Longstreet would later state that when he
left that Lee “had formed no plans beyond that of seizing Culp’s Hill as his point
from which to engage, nor given any orders for the next day.” According to Longstreet… Now the problem with all this and throughout
this whole program…l see a lot of couples in this crowd out here today, we’re back
here to Phillip, speaking of lovely couples, thank you Phillip for filming today and texting
during my program. There is always, there is always three sides
to a conversation. What are the three sides to a conversation? That’s right. His side, her side, and the truth. A lot of the problem with history, specifically
Gettysburg, and if we’re talking specifically today about the subject of Lee and Longstreet,
a lot of times I only have one side of a three sided conversation. So I don’t have the gap to fill in, I only
have one person’s recollections of that. So that, so that can only inevitably lead
to a problem. Same account, same day, different account
I should say… For his part, Lee’s staff officer, Armistead
H. Long recalled that Longstreet, on July 1st, advocated turning the Union left “and
force him back, meaning the Union, to the Pipe Creek line. But Lee found the idea impractical. After Long returned on a brief reconnaissance,
he found Longstreet and AP Hill still with Lee. Long states that Lee turned to Hill and Longstreet
and stated, this is Long’s version of this, “Gentleman, we will attack the enemy in
the morning as early as practicable.’ In the conversation that succeeded he directed
them (Hill and Longstreet) to make the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt action
for the next day.” That’s what the staff officer said. Notice he did not say attack at dawn. But Lee wants to attack as early as possible. I can believe that. I mean, why wouldn’t he? I always ask the question why wouldn’t Lee
attack as early, wouldn’t anybody? A good army commander would want to do that. So once again, you’ve got two conflicting
things here. You’ve got Longstreet and Long. Now the next day, July 2nd, Longstreet joined
Lee again at his headquarters. He spent a lot of time in the Seminary area
between daybreak and 11:00 that morning. A.P. Hill was apparently there part of the
morning as well as division commander John Bell Hood. Hood recalled that Lee was “anxious” for
Longstreet to attack. Lee remarked to Hood: “The enemy is here,
and if we do not whip him he will whip us.” Longstreet, after some point, it’s hard
to put this order of events in sequence together here, they don’t put timelines down. Longstreet remarked to Hood that Lee seemed
a bit “nervous.” The two generals then assisted “their deliberations,”
according to British observer Arthur Fremantle, “by the truly American custom of whittling
sticks.” On the morning of July 2nd, Lee’s mind was
already made up. He was going to attack! I don’t really think that is a point of
debate. I mean, is it? Does anybody want to debate that? Just raise your hand, you get on T.V. Lee
has decided he wants to attack. The only question for Lee on July 2nd was
where? Where is he going to attack? In order to answer this question Lee dispatched
officers to both flanks of the army, the Confederate army, to look over the terrain. It is hard to determine how far along Lee
was in his plan. That’s the problem. We are back to the three sided conversation. People don’t write about what was suppose
to happen. They write about what did happen. And we’re into what was suppose to happen
here. Had he, had he already decided to attack on
the right, meaning Lee? We know that his staff officers were asking
Ewell about his chances on the left flank and the thought was entertained of withdrawing
Ewell’s corps and allowing the army to slide to the right. In other words further to the south. At around 9:00 in the morning, Lee himself
went over to consult with Ewell also. In the end, whatever happens at that conversation
over at Ewell’s headquarters, Ewell is going to talk Lee out of it. Now this, ladies and gentlemen, is Capt. Samuel
R. Johnston, which most you have never seen a picture of before. If only the camera could see the reaction
of this crowd right now… The red shirt is just bored because he just
wants to get at me and find out where I got this picture from. Heck with the dramatics… Samuel R. Johnston, I got it off the internet. I hope it’s a true likeness. Apparently it came up for auction. Somebody was nice enough to post it. That’s pretty neat. So who is Samuel R. Johnston and why do I
keep referring to him? Johnson, probably without a doubt, has the
most impactful reconnaissance conducted on July 2nd. The reconnaissance actually occurred at early
dawn. This was the fateful ride of Capt. Samuel
R. Johnston. He was 30 years old in 1863 and a civil engineer
by training. He started the war working for Confederate
