Meaning & The Illusion of Free Will (Derk Pereboom)

so the position on freewill for which argue is the most controversial one the view that we don't have free will so in the history of the discipline the worry about free will stems mainly from the threat of determinism and there are two historical reasons to believe that determinism is true one is naturalistic it is that we think about nature and the laws governing nature the most natural idea is that the laws are deterministic so that take any time slice to the universe and add to that the deterministic laws every subsequent stage of the universe is thereby rendered inevitable okay so this would entail that as a result of some past time slice of the universe and the natural laws all of our actions are inevitable the worry then is if that's true are we free in the sense required for moral responsibility and many people in history of philosophy have worried about this the other threat to free will comes from the theological concern according to a fairly widespread theological tradition especially within the monotheistic theological tradition God causally determines everything that happens and if God from all eternity causally determines everything that happens then a lot of people think that this is a threat to our having the sort of freewill required for more responsibility Hey now there are a number of responses to this dilemma one is to say well despite appearances determinism is false and this allows us to have free will this is the libertarian view another response which is I think the favored response among philosophers is to say that determinism and free will the kind of free will we're talking about are really compatible right that's the majority response in history of philosophy and the majority position among contemporary philosophers in the third view the one for which I argue is the position argued for by Spinoza in the 17th century Spinoza says that because determinism is true we're not free in the sense required for more responsibility so he's a hard determinist he believes that determinism is true and because determinism is true we're not free in the sense at issue now ever since David Hume wrote about this topic in the 18th century another threat to moral responsibility has appeared on the horizon and that's not determinism but rather in determinism so the question is is indeterminate and suppose determinism is false is this also a threat to moral responsibility actually this was a topic of discussion way back in the time that the Stoics and Epicureans were duking it out right because the Stoics were determinists they're both theological determinists and naturalistic determinists and their opponents the epicurean said determinism is false they're also atomists they accepted the atomism of Democritus and they said look here's how it goes the atoms the universe consist just in atoms and our minds consist just in atoms as well now you'd think that the atoms are governed by deterministic laws and this is in fact what Democritus thought but this is actually false because every once in a while in the downward path of an atom there's a random swerve and this random swerve accounts for our being free so our free actions our free choices are just random swerves in the downward paths of atoms now the stoic said about this look in determinism is as much of a threat to free will as determinism is for after all we're not in control of the random swerve an atom right he just kind of happens so we're not in control of that so how could we be free as a result of some random swerve of an atom in our minds so we have this double threat and that's the way the debate has evolved in the contemporary era with this double threat to free will a threat from determinism if determinism is true it seems that we can't be free and if in determinism is true it seems that we can't be in control of our actions and hints can't be free either so some people have said free will is impossible this guy Galen Strawson for example believes that free will is impossible there's this double threat from determinism and indeterminism so I wouldn't call myself a hard determinist because I do believe that there's this double threat although I do think that there's a way of avoiding it but the way of avoiding it I think comes at too great a cost to be believed so in the end I want to say yeah with Spinoza that we don't have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility so let me elaborate on that view take a look at your hand ads okay the first here's the kind of general definition of my view I call it freewill skepticism or Hardy compatibilism says the sort of freewill required for more responsibility is incompatible with determinism and with certain varieties of in determinism and we lack this sort of freewill now it's important to keep in mind that the notion of moral responsibility at issue in the freewill debate is a very special one Hey the term moral responsibility has lots of meanings in English language and there are certain kinds of moral responsibilities that are not at issue in the freewill debate right the one that is at issue is one that involves what I call fundamental desert or basic desert and I defined it under point two so for an agent to be morally responsible for an action in the main sense that issue in the freewill debate is for it to belong to her in such a way that she deserve blame if she understood that it was morally wrong and she deserved credit or perhaps praise if she understood that it was morally exemplary supposing what supposing this desert is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve the blame or credit just because she's performed the action and you see this issue at play in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant when he is discussing the issue of the justification of criminal punishment he says when you're trying to justify criminal punishment can't look to the good of society you can't even look to the good of the criminal you got to say that the criminal should be punished just because he deserves it hey that's the fundamental reason for punishment and that's the idea of dessert that's I think at play in the freewill debate so the