns about nuclear programs in the region and just in general of the level of mistrust we felt uh that it would be a fair assumption that the assurances that states would require would be quite High um the second consideration is what is the expectation of States uh for the time frame for the negotiation of the treaty um how complex the the drafting process might be and what the time frame uh sort of their pain threshold for the time frame of the treaty's entry into force would be and there are really no easy answers for this because it's kind of a situation where you can't have all three you can just have one or two and then the third one will be complicated um so you know in the case of opting for a relatively easy negotiation and drafting pathway um that might seem a good idea but at the same time it has to be that choice has to be taken uh with keeping into mind that it might delay entry into Force if it is tied to Israel's npt accession um then again a detailed disarmament plan um might provide states with the assurances that they want but would be a complex and long process which would require active and sustained engagement and cooperation of several stakeholders including the P5 as well as the disarming state but you know on the other hand it could also provide a serious and clearer plan and pathway for disarmament which in turn could increase the credibility of the zone and and the final key consideration is um is the balance between these two two considerations like how complex is this drafting process to be it could be should be would you like it to be as well as um you know what level of assurances do states need and and who will be providing these assurances um so I'll stop here to give Kareem uh the the floor I'm sure he'll be able to add a lot more flavor I really hope that many of you have had the chance to read the report and I'm really looking forward um to the discussion thank you very much uh thank you very much to Misha and uh thank you all for being here for this event so pivoting off from uh what Tunisia presented really the the purpose of this paper is to present an overview of potential Frameworks or models uh for nuclear disarmament within uh the context of the Zone treaty and also the option of excluding uh any disarmament nuclear disarmament framework from the treaty itself so having disarmament uh taking place outside of the context of the Zone treaty so these are the two broad Pathways uh we present and of course the the challenge here when presenting an overview of models for nuclear disarmament is that there are a few models to to actually draw from so in contrast to the various non-polariferation obligations that are incorporated into various treaty Frameworks including nuclear weapons free zones the Frameworks that pertain to nuclear disarmament are relatively nascent and in many ways still evolving that said when we go through uh the overview of potential models in the first approach that is incorporating nuclear disarmament obligations within the proposed Middle East wmd3 Zone treaty we identify three broad approaches uh for for incorporating uh these models the first approach is incorporating disarmament obligations within the treaty however without a specific verification mechanism to oversee the implementation of these obligations and here we point to two specific models the npt and the BWC as potential models for this approach the npt of course bringing in an obligation for a state party to the Zone treaty to exceed to the MPT within a specific time frame uh that would require the state party that possesses nuclear weapons to join the treaty within a specified time frame by the Middle East wmd free zone treaty and that of course relies on the general uh Provisions Incorporated within the npt that pertain to nuclear disarmament uh but of course those uh Provisions pertain specifically to nuclear weapons States uh and there are really no uh Provisions within the MPT uh that pertain to nuclear disarmament for States other than the five nuclear weapon States identified by the treaty the biological weapons convention does contain clearer language regarding its members obligations to destroy microbial and biological agents that obligation is also time-bound so the treaty States as soon as possible but no later than nine months after the entry into force of the treaty for that particular state but the BWC of course does not include Provisions for the verification of this obligation so the BWC and the MPT really provide the Emperors for the first approach of incorporating uh General disarmament obligations within the treaty but without verification provisions the second approach would lie on disarmament obligations with General verification requirements and here we point specifically to the Treaty of palindaba establishing the African nuclear weapons free zone and the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons so the Treaty of palindaba presents a very interesting case with respect to a nuclear weapons-free Zone that is distinct from other nuclear weapons free zones uh that that do not actually incorporate a disarmament obligation so palindaba is really the first and so far only nuclear weapons-free Zone framework that actually includes specific nuclear disarmament obligations Incorporated within the treaty because unlike the other nuclear weapons free zones which were primarily a response to perceived external nuclear interventions the African nuclear weapons-free Zone treaty was seen as an instrument to assure against the emergence of nuclear threats from within the continent itself so hence we have article 6 of the treaty that requires a declaration of nuclear weapons possession the dismantlement destruction or conversion of nuclear explosive devices and the facilities of their Manufacturing the other distinctive aspect of the treaty here of course is that it establishes a regional body uh for the implementation of the treaty in general and that includes support for the disarmament uh elements of the treaty so the African commissioned on nuclear energy is the Secretariat or the implementation of the treaty and it has a role in nuclear disarmament verification in conjunction with the iaea the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons of course provides what is perhaps the most detailed framework with respect to nuclear disarmament so the elements of that framework are a baseline declaration regarding nuclear weapon status a template for steps uh pertaining to nuclear disarmament so the removal of nuclear weapons from operational status the destruction of these weapons and all of this within a legally time-bound plan for the verifiable and irreversible elimination of their weapons so introducing the element of irreversibility with respect to the nuclear disarmament process and that plan has to be negotiated by the state in question with the competent International Authority that would be designated by the state's party to the treaty responsible for nuclear verification so there are two in addition to these elements the tpnw presents two interesting aspects with respect to nuclear disarmament the first is that it allows for nuclear disarmament both prior to joining the treaty and also after accession to the treaty so even if a state is that possesses nuclear weapons is allowed to accede to the treaty uh before conducting the disarmament process the treaty incorporates a very detailed framework for nuclear disarmament within the treaty uh itself and then the other distinctive aspect of course is the role for the competent International Authority with respect to the verification of nuclear weapons disarmament so this is a function that the tree gives to the competent International Authority and this would be complementary to and in conjunction with the role of the iaea that focuses on nuclear material accountancy through the application of its state guard provision so the the third model uh that states parties negotiating The Zone treaty can resort to uh if they wish to incorporate a nuclear disarmament framework within the treaty is a disarmament framework with specific verification mechanisms and here we point to the chemical weapons Convention as the model that can be looked to uh in this respect so the CWC of course is thus far the only example of a multilateral disarmament treaty that includes a comprehensive disarmament verification regime and the elements of that regime are based on Provisions regarding uh the Declaration destruction dismantlement prohibition of chemical weapons and chemical weapons precursors and these are embodied within the different articles of the treaty and uh enunciated in great detail in the various annexes to the treaty and of course the detailed verification Provisions Incorporated in the 3D and were seen by the opcw now we point to this model uh as one potential template for incorporating disarmament uh obligations with a verification mechanism this may be too ambitious to apply to nuclear disarmament