cavalryman Jeb Stuart. Stuart described him as “sober, indefatigable,
and capable.” Johnston was assigned to Lee’s staff on
August 12, 1862. A year later Lee knew him as a capable engineer
officer with experience at reconnaissance. Lee summoned the young engineer before dawn
and asked him “to make a reconnaissance of the enemy’s left and report back as soon
as possible.” The route he took is one of the more debated
questions of the battle of Gettysburg. Where did Johnston get to? You go back to the Gettysburg magazines, you
will find article after article throughout the decades with people exploring that question. We know that Johnston made it to the south
end of the Union line – specifically he claimed to have made it to Little Round Top. The curious thing is that he did not encounter
any Union forces despite there being some Union forces on Little Round Top. When he did find Lee again, the general was
with Longstreet and Hill sitting on a log. Lee called Johnson over, and Johnson stood
behind the generals as he outlined the route he had just taken. When Johnson stated he got to Little Round
Top, Lee turned and looked up at him and said, directly to Johnson, “Did you get there?” Johnson assured him did. All of this story is coming from Johnson himself. Now that is debatable. The problem with the whole story is a couple
of things we will probably never know: when exactly was Johnson there? We don’t know that. What time did he leave? What time did he get there? The thing that will always be on the merry
go around about Captain Johnson’s reconnaissance is that we know there were Union soldiers
on the Little Round Top on the morning of July 2nd. Members of the 12th Corps. What time they left? We could get into all that but Johnston should
have seen them. So how did he get to Little Round Top and
not see them? Or were they already gone? Did he get there later than we imagine? So we just get on this merry go round. The important question though, the important
thing coming out of Johnston’s reconnaissance to me the question that come out to me, is
not where he got to? The important thing is what did he report. What he reported to Lee is what he’s going
to base his plan on. It’s relevant but it’s kind of irrelevant
where he got. In other words… And what he told Lee was that the Union left
flank was in the air. It was therefore this information that prompted
Lee to give the order to make the main assault on Union left flank. Remember this reconnaissance is done at early
dawn – 4, 5, 6 in the morning or along those lines. Now we get into crux of the matter as far
as Longstreet and the lateness of the attack on July 2nd – when did Longstreet receive
the definitive order to move his corps into attack position? When did he get the order? Was it before or after Lee went to see Ewell
at 9:00 that morning? Colonel Long stated that he joined Lee at
Ewell’s headquarters on the Confederate left flank around 9:00 in the morning. There he found Lee “expecting at every moment
to hear of the opening of the attack on the right, and by no means satisfied with the
delay.” Lee subsequently returned to Seminary Ridge
around 10 in the morning and according to Long proceeded in search of Longstreet, “remarking,
in a tone of uneasiness, ‘What can detain Longstreet? He ought to be in position by now.” Word arrived shortly thereafter that Longstreet’s
corps was moving into position. But by 1 o’clock, Lee had still not heard
any firing so he went in search of his top corps commander. He first came up on the rear of Hood’s Division
and then found Longstreet between the two, Longstreet had two divisions and Longstreet
was apparently at the head of Hood’s and behind McLaws division, and the two rode forward
to find out what the hold up was in front. They were told that they had “taken the
wrong direction” According to Longstreet, he received the definitive
order to move forward between 10 and 11 o’clock in the morning. That’s the fastest I’ve ever seen you
move. But apparently, Longstreet did not make any
preparation for his corps to begin its march to attack on July 2nd. So Longstreet says he gets the order between
10 and 11 o’clock. In other words, Longstreet asserts he did
not get the order to move forward until Lee returns. In one of the strangest turn of events, among
many, Longstreet decided to await the arrival of Evander Law’s Alabama boys while still
in position on the Chambersburg Pike. ( Keep in mind Law comprised 1/8 of his available
force.) Lee must share some of the blame in this because
he apparently acquiesced to the delay – according to Longstreet. Longstreet says he had permission. “Fearing that my force was too weak to venture
to make an attack, I delayed until General Law’s brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make