question is do we have the sort of control over action we have the sort of control over action that allows us to be morally responsible in this fundamental desert sense the sense of responsibility was reintroduced in into the debate in my view anyway in the early 60s through this famous essay by PS strossen and one of the greatest British philosophers of the mid century and he said look what's really at issue in the freewill debate is the reactive attitudes like moral indignation moral resentment guilt ain't gratitude and what these attitudes build in is this sense of basic desert when we're angry with someone in the sense of indignation what we presuppose is that the person deserves blame or perhaps punishment just because of what he's done and when we're grateful to a person in the reactive attitude sense that strawsons interested in we presuppose that the person deserves praise just because of what she's done so question is is that sort of moral responsibility and the control required for it which we call free will is that compatible with determinism and indeterminism hmm now compatible let's say it's compatible with determinism and I've got an argument against it it's a manipulation argument what I want to say is that the idea that were we can be morally responsible for actions in the sense that I just specified if determinism is true isn't illusion right this is something we can think because after all if we're told that determinism is true we still have the reactive attitudes that we ordinarily have that if somebody does something really nasty to us this is something that Hume says he says even if you believe that determinism is true if somebody does something really nasty to you you're still going to blame them and you're still going to have the reactive attitudes that you ordinarily have right determinism is going to make no difference okay I want to say that determinism does make a difference and you can see this if you compare if you compare determinism to being manipulated by some outside source like by some other agent or a neuroscientist so here's I want to set up this argument against compatibilism what compatibilist have said is that you don't need the absence of determinism for moral responsibility right all that's really required is for certain conditions of action and agency to be satisfied conditions that don't presuppose the falsity of determinism so Hume for example says that what's got to be the case for you to be morally responsible is for you not to be coerced by some outside source for example other humans have said it's got to be the case that you don't have some you're not caused by some disease like kleptomania or some sort of mental illness to behave as you do other people in the rationalist tradition have said that what's required for more responsibilities that you're responsive to the reasons in your situation John Fisher for example is a compatibilist me thinks that this is the key condition for moral responsible moral responsibility now it's my sense that these conditions aren't going to do what they need to do for compatibilism to be plausible you can see this if you imagine a situation in which an agent is manipulated by some neuroscientist into performing an action so that the action is performed in a situation in which all the compatibles conditions are satisfied ok so you can imagine a neuroscientist manipulating an agent to let's say kill somebody right and making sure that all the compatibilist conditions that compatibles will come up with are in fact satisfied so that the agent say is not coerced by having a gun held to his head the agent doesn't have kleptomania the agent has no mental illness the agent is responsive to reasons ok and I want to say that it's intuitive that in a case like that the agents not morally responsible so the compatibilist conditions not to be sufficient for moral responsibility okay now arguments like that have been proposed in the past but I want to soup it up a little bit by adding a few cases so if you look under under number three here in my argument against compatibilism I've got an outline of what I call a multiple a multiple case manipulation argument against compatibilism so in this setup and not only have a single multi a single manipulation case in which the compatibilist conditions are satisfied in which it's supposed to be intuitive that the agent is not morally responsible rather I've got four cases in the fourth case is the ordinary one there's an ordinary deterministic one in which naturalistic determinism is true all the compatibilist conditions for more responsibility hold but the agent is you know causally determined to perform some that act such as a murder in the first case I imagine that the manipulation is really extreme so that the manipulator just before the agent begins to reason about his situation pushes a button to kind of enhance the egoistic quality of the reasoning so that the agent will be causally determined to act as he does right and in the second case I set it up so that the manipulation occurs at the beginning of the agents life you can imagine some super scientist or maybe God setting up an agent so that kind like a wind-up toy like Lydon it's his monad for example so that the agent can foresee that in the crucial situation in which the agent has the opportunity to kill this other person the agent will in fact do so as a result of egoistic reasoning and in the third case I set things up so that the agent is very rigorously trained in a somewhat strange community to be rationally egoistic in these kinds of cases with the result that in the situation in which he now finds himself he's causally determined to perform the murder for egoistic reasons so not only do we a bunch of cases in which the compatibilist conditions are satisfied and the agent is intuitively not morally responsible now we've set things up so that it's going to be very hard to see how an agent can be morally responsible in this last case the ordinary case while it's so evident that the agent is not morally responsible in the first case okay the first case in which there's local manipulation look the neuroscientist pushes a button enhances the egoistic quality