Managing U.S.-China Relations: American and Chinese Perspectives: A Report Launch

okay folks good afternoon everybody my name is John Hamre I very pleased to have you all come today it's kind of a soggy wet day you just will be inside you know or we're gonna have a wonderful afternoon together look forward to this very important conference before we begin let me just say we always have a little safety announcement for everybody so if we do have an incident where I have to ask you to to get up and leave please follow me the exits are right behind me you know there are three doors the stairs that take us down to the street or right closest to this door right here but just follow me we're gonna go downstairs we'll meet across at National Geographic I'll get some ice cream or something and we'll celebrate we all survived okay so just but follow me if we need to do something I need to just give a bit of background for this project so that you understand what you're going to hear today this is a remarkably important thing it isn't because we were involved but because of the context of where we were I remember us last May a year ago May that the chairwoman fou Yang who was a chair of the Foreign Relations Committee for the People's Congress came to me and said we think that the time is right for a a serious study done by by Chinese think-tank scholars and by American think-tank scholars to look at the future of this relationship the china-us relationship very important several important things to note about this number one it was by its design meant to be very broadly scaled it wasn't just one think tank working with another think tank this was meant to be a very broadly scaled inquiry and which is part of the reason why you see the strangest publication you ever see in a think tank coming out it doesn't say CSIS or any institution because it really represents the collective work of about seven or eight institutions that came together on this as we donated scholars and worked on it together second this was a project that we began last summer before the presidential election we didn't have any idea who was going to be elected we were looking to say what does the future going to be of this relationship independent of the particular outcome of an election I think that's even more important today than at the time when we launched it because we they were at a stage where we need to be thinking about the fundamentals of this relationship and I think that's what comes through there are two two sets of parallel papers the this is the publication our our Chinese friends produced for their papers and this is the publication of the American papers they're parallel they were by they were not meant to be it wasn't meant to be a study in unison singing it was meant to be a case of singing in harmony and can we together look at these questions and with a not did not sugarcoating anything being very objective about it can we look to see what should guide this relationship going forward and I think both sets of papers and I think you'll hear this today both sets of papers really come to the same end point this is an enormous ly important relationship how America and China will work together over the next twenty years thirty years fifty years will fundamentally shape the well-being of the human of the human community we have to figure out how we're going to work together it could go badly if we don't work together because there are so many forces in both of our respective countries that are pulling us in the wrong direction there are so many forces that could pull us into a path where we're going to have a difficult conflicted contentious relationship we have to be active in managing in this relationship with a spirit of candor we're not going to hide the differences we have serious differences we're not going to shy away from being honest and vocal with each other about those differences but we also have to be constructive to try to Feliz find solutions for them not only for the well-being of our our country in China but for the well-being of the rest of humanity this is important relationship we're going to explore this today and so I'm very delighted that all of you would take your afternoon to join us we're going to start right in and let me ask dr. Michael Green who is going to be the moderator for this first session to take it from here thanks everybody for coming [Applause] thank you very much I'm Mike Green I'm the senior vice president for Asia here and professor Georgetown we had five issue papers with authors for each paper or papers on each subject from the US and China we've split the panel's up so that this panel will address the papers on US and Chinese strategy and interests in the Asia Pacific region and also us-china military-to-military issues and the next panel will cover economics global issues and politics and Scott Kennedy will chair that session we had a number of participants who helped to write the papers or who joined us in study groups to review the papers so this is a representative group it's clearly not everyone who was involved but some of the key authors for each of the papers were going to address in the panels Bonnie Glaser my colleague at CSS senior advisor and director of our China power project will talk about the Asia Pacific papers we're going to ask and the panelists not to summarize the papers but to identify between the American and Chinese papers the issues of convergence divergence and some recommendations my friends Joo Fong from Nanjing University will present on the Asia Pacific strategy issue after Bonnie then we'll shift to the military relationship David Finklestein of the Center for naval analyses and Zhang tore song from the Chinese foundation for international security studies will address the areas of convergence divergence and implications of what we identified and analyzed in military spheres as dr. Henry said we endeavour to make these papers that would be based on the u.s. national interest and u.s. strategy on on our side and on the Chinese national interest and Chinese strategy on the Chinese side we did these in consultation with each other meaning that for example on the asia-pacific paper Bonnie and I was you Fong and his colleagues talked about how we might structure the papers and what key themes we would try to address but we were very clear about several things we had no veto over the other side's paper it had to be an honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that country's perspective we informed and talked to our governments but the US government and the Chinese government did not review or approve these papers they're independent we are all independent scholars and so what we presented is not us or Chinese government policy but we think it represents a pretty good consensus point about how these issues are viewed in each country of course there are multiple views about military affairs global issues North Korea in both China and the United States and but we had for each of these papers three authors on the American side three authors on the Chinese side and a group of somewhere between six and fifteen other experts who weighed in and on the asia-pacific paper for example and I think this was true on our side for the military people there was an awful lot of consensus from experts hailing from think tanks across the ideological and functional spectrum this is quite interesting but the US and Chinese papers and there were some common themes one was that we should strive to be to avoid becoming adversaries that was consistent for both sides there was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build patterns of cooperation between the US and China where we can on every area of military asia-pacific issues and so forth and many of the papers concluded that the United States and China need a a substantive honest and far-reaching strategic dialogue where each side doesn't cover up its fundamental interests or concerns and presents those and goes from there to see what can be done there are obvious strategic and structural differences that come out of these papers these are not differences that can be solved with a different six character label or 120 character tweed or whatever you choose there's their fundamental their structural their historic we spend a lot of time on the history of these issues for our countries for example there are between the two papers on the asia-pacific some different assumptions about the future orientation of the Korean Peninsula it's not just disagreement over tactics on North Korea there's some fundamental structural issues about how the US and China each respectively view the complaints and where it's going in the longer term there are some fundamental differences in terms of the South China Sea or the first island chain that encompasses Japan and Taiwan the Philippines and the East and South China Seas about about what it means to have influence control denial this is not a small issue there were differences about how strong American alliances should be very basic differences not so much about the validity of alliances but how strong should you else alliances be in Asia there were differences about what China should be doing to assert its sovereignty not challenges over sovereignty per se but what what China should be able to do to assert its sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not there were big differences on both sides I think Dave will say more about what constitutes an a reasonable and acceptable level of defense capabilities I don't think either side drew that yardstick exactly the same Beasley the other side and there were differences about how we should think about the future structure or order of East Asia there was more enthusiasm on the Chinese side about some kind of bipolar us-china arrangement or condominium to manage the future of Asia there was much less enthusiasm on the US side but even within the two sides there was some some debate and disagreement I'm gonna let my colleagues go into more detail on these areas and just conclude for now by saying I think when you read the papers you'll find that these are papers that sort of stand the test of time then or not based on today's or tomorrow's news about the g20 or the or the North Korea problem although we can talk about that and then in some ways they may be a useful model for what a strategic dialogue would look like and how you would talk to address each side's fundamental interests and try to find ways to minimize confrontation maximize cooperation but be realistic about some pretty fundamental differences that we've unearthed so with that I'll turn it over to Bonnie and then Zhu Fong to address first the asia-pacific paper let me quickly add we printed out as many papers as we thought we would have audience it this being fourth of July week and we were short we're about 50 percent short so this is online as well and so you can get it online and check it out in Chinese and in English I think so with that Bonnie thank you thanks Mike and this is a very interesting project I would urge you all to read these papers very carefully and it's a privilege to be to be part of this we have a very short period of time each speaker so I'm just going to really hit on some highlights and then if there's time for Q&A we can go into greater detail for some some of the convergences and divergences both of these papers asia-pacific security say that there is a need for a rules-based order so that's a good start we should have rules but of course there are differences over not only what those rules should be but whether or not the international community is likely to allow even welcome China's participation in the process of shaping the rules so the US paper is quite clear on that score it says that America is not calling on China to simply sign on to the rules that have been written in the past but understands that the international community will draw these rules up together and that China would join in the process the Chinese paper is very skeptical of the u.s. willingness to do that it says whose rules are these what how can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation etc so a lot of suspicion and I think you find throughout the Chinese paper in the asia-pacific security that there is a lot of skepticism about us willingness to include China even though I would underscore that I think the current administration prior administrations have welcomed China to be a responsible stakeholder in this rules-based order and that goes back at least as far of course as the George W Bush administration who coined that phrase secondly is regional security architecture and alliances and the Chinese paper very much contends that the u.s. Alliance system is increasingly targeting China and it calls for the United States to give up that attempt to build this sort of anti China coalition and it states that China favors an open and inclusive security system rather than alliance based system but says China can tolerate the Alliance's as long as they're not targeted at at China so I'm a little bit of ambiguity there as to whether ultimately alliances can be part of the system but it does the bottom line is that the us-led alliance system can coexist with increasingly influential China in the region if the u.s. gives up that effort now for the u.s. you know this this paper doesn't portray in any way the Alliance's as aimed at China and it talks about the Allies as the basis of our regional position it lists several threats that our alliances are trying to deal with such as of course North Korea's emerging missile and nuclear capabilities talks about terrorism maritime conflicts so a very different discussion of alliances when I was at the rollout in May in in China the Chinese version of this Madame foo yang talked a bit about concerned his concern about alliances in the regional security architecture so I think that this really is a difference that the US and the China and Chinese have about whether or not the alliances should be part of this rules-based order going going forward third both identify areas of concern pretty much the same as you would expect you've got North Korea Taiwan maritime issues on North Korea I think the the US paper claims that China doesn't recognize the new level of threat posed by the Kim jong-un regime and I think as we sit here today events that have transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that