so we have no nuclear weapons convention that exists similar to the CWC but it is an interesting reference framework in terms of the level of detail and precision with respect to its disarmament obligations that we thought would be useful to include within the paper so these three options anchor the first approach incorporating a nuclear disarmament framework within the treaty the alternative approach of course is to have nuclear disarmament as a prerequisite for joining the Middle East wmd free zone treaty in other words having this argument conducted outside of the treaty framework itself and here of course the precedent that we draw on uh in the paper to illustrate this approach is the president of South Africa's experience the only case in which a state that had manufactured nuclear weapons having voluntarily decided to dismantle its nuclear weapons program prior to its succession to the npt as a non-nuclear weapon state and so following South Africa's accession to the MPT in 1991 it declared its possession of nuclear weapons and having conducted its disarmament process brought in the iaea to retroactively verify the disarmament process now we go into some length in terms of highlighting the distinctive aspects of Africa's disarmament because they are very Illustrated of an interesting precedent that can be used as a template to Envision potential disarmament nuclear disarmament scenarios for the Middle East South Africa's approach with respect to the iaea was mostly Cooperative so it offered the agency free access anytime anywhere but essentially the iaea conducted the retroactive verification of a unilateral disarmament process undertaken by South Africa prior to it succeeding to the npt so separate from the Treaty of palindaba which did incorporate Provisions for the nuclear disarmament within the treaty framework itself South Africa's nuclear disarmament was conducted essentially unilaterally outside the tricky framework of palindaba itself so the the point of this overview Within These two broad Pathways incorporating nuclear disarmament within treaty and having nuclear disarmament external to the treaty itself the point of this broad overview is really to present the implications of each approach or the issue of nuclear disarmament within the context of the Middle East Zone so to recap what to have mentioned opting to establish the nuclear disarmament as a precondition for joining the Zone treaty for example by requiring all states to the non-nuclear weapons takes parties to the amputee prior to treaty accession that does entail certain advances of course it up it's the need to incorporate detailed nuclear disarmament Provisions within the Zone treaty itself there thereby simplifying the negotiation process for the treaty but also simplifying the actual implementation of the treaty uh itself and therefore it states parties to the treaty would rely essentially on the iaea to assess and gain assurance that all member states are free of nuclear weapons and then finally of course with respect to this particular option the excluding nuclear disarmament from the treaty would alleviate the very sensitive question of who conducts nuclear disarmament right so who actually physically conducts nuclear disarmament whether it is the state in question uh unilaterally or whether in conjunction with some form of Cooperative agreement with the other nuclear five nuclear weapons States and this is of course an issue of great sensitivity that the treaty framework would essentially avoid excluding disarmament completely from The Zone framework however would effectively forfeit any ability on the part of the state's parties to the treaty to influence the terms of this Armament process itself and this could potentially compromise confidence in the completeness of the disarmament process and therefore the Integrity of the zone as a whole and here again just on a final note to illustrate advantages and disadvantages of each option we go back to the president of South Africa so it took the iaea essentially eight years since South Africa concluded its additional protocol in 2002 to draw the conclusion that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities and as we mentioned in the paper this was essentially the result of a very Cooperative approach undertaken by South Africa with respect to its disarmament process as verified by the iaea allowing any time anywhere access a full and complete Declaration of its nuclear inventory with respect to its nuclear weapons and also this all material uh stock model if we apply this template to Envision potential disarmament scenarios in the Middle East we can get a sense of the potential variations that might take place if a state that possesses nuclear weapons decides to disarm unit outside the context of the Zone treaty whether that state is Israel or whether that state is a future proliferator that manages to actually succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons so that process if conducted unilaterally in the absence a specific terms or framework for disarmament can potentially be based on incomplete Declarations of its nuclear weapons stockpile restricted access to the iaea to nuclear facilities and information pertaining to the nuclear program therefore thereby entailing significant gaps in the knowledge and the history and background of the program no time but bound binding framework for nuclear disarmament that would be negotiated by the state in question uh with the member states of the zone so all of these caveats might lead to a situation in which the state in question undertakes nuclear disarmament unilaterally in a way that compromises the Integrity of the Zone process and can potentially lead to concerns or doubts as to the completeness of the department process itself so with that we wanted to present the negotiators of the Zone treaty with a menu of options to choose from highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of these various approaches so let me stop there and uh you to open the floor for discussion thank you thank you uh to Misha and Karim for really laying the ground for us we're really thinking about hey the two broad options and what the implication and advantages as well as disadvantages of each one of them uh the line uh the in front of the negotiators so with that uh I will briefly introduce our two discussions uh that had the opportunity to read the paper and we'll share some of their Reflections uh we will start with Miss gaokar mukherjanova garka is the director of the international organization a non-proliferation program at the James Martin Center for non-proliferation studies and is currently based in Vienna Austria at the Vienna Center for this Armament and nonproliferation and if you are not following gaka on Twitter you're missing out not only does she share imported insights and during and on a non-proliferation events but also she injects her sharp humor into events that even in the most depressing situation so you should uh and then uh after following gaka we'll have Dr Hassan al-batimi Hassan is a senior lecturer at the world studies department and director of the Center for Science and security studies in King's College London it is a pleasure to have you both today thank you and Gaga the floor is yours thank you very much Ken for this very kind introduction I feel like I need to up my Twitter game now to the to the description and thank you very much to unidir for um having me in this event and for uh for letting me read the paper uh in advancing which is being being prepared so uh I would start my my comments with first of all commending the orders authors uh Tanisha and Karim for taking on what I think is is one of the more difficult and sensitive aspects of of the the future wmd free zone in the Middle East uh both in terms of negotiations and and implementation as Tanisha said this this hasn't really been discussed very much in detail yet partly because we haven't had the Diplomatic process to do so and partly because uh it is um uh it is generally underexplored under implemented Topic in the multilateral sphere and so existing experience in the international treaties and regimes with regard to nuclear exam in particular is is frankly of limited utility uh in terms of drawing lessons and practices for the future zones and the task list was certainly uh difficult and I think you did very well in terms of systematizing your approach to how to how to think about the elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of the Zone what should what could come first and what kind of implications each each approach um has so so very well done um and and just to comment as I was asked to talk about sort of the the international regime aspect of this and maybe some of the lessons from from the international regimes and treaties that you have used in in your analysis um I like this idea of defining the the two two big approaches so these are on first and then join and then the other the