of the reasoning so that the agents causally determined to kill his victim I think it's gonna be very evident the agents not morally responsible but now I ask you what's the difference between case one and case two that would legitimate a judgment of responsibility in case two of not in case one you know is it the fact that all the manipulation takes place at the beginning of his life in case two in its local in case one that couldn't make the difference between responsibility and non responsibility what about the difference in case two in case three that the manipulation take place as a result of the rigorous training of a community as opposed to some agent that sets the murderer up at the beginning of his life that couldn't make the difference between responsibility and non responsibility and I don't see that there is a difference between the third case and the fourth case the rigorous training case and the ordinary causal determination case that could make the difference between responsibility and non responsibility either right so after the conclusion is it's pretty evident that if an agent's causally determined that the agents not morally responsible for his action and in fact what explains the non responsibility is just causal determination it's not the absence of it's not the non satisfaction of the compatibilist conditions that can explain this because in each of the cases the compatibilist conditions are in fact satisfied okay so more generally it's that even if you're disposed to think that causal determination is compatible with moral responsibility I think reflection on the similarities between manipulation cases and a causally determined situation reflection on those similarities should get you to think that compatibilism is false that a causally determined agent isn't morally responsible in the sense at issue okay so that's compatibilism what about libertarian it the other really popular view so libertarians think that determinism is false and because determinism is false we can have the sort of freedom required for more responsibility I'd say it's that dominant position among religious people in this country maybe not among philosophers and in history of philosophy it had a lot of prominent advocates perhaps most notably Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant didn't think that he could show that libertarian that we have libertarian freedom but he did think that we should believe that we have it for the sake of morality so in the trade there are two main sorts of libertarianism x' one says look all causation is by way of events events are what like substances or things having properties at times like the cars speeding through the puddle right at a certain time that made me wet hey that's an instance of event causation and a lot of people think that all causation is my way of events so in the case of agents what would cause an action is an event like you know ends desiring to be at work at time and desiring to be at work on time at a certain time or ends desiring to help someone in trouble at a certain time those are the kinds of vents that cause actions on the event causal view so if that causal libertarianism says that actually write this on the board for you so Robert Cain has this nice case he's the main event causal libertarian these days philosopher at University of Texas and he says freedom consists in the fact that when decisions are caused they're caused in deterministically by other events there's this idea of in deterministic causation not all causations in deterministic but yet all causation is by way of events so events in deterministically caused decisions and this is what allows them to be free he's got a nice case that he sets up we imagine an and she's trying to be working time to please her boss he's got to make an important meeting but she sees a mugging in an alley and the victim needs help so now she's got this choice okay the Prudential choice is to speed on to work and please the boss the moral choice is to stop and help the victim of the assault now on the event causal picture it's just events that cause actions so we have the following situation we can simplify it we can say Ann's desiring to please her boss T there's one cost right and desiring to help the victim T okay there's the other cause we have a lot more events that are going to be involved here but let's simplify it and have just these two events doing the causing and let's suppose with Kane that the strength of each of these causes is about the same so this renders 50% probable the decision to speed on and this renders 50% probable the decision to stop and help okay so here's the central worry for our event causal libertarianism in my view we have these events okay which this one's representative that renders the decision to speed on 50 percent probable got these other events that render the decision to stop 50 percent probable now it's gonna resolve in one way or another suppose that she does in fact decide to stop now if this question at this point we want to ask well what settles right what settles whether this agent and stops or not it's not these agent involving events that settles whether she stops or not after all the agent involving events render the two decisions equally probable so the answer I think has to be nothing there isn't anything that settles which way the decision goes because the only causation involving the agent consists in events evolving the involving the agent and by hypothesis all the events involving the agent conspire to render each of the two possible decisions equally probable so I want to say that in the event causal picture nothing settles which decision occurs and in particular the agent doesn't settle which of the decisions occurs so I don't think that the agent can have enough control for freedom on the event causal picture I don't think there's any event causal picture that solves this problem so what should the libertarian say at this point the problem with this event cause a libertarian view is that the agent disappears at the crucial time right we want the agent to settle which way the decision goes but the event causal picture doesn't allow this so we should do is to