the United States is I think incredibly concerned about the launch of an ICBM by North Korea very upset about how US citizens are being treated and of course the most recent being the very tragic death of otto warmbier so I think that the Chinese paper in some ways recognizes the danger but insists that the problems just can't be addressed through sanctions alone and that diplomacy is necessary but I do sense a real gap between the two countries in terms of their assessment of the urgency the u.s. paper has some interesting policy recommendations in this regard calling for not only more dialogue but very specifically on things like noncombatant evacuation operations interdiction of North Korea's weapons proliferation closing loopholes and UNSC sanctions the Chinese paper honest honestly doesn't have any of these very specific areas of tential cooperation and I would underscore the need for discussions on crisis response in the event of instability in in North Korea and that's something the US has tried to do with China for for several administrations as well there are solutions that are put forward by both sides and I want to highlight again some of the convergences and divergences and comment on them both insist on peaceful resolution of disputes avoiding military conflict though the US paper focus focuses much more than the Chinese paper on the need to manage differences of course we would note that si Jinping does talk quite a bit about managing our differences so I think that's a common position both papers call for more candid strategic dialogue on major issues in the asia-pacific region and the Chinese paper proposes an institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between China and the u.s. led Alliance system this is something interesting and we should recall that there has been consideration in the past for example for of a trilateral US Japan China dialogue which was supposed to take place in June of 2009 and for various reasons did not so should we should be consider once again ways that we can offer China reassurances about our alliances engaged in maybe trilateral dialogues a couple of final comments on the divergences between the two sides in terms of their recommendations so as Mike mentioned the Chinese authors do not rule out a g2 they say a either a g2 or through other forms of security cooperation China in the u.s. need to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus I think that would be a very very difficult thing to do I don't know if we can establish a joint vision but certainly the u.s. paper and I think reflecting mainstream views in in the u.s. rule out such a g2 arrangement the u.s. paper says that Washington is not interested any sort of condominium that implies an exclusive great power relationship and finally the Chinese paper continues to call for adhering to the components of the new type of great power relationship seen seen that will grants even though it doesn't use that phrase but it says we should adhere to the principles of no conflict no confrontation mutual respect and win-win cooperation and I think accurately reflecting the late Obama administration as well as where the Trump administration has come to after its first several months in power that Americans in general don't like a bumper sticker phrase and there continues to be enormous discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations including the components so again the u.s. shares the goal of avoiding conflict but it worries that emphasis on core interests may be an attempt to create spheres of influence and that could be potentially destabilizing to the region so on that area I think there's there is some disagreement and I look forward to okay thanks Mike for your leadership in organizing such a lovely events I think a way also looking for for long but more importantly so well impress me and encourage me is in the past two and a half years so we're working together we thinking together so of course then currents I said reports no matter how wages to other differently but it's a reflection some sort of a share the spirituality share the vision how original security could evolve in a way we say and compatible with the both sides a couple of things I'd like to pick up and responding to the bonney's excellent presentation first of all of course divergence and convergence it's some sort of a reality so when either getting through some sort of a very very accurate reality checking but finally or some sort of like consent where considers some sort of such accuracy of reality checking should be back get back to the history so then we use the history tracing as some sort of very interesting studying point then we were fans yes has been a very positive security anchoring in a region no matter how China matters intima for West Pao status I think of a long run than China benefit lot from Americans very steady and very constructive you know regional partners that kind of a reality is a bigger one bearing on the Chinese side second I think of course if we look at Allah Cullen's some sort of a potential we say risk probably well causing some sort of a collision between the two powers then what's the leading element to create or drive at the divergence then we have to say it's not a status Jordan it's an issue driven so yes there's a lot of speculations across Lygia for example for a moment the leading challenge is the China is coming after the hegemonic uh transition I have to say it's a fallacy yes some Chinese nationalists capala Norway may see that way so then you read us some sort of recently published a book it's called everything on the heavens then the China may sing some sort of a Chinese leadership very very simply from a historical perspective of personal centric tributary system but I think the foremost of our Chinese well-educated scholars that kind of see no central system is totally gone I don't think here will be staged out once again in coming days so then where was he yes there's some sort of alabaster power shift compared to twenty years ago 30 years ago u.s. pal will say some sort of such a disparity is truly very significantly significantly diminished by us remain have a very solid health of a power disparity ahead of China we don't think in the coming days such a power disparity well Julie is getting getting undercuts very very tremendously so then from the Chinese perspective yes asia-pacific area is biggest a testing ground for us-china relations because a lot of interest now is in some sort of a collision and we are competing on some sort of a path taking solutions and methodologies but Allah promised if we get back to some sort of central piece to behind to be behind the lab of the strategy then we prefer to see and it's also very adequate and it's a very reasonable it's issued German it's not a state schedule it's not the state's driven the second is then we will see some sort of a Chinese assertiveness in the in Asian Pacific of course this place is a very important you know tasting ground as a mission to have a serious examination of low China's foreign policy reaction or Grandda strategical we we say suffering in in coming days but from our perspective I considered a Chinese methodology in the region remain is largely it's about as some sort of China's the mask a transition based is not the power ripping of Kapow competing based for example of South North Korea issues I consider the China's policy of DPRK has been very consistently and smart no way suffer la from some sort of a negative spillover of low China's indecisive repulsive DPRK but why it's very hard for China just like him after very tangible change F North Korea policy mostly important to read loots a reason should be deeper into legendas damask a factor so before China can't become some sort of very successfully transform the power where consider China remain vulnerable at large so then in the in the region where continents consider it will be some sort of waste a competing place to afford the China some sort of very inherent assertiveness then another point is that way consider no matter how way diverged but our strategy and policy shall be oriented with a future of rendered as knowledge as the history we say were oriented then Laos as a lot of a speculation for example since the dealers trap well over shed a lot of power relations between Washington Beijing and if someone believe the Chinese and Americans will be just arriving and also getting into some sort of inevitable conflict so you know have a professor Allison also just the parish that he's a very sensitive sensationalist you know the book it's called testing for war but we don't see that way we consider us-china working jointly creating some sort of new modeling of our power relations conclusively I have to say Chinese reports on the Asian Pacific area is also of course a very very interesting challenge for us so on the one hand we also have to balance love points from some sort of China's traditional policy narrative by all as a hint we offset the lack to bring about some sort of new inspiring points it's not easy job so I have to say mostly important a formidable test of our new Chinese side is not how we can just the envision some sort of power storage between the US China in the region is how China can overcome some sort of our domestic inherence we're shocked commies become before love China could be a real popular power in the region let me stop here excellent thank you you you you contrasted our papers well in eight minutes and you fit it in three book reviews so well done I appreciate it thank you over to the military side of this panel to David okay thanks and thanks again to John Hamre for providing the leadership of the American steering group I think without him as the glue the American side would have been in a high state of entropy so so thanks for that and thanks for to Michael and Scott Kennedy three of us comprise the military and defense writing team myself Randy Shriver from Armitage associates and Phil Saunders from national defense unit offense University all three engaged in this and our personal and private capacities and I'd be remiss if I didn't state that nothing in the paper or anything I state today reflects the views of CNA or any of its sponsors and I think if Randy and Phil were here up up here on the dais with me I'm sure they would provide the same caveat so as you heard we're not supposed to summarize our papers ours is 25 26 pages long you can take a look at it but I feel a need to at least provide you a sense of our overall assessment and the reason I feel a need to do that our assessment of the state and trend in us-china military and defense relations is because this is the major area where the US and Chinese sides did have some convergence recognizing some of the positives and recognizing some of the negatives so let me give you a a jesting of the US assessment of the state of being and it goes like this at the moment the relations between the US and Chinese militaries are more stable than they have been in decades the two militaries are engaged in a wide range an unprecedented number of interactions from the strategic level down to the tactical level that they've never done since relations were established in 1980 both militaries are working together at Risk Reduction to ensure that highly contentious issue do not result in miscalculation and the US team assesses that neither military seeks a conflict nor sees it in their nation's interests to resolve differences between us by military means however all is not necessarily well in the military and defense dimensions of the us-china relationship the u.s. writing team adjudged that the competitive aspects of the military and defense relationship are growing and intensifying both sides having deep hab deepening concerns about the other's defense and military policies as well as uncertainty over each other's future intentions the competitive dimensions are most intense in the asia-pacific region where traditional US predominance in the maritime and aerospace military domains and China's expanding offshore reach and increasing military capabilities are intersecting strategically the u.s. is determined to sustain its long-standing military predominance in the region through forward military presence and it's a system of alliances and partnerships we're asked for its part we assess that China from a u.s. perspective is purposely developing military capabilities to challenge US military advantages as well as military political and economic means to weakened the u.s. Alliance structure in some instances operationally this competition is being characterized by the development of weapons and technologies aimed at accruing operational advantage by doctrinal adjustments to maximize their effectiveness and by shifting forced postures and deployments beyond Asia in other parts of the world there are and will be more opportunities for US China military cooperation and we look forward to that but and we also recognize as China's military's footprint around the world steadily increases the potential for new misunderstandings beyond the asia-pacific region cannot be discounted so because of this intensifying competition carefully managing the military dimensions of the us-china relationship has to be a top priority for American and Chinese civilian and military officials to reduce the chances of confrontation and ensure that military tensions do not overtake other areas in the relationship that are cooperative in nation nature so those are the u.s. sides of bottom lines and I think if you read the two papers you won't see a lot of daylight between them now on convergence and divergence both sides agree that this relationship between the militaries is more stable but both also assess that this is taking place against a disturbing context that I laid out in which the US and Chinese militaries are increasingly wary and suspicious of each other's intentions and that both militaries are in fact hedging against each other operationally and on this account the Chinese paper I think was a bit starker maybe than the US paper where the US paper my paper talks about intensifying competition the Chinese paper talked about concerns that quote the potential for clashes over security interests between the two countries has grown rapidly so both law writing teams did law the efforts of the Pentagon and the PLA to introduce confidence-building