result of this part of the treaty and then differentiating what kind of experiences uh you already have in the international sphere um and and the broadly defined development obligations under the npt being the foundational instrument of international nuclear order have of course for a long time being the subject of contention um because of the lack of specifics in in the treaty itself and and and their continuous uh debates in the review process in an attempt to define those specifics to agree on on concrete design on steps and due to the general kind of lack of implementation and so the the experience of uh 50 years of the review process fighting over what is disarmament and how to implement it I think is more than instructive for for the Middle Eastern countries not to attempt to do the same with with their Zone that is just sort of prolonging and codifying the the agony BWC I think is interesting because it it does expressly prohibits and mandate prohibit a class of weapons and mandates disarmament but doesn't include any verification provisions and for each of these treaties it's important to understand in what contexts they were in negotiated why they went down the path that they did and with PWC the overwhelming I think desire was to establish a normative prohibition I guess against an abhorrent type of weapon uh the difficulty of uh coming up with an effective verification regime at that time and the willingness of the US in particular to just go with it as long as they established so it was normative prohibition unfortunately the experience of BWC is is there was a massive cheating on the treaty by by the other key participants Soviet Union and so again that is a big strike against against adopting that kind of approach for the Zone especially considering the the history of distrust in in the region and so I think In the Zone The Zone would have much more concrete and practical issues to deal with uh Beyond establishing abroads of normative prohibition the way the WC vwc does uh with the uh the general uh desirement uh verification verification um a model that you where you group pillendaba and the tpmw I think that's also very interesting to understand why those Provisions are the way they are in those agreements I'm afraid the provision for the disarmament and disaster application is more symbolic than practical the key problem of South Africa and South Africa's equivalence program had already been dealt with um and and so the treaty establishes this requirement for disarmament and designed verification tasking the Ia and afcon one of which was not even in existence at the time uh in a sense it's lucky that provision was never tested uh because it asks the Ia to verify the actual process of disarmament which the Ia has has never done and and there's an argument to be made that it wouldn't do so in the future just because of the on the kind of the specifics of its of its of its work on nuclear material accounts and see rather than involvement in any conformance control modification the model contained in the tpmw is uh interesting and again instructive to understand why the article 4 Provisions are the what they are the emphasis again in the the negotiations in CPW wasn't establishing a normative prohibition uh and therefore States negotiating it were determined to conclude the treaty without and even against an active opposition of nuclear weapons possessors and so that was the main reason that the treaty while having a development obligation doesn't have specifics on how it should take place within what kind of time limits and who exactly should verify the process so again driven by the needs to establish a norm and then facing the reality of not having the possessors the key actors at the table in that regard states were willing to sort of leave the specifics for future negotiations how how is that important for a potential zonal negotiation well one of the key principles of negotiating in the gluten-free Zone as reflected in a number of U.N uh agreed texts the key principle of negotiating a zonal treaty is to have all the relevant States at the table and so the situation where you don't have a possessor at the table and you negotiate treaty provisions and leave specifics for the future kind of kicking the can down the road that may not really be an option in Practical terms for the Zola negotiations or the very least it would be much harder to justify if you do have Israel at a table and still believe to possess nuclear weapons it will be much harder to justify leaving the specifics of disarm into the design certification for some time uh down down the future so in that sense I think while the CPW presents an interesting uh model for uh join and then disarm I think the the specifics of negotiating a Zone rather than a broad normal zip instrument uh really coming to play here uh the the CWC is in in a sense kind of an ideal um ideal example of of the ones we we have at our disposal the international Arena uh where you as as Korean describe you have a treaty not only prohibiting a class of weapons but also having very specific um uh program for dismantlement of of weapons there are timelines involved in very uh very robust verification um regime so that of course would be ideal for for a Zone if it if it is taking the approach to have disarmament as part of the zonon treaty the difficulty there I think is the fact that CWC was negotiated with the participation of several key possessors and so they they all have they at least the United States Soviet Union being the key actors there they both had its extensive chemical up as arsenals they could come to that negotiation of design verification from the position on that practical experience of having developed those vocals and having them in the case of nuclear disorders under a zonal agreement the there being inshallah only one nuclear weapons possession involved you you you do need to involve external uh expertise and so participation of extra Regional actors and therapist possesses becomes ever more important the guideline for the chemical resources yes you you need to consult with European States one way or another but the actual involvement of expertise and developing specific Provisions it would be that much more important in prominence in negotiations CWC style approach approach is taken um and uh briefly about the the other major approach to the design and join I would note that the tpmw also has that kind of South Africa model Incorporated uh into it that's another option you can design menu actually and then join the treaty and then conclude an agreement with the Ia to demonstrate that that you don't have an undergraded nuclear materials and activities so that seems like a fairly straightforward approach and that was considered a simpler formula for the tpw verification I'll be AIDS are potentially putting the entry into force or the involvement of key actors really really far down the road but again I would like to to remind some of the the specifics of how this was negotiated and what happened in the negotiation and so one exp one lesson to draw from the tpnw uh negotiation for the Zone potentially is to make sure that the stringent verification requirements apply to all states parties so that they all have to demonstrate the absence of Undeclared nuclear materials and activities on their territory and then then they'll have to decide whether that means comprehensive savings agreement and additional protocol or something beyond that that is something to be you know figured out with the iea or with an addition of some kind of verification Regional Authority original Arrangement but the key here is that if you are not incorporating design and verification of these elements in the process into the treaty but only having it at the end then that should apply equally to everyone because otherwise you might end up with uneven verification requirements for different parties joining the treaty and that potential is just not not sustainable um and just to throw in a little bit of the left left field idea considering the complexity of all this um conditions you know whether to have uh if if you put the um examines first and then joining in the end do you do do you make uh um certain certain conclusions by the Ia app prerequisite form um joining the treaty or is it something that you can obtain while being a party to the treaty already and here what I think would be interesting to consider is the experience of the Treaty of blacker local of opportunities so they didn't deal with these armaments but they have very elaborate entry to force divisions one of which is that all states uh all relevant states must bring into Force they say Parts agreements with the iea so we potentially can have something like that in the future Zone Middle East Zone as a requirement for entry into force that all states uh either bringing divorce the relevant safe Parts agreements with IA or they actually attain a buy a broader conclusion which is of course