our preparations the movement began.” However, it does not make much sense that
Longstreet awaited Law before moving into position or at the very least positioning
his two divisions to begin the march. In other words, he should have been ready
to go. Law could have very easily joined the end
of the column on the march. Capt. Samuel R. Johnston, whose reconnaissance
we’ve already covered, apparently thought Longstreet “did not move off very promptly
– nor was our march at all rapid. It did not strike me that Genl Longstreet
was in a hurry to get into position. It might have been that he thought hurry was
unnecessary.” Once the march began, (according to my office
mate, coworker, friend, Karlton Smith, Longstreet’s column departed at approximately 1245 in the
afternoon) Longstreet nevertheless continued to display odd behavior. My words, not Karlton’s. He apparently felt that Capt. Samuel Johnston
commanded the march or at least controlled McLaws division. Longstreet later stated that “he had direct
orders from General Lee to follow the conduct of Colonel Johnston. Therefore, I sent orders to Hood, who was
in the rear and not encumbered by these instructions.” Well this is what ends up happening, the column
comes to a large eminence called Bream’s Hill and because nobody had reconnoitered
the route, came in sight of the Union signal station on LRT. The whole purpose of the march was to achieve
speed while maintaining secrecy and it all went by the wayside, when they came in sight. This failure to reconnoiter the proposed march
route is even more puzzling when Longstreet’s division commander, Lafayette McLaws states
that he requested twice to go forward and scout. Perhaps Longstreet thought that Lee’s staff
would do that (Capt. Johnston) or perhaps he thought his own chief engineer Major Clarke
had already taken care of the matter. Maybe neither… Meanwhile, the column stood along Black Horse
Tavern road with its head at Breams Hill. After a slight delay, Longstreet rode to the
head of the column and he and McLaws rode to the top of the hill. McLaws pointed out that the column would be
exposed to Little Round Top. The easiest thing to do would be to march
around the base of the hill or about face the column. Apparently because Longstreet thought McLaws
was not under his control, Longstreet felt he did not have the discretion to alter the
order of that division. Now this is going out on a limb because, you
know, there is a lot of friction after the war between “he said” “she said” the
Longstreet faction the Lee faction and all that. Everybody knows that Longstreet received a
lot of the blame for the Confederate loss here at Gettysburg. So it’s hard to get in the mindset with
everybody, most everybody having an “ax to grind” in the postwar years. Going back to the conversation though when
Capt. Johnston returned from his reconnaissance in the morning, McLaws rode up about this
time also. Lee was probably tired by this time in the
morning, of arguing with Longstreet and to jumpstart things that morning he Lee did something
unusual: he bypassed the chain of command. Instead of issuing orders to Longstreet, Lee
began issuing orders directly to Longstreet’s subordinate, McLaws. And he told McLaws he wished his division
placed on the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet came over, apparently they had
a map out, looking at it, he goes Lee tells McLaws I want you to go in like this and Longstreet
comes over, he reaches over and says “no general, I wish your division placed like
this.” And Lee said “no general, I wish his division
placed like this.” You know they are just turning it back and
forth. Oh and you can imagine poor McLaws caught
in the middle. From this conversation, this is the point
Longstreet apparently took the view that McLaws was under Lee’s direct control. That’s where they are coming from. Now even, I only have, three sides of a conversation,
there is no indication that Lee ever issued a direct order saying McLaws was under his
army headquarters command. I have to assume that somebody either left
it out or Longstreet simply misspoke. Based on this possible assumption though,
Longstreet, because he did not command McLaws division, had that the entire column turn
around – meaning that the head of the column remained the head of the column. Does that make sense? In other words, if you look up at the top
left of the map right there you see the Black Horse Tavern right there. And if you look at the top of that map right
there you can see where it turns around. That’s going to be Bream’s Hill right
in that area. When you start putting a column on that road
you are probably talking about a road that is about the width of these aisles. These are not four lane highways and their
definitely not paved. Preceding McLaws division’s arrival at Bream’s