measures into the relationship and both sides agreed that a military conflict would derail both countries larger domestic and strategic objectives and they both acknowledged that each side is presenting significant security challenges to the other and that both are exacerbating each other's security situation in the asia-pacific region on divergence the to paint the two papers of course converge in identifying the common set of problems but they do diverge in many ways in explaining motivations causality and impact I think a significant example I think either Bonnie or Mike raised it already was differences in respect to views on the motivations behind the u.s. Alliance system or on the Chinese as part motivations behind Chinese military modernization very different views between the two sides on what those are all about overall though I think that the two papers if you read them will provide readers a very sound appreciation for the strategic perception gap that exists between the two countries on a wide range of military defence and security issues and readers should also come away with an appreciation nation that the military tensions are a reflection of competing national interests and fundamental policy decisions of civilian leaders in Beijing in Washington and not just the decisions of military officials it's much broader than just military issues on future cooperation if you take a look at the paper we've found many ways where we can be cooperating in non-traditional security some folks have mentioned that already but I think the most important thing to zero in on is what both teams did zero in on and that is cooperation on the very difficult issue of North Korea and I think if you read the papers both the US and Chinese teams cited the need to engage in crisis management activities as regards the peninsula and I think that's an important potential opening that that we need to pursue either at a track one or track two level final points going forward developments since January 2017 I think the events of the past week have underscored that the us-china relationship remains a tangled and messy web web of issues which impel the two countries on one hand to cooperate but another set of issues that produce contention and competition and great tension between the two and the military dimensions of the relationship are no different though some of us are concerned that the competitive dimensions are in the ascendancy but it is clear I think that leaders in both capitals today recognize this competitive problem and are attempting to manage the two sides of this relationship to include on the defense and military side one of the recommendations in our paper was to conduct an assessment of the efficacy of the military and security dialogues that had proliferated over the past few years to determine whether or not they were serving a good purpose now clearly leaders in Washington and Beijing have already voted on that account having dismantled the sned and creating the new comprehensive dialogue and with its diplomatic and security dialogue which had its first meeting of course just two weeks ago now after the defense and security dialogue defense secretary Matt has commented that the idea of the new venue is to quote elevate and folk the discussions and I think that on defense and military relations elevating the discussion and focusing the discussion is a pretty good idea so there's a new start to these discussions whether there'll be new solutions remains an open question and I'll stop at that point I'm I'm honored to have a chance to participate this created event I will be focused on two points first about my viewpoints about the two reports I think there are a lot of consensus and similar of the observations in the two reports for example both sides believe the new to me male religions is a very complicated regions with both cooperation and competition but this is a very very different from that between the former Soviet Union and United States another example is both sides believe although in recent years the frictions and the suspicions has been increasing especially in the West Pacific region however need the military six conflict and it tries to resolve differences by force for this both sides have achieved a lot of establishment of CPM and crisis management the regime another example is both reports believe in recent years the military relationship is a highlight of the whole bilateral relationship and the most rewarding it has been in decades this is not only reflected in the enhancement of the differences and crisis management but also in the keeping and upgrading talks exchanges and the developing more cooperation on non-traditional security and global governance this besides as a proposal policy proposal has a lot of convergence I shall not mention them one by one however however both sides reports also have a lot of differences here is just a pointed out two more striking ones first Americans report belief the East Pacific repeal is a strategy and that the operationalization of the rebalance by DoD is inevitable and very positive is in the interests of the United States its allies and the defense partners however Chinese report belief the repellents especially the military element in the rebalance policy mainly aimed at China and regard China is one of the major challenge security challenges in result it has intensified the military and security friction between China and the US and increased the tension in the region certainly Chinese believe the maritime friction increasing one of the reason for this is Americans in invitation and the US has a tick size however American reports believe that is the Chinese military capabilities expansion and especially the maritime capabilities expansion and the China's assertive policy and activities which are the root of the maritime tension desires both sides Post reports pointed out a lot of differences which referred to Taiwan Korean Peninsula regional architecture security architecture cyber or space nuclear relationship now we ask a question why we have this kind of male to male relations Post reports answer is the economic independence the common global challenges we are facing the common desire of no conflict and no confrontation all this decided that Paul says must corporate discharger including the passive security corporation on the other side because we have different political systems we have different variables and we have some different national interests it has decided that we must have some differences and especially in the new background of the changing of a balance of power China's rising power us is a existing power so because of this has all this has led to the aggravation of military frictions and competition then how can both militaries close their differences or maybe to them were also exploiting the potential areas for cooperation Post reports has raised a lot of proposals in summary mainly three points the first is we must always keep and expand their logs and exchange the major military dialogues and exchanges especially we should have new talks in the new strategic domains just like the nuclear talk cyber talk and other space talk in this way then we can increase the understanding of post country's strategic intentions decrease missile standing secondly we must put a reduction of risks operational safety crisis management at the center of our effort to stabilize military relationship and avoid military conflict the third is that we must just randon the non-traditional security cooperation in this area we are sit in the same boat now I will talk at my second point is about bilateral military relations in the first half of this year and is almost real ok the prospect I think in the first half of this year generally speaking the relationship is stable we keep talks and expanding new talks and especially early this year when the two presidents meet each other they reach consensus to strengthen cooperation on the new creation in the Crim pasilla peninsula and also because of the relaxation in the South China Sea and East China Sea so all day is beneficial for the stability of the bilateral military relations however in recent one month one month months they are summon active elements u.s. has took twice the so-called freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea and declared military arm sales to Taiwan again so this has bring about an active impact on the relationship now the two leaders are participated in the g20 conference both leaders will meet each other and very soon we were first there talks between the two joint staffs and tribe president Ron Bob will visit China in the second half of the year this year I hope this Ivor's could stabilize the middle two-nil relationship and stabilize the overall relationship of our two countries it will beneficial for the regional peace and stability I'll stop here thank you thank you thank you to our song let me ask one or two questions of the panel and then we'll open it up for audience questions we covered a lot of issues in these papers from India Pakistan to Hawaii and of course all the military and defense issues in two different domains let me focus first on one area which is in the news very much right now and that's North Korea seems to me of all the issues we looked at in the paper including cyber including a IIb of all the issues we've looked at the Korean Peninsula is the one where the United States and China could because of our interactions on the North Korea problem in a few years become much more trusting of each other across every issue or truly sensing there were adversaries as we were when the Korean Peninsula was at war and it seems to me that's the one issue that you could have the the biggest impact on the overall sense of whether we're adversaries or we can work together on hard problems that affect our security and we're not in a good place right now on North Korea and Zhu Phong you mentioned that part of the reason is within Beijing it's very hard politically the the president announced his disappointment the Chinese side couldn't do anything and yet probably Xi Jinping is doing more than was done before but it's clearly not enough to convince the US side let me start with Bonnie and ask you all are there concrete things we can do right now Russia China are blocking the US British French draft in the Security Council on the North Korean launch the US has imposed or has announced that will impose secondary sanctions against danghang bank and other banks because the Chinese side hasn't police and crack down on those section filers themselves these are we stuck on these very this is a very specific set of issues right now but it it has very broad geopolitical implications on what our relationship looks like can we can we expect more out of North Korea cooperation that we're getting I'll start with you Bonnie well I think that when si Jinping and President Trump met at mar-a-lago and agreed in principle to cooperate after that meeting the Chinese really tried to identify what it was that the u.s. really wanted and first the Chinese interpretation was compliance with existing UN sanctions Chinese always opposed any kind of unilateral or secondary sanctions and China has banned of course : ports from North Korea after reaching the cap under the UN Security Council resolution that was passed at the end of last year the Chinese also told the u.s. that it was tightening up in terms of border expected inspections but I think that there's been a maybe a failure on the Chinese side to identify what it was that would really satisfy the United States not meet all of our expectations because that wasn't in the cards anyway and it really goes to this issue of banks operate in northeast China that are facilitating North Korea's access to the international financial system and enabling North Korea to engage in these illicit activities and so there has been efforts by the Trump administration to provide evidence on banks and front companies that are enabling North Korea and the reaction as I understand it from China was not sufficient and that's why we saw this 311 action last week but there can be a way forward if China can take action against these banks if not I suspect what we've seen is the tip of the iceberg we've only seen one bank cited it that's Dondo and there are more but it would be better if trying to does this rather than the United States does it does it in particular because some of these small banks and front companies do business in currency other than US dollars and they really are beyond the reach of sanctions like the the world those that we imposed under 311 so I think there is a potential way forward maybe when President Trump called C Jinping on Sunday maybe articulated some of the things that we're looking for if C Jinping can deliver some of those things in this meeting in Hamburg maybe there is a positive pathway I think neither government really wants the relationship to sour over this issue the best outcome for the United States is more cooperation from China on North Korea and I think the best outcome for C Jinping as he heads towards the annual jungin high meetings the 19th Party Congress and eventually of course Trump's visit to China later this year he wants the us-china relationship to be heading in a positive trajectory also so I think that there is a way forward we'll see whether we get there thank you okay Mike I think you raised a very very important question I think of course China and the US could do lot more to cooperate over the DPRK shield bail a key variable that is how to measure how to define the China's cooperation for example I know how frustrated may be community in the US all I mean she was Latinas policy of a DPRK then president Trump has complained as little some sort of a significance China's some sort of a help to many in the DPRK but for Beijing where well not overwhelmingly kilala trade relations because trade relations with DPRK in some sort of normal turn is Chinese leverage is China's some sort of a political preemption against the DPRK mayor down because such expected the DP I guess mail down well be victimized Chinese too much but under the handle we see such a normal trade relations in such a nice way to domestically keep some slow geo geo ideological ways say some sort of uh such a calculation so it's not easy for China to to waste a bouncer table and a cutout floor all the trade relations was