a very high requirement and then allow states to also you know that's really wave that entry into Force requirement for or themselves to kind of accelerate the implementation of the zone I'll stop there and thank you again very much for the paper thank you thank you and thank you for bringing yet another model that we did not take into account but I think have really important uh lessons to learn Hassan great thank you um thank you so much and it's first allow me to uh thank Unity for the invitation and the opportunity to engage and read to Misha and Kareem's paper and I hope they don't they both don't mind me using their their first names I I have to say first Tunisia and Kareem are very bold to write this paper um and the reason um is is we talk a lot about the Zone in conferences diplomatic events and um round tables but we hardly ever talk about what tangible shape and form uh the Zone might take um and Tanisha and Kareem both made that leap into actually talking about the substance of what that might look like um but also they addressed one sensitive and in my view really key integral part of what the zone is about which is the disarmament element of the zone so this is a zone that in the minds of um a lot of countries or those who Champion it come directly linked with the uneven landscape in the region when it comes to nuclear weapons and therefore any progress imagined um in bringing that zone into reality would involve cracking this Armament addressing this Armament head-on um and I think also Tamisha Tamisha and Kareem both um took that as the you know key focus of their uh paper so that's why um I really thank them for their daring attitude to sort of like delve into this uh domain I really think it's a very good paper it's an excellent shorting exercise looking into two key Pathways and a number of modalities and approaching approaches that can be considered so this is really a must read for anyone who's trying to again think or how that idea of a Zone can be made tangible specifically within the disarmament domain but also they go beyond that and and I was very pleased to see them reflecting on some of the factors that can inform some of the decisions linked to the Zone designs so specifically when they raise the points about well the tensions between transparency and thinking about costs and benefits of various options and I think this is also a good way of opening up a conversation and discussion and more reflection on what actually some of these choices would entail which actually also takes that conversation into a deeper level which is very much needed I think to get that discussion and moving forward um I think in general I have three broad points um to make um the first um I think it's very useful um and very commendable to look into the various International experiences I would add a caveat there the the vast majority of them do not work I mean currently we don't have any thing that that actually shouts us and says like this is how you do this Armament this is how you do it properly we don't have that so we might be limited when it comes to the value that International experience can give us and that is because the international experience is limited is context dependent um and therefore it can provide some guidance can be an inspiration but let's not be too constrained by it I think it's very very important to short these options to think about the pros and cons to examine them to think about the lessons learned but I think to take that conversation forward and starting from this point that Tamisha and Kareem produced we think about what lessons can be learned how can this involve enable more creative imaginative context dependent thinking about how this can be applied to the region rather than be constrained by the international experiences there so that's my that's the first point I would I would say um the second point is I want to emphasize the importance of building a community of experts and building Regional capacity that can take that discussion forward and this comes mainly from my experience um from 2007 when I took part in um what was at the time a groundbreaking new idea of looking into how verification of this element can be done and this was championed by the UK and Norway in the UK Norway initiative or something very new and daring at the time um the whole initiative started without actually having a clear mission and this is how sometimes things start as in like we don't we don't really have a mandate there's no mandate it started as a sort of like governmental experts put together with participation from Civil Society to just like think through some of the verification options something that had no prior International experience in so it was really Uncharted Territory and and that's fine that's sometimes how things start but if I look now from 2007 I mean that's quite some time ago now one of the key benefits of this this technical open exchange of ideas that is quite unlimited is that it builds a technical community that if you look around now when it comes to the ipndv international partnership for nuclear disorder verification group of governmental experts all the efforts that any that discussion now has expanded significantly but you look into how the Cur the quads and look into how the kernel of that started from an initiative like this that built a community that enabled itself to expand and now we have a lot of experts that can examine and look into this and come with imagine imaginative sort of like solutions to it so I think this is something that maybe can be replicated regionally and one way of looking forward taking this conversation forward is think about well how we can enable or Foster a community like that recently that to a large extent will involve some technical input really you know the people that you will call upon in order to implement these things when they come into reality um the third point that I want um to raise in this context is the importance of enlarging the conversation around The Zone around nuclear disorder parts of the zone and around verification within this element within the zone and when I say when I say enlarge the conversation about that we for such a long period of time this has been locked into uh diplomatic negotiations multilateral conferences um multilateral diplomacy which is all fine and good but there is an opportunity to expand that to bring you know Academia to bring Civil Society to bring experts and and this will can give more energy and can give ideas can also help us you know perhaps look at the problems slightly differently and can provide very valuable inputs um into pushing the conversation around the Zone forward specifically this is very relevant when it comes to verification when we're now talking about societal verification when there is a lot of debate about how decentralized verification can become and and how the information um sphere around us defined widely involves all sorts of streams of information that are not necessarily just controlled by governments for example um and we need to think about how that features um into verifying something like the Zone but more broadly you know widening the stakeholders involved in that zone project and I think that will enable it to become more real more tangible and we'll give it also maybe more fire and Imagination uh thank you so much for the opportunity to comment on this excellent paper um and Well Done Kareem and Tamisha for being so bold and daring um and putting yourselves out in terms of starting all these various interesting scenarios thank you very much thank you thank you Hassan thank you for uh suggesting both with regard to uh bottom of although government initiatives that grew up and developed but also with regard to expanding the conversation and how you can bring both experts inside government as well as outside government to support that process and ideas how to go forward with that so thank you for that so we will now open the discussion uh for the audience and for their q a if you want to ask a question please use the raise and uh or take and we will let you take the floor uh or you can click also in the Q a and put in the Q a your uh question I will start as we start seeing more and more people asking their questions I will uh in a second give the floor to them but let me ask I guess the first question I I will take the prerogative and estimation Kareem one question I know that it was not easy to write the paper the topic is really complex and as many legal and Technical implications that we didn't really covered in the paper we beyond the regional the political as well as the Strategic realities uh what do you think was the most interesting or important aspect that you learned while writing it and where you any surprises that in your research the challenge your initial assumptions so either um to Michelle Karim you could take the floor if you would like to answer the question that's I started I think we should you know go