reintroduce the agent in different guys hey and as agent or as agent cause so we're gonna say look not all causation is by way of events some causation is by way of agents so and as a substance not just as involved in events causes the decision so we're gonna give in as agent cause the power to settle which way this decision goes and we're gonna give her this power in the following guys we're gonna say she's got the power to settle which way the agent which way the decision goes by what by causing a decision and by causing a decision without being causally determined to cause it this is what Immanuel Kant calls transcendental freedom and he thinks that this is the only kind of freedom that's gonna get us moral responsibility that's getting to the agent qua agent not as involved in events giving the agent qua agent the power to cause an action without being causally determined to cause it now this is a very special sort of power do we have this kind of power Kant said well we have no evidence that we have this kind of power we can't even show that it's possible that we have this kind of power but we can show that it doesn't contradict anything we believe right so we should believe it for moral reasons he thought it's really important for us to believe that were morally responsible he also thought that the moral law kind of falls away unless we're free in this sense so we thought that we have can't think so with ample practical reason to believe that were agent causes but there are certain kind of empirical worries that Kant was well aware of for the hypothesis that were agent causes I used to be an agent cause a list before I became a Spinoza's so I kind of like this view I've always argued that it's coherent but I think there's an empirical problem for it again that Kant was well aware of problem is this that Khan says look physical world is governed by deterministic laws so suppose we believe that we as agents have this power of transcendental freedom the power to cause an action with that being causally determined to cause it at some point there's going to be an interaction between the agent as cause and the deterministic world maybe at the juncture between the agent and the agents brain maybe you can think of agents agent causes has non-physical things that can affect the physical world suppose our think of it that way Khan says the physical world is governed by deterministic laws okay so you got the physical world down here which includes the agent's body okay here's the agent's body and here you have the trance finnaly free agent okay so suppose this free agent right suppose this free agent causes the decision to raise her hand without being causally determined to cause it Khan says it has to be reconciled with the following fact that we know from Newtonian physics the physical world is governed by deterministic laws how can this be right how can the speed it would seem that if the free agent Frehley and Khan sense causes the decision to raise their hand that the hand raising isn't going to be causally determined but Kant said that physics shows that the laws are deterministic and that all physical events are governed by deterministic laws okay so one thing you can say is well it just so happens that every free to say Susan ever made just happens to dovetail nicely with a determined physical world so each of the how many free decisions have been made in human history corticon say 17 trillion like each of the 17 trillion decisions happens to dovetail with the way that physical bodies have been causally determined since the DNA of the universe and I say that involves coincidences too while to be believed that's not really credible so content a certain point says well this problem can be solved because when an agent free-agent makes the decision that free agent changes of the universe back to the beginning of time he says it's Nick critique a practical reason I say well that's a pretty high price to build to pay for a belief in transcendental freedom seems implausible okay contemporary agent cause lists have said well maybe quantum physics will come to the rescue maybe the laws governing the physical world are indeterministic or in deterministic and I want to say that this doesn't help for the following reason suppose that the laws are in deterministic so let's take a class of action see it's Nick or to quantum physics if the in deterministic interpretation is true actions would be governed by statistical laws as opposed to deterministic laws so let's take that class of actions that class of possible actions each of whose physical consequences have some particular percentage chance of occurring say 32 percent now what is the physical law say it says we should expect write that within that class those physical actions will be actual about 32 percent of the time now in order for this Conti and reconciliation project between transcendental freedom and the physical world to work out would have to be the case that for this class of action actions the agent would have to the agent's choices exactly in Seeker almost exactly in sync with the probabilistic laws so that for this class of actions the free choices of agents would have to be for the action at issue right about 32 percent of the time and I say this is - while the coincidence to be believed so I don't think that this in deterministic solution works either now at this point the agent cause lists can say with Roderick Chisholm ok famous philosopher of brown who was an agent cause list he says well the reconciliation project doesn't work but you have to believe if you're an agent cause list is that everytime a human being acts freely a miracle occurs in the physical world and it's the miracle of you now maybe that's true I can't rule that out but it's a pretty high price to pay for a belief in freedom it's not clear that it's credible that every time a free action occurs the physical laws are violated okay so that's the libertarian view we're left with then is the view that we don't have the sort of freewill required for more responsibility and that's the position I defend now the problem for this sort of view isn't so much an empirical problem it isn't the sort of compatibility problem