DPRK overnight Bala province I think DPRK issue now has become send up some sort of leading points aware how strategically we adjust the relations between Washington bitching could be significantly and exactly crystallized just imagine back to the Korean War we're really enemies so Korean oh no screaming some sort of place the Chinese Americans were similarly shade a lot of a bladder but now there will be a second a'queen war you ask Chris roomful of Chinese a mature overwhelming modality Chinese say now it'll be crazy your flow yes just a house a kick like engines as militarily China where rich out and helping him now such as since is totally gone it's a big strategic change second is now where I also getting caused him some sort of with a strategic judgment of what the DPRK is it's us well not to the US it's a threat to China either so we needed to figure out some sort of joints contingency plan to relegate the DPRK where I'll set out but the promise where is a starting point how we can just the how they move very firmly by very notably going beyond some sort of a historical heritage remain just all the way for our better cooperation for example for Chinese what's the DPRK DPRK is history PRK ideology DPRK is China's security state where say way DPRK is also some sort of way say entangled some sort of a personal emotional you know our connections it's not easy but chain is very positive so I really hope two things could be serving as a very decisive I think the criteria one is if there is a one more nuclear test and really really help attorneys government could give them a bigger punch even just the house they decides the suspension for all your provision second your flick in Jungmann really want to weigh say how they tell about you'll international appeal to deescalate attention and stop in there some sort Angeles missile past we also need to get in pinch getting hurt economically and commercially so I rarely put a lot of a hope upper coming second around Chomp and Xi Jinping summit meeting yes some sort of a new race a summit momentum could build up then we're we're see both sides could adjust the heading to a more Cygnus specified and immeasurable cooperation thank you I am I I personally think that China's opposed to North Korea is not what it was but you're going it's certainly not what it was 20 years ago but the changes are incremental compared to the growth of the threat itself certainly as body said that's the view in Washington and for our Chinese friends I can tell you if the Chinese security services turned over several containers of centrifuges or precursors for reprocessing or shut down in very specific ways bank accounts in about a dozen banks having work that's in issue in the white house for five years boy would that have a huge impact huge impact on how the administration any administration thought about how trustworthy China is on this problem I'm gonna come back to David and touch one also but I want to give the audience a chance for one or two questions now raise your hand we have microphones very briefly who you are and and your question so I have the gentleman in the blue shirt right here all right thank you I'm called routine from the University of Washington Chinese student I have a question about North Korea's situation we have all been talking for a long time about what we should do which is putting plans to solve this crisis but I wouldn't just put force for one scenario for the panelists to response can it be a very very brief scenario yeah yeah it's very brief yeah so how about having China to have the kind of dominant control over North Korean nuclear scenario and having the United States internationally recognized North Korea so that we can solve the need denuclearization problem thank you we'll take a couple one more yes ma'am up in the front hi my name is Jamie um a couple little bit louder hi my name is Jamie and a couple of days ago Korea North Korea just launched a missile and landed in Japan see and I was wondering how far will let it go for security wise in building that momentum for figuring out something out with what actually should be done in letting North Korea keep testing the missile and landing in the sea and you're asking about what is China's line of Tolerance or the u.s. from both okay internationally give you one more yes sir right we're making our interns run hello my name is Cameron I'm an international relations student at Miami University my question is regarding the idea that etzioni Amitai came up with mutually assured restraint and whether or not that's a viable option given the two papers is viewpoints especially from diplomatic as well as military channels thank you thanks let's start with torchon and then David and we'll work this way our talking something about how to deal with the North Korea nuclear issue so I think China's the position is very clear that it's in the interests of China not just try to satisfy the u.s. system and because we think if North Korea became de facto nuclear state it will be also a disaster for China for example North Korea's the number one country withdraw from the NPT and and the so huge pressure but finally became a nuclear state so it will accept is a very bad example to the other countries the in the NPT will collapse so many people will follow suit then so many nucleuses will surrounding china is it's not in the interest of China and that thing is that the military countries the risk of this is very high now though any country really try to solve the issues by military meanings but if this extent of conflict if there is misjudgment there could be a military comfort even a war and a nuclear war just as at the border of China so it's terrible and the thirdly I think even without war but because of that the very attentions to Asian US will increase the militia pricing the rebirth thought strengthen the military alliances so now it's also not in inches of China so I think China are determined to realize the denuclearization but we must have cooperation with United staes without coordination and cooperation we can achieve anything and but on the side u.s. and North Korea will make some compromise between yourselves otherwise we can also achieve anything so in the future I think China's policy is very clear first the denuclearization and that the freeze the nuclear program should be the first step and in the long run the neutralization is the goal and the secondary we should prepare for the worst-case scenario if North Korea refused to go back to the negotiation table if they made that the 6th nuclear tests and ICBM so we should put more pressure on them yeah but now there are still chance lead a little chance for resume talks and will should - try anyway we should also not just pressure on them put pressure on them we should also give some a parrot who noble parrot parrot yeah to them yeah anyway we can't just depends on the pressure but if they refuse to go back to the Gaussian table we must prepare for the worst-case scenario so at their time especially after six nuclear tests maybe China in the u.s. and South Korea should have a talk of how to deal with the contingency it's in the interests of all the countries it's also a kind of a signal to the North Korea you can't go further so anyway we should strive for that best we should prepare for the worst this is the only way to deal with this crisis poor Shawn can I follow up and pick up the question that was asked over here about how much the international community should tolerate so for my sins I've been working on this North Korea problem for 20 years and others here have longer and every time I hear someone say we have to give joint North Korea one more chance to see if dialogue will work it reminds me of bars where I used to live in Japan and inside the door there was a sign saying starting tomorrow no drinking so it's sort of it felt very good about themselves while they drank and you know when at one point do we just decide or realize North Korea is just not serious about negotiating away its nuclear program I think that's basically what you're asking them yeah so you is it view your view this is the last chance I mean how much how much more do we have to try this thing which has not worked for 20-some years you see now the North Korea haven't totally realized the weaponization nuclear weaponization they are still maybe in two or three years they will go across totally go across the nuclear threshold becoming de facto nucleus is just like India Pakistan Israel at that time there is no way to force them to go back but before that they are still asleep of chance we can do something if the international community can unite it and we can have more coordination and cooperation just like in our daily life some people make a decision we have to do something but it it does mean he must be successful yeah the objective condition is very important so if we united we can persuade them to change their wrong idea we can force them to change their idea so they are still slip of chance but if we can't resume talks in two or three years I think the situation will be very pessimistic and finally we must be maybe we just can only prepare for the worst-case scenario that is the in the future the military conflict and even a war so that that's very bad situation but anyway we still should hyper try that's my point I'm gonna go to do funk next and then to David Ambani on North Korea question or the other ones so you found North Korea and or the other okay I'm a little bit more pessimistic similar to ocean hosting is very senior and to me but I'm a little bit pessimistic I don't think like in June when the lack to negotiate in exchange for any any better off by dismissing their nuclear weapon because they consider Armenia in the minds of young nuclear weapon is the only last a result to secure the region's security or secure regime safety rezian national security the second is nuclear bomb probably is the only way for Kim jong-un to magnify how holy how are the Marable he is to be a top leader of the DPRK so then viola all memes negotiation yes we should leave there that leave this option there but for me unless two conditions happen there's no way DPRK well well abandon their nuclear weapons through negotiation one to my understanding to be honest one is USA is a seriously signaling the major struck is is coming over the second condition is China is unbelievably clear in signal in the opinion we are going to abandon you so then yes I considered negotiation is always operable we say lipolysis rubella problems on the well conditions history also is very telling in the past as read a case since then we needed to be more serious then second question is about for example it's about this mutually assured the restraint I consider mostly important saying we should have some sort of a bottom-line mentality your floor both sides have such a bottom-line mentality and somehow very smartly and also very constructively accommodating each other I think such a mutual assume you chilliest really restraint will be totally achievable Thanks I don't know what I can possibly add to all of this except to say that the the visual of President Putin and President Xi Jinping calling for the dual suspension approach to to Korea does not give me a lot of confidence that the gentleman's prospect or idea of China taking the lead in dealing with North Korea has any any legs and that I think that's a non-starter and does not give me a lot of confidence the second thing I would say is that if ever any a country deserved an award for strategic patience it should be China with North Korea if you look at the last 70 years were it not for North Korea in Kimmel's sung China would probably have owned Taiwan in 1950 and if you don't believe me you can ask professor Warren Cohen who's sitting here in the front row an old friend who was not for North Korea and there no dong and tape o dong missiles Japan probably wouldn't have signed the revised guidelines for the defense cooperation back in 1998 because I was in the Pentagon at that time involved in that had it not been for those missiles North Korean missiles you you wouldn't have Japan providing billions of dollars for the very ballistic missile defense that China sees as a threat to itself and there would be no rationale for approximately 30,000 troops u.s. American forces in China's neighborhood which is definitely viewed by China as a not a good thing so so how much is enough we will leave that to friends in China to deal with that the third thing I would point out is that you know dealing with North Korea is a trip to the land of bad policy options but not just for the United States also for China too and I know that Chinese decision-makers and policy makers and leaders must be struggling with the monumental implications of what they're being faced with at the moment because of North Korea - which up until now China has not had to choose between North Korea and South Korea China has been able to have both ways to a certain degree sooner or later China is going to have to lean to one side on this issue and how it leans to one side on this issue will say a lot about its aspirations for world leadership so so this is this is not just tough decision for the u.s. these are tough policy decisions for for leaders and friends in China as well and and I'm honest-to-god glad that I don't have to make a decision on this because there are no good options at the moment and if you had the time I could give you 15 minutes on why as general mattis secretary mattis says the conflict in Korea would be the most disastrous departure that we've had in this century very short since we are just about out of time the question that this gentleman in the middle asked suggest somehow that we that what we China the United States are willing to do will satisfy North North Korea may be a useful conversation between the US and China is what does North Korea really want you say us recognized North Korea is that really what North Korea wants North Korea wants to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state not simply diplomatic ties with the United States I don't think China really wants to take over the North Korea problem but I can certainly be that North Korea doesn't want China to take over the problem if China offered North Korea today a nuclear umbrella the North Koreans would say thanks but no thanks we have our own so I think that maybe that would