in reverse order so if you want to tackle this one Kareem if not I'm also happy to go first um thank you uh thank you and let me just uh very quickly thank gokar and Hassan for a set of what I thought were really insightful comments uh uh on the paper so my appreciation uh so and to your question I think what was really the the um the most interesting aspect of writing this paper it was a difficult challenging paper to write uh these issues are complex uh so just um reducing the these different models and approaches to these two Pathways I think took a lot of thinking and I really also want to thank uh to Misha for her excellent work and framing uh these Pathways and and the background research that went into this paper but I thought what was really the most interesting aspect was beginning to think about the various trade-offs uh that countries in the region have to confront right so asking questions these questions that I think this hasn't implied have really not been asked uh previously because sort of the zone for decades now was the sort of General sort of uh abstract concept that as Hassan mentioned was debated in you know diplomatic for our conferences but when you ask the very difficult challenging question of you know how do you do disarmament who does it under what it turns um what what are the potential um scenarios or drawbacks of actually having States uh disarm unilaterally without any guiding framework uh for that disarmament process so just thinking through questions that really have have not been asked so I I thought that was a very revealing and challenging aspect of the paper um just one very quick comment on something delcar said because I think it's very important um she dalcar does a great service in providing the context by which these different Frameworks and modalities were actually negotiated and I think that that is extremely important to bear in mind because context is everything one very important piece of context with respect to Allen daba as as gaokar mentioned she's absolutely correct I mean this was a a novel rudimentary framework for nuclear disarmament Incorporated in the treaty but never tested but I think also important is the impetus uh why the negotiators for palindaba did incorporate this approach particularly with the regional body afcon and here it was very interesting in looking at the history the negotiating history of the treaty is that the negotiators wanted some form of regional ownership over the process even if it was rudimentary even if it was incomplete and the specific impetus here was that they wanted some input into how the nuclear process would be conducted and overseen simply because for decades they have been um voicing concerns over South Africa's nuclear program and nobody in the International Community really engaged with or responded to those concerns and that includes the iaea other members of the International Community with a stake in nuclear disarmament and so the the impetus here was really a desire to have Regional ownership over the process so that's one important piece of the context that I think has a direct bearing on the Middle East given that we're the Middle East today it seems to be in a situation similar to where Africa was at the time of the negotiation of palindaba thank you all right um yeah so for me it was similar to what cutting had mentioned and um and also what what galvar mentioned about context matters for me the the thing that I found most interesting in doing the research and thinking about the paper because you know first the idea came and then the research for it um and just you know for for a lot of us we you know we take it these we take these treaties when we're outside the U.N you know when we're researchers and we think oh my God this is this is the best that states could come up with but then when you read sort of like the Preparatory work for the paper you delve more into um the context and the environment at that time the different accounts by negotiators you really understand how difficult a negotiation is and although a lot of the people in the room and I'm sure this also applies to to the middle eastern states you know we want the best treaty that will give you know the the most assurances the best outcome and give everybody you know a piece of the pie but at the same time you know there are there's as as uh gopher mentioned you know so racing to establish a norm um wanting to wrap this up quickly uh concerns about um you know will we be able to devise something really complex so you know having to balance what I what what is the best course of action with what is possible uh for me was was kind of the most not to say challenging but but really interesting um and this also goes to something that Hassan mentioned you know we talk about all these treaties and they're great examples but some of them are facing I wouldn't say not working but facing uh some significant challenges um I also found that it was really interesting to debunk certain myths that this um that it's really simple there's a lot of talk prior to the conference that you know this this could be simple we will just take a template from another nuclear weapon-free Zone there are so many examples out there it's going to be you know mix and match and we'll have this treaty and and this will be a straightforward process but as we mentioned context matters and it isn't that that straightforward what would work for other places might not work for us and also we can look at their experience and say these were the pitfalls that we should avoid um but I do believe you know several people were surprised to hear that you know it's not just the iaea will establish the Zone I it will go in disarm any possessor and and that will you know will be it and we'll all have CSA and then ever and by we I mean sort of I don't know I'm saying States will have csas and this that will be the end of it um so yeah just highlighting that important of negotiating room Dynamics what states what their paid threshold is for during for the course of the negotiation and then the importance of that context of believe is the most interesting for me thank you thank you I have many more questions but I do want to give our audience to have uh the opportunities so I will call uh our Audience by the order that they showed up so I have the first three ones are Jennifer mcabee I'm in Khalil and Ambassador tonight so uh Jennifer if you want to unmute yourself thank you very much Ken and thanks to the presenters for this uh great uh conversation um I put my my question in the QA box rather than raising my hand but I was just curious why you did not use the ctbt also as a model for verification because it's got very extensive provisions and people are already discussing uh the possibility of applying it to the Middle East Zone it was just just an idle question thank you it's pretty easy to answer the question we did initially look at ctvt we looked at other instruments as well even bilateral instruments to sort of you know try to build this model and this is the the way that it you know eventually uh this is the final result um and yeah it is an example of a treaty that has a very Advanced complex robust verification mechanism however I did not have that disarmament element because you know the cdbt is about testing so that's why I kind of fell out of the the scheme um but it was something that we looked at initially um so yeah the absence of the disarmament obligation is the main reason thank you very much Madam chair and this is to follow up on uh on Jennifer's uh question and I think yes true ctbt has a verification mechanism which includes the testing but I believe that we have we can apply a transformational verification approach within the cpbp meaning that the data which is obtained by cppt could be easily used to verify the summary but on another note I would like to congratulate the Univision project this is the first time as a participant here this is the first time I have access to names and faces of participants and in a workshop this is something which I have not enjoyed and in earlier sessions uh and uh aside from the brilliant paper which was presented today I would like to share with you a concern because of the I mean with all respect to the speakers the discussion that we had today simply qualifies and could be could be under classified under the the umbrella of uh intellectual discussion now this project is really unique unprecedented unique because it has a very important International recognition it enjoys United Nations umbrella it enjoys EU umbrella and with these assets and funds of course one can do a lot with a project like this a massive project uh sticking to the intellectual approach intellectual discussion approach and I I know for sure that the unity project was able to get in touch and reach out to governments and officials in the Middle East yet the inability of this project to reach out and involve stakeholders and I mean specifically official