Hill was Edward Porter Alexander’s reserve battalion of artillery. In a strange occurrence, when Alexander gets
to that hill, once again on the top left, he takes the artillery and just goes around
basically toward the bottom of the map, he goes around the edge of the hill. I don’t know how good that is showing up
in the back of the room. He goes around basically and gets back on
the road. No problem. Apparently Longstreet and McLaws did not see
this or they did not consider it an option. Now going back to that road, and I’ll get
back to the column in just a second, keep in mind Longstreet’s column contained roughly
14,000 infantry along with two artillery battalions numbering 780 men, 280 artillery horses, 35
guns and at least that many caissons. These numbers that I just quoted do not include
Alexander’s artillery reserve who, I have already said, moved out ahead of the column
nor the estimated 1100 supply wagons and 300 baggage wagons who may or may not have accompanied
the column. I can’t imagine all of them did but they
had to have some of them with them. They’d need the ammo… What I’m telling you ladies and gentlemen
is that looks like a neat little black arrow but if were there on July 2nd what you are
looking at is a traffic jam – of big proportions. So when I say that McLaws column if it’s
marching up to Bream’s Hill, the easiest thing for them to do, and that would have
not been that easy, was to have everybody turn around and go back this way, right? In other words the head becomes the tail. What they did was, they turned that entire
column on it’s head, like a snake. They turned it around on a one lane road. Do you know how long that probably had to
take to get that straightened out? And that’s why the clock is ticking and
the sun is starting to set. It’s mid afternoon when they are going forward. That is a hard thing to overcome. When they get back to… when they finally
get the column sorted out. If you look at the top of the map, see the
Hagerstown Road, see where the arrow comes around. See how they backtracked and went around and
finally got into position? When they finally get into position around
3 330 in the afternoon and the artillery finally opens and so forth, Longstreet gets that attack
started around 4:00 in the afternoon. Without a doubt, without a doubt ladies and
gentlemen, Longstreet was feeling the pressure of the moment. I don’t think anybody could argue that. He’s snapping at his subordinates. McLaws in particular that we have accounts
of right there. And he seems to me two things – he seems
to be a man that doesn’t want to do what he’s asked to do and he knows he’s late. One or both or neither if you don’t agree
but that’s my opinion. When he finally gets up into place those 14,000
infantry the entire situation on the battlefield has changed. Captain Johnson’s reconnaissance was conducted
twelve hours before. Roughly four or five in the morning, by the
time they get out there and start to deploy the Confederate infantry, what has radically
changed on the battlefield? Dan Sickles, which is a program within it’s
own right. Hank Williams has a song named “dust on
the bible” and I’m sure Dan Sickles lived that out. Look it up on YouTube. “dust on the bible.” I wanna say this though, this is not the focus
of the program but I want to say this. Despite all the obstacles, and I’ll get
back to the conclusion in just a minute. Despite all the obstacles, what Longstreet
says after the war that it was the finest three hours fighting by any men, on any battlefield… I’m not getting the exact quote right. He’s pretty close to that. You’re talking about 14,000 Confederate
infantry launching an attack and you can add in Anderson’s division if you like in there,
which should be. Those Confederates are probably taking on,
Longstreet probably takes on twice his number, at least 30 35,000 Union troops. The Confederates, despite all the handicaps
they shot themselves in the foot that day, those soldiers were almost able to overcome
it. Only the best combat infantrymen could do
that. If you look at the south end of the battlefield
as a totality, if you look at the waves of Confederates that start to come through there,
if you look at the number of Longstreet’s brigades that are decimated and crushed, like
Kershaw, or Anderson, or other Georgians that are out there. Notice how quickly they reform and go back
into battle. Only the best of infantry could do that and
I think that’s the reason the fight goes so long and that’s really the reason Longstreet
is so proud of them. They almost win it despite all the handicaps. Now what about Longstreet? Let me ask you, let me ask you right now. I’m going to ask you if it’s Lee or Longstreet’s
fault and I know how you’re going to vote Karlton. Wave “hello.” No doubt about that. So Karlton has been scrambling in his seat