that we see for compatibilism and for event causal libertarianism it's rather this is it really believable can we really believe that where we lack the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility in this basic desert entailing sense so that whenever you're indignant with somebody just because of what he's done but you're presupposing a falsehood you're making some sort of mistake you're presupposing that the person is blameworthy in the basic desert sense whereas the person isn't really blame word the Internet sense and every time you are grateful to somebody for doing something that you consider to be praiseworthy you're also making a mistake can we believe that can we believe that what our lives work out the way we want them to work out if we held that sort of view another problem is for controlling bad behavior criminal punishment for example don't we presuppose in punishing criminals that they deserve punishment just because of what they've done Immanuel Kant says you know you can believe in the deterrence theory of punishment that the point of punishment is to deter others or you can believe in the moral education theory of punishment at the point of punishment is morally educate criminals but punishment is going to be illegitimate unless it's the case that criminals deserve to be punished just because of what they've done and that seems to go out the window if you cease to believe in free will okay so let me take criminal punishment first we lose the retributive justification of punishment the Contin justification that I just outlined if we believe what Spinoza did about the sort of free will required for more responsibility but what we do a criminology that turns out to be legitimate on the spinosum view makes use of a quarantine analogy so we think it's okay to quarantine cared carriers of dangerous diseases even if they're not morally responsible for being the carriers of the dangerous diseases they are why is this because of the danger these carriers of diseases posed to society and I would say that if quarantine is okay in the case of the dangerous disease it's also okay in the case of a really dangerous criminal so one difference is that in the quarantine case we don't think it's okay to inflict pain on the person being quarantined beyond what's required just a quarantine to keep society safe and I think you'd have to accept that for criminology as well if the only reason for confining criminals was a reason analogous to what we have in the case of the justification of quarantine eing carriers of dangerous diseases okay so what about the reactive attitudes that Strawson talks about what about the our personal relationships our personal relationships rawson says essentially involve the reactive attitudes and they wouldn't work if we got rid of them so indignation is required he says moral resentment is required somebody has something wrong it's really important to be indignant why well partly because this has a communicative function in the in the relationship how do you communicate hurt or pain or wrongdoing other than by other than by the reactive attitudes and even if there are other ways isn't this by far the most effective way of communicating these problems and isn't it very important for us to communicate joy through expressing gratitude or love strossen actually thinks that love is one of the reactive attitudes and that without love of course personal relationships would be impossible so in strawsons on Strawson suggestion if we cease to believe in free will we wouldn't we'd cease to believe in the appropriateness even of love and certainly that would undermine the kinds of relationships that make our lives meaningful so what do we say about all of this well first indignation when were indignant were angry with somebody just because of what he's done now there my view there's certainly gonna be wrongdoing in a world without free will right it's not as if moral right and wrong require in determinism or the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility after all even if the serial killer is causally determined to behave as he does by some mental illness we still think that what he did was wrong so wrongdoing survives I think in the spinosum world the world without free will now their ways of communicating wrongdoing other than through indignation and resentment well they're even emotions I think that communicate wrongdoing sometimes when a parent what a child is stuff something really bad the parent isn't angry and where the parents just very sore full or sad right so we have this other emotions moral sore moral sadness that I think can communicate what anger and indignation and resentment often do so this is a reactive and nonreactive attitude an emotion for communicating wrongdoing that would be accessible in the spinosum world the world without free will what about gratitude what about gratitude well I want to say that maybe there's some kinds of gratitude that presuppose praise worthiness in the basic dessert sense but I think a lot of gratitude reactions don't presuppose that when we're grateful to a child for a small favor for example we presuppose that the child has done something great and we're very happy about this I don't think that we presuppose that the child deserves praise just because of what she's done so I do think that there's kind of a least a part of gratitude or maybe an analog of gratitude that survives the criticisms of freewill that I just presented so what about what about love Strawson thinks as I pointed out that this is a reactive attitude as well does love require the sort of freewill required for more responsibility well my view in typical cases this isn't so take romantic love for example when your fall romantically in love I think that the will isn't even involved in a typical case when you fall for somebody it's not as if you will to fall for that person it just happens right in the typical case now one thing you might say is that in these kinds of cases you love the person that you love because of say her freely willed actions I doubt if this is typically the case often it's because of like personality characteristics other than those I mean all