stakeholders from the United States and Israel is is not going to lead us to anywhere stick into intellectual discussion is great but more importantly involving official stakeholders and important stakeholders when it comes to this one is more important thank you so much thank you Iman thank you for the comments about our evolving uh online uh capabilities we are managing finally to uh break into the the virtual words and get more people uh to see each other as well and speak with each other um but with regard to the questions about officials uh we do have we have been involved official growth Israel is a non-official Israelis as well as Americans and as you can see in the um in the participants there are also some of them are here with us today um they where we have real discussions is where we have the dialogues as well but those dialogues as well as the workshops that we conducted for almost all Publications are what informing the papers that we put up so most of the papers that we have been publishing else actually went through a vetting process both internally as well as externally by experts International experts uh as well as other Regional experts so both officials and unofficials so thank you for that and we will continue to really involve all countries in the region both officials as well experts as well as non-official because we are thinking it's important and as Hassan mentioned getting the outside voice sometimes of the non-officials is not as or as not as uh less important than the officials in the room so with that ambassador of Sultana I want to salute all good friends and uh of course congratulate both the authors of the papers uh my good friends I have a couple of uh points and paths questions for further clarification first of all uh when you talk about cinemdc it was worse to mention and highlight the fact that of course there is a dead woman uh Independence in 10 years of course with the exceptional five years extension which unfortunately both by Russia and U.S have violated and they went beyond even 15 years which is a very uh dark uh in fact part of the history of CWC which a president has been made therefore we cannot even uh we depend on it and say that that would be a good model let's assume that text as it is the provision at least shows that there is a deadline therefore one thing is important the element of a specific deadline is essential for any future discussion also otherwise uh we will have the same experience of uh decades like MPT article 6 therefore that is essential we should not lose sight of this important one the next point of course is when you talk about different treaties of course PWC uh as it was clearly said but it has to be highlighted that it doesn't have any verification mechanism it doesn't have any system to work on uh practically because of the lack of uh any mechanism or International organizations also as it was my experience in the Geneva after Decades of the negotiation unfortunately because of the U.S obviously position we were very close to establishing a Organization for verification mechanism but everything is in dormant and it was total collapse and it's unfortunate therefore we have we don't have anything to say about PWC as an example it doesn't have an example it's total failure for the of course uh the other one is tpw TB and W of course again this is a Pity that there is no deadline also there uh it has at least it was expected somehow to explain rather than to say promptly or so this kind of wage Provisions it should have uh specifically say like you see they will see that this expectation of course although it is not feasible uh the other issue which was I think eloquently mentioned the lack of support and present in negotiation by those possessors has uh of course given a negative message but I wonder to what extent that presence was crucial for our technical specification that could be added value to the text I don't know because it is very clear for the extras uh nuclear Express they know exactly what you are talking about we don't need a nuclear weapon Express to sit down there or uh diplomats to it to tell us and teach us what it's all about everybody knows about what we are aiming at and what has to be done of course we have the experience of South Africa as it was clearly explained there also and of course lack of any verification in the TP and the revenue is a very serious weakness which we should not lose sign the issue the experience of the teleco was mentioned this is a I said it in other events of unity we cannot compare this one because uh Brazil and Argentina didn't have and do not have new equipment before this is no uh resemblance or similarity to uh Middle East that Israel has and therefore we cannot say well it was said that whether they should join first or next or so well it isn't as it was said it was an intellectual discussion it's good but the reality on the ground it is not the case that you can use it as an example the next point of course is the question is as it was said and it is expected that the paper uh as Dr aimer Khalil was taught in Nepal uh we do respect which is excellent paper of course they should go and highlight some realities on the ground the reality is Israel has chemical biological and nuclear weapon and therefore uh what the Ambassador Karam said okay uh the possessor and those who are seeking in the future we don't need this kind of hypothetical discussion the fact is now when let's assume that we want to see what to do tomorrow is one possessor and the other question of course they have not dealed with is which one first uh Israel should uh give up biological First Chemical first and then join those treaties and verification of opcw or so and then nuclear or or simultaneously these are the real questions and practical questions that I uh suggest that it would be touch upon it will be very helpful but anyway I commend both my friends and I wish you all the best and of course we have to have further discussions but I hope that we will have more practical additive to all what we have prepared thank you very much for anyway giving me the time discussion the opportunity to answer and then I have a couple of more questions I think possum will be uh first but um you want to answer first okay sure thank you um so first of all thank you for all of the comments from the participants so I think this is a very uh uh interesting and Rich discussion just very quickly uh on this issue of uh sort of the the intellectual aspect of uh this paper so yeah clearly this was uh from an intellectual point of view quite challenging because of the complexities the details and just the volume of information that that we had to sift through uh to present these Frameworks but I I really want to underscore that the impetus for this framework was really from a very practical uh point of view so the the Practical challenge these four states in the region is how do you actually design a framework for nuclear disarmament within the treaty right so the Practical exercise that we are all concerned with is is how how do you actually structure and formulate the substance of a treaty framework for the zone and so that was really the the impetus and and hence uh the the uh the requirement to sort of go through these various options in order to actually present uh the negotiators with a menu of options uh to choose from to incorporate within the treaty if they uh choose to do so one very quick comment on what was said about the ctbt so in addition to tumisha's response I think that there's a lot in the paper that we don't address so that the focus of the paper was quite narrow on the issue of nuclear disarmament right the obligations that would uh be necessary to incorporate with respect to nuclear disarmament uh the time frame the modalities and so but clearly the the the the this issue of nuclear disarmament uh within the context of a treaty cannot be looked at in isolation I think that that is clear there are a number of other nuclear related Provisions that have to be addressed in conjunction with nuclear disarmament that can reinforce whatever nuclear disarmament framework is incorporated within the treaty so provisions on testing and verification of testing uh what golcar mentioned about the verification standard or nuclear related obligations whether those entail restrictions on fuel cycle uh enrichment and processing whether we need to incorporate a standard of irreversibility with respect to nuclear disarmament so all of these related Provisions I think form what we can call an ecosystem that would both re enforce or reinforce nuclear disarmament whatever nuclear disarming Provisions or framework is Incorporated in the treaty and get confidence to all states in the treaty uh that nuclear disarmament uh will be variable to reverse and that deals with the problem the associated problem of nuclear latency so having residual nuclear capabilities that can give States the option to re-arm uh in the future