have worked before 2006 when the North Koreans tested their first nuclear weapon but I think it's it's clear to me that what the North Koreans want is a nuclear weapons capability they have it they want to be able to deliver it to the continental United States I think Jeong torchon is far too optimistic in terms of his timeframe the US and China and Russia are going to have to work out what we classify this recent test as but I think from the US point of view if it were a standard trajectory it would have traveled approximately I think it was what six thousand miles that is ICBM range so I think the North Koreans have already miniaturized a nuclear warhead I think most people believe that it may have mastered reentry capability without the warhead burning up we are probably far closer to this goal not to a nuclear deterrent which is really something else but having a deliverable nuclear weapons capability and I'm just going to end on one very specific point that goes back to the issue of North Korea using Chinese banks and why this is so important to address between 2009 and 2016 approximately 300 million dollars was laundered through these banks in the US financial system this money is going to support the WMD programs in North Korea and so this is a place to start we can also cut down the North Korean laborers because a portion of their salary is going to North Korea's elite and I think we should take a look at issues like crude oil why do we have to wait until North Korea does it six nuclear tests to cut back on crude oil this is an area where China has enormous leverage so there's more that we can do overall Trey is going to be on the Trump administration's agenda trying to conduct North Korea's 88% of North Korea's trade with the international community is with China and I know that's a very very sensitive issue with Beijing but it will be discussed too so I hope that our two countries can have a more serious discussion about what's really doable and not just talk about suspension for suspension or things that I frankly are not workable at this point because we've really reached a very critical turning point I think with this ICBM test I want to thank the panel and and all your fellow authors and working group members were not on a stage David thank his co-writers I did the asia-pacific paper with Mira rap Hooper from CNS and Richard Bush from Brookings but with a lot of participation from Bonnie and Doug Paul and other experts around town and this is a good discussion and now for the really hard part I'm gonna invite the next panel come up stay Pro is going to moderate and we will give you room now thank you very much [Applause] good afternoon the first panel really did a stellar job of staying within the time limits and in staying within the guidelines of not simply summarizing their papers but actually looking for areas of convergence and divergence between the views of the two sides and particularly those with policy significance our panel will be dealing with a different set of issues but ones that are actually also fundamentally important to the bilateral us-china relationship economics this was the area which during our election campaign seemed to be the most confrontational issue between China and the United States and unlike it the exciting North Korean issue which gets a lot of the attention the North Korean problem is nobody's knows what to do they don't seem to be any good options but the administration thinks that it has options for dealing with the trade imbalance with China and how the United States handles attitudes on economic issues has a potentially major impact on the bilateral relationship global governance is another big issue this has to do is China really out to undo the liberal world order that the United States set up after World War two does it want to push this out of Asia how are the government governance issues playing what role is a plane in the relationship between the United States and China and politics is fundamentally important attitudes in both countries public attitudes often do not support the declared policies of the government polling shows that attitudes toward the United States and China are more hostile than attitudes in the United States toward China but when you think about it you realize of course because from China standpoint the United States is supporting countries who are making territorial claims against China or we are supporting Taiwan in ways that china sees as interfering on a very important territorial issue to them and we don't have any territorial issues with China in the same way that the Chinese see the issue so it's not surprising that if one side has a territorial issue that's going to affect public attitudes so public attitudes are very important and our panelists will get into the subject I will encourage them to be equally diligent in sticking within the time limits but please remember we have one additional member of our panel so that the pressure is on us will be even greater we'll start off with there was a Chinese participant who was supposed to be commenting on the economic side one of the drafters of the Chinese paper unfortunately could not be present so the economics issue is the one where the United States will be dominating the presentation although I'm sure that if we say anything that the Chinese feel has to be rebutted they will not be hesitant doing so Scott why don't you lead off thank you very much state and it's an honor to be a part of this project with everyone on both the first panel on this one as well as all the other contributors and I wanted to talk about the economic relationship the paper that you have in the report that we present that we published today was written jointly by myself and Liz economy from the Council on Foreign Relations we had several other people who acted as advisors who helped guide us along but were jointly responsible for what you like in the paper as well as of course all of the mistakes and challenges as well we also want to commit I also want to commend hoof on from Peking University School of Business who can't be here today because of a family illness but he and his team the other three authors on his team and the rest of their group really should be commended for a very thoughtful analysis a serious discussion presentation of evidence in their paper as well which is on the CSIs website which which you can read let me say a little bit about the sort of the differences similarities and differences in our analysis on economic issues and then similarities and differences where we come down in terms of policy prescriptions as well and and particularly since hoof on is not here I want to try and be as balanced as possible even though I probably can't fully you know meet that idea but I'm gonna I'm gonna try I do think in terms of our analysis both sides agree that the us-china commercial relationship is mutual has been largely mutually beneficial that it has benefited both sides that despite the fact that there is this large trade deficit bilaterally that number shouldn't be the measure by which we judge whether the relationship is beneficial or not and I think also we agreed on both sides that the United States economy faces a variety of challenges and not all of those challenges emanate from Beijing or from anywhere in China but emanate domestically and they're things the United States needs to do to address those that don't involve China we also agree that China's economy is changing evolving the role of the government in governance in managing the economy is is changing and the China still is trying to integrate itself into the global economy I think we all agreed to that those sets of analysis but we differed in a variety of other ways that are very important I think I think the US paper you'll find if you look at it we focus heavily on what we see is the growing centrality of Chinese industrial policy and protectionism in managing its economy in making life more difficult for those that want to export to China and those that do business in China and this is not a question of just whether how much it contributes to the US trade deficit or not or how much it jobs effects but first the question of basic unfairness and the difference between this behavior and Chinese commitments as well as the effect on companies that are competing with China in the US and elsewhere but even beyond that because of China's size its unique size Chinese Industrial Policy is having a huge global effect on business models not just in China but globally so it's really important that we address this issue not because we're trying to support one company winning over another but because of China's size and it has a special responsibility and that it's something that we focused on I think - and his group in the act on the Chinese side did folk and focus primarily on the benefits that both sides gain from the relationship the need to continue that and to avoid any path which would lead to growing protectionism on either side our sense was again from from our report is that these Chinese declarations of a continued reform and opening although repeated consistently in by Chinese leaders officials in the press are inconsistent with the reality on the ground in China in addition we don't see a consistent or equivalency between the challenges that foreign companies face in the Chinese market and some of the things the United States has already done with regard to market access in the United States are things that we're thinking of for example including revising Cepheus I don't think there's really much that the US has on its on the table as a possibility that would come close to what our ongoing obstacles to access in the Chinese market and I think you see this difference in approach in in analysis in the current rhetorical fight between the United States and China where China says it's opposed to protectionism in the United States most recently at the g7 in Italy and I expect we'll see this weekend at the g20 in Germany its opposition to trade distorting measures I think that's a good summary of the different overall visions of what's going on now when as the Ambassador alluded - when we got underway we expected that after the president Trump came into office that the us-china economic relationship would be mud be very contentious right away based on everything that we saw in the campaign and also there was concerns in the Obama administration and I think there was a growing consensus about a need for sort of a more tougher approach on China as you say but that's not what we saw that's what we've seen essentially in the first several months of the Obama administration we described the American a path the policy so far is sort of pursuing general cooperation and openness and we expected the u.s. to move towards what we call conditional cooperation and openness which which is essentially much more like the idea of reciprocity that is now circulating around and that we hear about every day so now there's a chance have we seen over the last few weeks that the u.s. may be shifting that it may be moving away from this effort to seek cooperation and deliverables toward putting more pressure on China to try and get outcomes that address these questions of Chinese industrial policy and considering penalties and pressure so we can't be sure because we're not exactly clear what American policy towards China is overall or what our clear policy is on trade but we will see you know over this coming weekend a discussion of the global forum and whether what's going on with Chinese subsidies with steel and aluminum and I think we'll have a better sense next week of whether we're seeing just some you know media coverage on trying to push things in a new way or whether this is really a substantial turn in terms of policy recommendations in our report and this is where I'll conclude I think again we had actually a lot of common agreement about the commercial relationship in terms of policy I think we agreed that the US should not engage in wholesale protectionism and just using any convenient tool sitting around above water below board to just the whack to use Jew funds term to punch the United States for example we again agreed that the US needs to do a lot to improve its domestic economy that isn't related and dependent on China I think we also agreed in both reports that China needs to continue to reform and open up in the US report we say China needs to resume that the Chinese say continue but nevertheless the direction I think is the same on both sides where we differed as I think again the u.s. believes in in our report that China isn't living up to its commitments and that much more needs to be done to bring China back to into compliance and restart liberalization and there are a variety of things that the u.s. can do bilaterally multilaterally both carrots and sticks and be proactive in pushing for that outcome so we had to begin with is simply just rigorously enforcing US trade laws bilaterally and in the WTO we're not advocating discouraging Chinese investment in the United States because it strengthens the economy but we do think that it's reasonable to strengthen the process for considering whether individual investments particularly in high-tech may have concerns for national security within our group there was no consensus about the principle or this term reciprocity but we do think US investment policy should be somewhat affected by how China treats American investment finally the US side thinks that the us-china bilateral dialogue is extremely important but addressing solving all the problems in this economic relationship isn't just about by the bilateral track the US and China need to engage in multilateral fora in Regional Forum and the US needs to further engage its allies you can't pick a fight with everyone at the same time on every issue if addressing this type of core strategic challenge is a real important goal so the United States needs to pick its priorities pick those it's going to cooperate with so it can engage China more effectively on these issues and achieve what we hope would be a more genuine win-win outcome thank you we will now move on to global governance and professor the words will lead off Thank You ambassador Roy it's been a privilege as others have said to participate in this project and I think it's important to say that because this project demonstrates how much goodwill