ever since I’ve been criticizing Longstreet. Raise your hand. We’ll take a Lee and Longstreet vote. Raise your hand if you think it’s Lee’s
fault? There is no right or wrong answer. Raise your hand if you think it’s Longstreet’s
fault? I would say, actually, anyone want to take
an educated guess? I would say that roughly most of you people
think it’s Lee’s fault by a slim majority, right? Okay. Let’s see what the contemporaries said. G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s Chief of
Staff, wrote “we were too late on our right. An attack, powerful indeed, at 4 p.m. was
quite different from the commanding General’s (Lee) of one in the forenoon.” In other words Longstreet’s chief of staff
is saying that Robert E. Lee wanted that attack to begin in the morning. E.P. Alexander wrote just the opposite in
his book Military Memoirs. Longstreet did not receive his orders until
11:00 and then delayed to await Law’s brigade’s arrival (which Longstreet estimated that delay
at 30 minutes). The fact that Anderson’s division did not
start to deploy until around 11 perhaps backs up this version of events. Or does it mean, on the other hand, that Anderson’s
division was just now moving into position after receiving the order to march before
Lee left to see Ewell? Did it take Anderson a couple of hours to
get untracked and get moving down Seminary Ridge? That is plausible too. What do the historians say? Oh you should have really been in my office
trying to put this program together, with Karlton leaning over my shoulder. No, it’s fine. Historian Stephen Sears states that Lee did
not issue any direct orders for the movement until 11:00, after returning from Ewell. However, Lee was vexed that Longstreet had
not prepared for the march. That is Sears take on it. I’m sure none of you have ever heard of
this. Historian Harry Phanz states that Lee, based
on Col. Long’s statements and some of Gen. Hood’s, had an understanding that Longstreet
would have the movement to the Confederate right flank underway even if he didn’t have
specific attack orders yet. Historian Glenn Tucker in Lee and Longstreet
at Gettysburg places the blame on Lee for the delay. Tucker states that Longstreet had to await
the return of Capt. Johnson from reconing the march route and therefore the blame lies,
once again, with Lee’s staff. This theory is even more vexing though when
one adds in the account by Capt. Johnston that he had no idea where Longstreet was going. So if Johnston was suppose to lead the march,
Johnston claims he didn’t know it. And what about, switching gears here, and
what of the overall conduct of Longstreet at Gettysburg? One of the more debated topics of the battle. Historian Bob Krick is probably one of the
more harsher critics of Longstreet on record, putting that mildly. A personal fan of Jackson, Krick points to
the similarities between Jackson’s flank march at Chancellorsville and Longstreet’s
flank march at Gettysburg. Quoting Krick “The most arresting parallel
between the two days is the way in which Jackson, as was his custom, sought- and found – the
best way to accomplish the purpose for which so much effort and risk had been incurred. In doing so Jackson received timely advice
from a number of subordinates, most notably Fitzhugh Lee. Longstreet not only sulkily failed to seek
out the best means of accomplishing his assigned task but also refused to countenance intelligence
toward that end voluntarily supplied by subordinates. I hate these big words… When he ostentatiously announced to all listeners,
then and later, that Lee’s bad plan must be followed, Longstreet was delineating as
starkly as any critic ever could the chasm that separated his attitude from that of Stonewall
Jackson. The contrast is an unpleasant one not in theoretical
fashion but particularly because it was drawn in blood and suffering of thousands of his
own men, and at a time that caused immense damage to his country.” Sound of silence… I always wanted one of these suits. I think their wool. It fit! It fit! Does anyone know where I might acquire one
of those? I might go traipsing down to The Mine. Who is that man? I do not know but he’s dazzling! Historian Douglas Southall Freeman, who I
should say is my favorite Civil War author and a Lee admirer, I should state that to. He states that “On the 2nd of July, co-ordination
among the Corps was lacking, with the result that the battle opened late. Reconnaissance was inadequate. The Confederate high command was deceived
concerning the strength of the Federal left. When action was begun, it was poorly directed
on the flanks. The engagement on the right of Lee’s line
probably should not have been fought at all under the vague and misfounded plan of the
commanding General. Errors of subordinates deprived it of whatever