so all of these I think humans need to be looked at uh holistically uh to reinforce uh one another and that of course presents another set of very challenging questions uh that perhaps may be the subject for a different paper if Ken decides to uh bite on that opportunity thank you thank you Tamisha you want to answer us one yeah yeah I just wanted to also you know Echo some of the things that Karim said about you know just being an intellectual exercise I suppose this is subjective because um for me you know somebody who's been on both sides of like practitioner and research I don't see it as very intellectual but you know I I let's say I humbly uh disagree but um you know perhaps this is subjective at the end of the day also it is not my place to uh tell States what to do as uh Kareem mentioned several times this is a menu of options based on discussions that are ongoing or have been um you know that the discussions that have been had by states that we thought okay this is a good opportunity to take all the things that have been mentioned and kind of break them down into their pieces explain what you know would be good and what we'd be bad about each approach what the implications might be and how how how do these different options fit in the specific context of the Middle East I just had a two comments on something that Ambassador sultania said first on the issue of wmds as could've also mentioned the focus is very narrow here so it is nuclear modalities nuclear disorder modalities that's why we don't go into the sequence it is also my impression that nuclear is kind of the most or the most urgent step for Faith currently negotiating and I think that is clearly to be read in the reports of the conference which also explains why we focused on it from the outset and another thing is yes we do focus on the fact that there is one possessor and perhaps have left the door open for you know future cases of this that being said uh and this is something gohar mentioned which is very important we don't want to have uneven obligations or the states don't want to have uneven obligations so whatever pathway is chosen I think you can read this also in several reports the conference the treaty has to be you know equally implemented and non-discriminatory so any thinking that we've done into how this could be formed has always taken into account that principle that it will be non-discriminatory and will be implemented equally um yeah on some of the things that they said they were so good sure thank you though um uh Tamisha for Grounded Us in the current negotiations and uh how that can fit into it or help them uh gaokar answers and then I will give the floor to Boston thank you again just just very quickly because the CPW came up again and the question of of the participation of nuclear con States and the tpnw and the general question of necessity of nuclear with States and experts for for these kinds of negotiations so if the nuclear weapon possesses States participated in tpw conference that would have been just a different treaty negotiation like an utterly different treaty negotiation I would say specifically because if this element were to be included um then then those States would have wanted the the maximum level of specificity uh in terms of the the timelines and verification because they want that confidence uh in each other's elimination and I think that standard should also apply to the zonal negotiations if they decide to have disarmament as a process incorporated into into the treaty um and and and uh so it would be I think I would imagine the demand of those states in the region that don't have Department of Europe was to have the maximum level of confidence that the states that have or believed to have nucleus have actually dismantled them irreversibly and very finally and on the subject of the necessity of the purpose expertise um the South African case when you look at the papers examining the verification you would see that even with dealing with a post-factor verification after the dismantlement the Ia found that they the regular safeguards expertise was not enough and they did have to turn to nuclear weapons experts and again that is the highest standard that I would imagine in the states in the Middle East would also want to have a holder verification of the trees in the future and Hassan wait for me and I will uh bus him has been waiting very very very patiently so awesome the floor is yours thank you Ken and it's really good to see all those familiar faces and I actually had to step out of uh meeting of the group of the governmental experts on nuclear disarmament verification so the discussions have a lot of commonalities there um first of all I have to express my sincere appreciation for Ambassador haggag and uh Tunisia for this very insightful paper which will definitely help and and provide impetus for the ongoing discussions uh at the relevant U.N conference needless to say of course my intervention today is totally in my personal capacity uh but nevertheless I wanted to express some remarks and Reflections on the discussions that transpired today and some earlier discussions on this paper and I also had the opportunity to briefly exchange some notes with uh Kareem had gag on this matter a couple of weeks um as I said this discussion is necessary it's important and it's very timely uh nevertheless I would strongly encourage everyone to fight the temptation to um try to reinvent the wheel or overstate the complexities surrounding this map sometimes when you're facing a complex problem you need to go back to the basics and ask some basic questions for example is nuclear disarmament verification brand new and I think you would share the view that it's not and we do have numerous successful examples of nuclear disarmament that has been conducted in a verifiable and irreversible Manner and um the the means and tools and methodologies that have been applied there I think are obvious to everyone I think you would also agree with me that from effectual and Technical point of view any state without unrestricted access to fissile material will not have access to nuclear weapons even if the non-nuclear components of that nuclear weapon program is there inserting the concept of nuclear latency there might take us all into a very difficult rabbit hole because the same concept is sometimes even applied when certain States discuss non-nuclear weapon states that are under comprehensive safeguards and even sometimes with an additional protocol so again sometimes it's important to note that we shouldn't make the perfect the enemy of the good having said that I wanted to reflect a little bit on tumisha's point that people thought that it will be just ieacsa and voila it's and that this is over simplifying this complex problem um I would beg to differ I mean getting a clean bill of health from the iea that declarations by a certain state of its facile material and the relevant production facilities are under safeguards and that the agency can confirm that they are not being used for any military purpose is not at all a simple exercise but nevertheless this clean bill of health is the core guarantee that states would ask for in a nuclear weapon free zone other elements of a nuclear working program the non-nuclear components such as delivery vehicles and and the metal components of a weapon this can be subject to confidence building measures for example or transparency measures but they cannot be verified it's impossible to verify that uh by by any technical account so we need to make a distinction between what is verifiable and what is not verifiable uh in this regard um so again thank you very much for this input it will be taken into consideration by many experts that are involved in this process nevertheless warnings for example that the possible treaty might have uneven obligations or that it might end up as a non-proliferation treaty uh rather than a disarmament treaty I think that the the the the question here is somewhat misguided any nuclear weapons or wmb free zone is by definition a comprehensive prohibition treaty so and and that General prohibition like uh what Kareem had gag alluded to will be linked to an ecosystem within that treaty something that will address the sequencing of uh the accession of a certain State uh the sequencing of how that state enjoins the three main well functioning treaties on chemical biological and nuclear weapons and then other provisions on the entry into force of that treaty so I mean that that misconception that uh warning negotiators that you might end up with an entrepreneurial treaty that would Grant Israel for example the status of a nuclear weapon state inside the Middle East I think was a little bit something that was not really called for I know that there has been some discussion on that but nevertheless I I will leave it there I will have to go back to that meeting that I left and I look forward to Future discussions on on these very valuable