there is in each country to work hard to try to get this complex us-china relationship on the best possible path and it's been good to participate in that and to continue to participate in that the topic of global governance is one that has been particularly disoriented I think is the word by Donald Trump's election as US president and I will get to that in a few minutes but I want to begin with the reports because the reports I think reflect and demonstrate a rather surprising amount of agreement on this large topic of global governance and I want to just give six quick examples also noting along the way some of the disagreements but in the current climate I think it's important to emphasize those agreements we agree that global challenges of which there are many require global solutions and that no single country is going to be able to address them effectively in isolation that cooperation is the path that produces the most share benefits and that rules-based approaches are usually better than ad-hoc responses second area of agreement the main institutions of global government government established after World War two remain essential institutions in the system of local governments the Chinese paper probably puts more emphasis on the United Nations and criticizes the u.s. for sometimes departing from UN processes and norms but the truth is the US remains strongly committed to the United Nations and truthfully no country has a perfect record regarding the United Nations third we agree that the established institutions of global governance need some reforms taking account of new power relations taking account of new realities yes there are differences on what those reforms might be but there is a shared agreement that we should be talking about what those reforms are fourth we want each other both the US and China want each wants each other to be active players in global governance there is some difference in the nuance that the United States has wanted China to be a full stakeholder and China by calling itself a developing country has sometimes seemed to the u.s. to want it both ways but recently by both ways I mean being a partial stakeholder but I don't think that's really a concern much anymore it is very clear that China has been stepping up and changing has changed both its self-understanding and its ambitions and playing a full-throated global role indeed that make me creating some problems for the United States that are more substantial than China being a partial stakeholder v we agree that the established institutions of global governments can be and already are in good ways being supplemented by various multinational mechanisms of governance now not surprisingly this is an area where I think a number of more substantial differences have surfaced in the two reports and in the discussions around those reports the Chinese has or already been noted criticized the alliance system and the u.s. considers that the alliance system especially in Asia or at least certainly in Asia has contributed to the stability of of the whole region which is allowed China itself to to prosper and we I think recognize in the US the alliances come in a rather broad spectrum of different kinds of partnership and commitment another difference the u.s. applauds China's ambitions to make greater contributions to global development but has also expressed some concerns about whether these Chinese lead institutions will develop norms of adequate transparency and governance and those concerns among others led the u.s. to decline to participate in the u.s. report that there's been a change set of views on the US side and the report recommends that that the u.s. consider ways of cooperating on in AIB and as you probably mostly know a high-level US government representative representative was recently sent to the Belton forum a Belton Road forum in Beijing the most complicated and difficult difference that has emerged I think in this area concerns the phrase liberal international order and what that implies the that phrase which was certainly widely used in the West to characterize the institutions after World War two and and after the fall of the Soviet Union has elements of emphasizing markets individual freedoms rule of law democracy and China and in its paper so indicates indicates that that's a Western ideological mindset and it in it has been invoking and this paper invokes a different concept in the paper called inclusiveness and elsewhere I've seen the phrase diversity in which global governance institutions are not guided by a liberal mindset but welcomed as equals illiberal political systems and are not about the business of changing those liberal institutions oh those illiberal institutions it's obviously a very hard complicated topic that we don't have time to discuss but it's it's clearly an emerging one of great significance the papers lastly agree on the areas where global governments is really needed and you know those and that's part why there is agreement economic architecture that addresses current realities and problems in globalization addressing issues of cyber space terrorism and serious problem of climate change and that last example is the pivot to my sort of closing observations which climate change as an example crystallizes the point I began with which is that a central problem in the moment currently in the field of global governance is that our American president has already taken a sharp turn away from the decades-long path of American leadership in the global order his slogan is American for America first he's begun a process of withdrawing from the Paris climate Accord he scrapped TPP he's criticized NATO and he's given no sign yet of nurturing and focusing on the strengthening and building of institutions of of global governments so it's fair to already start wondering what what is the fate of this project in in the upcoming period and I I want to close by simply mentioning reasons why I think this current moment is not one that should prevent the efforts of people like us be developing and working hard on thinking through these ideas and let me just mention quickly three factors one it's early in the Trump administration we don't really know where this administration is going to go on these issues secondly the United States of America is not just the period after Donald Trump's election until the next election we will have a long future and the issue of global governance is not a made-up issue it's a response to realities that require international cooperation and the United States will will have a future after Donald Trump which I believe will focus more again on issues of global glove lines and lastly in the present right now the United States of America is not just the national government and there are enormous numbers of actors who are working in spite of what the national government may be doing to sustain and develop and be active in issues of global governance and I'm I'll mention three states under the American system yes states can't sign international treaties but they have sovereign powers and they are standing up in particularly after the announced withdrawal from the climate of the Paris climate agreement take Jerry Brown Governor of California 40 million people he has organized other governor's to take collective action to try to jointly meet the Paris climate guidelines he met with Xi Jinping in Beijing Xinhua News Service had a headline that said President Xi eyes bigger role for California in us-china relations interesting and he invited California to join the belt and road in issue so States states don't forget about them to companies businesses are active in the enterprise of global guidelines global judgments and lastly NGOs which play a distinctively strong role in the United States in galvanizing public opinion helping on implementation of rules and sometimes even sitting at the table at global governance institutions so there's work to be done in the present regardless of what the national government is doing and I consider this project even in the small working group on global governance to be part of that Thanks thank you Paul dr. Lee sex chair and pole good presentation and also working on the global governance part of the China Society report I'd like to see that both sides report is very positive and constructive please be sure you're close enough to the microphone so that everybody can hear you and your China China and the US or believes that during the past eight years in the post countries have made great contribution to the global governance issues such as the protection of the environment and the cooperation of global economy and the Lum proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction etc and that's why in us reports it welcomes China to play more active though in the future and China also attached great importance to the bilateral cooperation on this area the US and China also reached comments on what's the future challenges facing by both sides that is we all called it a candle and answer uncertainty a bachelor continuation of such a good cooperation and both sides provides the observations and conclusions some conclusion are similar such as we are concerned about that Trump's policy focus transfer from the global to little mistake domestic will bring some a negative effect on the future cooperation and some conclusions are very different for example and what impressed me most is that in the u.s. reports when they're talking about and the future China maybe brings some kind of certainty to the global governance cooperation as that this in China want to change the current system just because the sync the current system is developed it by the but is created by the developed countries and particularly led by the US and actually it's not true that's why in the China's report when our team provides the basic attitude of China's site to to how to understand how to understand the whole system reform I think we have two key points in this area the first thing is your China always think the reform when it's necessary indeed in the practical level where or knows that there are some specific mechanism have some problems that Medellin cannot cope with new emerging challenges so that's why we sometimes we need to take some reform mayors to improve its efficiency and the other key point is that reform should based on the consensus that means no one country and no one stakeholder can do all these reforms in and its own so it needs cooperate and needs the worldwide consensus so I think maybe there are some differences between China China and the US and after the on the basis of the analyze of the future challenges the both sides also keep focused on how to get the differences and how to enhance our cooperation and the global governance issues both sides provide some specific suggestions advices I'd like to conclude them with four keywords to from your s site and to from the I think the most valuable keyword from the US sites what is the mutual trust that means that means both sides should judge were another's global governance initiative based on its targets objectives but not simply on its ideological or main set and this the second one from your side is that is that sensors it means whatever happens in the governance system reform we should cooperate and consultant worldwide and make some consensus just focus on the same consensus we can make some reform reform mayors and I think that to venable words from China set aside what is the practical that's mean that means we should need more practical common actions to do some things just not just stay on the stage of cave arguing or cable planning which we all know the process of governance global governance actually is a candle process or practice which have been proved is the most efficient way to enhance communication and improve the cooperation and the final key words from China sites I think it should it should be the focus that means that as we all know not only for China but also for the US states the resources the covenants resources are always limited and there are so many different global governance areas we should allocate this resources effectively in different different governance issues and keeps the balance between the global governance and domestic governance at the same time so we should do something really if patient in this area I'd like to a nap with another how to say maybe a little bit pity from the US side you know when we're talking about these areas issues were really our team really look forward to to figure out how the u.s. u.s. colleagues think what kind of specific or practical actions all the projects under different global governance issues that's why we spend a lot of time and to discuss the scandal questions but comparing with the China Society I think that US colleagues make a very general conclusion unless specific areas so I really look forward to hurt about not on more specific details about detail informations about the different governance issues this error I'd like to stop here thank you thank you we'll now move on to politics and Evan you'd like to lead off Thank You ambassador Roy I'd like to begin by thanking CSIS and my Chinese colleagues when we embarked originally on this project we weren't sure exactly how it was going to go I've worked on collaborative projects between American and Chinese scholars many times before and it's a challenge for the obvious reasons and as a result they gave me the hardest topic of them all politics and it was the hardest because it's so sensitive it's of course sensitive in America but it's even more sensitive in China but yet the two teams work together persevered and I think we're able to generate very credible products so what I'd like to do is make three points about how I think politics impacts the us-china relationship and weave into that those comments some thoughts about the differences were views converging diverge and hopefully make it policy relevant my first point is that when one looks at the us-china relationship and I look at it from a very practical perspective I was very fortunate enough to serve in the Obama administration at the White House for six years and I had six years where I got to sit at the control panel of the us-china relationship and see all the lights flash and the buttons world and figure out how this big relationship operates and it was fascinating and one of the lessons that I took away