chance of success it might have had. … Much may be asserted and sustained with
show of logic, but there can be no escaping the conclusion that Longstreet’s behavior
on the 2nd was that of a man who sulked because his plan was rejected by his chief.” Who’s that guy? Finally General Dwight Eisenhower weighed
in on Longstreet’s performance on the second day. In an early Civil War Times Illustrated interview,
Ike stated that Longstreet was not remiss in attacking on the morning of July 2. “He certainly could not have done it with
any strength,” Ike related. He referred to a study by a fellow officer
that stated Longstreet could not have attacked any earlier than 3 p.m. “It is not just to say that Longstreet is
as much to blame as he is often said to be.” When Ike was asked about Freeman’s premise
that Longstreet may have delayed the attack because he didn’t like the way the battle
was being fought, Ike “discounted that contention on ground Longstreet was too good a soldier
to deliberately botch an attack.” So there you have it. How am I ever supposed to give you an answer
about these conflicting things? But that’s the fun thing about Gettysburg,
isn’t it? That’s why we are all sitting here 150 years
later still trying to figure this out. Conclusion. Drum roll. I saved the color pictures for last. You know like fireworks? You don’t shoot them all off at once. See Karlton doesn’t have a color picture
of General Longstreet. Longstreet had the right, this is all my opinion,
had the right to offer opinions to his commander – especially as his top subordinate. However, after Lee did not accept his advice,
Longstreet apparently proceeded to, if you use this term and it’s kind of a strong
term, sulk. As his chief of staff Moxley Sorrel said “there
was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual
bearing on the battlefield.” That’s his chief of staff. That’s not Lee’s chief of staff. That’s Longstreet’s chief of staff. “there was apparent apathy in his movements.” Today, without more primary sources, we will
probably never have a definitive answer on what Lee’s expectations were for Longstreet
on the morning of July 2nd. I just don’t have it. I don’t have the smoking gun. The evidence, which has been presented, points
to the fact that Lee expected something that morning, although that “something” is
not clear. Perhaps the first indication that Lee had
plans for Longstreet is the fact that Longstreet’s chief engineer, Major Clarke, accompanied
Captain Johnson on his early dawn reconnaissance. Why would you send Major Clarke, Longstreet’s
chief engineer, if you weren’t going to send Longstreet? I don’t know. Why was Clarke there? Another example - Before Lee rode to the right
to meet with Ewell at 9:00, if he had not explicitly given an order to Longstreet to
prepare to attack, then he certainly told Longstreet the parameters of his plan and
what to expect. This is borne out by E.P. Alexander’s statement
that Longstreet directed him to find a route for the artillery to the right flank. After that, Longstreet apparently failed to
do anything else to either move his divisions toward the right or to prepare to move them. No staff officer or engineer was dispatched
to reconnoiter the route to the Federal flank. And his excuse that McLaws was not under his
command because Lee had taken direct control of the division is just absurd. I mean, do you need a better example? I mean really, did you ever see Robert E.
Lee… Studied Lee, I mean all you people have studied
Lee as much as I have, is that within Lee’s nature to do that? Why would Lee take command of the lead division,
even if he wanted to, he was not personally there in order to do that. Longstreet used this same excuse later in
the postwar years to say that since Pickett’s division was not up with the army, then he
did not command the troops on July 2nd, that day. On July 2nd, he didn’t command Pickett’s
division because Pickett’s division was in the rear of the army. What I’m saying is there is a pattern of
these excuses with Longstreet or in other words what you will see tomorrow is basically
what I want to say today. “Come on, man!” A lot of you don’t watch football… In conclusion, prior to Longstreet beginning
the countermarch, Douglas Southall Freeman says that it is not just to criticize Longstreet. “His attitude was wrong (meaning Longstreet)
His attitude was wrong but his instinct was correct. He should have obeyed orders, but the orders
should not have been given.” Nevertheless, Longstreet owed to his chief
and his nation to do his utmost to execute the orders and not in “the letter” of
them but in “the spirit” of them. Longstreet executed the orders but it is hard
to argue that his heart was in it. Longstreet may have accomplished the letter
but one is hard pressed to find any spirit behind it. Thank y’all very much!