elements with you thank you very much thank you basam good luck with the gge and thank you for uh sharing a little bit different perspective um I think uh let me give Hassan I think Hassan this is for previous uh comments if you want to go for uh like a Hot Pursuit for this for these points or yeah I'm happy to wait it's it's on a different um topic topic yeah so let's I will give uh to Misha Kareem and possibly uh also the and the opportunity to answer and then we will conclude with you Hassan since we are already uh over the time so um because I can see that we're you know running over time um in terms of uh I believe this was a previous discussion just to make it very clear for everybody in the audience and and to reiterate for a bath and we don't actually ask that question whether it should be an on proliferation treaty or disarmament treaty but as an Insider you know that this was something that was raised uh indifferent for that is not the question within um this piece however um on the question of complexity I do believe that every negotiation is complex it could be more complex less complex um there are no easy negotiations uh that I I have been at least I'm exposed to uh is the process of ndv itself something that is technically feasible yes I agree with that how it will be incorporated into the negotiation uh who will do it um as gohar mentioned you know what will the iaea role be in this that remains to be seen on the question of CSA I agree a lot of States would see this as a clean bill of health is more than enough and and you know it's it it is something that a lot of states have said that is enough for them for others perhaps not as much and and that's kind of the the balance that we're or the different kind of positions that the paper is trying to account for um some of which have not even spoken at all in the conference process so just to kind of highlight those points that the negotiation complexity is not uh about the technical aspects of the disarmament uh verification but rather you know how will this be incorporated who is going to do it um you also mentioned several cases perhaps we can speak about this separately uh I was wondering if you meant actual destruction of of um stockpiles by nuclear weapon States because the only other case whereas state has voluntarily given up a complete Arsenal was was South Africa which is why we mentioned it in the paper but perhaps we've missed something crucial here and and you know I'm sure we'll run into each other oh you're all right to me uh and I'd like to prick your brain about that a bit more um one last Point uh just back to uh Hassan you know see where we're again stuck here is this too diplomatic is this too intellectual uh but you did mention you know building a community of experts enlarging the conversation um as I'm sure you're aware the conference does have a working committee connected to it that works intercessionally and that does invite experts that doesn't mean that this is the be-all and all I'm sure there's a lot of opportunities within the region to as you said enlarge the conversation half track two and this would be the perfect opportunity to do so because it is my belief that you know track two has limited utility in the absence of a track one and now that we have a track one track two can really same as what are the impetus for our paper is focus on the issues that are being um discussed by the states and and really dig deeper into them have discussions have recommendations um and I really hope somebody will take this up perhaps you uh can lead it Hassan I would be the first person to to raise my hand and say I'd love to help with that and we do have a lot of great people in the Middle East that would be so good um at doing something like this and taking ownership of this process um and that's enough out of me for today uh thank you very quickly because I want to hear Hassan's wrap up um so I fully concur with uh what Basin mentioned uh that there is no need to reinvent the wheel and I hope that's I don't think that's what we did in the paper I mean there were very few Wheels to actually reinvent so what we did was basically present an array of existing Wheels uh that we have to draw on when it comes to nuclear weapons uh this argument I think bassim is also definitely correct that there are some wheels that are easier to steer than others uh so clearly uh the um the wheel that focuses on uh MPT accession as the vehicle or disarmament uh is one option that we put there on the table for states to consider that sort only has advantages as I mentioned it's simple it relieves the negotiating process from the burden of dealing with all of these other wheels are certainly more complex um it does though have certain disadvantages and this is perhaps where I would differ with bessing uh not all disarmament Frameworks uh or nuclear Frameworks are equal so not all nuclear weapons free zones are equal I think uh the negotiators for the palindaba treaty would certainly take exception that the standard template or nuclear weapons free zones are sufficient to guarantee nuclear disarmament they clearly thought that they were insufficient hence the need to incorporate at least the basic elements of a disarmament framework for palindaba I think just finally this opens up been interesting conceptual question uh the conceptual meaning uh that it is not divorced from reality in fact it's very much linked to reality conceptual question of how we conceive of nuclear disarmament is it a black and white process right so either a state has nuclear weapons or does not have nuclear weapons I mean that has been sort of the standard uh frame or template of thinking about nuclear weapons possession you know other exists or it does not exist I think one of the very interesting aspects in producing the paper and to your point um you know your first question is that you can actually conceive of disarmament scenarios uh within the gray Zone in between both options and this does deal uh to a certain extent with elements of irreversibility but you can have situations of ambiguous nuclear disarmament right of the nuclear disarmament taking place but with certain questions or concerns uh that that uh are raised on the parts of member states with respect to the completeness uh of that process um but certainly I completely concur with with Basin that Reinventing the wheel uh would be would be extremely difficult but arraying the different wheels in the context of this paper is what we try to do thank you thank you Karim and Hassan you will be our last wrap up commentator great thank you so much and I once again I would like to to thank Karim and to Misha this has been a very rich discussion this discussion that came at the back of you know what you've uh produced so you know thanks um we'll have to go to to you for triggering it all uh two final quick points one is I think we should not be defensive about you know intellectual engagement or conceptual um dealing with uh with this issue uh it's we need more of that um there's not been enough of that so I would encourage you and others sort of like to put their um uh Minds to it and you know and you know don't feel try or defensive about it I think that is something that we actually desperately need I think the second Point um is one on the importance of thinking a bit also about long term and I uh so the ctbt was mentioned and made me think like the elaborate verification regime that was established and now in function as part of the ctbt uh actually the seeds of that you know were planted in the 70s or maybe even earlier but with the 70s specifically with a mandate for a group of technical experts that look into sort of like seismic monitoring um and that is in the 70s and look into 1996 this is when it was called upon and needed I mean that group met without actually formal um negotiating mandate or anything you know there was no negotiations tangible negotiations taking place at the time but that was just points to the importance of sometimes just like the importance of planting the seed and being hopeful and thinking about the future and working towards that and I think that is also something that we need to incorporate in our thinking about the zone and thanks so much again for this excellent paper and uh discussion as well thank you thank you Hassan thank you for encouraging uh intellectual exercises as well as grounding them in reality and in practicality so uh I would like with that to express my gratitude to our Steve Waters both uh Karim and Tamisha as well as the inside in our insights we'll discuss and uh gaucher and Hassan and all our virtual audience for participating in this important and enlightened discussion uh thank you all and I'm looking forward to see you in our future events goodbye

Channel: UNIDIR — the UN Institute for Disarmament Research

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Id: hth7zZq1Ae4

Length: 96min 20sec (5780 seconds)

Published: Fri May 26 2023