from that and there are many lessons and I'm still digesting them years later is that this is a deeply mature relationship and what I mean is as of 2017 this is a 30 year 38 year old relationship right this is not a young kid this is not an adolescent it's not even a 20 year old 38 year old relationship which means America knows China and China knows America now that doesn't mean we still don't have a lot to learn from one another we're constantly changing and evolving as societies as countries as polities but nonetheless there is a big enriched data set that both both sides can draw from in understanding the sort of the pace the scope the tenor of the us-china relationship and I think that the the scope the depth and the quality of the papers in this particular project reflect that underlying maturity in the us-china relationship I mean look no further than the current period of the us-china relationship the u.s. took arguably four major actions against China last week Taiwan North Korea South China Sea you know in all the sensitive areas did the bottom fall out of the relationship no is the relationship in a rapid spiral downward no not really both presidents talked a few days afterwards they're gonna meet on Saturday so in other words you know there are boundaries around this relationship that are shaped by politics but nonetheless I think it's important to keep in mind the maturity of the relationship and that was point number one point number two as we try and understand what what these boundaries are and how we get things done and in in the case of the work that myself and mr. Dow and Fonzie sure and others did on politics won't as we're trying to understand how politics in both countries affects the us-china relationship I think there's one distinction that's critical to understanding how to assess this relationship and it's a distinction that I have used before some of you have heard me refer to which is distinguishing between the structural features of the relationship in other words those features of the relationship that are enduring and probably aren't going to change and will have a deep and profound effect on the ability to stabilize the relationship and to shape it so a distinction between the structural features of the relationship and the cyclical features in other words sort of the the issues that come up on a day to day basis and we've talked a lot about a lot of them today North Korea Taiwan South China Sea and certainly in the think tank community in Washington it's fun and exciting and engaging to talk about those cyclical issues but sometimes they don't really have a long-term effect on the trajectory of the relationship and in particular what is the shape of that curve look like and so I think this is an important distinction because when one thinks about these issues of politics in the us-china relationship that is deep structure that's something that probably isn't going to change anytime soon and it's important that we not always get caught up in the day-to-day debates about China North Korea South China Sea Tibet Taiwan etc and yet focus on these structural features and there's two structural features that I think came out of our analysis of how politics impacts the relationships and the first is that it's clear that competition and the competitive aspects of the us-china relationship are coming to the fore and that's not meant to be a dark or negative statement but rather a statement about sort of the balance of issues facing the us-china relationship and Dave Finkelstein sort of began to go down this pathway in his description of the us-china military-to-military relationship but these are not issues this is this is not a statement about issues that we should shy away from we need to embrace the competitive aspects of the relationship because that's the only way we're going to manage them and in fact one of Xi Jinping's attributes is the fact that he has been relatively frank and open about the fact that there are disagreements we have to talk about them they're going to generate competition the question is not can we avoid competition the question is what kind of competition is it is it competition that leads us both to improve our game and raise our capabilities or is it destructive competition militarized competition that runs the risk of instability and militarized conflict so competition is one structural aspect the second is sort of what I refer to as resilience and stability in the relationship because from my perspective there's a big difference and while I find that the us-china relationship is is not always the most stable relationship there's lots of disagreements we disagree regularly but it's a relationship that is actually quite resilient in other words even though their disagreement even though there's competition there's a sort of core of stability at the center of it has you know bounded these disagreements in this competition from leading to you know a free fall now that's something that could change but it's something that you know I noticed evolve over the Obama administration and it's one of these cyclical features that could become structural depending on how the politics play out so what does that mean for my assessment of the papers well I would say that these papers are excellent compliment they actually do two very different things they highlight different aspects of the relationship the Chinese paper was very focused on history ideology and the way in which those issues affect Chinese perceptions of the us-china relationship I think the paper is a very good description of how China believes that ideology and in particular this feeling that China has been the victim China has been wronged by the United States and how that that affects Chinese perceptions of the US and the us-china relationship and it's clear from the paper that China really holds on to these and that that even in 2017 that these issues affect Chinese perceptions of US strategic intentions and the quality of cooperation that can be gained in the us-china relationship I was I have to admit I was surprised by the fact that there was so much discussion in the paper about the u.s. trying to change China's political system and that that is a continues to be a core fear at the heart of the us-china relationship and I say that because as somebody that spent six years in the White House I I was not in a single conversation with the president the vice president the National Security Advisor where anybody said China's political system is a threat to American national security and we have to do everything possible to change it never once never even remotely close now that said of course we have questions and concerns about human rights in China the clamp down on political freedoms because that's who we are and that is a structural feature of the us-china relationship but that is very very different than the kind of claims addressed in the paper the u.s. paper took a different approach when Mike and I were working on it we focus less on history and ideology and more on institutions actors and changing American perceptions and how the changing set of institutions the fact that the executive branch appears to be playing a much more consistently active role in both formulating and implementing China policy the fact that there's a broader set of actors in the United States influencing the us-china relationship we talked about the business community we talked about NGOs and Paul's great presentation reminded me of the importance of sub-national actors States in the United States Governor Brown for example and the important role they can play in bounding competition expanding cooperation now that raises the question does that mean ideology and history doesn't play a role in in the in American perceptions of China and I would say no I would just say that in the u.s. we don't really call it ideology what we call it is international relations theory and what I mean by that is that there are different schools of thought in the United States about China strategic intentions you have the and I'll use to sort of stylize schools of thought to make my point the spectrum is obviously far more diverse on the one hand you have the sort of offensive realist John Mearsheimer Ashley tell us China China wants to recreate the sino centric tributary system and will do everything possible to become the hegemon in East Asia on the other hand you have a group of China specialists I would maybe point to somebody like Michael Swain's were excellent work who tries to point out that China has a much much more new approach to the region it's not trying to recreate a sino centric system but rather it's trying to find greater space for its rise in East Asia as it tries to protect its self defined economic and security interests but my point is in the United States we have our own competing schools of thought and those have different influence on US policy over time so the Chinese paper would benefit from a greater attention to actors institutions processes and how those affect perceptions and I think the u.s. paper would have benefited from a little bit more discussion of sort of the range of schools of thought in the United States because we have our own manifestation of ideological and theoretical lenses that inform our approach let me end with this point which is what does this all mean for the trajectory of the us-china relationship and I'm very much of the view that the evolution of the us-china relationship is is one that is going to be determined by a series of ad hoc decisions by both sides to put it differently the future of the us-china relationship is a constant search for a stable strategic modus vivendi between Washington and Beijing but unfortunately that the search for that stable strategic modus vivendi is not going to occur at a Potsdam or a Yalta type negotiation I think many people in this room wish it were that you could just have two leaders sit down hash it out and move on but rather it's going to be a series of ad hoc decisions and the question is will the political institutions in both countries institutions actors perceptions filtered through ideology and history allow that sort of series of actions to be one that takes the US and China down a pathway toward a gradual convergence of interests where there's both cooperation and competition or one where the pathway looks darker thank you Thank You Evan and now mr. jeremy some care ambassador it is hard even dangerous for for sleepy people to talk about politics but i will try my best I'm I'm honored to participate in the writing of the Chinese report and to attend the so great so great panel here today actually my research is focusing on US politics so the process of writing for me is very cool chance to reconsider about you about Chinese politics about the us-china relations I don't say that I have read write about the u.s. report very carefully and especially the wonderful analyzes about can't you ask on question no role and in the US China and again the US China for US foreign policy making I totally agree with the idea of ups and downs of congressional power compared with the two reports we have a lot of consensus we are agree that domestic politics is one of the most factors shaping us-china relations most importantly we we all believe that when the two countries political goals are consistent the Perito relations will make significant the process the I think is a very important consensus of course we have some difference I think personally I think the most maybe the biggest difference between the two reports is that the true size seems think about the world politics in different ways for the Chinese report we talked about politics as a very big issue such as political system ideology or even the political stability but the u.s. report make me a give me some impression that the party is about common to process the decision-making process especially the the key players during this process I think the trust because of this this difference the Chinese report give us a bigger political background and the future of us-china relations and that the u.s. report talked about I mean more discussion about the the key details such as Congress such as business community and geo even the personal factor of the leadership personally asking for a lot of issues if you talk about if you focus more on the details it's very very easy for people to find out some problem even some natural problem but when you will pay more attention on the overall historical trend maybe we will see maybe we may see a better future so what is the why there's some difference the reason for the difference maybe is the deficit of the mutual trust is that China and the United States how still have doubts how to look at each other how to deal with each other of course to some distance China is still worried about some so-called political involvement of United States and for the u.s. part maybe because the diversity of the decision-making participants so there are more and more different even conflicting views on China or on Chinese politics though for a long time as other mentioned in there's a long history of which us-china relations so we have a long time to try to resolve the difference gradually as our way as both of us I mean both of this report mentioned that the sub-national level relations I think that is a bastard tries now for us I mean that is a one of the it's a personal choice for us to strengthen the u.s. the sub-national relation between US China such as the state to province the city to city that County to County or the other local level the sub-national relation exchange can not only by past so-called high politics these fields and maybe can improve a lot of people to people exchange such as economy trade technology science education and so on and will maybe it will come consolidated the basis of the bilateral relations the addition I think that as the Chinese report mentioned that there is a situation that the US and China conflict confronting the some kind of the same challenge the same problems but a solution maybe not the same as we know China is continuing the economy reformed open up reform and improved try to improve people's welfare and as we know the Trump administration proposed American forces slogan and concerned more about the economy the jobs the immigration and the and other domestic issues so maybe there's some there's a more room for some