freewill right often it's looks right often it's other factors that don't involve freewill I think it's seldom the case that free will is the target of love in the typical romantic case or take the case of children parents love their children babies born you love the kid is that will involved not at all is the kids will involve not at all the wheel plays no role whatsoever in the love of children I say when the children are very young now maybe when they're older the Wills involved suppose the kid does something really nasty or is a difficult child and the parent may want to will to love the kid despite the fact that it no longer no longer comes naturally there the will is involved okay and agree with that but it doesn't seem as if that sort of voluntariness has to be the free will required for moral responsibility that that sort of voluntary is the sort of Valen parents that's involved in making a relationship work in a difficult situation me be the kind of free will that eventuates in deserved praise or deserve blame so it seems to me that love doesn't require free will it may sometimes involve the will require the will doesn't require the sort of free will required for more responsibilities now one thing that some people like Kane have said is this look you think that these manipulation cases show that free will is incompatible with determinism but I can use a manipulation case to show you that determinate determinism is incompatible with the kind of love that we really want so suppose you find out that it's a somebody loves you and you really care about this relationship but that this person was causally determined by neuroscientists to love you what about that you might not well you might not like having I wonder if this is really true don't we usually think that people are causally determined by factors beyond their control to love us right isn't that why we have this image of Cupid shooting the arrow but even then determination care manipulation cases I think some are such that we'd really be bothered by them they suppose that the followings the case that somebody's really in love with you but you're not in love with this person what this person does is slips love potion number nine in tear martini which causes you to be unaware or cease to be aware of all this person's faults and as a result you fall in love with this person you might say well this is bad news hey I wouldn't want to be manipulated that way into falling in love with somebody but suppose the manipulation worked differently suppose that the person slips the drug into your drink which suppose you got the following problem you can't make commitments it's very difficult for you to make it commit to another person and so you disregard other people's good qualities so suppose somebody to drug into your drink which cures you of this fear of commitment and allows you to see the other person's good qualities makes you appreciate the other person's good qualities as a result you fall in love with this other person I suppose this was all deterministic how bad would that be I think I wouldn't mind that so much so I guess I want to say that India doesn't seem to me that love even the kind of love that we really care about most is incompatible determination even with certain kinds of manipulation so in the last analysis the main problem for the spinosum view about free will isn't empirical issues it isn't eternal issues like what we saw what we saw surfaces problems for both compatibilism and event causal libertarianism rather it's how do we live as if this view is true now Saul Smolinski philosopher and Israel has said look they're really good ardent so we don't have free will but there's no way we can live without it so we should maintain the illusion that we have free will and we shouldn't teach courses on free will not only we shouldn't give lectures on free will either okay and he doesn't you just got a whole book on free will he didn't never teach you the subject because he doesn't want to he doesn't want to cure people of their illusion that we have free will but the few that I just presented is more optimistic so I think that we can live or at least there's a pretty good chance that we can live really great lives even if we don't believe that we have free will and there even certain kinds of benefits for after all I think one problem that arises as a result of our belief in free will is that we're a little too careless with our retributive attitudes so free will the belief that we have free will justifies us in having the retributive angry attitudes we have toward other people yes retributive attitudes do have benefits for our lives they motivate us to resist injustice and to right wrongs and to improve relationships bad relationships that were involved in on the other hand the sort of retributive anger also causes people to hate each other it causes people to fight wars causes people to torture and kill in the worst situations so one thing Spinoza says is that if we get rid of this belief that we this is maybe you know when we quote this passage of Spinoza's to you okay so about the view that we lack the sort of free will we're talking about Spinoza says this doctrine contributes to the social life insofar as it teaches us to hate no one to disesteem no one to mock no one to be angry at no one so I want to say that maybe given the concerns to which expression of moral anger gives rise are coming to believe that we lack this sort of free will may on balance be a good thing

Channel: Philosophy Overdose

Views: 16,843

Rating: 4.7732792 out of 5

Keywords: Philosophy, Free Will, Derk Pereboom, Determinism, Incompatibilism, Moral Responsibility, Compatibilism, Meaning, Consciousness, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Ontology, Spinoza, Morality, Freedom, Freedom of Will, Punishment, Reactive Attitudes, Strawson, Analytic Philosophy, Causal Closure, Materialism, Physicalism, Dualism, Spinozism, Causal Law, Physical Law, Laws of Nature, Physics, Epistemology, Kant, Hard Determinism, Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Illusion of Free Will, Free Will Skeptic

Id: bObzpWrhH-Q

Length: 42min 45sec (2565 seconds)

Published: Tue Jan 15 2013