kind of mutual learning mutual cooperation of a mutual benefit between our two countries for the new development of the political factors since Trump took place I think for the under an attorney side there's no big big change on the US side maybe there's some new points should should be talked about one of them is that the inner circle in fighting general so-called politics of a Trump from the White House brings more uncertainty to u.s. foreign policy making outside the world totally have no idea about who either who at what time how how much influence on which issue so it's a it's a big uncertainty for even for United States another part had on to resist that in case of trumps unclear policy US Congress seems to once more dominate some foreign policies for example the time and policy so we can see the arm sales we can see there is a bill named titled tywin Travel Act sponsored by Marco Rubio in the Senate and Stephen Chow both in the in the house I don't think this distance is country conducive to the to the to the stable development of us-china relations my terms are powers of years thank you we'll run over our time the panelists have raised some fascinating issues that we could usefully explore for the next hour or two but rather than eating into the time of Professor Wang Zhi Zhu who is going to make concluding remarks I will thank our panelists and if you have questions maybe you can color members of the panel after the conclusion of our conference this afternoon I want to thank the panel and especially ambassador state boy who shared steepest part of the steering group on the other side of senior China hands and veterans of foreign and defense policy who provided overall guidance and worked with John Henry to produce an overview paper the Chinese side also had a steering group with very distinguished scholars diplomats defense experts and also produced an overview paper and the principal author was our closing speaker professor Wong dish of beta so it's now over to you to sum up and tell us what we do next where do we go from here ambassador will president wine I'm not going to summarize and I'm going not going to tell you what to do but I will have to say something first of all on behalf of ambassador fooiing and all the members on the Chinese research group we want to express our heartfelt congratulations on the release of your very comprehensive report that is the u.s. side report on the earth side and we also want to express our sincerest appreciation to CSIS for his collaboration with us and and support for our joint joint effort so actually we have two set of reports parallel reports I the beginning of this joint effort was the spring of 2016 under the able stewardship of ambassador for Yin we initiated the research work on the future of us-china relations the news initiative has been endorsed and financed by the Chinese that had monstroso Sciences global think-tank that's all what I don't remember the exact name of that it is called something like a global strategic studies think-tank and we have been in touch with Chinese foreign ministry and other government agencies senior diplomats US Embassy in Beijing and various US counterparts individuals and institutions especially CSIS where we are very much indebted to their advice and the research team on the Chinese side work was composed of about 20 to 30 researchers scholars and policy analysts from numerous leading think tanks in China actually not simply from Beijing but from shanghai nanjing and elsewhere they include Chinese Academy of Social Sciences China foundation for international and strategic studies National Defense University the PLA Academy of of military science of course my University Peking University and and people's University Fudan University Shanghai Institute Shanghai kind of Social Sciences Nanjing University pengal think-tank and many others many others we held dozens of closed-door debates and discussions some were plenums some were small group meetings and we also helped many meetings with our American counterparts in Beijing Washington DC or New York City the end result is the Chinese report published sized in both Chinese and English and we also want to thank CSIS for published publicizing the Chinese report and the Chinese report in both English and Chinese are already edited in the in the volume which will be published by the Chinese again or social sciences publishing house I hope that it will come out pretty soon and in May this year we launched an a rollout event in Beijing and similar to the one we are holding today in Washington DC we have people from CSIS and and other think tanks from the United States this is simply my story the Chinese side of the story equally important or even more important is the instead after a few round of consultations CSIS took the made a decision to help us and to coordinate American think tends to write a joint report to join write a report instead of instead the first idea is to write something called a joint report no lack of the public publicity of our teamwork collaborated by both sides but because of the lack of communication I mean the means we are we are separated so so widely and we don't we cannot reach consensus on every single issue so we decided to some do something like the Shanghai communique that is we express our views and these express their views and when we can you can compare notes we compare notes first in the first place so the end result is two separate and parallel reports reflecting our views of several dimensions like trade and economics asia-pacific global governance the impact of domestic politics on the bilateral relationship and military-to-military relations and also of course the overview and we have frequent exchanges of views between the nightstand and Chinese teams when we'll have to plenums in Washington DC and another in Beijing respectively we compared notes and we improve the quality of the papers substantively we debated on the Chinese file more than we publicize them I mean we have honestly who have different news among the Chinese on some issues we don't have identical views on issues like North Korea on no sensitive issues in Chinese foreign policy of course generally we have a consensus but on specific issues we don't have everything you know in such a group of such a large group thirty to twenty to thirty people we cannot agree on everything but what is available is it's generally the consensus on the Chinese side but the consensus is not necessarily the government point of view and this is our think tanks turned effort we consulted the government but we did not seek endorsement from gun agencies in in our corporation the I'm talking about the strategy oriented think-tank cooperation two things are striking to myself to me I'm speaking myself on this regard in this regard first the frequent substantive and sustained dialogue is very useful and as when we constructed the report I cannot help but thinking about some earlier episode of the u.s. Tran relationship in the early 1990s we the economic and cultural exchanges were influenced by the political storm in Beijing and then in the mid-1990s the our bilateral dialogue was suspended by leading who is visiting our states and then in the late 1990s with the there was the Embassy bombing incident and so the academic and scholarly exchanges between universities and think tanks of the two countries were was all often we're often interrupted by political events but nowadays especially since the beginning of this century we have very intensified and extensive changes of views between think tanks and I think personally speaking I think that in intensity and extensiveness of the sustained dialogue between the two sides it sees what I know as the exchanges of views between China and other countries we have very strong ties with countries like Russia and Europe and many other countries but I don't think you know the the intensive now extensive the dialogues are less frequent and now exchanges of views with with the countries we are we have friendly relationship with like Russia and if I to be very honest if I compare this relationship with our relationships with South Korea or Japan in recent years unfortunately some sometimes the exchanges of views has been have been interrupted by unhappy events or happening so this what does this tell us this tells us this we have reached a new level of maturity and in the words of ever manures this is reflexive Raziel resilience of the relationship the second striking thing to me is of course how much we are familiar with each other's fuels and how much we are we know each other personally and individually that includes some younger generation scholars and the think 10 people in fact because of the depending understanding of us think tank like CSIS a great number of Chinese think tanks have been established in China in recent years when we have specific issues to discuss or to debate we know who we are going to talk to or to seek advice from and and I I would like to mention a paper I did with my friend candy booth or five years ago and we co-author that report on china-us strategic distrust and this justice trust was reflected in every modules discussion of whether the United States wants to change China China's political system that is what we see as a very deepen deepened distrust in the last five past five years since we published that report has the distrust been dispelled or reduced my answer is no I think the stretchy distrust has deepened then it more become more extensive but at the same same time have the two countries moving move closer to confrontation again my answer is no but why is that why it is contest between the two things I can give some reasons that are reflecting in our joint report our parallel reports first we increased mutual understanding we share our more balanced more sophisticated use of you know the think tank views with a larger without separately respective domestic audiences and we are much less influenced by for instance conspiracy theories because the conspiracy we can think about among the audience here if they don't have conspiracy I don't know well we can have those conspiracies and you know us very well and you know Chinese people and Chinese government officials much better than before so it is very difficult to believe in those conspiracy theories I'm not saying that there's no conspiracy but conspiracy conspiracy some knows why spread so widely spread and and second we have more Institute institution institutional linkages which are cushioning against possible conflict between those two sides we are helping government agencies to construct crisis prevention and crisis management skills and devices and this is what Tantra song is very good at and also my friend Finkelstein also has talked about that and third despite the continuum utilities mutual distrust the two countries greatly enhanced their practical bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation reflected in the report on global governors and all reflected on on the papers on economic and trade relations and what is not talked too much about the s tier is the booming tourism between the two countries and the United States is more interested in one belt one Road initiative and China's best interest best students continue to come to us two last days for Advanced Studies I'm not extremely happy about that because I'm losing some of my best students who I want them to I want them to attend our graduate schools but instead they go to the best universities in United States but at the same time we have a many very good students from the from the United States studying in China so this gives me somewhat more reason to be are cautiously optimistic I don't want to neglect the differences and the pitfalls difficulties ahead what I see is a normal a new normal of the pilot relationship featured by increased cooperation and increased competition and I don't know competition is greater our corporations equator they are rising simultaneously and another feature I see in the bilateral relationship is the increased degree of influence from domestic politics on both sides and what should be we do next I don't have any good advice but I'm thinking about more substantive and more collaborative projects for instance we can be somewhat more specific in talk in discussing your travel relations one aspect is for instant investment trade and we can talk also about more extensively security multilateral security architecture in the asia-pacific region there are already proposals in that regard so we can launch some joint programs on a great great number of projects and we should also try to bring countries like Japan South Korea Assam India and Russia into our collaboration and we can even think of our you know our joint effort to analyze situations in the Middle East this morning I read very carefully a publication by your vice president Jang or Ottoman on China and the United States in the Middle East that is something we can also think about so in any sense the joint effort we have made so far has set up a good foundation for think-tank cooperation in the future will continue to rely on CSIS s our partner of course weird also trying very hard to reach out to other Chinese us ting tense and on our side we also want to reach out to other universities in China to bring them together to cooperate with you thank you very much on behalf of the American participants I want to thank professor Wong and again masa de feu yin who brought this idea to us a little over a year ago everyone was interested probably a dozen think tanks and universities at least heard her idea and we weren't sure how it would work he was an experiment and I think it worked quite well for three reasons one the goodwill and the candor of all the participants number two we structured it in a way where each side had to really think hard about how they thought about the others relationship but most importantly third because of Maria Sinclair and Sun yang an example of a American University graduate going to work for you professor Wang so the two of them really hurted all these cats and we owe them special thanks and thank you all for joining us [Applause]

Channel: Center for Strategic & International Studies

Views: 6,913

Rating: 4.6923075 out of 5

Keywords: csis, international, politics, diplomacy, washington

Id: N0U6GijCF3g

Length: 157min 13sec (9433 seconds)

Published: Thu Jul 06 2017